Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America

Handbooks of Sociology and Social
Research
Series Editor
John DeLamater
University of Wisconsin-Madison MADISON, Wisconsin, USA
Each of these Handbooks survey the field in a critical manner, evaluating the-
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More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6055
Paul Almeida • Allen Cordero Ulate
Editors
Handbook of Social
Movements across
Latin America
Editors
Paul Almeida Allen Cordero Ulate
School of Social Sciences Humanities and Arts FLACSO-Costa Rica,
University of California, San José
Merced, California Costa Rica
USA
ISSN 1389-6903
ISBN 978-94-017-9911-9 ISBN 978-94-017-9912-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9912-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015940753
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Contents
Part I Introduction: Movements Across Latin America
1 Social Movements Across Latin America�� 3

Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate
Part II Conceptual and Theoretical Advances
2 Social Movements and Progressive Regimes in

Latin America: World Revolutions and
Semiperipheral Development�� 13
Christopher Chase-Dunn, Alessandro Morosin and Alexis Álvarez
3 “There and Back Again”: Latin American Social

Movements and Reasserting the Powers
of Structural Theories�� 25
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley and Susan Eva Eckstein
4 State Repression and Mobilization in Latin America�� 43

David G. Ortiz
5 Protest Artifacts in the Mexican Social Movement

Sector: Reflections on the “Stepchild” of Cultural Analysis�� 61
Ligia Tavera Fenollosa and Hank Johnston
Part III Critical Themes in Contemporary Popular Mobilization
6 Women’s Movements in Latin America�� 79

Lynn Horton
7 Latin American Social Movements and the Social

Forum Process�� 89
Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, Natasha Radojcic, Ellen Reese,
Elizabeth Schwarz and Christopher Vito
8 Liberation Theology and Social Movements�� 101

Robert Mackin
v
vi Contents
9 Beyond Clientelism: The Piquetero Movement and the

State in Argentina�� 117
Federico M. Rossi
Part IV Indigenous-Based Struggles Across the Continent
10 Indigenous Peoples’ Movements, Developments, and Politics

in Ecuador and Bolivia�� 131
Eduardo Silva
11 S
liding Doors of Opportunity: Zapatistas and
Their Cycle of Protest�� 145
María Inclán
12 Panama: Worker, Indigenous, and Popular Uprising

in Bocas del Toro�� 165
Giovanni Beluche V.
Part V Urban-Based Movements in South America
13 It Takes Two to Tango: Students, Political Parties, and Protest
in Chile (2005–2013)�� 179
Marisa von Bülow and Germán Bidegain Ponte
14 Urban Social Movements in Venezuela�� 195

Sujatha Fernandes
15 Squatters and Politics in Montevideo at the Turn

of the Century�� 205
María José Álvarez-Rivadulla
Part VI Environmental Conflicts
16 The Environmentalism of NGOs Versus Environmentalism

of the Poor? Mexico’s Social–Environmental Coalitions�� 223
Jean Foyer and David Dumoulin Kervran
17 Environmental Conflicts and Social Movements in

Postwar El Salvador�� 237
Rafael E. Cartagena Cruz
18 Forest, Water, and Struggle: Environmental Movements

in Costa Rica�� 255
Allen Cordero Ulate
Contents vii
Part VII Country Case Studies
19 Protest and Social Movements in Peru�� 275

Moisés Arce
20 Social Movement Contention in Colombia, 1958–2014�� 291

Marcela Velasco
21 Social Movements in Nicaragua (1979–2014):

An Exceptional Case�� 301
Salvador Martí i Puig
22 The Movement Against the Coup in Honduras�� 313

Eugenio Sosa
23 Guatemalan Social Movements: From the Peace Process

to a New Cycle of Popular Struggle, (1996–2013)�� 327
Simona Violetta Yagenova
24 Trends of Social Protest in Argentina: 1989–2007�� 335

Sebastián Pereyra, Germán J. Pérez
and Federico L. Schuster
25 Brazilian Social Movements in the Last Decade�� 361

Maria da Glória Gohn
Index�� 373
Contributors
Paul Almeida University of California, Merced, CA, USA

Alexis Álvarez University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
María José Álvarez-Rivadulla Programa de Sociología, Universidad del
Rosario, Bogota, Colombia
Moises Arce University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
Giovanni Beluche V. Extension and Social Action Divission, Universidad
Técnica Nacional de Costa Rica, San José, Costa Rica
Germán Bidegain Ponte Political Science Institute, Pontificia Universidad
Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
Ian Breckenridge-Jackson University of California, Riverside, USA
Marisa von Bülow Political Science Institute, University of Brasilia, Brazil
Political Science Institute, Pontifícia Universidad Católica de Chile, San-
tiago, Chile
Rafael E. Cartagena Cruz San Salvador, El Salvador
Christopher Chase-Dunn University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
Allen Cordero Ulate FLACSO-Costa Rica and the Department of Sociology,
Universidad de Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica
David Dumoulin Kervran Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine
(IHEAL)—CREDA, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, France
Susan Eva Eckstein Boston University, Boston, USA
Ligia Tavera Fenollosa Department of Sociology, FLACSO México,
México D.F., C.P., Mexico
Sujatha Fernandes City University of New York, New York, USA
Jean Foyer Institut des Sciences de la Communication, CNRS-Sorbonne
Université-UPMC, Paris, France
ix
x Contributors
Maria da Glória Gohn UNICAMP/ CNPq, Campinas, Brazil

Lynn Horton Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
María Inclán División de Estudios Políticos, Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas, México, D.F., México
Hank Johnston Department of Sociology, San Diego State University, San
Diego, CA, USA
Robert Mackin Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Salvador Martí i Puig Girona University, Girona, Spain
Alessandro Morosin University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
David G. Ortiz New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico,
USA
Sebastián Pereyra CONICET—Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Bue-
nos Aires, Argentina
Germán J. Pérez Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Natasha Radojcic University of California, Riverside, USA
Ellen Reese University of California, Riverside, USA
Federico M. Rossi Tulane University, New Orleans, USA
Federico L. Schuster Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina
Elizabeth Schwarz University of California, Riverside, USA
Eduardo Silva Tulane University, New Orleans, USA
Eugenio Sosa UNAH, Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Marcela Velasco Colorado State University, Fort Collins, USA
Christopher Vito University of California, Riverside, USA
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley Georgetown University, Washington, DC,
USA
Simona Violetta Yagenova FLACSO-Guatemala, Guatemala City, Guate-
mala
Part I
Introduction: Movements Across
Latin America
Social Movements Across Latin
America 1
Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate
The past 25 years in Latin America have wit- austerity, adjustment, privatization, and free trade
nessed a renewed upswing in popular mobiliza- (Almeida 2007). The rural sectors also persist by
tion. The ending of the violent conflicts and mili- launching struggles over working conditions or
tary governments in the 1980s gave way to new past exploitation (Enríquez 2010; Cordero 2009).
struggles and a relatively more democratic cli- Indigenous communities continue to be key play-
mate. From northern Mexico to southern Argen- ers as well in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Gua-
tina, social movements in the 1990s, and espe- temala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru. The mass
cially in the 2000s, have reached new heights of mobilizations are also directly linked to the rise
popular participation. These claims are confirmed of several left-leaning governments in the region
by the multitudinous street marches in Costa by converting street politics into successful elec-
Rica against the Central American Free Trade toral outcomes (Roberts 2014; Stahler-Sholk
Agreement (CAFTA) in 2007, the white marches et al. 2014).
in El Salvador against health care privatization,
and the black marches in Panama against pension
system reform, along with the massive indig- The Threats of Globalization
enous mobilizations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Peru. In addition, the southern cone countries of Economic globalization processes driven by neo-
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay experienced liberal measures create new threats that mobilize
widespread mobilization against economic lib- massive numbers of people (Almeida 2014). Two
eralization policies throughout the early 2000s. major threats connected to globalization include
New social actors and social organizations have environmental threats and economic threats. En-
entered the political scene such as social move- vironmental threats are driven by mobilization in
ments with environmental, feminist, gay/lesbian, response to declining ecological conditions (Arce
and consumer identities (Alvarez et al. 1998). In 2014; Johnson and Frickel 2011). Chapters 17
addition, “traditional” social movements such and 18 in this volume show such environmental
as labor unions continue to play a major role in threats motivating mass mobilization from min-
the social movement sector in campaigns against ing to deforestation in Costa Rica and El Salva-
dor, respectively. Economic threats relate to the
loss of social safety nets and subsidies put into
P. Almeida ()
University of California, Merced, CA, USA
place during the period of state led development
e-mail: palmeida@ucmerced.edu (Simmons 2014). Between the 1950s and 1970s,
even military regimes in El Salvador, Guatema-
A. Cordero Ulate
FLACSO-Costa Rica, San José, Costa Rica la, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama provided
e-mail: acordero@flacso.or.cr basic price controls and implemented social se-
P. Almeida, A. Cordero Ulate (eds.), Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America, 3
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9912-6_1,
4 P. Almeida and A. Cordero Ulate
curity systems. Since the 1980s, this social safety tions since 1980 when the government moved to
net has come under attack with the debt crisis try and privatize the Salvadoran Social Security
(Walton and Seddon 1994). In the late 1990s and Institute. Panama also witnessed major campaign
early 2000s, these threats reached a threshold between 1995 and 2014 against labor flexibility
whereby they began to spark major campaigns laws, telecommunications privatization, the re-
of resistance throughout the Americas. Perhaps, structuring of the pension and social security sys-
the opening bell was the 1994 Chiapas uprising tem, and mining (see Chap. 12 in this volume).
that occurred symbolically the day the North These struggles are all unified by the threat that
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went the economic policies will make groups worse
into effect. The Chiapas rebellion proved to be off if implemented (Goldstone and Tilly 2001).
a hybrid of the region’s past with its future (see
Chap. 11 in this volume). The Chiapas rebels
began their struggle as a classic Latin American Opportunities of Globalization
Guerrilla movement, as a rag tag army poorly
armed facing the Goliath of the Mexican military The economic side of globalization may create
and local landlords. Quickly, however, the strug- new threats to induce mobilization, but the po-
gle changed to a strategy of largely nonviolence litical and organizational dynamics of globaliza-
and a strong critique of neoliberalism mixed with tion also drive new opportunities and spaces for
indigenous rights. These kinds of claims would mobilization (Meyer 2004). In several countries,
become common throughout Latin America in demonstrators worry less about state violence
the proceeding decades. than in the past. While fear and intimidation are
Other subsequent campaigns in the region still part of the state’s repertoire of tactics they
largely maintained a nonviolent path against per- pale in comparison to the extreme forms of state
ceived threatening neoliberal economic policies. violence employed in the 1970s and 1980s (see
Major struggles were launched against privati- Chap. 4 in this volume; Viterna 2013). A verita-
zation in each country of the region and closely ble wave of democracy engulfed the developing
related austerity measures. As the Sandinistas world in the 1980s, which also included several
lost power in early 1990, its base of supporters Latin American states (Markoff 1996). The emer-
launched several campaigns against austerity, gence of democracy in the region since the 1980s
massive layoffs, and privatization (see Chap. 21 emboldens more groups to seek redress for griev-
in this volume). One of the larger campaigns in ances (Arce and Bellinger 2007).
Nicaragua in the 1990s was against budget cuts This democratic transition has shifted the
to higher education following pressure from strategies of the social movement sector in Latin
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the America. Campaigns of opposition no longer
World Bank debt reduction decrees. In Honduras, search to remove authoritarian regimes (with
public school teachers, university students, and the exception of the anti-coup resistance in Hon-
public sector workers fought several campaigns duras); rather they focus on specific policies of
against economic austerity and privatization and the state. The struggles are largely nonviolent
united these efforts in the multisectoral organi- at times blending forms of disruptive protests
zation, the Bloque Popular. These organizations such as roadblockades (Silva 2009). Many of the
would move on to constitute the resistance to the tactics also demonstrate novelty and creativity
2009 military coup—the Frente Nacional de Re- such as the use of the heart in the NO campaign
sistencia Popular (FNRP) (see Chap. 22 in this against CAFTA in Costa Rica (Raventos 2013).
volume). Costa Rica has fought several anti- In short, the new democratic terrain has shifted
neoliberal campaigns since 1995, which often the strategies of social movements as state insti-
peaked with street marches of 100,000–200,000 tutions are relatively more open to popular de-
people—the largest marches in Costa Rican his- mands and the government must tolerate certain
tory. El Salvador also held its largest mobiliza- levels of dissent to retain political legitimacy and
1 Social Movements Across Latin America 5
maintain electoral competitiveness in future elec- Foro held in Managua, activists planned and co-
toral rounds. ordinated a day of Central American wide pro-
An additional opportunity brought about by tests from Chiapas to Panama against free trade
globalization is the transnationalization of the and the Plan Pueblo a Panama (PPP). Simultane-
social movement sector (McCarthy 1997; Smith ous protests and roadblocks were carried out on
2008). Movements are beginning to coordinate October 12, 2002 (Día de la Raza) throughout the
activities across borders through international isthmus. It marks the largest coordinated action
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and in- in the region and demonstrates the growing possi-
ternational conferences (Von Bulow 2011). Inter- bilities of transnational collective action with the
national labor organizations such as the Service advance of globalization. An even larger coordi-
Employees International Union provide work- nating body across Latin America is the World
shops to dozens of public sector labor associa- Social Forum (WSF), first founded in Brazil in
tions about the potential negative consequences 2001 (see Chap. 7). Since this time, the WSF has
of privatization in Latin America. Several US- held several multinational forums across Latin
based labor solidarity associations have assisted America including in Argentina, Ecuador, Gua-
maquiladora workers throughout the region in temala, and Venezuela, linking activists, NGOs,
campaigns for union rights and collective con- and labor unions across the hemisphere. None-
tracts (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). theless, most anti-neoliberal mobilizations main-
For example, SAPRI and Jubilee 2000 are tain a national focus through the second decade
very active in Latin America providing training of the twenty-first century.
and information about structural adjustment poli-
cies and demanding they become more transpar-
ent to the public. In El Salvador, INGOs help Movements in Opposition to
sponsor the Campaña Democracia Azul against Neoliberal Forms of Globalization
water privatization. Perhaps the transnational
force with the greatest influence involves en- A variety of groups now engage in the cam-
vironmental organizations. These international paigns against globalization in the region. These
groups have played a major role in several cam- groups can be partitioned into three categories:
paigns since the 1980s, and ever more frequently, (1) labor movements, students, and the infor-
in struggles over hydro-electric dams, strip min- mal sector; (2) new social movements; and (3)
ing, deforestation, and species conservation (see rural and indigenous groups. These three group-
Chaps. 17 and 18 in this volume). At the same ings form the basis to resistance to globalization
time, NGOs should not be classified as a homo- throughout the region. In this section, we link
geneous group sponsoring mass mobilization the grievances and the capacity to mobilize of
(Spronk and Terhorst 2012). Often NGOs serve each of these social sectors to the broader pro-
to demobilize communities acting as agents of cesses of globalization.
domestic and international elite interests.
Beyond the growing influence of transnational Labor, Students, and the Informal Sector Labor
advocacy organization, we find increasing com- is threatened by economic crisis, privatization,
munication across countries via Latin American and labor flexibility. Public sector labor unions
associations of universities, labor associations, have been the most influential because of maqui-
and a variety of civil society organizations. One lazation of the region, with the exception of
important forum is the annual Foro Mesoameri- CONUSI in Panama and relatively strong labor
cano, where NGOs and social movements from confederations in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and
throughout Central America congregate for a Uruguay (Anner 2011). Workers show up in pro-
week and exchange past struggles while strate- test more than any other social group in Central
gizing future ones. The Foro has met seven times America (Mora 2004), as well Latin American
in each country in the region. After the July 2002 wide studies (Almeida 2007).
In general, students and the university com- identities, and solidarity for other causes (Laraña
munity have been at the core of the largest strug- et al. 1994). Many of these new social move-
gles in Latin America over the past 20 years. The ments have played a major part or in coalition
public universities, in particular, have played a against the process of neoliberal globalization.
critical role. The student federations in El Sal- In El Salvador, the environmental group Uni-
vador (AGEUS) and more radical organizations dad Ecológica Salvadoreña (UNES), has used its
such as Frente Roque Dalton, Bloque Popular limited resources to participate in several anti-
Juvenil (BPJ), and UERS-30, participate in an- neoliberal campaigns, including anti-health care
ti-austerity struggles. The Panamanian univer- privatization, CAFTA, mining, and geothermal
sity system participated in the struggles against energy exploration. In Costa Rica, the Federación
pension system reform, water privatization, and Ecologista Nacional (FECON) groups dozens of
labor flexibility laws. The Guatemalan student local and national environmental groups to battle
federations were key actors against the signing energy privatization, CAFTA, and several local
of the CAFTA between February and March of battles over a variety of environmental threats by
2005. In Costa Rica, the university community transnational mining, energy, and tourist compa-
(students and staff) was integral in the struggle nies. In some cases, environmental groups have
against telecommunications and electricity priva- created broad alliances with civil society sustain-
tization in 2000 as well as forming a university ing campaigns over a long period of time (see
front against CAFTA between 2004 and 2007. Chap. 18 in this volume).
The largest social movement in Chile, since the The women’s movement and feminist groups
restoration of democracy in 1989, has been the have also participated in organizing tasks within
mass organization of high school and university civil society against globalization (see Chap. 6 in
students over the privatization of public educa- this volume). Mujeres contra el TLC held several
tion (see Chap. 13 in this volume). major events in 2006 and 2007 against CAFTA
The informal sector, despite a difficult uphill in Costa Rica. In El Salvador, women’s organiza-
struggle, has also participated in several cam- tions such as las DIGNAS and MAM were on the
paigns against the social and economic conse- frontlines against health care privatization. Female
quences of globalization. In El Salvador, street leaders from key NGOs such as CRIPDES and the
vendors of pirated DVDs formed a national coor- Alianza Ciudadana contra la Privatización, also
dinating organization to fight the implementation have served in key leadership positions in anti-neo-
of CAFTA and police raids on their kiosks. Other liberal campaigns (Almeida and Delgado 2008).
informal sector workers addressing grievances
related to the globalization of sex tourism have Rural/Indigenous Groups Indigenous and rural
also demanded more protection from the state. In groups also join in opposition to the latest round
Uruguay, the urban squatter movement has con- of Latin America’s integration into the capital-
tributed to the electoral success of the left-lean- ist world economy (Robinson 2008). In Guate-
ing Frente Amplio party in the 1990s and 2000s mala, Mayan peasant associations were integral
(see Chap. 15). in the opposition to the TLC between 2004 and
2006 (see Chap. 23 in this volume). They also
New Social Movements Newer less traditional participated in major campaigns against an IMF-
social movements have emerged on the political imposed sales tax hike in 2001 and 2004, as well
scene throughout Latin America. They include as electricity price hikes in the 2010s. In Panama,
feminist groups, ecologically based civic organi- the Kuna and Ngobe people have fought several
zations, gay and lesbian collectivities, and con- battles against transnational tourism companies
sumer advocacy groups. The key defining com- to protect their native lands (Maney 2001; Horton
ponent of social movements is that they cannot 2007) as well as major campaigns against min-
be reduced to only social class cleavages. They ing and mega projects such as dams. Throughout
represent other social conflicts over lifestyles, Central America, banana plantation workers have
launched campaigns against the transnational spectives is offered by Chap. 5 with a detailed
chemical corporations that dispensed Nemagon focus on how cultural interpretations are funda-
and poisoned thousands of workers (Cordero mental in fomenting and sustaining collective
2009). Rural peasant associations in Honduras action campaigns in contemporary Mexico. The
have also fought CAFTA and other privatization cultural and political practices of social move-
measures. ments are critical in understanding how collec-
tive identities develop and convert into episodes
of popular contention (Escobar 2008). A purely
Organization of the Volume structural approach cannot account for the cog-
nitive processes of grievance formation and in-
The following chapters capture many of the terpretation of events as they unfold in particular
major movements, groups, and issues mobiliz- cultural milieus.
ing Latin America over the past two decades. We Part II is structured around Critical Themes in
have drawn from a community of Latin Ameri- Contemporary Popular Mobilization. This sec-
can social science experts, many of whom were tion incorporates essays and original research
born or currently reside in the region. The vol- on major issues cutting across the region in re-
ume provides a platform and resource for a new lation to social movements, including women’s
generation of scholars to analyze the complexity movements, the WSF, Liberation Theology, and
and consequences of this unprecedented wave of clientelism. Horton’s contribution examines key
mobilization across the hemisphere. forces mobilizing women and feminist organiza-
Based on the earlier discussion, we organize tions throughout the Americas. As noted earlier
the handbook along the following structure: and in several chapters in this volume, women’s
(1) Conceptual and Theoretical Advances in associations in gender-specific struggles and
Latin American Social Movements; (2) Critical in coalitions with larger multisectoral move-
Themes in Contemporary Popular Mobilization; ments have acted in pivotal roles in nearly every
(3) Indigenous-Based Struggles across the Con- major social movement campaign over the past
tinent; (4) Urban-Based Movements in South 30 years. The chapter on the WSF highlights its
America; (5) Environmental Conflicts; and (6) evolution over the past 12 years of its existence,
Country Case Studies. Our conceptual chapters from Porto Alegre, Brazil, to the various regional
organize the broad parameters of competing WSF summits in other parts of Latin America.
schools of thought on the core causal condi- The WSF is arguably the most consequential
tions driving social movement participation and transnational social movement left in the world
movement emergence in Latin America. These today, and its origins reside in South American
theoretical approaches include Chase-Dunn et social movements (Smith et al. 2014). Mackin’s
al.’s macro-level chapter that argues for a world comprehensive review of the rise and fall of
system perspective in order to contextualize na- liberation theology brings readers up to date on
tional level collective resistance in Latin Amer- current scholarship on a religious movement that
ica. Another structural approach is presented by engulfed much of the continent by the late 1960s.
Wickham-Crowley and Eckstein which priori- He walks us through several regions and explains
tizes political and economic conditions in order how changes in Catholic Church social doctrine
to comprehend the shape of popular contention became a rich resource for social justice move-
in the Americas that is largely rooted in working ments in country after country. Of special impor-
class and excluded communities. A more specific tance is how liberation theology, once implanted,
theoretical contribution comes from Chap. 4 on had such differing outcomes in local contexts
the ways various forms of state repression either with varying regime types. In some cases, libera-
escalate or defuse social movement activity in tion theology supported nonviolent movements
a variety of countries and historical contexts. A for human rights (such as in Chile and Argenti-
refreshing counter balance to the structural per- na), in other national contexts the new social doc-
trine for the poor reached revolutionary levels of is one of the most urbanized world regions. The
mobilization, such as multiple Central American first chapter in this section centers on original
countries in the 1980s. Finally, Chap. 9 on cli- research on the student movement to re-nation-
entelism within the unemployed workers’ move- alize public education in Chile. As high school
ment in Argentina, reminds us of the complexi- and university enrollments continue to expand
ties of patron–client relationships in terms of so- throughout the cities of the global South (Schofer
cial movement mobilization. It offers a corrective and Meyer 2005), the educational sector becomes
to social movement studies of the “North” that one of the only segments in civil society capable
often assume an overly horizontal or autonomous of mobilizing large numbers of people in collec-
relationship between social movements and their tive action campaigns (Almeida 2014). This was
allies and benefactors. certainly the case for Chile, as Von Bulow and
In Part III, we turn to indigenous-based mo- Bidegain Ponte argue; the student movement
bilization in Latin America. Native peoples (or in Chile was the largest in the past 20 years of
pueblos originarios) have led some of the largest any social mobilization. Chapter 14 captures the
protest campaigns in the Americas over the past everyday routines of urban community activists
20 years. This is especially true in the Andean during the years of Bolivarian Revolution under
countries of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, south- President Hugo Chávez with crucial compari-
ern Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama. Chapter 10 sons to urban mobilization in the pre-Chávez era.
highlights the roles of indigenous mobilization in Álvarez-Rivadulla presents original quantitative
Bolivia and Ecuador over the past two decades. research on the urban squatter movement for
Eduardo Silva addresses the understudied ten- land and housing in Uruguay with special atten-
sions of these movements once socialist govern- tion on the relationship of political parties with
ments take power in the late 2000s, the establish- the movement.
ment of new constitutions, and the ability to press Environmental struggles in Latin America are
for change through institutional channels. Inc- introduced in Part V. The chapter on Mexican en-
lán’s chapter focuses on the indigenous Zapatista vironmentalism provides a concise 30-year histo-
movement of Chiapas, Mexico. In the most sys- ry of the transformation of conflicts from conser-
tematic quantitative analysis of the movement, vation to new types of social struggles over new
she shows variation in mobilization across the development projects. Cordero’s essay on Costa
localities of Chiapas over a period of 10 years Rica combines dominant modes of environmen-
and how the local political context of opportu- tal thought driving action over two centuries with
nities and threats conditioned the largely non- more contemporary struggles over water, forests,
violent (but often disruptive) mobilizations. In a and mining. Drawing on another case from Cen-
case from Panama, where contentious indigenous tral America, Cartagena Cruz creates an exhaus-
mobilization is on the rise in the 2010s, Beluche tive listing of major environmental conflicts in the
analyzes the indigenous Ngobe-Bugle workers’ post civil war era in El Salvador. He demonstrates
strike and nonviolent uprising in 2010 on the ba- convincingly that the majority of social conflicts
nana plantations and packaging plants in Bocas reside at the community level, often over contam-
del Toro Province. It offers a unique situation of ination and pollution issues. These chapters com-
solidarity across the country with the indigenous bined show growing evidence that battles over
people in a relatively remote district. economic development projects and resource
Part IV introduces readers to urban and in- extraction are likely to continue to serve as the
formal sector mobilization in Latin America. focal points for the largest social-movement type
As the urbanization process continues at a rapid mobilizations in the twenty-first century.
rate in the twenty-first century in the developing In Part VI, the collection moves into more
world, the locus of the majority of struggles has global case studies of social movement activity
moved forcefully to the cities. This proposition in individual countries. In the cases of Nicaragua,
finds special relevance here as Latin American Honduras, and Brazil, we are provided with gen-
eral social movement histories over the past two Russia, and China. University Park: Pennsylvania
decades in each country, highlighting key social State University Press.
Escobar, A. (2008). Territories of difference: Place, move-
sectors and grievances generating the mobiliza- ments, life, redes. Durham: Duke University Press.
tions. In the chapters on Argentina, Colombia, Goldstone, J., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and opportunity):
Guatemala, and Peru, the authors present original Popular action and state response in the dynamic of
quantitative counts of protest events and other contentious action. In R. Aminzade et al. (Ed.), Silence
and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 179–
movement-related activities. These chapters pro- 94). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
vide systematic empirical data on the core trends Horton, L. (2007). Grassroots struggles for sustainability
of protest activity over several years demonstrat- in Central America. Boulder: University of Colorado
ing fluctuations in mobilization related to chang- Press.
Johnson, E. W., & Frickel, S. (2011). Ecological threat
ing political and economic conditions. and the founding of U.S. national environmental
By structuring the Handbook along the lines movement organizations, 1962–1998. Social Prob-
of theories, topical themes, specific movements, lems, 58(3), 305–329.
and in depth case studies we are able to obtain Johnston, H., Laraña, E., & Gusfield J. (1994). Identities,
grievances, and new social movements. In E. Laraña,
a comprehensive approach to Latin American H. Johnston, & J. Gusfield (Eds.), New social move-
social movements from a variety of lenses. The ments: From ideology to identity (pp. 3–35). Philadel-
objective of this organizational style is for this phia: Temple University Press.
collection to ultimately serve as an important re- Maney, G. M. (2001). Rival transnational networks and
indigenous rights: The san blas kuna in Panama and
source for scholars and students of social move- the Yanomami in Brazil. Research in Social Move-
ments in the social sciences. ments, Conflicts and Change, 23, 103–144.
Markoff, J. (1996). Waves of democracy: Social move-
ments and political change. Thousand Oaks: Pine
Forge Press.
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Part II
Conceptual and Theoretical Advances
Social Movements and
Progressive Regimes in Latin 2
America: World Revolutions
and Semiperipheral
Development
Christopher Chase-Dunn, Alessandro Morosin

and Alexis Álvarez
The “Pink Tide” process in Latin America has in the 1980s (Walton and Seddon 1994; Francis
seen the emergence of populist and left-leaning 2005) were draconian instances of “shock thera-
regimes in most Latin American countries since py” that emboldened domestic neoliberals to at-
the late 1990s. This article situates counter- tack the “welfare state,” unions, and workers par-
hegemonic social movements and progressive ties. In many countries, these attacks resulted in
regimes within the long-term evolution of global downsizing and streamlining of urban industries,
governance and global capitalism. In our effort as many workers in the formal sector lost their
to investigate why it is that in recent history, jobs and were forced into the informal economy,
more administrations in Latin America (relative or toward emigration. This accelerated the for-
to other world regions) challenge the neoliberal mation of the same globalized working class de-
development model, we examine the stratifica- scribed by Robinson (2008).
tion of Latin American countries with regards to Capital seemed to have won the political and
the larger world-system as one potential struc- ideological war in Latin America in the early
tural factor that may have contributed to the Pink 1990s, but by the beginning of the twenty-first
Tide. century, a former military commander had won
Although each Latin American country has its the votes of the poor in Venezuela while a team
own unique history, important commonalities to including social democrats became elected in
the whole region include indigenous rebellions, Chile, a member of the Workers Party (PT) came
slave revolts, anti-colonial struggles for indepen- to power in Brazil, and a brave president in Ar-
dence, concomitant wars and altercations between gentina finally stood up against the demands of
authoritarianism and democracy, the commodifi- the IMF and Wall Street.
cation of natural resources, competing commer- Portes and his co-authors (Portes 2008;
cial interests, foreign intervention (often at the Portes and Smith 2008; Portes and Roberts
behest of corporations based in the Global North), 2006) explain this turn to the left with the fol-
and leftist popular waves. In other words, Latin lowing scenario: neoliberal policies swelled the
America has been a battleground of global and informal sector by forcing millions into shanty-
internal class conflict since 1492 (Galeano 1987). towns, favelas, and precarious work conditions.
The early Structural Adjustment Programs im- Political leaders often mobilized this section of
posed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) society into populist movements and parties. In
C. Chase-Dunn () · A. Morosin · A. Álvarez

University of California, 900 University Ave,
Riverside, CA 92521, USA
e-mail: christopher.chase-dunn@ucr.edu
14 C. Chase-Dunn et al.
some cases, these movements were eventually and smaller countries with middle levels of
successful in electing leaders to national power GNP per capita (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea,
(Almeida 2010). Thus, it can be argued that neo- South Africa, etc.).
liberal Structural Adjustment Policies provoked (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Hall and Chase-
domestic and transnational counter-movements Dunn 2006) have modified concepts developed
that eventuated in Pink Tide presidencies. by scholars of the modern world-system to
While elements of this analysis definitely construct a theoretical perspective for comparing
seem to describe the recent history of many Latin the modern system with earlier regional world-
American social movements and an electoral turn systems. Perhaps the most important idea that
to the left, we add a world-system perspective to comes out of this theoretical perspective is that the
account for the Latin American Pink Tide. semiperiphery tends to be a dynamic region. This
is to say, transformational changes in the world-
system are brought about mainly by the actions
The Contemporary Core/Periphery of individuals and organizations within societies
Hierarchy that are semiperiphery relative to the core and
periphery of that same hierarchical system. This
In brief, the world remains hierarchically strati- is known as the hypothesis of semiperiphery
fied into three types of countries: core countries development. Both the spatial and demographic
are those whose economies are highly diversified scale of political organization and the spatial
and whose governments are largely stable. Pe- scale of trade networks were mainly expanded
ripheral countries remain dependent on export- by semiperiphery polities, eventually leading
ing one or a few commodities and on low-wage, to the global system in which we now live. The
labor-intensive production. Semiperipheral coun- modern world-system came into being when
tries tend to be more diversified and politically a formerly peripheral and then semiperiphery
powerful than peripheral economies, but remain region (Europe) developed an internal core of
dominated by core countries and by corporations capitalist states that were eventually able to
based in the core. dominate all other regions of the globe. This
Jeffrey Kentor’s quantitative work on the Europe-centered system expanded in a series of
position of national societies in the world- waves of colonization and decolonization, the
system (2008) remains the best continuous latter constituting the incorporation of former
measure of core–periphery hierarchy because colonies into the world-system (See Fig. 2.1).
it includes GNP per capita, military capabil- The recurrent waves of colonization shown in
ity, and economic dominance/dependence. We Fig. 2.1 show that European expansion and pe-
trichotomize Kentor’s combined indicator of ripheralization of the Americas, Asia, and Africa
world-system position into core, periphery and was a somewhat cyclical process that was car-
semiperiphery for purposes of our research. ried out by different European powers over time.
The core category is nearly equivalent to the Waves of decolonization, or the dismantling of
World Bank’s “high income” classification, and formal colonial empires, began in 1776 with the
is what most people mean by the term “Global independence of the 13 British colonies that be-
North.” The “Global South” is divided into two came the USA, followed by the great wave of
categories: the semiperiphery and the periph- Latin American independence in the early nine-
ery. The semiperiphery includes large countries teenth century, and Asia and Africa in the twen-
(e.g., Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, India, China) tieth century.
2 Social Movements and Progressive Regimes in Latin America 15
Fig. 2.1 Waves of colonization and decolonization Since 1400—number of European colonies established and number
of decolonizations. (Source: Henige 1970)
World Revolutions and the Evolution “double movement” (Polanyi 1944), while others
of Global Governance have termed it a “spiral of capitalism and social-
ism” (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000). Looking
Global governance can be conceived as an evolu- at the sequence of past world revolutions (e.g.,
tionary process of sociocultural change in which 1789, 1848, 1917, 1968, and 1989) allows us to
the institutions and structures of hegemony pro- see the similarities and differences between the
voke counter-hegemonic responses within coun- constellations of movements and different world
tries and in the Global South (the noncore of the historical contexts.
world-system). These responses from subordinat- Waves of social protest have interacted with,
ed peoples and countries, ranging from moderate and sometimes undermined, the capitalist world-
calls for inclusion to more radical oppositional system since the Protestant Reformation (Mar-
programs, pose new necessity for more power- tin 2007). The French Revolution of 1789 was
ful states, classes, and institutions that have tra- linked with the American and Haitian revolts
ditionally wielded disproportionate political and (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000). The successful
financial power. Popular responses to increasing anti-colonial movements in many of the British
volatility, insecurity, and social inequality have colonies of North America helped to inspire the
provoked elites to fine-tune their efforts to repro- French revolution as it also deepened the fiscal
duce a system that maintains their interests. crisis of the French monarchy. The Haitian revo-
Various resistance movements and rebellions lution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture established
have affected the evolution of global governance the first republic in Latin America and inspired
because they often clustered together in time, movements for national sovereignty in the colo-
forming what have been called “world revolu- nies of Spain and Portugal. The 1848 rebellion
tions” (Wallerstein 2004). These periodic waves in Europe was both synchronous with the Taip-
of oppression and resistance have been called the ing Rebellion in China and was linked with it by
the diffusion of millenarian ideas, as it was also a more fully globalized world economy in which
linked with the emergence of new Christian sects capital is given free rein to operate wherever
in the USA. profits are greatest. Gills et al. (1993) propose
The world’s first socialist revolution took that “low intensity democracy” facilitates the im-
power in Russia in 1917, the same decade as the position of neoliberal economic policies, among
Chinese Nationalist revolt of Sun Yat Sen, the them liberalization, marketization, and privatiza-
Mexican revolution against Porfirio Diaz, the tion of resources. These constitute the three pil-
Arab Revolt of 1916 and a general strike in Se- lars of the Washington Consensus: a package of
attle led by the Industrial Workers of the World Anglo-American policies and a mode of gover-
(Martin 2007). The revolts of students and op- nance that the Latin American Pink Tide regimes
pressed nationalities in Europe, Latin America have been trying to distance themselves from and
and the USA in 1968 coincided with the height of challenge.
the Cultural Revolution in China, as well as with For all their differences and separate national
wars of national liberation in Southeast Asia and histories, it can still be said that progressive re-
Africa. The world revolution of 1989 was mainly gimes have engulfed most of South America and a
concentrated in the Soviet Union and Eastern considerable portion of Central America (Almei-
Europe, but important lessons about the value of da 2014). Why have the Pink Tide regimes and
civil rights were learned by an emergent global allied Latin American social movements played
civil society (Kaldor 2002). a strong role in this revolution of 20xx up to this
We contend that transnational resistance to point? Within Latin America, are populist leftist
neoliberal globalization since the mid-1990s, the regimes and strong transnational social move-
Latin American Pink Tide, the Arab Spring, Oc- ments that contest neoliberal capitalist globaliza-
cupy, the movements against austerity in Europe, tion more preponderant in the semiperiphery than
and the recent major rebellions in semiperipheral in peripheral countries?
countries like Turkey and Brazil embody the We suggest that Latin American countries have
early stages of another conjuncture of globally more options to pursue independent development
linked counter-hegemonic forces: the contem- strategies than the overwhelmingly dependent
porary world revolution of 20xx (Chase-Dunn countries of Africa and South Asia, for example.
and Niemeyer 2009). Anti-IMF protests in South This could be explained by the innovative politi-
America in the 1980s, the 1994 Zapatista upris- cal climate in Latin America that fosters the rise
ing in Chiapas, Mexico, and the large protests by of social–democratic, reformist governments in
the “global justice movement” outside interna- large semiperiphery societies like Brazil, Argen-
tional meetings of powerful states and companies tina, and Chile after widespread popular disen-
(Almeida and Lichbach 2003) can be viewed as chantment with US-led neoliberalism.
early harbingers of the world revolution of 20xx. The World Social Forum was founded in 2001
This still inchoate revolution can be interpreted as a focal point for global anti-systemic move-
as a broad counter-movement in response to ments in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see chapter by
the latest wave of capitalist globalization. It has Reese et al. in this volume). Venezuelan Presi-
emerged as resistance to, and a critique of, global dent Hugo Chávez, whose recent death from can-
capitalism during its neoliberal phase (Lindholm cer and implications for the future of the Latin
and Zuquete 2010; Reese et al. 2008). American left are beyond the scope of this ar-
In Latin America, the forms of democracy ticle, personified the Pink Tide as a distinctive
promoted since the end of the Cold War by global brand of leftist populism, using the oil wealth of
and national neoliberal elites are best understood semiperiphery Venezuela to chart a course of op-
as political institutions that aim to contain popu- position to neoliberalism. Just like the previous
lar mobilizations. Robinson (1996) convincingly world revolutions, the revolution of 20xx seems
argues that “polyarchy” and democracy promo- to be emerging from the semiperiphery of the
tion are the political forms most congruent with world-system. Those semiperiphery societies in
which opposition to neoliberal capitalism is the Drawing on a distinction made by Smith and
strongest, are attempting to supplant the current Wiest (2012), most are reformist and some are
world-system’s logic with that of a new political anti-systemic. Reformist regimes make some at-
and economic model. tempt at internal wealth redistribution, but main-
But many of the Latin American countries that tain a conservative macroeconomic posture and
have, after years of conservative rule, recently free trade policies (e.g., Chile). States like Argen-
elected progressive regimes (be these more re- tina and Brazil have been less oppositional in in-
formist such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, or ternational relations and fairly moderate in their
more radical such as Ecuador and Bolivia) are measures taken to reduce domestic inequality, so
also peripheral rather than semiperipheral. We at- we call their current regimes reformist rather than
tribute this to a regional effect that does not seem anti-systemic.
to be operating in either Africa or Asia, whereby Following Wallerstein (1990), “to be anti-sys-
the election of progressive regimes in large states temic is to argue that neither liberty nor equal-
like Brazil and Venezuela has given anti-system- ity is possible under the existing system and that
ic movements in small and weaker states more both are possible only in a transformed world.”
room to contest the leadership of their national This captures some of the variation among re-
elites, win office, and project a more leftist pos- gimes that identify themselves as (or who have
ture onto the international scene. As we further been labeled by various forces as) Pink Tide.
explore some of the similarities and differences The political paths of the anti-systemic regimes
among the Pink Tide regimes using the hypoth- in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have largely
esis of semiperipheral development, we analyti- been colored by their very negative experiences
cally distinguish progressive regimes into two with the Washington Consensus since the 1980s.
categories: reformist and anti-systemic. The remainder of Latin American states can
be seen as being led by non-progressive (or neo-
liberal) regimes. Though some of these neoliberal
Conservative, Reformist, and states talk about inequality as a problem (Colom-
Anti-systemic Regimes in Latin bia just recently), and may have some programs
America to offset it (Mexico for most of its post-revolu-
tionary history), social welfare measures are not
We develop and apply a method for coding reas high a priority of state policy as is maintaining
gimes in Latin America based on whether and foreign investment and protecting national/trans-
how they relate to what is broadly called the Pink national elites. Neoliberal regimes tend to most
Tide.1 We use this coding to examine the rela- closely follow U.S. diplomatic, political, and se-
tionship between regime form and world-system curity designs.
position (periphery vs. semiperiphery). The rela- The fact that today’s Pink Tide governments
tions within the family of progressive movements in Latin America were legally elected (Foran
and Pink Tide governments in Latin America are 2005), unlike Cold War leftist forces who often
both cooperative and competitive. We label as mounted armed struggles to gain political power
“progressive” the regimes that to some extent op- (with the exception of Allende in Chile), offers
pose the neoliberal policies that have been pro- one important contrast with Latin America’s re-
mulgated and enforced by the International Fi- cent past. Current regimes with roots in the Cold
nancial Institutions since the 1980s. Progressive War left (Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador) have ei-
regimes can be further divided into two types. ther been reconstituted as political parties, such
as in El Salvador and Nicaragua, or maintain
their original form, as in Cuba.
1
Explanations of why we coded particular regimes in the We wish to acknowledge weaknesses within
way we did are contained in the appendix to this paper,
which is available at irows.ucr.edu/cd/appendices/pink- our use of regimes as units of analysis. First,
tide/pinktideapp.htm regimes often include factions with different
ideological shades. Also, social movements that mains in power despite continuing embargo and
oppose the existing regime, either from the left isolation imposed by the USA, and is currently
or the right, often exert important regional coun- in the midst of societal debates over whether pri-
ter power. But if the movement has not elected vate enterprise, workers’ self management, or a
its leaders into power (or, like Mexico’s anti- centralized state should set the terms of Cuba’s
systemic EZLN, does not seek to) our classifi- future.
cation system will not necessarily capture these There is considerable diversity among the
subnational features of different countries, For anti-systemic regimes’ responses to simultane-
example, even in neoliberal regimes, such as ous pressures from a right wing opposition and
semiperipheral Mexico and Colombia, dynamic from indigenous political actors to the left of
social movements and regional centers of op- these governments (Fontana 2013; Becker 2013).
position have asserted significant challenges to Commonalities among the anti-systemic regimes
the neoliberal paradigm of governance. Electoral of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador include win-
irregularities in Mexico were documented and ning popular elections by wide margins (unlike
acknowledged in the 2006 and 2012 elections Salvador Allende’s narrow electoral victory of
by independent media groups. Had the last three 1970 in Chile), a commitment to a much broader
Mexican elections not seen such irregularities, social transformation, and a greater reluctance to
Mexico might have had a reformist regime since negotiate agreements with foreign and domestic
1988, and might still have one today. Similarly, adversaries.
Honduras may still be governed by a reformist Chávez’s leadership of the Pink Tide project
regime today had the government of Manuel Ze- was made easier by Venezuela’s massive oil re-
laya survived a 2009 coup (see Chapter by Sosa serves. This began the attempted political and
in this volume). economic integration of a bloc of Latin American
While attempting to gauge social change at countries as an alternative to the US-backed Free
the level of progressive regimes does not allow Trade Area of the Americas. The Bolivarian Al-
a detailed analysis of their internal political situ- liance for the Americas (ALBA) was founded by
ation, the nature of the existing regime still re- Cuba and Venezuela in 2004. The Chávez gov-
mains a necessary measure of the strength of the ernment pledged to fully withdraw from the IMF
revolution of 20xx in Latin America. The ability and founded Banco del Sur (Bank of the South)
to bring a new government into power, although in 2009 along with Argentina. Banco del Sur has
not to be confused with a revolutionary transfor- been joined by many progressive regimes and
mation of society in and of itself (Foran 2005), seeks to replace the IMF and the World Bank in
reflects the underlying strength of counter-hege- development projects throughout the Americas
monic movements. Whether the regime is pro- and the Global South. Whether Banco del Sur
gressive, anti-systemic, or neoliberal, and how will turn out to be a “an institution for funding the
long it has remained in the hands of progressives, so-called ‘national champions’—big companies
signals how much legitimacy progressive politics that operate like multinationals, with great opera-
have gained since the end of the Cold War, and tional autonomy but with practically no national
it would also indicate how much political, eco- responsibility,” or, whether it “prioritizes the
nomic, and organizational distancing from the overall needs of Latin America’s people—land,
Washington Consensus the governing elites of employment, housing, and national sovereignty,”
these countries can tolerate. will be a crucial marker of the style of “Latin
The ideologies of the Pink Tide regimes have American integration” implemented by the Pink
been socialist, populist, and indigenist, with dif- Tide (Soares de Arruda 2007).
ferent mixes in different countries. Bolivian To show the gradations among progressive
President Evo Morales espouses a combination regimes, we can also highlight the example of
of socialism, indigenism, and environmentalism. Nicaragua, a peripheral Central American coun-
The leftist regime fashioned by Fidel Castro re- try. We would classify the country as a reform-
ist regime from 2007 to the present day despite sition from authoritarian rule in the 1980s politi-
its membership in ALBA. While the Sandinista cized and mobilized civil society, contributing to
revolution was in power during the Cold War era the elections of reformist leftist presidents. One
(1979–1990), its internal policies and interna- of these presidents includes Fernando Henrique
tional posture could be read as anti-systemic. Its Cardoso, a sociologist who was one of the found-
current President, former Sandinista Daniel Orte- ers of dependency theory (Cardoso and Faletto
ga, is now trying to grow the economy in a “free- 1979).
market” system and then redistribute wealth (see Porto Alegre had been a stronghold of the
chapter by Martí Puig in this volume). His post- Brazilian Workers Party (PT). It was in this city
ponement of progressive promises has many Ni- that the World Social Forum (WSF) was born in
caraguan leftists splitting with him, often forming 2001, under much influence from the PT. The
their own regional initiatives “below” the federal WSF remains an important force of the New
level (see for example Teague 2012). Notwith- Global Left, bringing together activist move-
standing the ties to Venezuela that contributed to ments from all over the world for international
economic growth, the current Nicaraguan regime meetings where experiences and alternatives to
currently offers much less support to worker-run neoliberal capitalism are being implemented
enterprises than Bolivia and Venezuela. This ex- and discussed (see chapter by Reese et al. in this
ample helps to illustrate the types of regimes that volume). But with the widespread and massive
we classify as reformist (i.e., those more moder- protests against inequality and corruption in early
ate governments whose break with neoliberalism summer 2013, the progressive rhetoric of the PT
is less consistent) or anti-systemic (those govern- under Presidents Lula and Roussef generated
ments who show more substantive economic, high expectations that have exploded into unrest
diplomatic, and ideological differentiation from (Carlsen 2013).
the Washington Consensus). These most recent social eruptions in Brazil
We classify four of ALBA’s eight member can be viewed in light of Brazil’s integration
countries as having anti-systemic regimes. These with global capitalist institutions and the particu-
are Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. The lar role that the PT has played in managing the
latter three were the only countries to become country’s growth, trade, and social policies. Bra-
anti-systemic after the Cold War period, starting zil’s large economy has allowed the PT to pur-
with Venezuela. While these regimes still have sue a “great power” role for Brazil in the G20,
varying degrees of structural dependence on the a multilateral organization of 20 powerful states
capitalist world economy and other deeply-rooted around the world. These developments could be
internal inequalities (Higginbottom, 2013), they seen in relation to the catalytic role offered by
have been posing the most substantial ideologi- Brazil’s semiperipheral status, large size, and dy-
cal, diplomatic, and economic challenges to the namic social movements. The aspirations of the
neoliberal development model in Latin America PT as a governing force have not been to chal-
thus far. It is noteworthy that the ALBA countries lenge international financial institutions or over-
in the Andean region (Bolivia and Ecuador) have turn deep-rooted domestic inequalities. But it has
been able to keep more of the total surplus value staked out a set of positions in international poli-
produced in their country from going to foreign tics that challenge many of the positions taken by
investors, relative to more conservative Andean the USA.
regimes like Colombia and Peru (Higginbottom,
2013).
Rather than assert nationalist control over Testing our Hypothesis
resources and advance broad leftist discourse,
reformist regimes like that of Brazil have been Are semiperipheral countries more likely to tran-
much more cautious and pragmatic in the devel- sition to progressive regimes than peripheral
opment models they promote. The Brazilian tran- countries?
Table 2.1 World-system position of progressive regimes in Latin America (1959–2014, percentage on column totals)
Semiperipheral Peripheral total
Always conservative 0 5 (31 %) 5
Reformist, never anti-systemic 5 (83 %) 6 (38 %) 11
Anti-systemic At least some of the time 1 (17 %) 5 (31 %) 6
total 6 16 22
Table 2.1 allows us to see whether or not there er than peripheral countries, with a wave of tran-
is a relationship between regime form and world- sitions in the 1970s and another large wave that
system position. All the Latin American coun- began in the late 1990s. This result supports the
tries with populations over 1 million are either notion of semiperipheral development.
peripheral (16) or semiperipheral (6).
Table 2.1 shows all the regimes that were con-
servative throughout the whole period, those that Results and Discussion
were reformist, but never anti-systemic and those
that were anti-systemic at least some of the time. The results are complicated by the fact that pe-
These are divided into world-systemic zones ripheral countries are both more conservative
(periphery and semiperiphery). Table 2.1 shows and more radical than semiperipheral countries,
that no semiperipheral countries remained con- as shown in Table 2.1 above. But Fig. 2.2 demon-
servative throughout the whole period, whereas strates that semiperipheral countries led the way
5 (31 % of the 16 peripheral countries) remained toward the Pink Tide in Latin America. The more
conservative. This would seem to support the innovative semiperipheral countries (e.g., Ven-
hypothesis of semiperipheral development. But ezuela in the late 1990s followed by Brazil in the
the results are more complicated. Table 2.1 also early 2000s) began experimenting with progres-
shows that semiperipheral countries are more sive forms of governance, and the peripheries
likely to have been reformist than peripheral (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) latched
countries (83 % vs. 38 %) and that peripheral on to these successful strategies of their semipe-
countries are more likely to have been anti-sys- ripheral predecessors. There seems to have been
temic at least some of the time between 1959 a regional effect in which progressive regimes in
and 2012 (31 % vs. 17 %). Therefore, peripheral large countries (e.g., Brazil, Venezuela, Argenti-
countries were more likely to remain conserva- na) provided more freedom for smaller countries
tive, but also more likely to have become anti- to elect more radical regimes in recent years.
systemic. This is not a clear demonstration of the Drawing on a Simmelian (see Coser 1956,
principle of semiperipheral development. Chap. 2) idea that a common threat facilitates co-
We then considered if semiperipheral coun- hesion among actors (in this case, Latin Ameri-
tries might have led the way to the Pink Tide in can polities), another reason why the Pink Tide
Latin America. To test that idea we constructed phenomenon and progressive regimes have been
a table that shows when the regime transitions concentrated in Latin America could be that the
occurred (see the appendix of the following: foremost proponent of the neoliberal policies has
irows.ucr.edu/cd/appendices/pinktide/pinktid- been the USA, and Latin America has long been
eapp.htm). We used this data to produce Fig. 2.1, the neocolonial “backyard” of the USA. Leaders
which shows the timing of transitions toward re- of Latin American anti-neoliberal movements
formist and anti-systemic regimes for peripheral use the ideological frame of the USA as the “co-
and semiperipheral countries weighted by the lossus of the North,” which perhaps has made it
number of these countries in Latin America (6 easier to unify anti-systemic movements histori-
semiperipheral and 16 peripheral). cally. Both Africa and Asia have more compli-
Fig. 2.2 shows that semiperipheral countries cated relationships with former colonial powers.
were more likely transition to the Pink Tide earli-
Fig. 2.2 Number of regime transitions to reformist or anti-systemic by year, weighted by the number of countries in
the two world-system zones
For all of the region’s political, geographic, The global climate has also brought about
and cultural diversity, Latin America remains more unexpected ruptures in its traditional power
a particularly large epicenter of anti-systemic relations in just the past few years. As several
activity on the current world scene. Many of Middle Eastern countries erupted in protest
these mobilizations are spontaneous, and many against corrupt neoliberal regimes in the Arab
have not reached (or do not seek) formal politi- Spring of 2011, and in the wake of the World So-
cal power. Even the anti-systemic regimes and cial Forum having been held in 2013 and again
movements are limited by the ecological and in 2015 in semiperipheral Tunisia (the country
social contradictions of the dominant economic that sparked the Arab Spring), global public so-
model from which they have yet to fully rupture. cial science can help broad publics understand
As governing Pink Tide forces have attempted the challenges and opportunities facing emerging
to maintain power in the context of a variety of forms of transnational solidarity in the twenty-
struggles to the “left” of them (largely on envi- first century.
ronmental and indigenous questions), and others The Latin American Pink Tide may be just
to their “right” positioning themselves in hopes one stage of a longer-term world revolution
of a return to neoliberalism, social and politi- that comes to confront global capitalism more
cal forces have become highly volatile in many coherently in more regions of the world in the
countries. As Domínguez et al. (2011) point out, twenty-first century. On the world scale, many of
there remains a formidable Old Right as well as the national protest movements that have made
New Right in Latin America that scholars of so- headlines (Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Brazil, Bul-
cial movements cannot afford to overlook. garia) and sustained a national radicalization
(Greece, the country in the Eurozone where pro- Galeano, E. (1987). De Las venas abiertas de América
Latina. Montevideo: Universidad de la República.
tests against austerity have seemed to be the lon- Gills, B., Rocamora, J., & Wilson, R. (Eds.). (1993). Low
gest and loudest) are semiperipheral societies. As intensity democracy: Political power in the new world
we progress into what appears to be a new stage order. London: Pluto.
of global revolt, it will be important to continue Hall, T. D., & Chase-Dunn, C. (2006). Global social
change in the long run. In C. Chase-Dunn & J. B. Sal-
studying the role of Latin American social move- vatore (Eds.), Global Social Change (pp. 33–58). Bal-
ments and the world’s semiperiphery in general. timore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Henige, D. P. (1970). Colonial governors from the fif-
teenth century to the present. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press.
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“There and Back Again”: Latin
American Social Movements 3
and Reasserting the Powers
of Structural Theories
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley and Susan Eva Eckstein
In the early 1990s publication of The Making Perspectives and Contributions

of Social Movements in Latin America, editors from Political Economy and Political
Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez (1992)claimed Sociology about Today’s Latin
that older social-movement approaches to Latin American Social Movements
American events were less suited for explain-
ing the forms and foundations of contemporary The Basic Premises of NSM Theorizing
movements in the region. Instead, they argued
that the New Social Movement (NSM) types of Major claims of a historical and theoretical wa-
analyses offered a more fruitful frame of refer- tershed punctuate the joint and individual essays
ence. In our view, Latin America has not wit- by Escobar and Alvarez in their 1992 volume,
nessed such a deep shift in its social-movement as well as editors’ comments in their later com-
universe that earlier theoretical approaches panion volume—self-acknowledged as an exten-
should be abandoned. NSM perspectives are sion of the first (q.v. Alvarez et al. 1998, pp. 2–3,
better-suited to assess collective-identity forma- 431)—and also in essays by many contributors to
tion and cultural struggles beyond the state as a the two books.
target. We argue that the NSM theoretical frame The two volumes are not identical in their
provides different analytic tools than historically stated aims or perspective. The first volume re-
grounded and largely structural approaches, spe- veals far more variation in the frames of analyses
cifically those varied analytical efforts rooted in adopted by contributors, whereas the second vol-
political sociology and political economy. These ume settles itself more homogeneously into the
more structural approaches may better serve realms of poststructural anthropology and cultur-
scholars who wish to understand the emergence, al studies of the Birmingham-School variety. In-
evolution, and accomplishments of social move- deed, the first volume contains multiple authors
ments in Latin America today, as well as in years from a political sociology perspective. Still, there
past, and they also better capture how, when, and is enough held in common to merit their treat-
why the region’s movements have changed over ment as a joined-at-the-hip theoretical pairing.
the years. There is also a variety of perspectives within the
NSM theoretical tradition that have heavily influ-
enced Latin American political thought, especial-
T. P. Wickham-Crowley ()
Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA
ly the work of Alain Touraine. NSM theorists in
e-mail: wickhamt@georgetown.edu general include the following set of assumptions
and assertions:
S. E. Eckstein
Boston University, Boston, USA 1. They read previous attempts at social-move-
e-mail: eckstein.susan@gmail.com ment analysis as dominated by Marxian and
26 T. P. Wickham-Crowley and S. E. Eckstein
functionalist approaches, and by a (near-) ple’s lives are embedded, which include state and
exclusive focus on class and labor struggles. other political institutional arrangements, macro
2. They find that most movements appearing in market and other economic conditions, norms,
Latin America since the 1980s are quite novel traditions, and cultural practices, may influence
in their aims, internal constitutions, and con- collective initiatives for change, and with what
stituents, and that therefore novel theorizing is effects. The political sociology frame of analysis,
required to make sense of them. in turn, looks inside the “black box,” namely at
3. They contend that social-movement analysts characteristics of the movements themselves that
now need to focus their attention on the cul- influence their formation, tactics, and effective-
tural elements in social movements, especially ness, for example, group leadership, resources,
on the creation and negotiation of new mean- strategies, and group alliances.
ings emergent from these movements. They The paired frames have a number of strengths.
thus privilege the idiographic and interpreta- First, they help account for why people subjected
tive concerns that typify anthropologists, con- to the same disconcerting conditions may differ
cerns which they claim have been ignored by in the social movements they join, and why the
other social-movement scholars. movements they join may take different forms
4. They assert that social movements in Latin and differ in their achievements. Second, they
America have come to be based largely on help account for conditions under which par-
newly forged or activated collective identi- ticular identities come to the fore, induce the
ties, and hence are profoundly different from formation of social movements, and shape their
the class-derived material interests on which outcomes; in doing so they deepen the under-
earlier movements were based (also see Haber standing of the movements on which NSM ana-
1996). lysts focus. Third, they pinpoint conditions under
which distinctive ideologies, values, traditions,
and rituals take on meaning and influence social
Some Basic Premises of Political movements. Nonetheless, we would still argue
Economy and Political Sociology that social movements are not mechanistically
determined by features of social structure. They
We contend that historically grounded political are historically contingent, varying with local
sociology and political economy approaches, conditions, including also what sociologists call
combined, account better than NSM theory for “agency”: the initiatives of ordinary people, ac-
the origins, trajectories, and outcomes of social tivists, and leaders. People subjected to similar
movements—and not only in the past but also in actual and perceived injustices may respond dif-
the present. ferently to them, though mainly under circum-
The culture-and-discourse foci of NSM theo- scribed conditions.
ry, and the analysis of newly emergent collective People may tolerate the inequities and injus-
identities forged within some social movements, tices they experience, however begrudgingly, if
should be more thoroughly integrated with the for no other reason than they feel their situation
perspectives of political economy and political to be unchangeable. They may turn to individ-
sociology. ual solutions, such as exiting the relations they
Political economy-rooted explanations zero in dislike, for example, through migration or job-
on those structural and unequal relations in which shifting (q.v. Hirschman 1970). Yet, instead, they
people’s lives are embedded. Such relations are may also collectively mobilize to improve their
often perceived as unjust and modifiable, per- situations when they think conditions propitious.
ceptions which may lead to (or be enhanced by) The economically disadvantaged may strike,
joining forces with others who are similarly ag- stage road blocks, and otherwise disrupt produc-
grieved. They also provide a frame for under- tion and the economy. These are weapons of the
standing how the broader contexts in which peo- weak, who are more likely than those better-off
3 “There and Back Again” 27
and better-connected to turn to collective forms concentration and proletarianization on the one
of resistance, precisely because institutional hand, and to the growing power of the state and
channels to redress felt-deprivations tend either the institutionalization of liberal democracy, on
to be closed to them or work to their disadvan- the other. In essence, as the loci of power in so-
tage. Nonetheless, middle and upper classes may ciety shifted, ordinary people’s interests, oppor-
also mobilize for change. Although their more tunities, and capacities for collective action al-
dominant positions in social, economic, and po- tered. Within and across our own Latin American
litical hierarchies typically work to their advan- cases treated herein, we also witnessed changing
tage and provide them access to informal behind- elements within national and group-based rep-
the-scenes, as well as formal, channels to attain ertoires of resistance, which displayed and even
changes they covet, when those channels leave extended their already rich variety of collective
their concerns unaddressed they too may turn to protests, as we shall see in our empirical discus-
collective modes of resistance. sions below.
If we are correct that “the political” is also
central to social movements, from their forma-
tions to their outcomes, states and political struc- Locating Grievance-Structures in Class,
tures also need to be taken into account. NSM Status-Group, and Power Inequalities
theorists have tried to address the state and its
“insertion” into the broader society. But the state Social structures directly affect social move-
is more than simply an “interlocutor” with social- ments because the unequal distribution of power,
movement demands and activism, as Escobar wealth, and prestige within societies generates
termed it (Escobar and Alvarez 1992, p. 83). In disparate interests among people differently
that the state in all its power and materiality oc- situated in class, race/ethnic, gender, and other
cupies a unique position vis-à-vis grievances of hierarchies, and also disparate capacities to act
many social movements and ways of redressing on their interests. Those who control the means
them, its role in social movements needs to be of physical coercion and the means of produc-
clearly understood both analytically and empiri- ing wealth have power over those who do not.
cally. On these conjoined subjects, Max Weber (1978,
Social-movement repertoires, in turn, have pp. 926–940) famously elaborated his distinc-
been affected by the interplay of social structure tions among classes, status-groups, and power-
with culture, and also by state structures and state wielders, phenomena which create three dif-
policies and features of the political economy in ferent, cross-cutting types of inequality within
which peoples’ lives are embedded. Charles Tilly complex societies. Each is worthy of attention on
and his collaborators insightfully pointed out its own, and all are relevant to the arguments we
decades ago that the repertoires of popular resis- make herein.
tance have varied over time, with changing con-
ditions (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tilly and Tilly Class Differences In “Class, Status, and Party,”
1981; Tilly et al. 1975; Tilly 1978, 1995). For Weber (1978, pp. 926–940) argued that class
example, in Europe the repertoire shifted from differences are rooted in two different patterns
food riots, resistance to conscription, rebellion of economic inequality: the ownership (or not)
against tax collectors, and organized invasions of productive private property—he acknowl-
of fields and forests to demonstrations, protest edges that Marxians are on target in emphasiz-
meetings, strikes, and electoral rallies between ing that phenomenon—but also market-based
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the life chances. Thus for Weber property/property-
twentieth century, he and his collaborators noted, lessness and also market inequalities combine
lengthy proactive activities by large-scale, spe- to define social-class positions. With respect to
cial-purpose associations became more common. the market-based elements of inequality, Weber
They trace such changes to increased economic also laid out a tripartite scheme for the study of
class conflicts, and that argument was later finely The Exercise of State Power As we argued
elaborated by Norbert Wiley (1967). Three dif- above, the state and its lawmaking and law-
ferent types of dominant/subordinate class rela- enforcing capacities are obviously potential and
tions emerge wherever capitalist market-systems potent sources for the creation and coercive
crystallize, representing the credit, commodity, implementation of all sorts of economic, mate-
and labor markets. Respectively, they pit credi- rial, and political privileges and disprivileges.
tors versus debtors, sellers versus buyers, and And that is precisely a blind spot for much NSM
employers versus employees. Each of these theorizing, in its assumptions that class-conflicts
market relationships tends to generate pressures and the grievances underlying them are “only”
for change from within the second-listed, more about “economic” matters. This is patently
vulnerable class, with that group in each scenario untrue, and we again draw attention to the analy-
often turning to governments and state managers ses by Weber and Wiley noted above: historically
for relief of their economic woes, when interclass speaking, such class conflicts have been routinely
appeals or protests fail to help. As Wiley notes, displaced from the shop-floor into the realm of
in each case the underclass is pursuing a kind of national politics, and across the planet those con-
socialism, in seeking out the state’s protections flicts have led again and again to the creation of
for its more vulnerable position. state controls over matters such as the length of
the working day, minimum wages, required ben-
Status-Group Distinctions Unlike class posi- efits’ provisions, health and safety regulations at
tions, which are in principle mutable if persons the work-site, and so forth.
can change their property-owning profiles or The significance of the state is multifaceted.
their labor-market (dis-)advantages, status- First, the state per se is central to the initial cre-
group distinctions are normally bestowed upon ation and extension of certain rights and to chal-
persons at birth, and such positions among lenges to such rights, including, at times, mas-
privileged status groups are normally associ- sive transformations into differently-distributed
ated with (attempts to assert) monopolies over and differently-defined property rights (espe-
access to specially prized perquisites, goods, and cially in the context of revolutions). Of special
services; they are also symbolized by signature note, through subsidies and other policies, states
distinctions in styles of consumption among are deeply involved in maintaining and expand-
such groups. Weber argues elsewhere that the ing or, at other times, withdrawing and under-
“enforcement” of any such monopoly-claims mining material protections for the populace
or other hierarchical societal standards may not throughout Latin America. The second point is
only be backed up by the legal system itself, but especially relevant when we consider systems
also can be maintained by more informal controls of status-group discrimination and disprivilege,
rooted in custom and convention (Weber 1978, for the state is also the pivot-point for systems
pp. 319–325). He argues that an exceptionally of politically established discrimination and at-
sharp instance of status-group inequalities has tempts to change/transform such systems via an-
prevailed within the Indian caste system, which tidiscrimination laws or constitutional changes,
(indicatively) has long survived its formal legal “affirmative action” laws, or the installation of
abolition more than a half-century ago, coeval quota systems. Its relevance is apparent in mat-
with India’s independence. If we argue by anal- ters such as the recent regional spread of gender
ogy, the statuses of women (vs. men), and also quotas for national legislative elections and, for
of indigenous peoples and Afro-descent peoples Brazil, in the initiation of race/color-based quo-
(vs. European-descended ethnic groups) can be tas for access to public higher education. There-
readily conceived as sets of unequal status-group fore, to understand how and why groups (self-)
hierarchies, with systematic advantages and even identified by gender, race, and ethnicity, as well
monopolies long since secured by males and also as by sexual orientation, and lack of property—
by whites and mestizos within Latin America. for example, movements among urban and rural
squatters and among landless rural peoples (de- ment of role theory by many scholars, including
scribed below)—come to mobilize for rights and anthropologist Ralph Linton, but most notable
benefits, we should look first at state biases in the were Robert K. Merton’s close discussions of
distribution/allocation of rights and benefits, be- the concepts of status, role, status-sets, role-sets,
fore focusing on identity politics and (presumed) status-sequences, and so forth, first published
quests for identity. well over a half-century ago in what is arguably
the single most important book on sociological
Mixed Patterns and Sources of Material Griev- theory in the twentieth century (Merton 1968, esp.
ances Another theoretical weakness of some pp. 422–440). These literature-review lacunae in
NSM studies derives from the mode of think- the writings of the postmodernists have not gone
ing implicit in the empirical assertions of theo- unnoticed, and the virtues of a classical Sim-
rists in both Europe and Latin America. In both melian approach to the multiple groups that em-
regions they have argued that, if working-class- brace us, and the multiple roles that we all play,
based movements have gone into decline, then have now been forcefully restated, along with a
other, different identities must have replaced critique of postmodern conceits on such matters
them as the “drivers” of movement activism. As (Pescosolido and Rubin 2000).
is true of postmodernist theorists more generally, Within studies of Latin American social move-
varieties of NSM thinking often “discover” the ments, the works of anthropologist June Nash
“activation” of previously quiescent indigenous have provided fine models of such synthetic
identities (in particular), which had been perhaps analyses, effectively blending studies of the mul-
suppressed due to an understandable set of class- tiple status-locations of the people among whom
oriented concerns, given the material crises that she did fieldwork. In her studies of Bolivian tin-
have faced all of Latin America’s lower classes.1 miner activism, within a highland region where
We certainly agree that careful attention to our the Quechua and Aymara cultures ran deeply,
multiple statuses—“identities,” if one wishes—is her work seamlessly integrates the analysis of
important to good social analysis; we do disagree, its working class foundations and of tin miners’
however, with any suggestion that such concep- culture(s) in all their ethnic richness (Nash 1979,
tual and empirical advances are the original con- 2001/1989). In her more recent studies of the
tributions of postmodern notables such as Michel Mexican revolutionary EZLN (Zapatistas), the
Foucault.2 Quite apart from Shakespeare’s “All reader encounters a different blending, with its
the world’s a stage” monologue, or Marx’s com- focus on the complex lives and movement-activ-
ments in the later editions of Capital—that he ism of (often landless) peasants, of women, and
only opted to analyze humans as “personifica- of aggrieved indigenous groups in Chiapas, the
tions of economic categories”—we now have a poorest state in Mexico (Nash 2003).
full century of the development of role theory in
the history of sociological thought, which always
begins with the assumption that every human A Movement Integrating Class-Based
possesses multiple identities, and never just a sin- Grievances with Ethnic Grievances:
gular one (e.g., “worker”). The foundation-state- Bolvia’s MAS
ment, if there is one, is probably Georg Simmel’s
“The Web of Group Affiliations,” from a century The recent history of Bolivia’s Movimiento al
ago (Simmel 1955 is the later translation). There- Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism/MAS)
after ensued the thoughtful, formalized develop- shows elegantly that the multiple identities of
class and ethnicity are not mutually exclusive
1 All of the selections on feminism might be consider ex- sources for producing structured material griev-
emplars here, that is, Chaps. 3, 8, 12. ances within the social order, but rather ones
2
That suggestion mars the otherwise superb entry by which can reinforce and buttress each other. MAS
Starn in Escobar and Alvarez 1992, p. 95. began under the leadership of a coca-grower
( cocalero) named Evo Morales, who organized were won against the entrenched opposition of
fellow cocaleros in the eastern Chapare region of counter-movements developed by middle- and
Bolivia to fight multiple and sustained attempts upper-class Bolivians living mainly in the rich-
by Bolivia’s federal government (under US gover, but more sparsely populated states of eastern
ernment pressure) to suppress the growth and Bolivia, known as the media luna (half-moon)
sale of coca leaves. In every meaningful sense of region. Only in the media luna did Morales fail
the term, this movement thus began as a strug- to secure huge majorities, and there are strongly
gle over farmers’ conceptions of their “property negative correlations across Bolivia between the
rights”—how best to cultivate their own lands— vote for Morales in 2009 and the per capita in-
which are the very essence of class distinctions comes of Bolivia’s various departments.3
(as we noted above). In addition, these peasants
covertly as well as overtly resisted state (and US)
intrusion into the “market-based” element of Movements and Protests Rooted
class distinctions, as they resisted state and for- in Class Conflicts: Landless Farmers,
eign intrusions into their export-based, market- Workers, Consumers, and Debtors
driven production choices.
Thereafter the trajectory of MAS and its de- A Massive Movement Rooted
velopment saw a twofold alteration, as its base in Landlessness: The Example
expanded to include a range of the country’s of Brazil’s MST
indigenous people, along with mestizo lower,
working, and lower-middle class people, the Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement ( Movi-
country’s demographic majority. It expanded its mento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra,
self-definition to focus on unequal land-distribu- MST) came to be the largest, most active social
tion across the nation, and made a vigorous at- movement in all of Latin America by the end
tempt to expand indigenous rights, access, and of the twentieth century. It was formed in 1984
political/material resources more generally. within a nation displaying one of the most un-
MAS’s shift rested on a clear political strategy, equal systems of land tenure on the planet: The
first in the quest for presidential and parliamen- maldistribution of lands in Brazil not long ago
tary powers, then in a wholesale rewriting of the generated a Gini coefficient of inequality reach-
nation’s constitution, which established the abil- ing 0.843, on a 0–1.0 scale (Ondetti 2004, 2008,
ity/rights of Morales and the MAS to pursue both p. 60). Within the Amazon region, a single com-
the property and the indigenous-rights elements pany controlled lands equal to the size of Switzer-
of their expanded agenda. All of those aims have land (Ross 2000, p. 488, Table 2, first entry). In
been furthered by a long string of MAS-led, na- the face of such inequalities MST began its mo-
tionwide political successes, including massive bilizing processes 30 years ago, with the demand
and ultimately successful movement-protests
against privatization of both the gas and water-
3 The National Electoral Court of Bolivia released the
supply sectors of the economy (activities then
results on 28 January 2009; in mid-2010 they were found
resulting in Morales’s expulsion from Congress). at: http://www.cne.org.bo/ResultadosRNC2009/wfrm-
Bolivian voters strongly supported Morales’s Dirimidor.aspx. Across all nine Bolivian departments,
first successful election to the presidency in the vote results correlated − 0.24 with per capita income,
2005; his January, 2009 referendum creating a and − 0.41 with the department-specific scores on a vari-
ant of the United Nations’ Human Development Index,
new constitution (see Chap. 10), which gave a one which also includes equally weighted elements for
legal basis for the expansion of indigenous rights, literacy and for life expectancy; calculations were made
reform of property rights, and other changes; and using data from Bolivia-PNUD 2004, pp. 15, 16, 18, 20,
his December, 2009 reelection and the accom- 151. For excellent sources on Bolivian events on which
we draw here, see also Barr 2005, Crabtree 2005, Domin-
panying, sweeping MAS congressional victories go 2005, Hylton and Thomson 2007, Olivera and Lewis
which accompanied it. All these MAS victories 2004, and Postero 2010.
for land first and foremost in its campaigns. Its Ondetti (2008: Chap. 1) suggests yet other op-
most common movement-repertoire element has tions. And Wickham-Crowley (2004, referring
been the land invasion, followed by demands that to Wolford 2003) has argued for the applicabil-
the state then grant ownership rights, but it has ity of Jeffery Paige’s (1975) theories predicting
also employed road blockades, organized mass the diverse forms which agrarian social move-
demonstrations and marches and sustained comments might take, and their varied social bases.
munity settlements, established a strong Internet The MST’s core tactic of land invasions has led
presence, and even placed its own cadres into to their enhanced appeal among truly landless
key positions in state organizations. By 2009, the Brazilians who confront large-scale, landlord-
movement was reported to have initiated 230,000 dominated agrarian systems; when dealing, in-
land occupations and to have formed 1200 agrar- stead, with small-scale peasant property-holders
ian reform settlements, had active organizations (some of them newly minted), however, their ap-
in 23 of Brazil’s 26 states, and had helped over peal noticeably dwindles. Paige’s model predicts
146,000 families gain access to 5 million ha of both such outcomes.
land (Vanden 2007; Ondetti 2008; Hammond Material and economic matters have also been
2013).4 Both by longevity and level of activity invoked by Angus Wright trying to explain the
the MST had become the most important social potential decline of the MST as a movement or-
movement in all of Latin America. ganization, pointing to the Brazilian state’s land-
And in this context we must state the obvious: colonization efforts within the Amazonian interi-
despite its vast size, importance, and accomplish- or, which might “dry up” some land-hunger bases
ments, the MST is almost completely ignored by for the MST’s strengths (see also Carter 2010 on
proponents of NSM theorizing. Why? The MST such matters).5 For our part, we point to the im-
is not centered on culture or contested discours- portance of Brazil’s initiative, now a decade-plus
es, nor is it “about” asserting collective-identity in force, which gives cash directly to poor moth-
claims. It is glaringly obvious, instead, that the ers of young children, both rural and urban. This
MST is utterly rooted in a set of class-based, eco- Bolsa Familia (“family pocketbook”) program
nomically rooted grievances over the distribution may well be lessening the material-basis of the
of landed property. As for the varied approaches MST’s appeals.
derived from political economy and political so-
ciology, we do not contend that only one theory-
variant can apply here, since close analysts of the The Working Class and Work-Based
MST have addressed such matters themselves. Protests
Yet these varied attempts (here only briefly noted)
to “explain” the MST all begin with land hunger. Any analysis of the rise and decline of strikes,
For example, Wendy Wolford (2010: Chap. 6) the classic tool of the workers’ movements, must
deems useful three different social-movement be a synthetic one, uniting multiple theoretical
perspectives (some of which we noted above), tools. Remaining central, of course, are the mate-
yet she argues they must be complemented with rial grievances of the workers themselves, rooted
other types of viewpoints and evidence for a full- especially in levels of pay and benefits, work-
er understanding of the MST processes she has place conditions, and job security. Also, central
examined. For another, different consideration of are the political opportunity structures (Tarrow
“which theories best apply” to the MST, Gabriel 1989, 1998) at the level of national politics,
which either permit (e.g., democratic openings)
or obstruct (e.g., political repression of strike ac-
4
We lack the space here to elaborate further. But for
fuller-fleshed treatments see Hammond 2009, 2013; On-
detti, 2008; Wright and Wolford 2003; Navarro 2010; 5
Wright, Wolford, Ondetti, Carter, and Wickham-Crow-
Carter 2010, and our own briefer analysis in Wickham- ley all participated in a panel about the MST at the 2004
Crowley and Eckstein 2010. LASA Congress held in Las Vegas, Nevada.
tivity) chances to engage in public and collective politicians exacted of them, and for reinstate-
protest. Moreover, the nature of international po- ment of jobs lost to neoliberal austerity policies.
litical economies has changed over the decades, They staged a hunger strike, marched en masse
in ways that shift the potential costs that might to Mexico City, and stampeded into Congress
be borne by workers who consider the potential where they peeled off their clothes to press their
gains of resorting to strikes. claims.6
In Brazil, as the society returned to democ- As the preceding stories suggest, the state can
racy in the late-1980s, the level of strike activity become deeply embroiled with class conflicts,
rose to one of the highest levels seen anywhere and it can do so in a wide variety of ways. In Ven-
on the earth (Noronha et al. 1998). Yet there and ezuela, the working-class “aristocracy” in the oil
elsewhere in Latin America, overall patterns of sector actually partnered with the oil companies
strike activity have been generally downward in themselves in a conflict with the Hugo Chávez
the ensuing years, as Susan Eckstein (2002) has government, but lost the struggle. In Argentina
documented. She also has analyzed those chang- a major, worker-based movement began mainly
es from the point of view of political economy, as a set of class demands, but soon expanded
and argues that globalization and the increasingly its grievance-list and “tacked on” broader de-
fluid (re-)location of manufacturing almost any- mands for political justice and even the ouster of
where in the world have sharply raised the stakes a government no longer perceived as legitimate
for workers seeking to use the strike-mechanism (Auyero 2007).
to wrest better deals from major corporations:
such businesses can much more readily than in
the past shift operations to lower-cost locales. Consumer Protests
This pattern is often termed the “race to the bot-
tom”: while in earlier decades it might have fa- Debt crises in the region in the 1980s—rooted
vored the creation of maquiladoras in Mexico, in heavy foreign-bank borrowing to finance de-
in the very recent past factory work has been in- velopment, followed by loan repayment difficul-
creasingly transplanted to super-low-wage loca- ties owing to weak export sectors—provided the
tions such as Bangladesh. Eckstein also argues coup de grace to the nationalist industrial-devel-
that, for the case of Brazil ( inter alia), govern- opment model which had prevailed in much of
ments—even including democratically elected Latin America for decades. Import substitution
ones—have often sided with foreign corporations was discredited, and the debt crises created the
over labor in implementing domestic economic conditions under which the USA and the Inter-
policies, since they do not wish to lose foreign national Monetary Fund (IMF) pressed for eco-
investment, foreign exchange, or foreign sources nomic restructuring. Latin American govern-
of job-growth. ments cut back the subsidization of subsistence
Multiple protests in Mexico have also shown to which the urban populace had come to feel
that disgruntled workers could resort to non- entitled. The state became leaner and, from the
strike tactics within their repertoires, especially vantage point of many of the lower and work-
if such collective actions would garner media ing classes and even portions of the middle class,
attention for their concerns. In the late-1990s, also meaner (see Eckstein 2006 for further de-
public-sector nurses, upset with medical-supply tails). Latin America was not alone in restructur-
shortages tied to neoliberal fiscal belt-tightening, ing in ways that have driven subsistence costs up,
publicly drew blood from their arms with syring- yet no other world region experienced as many
es that they then squirted at the doors of hospital protests centering on food and other consumer-
administrators, to gain media coverage for their claimed rights. That region-specific concentra-
concerns. And in the state capital of Tabasco, tion perhaps derived from two distinctively Latin
public-employee street-sweepers collectively
pressed for compensation for the private services 6 New York Times, 21 January 1997, p. 10.
American patterns: it has for some time been the macro political-economic conditions, different
most urbanized Third-World region, with more state–society relations, different group alliances,
of its people dependent on the market for food; and different organizational involvements. Subsi-
and its nations’ political economies and popu- dy cutbacks, for example, stirred riots in Jamaica,
laces were more deeply “shocked” by the depth Argentina, and Venezuela, street demonstrations
of neoliberal restructuring programs which they in Chile, and strikes and roadblocks in Andean
imposed. nations. One monster riot, dubbed the caracazo,
The expectations of the urban poor of Latin rocked Venezuela’s capital and other cities in
America fit closely with centuries-old patterns early 1989 in response to just such cutbacks, and
common to Europe, Latin America, and else- was only put down after the loss of hundreds of
where which came to be dubbed the “moral lives (Coronil and Skurski 1991, p. 291). Dubbed
economy,” or an economic system which in “IMF protests,” these seemingly spontaneous
many respects is anti-freemarket in its cultural eruptions typically involved some degree of coor-
foundations. Its main principles are few and dination. They occurred especially where backed
clear: subsistence and local needs come first, and by unions and by Liberation Theology-inspired
violations of those norms can readily provoke clergy, 7 where political divisiveness and power
indignation and collective protests (Weber 1978, struggles prepared the ground, and where gov-
pp. 1328, 13931; Thompson 1971; Wright 1985; ernments were weak and unpopular (see Walton
Scott 1976). Within multiple nations Latin Amer- 1998, 2001/1989). The groundwork prepared by
icans, in conjunction with neoliberal reforms, unions illustrates how social class, in its organized
underwent a sudden and collective retraction of form, soon came to shape economic claims out-
food and other subsidies, which had come to be side the workplace. Where such union, religious,
considered subsistence rights, at a time when and state conditions did not prevail, as in Mexico,
earnings fell. City-dwellers in anger took to the no such protests occurred despite widespread cut-
streets. While mainly directing their rage at au- backs in consumer subsidies.
thorities, some urbanites also looted supermar- The impact of the cost-of-subsistence protests
kets, where they directly experienced the strains also varied. When unrest was broad-based, insur-
of heightened prices. Urban consumer revolts oc- gents typically succeeded in getting governments,
curred in at least half of all Latin American coun- anxious to reestablish order and their own claims
tries in the 1980s (cf. Walton 2001/1989, 1998), to rule, to retract or reduce the price hikes. Even
and countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and when reintroducing consumer subsidies, govern-
Argentina experienced them well into the early ments on occasion collapsed under the weight of
years of the new century (Almeida 2007). The the claims to subsistence rights. This occurred,
material bases of these uprisings make them rath- for example, in Ecuador, where protesting trade
er clearly today’s equivalent of the sans culottes’ unionists, teachers, and indigenous groups para-
and workers’ bread riots of eighteenth- and nine- lyzed the country and put government officials
teenth-century France and England (Rudé 1981; between a rock and a hard place. In attempting
Thompson 1971). All these types of protests are to appease the populace by rolling back price-in-
also deeply imbedded in class relationships, but creases, fiscally bankrupt governments defaulted
they are found typically at points of consump- on foreign loans and in desperation turned to hy-
tion, rather than at the sites of production. perinflationary policies that made them yet more
Yet price hikes alone neither stirred unrest nor unpopular. Continued resistance to price hikes,
determined the form it took. The Latin American in the context of the devalued worth of the na-
protests displayed various combinations of dem-
onstrations, paros cívicos (civic or general strikes),
7
riots, strikes, looting, and attacks on government Latin American theologians in the 1960s formulated a
biblically-inspired social doctrine that called for a “prefer-
buildings in different countries, in line with dif- ential option for the poor.” Subsistence struggles accord-
ferent national repertoires of resistance, different ingly became one of their foci of concerns.
tional currency, contributed to the deposing of perspective on class within which we write. In
two elected presidents there, in 1997 and 2000. the section which follows, socioeconomic and
Argentina roughly echoed Ecuadoran events in material disadvantages still prevail among, and
late-2001 and early 2002 when massive consum- provide fuel for, the aggrieved members of these
er protests forced President Fernando de la Rúa social movements, but we can no longer describe
and a short-lived string of successors from of- them as “class-based” in any precise sense of that
fice as Argentina’s dollarized economy faltered, term. Even more certainly, however, they are also
the peso–dollar linkage was scrapped, the gov- not derived from “collective-identity” quests or
ernment defaulted on international loans, and a other foci deriving from the writings of the NSM
major peso-devaluation followed ( Boston Globe, theorists.
January 6, 2002, p. A6).
Protests over Access to Higher

Debtors’ Protests Education
Although the more privileged classes typically In the later twentieth-century a broader notion
address their economic concerns through institu- of social and material entitlement appeared, as
tional channels and their informal ties to policy more groups clamored for the right to free educa-
makers, when those fail they have formed move- tion. Since one’s level of education in complex
ments of their own, as we saw above in Bolivia. societies has increasingly become the pivot-point
These have included movements addressing their for placing young adults within the social-class
financial concerns. Middle-class movements structure, its link to socioeconomic issues and
grounded in economic concerns have in recent class divisions is patent, and analyses of the con-
years typically focused on debt relief, especially nection between years of educational attainment
when governments devalue national currencies in and one’s class position in adult life have been a
response to their institutional crises. In Mexico staple of the status-attainment literature in soci-
in 1993, and then several years later in Brazil, ology for at least a half-century (for Brazil, see
for example, there arose debtors’ movements to Pastore 1982; Pastore and Silva 2002). And as
press their respective governments to address we see below, states and their educational poli-
and relieve their obligations to lenders (Eckstein cies have overwhelmingly been the target of the
2002, pp. 344–345). Then in Argentina in 2002 protestors’ rage.
a movement emerged called the ahorristas, the Led by youth of the middle and organized
“savers,” comprising people who protested to the working classes, protesters have focused upon
government about the loss of their savings ac- access to university education (from which they
counts following state-initiated bank freezes and could benefit), rather than on the persistent and
currency devaluations (Almeida 2003, p. 352). In in some nations massive lacunae in primary and
the cases of the debtors’ and savers’ movements secondary school-opportunities that severely
noted here, demands have focused on calls for limited life-chances for the rural and urban poor
state relief of debts and loan obligations (includ- (q.v. IDB 1998, p. 27 for data; also Birdsall 1996
ing interest-rate regulations). on Brazil). When neoliberal governments in the
region sought to charge for previously gratis uni-
versity studies the students collectively protested.
Protests Indirectly Related to Thus Venezuelan students rioted in 1997 against
Class-Based and Material Inequalities cuts in school and transportation subsidies, and
in Nicaragua students protested cutbacks in uni-
The preceding section zeroed in on the protest versity funding (Almeida and Walker 2007) (to-
movements obviously rooted directly in a vari- gether with shantytown dwellers who took to the
ety of class disadvantages, given the Weberian streets in rage over consumer price increases).
Students were enraged more by what they contests each involving 100,000 or more students,
sidered an infringement of their rights than by the often involving the occupation of selected uni-
new tuition costs per se. versity campuses (Peterson 2012).
Mexican students have been more persistent
than their peers elsewhere in the region in pro-
testing state-initiated tuition charges. In 1988, Anticrime Protests
hundreds of thousands of students in the capital
marched in protest against government efforts Under neoliberalism the moral order of cities
to impose fees (along with entrance exams), further eroded beyond the matters just discussed.
just when a major peso-devaluation and auster- Across the region disaffected city-dwellers, in-
ity measures had dramatically driven up living dividually and in organized groups, have defied
costs. The government did not dare to fire on the law and turned to theft, pilfering, looting,
students as it had in 1968, for it had never fully gang activity, kidnappings, and killings on an
recuperated legitimacy after that student massa- unprecedented scale (Caldeira 2000; Portes and
cre at Tlatelolco. Capturing the imagination of Roberts 2005).This turn of events is obviously
Mexico City, the students won: The government related to property (non-)ownership, inter alia.
retracted the newly imposed charges (Castañeda Furthermore, the turn to illicit activity revealed
1993, p. 204). that a general rise in economic insecurity, partly
History somewhat repeated itself a decade associated with a decline in formal-sector work
later when students again closed down the main opportunities, and worsening under neoliberal
public university campus in the capital (UNAM, policies, led growing numbers of people in the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) region to take the law into their own hands to
after the government announced that enrollment address their economic yearnings. Poverty and
charges would rise from a few cents to $ 140 per unemployment, along with drugs, police corrup-
year. This time, though, strike organizers refused tion, and the entrenchment of leaner and meaner
to back down when the government offered to governments, were at the root of the rise in the
make the tuition payments voluntary. Instead, illegal activity. In some countries gangs also con-
they broadened their demands, also calling for tributed to the deterioration of law and order, and
university democratization, the resignation of the in turn to increased crime.8 And as increasing
rector, and increased student involvement in uni- numbers of them did so they have contributed to
versity decision-making. However, as the paraly- a culture of illegality that made such criminality
sis of university education dragged on the protest all the more likely. Law-enforcement agents in
movement fragmented, and after 10 months the numerous countries became part of the problem,
government finally broke it up. Learning from not its solution, as they joined the ranks of the
history, President Ernesto Zedillo ordered the po- criminals and operated with impunity.
lice to enter the UNAM campus unarmed and he The surge in criminality gave rise to new mid-
made sure that the operation was conducted under dle-class-led, yet multi-class-based, anticrime
the watch of official human rights observers. movements, some of the largest mobilizations
Even more recently, massive student protests of recent times. Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and
among both high-school and college-age Chil- Argentina are among the countries that witnessed
eans began in May 2011 against government pol- such movements. Demanding tougher govern-
icies and proposals favoring private and nontra- ment anticrime measures, participants in the
ditional forms of higher education over the large
public university system of Chile. They succeed-
8 US deportation of undocumented Latin Americans who
ed in securing some concessions from President
Sebastián Piñera, yet the protesters’ grievances had affiliated with gangs in the USA, especially in Los
Angeles, has fueled a transnationalization of US gangs,
had not been thoroughly resolved by 2013 (see especially in El Salvador, from where they have fanned
Chap. 13). Those 2 years witnessed multiple pro- out to other countries in the region (Cruz 2013).
movements made use of culturally crafted sym- Contemporary movements among Latin
bols of resistance. Grounded in crime-caused per- America’s indigenous people, with their varied
sonal and economic insecurity, these movements and distinctive cultures, cannot first and foremost
were also shaped by features associated with the be culturally explained in any simple manner.
new political opportunity structure which democ- Otherwise, rather than new to the Latin Ameri-
ratization in the region has unleashed. They often can social-movement universe, they would have
selected symbols of resistance to capture the pop- dated from the colonial era, since some of the
ular imagination with their democracy-improved concerns of indigenous movements are centu-
media access; for example, they often clad them- ries-old. And the very fact that major indigenous
selves in white. Democracy-linked electoral social movements already had arisen in the co-
competition has fueled some of the movements, lonial era challenges NSM “newness” claims.9
as opposition candidates have pointed to crime- NSM claims for the “novelty” of contemporary
concerns to discredit the ability of incumbents to indigenous movements thus are in part based on
maintain law and order (e.g., see Eckstein 2006, simple historical oversight.
pp. 32–34). Within NSM theoretical circles, first in Europe
and later for Latin America, analysts found that
members of the “new” social movements, includ-
Protests Rooted in Status-Group ing ethnically based ones, were focally asserting
Disadvantages claims to new identities and questing for identity-
formation, instead of pursuing class-based inter-
Status-Group Protests I: Mobilizations ests (see the reviews by Polletta and Jasper 2001
Rooted in Race and Ethnicity and Gohn 2007).10 Contrariwise, several analysts
of present-day indigenous movements in Latin
Seven recent collections about Latin American America have echoed the argument from Orrin
social movements have shown the deep staying Starn about Peru (1992)—wherein he tells ana-
power of “old-regime” theory: those edited by lysts that they cannot ignore indigenous people’s
Eckstein 2001/1989; Eckstein and Wickham- core motivations rooted in material needs and
Crowley 2003a, 2003b; Johnston and Almeida scarcities.
2006; Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker 2008; Several analysts who looked closely at the
Prashad and Ballvé 2006; and López et al. 2008. massive, present-day indigenous movement
More than 100 contributions to those collections in Ecuador make the same point: both Nathan
routinely highlight the critical import of econom- Whitten (1996, pp. 197–198) and John Peeler,
ic and political conditions in activating (some- the latter in his essay in Eckstein and Wickham-
times previously quiescent) identities and shap- Crowley (2003b, p. 266), report that material/
ing the trajectories of the movements, implicitly political goals were central to the largest upris-
if not explicitly suggesting that the study of such ing of indigenous peoples in Ecuadorean history,
conditions should be a part of any theory of so- which exploded in June 1990,11 an uprising that
cial movements. has influenced other indigenous movements in
Most importantly in the immediate context,
indigenous movements are shown in these col-
lections and other recent writings to be con- 9
For example, Huizer (1972, p. 3, 88–105) notes that
cerned with seeking material and political re- there were thousands of indigenous protests in Bolivia
sources and rights that extant class inequalities alone, during and after the colonial era.
10 And for European movements of the nineteen century,
and long-established status-group disprivileges
Craig Calhoun (1993) vigorously disputes the NSM theo-
have denied to them. Accordingly, the analyses
rists’ claims about the presumed novelty of cultural ele-
suggest that such mobilizing concerns should be ments and of collective-identity formation.
central to social-movement theorizing. 11 On indigenous movements in Ecuador, also see Za-
mosc 1994 and Yashar 2005.
the country in subsequent years. Within Bolivia, Morales. And the Brazilian government, under
Felipe Quispe leads an Aymara-based move- Fernando Henrique Cardoso, began to guarantee
ment, the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP), Afro-descent Brazilians greater access to higher
which does place indigenous identity front and education with a skin-color-based quota system
central to its aims and self-image. Yet even these for seats in the public universities. That was not
things are certainly not reducible to a simple merely a proactive policy on his part, because
identity-quest. A former NGO worker familiar for some time Afro-descent Brazilians had been
with his trajectory, Roxana Liendo, said that “this campaigning for greater access to higher edu-
is not because he rejects modernity … Rather it’s cation under their Direitas Ja! slogan (“Rights
a coded appeal for social justice and greater re- Now!”).13 Meanwhile in Guatemala, indigenous
spect” She also argues that these same Aymara intellectuals pressed for changes in school cur-
are still asking specifically for long-since-prom- ricula to include the perspectives of indigenous
ised tractors to be delivered, among their other peoples.
wishes for modern agricultural technologies
(Crabtree 2005, pp. 85–86). Ironically, a lengthy
review of the recent literature on indigenous Status-Group Protests II: Gender-Based
movements, which argues from the perspective Movements
of anthropology and in the mode of NSM theory,
actually confirms our argument about the central- Women’s concerns are shaped by their social
ity of material and political matters. The authors standing within their families and the society at
note that “[t]erritory—gaining land rights—con- large, typically centering on their subordinate
tinues to be the prime goal of indigenous orga- status. Analytically, gender may be of conse-
nizations” (Jackson and Warren 2005, especially quence in two distinct ways: as a social base of
pp. 553, 564–566 [quote]). Charles Hale (2006, mobilization and as a set of issues that concern
p. 271) has made a similar argument in looking at women as such, or in combination with class and
Guatemala (and beyond). NSM claims notwith- ethnic/racial statuses and identities.
standing, then, rare is the contemporary move- Women involved themselves in a variety of
ment in which the raison d’etre rests solely or social movements before mobilizing for gender-
primarily on the “symbolic status” of “collective specific concerns (see Chap. 6). For example,
identities.” many women were active in squatter-settlement
Material, property-oriented, political, and movements in the 1960s, a period of massive
educational demands targeted at the state have rural-to-urban migration in the context of import-
unsurprisingly also been common among recent substitution developmental changes. Remaining
indigenous movements, especially concerning in their neighborhoods during the day while their
rights and autonomy claims and, in some instanc-
es, quota-guarantees for political representation,
13 See the telling PBS Documentary, “Brazil in Black and
bilingualism, and changed contents within pub-
licly funded education.12 In its 1991 Constitution White” (Wide Angle 2007), which offers video footage of
some of those protests, inter alia. The quota was imple-
Colombia granted Afro-Colombians quota-rights mented via screening of standardized photos taken of all
for two legislative seats. The Bolivian govern- “quota petitioners,” and its percentage target varied from
ment introduced bilingualism even before the state to state across Brazil, depending on the size of that
country elected its first indigenous president, Evo state’s Afro-descent population; two typical targets were
20 % (for Brasilia/The Federal District) and 40 % (for
Bahia). Often forgotten in the accompanying, often vehe-
ment, public debates over race was the second element in
12 Similarly, the same transpired in Africa and Asia dur- the new quota system. It directly targeted socioeconomic
ing the decolonization processes following the end of disadvantages by also installing a minimum quota of en-
World War II. Geertz (1963, 1970) addressed the emer- trants from the nation’s public high schools, since appli-
gence of “primordial politics” in the new, postcolonial cants from privately run high schools utterly dominated
states of Africa and Asia after World War II. access to programs such as medicine.
men worked elsewhere, they were strategically to them occurred in a pattern of global, then in-
well positioned to defend their family claims to tra-regional diffusion—a cross-national political
land, press for urban services, and fend off po- “epidemic” of sorts—in the middle third of the
lice, tax assessors, and other state agents (cf. twentieth century (Ramírez et al. 1997), and then
Vélez-Ibáñez 1983, pp. 119–122). a highly similar, spatiotemporal epidemic led to
But it was the political and economic crises the legal mandating of gender-quotas in national
of the 1980s, associated with repressive military legislative elections over the past two decades
rule and neoliberal restructuring, causing the cost through most of Latin America (Htun 2003; Bar-
of subsistence to spiral, that catapulted women rig 2006; Krook 2009). The latter quota-mandat-
qua women into the public arena, first in defense ing process—which enshrined in law women’s
of their rights to motherhood (and grandmother- party-mediated access to their nations’ levers
hood) regarding their children who “disappeared” of political power—was set in place as early as
under the military regimes, then in opposition to 1991 in Argentina and prevailed in more than
the new state-backed increases in prices of basic half of the nations by 1997.
foods, fuel, and services which they experienced
directly in that they were in charge of house-
hold purchases. Preoccupied with subsistence Conclusions
needs, women formed consumer-based move-
ments. They collectively mobilized to protest In Table 3.1 we have summarized the varied ap-
cutbacks in state subsidies that drove up their liv- proaches to the study of social movements dis-
ing costs, and they formed neighborhood-based, cussed in this essay. Those tabular and summary
cost-saving, purchasing, and marketing groups. comments encompass studies done across Latin
Underlying these movements were class-based America, but also can be thought of as applicable
concerns. It was women with limited incomes beyond Latin America. In a like vein, the particu-
(which included the lower-middle class and the lars of the three approaches also suggest broader
working class as well as the poor) who formed conceptual guidelines than the particulars found
the bedrock for the movements, since the wealthy within our essay.
could absorb the price increases. Although these The studies of and theorizing about new social
movements brought women collectively into the movements in Latin America were meant both to
public arena, they were not intended to transform provide models for analysis and to inspire con-
women’s place either in the home or in the soci- cern with purportedly neglected, but increasingly
ety-at-large. prevalent, new types of groups and social move-
The 1992 and 1998 volumes promised analy- ments in the region. They sought and claimed to
ses of women’s lives, but instead of examining a do so from a new perspective, one in which mat-
variety of watershed events for the region’s po- ters of culture and collective identity were to be
litically involved women, both volumes focus on privileged conceptual tools.
debates and discourses held almost exclusively From the view of our political sociology and
within the confines of feminist organizations and political economy framework, NSM-style theo-
feminist conferences. Our own analytical incli- rizing remains underdeveloped, and certainly un-
nation is to look at the actual patterns by which representative of ongoing research on a variety
women as a whole have addressed (or had ad- of Latin American social movements. For one
dressed for them) their lack of power within the thing, NSM theory leaves unexplained the dimi-
state and the polity more generally, rather than nution of historically important movements, such
dwelling excessively on the words and texts as worker strikes, a change perfectly intelligible
being generated within feminist groups. For ex- from the perspective of political economy. In
ample, careful studies of women’s access to the recent decades, moreover, concomitant political
vote and to higher political office within Latin changes in the region, especially with redemoc-
America have shown that the granting of suffrage ratization, have created novel opportunities for
Table 3.1 Comparing key premises of three approaches for understanding contemporary Latin American social
movements: new social movements, political economy, and political sociology
Assessment criteria New social movements Political economy Political sociology
Historicity Discontinuity with past Movement concerns and forma- Broadened opportunity struc-
movements with respect tion shaped by oft-changing tures limit protest-risks; rights
to typical social bases and political and economic condi- expanded de jure, but not
focal concerns tions, both macro (national and addressed de facto; increased
international) and more local, access to transnational ideas
including state structures and and social networks that serve
processes, such as repression, as change-models
elections, cooptation
Social base(s) of Varied nonclass social Work-based groups (re: earn- Disprivileged classes and
movements bases grounded in newly ings and benefits; job security status-groups (e.g., for the
emergent collective or abuses); consumers (re: latter, indigenous and women).
identities. for example, living costs, land, or housing Both newer and older rights-
women, indigenous and access); debtors (re: debt- claimants (e.g., for indigenous
racial groups, gays/lesbi- relief); gender and indigenous/ or race-based rights; gender
ans, “greens,” grassroots race groups (re: claims for (re-) equality; human rights;
democrats distributive justice) pro-democracy)
Origins/causes of Collective identity-building Micro: defensive and proactive Collectively shared and
mobilization and cultural shifts in mean- movements rooted in perceived perceived grievances, seeking
ings (often emergent from and collectively shared mate- new political guarantees and
intragroup discourses) rial, political, and/or social access. Movement formation
which foster new collective injustices. favored by leadership and by
claims-making in extra- Macro: perceptions that gains resource-access (e.g., material
and anti-institutional ways from collective protest out- supplies), and by all support
weigh not only risks but also from “outsiders,” e.g., from
possible gains from “exit” NGOs, mass media, intelligen-
tsia, political parties
Desired outcomes Creation of new and Improved politico-economic Enhanced political rights and
of mobilization unprecedented: social rela- conditions at the group or protections via new laws and
tionships; shared cultural societal level policies (e.g., quota-oriented
understandings; political ones), referenda, and consti-
cultures which remake, tutional rewrites, including
transcend the polity; public rights sought by indigenous
domains of discourse. groups
Establishing new political
spaces for the emergent,
identity-based groups
named above
Actual outcomes of Largely ephemeral, small- Patterns vary over space and Patterns vary over space and
mobilization scale, and highly localized time. time.
for all attempts to “remake” Successes contingent on Successes fostered by degree,
the political realm and its favorable conditions in: global depth of nationwide democra-
public discourses. economic conditions; newly tization (vs. repression), which
Broader politico-cultural globalized cultural changes creates more political opportu-
achievements, material (e.g., re: feminism, indigenous nities for historical outsiders.
gains for disprivileged rights); political opportunities Influenced by mass media and
status-groups (women, the (e.g., with full democratiza- by newly globalized cultural
indigenous), but only in tion); mass media coverage; changes (re: rights of women
ways predictable from tra- access to both national and and the indigenous).
ditional political sociology, international material resources Intensity, scope of collectively
ways also prefigured and and organizational allies shared grievances a key
paralleled in many other
global locales
arrays of collective resistance—for all aggrieved References

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State Repression and
Mobilization in Latin America 4
David G. Ortiz
Introduction (i.e., do they pose a serious threat to the regime or

can they be coopted) amongst others.
Scholarship reviewing the relationship between Given the myriad ways in which this relation-
state repression and mobilization is plentiful in ship can be (and has been) explored, I use the
both sociology and political science; most of sociopolitical history of the region to divide this
this research explores cases in the global North, essay into two periods. The chapter first explores
but there is also a vast literature that examines the pre-democratization era (1900s–1980s),
the role of repression and mobilization in Latin where most mobilization was undertaken by so-
America (e.g., Brockett 1991, 2005; Eckstein cial movements with a desire to transform the
2001; Almeida, 2003, 2008b; Carey 2006; Trejo authoritarian and highly corporatist governments
2012). State repression towards mobilization is a into more flexible, democratic, representative
particular form of political control in which “the ones. Mobilizations occurring from 1900 through
purpose of the control is to prevent or diminish the 1920s were mainly struggles to gain labor
direct and noninstitutional challenges to social, and agrarian rights. These efforts were stalled in
cultural, and/or political power (i.e., protest, the 1930s–1950s by various authoritarianisms
activism, and social movements)” (Earl 2011, brought on in response to the effects of the Great
p. 262). Therefore, state repression against mobi- Depression on the region, and the 1960s–1980s
lizations can be manifested in very diverse ways were marked by struggles against long-term dic-
that range from nonviolent and covert to violent tatorships and entrenched authoritarian corpo-
and overt forms (e.g., harassment, censorship, ar- ratist regimes. The state repressive responses to
rests, violent threats, police violence, disappear- these challenges were highly coercive, usually
ances, massacres), can be carried out by different swift, and sometimes brutal, which led to the
actors (e.g., armed forces, police forces, death radicalization of many movements, the appear-
squads) at different levels (national, state, and ance of guerrillas in several countries (Wickham
local), and its characteristics can vary by the type Crowley 2001), and ultimately to a wave of tran-
of regime in which it occurs (e.g., democratic, sitions to democracy.
semi-democratic, authoritarian) and/or the par- The second part of the chapter explores state
ticular opponent that the state is trying to repress repression and mobilization during the post-au-
thoritarian period (1990s—present). Within this
period, as most Latin American states completed
D. G. Ortiz ()
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico,
USA
e-mail: dgortiz@nmsu.edu
44 D. G. Ortiz
their transitions to electoral democracies, the Incipient Nations: Social Movements

more overt, harsh, coercive forms of state repres- and State Repression After
sion diminished, giving way to less severe forms Independence
of repression (e.g., more professionalized police
forces, the use of nonlethal weapons). As a result, Between 1900 and 1920, Latin America was a
the opportunities for mobilization began to open, region of emergent nations that had gained their
resulting in the rapid growth of social rights independence in the previous century from major
movements and identity-based movements (e.g., colonial powers. Its precarious regimes were try-
Eckstein and Wickham Crowley 2003; Cleary ing to build political and social institutions to
2007; Stahler-Sholk et al. 2008), and movements strengthen their countries, and fend off the in-
in response to globalization and neoliberal poli- terventionist policies of the USA and its expan-
cies (e.g., Johnston and Almeida 2006; Petras and sionist Monroe Doctrine (Vanden and Prevost
Veltmeyer 2011). 2009). Most nations were still weak, unstable,
or in turmoil. They had highly contested socio-
political institutions in which the divided po-
Repression and Mobilization in Latin litical elites were trying to enforce their newly
America During the Authoritarian acquired power (Wiarda and Kline 2007), and
Period most were still operating under economically
exploitative systems created by the legacies of
As Eckstein aptly notes, “twentieth century colonial structures (Rock 1994; Thomas 2012).
Latin American history has been punctuated Some countries, such as Mexico (1876–1910)
by shifts between authoritarian and democratic and Venezuela (1908–1935),established person-
rule” (2001, p. 11). However, these swings have alistic dictatorships. Several, such as Argentina,
mostly been between authoritarianism and highly Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, and Brazil, established
populist and/or corporatist low-intensity democ- oligarchic low-intensity democracies. Others, in-
racies (Gills 2000). This created an atmosphere cluding Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, and
where civil society had brief windows of politi- the Dominican Republic, were occupied by US
cal opportunity (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998) to Marines.
generate ties and networks, form and coordinate At the same time, the struggles of the bur-
civic organizations, and organize nonviolent mo- geoning organized labor movement in the late
bilizations during the periods of low-intensity depart of the nineteenth century, and the Russian
mocratization. Moreover, those same structures Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
could be used for more radical and violent rep- tury, had a tremendous impact in the organization
ertoires of contention (Tilly 1986) when regimes and formation of labor and peasant movements in
would close opportunities by becoming even Latin America. This environment fostered popu-
more authoritarian and repressive, as Almeida lar dissent in the form of peasant and labor re-
(2003) fittingly notes while examining the case lated protests—fueled by anarchist and socialist
of El Salvador. This pattern of political opportu- tendencies in some countries—that were gener-
nity-based mobilization and threat-induced mo- ally met with severe state repression and a grow-
bilization (Goldstone and Tilly 2001) occurs in ing tendency of states towards authoritarianism
most Latin American countries during the twen- and corporatism (Thomas 2012).
tieth century, with some states more efficiently For example, in 1907 in Argentina, the re-
destroying the organizational capacity for dissent cently founded Federación Obrera Regional Ar-
than others during the authoritarian periods— gentina (FORA)—an anarchist workers’ union—
mainly due to the strength of their military and led 140,000 families in a no-payment protest
control over their territory (Goodwin 2001; Ortiz to oppose the lack of dwelling regulations in
2007, 2013).
4 State Repression and Mobilization in Latin America 45
vecindades amid rising rent prices and terrible the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, and are widely
living conditions in Buenos Aires (Godio 2000). considered precursor movements to the Mexi-
The response of the Argentine authorities was to can Revolution. The worker’s role in the subse-
use the police and firefighters to violently evict all quent revolution continued with the creation of
protesting workers’ families by using pressurized the Casa del Obrero Mundial (COM) in 1912, a
hoses with freezing water to disperse them dur- socialist congregation of workers that supported
ing the winter months (Godio 2000, p. 147). This the Carranza revolutionary faction in exchange
pattern of repression continued until 1909, when for social and economic worker’s rights (Carr
the FORA organized a May Day march that was 1976; Bizberg and Zapata 2010). This would
severely repressed by the Buenos Aires mounted mark the beginning of a system of corporatist
police, who fired shots at a crowd of more than representation based on clientelistic relation-
15,000 workers gathered at the Plaza Lorea-kill- ships.
ing a dozen workers, injuring another 80, and ar- This wave of labor and peasant protests in
resting 16 anarchist leaders in the following days Latin America intensified between 1917 and
(Schiller 2005). In response, the FORA decided 1920. State responses were highly violent and
to call for a general worker’s strike demanding repressive including the use of police and mili-
the removal of the police chief, and garnered the tary forces, paramilitary squads, laws restrict-
support of the Partido Socialista (PS) and the ing labor organization, and suspension of civil
Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). In the liberties in most countries such as Argentina
following days, the police fired shots at the fu- (Adelman 1993), Bolivia (Klein 1969), Brazil,
neral procession of those killed in the May Day (Wolfe 1991), Chile (Albert 1988), Colombia
massacre and closed down union shops and of- (Valencia 1984), Ecuador (Ycaza 1991), Hon-
fices. In the end, the strike was lifted when the duras (Meza 1985), Paraguay (Alexander 1965),
government granted concessions by freeing the Peru (Collier and Collier 1991), and Uruguay
arrested workers and labor leaders and reopening (Sala de Touron and Landinelli 1984).
the union shops.
In Mexico, in June 1906, more than 2000
mineworkers at an American company operat- The Effects of the Great Depression on
ing in Cananea, Sonora demanded the same Movement and States in Latin America
wages and treatment as their American counter-
parts. Porfirio Díaz’s rural police opened fire By the late 1920s, political reformists—aided by
on the Mexican strikers killing 23 and injuring a a generalized fear of communism among eco-
similar number (Novelo 1980; Cárdenas 1998). nomic elites—began to push for more liberal
By the third day of the strike, Díaz declared democratic practices and an incorporation of
martial law, arrested all the union leaders, and disenfranchised groups through state interven-
reopened the mining company. On January 7th tion policies in most Latin American countries
of the following year in Veracruz, thousands of (Calvert and Calvert 1990; Korzeniewitz 2000).
workers threw rocks and stood naked in front But this increased political incorporation and lib-
of the Río Blanco textile factory. Mounted po- eralization was short lived, and the onset of the
lice and military soldiers dispersed the rioting Great Depression would undermine both the rela-
workers who fled to nearby cities, looting hous- tive economic prosperity and political openness
es, and disrupting streetcar service (Gamboa that most regimes were experiencing (Halperín
1991). The response of the military forces was Donghi 1993). For example, Almeida (2008a)
to open fire against workers and their families, notes how by the late 1920s, El Salvador entered
killing around 500 workers, and arresting 200 a period of increased political liberalization that
more (García Díaz 2007). The Cananea and Río led to the formation of semiautonomous labor
Blanco labor strikes transcended worker’s de- and peasant unions under the auspices of the
mands by highlighting the repressive nature of state. However, by 1930 the effects of the Great
46 D. G. Ortiz
Depression on coffee prices led to significant de- opponents, and signed several laws which would
cline in workers’ wages, which caused nonvio- condone executions of laborers by landowners as
lent protests in several parts of the country. The a “disciplinary” measure (Grieb 1979). In Hon-
civilian government responded with a series of duras, the government of Tiburcio Carías Andino
repressive strategies, such as arrests, police vio- (1932–1949) restricted civil liberties, created a
lence, and laws curbing rights of public assem- secret police, and started a campaign of censor-
bly (Almeida 2008a). By the end of 1931, after ship and repression against any opposition (Meza
a successful coup d’état and the arrival of a new 1985; Dodd 2005). And in Nicaragua, Anastasio
military dictatorship, the level of violent repres- Somoza assassinated Augusto Sandino and 300
sion and persecution increased, forcing the labor of his followers in Wiwili, used the National
and peasant movements to become more radi- Guard as a spy network, and persecuted and
calized and to operate clandestinely. Increasing killed any popular social movement that opposed
state authoritarianism paired with peasant and his political power (Walter 1993).
labor movements radicalization, led to a mass In contrast, some Southern cone dictator-
insurgent uprising in 1932 that culminated in the ships—though still repressive—were more per-
massacre of tens of thousands in this massacre missive towards social organization of workers
ushered in a new period of highly repressive au- and peasants. This resulted in more opportunities
thoritarian governance in El Salvador (Almeida for mobilization and patterns of repression and
2003, 2008a). accommodation that sometimes led to the fall of
Between the 1930s and the 1950s, most Latin dictatorial regimes. In Uruguay, for example, the
American countries experienced similar shifts short-lived dictatorship of General Terra (1933–
between authoritarianism in the form of dictator- 1938) could not effectively repress a series of
ship and political openings in the form of low- general strikes organized by the labor movement;
intensity democracies. Dictatorships were mainly this created enough pressure to make him call for
brief in nature, with the military supporting cer- elections that resulted in a more liberal govern-
tain oligarchic or populist reforms, installing new ment lasting through the 1950s (Korzeniewitz
civilian governments to support those changes, 2000). During the late 1930s, Bolivian workers
and stepping out of government (Blake 2005). By gained the right to collective bargaining with
the mid-1930s, repressive military dictatorships support from left-wing political parties in Con-
had come and gone in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, gress. In 1942, during the more repressive gov-
Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay, ernment of Enrique Peñaranda, two large min-
but the ones in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, ers’ unions called for a strike demanding wage
El Salvador, and Nicaragua were more stable. increases. Instead of negotiating with workers,
Additionally, by 1950 most countries in Latin Peñaranda’s government arrested union leaders
America had turned into an economic system of and killed seven miners. When the strike grew in
import substitution industrialization (ISI), clos- force, Peñaranda ordered the Bolivian military to
ing their markets to foreign investments in lieu of open fire on the crowd of 7000 protesters, killing
developing strong national industrial economies as many as 400 (Klein 1971). This led directly to
(Blake 2005; Zapata 2010). a coup d’état and the fall of the Peñaranda regime
Most Central American and Caribbean dicta- in 1943.
torships were brutally repressive and able to curb In Argentina, a military dictatorship gave way
most forms of overt protest, providing very lim- to a series of fraudulent low-intensity conser-
ited political opportunities for social movements vative democratic governments that produced
and forcing most opposition to remain hidden a large agrarian crisis in the 1930s. This led to
and organize covertly (Bulmer-Thomas 1987). a massive internal migration to urban areas by
For example, repressive policies were character- poor and dispossessed rural immigrants (Di Tella
istic of the Ubico regime (1931–1944) in Guate- 1990; Rossi 2013a) and another military coup in
mala who regularly tortured and killed political 1943. Juan Perón became the Minister of War and
the Minister of Welfare during the dictatorship tions that would regularly express their demands
and was highly popular among workers. When peacefully through classic mobilization tactics
other members of the military junta fired and im- such as demonstrations, marches, and occupa-
prisoned him, a mass protest of union workers tions of public spaces during this period (Hell-
and new immigrants forced his liberation. He ran man 2008). The PRI was quite accommodating
for the presidency in 1946 after making alliances to these types of social mobilization during this
with union leaders and other underrepresented time, and several nonaffiliated syndicates (e.g.,
elites (Di Tella 1990). Perón incorporated most railroads, oil, and mining) mounted significant
of the labor unions, new immigrants, and other protests campaigns during the 1938–1948 pe-
popular sectors into a political coalition that he riod that ended with the state accommodating to
effectively managed to mobilize for his support their demands.
(Rossi 2013a).
The Mexican case was sui generis in that
the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI)1 Military-Bureaucratic Authoritarianism,
reigned as the de facto ruling party for more Movement Radicalization, and Democ-
than 70 years (Krauze 1997). Though not a dic- ratization
tatorship, Mexico became a highly authoritar-
ian, corporatist regime with a facade of demo- By the 1960s, the rapid urbanization and indus-
cratic electoral politics. Still, the PRI was highly trialization processes of the ISI model started to
successful in incorporating labor and peasant place severe economic and political strains on
demands into state-created and controlled orga- Latin American countries. Domestically, Latin
nizations and then electorally mobilizing those American countries accrued large debts to fund
groups and organizations for the support of the industrialization projects, but were unable to
party (Collier and Collier 1991; Favela 2010; deliver the promised social reforms. Internation-
Zapata 2010). They institutionalized national ally, the Cold War and the Cuban revolution also
workers’ rights into law (Ley Federal del Tra- had two important consequences for the region.
bajo), and created the Confederación de Taba- First, they increased military interventionism by
jadores Mexicanos (CTM) and the Confeder- the USA to prevent a “turn to socialism” (Wiarda
ación Nacional Campesina (CNC), a pair of na- and Kline 2007). Second, a successful social-
tional associations that incorporated most local ist regime in the region encouraged the politi-
and regional union and agrarian organizations cal aspirations of the left and their redistributive
into single national associations that were the policies, which were also fueled by the growth
official mediator between workers’ and peas- of new alternatives in Western Europe and the
ants’ interests and the state. Popular organiza- Communist world (Collier 2001).
tions that did not want to tie themselves with the The combination of these factors served to po-
party would be allowed to exist autonomously, larize Latin American countries even moreduring
but they would also be forced to survive without the 1960s and 1970s.A wave of escalating politi-
any support for their demands (Hellman 1988). cal mobilization and protest fueled conservative
Nevertheless, there were a number of organiza- fears and facilitated the discouragement of demo-
cratic practices in favor of sharp turns towards
right-wing authoritarianisms. By the late 1960s,
1
The PRI went through many compositional reorganiza- most Latin American countries were either mili-
tions and political redefinitions—fueled by the divisions
within the party’s political elites—in which the name of tary dictatorships or highly authoritarian civilian
the party was altered. When it was first founded in 1929 regimes—often backed or condoned by the US
by President Plutarco Elias Calles, the party’s name was government, military, or intelligence agencies.
Partido Nacional de la Revolución (PNR). In 1936, Presi- Only Venezuela and Costa Rica were stable de-
dent Lázaro Cárdenas changed the party’s name to Partido
de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), and in 1946 President mocracies (Wiarda and Kline 2007), and Co-
Manuel Ávila Camacho gave the party its current name. lombia—although democratic—suffered from a
48 D. G. Ortiz
lingering low-intensity asymmetric conflict. This (e.g., Wright 2007; Sikkink 2008; Hayner 2010;
wave of dictatorships was different from those Stern 2010; DeGregori 2012). In El Salvador
of the first part of the twentieth century. Instead (Viterna 2006, 2013; Wood 2003; Almeida 2008a)
of personalistic short-term regimes the military and Guatemala (Brockett 1991, 2005; Brett 2008;
took power for an extended period of time (Blake Rothenberg 2012), the escalating quid pro quo
2005). Military-bureaucratic authoritarianisms violence between the military and the guerril-
were imposed (especially in South America) as a las—Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación
way to bring sociopolitical order and foster eco- Nacional (FMLN) and Unidad Revolucionaria
nomic development (O’Donnell 1975, 1982). Ac- Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), respectively—
cording to Collier (2001), most of these regimes culminated in protracted civil wars that extended
had the clear intention of promoting economic into the early 1990s. Hundreds of thousands were
growth by postponing redistribution policies and killed and several thousand more disappeared.
attempting to control or destroy left-leaning po- Similarly, the radicalizing effects of the brutally
litical groups, peasant, and labor movements. repressive Somoza regime on a vast array of civil-
Although the level of state-sponsored vio- ian associations and social movement groups in
lence varied from country to country, common Nicaragua, led to the formation and growth of the
state repressive actions included continuous in- Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional (FSLN)
fringements to civil liberties, rampant human that used its violent contentious tactics (Moly-
rights violations, forced deportations, unwar- neux 1985; Wickham Crowley 1992; Spalding
ranted arrests, detentions without trials, torture, 1994), to oust the Somoza clan out of power.
disappearances, assassinations, and massacres— In Southern cone countries such as Chile, the
all perpetrated by militarized forces (e.g., Wood military suspended the constitution, imprisoned
2003; Pereira 2005). Over time, these brutal ef- nearly 40,000 people without a trial in a stadium
forts to eliminate civil associations and mobili- that served as a detention center, tortured tens
zation often pushed social movements, dissident of thousands at Villa Grimaldi and other con-
groups, and their members to either radicalize or centration camps, executed almost 2500, and
join radical organizations, fostering the appear- disappeared more than 1300 political activists,
ance of urban and rural guerrillas with violent students, workers, others considered “subver-
tactics in several countries (e.g., Almeida 2003, sive” (Gómez-Barris 2010). The brutal repres-
2008a; Pereira 2005; Brockett 2005). This also sion quelled most forms of protests, though some
affected the movements’ repertoires of conten- symbolic protests like the La Cueca Sola dance,
tion. Tactics such as guerilla warfare, public- where widows of the disappeared dance alone
building occupations, small town take-overs, (García Castro 2002), continued to exist. On the
high-profile elite hijackings, armed attacks, and other hand, there was a growth in radicalized
bombings increased with the growing radicaliza- urban groups such as the pobladores (Salman
tion of the opposition movements (e.g., Salazar 1994; Garcés 2002), and urban guerrilla groups
2006). The military, in turn, would use the threat such as Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
of the guerrillas as justification for escalating (MIR), and Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez
violent repressive practices and civil rights viola- (FPMR) who bombed buildings, kidnapped and
tions (Blake 2005), causing either the destruction killed military officials, and even conducted a
of or escalation in hostile backlash by guerrillas failed assassination attempt of Pinochet (Salazar
and other dissident groups (Martin 2007; Ortiz 2006). Similarly, the “dirty war” perpetuated by
2007, 2013). the Argentinean military and its death squads re-
A vast number of case and comparative stud- sulted in the disappearance, killing, torture, and
ies details the atrocities committed by the dictato- illegal detention of tens of thousands of civil-
rial regimes and the responses from radical and ians and dissidents (CONADEP 1984; Novaro
guerilla groups in Latin America during this time and Palermo 2003). The Argentine state repres-
sion was challenged by the unfaltering mobili- the dismantling of the military rule in most coun-
zation of nonviolent groups such as Las Madres tries. Internationally, the economic weakening of
de Plaza de Mayo (Álvarez 1990; Navarro 2001; the USSR, the impending fall of the Berlin Wall,
Borland 2006), and the growth of radical urban and the end of the Cold War would cause the
and rural guerrillas such as the Montoneros USA to ease its interventionist policies in support
and Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) of “stable” military regimes in Latin America
(Gillespie 1982; Lewis 2001) whose violent (Vanden and Prevost 2009). The combination
repertoire included armed attacks, civilian and of these factors would mean that most of Latin
nongovernmental bombings, and abductions of America would undergo a period of transition to
prominent civilians and politicians, (Novaro and democratic rule known as the third-wave of de-
Palermo 2003). mocratization (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005).
In Brazil, though the violent repression was
less extensive than in Chile and Argentina, there
was a similar pattern of disregard for civil liber- Repression and Mobilization in Latin
ties, including mass imprisonments, torture, and America After the Transitions to
military courts leading to executions and disap- Democracy
pearances. Initially, students mounted massive
protests against the new regime, but the mili- There is no doubt that social movements had a role
tary suspended habeas corpus, declared a state to play in the wave of transitions to democracy
of siege, and violently repressed the students that occurred in Latin America between 1978 and
(Skidmore 1990; Pereira 2005; Codato 2006). 1992. As in the case of Brazil, the role that social
Several factions of the antimilitary movement movement organizations (SMOs) played during
radicalized and formed urban guerrilla move- democratic transitions in other Latin American
ments such as the Ação Libertadora Nacional countries would be crucial for ousting military
(ALN) and Movimento Revolucionário 8 de regimes and returning to democratic rule. Social
Outubro (M8) that resorted to violent contentious movements either forced out the military via a
tactics. But the regime only became more bru- combination of guerrilla groups and civil society,
tal in its repression against the guerrillas, which such as in the case of El Salvador, Guatemala,
eventually led to their decline (Rose 2005). By Nicaragua, and Honduras (Wood 2003; Booth
the mid 1970s a more moderate military group et al. 2006; Johnston and Almeida 2006; Brett
had ascended to power and started a gradual 2008) or pressured the military regimes to open
abertura process, restoring civil liberties, and via a coalition of labor, church, student, and
gradually moving towards democratization. This other civil society organizations (Mainwaring
brought forth an unprecedented amount of non- 1986; Foweraker and Landman 1997; Collier
violent social movement organization against 1999). While most Latin American countries
the military that led to the massive civil society transitioned to democracy by the late 1990s, the
diretas já mobilization campaign, which spread Mexican case was somewhat different. The coun-
over several years and sites and culminated with try did not go through a dictatorship, but kept its
the election of the first civilian president in 1985 authoritarian regime, dubbed a dictablanda (soft
(Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Hochstetler 2000). dictatorship), until the end of the twentieth centu-
By the mid 1980s, the brutal legacy of nearly ry. By the mid 1960s, there were clear signs that
two decades of violent military rule had created the highly authoritarian and corporatist regime of
widespread discontent about human rights viola- the PRI was not as representative and inclusive
tions in Latin America. In addition, the worsen- as it was in the late 1930s and 1940s. A series
ing economic conditions due to the failure of the of mobilizations starting with the student protest
ISI model in an increasing interdependent world and massacre of 1968, and followed by the 1985
economy, and the growing elite and military divi- protests by those affected by the earthquake, the
sions (Blake 2005) would create a push towards mobilizations for electoral reform after the 1988
50 D. G. Ortiz
election fraud, and the Zapatista rebellion and previous decades were being rapidly eroded by
Barzón movements in 1994, all led to gradual po- the privatization of public goods and economic
litical liberalization and a delayed but peaceful policies that emphasized cutting jobs, increas-
opening to democracy in 2000 that culminated in ing taxes, and the rapid opening of previously
the election of president Vicente Fox of the Par- protected industries, leading to increased pov-
tido Acción Nacional (PAN)—the first non-PRI erty and income inequality (Cleary 2007; Brown
president in the history of the country. 2009).
As national democratization projects ad- The combination of these two trends led to
vanced during the 1980s, the economic crises in the decrease of support for guerrilla movements
Latin America worsened. Highly indebted from and encouraged the rapid growth and diversifi-
the massive expenses required to build indus- cation of social movements with a much wider
trial capacities—as demanded by the ISI proj- spectrum of grievances than in the previous de-
ect— and faced with a global recession fueled cade; these new movements addressed concerns
by the drastic drop of the oil prices, Mexico and such as anti-neoliberal reforms, the environment,
several other countries in the region declared human rights, women’s rights, race and ethnic
themselves incapable of paying their external discrimination, LGBT rights, and indigenous
debts (Pastor 1989; Blake 2005). To resolve rights, amongst others (Eckstein and Álvarez
this situation, national banks had to restructure 1992; Álvarez et al. 1998; Almeida and Johnston
their debts through the acquisition of new loans 2006). Accordingly, the movements’ repertoires
from international financial institutions such as of contention during this period also became
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the increasingly less radical. Tactics such as high-
World Bank. The loans conditioned governments profile elite hijackings, armed attacks, and bomb-
to enact a host of neoliberal reforms such as cut- ings were used less frequently, while support for
ting government expenditures in housing, health peaceful—though still disruptive—marches,
care services, education, and retirement accounts roadblocks, strikes, demonstrations, public space
(Garuda 2000; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000); occupations, and sit-ins increased. Governments,
prescribing increases in the levels of taxation, in turn, refrained from the frequent use of the
reduction of wages and credit restraints (Crisp military to control protests, replacing them with
and Kelly 1999); and the privatization of nation- highly specialized and professionalized riot po-
alized industries such as health care, oil produc- lice units that were organized, deployed, trained,
tion, electrical energy, and telecommunications and armed specifically to confront and control
(Brown 2009). crowds. As a result, mass civil rights violations
As a result, most social movement mobiliza- and violent coercive practices such as disappear-
tions of the twenty-first century in the region ances, torture, and massive illegal imprisonments
grew out of a combination of the opening of were largely diminished. Even so, police abuses
political opportunities driven by the process of such as shootings, beatings, tear gas use, rubber
democratization, and the opposition to the reduc- bullet use and other human rights abuses were
tion of social and economic rights driven by the still common (e.g., Cleary 2007). Similarly, some
implementation of structural adjustment policies violent repertoires of contention such as the use
and neoliberal programs. The newly transitioning of Molotov cocktails, defacing of public proper-
regimes were much more permissive of the ex- ty, breaking into buildings, and rock throwing oc-
istence of social movements and civic organiza- curred; even classic guerrilla movements—e.g.,
tions, which meant that grievances related to the the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
threat of repression were not as salient, and the (EZLN) and the Ejército Popular Revolucionario
imperative desire to oppose the military was not (EPR) in Mexico—arose during this period, but
the central associational force it was under the this was a much less frequent occurrence than
authoritarian regimes. At the same time, social during the 1960s and 1970s.
and economic rights that were established in the
Democratization and Neoliberalism: Aguas del Tunari, in what is now known as the
Backlash Against Austerity Policies first water war (Arce and Rice 2009). The Boliv-
ian government sent riot police who used tear gas
Given the circumstances described above, many and rubber bullets to stop the demonstrators, who
protests during this period were directly or indi- then responded by throwing rocks and Molotov
rectly linked to both the participation in and im- cocktails. Violence escalated when the president
plementation of IMF and World Bank economic declared a state of siege and used the army to en-
programs and the austerity policies promoted force it. In April 2000, after a couple of months
by these organizations (Auyero 2001; Almeida of confrontations, soldiers removed most of the
2008b; Rossi 2013b; Silva 2009; Arce 2010). roadblocks but killed a teenage boy in the pro-
Citizens engaged in mobilizations against the in- cess. This radicalized the protests and brought
ternational agencies themselves (Almeida 2007; more than 100,000 angry protesters to the streets
Silva 2009) and protested the loss of legitimacy where they overwhelmed soldiers and used their
of their domestic governments (Auyero 2004; weapons against them. The government quickly
Ortiz and Béjar 2013). With close to 300 con- decided to reverse plans for privatizing the public
tentious actions occurring in the region between water system (Olivera and Lewis 2004, Spronk
1995 and 2001, anti-neoliberal protest campaigns and Webber 2008).
have formed a sustained wave of mobilization Ecuador also experienced massive protests in
that begins in the early 1990s and continues until 2001 as a response to austerity measures, plans
now (Almeida 2007, 2010). for privatization in the electricity and telecom-
For example in Buenos Aires, Argentina on munications sectors, and the granting of a 30-
December 19th and 20th, 2001, thousands of year concession to a foreign company for the
people took to the streets, hitting pots and pans supply of water and sewage services to the city
( cacerolazos) and shouting “Que se vayan todos” of Guayaquil. On January 21 and 22, the Con-
in protest against the government’s decision to federación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ec-
limit the amount of money people could with- uador (CONAIE) and the Federación Nacional
draw from their bank accounts weekly to prevent de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Ne-
further defunding of the bank system. This was gras (FENOCIN)—the two largest indigenous
the last of a series of neoliberal measures adopted and peasant organizations in the country—along
by the Argentine government after the signature with coalitions of students and workers, coordi-
of an IMF agreement. The resulting massive, nated national mobilization campaigns that con-
violent protests included the defacing of banks’ sisted of marches and roadblocks throughout the
facades, breaking of banks’ windows, and the country, as well as the takeover of a couple of TV
breaking into and occupying of banks by force and radio stations in the Chimborazo area. The
even after a state of siege was enacted. These government responded by imposing a national
protests were the peak of a cycle of contention state of emergency, limiting public meetings and
that included many unemployed workers’ ( pi- nationwide travel, and deploying the army and
queteros) road blockades, protests, lootings, and police to arrest protest leaders. Still, thousands
riots that resulted in the resignation of President of indigenous workers and peasants marched into
Fernando de la Rua and continued through 2003 Quito on February 7, forcing President Noboa to
(Auyero 2001; Rossi 2013c; Alcañiz and Scheier meet with them and retract the implementation of
2008; Villalón 2008; Silva 2009). austerity measures (Perrault and Valdivia 2010).
In a similar case, Bolivian protesters used Many similar cases of mobilization campaigns
massive protests, roadblocks, and a general against neoliberalism occurred in Latin America
strike demanding the resignation of president during the first two decades of the century, and
Hugo Banzer during the 2 weeks that followed have been explored extensively in the literature.
the government’s attempt at selling the Cocha- Some of the most salient examples are the sec-
bamba public water system to the multinational ond water war of 2005 (in El Alto) and the na-
52 D. G. Ortiz
tionwide gas wars of 2003 and 2005 in Bolivia, Indigenous movements in Bolivia, for exam-
which led to the resignation of President Mesa ple, mounted significant efforts to increase their
(Arce and Rice 2009, Spronk and Webber 2008), participation and inclusion in decision-making
the massive health-care anti-privatization strike processes through the transformation of the ex-
campaigns in El Salvador from 1999 to 2000 and isting political institutions of democracy (Postero
2002 to 2003 (Almeida 2008a), several roadblock 2011). Coca farmers’ organizations such as the
campaigns of the piquetero movement in Argen- Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores
tina from 1997 until now (Auyero 2003; Merklen Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) made an al-
2005; Rossi 2013c), the continuing land occupa- liance with the Confederación de Pueblos In-
tion campaigns of Brazil’s Movimento Sem Terra dígenas de Bolivia (CIODB) to form an indig-
(MST) since the early 1990s (Wright and Wol- enous-peasant coalition that would mobilize for
ford 2003; Fernandes 2005; Navarro 2007; Ham- indigenous rights in La Paz in 1992. In 1995 this
mond 2009; Ondetti 2011), and Chile’s pingüino indigenous peasant coalition decided to form the
revolution of 2006 and the university student Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party with Evo
movements against the privatization of education Morales as their leader. International pressure to
in 2009 and 2011–2013 (Salinas and Fraser 2012; privatize public goods such as water and attacks
Donoso 2013; Stromquist and Sanyal 2013; von against “illegal” coca growers in the region led
Bülow and Bidegain Ponte in this volume). to a surprising amount of collective action in the
Cochabamba and Chapare regions between 2000
and 2003 (Lucero 2013). Besides marches and
Rights, Accountability, and the roadblocks of major highways, the coca farmers
Transformation of Democracy in the Chapare region used more aggressive tac-
tics such as invading and occupying military out-
Although social movements against austerity pol- posts (Zibechi 2010; Barndt 2012). The military
icies were the most prevalent in the region during and police responses to these tactics caused fre-
the first part of the twenty-first century, there was quent violent confrontations over the removal of
also an increase in the number of movements that roadblocks and the arrest and incarceration of oc-
promoted social rights and identity issues. Social cupiers. Given these circumstances, MAS gained
rights and identity movements—e.g., indigenous the support from the urban left, and in the 2005
movements, land rights movements, environ- election, Morales was elected president of Boliv-
mental movements, LGBT movements, women’s ia (Do Alto 2010). With control of the presidency,
movements—provided ways for diverse groups the senate, and the house, MAS began a project
to articulate claims and carry out efforts to cor- of national redefinition and reconstruction (Albro
rect violations that had been long subsumed to 2005, 2013) in which they reformed the constitu-
the more pressing struggle against deposing tion to create a “multinational and pluricultural
authoritarian regimes (Eckstein and Wickham state based on the autonomies of the indigenous
Crowley 2003). Many of these movements aim peoples” (Komadina and Geffroy 2007, p. 119;
to redefine citizenship and identity into collective Silva in this volume).
constructs that are more meaningful, inclusion- At the same time, other movements relied
ary, and representative of disadvantaged groups on autonomy from the state, horizontal partici-
(Álvarez et al. 1998; Stahler-Sholk et al. 2008), pation, and innovative contentious performance
challenging the representativeness and account- tactics. For example, after 11 years of struggle,
ability of their own political systems (MacKin- changes from a guerrilla movement to a nonvio-
non and Feoli 2013). Some of these movements lent indigenous rights movement, and an agree-
seek to affect the polity in traditional ways by ment with the government (i.e., San Andrés
using the political institutions in place, while Accords) that effectively failed to translate into
others seek autonomy from the state and favor a more constitutional autonomy for indigenous
more horizontal and participatory process in de-
cision making (Sitrin 2012).
groups in Mexico (Trejo 2012; Inclán in this vol- culacho Popular (FEP) in Brazil and HIJOS in
ume), the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Na- Argentina, with their public humiliation protests
cional (EZLN) launched La Otra Campaña (The ( esculachos or escraches) against ex-military dic-
Other Campaign) in 2005. The campaign marked tators and torturers (Villalón 2008; Sitrin 2012);
a departure from previous efforts of the Zapatis- and the Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recu-
tas to achieve their goals within the framework of peradas with its tactics of occupying abandoned
institutional politics. Instead, they rearticulated factories and reopening them via self-manage-
their goals to advance their agenda by dissolving ment (Alcañiz and Scheier 2008; Almeyra 2004;
most power relations with governmental institu- Sitrin 2012). Most of these movements have
tions and institutional politics (Muñoz Ramírez specific goals, but they also intend to redefine
2003; Mora 2008). They created autonomous in- social relationships with state institutions by em-
digenous municipalities and Juntas del Buen Go- powering their members to actively take part in
bierno (good-government councils) to govern all decision-making political processes-using inno-
municipalities grouped into five regional clusters vative contentious tactics, rejecting classic forms
named caracoles. Positions on the councils rotate of hierarchical institutional politics, redefining
and are time-delimited, so each member learns political participation in less institutionalized
how to perform each position and all members of ways, and attempting to transform institutional
the municipalities can, at some point, be part of democracy to accommodate more horizontal and
the councils. inclusive patterns of political participation.
As noted by Mora (2008, p. 157), the councils
“coordinate activities with the health, education,
and agricultural commissions created to provide Conclusion
the EZLN bases with social programs alterna-
tive to those of the Mexican state.” In practice, This chapter charted the development of mobili-
all municipalities share and help others to pro- zation and state repression in Latin America by
vide education programs and materials, health- looking at two distinct periods in the region’s
care services and medicines, agricultural training history. During the pre-democratization period,
and products, and other services. It is a complex social movement and civil society efforts—while
and multifaceted system of self-governance that diverse and multifaceted—generally mobilized
brings autonomy from local and state political for more representative and liberal political insti-
bureaucracy to the Zapatista communities. Un- tutions, and against the authoritarian and highly
fortunately, this leaves the EZLN vulnerable to corporatist governments of the region. The state
state aggression. Reports of police abuses, un- responses to these movements varied accord-
justified imprisonment of community members, ing to periods of moderate liberalization or en-
illegal searches, and seizures of community land trenched authoritarianism, resulting in a pattern
increased in frequency during the Calderón ad- of political opportunity-based and threat-induced
ministration under the guise of the war on drugs mobilizations. During the 1960s and 1970s, an
(Earle and Simonelli 2011). increase in authoritarianism and brutal repres-
In similar ways, over the past decade many sion led to a period of movement radicalization
other social movements in the region have turned with the appearance of urban and rural guerrilla
to horizontal organizational processes, autonomy groups with violent contentious repertoires.
from the state’s political institutions, and the use The post-democratization period featured the
of innovative contentious tactics to advance their growth and diversification of social movements
goals. Some of the most salient examples include due to the opening of new political opportunities
the movimiento de asambleas (Almeyra 2004; brought by the democratization process and the
Rossi 2005; Villalón 2008) with their public as- erosion of social rights caused by the implemen-
sembly tactics and their reexamination of delega- tation of neoliberal policies. Mobilization during
tive democracy in Argentina; the Frente de Es- this period is not solely carried out to advance
54 D. G. Ortiz
identity issues, redress social rights, or struggles curbing Internet use during mobilizations, such
against anti-neoliberal policies, but also to cre- as the case of Egypt during the Arab Spring
ate more direct forms of democracy and politi- (Howard 2010; Howard and Hussain 2011). We
cal participation that break with the established also have examples of democratic countries at-
political power relationships in institutional poli- tempting to legislate restrictions to the use of
tics. Accordingly, the contentious repertoires of the internet, enabling law enforcement to block
social movements also expanded and diversified, access to entire internet domains (e.g., PIPA and
adapting to the new more permissive democratic SOPA in the USA), and the use of governmen-
context, becoming less radical but still disruptive tal agencies to monitor social media and other
and even quite innovative. At the same time, state internet sites in the name of national security
responses to mobilization became less overtly re- (e.g., the USA currently does both).
pressive and military forces were replaced with Finally, another significant trend of this last
professionalized riot police units. Widespread decade has been the development and expansion
torture, blatant human rights violations, and dis- of transnational networks amongst oppositional
appearances diminish considerably during this collectivities and civil society groups. Scholars
period. Still, police brutality and violence during have noted that a wide variety of indigenous,
the control of protests are common occurrences. worker’s, environmental, and other movements
Scholars exploring the relationship between have formed large transnational networks on
mobilization and state repression in Latin Amer- which they can rely to share experiences, ex-
ica have many potential opportunities for further change framing strategies, draw resources, and
research. Two areas in particular seem underde- plan simultaneous contentious actions or even
veloped in the current literature. First, as the transnational contentious campaigns (e.g., Ole-
current movements continue to adopt new con- sen 2006; Stewart 2006; Silva 2013). As these
tentious strategies, the use of social media has transnational social movement agendas develop,
become increasingly important (e.g., Valenzu- it will be important to understand what—if any-
ela, Arriagada, and Scherman 2012; Valenzuela thing—states and groups of states do to coun-
2013). Social media is being used not only as a teract such agendas. Under the authoritarian
resource to use in the organization and diffusion military regimes of the 1970s, the transnational
of contentious actions and social movement networks formed by various guerrilla movements
frames, but also as a defining feature relevant in the Southern Cone led the military regimes
to the very identity of some movements (e.g., of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
#YoSoy132 in Mexico; Tavera and Johnston in Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela to form
this volume). As the use of social media contin- regional operations to repress such networks,
ues to grow in significance for the development i.e., Operación Condor (e.g., McSherry 2002).
of social movements in the region, it will be Will similar transnational agendas for repressing,
equally important to examine how the state will controlling, or policing the activities of increas-
react to this trend. Will states engage in repres- ingly transnational social movements emerge in
sive tactics by restricting access and use of so- the region?
cial media during periods of high mobilization?
Will states enact legislation to restrict the use of
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Protest Artifacts in the
Mexican Social Movement 5
Sector: Reflections on the
“Stepchild” of Cultural
Analysis
Ligia Tavera Fenollosa and Hank Johnston
Social science perspectives on culture that pre- In protest studies, somewhat different ap-
dominated in the past stressed the interconnect- proaches to culture entered the field via the no-
edness of symbols, categories, and beliefs. Cul- tion of framing as an element in recruitment and
ture was a vast net and its influence was seen in participation, first through social psychology
the coordination of everyday behaviors and ritu- (Gamson et al. 1982) and then symbolic interac-
als. This view was built upon a “myth of cultural tionism (Snow et al. 1986). For about a decade,
integration” (Archer 1996, p. 2) that highlighted the framing perspective, especially in the elabo-
consistency of ideational orientations in social rations of David Snow, Robert Benford, and col-
groups, specifically ones that speak the same leagues (Benford 1993, 1997; Snow and Benford
language. Two generations of social scientists, 1988), and a renewed interest in the concept of
nourished by Durkheim, Kroeber, Boas, Bene- collective identity, which was kindled by Euro-
dict, and Parsons, mostly adhered to this view pean research in new social movements, were
of a uniform cultural fabric. Applied to politics the main carriers of cultural analysis in the field
and protest, a cultural emphasis typically took of social movement and protest research. Then,
the form of looking at beliefs, attitudes, and pre- the publication of Social Movements and Cul-
dispositions among different populations, taking ture (Johnston and Klandermans 1995), brought
measures of how these meanings were distrib- together the US and European perspectives to
uted, and linking them with political behaviors present several new analytical approaches from
(Inglehart 1990, 1997; Willdavsky 2006; Rochon various social science fields: rhetorical analysis,
1998; Jasper 1997). The presumption was that sociology of culture, narrative analysis, social
because all social action is preceded by ideations, psychology, and cognitive science. Since that
knowing how these meanings cluster can tell the time, there have been important additions to the
analyst much about patterns of behaviors such as cultural canon that have moved beyond framing:
voting or joining a social movement. Jasper (1997), Rochon (1998), Steinberg (1999);
Davis (2002); Young (2002); Stryker et al.
(2000); Ewick and Silbey (2003); Goodwin and
L. T. Fenollosa ()
Jasper (2004), Polletta (2006), to name a few. A
Department of Sociology, FLACSO México, México thread that was discernible among these studies
D.F., C.P. 14200, Mexico was that there is an inherent diversity and conflict
e-mail: ligia.tavera@flacso.edu.mx; taverafenollosa@ in the production of culture, directing analytical
yahoo.com
attention away from culture’s standard ideational
H. Johnston components toward the diversity of cultural pro-
Department of Sociology, San Diego State University, duction, discourses, and frames, and how these
San Diego, CA 92182-4423, USA
e-mail: Hank.Johnston@sdsu.edu; johnsto1@mail.sdsu. are reflected in what gets produced: texts, talk,
edu narratives, and cultural performances.
62 L. T. Fenollosa and H. Johnston
In recent years, developments in cultural so- recent cognitive reformulations of these concepts,
ciology have further torn apart the intricately such as schemata, algorithms, and grammars that
woven cultural fabric of decades past. They have are collectively shared (DiMaggio 1997; John-
politicized it, contextualized it, relativized it, and ston 1995, 2010). Packaged as “ideologies” and/
deconstructed it to further lay stress on culture’s or frames, ideational elements have always been
inherent diversity and to emphasize the conflict- key components of what a social movement is.
driven processes by which it is produced. These The key theme of postmodern cultural analysis,
new research foci questioned linear approaches however, is that there is always diversity and
to culture that measured attitudes, beliefs, opin- conflict in these ideas, rather than seeing them
ions, or frame content as causes of movement mainly as an integrating and coordinating force.
participation. Ann Norton, in her manifesto of The second dimension of cultural analysis is
cultural analysis in politics, states, “Culture is that of the performance. As a reflection of the in-
not a ‘dependent’ or ‘independent’ variable. Cul- fluence of cultural sociology, protest events are
ture is not a variable at all” (Norton 2004, p. 2). increasingly seen as protest performances—a
Her position is that because nothing is outside of subtle recasting of perspective that captures the
culture, any given society, social process, social dynamic unfolding of actions of diverse protago-
institution, or social movement organization can- nists (the protesting groups) and antagonists (po-
not have more or less culture. This view under- lice, bystanders, countermovement protesters).
mines standard approaches to social movements Briefly, performances are where the ideational
that seek to identify general models of their de- elements of the first dimension are acted out and
velopment and trajectories. For a long time, the given life. Most analysts today take as axiomatic
watchwords of modern cultural analysis such as that culture is not simply the sum total of indi-
narratives, text, discourse, metaphor, rituals, ac- vidually held beliefs, values, and understandings,
tors, and performances fell outside the commonly but rather is a reflection of how they are played
practiced research methods in the field. What is out in social performance or social action, stress-
a student of social movements to do in this situ- ing the agentic and collective aspects of culture
ation? How can we view protest mobilization in as well as its ongoing production and diversity
ways informed by three decades of theoretical of interpretation. Moreover, a cultural perfor-
work that redefines culture processes as ubiqui- mance is where artifacts are produced and/or in-
tous and relativizing, yet diverse, fragmented, terpreted. But also—and this is a central tenet of
and conflicted? contemporary cultural analysis—performances
themselves are “artifactual” in varying degrees
because they are “read as texts” and given signif-
Dimensions of Cultural Analysis icance by those also present at the action—their
audiences. Stated simply, performances are loca-
To help sort through these questions, we begin tions where culture is accomplished (Alexander
with three basic dimensions of culture: ideations, 2006, pp. 32–34). They represent both the per-
performances, and artifacts. They are closely in- vasive nodes of diversity and contention in cul-
terrelated and mutually reinforcing in contempo- ture as well as knots in the cultural net that binds
rary approaches to culture. In fact, they come as a individuals and groups together as interpretations
package—if there is intentional social action, you converge.
do not get one without the other two. Ideations Given the centrality of the performative focus
are the traditional stuff of cultural analysis such in current cultural thinking, and the hegemony of
as ideologies, frames, values, beliefs, mentalités, ideations on cultural theorizing of the past, it is
social representations, habitus, or more specific fair to say that the third analytical dimension—
norms of behavior, including understandings of the cultural artifact—is the “stepchild” of cultur-
normative forms of protest—the modern social al analysis. Like shards of pottery or funerary rel-
movement repertoire. We can also include here ics, the presumption seems to be that they can tell
5 Protest Artifacts in the Mexican Social Movement Sector 63
us about a culture, but not too much. Artifacts are less open-ended, less subject to social processes
produced either individually or collectively, such of interpretation, and therefore less necessary.
as music, art, literature, speeches, narratives, The other side of the coin, and especially for
videos, recruitment tracts, and other movement our purposes in thinking about Latin American
texts. Whether a product of one person’s cre- movements, is that there are political contexts
ativity or a collective endeavor, artifacts take on where—although interests, power, and organi-
significance because they are always interpreted zation are present—they are less determining of
socially by their audiences and constitute part of mobilization trajectories in relation to cultural
the ongoing creation of culture through subse- factors because of historical structural barriers
quent interpretation, although they have already and current political institutions. We especially
been “materialized” in their initial creation. They have in mind cases where democratic political in-
are closely linked with ideations because ideas stitutions and organizations of civic engagement
usually stand behind the production of an artifact, might be less elaborated.
or the expropriation of one, as we will discuss. Our focus on Mexico is guided in part by
However, artifacts are unique because, unlike this hiatus between political-process and cul-
ideas, they are concrete, material objects. They tural approaches to social movements. There
are important to social movement participants are, of course, no perfect democracies, and state
because, insofar as they invoke shared interpre- regimes vary on how they fulfill basic demo-
tations, they help bridge the inevitable diversity cratic requirements. Primary among these, and
of a movement. They also can foster collective central to the appearance of social movements,
identity around these shared meanings so that co- is responsiveness to citizens. When political
ordinated movement activities can occur. Their channels are closed, citizens will choose extra-
materiality means the analyst can point to them institutional means to voice demands and griev-
as evidence of his or her interpretation, to be ances. Especially among emerging democracies
judged by others. of Latin America, democratic structures of state
A shadow cast behind this chapter’s discus- administration are stained by the past, and politi-
sion of cultural analysis is its relation to structur- cal elites are often less responsive to citizen de-
ally based, political process approaches that pre- mands. Other residues of the undemocratic past
dominate in analyses of social movement devel- are patronage networks and corruption, which
opment. On the one hand, we hold that this well- citizens see as violations of equal access, and
known and widely discussed division between lavish lifestyles of elected politicians. It is not
culture and politics is really artificial in the sense surprising that in the summer of 2013, issues of
that all politics—the interests that drive them, the corruption and misapplication of taxes to soccer
structural relations that constrain them, and the stadiums ignited a wave of mass protests in Bra-
conflicts that define them—are cultural. Politi- zil. In another context—another time, place, and
cal contention obviously has its artifacts, ideolo- historical memory, protests might have been lo-
gies, and performances, all of which means that calized as simple, circumscribed policy demands
contentious politics can be analyzed with cultural to roll back bus fare increases. Similarly, it is not
tools and concepts. On the other hand, setting up surprising that the construction of a multimillion
the opposition between politics and culture can dollar monument in Mexico City became an icon
also be useful, as we will see. It is not uncom- of governmental corruption and unresponsive-
mon that certain instances of political contention ness for several Mexican movements and for
need the tools of cultural analysis more than oth- Mexican society at large—more on this shortly.
ers. To the extent that interests, political power, We build our presentation on the proposition
and structure are more central in a social move- that, where residues of a less democratic past per-
ment’s appearance and development, they may sist, as is the case in Mexico and several other
constrain it more, rendering the interpretation of Latin American states, cultural insights to mobi-
performances, ideologies, and artifacts relatively lization processes can be especially instructive.
We say this based on research on mobilization heavy with symbolism, that we identify as mate-
processes in repressive regimes, where symbol- rial and textual artifacts.
ism, double entendre, duplicitious organiza- There are “high cultural” artifacts of protest,
tion, and reliance on dissident networks among such as the plastic arts, poetry, literature, theater,
intellectuals take primary roles in oppositional music, even opera, and their counterparts in pop-
organization. The reason of course is that in re- ular culture: rhymes, music, jokes, masks (Guy
pressive states, channels of more direct conten- Fawkes), iconic symbols to name a few. It is fair
tious action are closed by the unresponsiveness to say that although social movement research-
of political institutions. We suggest that it is a ers widely recognize that cultural artifacts play a
plausible proposition that, in the balance between role somewhere in the mobilizing equation, they
political-process factors of interest articulation are often relegated to a secondary status—inter-
and political institutions and cultural factors of esting but peripheral. Yet, the songs of the civil
performance, artifactual definition, and social rights movement, the strong and chiseled images
construction, the latter—cultural elements of of workers in the labor movement’s posters, the
mobilization—may have significant weight. Not ubiquitous graffiti of the South American Left,
that political process elements are not relevant, not only represent movement ideologies and
but that important insights come from balancing shared injustices that animate their original pro-
them with cultural analysis. duction, but once “artifactualized” they invoke
To draw this paradox out completely, the pres- wide-ranging responses among the collectivities
ent chapter focuses on several mobilization sites where they come into play. More importantly, it
and moments drawn from the contemporary Mex- is hard to conceive of movement mobilization
ican social movement sector, where the tools of occurring without them. Is their ubiquity simply
cultural analysis—and especially the “stepchild” coincidental, or are analysts missing something
of cultural analysis, cultural artifacts—are rela- fundamental about their constitution? The point
tively more important. However, as we will see, is—and one of the insights cultural sociology
our analysis rarely loses sight of politics com- can offer protest studies—that such artifacts have
pletely. Indeed, even the most unlikely candidates, their own central place in the matrix of a social
those cases that ostensibly focus on cultural con- movement, one that is more than a mere reflec-
cerns—“high culture” such as intellectual discus- tion of important political and ideological forces.
sions and poetics—frequently are but symbolic The producers of these cultural artifacts, and the
representations of contentious politics. social embeddedness of the artifacts themselves,
and the diverse ways that audiences respond to
them, mean that the artifacts themselves can
Culture as Artifact play key roles in mobilization trajectories, as
social actors encounter them, appropriate them,
The question we pose is if there are instances discuss them, modify them, and perhaps further
where cultural artifacts move into more primary enhance their role. This means that the analyst
locations in the mobilization trajectories of social is well-served to consider cultural artifacts in
movements. In previous research in polities with ways that go beyond thinking of them as simply
less open channels of claim making, it has been “powerful symbols.” Highly relevant to a hand-
noted that movements often lay claim to material book on Latin American social movements, they
artifacts—places, music, iconic images, flags, may play especially prominent roles in less open
and monuments. These often become central political regimes where the expression of claims
sites of oppositional symbolism because other is restricted.
channels are closed. This is a proposition that In what follows, we will consider two pro-
we are developing, in general, with regards to test campaigns in the recent social movement
the role of culture, but here we refer specifically sector in Mexico that illustrate the centrality of
to those concrete cultural productions, typically a set of cultural processes that demonstrate the
complex and reticulated character of interpreta-

tion that centers on cultural artifacts when they
are seized (and produced) by social movement
actors. We begin our discussion with a cultural
artifact of monumental materiality, which, nev-
ertheless, triggers a wide diversity of interpreta-
tions as points of mobilization. We then focus on
the complex intertwining of performances, audi-
ences, and cultural artifacts in the #YoSoy132
student campaign. We conclude by pointing to
several ways in which cultural sociology gives
the social movement researcher a more elabo-
rated way of thinking about artifacts and protest
when the standard repertoire functions under lim-
ited constraints.
La Estela de Luz
The Estela de Luz (the Stela, or Monument of

Light) is a 341-foot tall quartz-inlaid monument
built in Mexico City by the federal government Fig. 5.1 The Estela de Luz, Paseo de la Reforma, Mexico
to commemorate the bicentennial of Mexico’s in- DF
dependence (see Fig. 5.1). Since its official—and
delayed—inauguration in January 2012, it has
become a magnet for protests and symbol of the In contrast, to the MPJD movement and many
corrupt and unresponsive regime of President Fe- Mexican citizens critical of the government, the
lipe Calderón. Its history not only affirms the im- Estela represents the corruption, ineptitude, and
portance of artifacts in mobilization trajectories, unresponsiveness of the Mexican state. This
but also highlights the contestation that some- interpretation was first introduced by critical
times surrounds their representation, in this case, sectors of the mass media in 2011, and gained
conflict between the Estela’s official significa- foothold in public opinion as revelations about
tion and the one attributed to it by regime crit- increasing costs, secrecy, and sweetheart deals
ics and, especially the broad-based movement, in its construction came to light. “All this repre-
Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad sents something about what we Mexicans have
(MPJD). For the government, in its own words, observed regarding the obscure, clumsy and of-
the Estela was intended as “A monument to look fensive governmental procedure, leaving today a
to the future, based on the memory of our strug- very clear Stela of Darkness”.2
gles. A stela to commemorate our nation’s most The architect that designed the Estela reported
important men and their acts. Located on Paseo pressure from the secretary of education to keep
de la Reforma, a place that is full history. Stela of silent about the corruption in its construction.
light. Commemorative Monument. Two hundred “Monumento a la corrupción” was the phrase
years of proudly being Mexicans.”1 used by the media to capture the essence of this
resignification. But the narrative put forth by the
MPJD movement recast these criticisms more
1
It is interesting to note that whereas the Mexican gov-
ernment stressed the orientation of the Estela toward the
future, the movement wanted to bring the past forward 2 http://nuestromedio.mx/colaboradores/el-mirador/3618
into the present through the resignification of the Estela. -una-estela-de-oscuridad.

broadly, placing them in the light of the govern- meeting with 2012 presidential candidates, and
ment’s policy failures, in particular, choosing to actively participated in the passing of the General
build a monument at a cost of $ 83 million dol- Law of Victims, a law that compensates victims
lars, over focusing on waging in earnest the war of organized crime.
against narcotraficantes, which has claimed the At this point, social-movements specialists
lives of 60,000 Mexican citizens3. The war itself might be asking if our discussion goes beyond
is a major challenge to the regime’s legitimacy the observation that artifacts can be symbols that
and reflects a crisis of state capacity within its strike powerfully resonant chords among the
own borders. The MPJD has grown significantly public. If that were all we are offering, a fair criti-
in recent years as a voice, not only for the fami- cism would be that we have accomplished noth-
lies of the victims but also all who live in fear ing more than renaming the idea of “mobilizing
and insecurity throughout Mexico. By situating symbolism,” which already is widely recognized,
the Estela’s significance in this broader context, although generally accorded a secondary role in
the movement generalized the oppositional sig- movement development. What is gained by call-
nificance of the monument from corruption to ing potent symbols “cultural artifacts” and situ-
state failure. This shift helped make it a potent ating them in contemporary cultural approaches
symbol in the social movement milieu in Mexico to politics and sociology? Is it one more addi-
in recent years. tion to the litany of terms that often confuses the
The MPJD is one of several instances of “pain dialogue between social movement research and
and loss activism” that have emerged in Mexico cultural sociology? What exactly are we offering
in the last years.4 It was triggered by the assas- here that is new?
sination in March 2011 of Juan Francisco Sicilia, Applied to social movements and from the
the son of poet and writer Javier Sicilia, three perspective of cultural sociology, the keys to the
of his friends, and two of his friends’ relatives. cultural artifact concept lie, first, in the tempo-
The movement has been extremely successful in ral process of how an object becomes an artifact;
mobilizing parents, relatives, and friends of the second, the diversity of interpretations that sur-
thousands of victims who had been killed, kid- round it; third, the ongoing process of its mul-
napped, disappeared, or arrested on trumped-up tifaceted redefinition that concentrates more
charges since the beginning of Calderón’s “war and more on widely shared representations; and
on drugs.” It has organized Caravans to the North fourth, its central role in mobilization as a trig-
and South of Mexico and to the USA, has held ger of these interpretations, which in the lexicon
an unlikely meeting with President Felipe Calde- of protest studies are called collective action
rón to discuss the latter’s war on drugs, held a frames. Traditional approaches might trace the
emerging oppositional significance of the Estela
as a shift in public opinion given impetus through
3
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_ameri- the media. The materiality of the Estela on Paseo
cas/calderon-finishes-his-six-year-drug-war-at-
de la Reforma and the ongoing public debate re-
stalemate/2012/11/26/82c90a94-31eb-11e2-92f0-496af-
208bf23_story_1.html. inforced these oppositional and critical interpre-
4 Other instances of political action motivated by person- tations among sectors of the population such that
al tragedies are: the kidnapping and murder of Fernando there was contestation over the meanings—the
Martí, the 14-year-old son of Alejandro Martí co-owner of official and the oppositional. From a perspective
one of Mexico’s largest sporting goods chain and found- of 30,000 ft, this view is not incorrect, strictly
er of Mexico SOS, a civil organization for security and
justice. Another instance is the kidnapping and killing of speaking, but for an accurate social science of
Hugo Alberto Wallace Miranda, son of Isabel Miranda de how artifacts affect mobilization, we need to be
Wallace who personally carried out the investigations that closer to the ground. Otherwise, the analyst will
led to the capture of his son’s killers and later founded the miss live processes by which social actors create
association Alto al Secuestro and has actively participated
with Martí and Sicilia in the drafting of the General Law culture through interaction around artifacts. Here
of Victims. is where cultural sociology can help us.
The emergence of oppositional signification municipal policy issue—but it quickly morphed

around a cultural artifact is a complex and mul- in a nationwide protest movement that, like the
tifaceted process. Cultural sociology informs us Mexican case, combined grievances against offi-
that we cannot treat it as a singular collective cial corruption, the unresponsiveness and venal-
manifestation at the level of “public debate.” ity of the political elite, and challenges that went
Rather, artifacts generate multiple symbolisms to the heart of the regime’s legitimacy. One pro-
that ripple through networks of personal relations tester spoke of Brazil’s political elites in words
where discussion occurs and understandings are that reflect how the stadiums—like the Estela—
collectively shaped situationally and interaction- were triggers for much deeper grievances: “They
ally. Unlike the monument itself, which is aus- don’t invest in education, and they keep putting
tere in its singular materiality in the heart of the makeup on the city to show the world that we can
Distrito Federal, analyzing the emergence of its host the World Cup and Olympics…. We work
oppositional significance directs analytical at- 4 months of the year just to pay taxes and get
tention to multitudinous smaller sites. These nothing in return” (Romero and Neuman 2013).
are places where microlevel collective perfor- Likewise, commenting on the Estela, a protest-
mances of personal understandings occur. These er said: “It could have been used elsewhere on
performances are also public tests—sometimes things we need, like public safety. It was a bad
tentative, sometimes assertive—of those under- investment.”5
standings. They are floated delicately on the wa- The starkly material monuments of soccer sta-
ters of others’ understandings, perceptions, con- diums, especially in the context of Brazil’s his-
firmations, modifications, and rejections thereof. tory as a soccer power and plans for the World
All these microperformances are made known Cup, became triggers for a reservoir of diverse
through collective exchange, discourse, storytell- meanings that coalesced around the accumulat-
ing, questioning, and so on. It is axiomatic that in ing illegitimacy of the government—again, like
interaction and talk, culture is made and artifacts the Mexico’s Estela. In Mexico, multiple opposi-
given their influence. tional meanings were given the Estela by differ-
For the analyst, any collective interpretation ent branches in the cultural matrix it generated.
of an artifact at the aggregate level must begin As a general observation, the official imagery of
as a groundswell here, an initial matrix effect, to a pillar of light carries very heavy irony indeed
coin a term, whereby interpretations are given life for many Mexican citizens, first, for those who
as they diffuse through networks of interpersonal see its construction as shrouded in darkness, se-
interaction through microperformances of the ac- crecy, and corruption. Second, commemorating
tor’s own understandings around an artifact. Only 200 years of the independent Mexican state with
later, when varied-but-convergent oppositional the metaphor of light contrasts with the “dark-
significations coalesce in larger performance ness” of federal and local officials on the payroll
sites, can they be further elaborated in larger col- of drug cartels and distrust and illegitimacy that
lective gatherings—protests at the Estela itself, many citizens hold for the officials prosecut-
for example—which occur frequently. When that ing the war on drugs. But also, different groups
happens, collective interpretations concretize have offered competing imagery. The false light
even more as the sites of collective performance of the Estela has been contrasted with the small
become larger and more widely shared. lights of the numerous vigil candles—velas—
This last process is nicely demonstrated in re- lit in remembrance of those lost in the war on
cent mass protests in Brazil in which multimil- drugs. Their families have paid the highest cost
lion-dollar soccer stadiums became artifacts of imaginable, and their losses are often compen-
protest. The huge popular mobilizations in Bra- sated with feeble investigations by the police,
zil, the largest in 20 years, were precipitated in
June 2013 by a 10 % fare increase for bus rid- 5
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/07/world/la-fg-
ers in Sao Paulo—a relatively straightforward mexico-monument-20120207.
obstructionism and a paucity of information, and cultural sociology in the same way that it has pro-
frequent blaming-the-victim insinuations instead test studies, even though “primary frameworks”
of empathy. are cultural productions par excellence (Goff-
Another alternative imagery is captured by man 1974). In protest studies, the framing per-
the word esquela rather than estela. The elon- spective has been applied by deemphasizing the
gated form of the monument is said to represent microprocesses discussed here, even though the
the elongated columns of death notices placed symbolic interactionist basis of framing stresses
in newspapers or gravestones. Emilio Alvarez their ongoing definition in ways that parallel the
Icaza, former president of the Commission of cultural matrix. In fact, as applied to mobiliza-
Human Rights for the Distrito Federal has spoken tion issues, frames are mostly conceived not in
of the Estela as the “Esquela de Luz” to represent their dynamic sense, but rather in terms of strat-
the association of the government’s policies with egy: how a movement’s message is framed, by
death. Due to its yellowish/greenish color and in leaders and activists, so as to maximize its impact
allusion to the putrefaction of the political sys- on audiences (see Snow 2004, 2013; Snow et al.
tem, the Estela has also been called “Estela of 2014). We close this section by pointing out that
Pus.”6 In a more humorous tone the Estela is also the matrix perspective developed here is able to:
known, especially among the youth, as the “sua- (1) reinvigorate framing as a microprocess based
vicrema” in reference to a famous vanilla cookie. on cultural accomplishment; and (2) indicate
By contrast with how activists widely accord the how cultural artifacts such as stadiums and mon-
Estela’s monumental presence with darkness, it uments function as triggers that activate certain
even provided the student movement #YoSoy132 framings. It is entirely plausible that every Mex-
with a symbol for their actions of resistance, ican critic of the Estela has a slightly different
where they were the beacon of light, not the gov- schema of understanding of it, but its artifactual
ernment, at a protest held at the base of the monu- materiality prompts them to initiate the interac-
ment. On that occasion a speaker said: “We have tion performances that, ultimately, redefine and
ignited a light in the country’s let us keep silent coalesce the interpretations such that the succes-
no more.”7 In clear reference to the Estela, the sive framings lead to collective actions.
movement has chosen as one of its leitmotifs: “If
we do not burn together, who will lighten up this
darkness for a genuine democracy?”8 The Video “131 Students from
As when Brazilian protesters see the stadi- the Ibero”
ums, or the Estela’s piercing shape seen from
surrounding streets in Mexico City, cultural Jeffery Alexander has noted that the development
artifacts act as entry points to diverse opposi- of highly complex, diverse, and differentiated so-
tional interpretations that define what is going cieties create the conditions for—and even the
on: corruption, venality, injustice, illegitimacy, necessity of—the transformation of rituals into
state failure, and so on. Here, cultural artifacts performances (2004, p. 540). In less developed
trigger collective action frames, in the lexicon societies, rituals are acted out according to well-
of the framing perspective, the diagnostic frame defined scripts, and their interpretations tend to be
that shapes interpretations of “what’s going on constrained and closed to debate and contention.
here.” The concept of framing has not animated Contemporary public performances, on the other
hand, are more contingent processes of symbolic
6 http://lastresyuncuarto.wordpress.com/2012/01/11/la-
communication, where actors have greater flex-
ibility and various audiences take greater liberty
suavicrema-de-luz/.
7 http://www.adnpolitico.com/ciudadanos/2012/05/23/ in interpretation. In cultural theory, performances
universitarios-del-movimiento-yosoy132-marchan-por- are everywhere: in politics, religion, economic
reforma. transactions, finances, and international rela-
8 http://www.yosoy132media.org/. tions (Alexander 2006). They comprise the web
of meaning creation and basis of contemporary Latin America, but also in the Middle East, Asia,
cultural analysis via narrative performances and and Africa.
reading social action as text. In the field of pro- #YoSoy132 is the most dynamic student mo-
test studies, it is not surprising that Tilly’s classic bilization Mexico has witnessed since the 1968
(1995) work on repertoires traces the transforma- student movement. It started as a protest action
tion of well-defined ritualistic collective actions against the manipulation of information by the
of rural villages and urban sans culottes charac- mass media and politicians—in particular mem-
teristic of traditional societies, to more flexible, bers of the PRI and PVEM—and quickly devel-
diverse, and audience-conscious contentious ac- oped into a broadly based student movement
tions characteristic of modern society—the mod- for democratization of the media, free, fair, and
ern social movement repertoire. informed elections, and opposition to the govern-
Protest events in the modern repertoire are ment’s neoliberal policies and human rights vio-
fundamentally complex performances as well. lations. It is the first nonpartisan national move-
They have diverse actors, audiences—of which ment to have emerged in the midst of an electoral
the mass media play a central role—and multi- campaign, and the first to have organized a de-
faceted interpretations based on perspective and bate with presidential candidates.9 It is a leader-
context (Johnston 2014). Their contingent ele- less, horizontal movement for real democracy
ments are often seen in the ways that they unfold reminiscent of predominately youth-based move-
in directions far from how their organizers origi- ments in Spain (M-15 or los indignados), the USA
nally planned them. But Alexander’s original (Occupy Wall Street), Turkey (Taksim Square),
observations on the topic were penned at a time and elsewhere that all supported heavy use of the
when researchers were just beginning to probe in internet’s networking functions via social media.
earnest the mobilization functions of the inter- At the theoretical level, the origins of #YoSoy132
net—let alone Web 2.0. At that time, Facebook lie at the intersection of performances, audiences,
was just being introduced and Twitter had not yet and cultural artifacts. In empirical terms, its ori-
appeared. Alexander could not have foreseen the gins can be traced to the PRI–PVEM’s presiden-
way that social media could transform the cul- tial candidate Enrique Peña Nieto’s visit to the
tural analysis of performance and artifacts, in- Universidad Iberoamericana, a private Catholic
deed, how performances can be “artifactualized” university in Mexico City.
and—as we will discuss shortly—vice versa, On Friday May 11, 2012, the candidate of the
how artifacts can take on qualities of performanc- PRI–PVEM to the presidency of Mexico, Enrique
es by being digitized and posted on a Facebook Peña Nieto, went to the Universidad Iberoameri-
page or blog. The Mexican student movement, cana as part of the “Forum of the Good Citizen,”
#YoSoy132, offers us a unique and contemporary which included individual lectures by presiden-
opportunity to reflect upon the effects of Face- tial candidates.10 He was received with hostility,
book, YouTube, Twitter, smartphones, instant
communication and digital recording, as well as 9
The debate was posted online and was viewed over
the theoretical relationship between performanc- 1.3 million times.
es and artifacts in the context of cultural analysis 10
Candidate Manuel Andrés López Obrador was the
of protests. Importantly, for a handbook on Latin first to visit the Iberoamericana on April 22, 2012 and
American social movements, it does this in a left the University amidst shoutings of President! Presi-
context that is generalizable: the Mexican state dent! http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=305260.Josefina
Vazquez Mota visited the Iberoamericana on June 4, 2012,
is a political regime still in a transition process, after the movement #YoSoy132 had taken off. Members
characterized by limited responsiveness and con- of the movement carried photographs of children’s ABC
strained openness to popular input to governance. daycare center killed by a fire in Sonora, Mexico in 2009.
Moreover, the case of #YoSoy132 can shed light Forty nine children were died and 76 others were injured.
The tragedy triggered another “pain and loss movement”,
on movements for increased democratic par- “Manos Unidas por Nuestros Hijos” (Hands together for
ticipation and political transparency, not only in our children). According to investigations by the move-
and during his speech was severely questioned ly not foreseen. Also, from the students’ perspec-
about the repression exercised on May 3 and 4, tive, their plans may have developed in unexpect-
2006, against the people of Atenco, members of ed directions. While students, in particular from
the Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra the Communications department, had discussed
(FPDT) and sympathizers of La Otra Campaña Peña Nieto’s record and had planned to question
and the EZLN, while he was governor of the state him about it, they could not have anticipated the
of Mexico.11 Just before he left the auditorium, direction events would develop. Beforehand,
Peña Nieto decided to answer this questioning. Peña Nieto’s appearance at the university could
With no hesitation he referred to the brutal re- have hardly been anticipated as a risky event. The
pression at Atenco as “…an act of authority, that Universidad Iberoamericana is an educational in-
I personally assume, in order to restore order and stitution where political opposition has been rare.
peace, within the Mexican state’s legitimate right And yet, in spite of attempts by his staff at pre-
to make use of the public force. This decision venting such oppositional performances through
was validated by the nation’s Supreme Court of bribing and intimidation (Muñoz 2011; Figuei-
Justice.”12 The audience strongly reacted to his ras 2012), his appearance at the Iberoamericana
authoritarian response. On his way out of the unfolded in such a way that his visit became a
university, Peña was chased by students who turning point, not only for his campaign and the
shouted,“Ibero doesn’t like you!”; “Out, out, entire electoral process, but also for the Mexican
out!”; “Coward!” and “Assassin!” and other ex- social movement sector.
pressions of rejection.13 His other activities at the The protest performance of Ibero students
university were called off and Peña Nieto left the was strongly condemned by some commentators,
university through a side door. ignored by others, and—especially significant
Apropos of Alexander’s (2012) observation for the movement’s development—purposefully
about the contingency of performances, suffice distorted by high-profile representatives of the
it to say that Peña Nieto had no idea of the full PRI and the PVEM, and major TV networks and
drama that was in store for him that day. He may newspapers. Among the politicians, the speaker
have anticipated such questions, but the heckling of the PVEM, the president of the PRI, and the
and lack of respect shown by students, and his leader of the PRI’s National Confederation of
rapid and less-than-decorous retreat were certain- Popular Organizations, all called into question
the identity of the protesters, casting doubts on
ment, the fire that killed the children was set intention-
whether they were university students at all, with
ally with the purpose to destroy documents related to the the implication that they were present as agent
debt of $ 10,000.000.000.00 (Ten Billion Pesos) gener- provocateurs from other parties. Such statements
ated during the administration of former Governor of So- undermined the autonomy of the students, mini-
nora, Eduardo Bours Castelo, in implementing his devel-
opment project program called “Plan Sonora Proyecta,”
mized the genuineness of their questions, and the
http://mexico.cnn.com/fotogalerias/2012/06/04/josefina- authenticity of their protest performance. The
vazquez-mota-visita-la-universidad-iberoamericana; events at the university were also undermined
http://www.sandiegored.com/noticias/37984/ABC-day- by the media sectors that either did not cover the
care-fire-was-started-on-purpose/.
11
event or edited out the demonstrations. In addi-
According to the National Human Rights Commission,
tion, newspapers linked to the official Mexican
repression at Atenco, where the rights of 209 persons were
violated, 206 people were harmed and tortured, 26 women Editorial Organization, the largest media orga-
were sexually assaulted and two males aged 14 and 20, nization in Mexico,14 reported a successful and
were killed, and is one of harshest in the history of social
movements.
12 Rosa Elvira Vargas, La Jornada, sábado 12 de mayo
de 2012, p. 5. 14 La Organización Editorial Mexicana publishes 70

13 See,for example, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= newspapers at the local, regional, and national levels, and
VCa1QwwwF6s; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= owns 24 radio stations, one press agency, one TV channel
xlqS1abNCkw. and 44 internet sites.
congenial performance by Peña Nieto—just the campaign of misrepresentation, and without the
opposite of what happened. students’ dramatic answer to it, the protest at the
The president of the PRI, Pedro Joaquín Ibero probably would have been soon forgotten
Coldwell, referred to the students as “a group as the media’s attention cycle moved on to other
of intolerant youth” as “a bunch of young peo- topics. Yet public policy research shows that the
ple who were not representative of the Ibero public image of a group is crucial to how its po-
community.”15 The leader of the National Con- sitions are accepted (Donovan 2001; Schneider
federation of Popular Organizations of the PRI, and Ingram 1993; Itkonen 2007), and protesters
Emilio Gamboa Patrón, declared that it was a with an unfavorable public image are more likely
responsibility of the authorities of the Ibero to to be ignored and discredited. The students were
investigate “who had been behind the students” not willing to let the official narrative attack go
who exactly had protested against Peña Nieto’s uncontested. Compounding their challenge,
visit to the Ibero.16 Finally, the speaker for the the battle for media coverage was played on a
Green Party, Arturo Escobar, while narrating tilted playing field. On the one hand, protesters
what was occurring at the university, said that need the media more than the media need them
protesters were not young, but were between 30 (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). On the other, the
and 35 years old; that there were “no more than acceptance of the official storyline for the pro-
20” and that “they were groups close to López tests reflects how public officials, political candi-
Obrador”.17 In an even blunter misrepresentation dates, and party representatives receive automat-
of the performance at the Ibero, newspapers such ic media standing, while movement actors must
as El Sol de México and La Crónica de Hoy pub- struggle to establish it. More so than in other state
lished on their main page, “Éxito de Peña en la regimes, mainstream media are not autonomous
Ibero, pese a intento orquestado de boicot.” At and neutral actors in Mexico, but are often agents
one point, and in ways similar to what occurred and handmaidens of the dominant groups that
in Egypt with Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English movements challenge.
channels (Alexander 2012, p. 68), videos were To this mix of protest performance and audi-
shown on YouTube that juxtaposed the relatively ence contestation, enter Facebook, Twitter, and
peaceful, supportive, and friendly scenes broad- smartphones into the mix. Social media hold the
casted by Televisa with images of students shout- potential to drastically decrease the need of tra-
ing at Peña Nieto. As one observer put it: “It was ditional media coverage by protesting groups.
just incredible. If you compare what happened Performances artifactualized through digital
with what was presented on TV, it’s just two dif- technologies can play a decisive role in shaping
ferent worlds.”18 audience’s perceptions, and can become integral
The students of Iberoamericana were offended elements in the unfolding of the protest perfor-
by the media’s negative characterization of them, mance. Consider the images of the slain body
by the incorrect reporting of the protest, and by of Neda Agah-Soltan, shot by security forces on
the general acceptance of PRI’s script for the June 22, 2009, during street protests as part of
events. In fact, without the officially coordinated the Iranian Green mobilizations against fraudu-
lent elections. The poignant image went viral
worldwide, becoming an artifact representing the
15
Figueiras Tapia (coord.) 2012. regime’s brutality and unresponsiveness. Such
16
http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/05/11/el-pri- images can challenge the regime’s self-character-
llama-intolerantes-a-los-jovenes-que-abucearon-a-pena- izations as moderate defenders of public order,
en-la-ibero.
as uploads of Syrian security sweeps in Homs
17 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hca6lzoE2z8.
and Aleppo do, and, conversely, can play a key
López Obrador was the presidential candidate of the Left.
18 http://classwaru.org/2012/06/11/yosoy132-student- role in challenging unfavorable characterizations
led-uprising-in-mexico-an-interview-with-patrick-cun- of protesters by powerful opponents, disputing
inghame-professor-mexico-city/. distorted media coverage and creating alternative
interpretations of events and persons. In addition, Through the consequential creation of a “digi-
they can contribute to disclosing in an unambigu- tal identity artifact,” students were able to tell
ous way the biased, partisan, and engaged role their side of their story. By showing who they
of mainstream media. Audio/video recording is a really were, students also made clear to the audi-
technology that presents opportunities for widely ence that they had been unfairly accused by PRI
dispersed performance artifactualization. and PVEM representatives and that media repre-
YouTube videos are seen by millions and dis- sentations were not bona fide, to say the least. In
cussed by media commentators, citizens, and ac- this way, they were able to actively participate in
tivists, making them available for new categories the construction of their public image: no small
of culture making. Regardless of the form which victory given the concentration of traditional
artifactualized performances take, their origi- media in Mexico and their enormous political
nal production occurs in contexts different from influence. In addition, by exhibiting their “true
their subsequent reading and/or playback, and identity,” students simultaneously displayed in
they become the focus of new performances and an unambiguous way the biased, partisan, and
give rise to different interpretations. An artifac- engaged role of mainstream media.
tualized performance has a cultural life different The video “131 Ibero Students” was widely
from the original, and invokes the active cultural diffused through digital networks. It was posted
practice of subsequent participants (Johnston on YouTube on May 14 at 14:25 and by 8:30 it
2009, 2010). had already been seen by 21,747 users. On Twit-
Outraged by the media misrepresentation of ter, it rapidly became a trending topic; the theme
the events at the Universidad Iberoamericana, “131 Ibero Students” occupied the first place in
and in direct response to PRI and PVEM’s high- the trending topic list until 19:00 h.19 Among
ranking members’ attempt at denigrating their the multiple interpretations that the video elic-
public image, students put together a video to ited, one in particular stood out. In the midst of
prove that the official narrative of events was conversations with friends, some of them from
false. Framed as an assertion of the students’ the Ibero, a student from the Tecnológico de
basic right to answer charges against them, the Monterrey in Mexico City, came up with the
video begins with a cover-letter introduction for- idea of creating the hashtag and a website titled
mat directly addressing the politicians linked to “#YoSoy132”—I am the 132nd (Figueiras 2012;
the PRI and PVEM who had aimed at construct- Muñoz and Desinformémonos 2011). Through
ing a negative public image of the protesters. this microperformance, digitized and artifactu-
Dear Joaquín Coldwell, Arturo Escobar, Emilio alized, the student symbolically joined the 131
Gamboa as well as media of dubious neutrality. We Ibero students who appeared in the video. In so
use our right to answer to a charge, to refute you. doing, he did not just express his personal sup-
We are students of the Ibero, we are not acarrea- port for their cause, but more importantly, he
dos [paid participants] we are not porros [thugs]
and nobody trained us for anything, and nobody expanded the cultural artifact by symbolically
trained us for anything, and nobody trained us for creating the slot 132, an empty space, a vacant
anything. And nobody trained us for anything. position, an unoccupied spot, to be appropriated
by anyone sympathizing with the students’ pro-
This initial presentation is followed by an 11 min test at the Iberoamericana. Symbolically, number
sequence of 131 young women and men facing 132 is a citizen of Mexico who is outraged, most
the camera, keeping still and simply holding immediately, by the misleading public declara-
their university IDs and pronouncing their names tions that followed the protest and/or enraged by
and ID number. No demands, no mobilization the biased, partial, and interested media coverage
calls, no requests for support. Protesters simply of the events. It is an artifact with diverse inter-
stressed, in a dramatic form, their identities as
students, and not outside agitators sent by oppo- 19 http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=307494; Figueiras Tapia
sition parties. (coord.) 2012.
pretations. But also, and more broadly, no. 132 media responses that it elicited show that digital
is outraged by the unresponsiveness and corrup- artifacts can be instrumental in bringing a move-
tion characteristic of institutional politics in their ment into existence. They attract diverse popula-
country, by the deficit of democracy that reigns tions, drawing them by the drama their presence
there, and by the entrenched interests that block as artifacts represents, and then plugs visitors into
political reform. These interpretations of the cul- spaces where information is passed and discus-
tural artifact further enhanced its role in a way sions hosted. This stands in contrast to relatively
that proved to be decisive for the mobilization fixed relations of the mobilization structures of
trajectory of the student movement. foregone movements. This particular case nicely
In the following days, mobilizations under the illustrates how cultural artifacts can be used in
hash tag #YoSoy 132 and under similar ones like the production of oppositional meanings and how
“#marcha YoSoy132” were called together. On the unfolding events and actions around them can
May 23th, between 15,000 and 20, 000 students become central to the identity and to the genesis
from private and public universities, young peo- of the movement. What we would like to stress at
ple, and ordinary citizens rallied at the base of the this point is that this occurred not by a movement
Estela de Luz, and that’s when the #YoSoy132 group plotting mobilization and framing strate-
movement took off. Since then, the movement gies, but rather by the complex and extensive
expanded at the national level. Student assem- intertwining of performances, audiences, and
blies were regularly held, and just about every cultural artifacts.
single university in the country set up its own Just as individual performances can be artifac-
branch. With an estimated 3.5 million people tualized and become a new kind of performance
voting for the first time in the 2012 election, the that produces a “cultural artifact,” the latter can
student movement radically changed the elector- also serve as the focus of further interpretations
al process by organizing a public debate with all and performances. Since they are concrete, ma-
presidential candidates—except Peña Nieto who terial objects, cultural artifacts can be discussed,
declined the invitation to participate—and by resignified, amplified, or expropriated for further
reintroducing uncertainty to the contest, which actions both by movement members and by non-
until the appearance of the movement was per- members alike. As noted earlier, artifacts take on
ceived as a sure win for the PRI by large sectors significance because they are always interpreted
of Mexican society. The movement went on after by their audiences. Interpretations are given life
the July 1st elections, held national meetings reg- as they diffuse through networks of interpersonal
ularly, and pronounced itself on every important interaction through microperformances of actors’
debate on the public agenda such as the reform to own understandings. Artifacts become the fodder
the educational system and the energy sector, and of oppositional microperformances as bystanders
of course, the democratization of the media.20 discuss them among themselves, commenting on
This brief chronicle of how the roots of the their meaning and audacity, and reacting, in some
#YoSoy132 movement are set in a social-me- instances, with new performances that, in turn,
dia-based, digital artifact that resonated broadly may enhance the oppositional role of cultural ar-
among Mexican youth shows that, rather than a tifacts.
ostracized stepchild in cultural analysis, cultural
artifacts—their production, their social embed-
dedness, and the ways audiences responded to Conclusion
them—can play key roles in the trajectory of a
movement. Indeed, the roots of #YoSoy 132 in This chapter has been built on the proposition
a much-watched online video and in the social- that where residues of a less democratic past
persist, as is the case in Mexico and other Latin
20 For more information see http://www.yosoy132media. American countries, cultural insights to social
org. protest can be particularly useful because direct
channels of political access are less open. This In sum, a fuller understanding of framing process-
proposition implies that in order to have a bet- es requires us to go beyond: (1) the ideational and
ter comprehension of social movements we need writings bias in the study of framing processes
to recognize culture as internally constitutive of and (2) the tendency to study framing processes
politics, warning us against the view permeating from an instrumental movement-centered per-
much current work on social movements whether spective.
from the political process perspective or the new Our two cases have also shown that staging
social movements approach, of culture and poli- a resonant protest performance can be in itself a
tics as two opposed spheres and joining recent major achievement in less democratic regimes,
work on the cultural analysis of social move- either by state obstruction, repression, or media
ments. manipulation. These cases have also demonstrat-
Three basic elements of cultural sociology ed that with the artifactualization of performanc-
have been identified to be particularly relevant es, either through digital technologies or creativ-
to the study of social protest: cultural artifacts, ity in the interpretation of symbolism, social
performances, and audiences. Regarding cultural movements can increase their oppositional ca-
artifacts, we have argued that they give the so- pacity. This has enabled movements to challenge
cial movement researcher a more elaborated way unfavorable interpretations by powerful oppo-
of thinking about mobilization processes. Rather nents, dispute distorted media coverage, influ-
than the stepchild of cultural analysis, or, as ap- ence audiences’ perceptions of the situation, and
plied to social movement research, just “potent circumvent surveillance and outright r epression.
mobilizing symbols,” we see; To close, we see this in a point of conver-
• The diversity of interpretations that surround gence between the two movements described in
them. Regarding the Estela, there is not only this chapter. Just like students at Iberoamericana
the official interpretation, the official and the were outraged, members of the MPJD have been
oppositional, but also multiple variant inter- profoundly offended by governmental attempts
pretations according to matrix branches at characterizing victims of organized crime as
• The movement of these various interpreta- “daños colaterales,” “mere numbers,” or “statis-
tions through branches of the cultural matrix, tics.” They have also been outraged by statements
where, through microperformances, they are undermining the innocence of the victims, sug-
reinforced, elaborated, tested, and proven gesting that those who are killed or disappeared
worthy, and then “must have done something” or “must have been
• Their coalescence around themes of general involved in crime related activities.” The tenden-
illegitimacy of the state as larger collective cy of Mexican authorities to assume that victims
performances, such as protests, marches, dem- are themselves criminals or are people related to
onstrations speeches, and so on, create sites of criminals has become a grievance that MPJD and
additional meaning making for participants, its founder, Javier Sicilia, have fought against
and provide for more broadly shared common throughout the campaign.
experiences. Also like #YoSoy132, the MPJD movement
• Cultural artifacts trigger the application of has been very successful at showing that this is
collective action frames, which, although not true. Its success has not been based on digital
highly variable (as they are individually held artifacts but rather, on simple performative acts
and stored in memory according to past expe- such as the pronunciation of the names of the vic-
rience), are “collectivized” in microperfor- tims and on small cultural artifacts. For example,
mances as individual actors discuss their inter- in spite of being inaugurated almost in secret, the
pretations with others—the collective process opening ceremony of the Estela was disrupted by
by which frames are congealed around shared a performance by the MPJD in which, in addition
interpretations. to candle lights, a speaker cried out the full name
of a victim while the audience responded “Should
not have died!” In addition to such performances, Benford, R. (1993). Frame disputes in the nuclear disar-
mament movement. Social Forces, 71, 409–430.
the movement has resorted to cultural artifacts Benford, R. (1997). An insider’s critique of the social
that aim at transforming the bold and cold num- movement framing perspective. Sociological Inquiry,
bers of Calderón’s war against drugs into par- 67, 409–430.
ticular, unique, human beings, with a name and Davis, J. E. (2002). Stories of change: Narrative and
social movements. Albany: SUNY Press.
a family surname. It has placed plates—similar DiMaggio, P. J. (1997). Culture and cognition. Annual
to the commemorative plates found on streets, Review of Sociology, 23, 263–287.
monuments, and other public places and reminis- Donovan, M. C. (2001). Taking aim: Target populations
cent of the nameplates at gravestones—on pla- and the wars on AIDS and Drugs. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press.
zas, buildings, and even at the Estela. The placing Ewick, P., & Silbey, S. (2003). Narrating social structure:
of the plates has not been uncontested, and local Stories of resistance to legal authority. American Jour-
as well as institutional authorities have removed nal of Sociology, 108, 1328–1372.
them, only in some instances to be later replaced Figueiras Tapia, L. (coord.). (2012). Del 131 al #YoSoy132.
Elección 2012. México DF: Comunicación y Política
by the movement or by the authorities them- Editores.
selves. When an ordinary citizen, a member of Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. Cambridge: Harvard
the neighborhood, or a visitor sees the nameplate University Press.
he or she is reminded that Calderón’s strategy Gamson, W., & Wolfsfeld, G. (1993). Movements and
media as interacting systems. Annals of the Ameri-
against drug dealers has cost a life, has destroyed can Academy of Political and Social Science, 528,
a family and has caused communities deep pain. 114–125
The nameplates trigger the application of collec- Gamson, W., Fireman, B., & Rytina, S. (1982). Encoun-
tive action frames that help build oppositional ters with unjust authority. Homewood: Dorsey.
Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (2004). Rethinking social
interpretations to Calderón’s official discourse, movement. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
which forced him to change it and publicly ac- Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial
knowledge the high social cost of his strategy society. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
against drugs, transforming also media coverage Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmoderniza-
tion: Cutlual economic, and political change in 43
and public debate on organized crime, narcotrá- societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
fico and state capacity. Itkonen, T. (2007). Politics of passion: Collective action
By focusing on the complex and extensive in- from pain and loss. American Journal of Education,
terplay between performances, cultural artifacts, 113(4), 577–604.
Jasper, J. M. (1997). The art of moral protest. Chicago:
and audiences we have presented a compelling University of Chicago Press.
explanation of contemporary social movements Johnston, H. (1995). A methodology for frame analysis:
in Mexico that goes beyond strategic approach- From discourse to cognitive schemata. In H. Johnston
es to protest, demonstrating the centrality of & B. Klandermans (Eds.), Social movements and cul-
ture (pp. 217–246). Minneapolis: University of Min-
cultural artifacts, and cultural analysis in gen- nesota Press.
eral, in explaining protest movements and their Johnston, H. (2009). Culture, social movements, and pro-
development. test. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Johnston, H. (2010). Cultural analysis of political protest.
In K. T. Leicht & J. C. Jenkins (Eds.), Handbook of
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and changing values. Princeton: Princeton University ford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micro-
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Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction & Fitzgerald, S. (2014). The emergence and devel-
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(Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements nineteenth century England. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
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Part III
Critical Themes in Contemporary
Popular Mobilization
Women’s Movements in Latin
America 6
Lynn Horton
Introduction are further undermined by limitations they face

in controlling their sexuality and gaining access
The trajectory of women’s mobilization in con- to safe, affordable reproductive health services,
temporary Latin America incorporates both im- and sex education. Much of this persistent in-
portant gains and ongoing challenges. With a equality is reinforced through gender ideologies
wave of legislative and policy reforms across which represent masculine-identified values,
the region, women had largely achieved formal traits, and activities as superior. Women’s contri-
equality under the law by the end of the 2000s. butions in the household, community, and nation
They engage in paid labor outside of the home are devalued and rendered almost invisible, even
in substantial numbers and are advancing rapidly as women are given primary responsibility for
in educational attainments. Yet women in Latin unpaid household and childcare labor.
America still face a range of challenges linked to Women’s individual and collective responses
the intersections of their gender, class, and racial/ to these patterns of exclusion and inequality have
ethnic identities. In economic terms, women are been diverse, shaped by distinct national histo-
concentrated in low-paying, precarious jobs in ries, cultures, and political processes. Likewise,
the informal sector. They earn 10–40 % less than their experiences as activists are mediated by
men on average, and 28 % of the regions indi- their gender, class, and racial/ethnic identities.
gent households are female-headed (World Bank For afro-descendant, indigenous, low-income,
2012, p. 7, 23). and rural women in particular, gender inequal-
Gender quotas, now in place in a dozen Latin ity is compounded with racial-,class-, and place-
American countries, have increased women’s based discrimination.
political representation, yet women continue to From this diverse panorama of feminisms
face gendered barriers to access and participate across the region, the sections below identify
in formal political arenas (Jaquette 2009). Within several broad stages of women’s mobilization in
the household, women must often contend with contemporary Latin America. The chapter first
unequal power relations and control of resources, explores mobilization of women in the 1970s and
as well as violence and sexism. The physical se- 1980s against authoritarian regimes and in favor
curity and well-being of Latin American women of nationalist, class-based causes. It examines
how women’s experiences of political opportu-
nity structures, movement recruitment, framing,
and identity-linked grievances have differed
L. Horton () from those of male-dominated movements.
Chapman University, 1 University Dr, Orange,
CA 92866, USA The next sections explore factors that shifted
e-mail: horton@chapman.edu women toward a second phase of greater feminist
80 L. Horton
consciousness in the 1990s, and how women’s This occurred in countries such as Argentina
movements have grappled with autonomy from and Chile, where authoritarian regimes sharply
leftist political parties and the state. Finally, this contracted spaces of formal political participa-
chapter identifies several ongoing salient issues tion by shutting down national assemblies, out-
for women’s movements, implementation and lawing political parties, and targeting male ac-
enforcement of gender equity laws and policies, tivists for repression. State violence intensified
diversity among women, and the gendered impli- women’s sense, outrage and grievances, espe-
cations of new social policies in the region. To cially as partners and family members became
illustrate these trends, this chapter draws on sec- victims. In the context of the collapse of formal
ondary materials, as well as 38 interviews con- political spaces of dissent, women mobilized in
ducted by the author with women activists at the informal spaces to advocate for human rights.
grassroots, regional, and national levels in Nica- They founded human rights organizations such
ragua and El Salvador. as Argentina’s Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the
family members of the detained and disappeared
in Chile, and El Salvador’s Mothers of the Dis-
Non-Gender Based Mobilization appeared (CoMadres). Women’s mobilization on
human rights issues was aided by traditional gen-
Women in Latin America have a long history of der norms in Latin America that have represented
mobilization on a variety of social and political women as apolitical, self-sacrificing, of supe-
issues. First wave feminists in the early twentieth rior morality, and subject to male protection. In
century struggled to achieve suffrage, democratic some instances, these paternalistic gender norms
reforms, and equitable family codes. The resur- offered women activists a degree of protection
gence of women’s mobilization in the 1970s and from state repression (Jaquette 2009).
1980s, however, had several distinct characteris- Women also integrated into more male-dom-
tics. While women in the region have always been inated nationalist, revolutionary movements.
aware of inequalities and gender discrimination, Movements such as the Farabundo Martí Nation-
women in this early second-wave did not neces- al Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and
sarily place gender equality at the center of their Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front
struggles (Craske 1999). Rather, they mobilized (FSLN) adopted a discourse of gender equality
in favor of democratic reforms, nationalism, and and actively recruited women into their guerrilla
socialism and against neoliberal economic poli- organizations. This recruitment of women grew
cies. Three national and global processes facili- out of necessity to build ranks, as well as leaders’
tated women’s collective activism: the gendered recognition of the ways women could subvert
characteristics of political repression by the au- traditional gender norms and make unique contri-
thoritarian regimes of this era; the rise of leftist, butions (Viterna 2013). Women combatants and
nationalist movements; and the impacts of neo- collaborators eventually made up roughly one-
liberal economic reforms on women. third of these revolutionary movements (Kamp-
Scholars have long emphasized the impor- wirth 2004; Luciak 2001).
tance of favorable political opportunity struc- A third factor in women’s early second-
tures to the emergence and effectiveness of social wave mobilization was the implementation of
movements in Latin America. Such openings are neoliberal economic reforms. Such reforms in
not universal in scope though, as they are inter- Latin America have typically included reduc-
preted and experienced differently by women tion of states services and subsidies, free trade
(Franceschet 2005). In particular, periods of na- policies, privatizations, and weakening of labor
tional transition and political realignment which protections. Scholars identify a male bias in the
disrupt and derail traditional male-dominated conceptualization and implementation of such
political spaces, institutions, and practices may reforms. In particular, the withdrawal of state
create new openings favorable to women’s services and more precarious work conditions
movements. disproportionately impact women in intersect-
6 Women’s Movements in Latin America 81
ing gender- and class-based terms (Elson 1992). larly, traditional gender norms and values, the
Low-income women, in their roles as mothers public/private dichotomy, locate women in the
responsible for family survival, had to deal with house, while “street” activities like politics and
intensified insecurity and stress, and further in- collective action are represented as the purview
crease in their already heavy, unpaid domestic, of men. Sexual double standards in Latin Amer-
and caretaking workload. In countries such as ica further discourage women from engaging in
Ecuador and Chile, women organized commu- collective action, as women who become active
nity kitchens and collectively mobilized to de- in social movements are often criticized for vio-
mand access to affordable housing, food, water, lating norms of female sexual purity. Community
and public transportation (Lind 2005). Similar to social networks in more traditional rural areas, in
women in human rights and revolutionary move- particular, can be quite critical of women’s activ-
ments, low income, urban women who mobilized ism, spreading gossip and stigmatizing women
against neoliberalism did not prioritize gender in- activists in as, for example, promiscuous, bad
terests. Rather, class-based concerns, moral out- mothers, and lesbians.
rage, and a commitment to nationalist socialism Central American grassroots leaders also re-
were key motivators. port widespread pressure and even violence from
male partners against women who are active in so-
cial movements. Male partners have reacted with
Barriers to Movement Participation jealousy and anger that women were perceived
to be neglecting their socially assigned domestic
Along with gendered political opportunities work and childcare responsibilities. According to
structures, women have faced gender-specific the activists interviewed, negative pressures from
material and social constraints to their full partic- partners lead many women to choose to abandon
ipation in social movements. This section draws participation in social movements.
attention on interviews conducted by the author In addition to these external factors, women
with grassroots and regional women movement leaders interviewed in Nicaragua and El Salva-
leaders in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Many of dor identified an initial reluctance to participate
the women who were later to form much of the in social movements because of internalized pa-
core leadership of contemporary feminist move- triarchal gender beliefs and norms. They b elieved
ments began their activism in leftist, revolution- political activity is only for men and that women
ary movements, the FMLN in El Salvador and lack the knowledge and skills to participate in
the FSLN in Nicaragua. movements, much less assume leadership posi-
In the interviews, women identified gender- tions. Many grassroots leaders reported that in
specific material and sociocultural factors that their early days, social movements were an un-
have shaped their ability and willingness to join familiar, frightening environment. Many had
social movements. First, women overall have un- to overcome their fears of speaking in front of
equal access to social and economic resources, groups, joining a protest, and facing police or
and face cultural and power inequalities that military forces, through medium- to long-term
especially constrain low-income women. Grass- processes of empowerment that were qualitative-
roots leaders in Nicaragua and El Salvador, for ly different from pathways of their male move-
example, report that even small expenses like ment counterparts.
missing several hours of work or paying bus fare
to attend a meeting are serious obstacles for poor
women. Gendered Movement Resources
Economic barriers are compounded by the
gendered division of labor that gives women pri- If Latin American women have had to contend
mary responsibility for childcare and domestic with gendered obstacles in their activism, con-
labor. Women’s double shift restricts the time and temporary women’s movements have also had
energy they have available for activism. Simi- access to key resources: transnational gender
82 L. Horton
advocacy networks and motherhood frames. The motherhood frame has been an important
Transnational gender networks in Latin America tool to gain access to both formal and informal
date from the 1975 UN Women’s Conference political spaces. Women have engaged in collec-
held in Mexico City. In the 1980s, Latin Ameri- tive action and politics representing themselves
can women held a series of regional encuentros as apolitical, self-sacrificing mothers, a frame
to develop regional policy agendas and strategies that deflects potential criticism of their trans-
(Chinchilla and Hass 2007; Alvarez et al. 2002). gressions into traditional male-centric spaces of
These linkages have provided women’s move- political activities. The motherhood frame is also
ments with access to international resources, ex- effective because it taps into gendered values and
pertise, and new spaces of participation (Craske beliefs, shared across left-right political lines,
and Molyneux 2002). They have also facilitated that mothers exercise a superior moral authority.
the development of organizational capacity and For human rights groups such as the Mothers of
aided women’s movements in holding national Plaza de Mayo who mobilized during Argentina’s
governments accountable. dirty war, this frame provided a degree of protec-
On an ideological level, Latin American tion from state-sponsored repression, torture, and
women activists have appropriated, adapted, and imprisonment.
transformed transnational feminist discourses. It is important to note that women employed
Even in the 2000s, however, the term feminist maternal frames as a type of strategic essential-
is still resisted in the region. Some grassroots ism, emphasizing in their discourse and actions
activists in El Salvador, for example, were re- directed toward external audiences idealized and
luctant to take on a term they associated with simplified representations of mothers. A potential
radical and foreign ideas. Transnational linkages concern is that the heavy reliance on motherhood
may also reproduce unequal power relations frames may undermine women’s other interests
between more well-off Northern feminist activ- and identities. While effective on certain issues
ists and Latin American feminists they support such as human rights issues, it may limit both the
(Thayer 2010). scope and forms of women’s activism in the re-
Frames are another critical moral and sym- gion (Jaquette 2009).
bolic resource for social movements and the Yet activists did more than simply reproduce
repertoire of frames available to women’s move- traditional gender images. They also exercised
ments has been distinct from those employed by militant or politicized motherhood as asser-
male-dominated movements. Above all else, the tive and proactive political subjects. Grassroots
frame of motherhood has been at the center of movements of low-income urban women, for
women’s mobilization in Latin America as a tool example, mobilized as mothers to advocate for
which shapes both how collective action is inter- the survival of their families. In doing so in coun-
preted by activists themselves and perceptions of tries such as Ecuador and Chile, they took private
external audiences. “family” problems and brought them to the fore-
Frames are employed by social movements to front as political issues, linked to state policies
recruit new members and gain external support and subject to collective action (Cosgrove 2010;
for causes (Snow and Benford 1992). They are Chinchilla and Hass 2007; Lind 2005).
particularly effective when they resonate with Salvadoran and Nicaraguan women who
existing values, beliefs, norms, and symbols. In joined leftist guerrilla movements also engaged
Latin America, the motherhood frame has served in activities that expanded their individual identi-
as a master frame that incorporates widely held, ties beyond that of mother and pushed the bound-
culturally embedded constructions of women’s aries of traditional gender roles. While both the
roles in society. Yet, motherhood frames have FMLN and the FSLN adopted explicit policies
also been complex and adaptive. They have both of gender equality in the 1980s, in practice ma-
reproduced and contested traditional gender rela- chista beliefs and practices persisted. The disrup-
tions (Bayard de Volo 2001). tions and exigencies of war conditions in both
countries, however, did offer new opportunities the signing of peace accords in Central America.
for women. Along with more traditional caretak- Overall, democratization has had a complex im-
ing and support activities as cooks, radio opera- pact on social movement strength and levels of
tors, teachers, and political officers, Salvadoran mobilization and in some countries, the reopen-
women activists recalled with pride the harsh ing of formal politics and increased strength of
conditions they endured and their combat roles in political parties have led to a demobilization of
war zones. In Nicaragua in the 1980s, with male social movements. As with the earlier shifting
labor shortages, women carried out nontradition- political opportunity structures, these processes
al agricultural work and served in the armed forc- have been interpreted and experienced differ-
es and militias. These gender-transgressive ac- ently by women who faced both new gendered
tivities allowed women to gain self-confidence, barriers and new opportunities under formal de-
develop new skills, expand social networks, and mocracy and peace settlements (Waylen 2007;
contest sexism. Likewise, women drew attention Friedman 2000).
directly on these skills and empowerment in their The experiences of women in postwar El Sal-
subsequent years as they moved into leadership vador and Nicaragua provide insights into the fac-
roles in feminist movements with explicit, central tors that facilitate this shift in women’s grievances
goals of gender transformation and equality. and consciousness toward feminist forms of ac-
tivism. During the war years in Central America,
many leftist women activists practiced double
Post-Transition Marginalization militancy as they participated simultaneously in
feminist and revolutionary/leftist organizations
Women’s mobilization on human rights, house- (Shayne 2003). In the post-transition era, however,
hold survival, and class-based nationalism sug- some moved toward greater autonomy from both
gest that the grievances that move women toward leftist political parties. Under Nicaragua’s civil
collective action cannot be assumed or be taken war and economic crisis of the1980s, the FSLN
for granted. Rather they are complex, and under- subordinated women’s issues to broader goals of
go multiple phases in which gender grievances national unity. After the FSLNs 1990 electoral de-
become more or less salient. Molyneux (1985) feat, women’s movements loosened their ties to
suggested that low-income women tend to priori- the party and moved toward greater autonomy.
tize practical gender interests, day-to-day surviv- Similarly, in El Salvador, with the 1992 peace
al needs, not necessarily analyzed from a gender accords and renewed democracy, newly revital-
perspective. In contrast, strategic gender interests ized, male-dominated political parties resisted the
focus on longer term gender equality and trans- full incorporation of women. Across the region,
formation of gender roles and norms. Recent sexist beliefs and practices have persisted even
scholarship suggests this is more complex than in leftist parties with a formal discourse of gen-
a straightforward dichotomy and the 1990s and der equality, and men have been often reluctant
2000s saw a growth of women’s movements in to share power with women (Kampwirth 2004;
Latin America that emerged from largely class- Luciak 2001). Women activists often carry out
based, and democratic reform movements to vital, behind the scenes work in forming and
focus directly on gender issues (Stephen 1997). maintaining social networks that is less promi-
It should be noted that in this period women in nent and less valued than men’s roles in social
grassroots movements often did not always self- movements. This relative invisibility of women’s
identify as “feminist,” a term still sometimes contributions during the war years in El Salva-
identified as “foreign” and “radical,” and inap- dor undermined women’s claims to equal treat-
propriate for the Latin America. ment and inclusion in the postwar period. Female
This transformation took place in the context FMLN leaders, for example, were pressured to
of the emergence and consolidation of demo- return to more limited domestic roles when the
cratic regimes in much of Latin America and war ended.
84 L. Horton
Salvadoran women activists interviewed sug- with a broader pattern of identity-based social
gested that rather than drawing attention on the movements whose goals focus less on formal
motherhood frame to contest this reimposition of political processes and changing laws and poli-
traditional gender norms and roles, they chose to cies (Alvarez et al.1998). Rather they work in
emphasize their nontraditional contributions dur- the arenas of culture and everyday life, to contest
ing the war years. They highlighted their courage, patriarchal beliefs and practices. Autonomous
sacrifices, and physical endurance to strengthen feminist movements have worked to transform
their claims for postwar material resources and gender power relations and reshape of gender
access to leadership positions. A second impor- values, beliefs, and roles. They challenge the
tant strategy of women’s movements vis-à-vis gender division of labor, sexual double standards,
leftist political parties has been to create more and promote women’s access to safe affordable
autonomous women’s movements that place gen- reproductive services.
der issues at the forefront. In contrast, women activists known as the
The reemergence of political parties has also institutionalistas have entered the new institu-
brought to the forefront partisan divisions and po- tional spaces that opened up in the post-transi-
litical differences among women. Such divisions, tion period with the creation of new government
of course, have long existed in Latin America women’s ministries and offices to promote gen-
as women have mobilized on both the political der equality and gender sensitive public policy
left and right (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001). formation and implementation. Parallel to these
In Nicaragua, for example, women in the rural state offices, the 1990s saw a sharp increase in
war zones were deeply polarized into pro- and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
antirevolutionary camps through the 1990s. Just Latin America who focused on carrying out
as women on the left have used a militant moth- gender-linked development projects and social
erhood frame to legitimize their political activ- services delivery. A well-studied case of such
ism, conservative women have framed their mo- institutionalization is Chile’s National Office
bilization as a defense against the breakdown of for Women’s Affairs (SERNAM). Many of the
the traditional family. One post-transition strat- women who joined SERNAM were of middle-
egy that women’s movements have employed to and upper-class women, following the broader
overcome such partisan differences has been to trend of the professionalization, technification,
identify specific issues where women can form and “NGOization” of advocacy on women’s is-
coalitions across party lines, such as campaigns sues (Franceschet 2005).
against domestic violence and sexual assault. Several potentially negative implications of
this trend can be seen. First, as with the other so-
cial movements, feminists who closely interact
Movement Autonomy and States with the state risk depoliticizing gender inequali-
ties, obfuscating conflicts, and deradicalizing
Issues of autonomy have also characterized the both the underlying analysis and proposed solu-
post-transition relationships of women’s move- tions to gender inequalities. Women’s agencies
ments with the state. Across the region in the may end up reinforcing traditional gender roles
post-transition era, governments created new or risk being defunded or shut down by conser-
women’s ministries and offices, and movements vative governments. Women with more critical
responded in distinct ways to this mainstreaming perspectives risk losing their employment if they
and institutionalization of gender issues. On the are outspoken, and more transformative feminist
one hand, movements known as the autonomas projects and processes are less likely to receive
sought to maintain women’s movements inde- funding. Activist leaders who take positions in
pendent from the state. These movements tend to government offices may also be co-opted as their
be staffed by volunteers and operate with limited more favorable salaries, work conditions and
funding (Alvarez 2009). Their approach aligns funding, distance them from the grassroots base.
SERNAM, for example, did not support of mutual support, and overcome fears of partici-
Chilean feminist campaigns to legalize divorce pating in traditional masculine political activi-
or therapeutic abortion (Chinchilla and Haas ties. Women’s movements have contested narrow
2007). Likewise, in post-transition Chile, a gap conceptions of citizenship and democracy, argu-
has opened between middle- and upper-class ing that democracy must occur in both the nation
women working for state and professional NGOs and the home. They have had some limited suc-
and grassroots organizations in working class cesses in challenging sexist values, norms, and
neighborhoods, weakening representation and practices at the level of communities and house-
accountability within and among women’s move- holds. Although, there has been unity around
ments. campaigns on topics such as domestic violence,
On the other hand, women’s movements en- sexual assault, other issues such as abortion and
gagement with the state has advanced gender reconfiguring the gender division of labor and
equality as government women’s offices and gender roles remain controversial and still divide
ministries have initiated and facilitated legisla- women.
tion and policy shifts on issues such as gender While Latin America women have largely
discrimination in the workplace, domestic vio- achieved formal equality under the law, other im-
lence, sexual assault, marriage and family law, portant challenges remain, notably the implemen-
and reproductive rights (Cosgrove 2010). Wom- tation and enforcement of existing gender legis-
en’s offices have also monitored state policies lation and policies; tensions of diversity within
and facilitated the implementation of gender- women’s movements; and feminist responses to
based projects and services. Research suggests second stage social policy reforms.
as well, that movements can be most effective in First, a lack of resources for enforcement, re-
periods of realignment where political parties are sistance on the part of male-dominated institu-
actively striving to build a base of support by ap- tions to put greater gender equality into practice,
pealing to women’s movements (Waylen 2007). and the broader sexist beliefs and values in the
spaces of everyday life have contributed to inad-
equate implementation and enforcement of gen-
Movement Outcomes and Future der-equitable legislation and policies and contin-
Challenges ued unequal outcomes. Likewise, while gender
quotas have increased women’s representation
By 2010, the list of achievements of women’s in Latin American legislatures, concerns remain
movements in Latin America in the formal policy about the substantive content of women’s partici-
and legislative realms was substantial. In a norm pation in formal politics. Women may enter poli-
cascade, governments across the region have ap- tics in greater numbers, but do not necessarily
proved laws promoting formal gender equality. use this newly gained access to advance gender
Family codes and labor codes no longer discrimi- equality.
nate against women, and gender quotas promote Women activists suggest that the presence of
the participation of women in politics in a dozen women in positions of power should not be mere-
countries. Progress on reproductive rights and is- ly symbolic. Rather, women need to bring gender
sues such as same sex marriage has been slower, consciousness to formal political spaces; focus-
in part linked to the continued social and political ing not only on traditionally feminine issues, but
influence of the Catholic Church. also applying a gender lens to broader sociopo-
Women’s movements have achieved other im- litical issues. They also emphasize the need for
portant, but less easily measured gains. Through a multifaceted approach toward gender advocacy
their participation in movements, women activ- that operates on multiple levels. Legislative and
ists have experienced individual and collective policy reforms are necessary but not sufficient.
empowerment, a transformation of conscious- Feminists continue to work to chip away patriar-
ness. They have gained greater voice, built ties chal beliefs, values, and practices at the level of
86 L. Horton
the household and community, as well as in na- stress and responsibility for family survival.
tional institutional spaces and at a transnational Scholars and activists argue that attention must
level. focus on unequal gender power relations and
A second challenge for women’s movements structural inequalities, as well the transforma-
is that of diversity among women. Scholars note tions of masculinities in the region, traditionally
that it cannot be assumed that women’s move- linked to multiple sexual partners and disengage-
ments are internally democratic or inclusive. ment in the economic and emotional caretaking
Women’s movements in Latin America have of children and domestic labor.
often failed to fully represent the perspectives Finally, the pathways of women’s move-
and needs of poor and working class women, ments in Latin America can also enrich and in-
lesbians, and indigenous and afrodescendant form social movement theory on the region more
women. Women confront inequality and exclu- broadly. They suggest that rather than taking the
sion not only linked to gender identity, but also experiences of largely male-dominated social
to class, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, able- movements as universal, there is a need to exam-
bodiedness, etc. ine how political opportunities, and movement
A particularly salient case is that of indig- grievances, recruitment processes, and framing
enous women. Indigenous movements have been repertoires are also mediated and shaped by gen-
highly mobile in the twenty-first century and der and other core identities.
made important gains in recognition of land and
cultural rights and constitutional reforms. Yet
indigenous women’s identities are multifaceted References
and fluid, and they face exclusion and margin-
alization on multiple dimensions, issues that are Alvarez, S. E. (2009). Beyond NGO-ization? reflections
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not adequately addressed in the regions feminist Alvarez, S. E., Dagnino, E., & Escobar, A. (Eds.). (1998).
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class women (Speed et al. 2006 ; Richards 2004). latin american social movements. Boulder: Westview
In response, women have negotiated an “indig- Press.
Alvarez, S. E. et al. (2002). Encountering Latin American
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indigenous organizations and racial exclusion Bayard de Volo, L. (2001). Mothers of heroes and mar-
in feminist organizations (Hernández Castillo tyrs: Gender identity politics in nicaragua, 1979–
2010). Indigenous and afrodescendant women 1999. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Chinchilla, N., & Liesl Haas. (2007). De Protesta a Pro-
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greater voice, visibility, and recognition of and American Feminism. In E. Hershberg & F. Rosen
respect for cultural differences. (Eds.), Latin America after neo-liberalism: Turning
A third issue for women’s movements is the the tide in the 21st century. New York: New Press.
Cosgrove, S. (2010). Leadership from the margins:
recent shift in government social policies. In Women and civil society organizations in Argentina,
contrast to earlier, more stark neoliberal reforms Chile, and El Salvador. Rutgers University Press:
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Cambridge: Polity Press.
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human capital. Feminists have raised concerns, the politics of rights and democracy in Latin America.
however, that such social programs targeting London: Palgrave.
women further entrench gender stereotypes that Elson, D. (1992). From survival strategies to transforma-
tion strategies: Women’s needs and structural adjust-
women’s primary role and responsibility is that ment. In L. Benería & S. Feldman (Eds.), Unequal
of the mother; the self-sacrificing, caretaker of burden: Economic crisis, persistent poverty, and
the family, community, and nation. As such, new women’s work. Boulder: Westview Press.
social policies may place additional burdens on Franceschet, S. (2005). Women and politics in Chile.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
low-income women, already overwhelmed with
Friedman, E. J. (2000). Unfinished transitions: Women Richards, P. (2004). Pobladoras, indígenas, and the state:
and the gendered development of democracy in Ven- Conflicts over women’s rights in Chile. New Bruns-
ezuela, 1936–1996. University Park: Penn State Uni- wick: Rutgers University Press.
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González, V., & Kampwirth, K. (Eds.). (2001). Radical in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba. Brunswick: Rutgers
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Hernández Castillo, A. (2010). The Emergence of Indig- and Cycles of Protest. In A.D. Morris & C.M. Muel-
enous Feminism in Latin America. Signs, 35(3), ler (Eds.), Frontiers in social movement theory. New
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Jaquette, J. S. (Ed.). (2009). Feminist agendas and Speed, S., Hernández, A., & Stephen, L. (Eds.). (2006).
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Luciak, I. (2001). After the revolution: Gender and cesses of mobilization in El Salvador. Oxford: Oxford
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Latin American Social
Movements and the Social 7
Forum Process
Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, Natasha Radojcic, Ellen

Reese, Elizabeth Schwarz and Christopher Vito
Introduction The Origins and Development of the

WSF
Since its founding meeting in Porto Alegre, Bra-
zil in 2001, the World Social Forum (WSF) has The WSF grew out of earlier movements resist-
quickly become the largest international gathering neoliberal globalization. Such movements
ing of progressive social activists seeking to re- were initially strongest in the global south, where
sist neoliberal globalization and to democratize protests in the 1970s and 1980s emerged against
the global economy. The WSF process has since structural adjustment programs, the Internation-
spawned local, national, regional, and thematic al Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. These
forums both within Latin America and world- movements were reinvigorated and became more
wide. At these meetings, and the process through visible within North America by the Zapatista
which they are organized, activists from a va- rebellion in Mexico in 1994, the international
riety of movements exchange ideas, build their encounter against neoliberalism organized by the
networks, and organize collective actions. This Zapatistas and their supporters in 1996, and the
chapter provides a brief overview of the origins Battle in Seattle protest targeting the World Trade
of the WSF process, its main participants, and Organization in 1999 (Smith et al. 2007).
how social movements within Latin America The WSF was conceived as the popular alter-
have related to it and use it to advance their goals. native to the World Economic Forum (WEF), an
Latin American activists played key roles in the annual gathering of international business leaders
formation of the WSF. While this experience that took place in Davos, Switzerland. The WEF
has helped social movements both within Latin had been meeting under that name since 1987,
America and beyond to advance their objectives, and grew out of earlier gatherings of European
gaining recognition within this process has been business leaders that had been occurring since
easier for some movements than others. 1971. In 2000, activists held the first counter-
event to the WEF, known as the “alternative
Davos” or “anti-Davos” forum. Activists from
around the world participated, including the Bra-
zilian Landless Rural Workers, the World Forum
of Alternatives, the World March of Women, and
the Association for the Taxation of Financial
E. Reese () · I. Breckenridge-Jackson · N. Radojcic · Transactions for the Aid to Citizens (ATTAC).
E. Schwarz · C. Vito The event included workshops as well as a press
University of California, Riverside, USA
e-mail: ellen.reese@ucr.edu
90 I. Breckenridge-Jackson et al.
conference and a protest demonstration outside bisexual, and transgender people, etc.), and the
of the WEF meetings (Teivainen 2002). antiwar movement. Armed movements, such as
That same year, plans for the first WSF the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-
were hatched. The initial idea for the WSF was bia (FARC) and Zapatistas, were not invited to
conceived by Oded Grajew, who led the Brazil- participate in the WSF process, however, because
ian Entrepreneurs’ Association for Citizenship. of their reliance on violent tactics. Initially, the
Plans for the first WSF were developed through a Association of the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo
meeting that took place in Paris in 2000 between from Argentina was also not invited to participate
Grajew, Bernard Cassen (chair of ATTAC), and in the WSF, but the Landless Workers’ Move-
Francisco (Chico) Whitaker, a Brazilian activ- ment in Brazil protested its exclusion and paid
ist and Workers’ Party leader. The three activists for the airfare of its leaders so they could attend
agreed to hold the first WSF meeting in Porto (Harris 2002). Although the WSF is nonpartisan,
Alegre, Brazil, in 2001 at the same time as the the Workers’ Party has helped to finance the WSF
WEF meetings in Davos. The future WSF meet- meetings in Brazil and leftist politicians associat-
ings would facilitate organized responses to the ed with this party and leftist parties in other coun-
WEF meetings. Porto Alegre was seen as the tries have been featured speakers at the meetings.
perfect venue for the first WSF meeting since it While some WSF participants espousing direct
had become a stronghold of the Workers’ Party forms of democracy and more autonomous and
and the city had recently adopted a participatory horizontal forms of organizing have been critical
budgeting process, in which popular groups were of the interconnections between left parties and
involved in the allocation of public resources politicians in the WSF process, other leftists have
(Teivainen 2002; Smythe 2011). promoted these interconnections.
Whereas the WEF draws international busi- The WSF is organized by an international
ness leaders, the WSF brings together activists council, comprising representatives from vari-
opposed to neoliberalism, including representa- ous activist organizations around the world, and
tives from various grassroots social movements a local organizing committee based in the city
and progressive organizations. By the time the and country hosting the forum. The international
first WSF meeting was held in 2001, neoliberal council decides where and when the WSF will
reforms had spread throughout Latin America. take place and develops general policies regard-
Although the Chavez and Castro administra- ing how the meetings will be organized and fund-
tions have been more openly resistant to these ed. The organizing committee makes decisions
reforms, many left parties in Latin America were regarding the logistics of the meeting and works
taking neoliberalism for granted. Yet, popular to secure resources and participation by local
resistance to neoliberalism in Latin America was and regional volunteers and organizations. In its
growing (Almeida 2007), taking both nonviolent early years, the international council tended to be
and violent forms. For many, the WSF process dominated by organizations from Latin America,
was seen as a way to advance and continuously Europe, and North America, but it has become
unite the opposition against neoliberalism both more inclusive of other regions over time (Teiv-
within Latin America and across the global ainen 2011).
North and South and to help develop a shared vi- WSF meetings traditionally begin with an
sion of a more environmentally sustainable and opening march through the streets of the host
democratic alternative (Harris 2002; Smythe city where participants display signs, t-shirts,
2011). and banners from their various organizations and
Activists from various nonviolent progres- movements. Flags from various countries are
sive social movements were involved, including also displayed, providing a visual cue of the in-
those developing alternative media, movements ternational character of the event. The march is
for the rights of oppressed groups (women, the a noisy cacophony of drumming and chanting in
indigenous, racial minorities, and lesbian, gay, multiple languages. Most of the program of the
7 Latin American Social Movements and the Social Forum Process 91
WSF is composed of workshops, which range workshops with the goal of creating an autono-
in size from a handful to hundreds of people. At mous space “that was experimenting with new
workshops, activists discuss their experiences, ways of interacting, living, and organizing”
share about upcoming actions, or exchange ideas which organizers considered different than the
and engage in political debate or critique. Most WSF (Wood 2010, p. 52). There were 1500 par-
workshops address issues within particular types ticipants in the original youth camp (Juris 2006).
of social justice movements, drawing together By 2005, there were 35,000 youth camp partici-
activists from those movements across countries pants. However, there has been continued tension
to discuss their struggles and experiences at the between participants associated with leftist polit-
local, national, regional, or transnational levels. ical parties (based on representational forms of
However, some workshops focus on cross-move- democracy) and those who identified with more
ment dialogues in order to explore similarities horizontal networks that espoused direct forms of
and differences in their perspectives and de- democracy (Kerswell 2012, p. 78). Yet, the pro-
mands. Large plenary events draw thousands of grams and practices found within youth camps
people for panel discussions featuring leftist ce- have varied across contexts, as the horizontalism
lebrities, such as politicians or well-known writ- popular among Porto Alegre youth was not as
ers or activists. Translation is provided at work- prevalent in other locations such as in Caracas,
shops and plenary events by volunteers, many of Venezuela, in 2006 (Wood 2010).
whom are affiliated with Babels, an international Whereas the WSF was initially conceived as
network of translators that was born from the ef- an “open space” rather than as a political body
forts to prepare the 2002 European Social Forum. that makes decisions, some organizers and
At larger events, simultaneous translation equip- participants sought to move the WSF process
ment is provided. At smaller events, attendees sit beyond a mere “talk shop.” To facilitate greater
next to translators and others who speak their lan- unity and collective action among social forum
guage (Smith et al. 2007). participants, “social movement assemblies”
Throughout WSF meetings, participants can were developed. At “social movement assem-
enjoy cultural performances from around the blies” (or “people’s movement assemblies” as
world, including live musical concerts and danc- they are called in the USA), participants from
ing, as well as screenings of independent films. various locales and movements gather togeth-
Vendors also sell food, arts and crafts, t-shirts, er and agree to support various calls to action.
books, and various types of “fair market” goods The structure and decision-making processes of
from around the world. Solidarity tents provide a these assemblies vary across local contexts, with
space for activists to share information about their some assemblies being more deliberative than
organizations or campaigns and for participants others. The first social movement assembly was
to meet and talk informally. WSF meetings draw a European Social Movement Assembly, which
journalists from around the world who are given occurred during the first WSF meeting in 2001 in
space and Internet access in order to prepare their Porto Alegre, and was used to promote the first
news stories for distribution as well as special ac- European Social Forum. Social movement “as-
cess to plenary events (Smith et al. 2007). semblies” were later incorporated into ESF meet-
The Intercontinental Youth Camps were es- ings and preparatory meetings, and similar kinds
tablished at the first WSF meeting in response to of assemblies have since become integrated into
a shortage of affordable housing. Traditional Bra- the social forum process in other contexts. Since
zilian youth organizations including those affili- 2007, WSF meetings have ended with a formal
ated with the Workers Party, the Communist party “social movement assembly” where international
of Brazil, the Unified Socialist Workers party, and calls for action and solidarity are issued and later
the Socialist Youth Union were initially involved. summarized and disseminated. This process has
Afterward, a broader youth committee formed in helped to promote various international days of
2002, the Camp Organizing Committee, which action and transnational campaigns (Juris and
led to the creation of youth-led programs and Smith 2011; Smith and Doerr 2011).
WSF Meetings and Venues clusive format (Corbeil 2012; Hammond 2006).
At the South American meeting held in Caracas,
Table 7.1 shows the list of all WSF meetings that Venezuela, about 80,000 participants showed up
have taken place since 2001. The first three WSF from 150 countries to partake in 1800 scheduled
meetings took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil, activities (Kaneshiro et al. 2011). The meeting
between 2001 and 2003 and the WSF returned highlighted the debate over the ways in which
there in 2005 after meeting in Mumbai, India, in local government should be included in the meet-
2004 (Corbeil 2012; Smith and Smythe 2011). ings. On the one hand, the Chávez regime and
The WSF meetings have generally grown in “Bolivarian revolution” in Venezuela was given
size from the first WSF meeting in Porto Alegre the opportunity to showcase some of its more pro-
which drew 20,000 people, although attendance gressive programs. But on the other hand, critics
has fluctuated across venues, with meetings held felt that integrating politicians and governmental
in Porto Alegre attracting the largest numbers. programs into WSF meeting space was counter-
As many as 155,000 people attended in 2005 productive to WSF ideals (Hammond 2006). One
and as many as 156 countries were represented observer described the Caracas WSF as “nearer
in 2003. to an orthodox anti-imperialist project than to an
The sixth WSF, held in 2006, provided a poly- alterglobalization Forum” (Wood 2010, p. 314)
centric version of the forum in order to diversify whereas others welcomed the presence of leftist
and “globalize” it. The 2006 WSF meeting was parties and politicians.
organized as three concurrent gatherings held In 2008 and 2010, the International Council
in three continents: Bamako, Mali (Africa), Ca- did not hold a WSF meeting. In 2008, it spon-
racas, Venezuela (South America), and Karachi, sored “global day(s) of action and mobilization”
Pakistan (Asia). This polycentric strategy was around January 26 in an effort to broaden the
designed to better accommodate individuals un- reach of the social forum process and to reduce
able to travel and offer a more democratic and in- the resources and energy that planning global
Table 7.1 Attendance at the World Social Forum. (Source: Santos (2004) and World Social Forum Website)
WSF year Location Total attendance Numbers of workshops Numbers of countries represented
2001 Porto Alegre, Brazil 20,000 420 117
2004 Mumbai, India 135,000 1200 117
2006a Caracas, Venzuela 80,000 1800 150
2006 Bamako, Mali 15,000 600 –
2006 Karachi, Pakistan 30,000 720 –
2007 Nairobi, Kenya 66,000 1500 110
2008b Worldwide
2009 Belem, Brazil 100,000 2000 150
2010c Worldwide
2011 Dakar, Senegal 75,000 1200 132
a
The 2006 meeting was organized as three concurrent gatherings in Caracas, Venezuela, Bamako, Mali, and Karachi,
Pakistan. Accordingly, this data represents just one of the three gatherings.
b
The 2008 meeting was designed as a Global Day of Action and Mobilization, and saw activities in multiple cities
across the world.
c
The 2010 forum organizers encouraged national, regional, and local forums, and at least 35 such gatherings occurred.
gatherings entailed. By then, some activist orga- National, Regional, and Local Social
nizations thought that the WSF planning methods Forums in Latin America
were diverting their energy from grassroots orga-
nizing and collective action and favored biannual From the beginning, Brazil has been a major cen-
meetings. In 2010, WSF organizers encouraged ter of social forum activity. Not only has Brazil
the spread of regional, national, and local social hosted six WSF meetings, it has also been the site
forums. for over 20 thematic forums, several transbound-
In 2009, the WSF meeting returned to Brazil, ary regional forums, 24 subnational forums, and
but this time was located in Belem, in the Ama- 2 national social forums (Smith and Smythe
zon. Smythe and Byrd (2010, p. 96) explain, 2011, p. 40). However, the strong connection
The International Council made a calculated politi- between Brazil and the WSF is not surprising
cal decision to hold the Forum in the city at the when considering that several of WSF’s found-
mouth of the Amazon in Northeastern Brazil, ing members were Brazilian activists.
a region at the very heart of the struggle over a The state of Minas Gerais in Brazil was the
model of development and its environmental con-
sequences that threaten the way of life of indig- location of the earliest subnational forum, which
enous peoples with global implications. is linked to the 2001 WSF in Porto Alegre. The
same group developed Forum Social Mineiro in
The 2009 WSF meeting focused greatly on issues 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005. These inspired the
in Brazil, in part because of the extensive travel first national Brazilian Social Forum, which took
and cost of traveling to the remote location. In place in the city of Belo Horizonte in Novem-
the hopes of expanding the reach of the 2009 ber 2003. A subnational forum was held there
WSF, organizers created what they called Belem in 2004 and a second national Brazilian Forum
Expanded to reach out to those who could not followed in 2006 (Smith and Smythe 2011). In
attend in person but still allow them to partici- Chile, the social forum process has taken hold
pate “using Internet, telephone, radio broadcasts, in Santiago, the location of two national forums
and screening of video using the social network- in 2004 and 2006 and three thematic forums.
ing website of the WSF (www.openfsm.net)” In addition, there were 11 subnational forums
(Smythe and Byrd 2010, p. 103). Forum topics at in Chile between 2004 and 2006. Social forum
the WSF 2009 in Belem included neoliberal glo- activity emerged in Chile based on reaction to
balization, the pace of development in the region, struggles over economic integration. In con-
and the implications for the people there. Broader trast, as of 2011, there had only been five so-
themes emerged as well, such as climate change, cial forums in Mexico, which may be because
human rights, the global financial crisis, and eco- of “the complexity of state–society relations, the
nomic dislocation. Discussions at the forum also strengths and weaknesses of collective actors,
engaged the leftist leaders of Brazil, Venezuela, and the state of political activism” (Smith and
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. As before, while Smythe 2011, p. 36).
some participants were resistant to a government Table 7.2 shows the location of regional,
presence, others supported it (Smythe and Byrd national, local, and thematic social forums oc-
2010). curring between 2010 and 2012. As shown,
Since then, the WSF meeting has been held most of these have still taken place in Brazil,
in Dakar, Senegal, in 2011 and returned to Porto but have occurred in other countries, includ-
Alegre in 2012. Porto Alegre’s 2012 meeting, ing Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico,
attended by 40,000, focused on varying topics and Paraguay. Most commonly, these thematic
from the Arab Spring Movement, the Occupy forums focused on education, but other issues
Wall Street Movement, Spain’s Indignados, and have been addressed, including migration, the
the “Take the Streets” march on June 5th for so- financial crisis, and theology and social justice.
cial and environmental justice.
Table 7.2 Regional, local, and national forums held in Latin America between 2010 and 2012
Forum title Year held Location
Regional forums
Pan Amazon Social Forum 2010 Brazil
2010 Americas Social Forum 2010 Paraguay
International Forum of Lands 2010 Ecuador
Local forums
Bahia Thematic Social Forum 2010 Brazil
Serra Gaucha World Social Forum 2010 Brazil
Greater Porto Alegre 10 years Social Forum 2010 Brazil
Sao Paulo Social Forum 2012 Brazil
National forums
El Salvador World Social Forum 2010 El Salvador
Thematic forums—education
World Forum on Early Childhood and Youth Education 2010 Brazil
First World Forum for Culture and Education for Transformation 2010 Brazil
International Forum on Education, Diversity, and Identity in Countries of the African 2010 Brazil
Diaspora
Community Academic International Forum 2011 Argentina
Thematic forum—Other
Thematic Forum on Alternatives to Financial Crisis 2010 Mexico
World Social Forum on Migration 2010 Ecuador
Solidarity Economy Social Forum and Solidarity Economy World Fair 2010 Brazil
Sixth World Forum of Judges 2010 Brazil
Right and Justice-World Forum Theology and Liberation 2010 Brazil
Thematic Social Forum: Capitalist Crisis, Social and Environmental Justice 2012 Brazil
International Forum in Solidarity to the Palestinian People 2012 Brazil
of survey respondents had 16 or more years of

Characteristics of WSF Participants: school. IBASE survey results similarly found
Survey Findings that most attendees were under the age of 35,
while levels of education were high relative to
Surveys among adult participants of the 2005 the general population (IBASE 2005). With re-
WSF meetings collected by the University of gard to race, over 40 % of attendees identified as
California, Riverside (UCR) Transnational So- white, with fewer attendees identifying as black,
cial Movement Research Group shed light on multiracial, Latino/Hispanic, indigenous, Asian/
the composition and dynamics of these events Pacific islander, or Middle Eastern. A small num-
in Brazil. These surveys were collected in three ber of attendees identified in other ways, such as
languages (64.6 % in Portuguese, 18.8 % in Eng- listing their nationality or religion (Alvarez et al.
lish, and 16.6 % Spanish) at a variety of venues. 2008). While IBASE only asked Brazilian re-
Table 7.3 summarizes findings from this survey spondents about race, they also find that the bulk
in terms of respondents’ demographic charac- of attendees identified as white. Slightly more
teristics, while Table 7.4 summarizes findings attendees were male than female, a finding cor-
regarding their political and organizational char- roborated by IBASE’s survey (IBASE 2005).
acteristics. Responses were weighted according Many attendees at the 2005 WSF were linked
to the national and regional representation of reg- to activist networks through prior participation in
istered participants. social movements and affiliated organizations, a
As Table 7.3 shows, attendees tended to be finding corroborated by IBASE’s survey (IBASE
young. With regard to education, nearly half 2005). In fact, most of the respondents belonged
Table 7.3 Demographic characteristics of WSF 2005 Table 7.4 Political experiences and affiliations of
participants (valid percentages; weighted). (Sources: WSF 2005 participants (valid percentages; weighted).
Reese et al. 2008b) (Sources: Reese et al. 2008a)
Language of questionnaire Prior participation in social fora
English 18.8 % None 60.7 %
Spanish 16.6 % One 20.3 %
Portuguese 64.6 % Two 10.3 %
Region of residence Three–Five 8.7 %
South America 88.1 % Six or More 0 %
Europe 4.4 % Organizational affiliations
North America (w/out Mexico) 2.5 % NGOs 41.3 %
Asia 2.5 % Labor Unions 21.8 %
Africa 1.7 % Political Parties 20.6 %
Central America and Caribbean 0.7 % SMOs 36.3 %
Oceania 0.2 % Government Agency 3.2 %
Gender No Affiliations 19.6 %
Male 51.9 % Attending on behalf of an organization
Female 48.1 % Yes 79.5 %
Age No 20.5 %
18–25 45.9 % Protests during the past 12 months
26–35 26.6 % None 16.8 %
36–45 13.3 % One 21.4 %
46–55 3.2 % Two–Four 35.8 %
56–65 9.7 % Five or More 26.0 %
Over 65 1.3 % Actively involved in at least one movement
Race/ethnicity Yes 72.5 %
Black 18.4 % No 27.5 %
Middle Eastern 0.6 %
Asian/Pacific Islander 2.5 %
Indigenous 1.3 %
ment. Respondents were most commonly active
Latino/Hispanic 6.9 %
White 44.0 %
in the environmental, human/civil rights, and
Multiracial 10.0 % peace movements. This number is a bit higher
Other or unclear answer 16.3 % than IBASE’s survey results, but scholars note
Years of school that it may be because IBASE’s survey asked
None 0.2 % about involvement with fewer types of move-
1–5 years 1.8 % ments and included more local respondents
6–10 years 6.0 % (IBASE 2005; Reese et al. 2008a). Over 80 %
11–15 years 42.9 % of respondents participated in at least one pro-
16 or more 49.1 % test event during the previous 12 months. Over
a third of respondents took part in two to four
protests, and over a quarter were involved in
to some political organization and most were at- five or more protests.
tending the forum on behalf of an organization. The location of the forum influences who par-
Respondents were most likely to be affiliated ticipates, which is evident when comparing the
with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre to the 2007 WSF in
and social movement organizations. Nairobi. According to the Organizing Commit-
Most WSF 2005 respondents were active- tee, more than 88 % of registered participants
ly involved in social movements, with close at the Porto Alegre meeting in 2005 were from
to three quarters of WSF 2005 respondents South America, of which 80 % were from Bra-
actively involved in at least one social move- zil. In contrast, only 69 % of Nairobi attendees
were from Africa and 48 % were from Kenya. In c orporations and as antidemocratic. Many groups
contrast to attendees in Porto Alegre, attendees at view their national governments as becoming less
the WSF 2007 in Nairobi tended to be older, to responsive to them, including “the urban working
complete the survey in English, and most identi- class, the peasantry, the rural workers, the lower
fied as black. They also tended to be slightly less sectors of the middle class, the members of the
educated than attendees in Porto Alegre. At the large informal sector, and the indigenous com-
2007 WSF, most survey respondents were affili- munities” (Harris 2002, p. 139).
ated with organizations, although the percentage Organizing and uniting these various groups
of respondents affiliated with NGOs was higher have been hindered by governments’ efforts to
and social movement organizations was lower repress, co-opt, and “divide and rule.” More-
than in Porto Alegre in 2005. Scholars suggest over, progressive forces have failed to develop
that NGOs were more prevalent because of the an effective strategy against neoliberal capitalist
amount of poverty in Africa and reliance on in- globalization or a coherent vision of an alterna-
ternational funding. Further, affiliation with labor tive. Popular resistance against neoliberalism has
unions was lower at the WSF 2007, reflecting the generally been reactive, such as opposing auster-
relative weakness of the labor movement within ity measures, the International Monetary Fund,
Kenya. Over a third of respondents at the WSF structural adjustment or free trade policies, rather
2007 had not been involved in protest activity in than uniting around a shared vision for the future
the past 12 months. However, at both the WSF (Harris 2002; Almeida 2014).
2005 and WSF 2007 over half of the respon- Various new alliances against neoliberalism
dents had been involved in more than two protest were nevertheless growing by the time WSF
events in the past 12 months (Reese 2008a). began, and have participated in the WSF pro-
cess. Among these was the Landless Movement
(MST) in Brazil, which has helped to unite small
Latin American Movements and the producers, landless peasants, and workers against
Social Forum Process neoliberal reforms benefiting agro-business.
The Confederation of Nationalities of Ecuador
As discussed earlier, a wide range of movements, (CONAIE) has helped to link indigenous strug-
networks, and organizations have participated in gles to those of peasant unions and rural workers
the WSF gatherings. Below, we focus on how the and to build international alliances. While WSF
WSF process has been used to advance popu- participants embraced the principle that “anoth-
lar resistance to neoliberalism, environmental er world is possible,” they are divided in their
justice, and the rights of marginalized groups, visions of that future. While some embrace radi-
including women and the indigenous. These cal visions of democratic socialism, communism,
examples are used simply to illustrate some of or anarchism, others embrace a more reformist
the various ways that movement activists have approach (Harris 2002).
engaged with the WSF experience, as well as In 2005, the process of participatory b udgeting
some of the challenges they have faced with it. in Porto Alegre was a major topic for debate.
Activists participated in a sequence of workshops
looking at the spread of participatory budgeting
Popular Opposition to Neoliberalism as an alternative to neoliberalism and the priva-
and Environmentalism tization of previously public goods. Among
them was the Comisión en Defensa del Agua y
The WSF has helped to build coalitions across la Vida (CDNAV), consisting of 40 local social
both nations and movements against neoliberal- movements from Uruguay. CDNAV’s efforts to
ism. Like elsewhere in the world, Latin American push for participatory budgeting culminated in
activists criticized neoliberalism as serving a referendum voted by the majority of the Uru-
the interests of upper classes and transnational guayan people that prohibits the privatization
of water and water services (Almeida 2010). omy and visions of alternative forms of global-
Shortly after, the CDNAV proposed participatory ization. The 2001 Call of Porto Alegre included
mechanisms following the guidelines of the 2005 language that explains, “Globalization reinforces
Porto Alegre model on participatory budgeting a sexist and patriarchal system,” and argued that
(Allahwala and Keil 2005). equality between women and men should be cen-
The struggle for environmental justice is an- tral to activists’ struggle for a better alternative
other major topic at WSF meetings and is often (Hewitt and Karides 2011, p. 85). During the
linked to resistance against neoliberalism. For second WSF meeting in Porto Alegre, the Call of
example, the 2006 WSF meeting in Caracas, Social Movements stated in its goals that they are
Venezuela focused on various themes, includ- fighting “against a system of sexism, racism and
ing “ecological debt… and the struggle over the violence, which privileges the interests of capital
preservation of natural resources, or more appro- and patriarchy over the needs and aspirations of
priately, the global commons” (Pallister 2006, the people” (Vargas 2003, p. 911). In discussions
p. 270). The “‘flexible nature of the Forum’ pro- about democratizing the global economy, femi-
vides a communicative arena for people to share nists have helped to keep participants’ focus on
their experiences” (Kaneshiro et al. 2011, p. 201), both the “socio-economic, rooted in the political
allowing various types of environmental activists and economic structures of society, and the cul-
and organizations to participate and unite. For ex- tural or symbolic, rooted in the social patterns of
ample, at the 2005 Forum in Brazil, a workshop representation, interpretation, and communica-
focusing on “Nature for Sale,” brought together tion” (Vargas 2003, p. 912).
such varying groups such as: “Sobrevivencia, a Also during the second WSF, the Articulación
Paraguayan umbrella organization concerned Feminista Marcosur provided novel spaces for
with numerous environmental issues such as communication among activists. Workshops
water rights, ecological sustainability, and bio- drew attention to issues ranging from “Women
diversity; Friends of the Earth International, a Migrants: Frontiers Wide and Alien,” “Sex, Lies,
large US NGO; the World Rainforest Movement, and International Trade,” to “Discrimination and
a conservationist group with head offices in Uru- Intolerance.” Also, the global network, Women
guay and Britain; and even Central Unica dos Living under Muslim Laws, participated in the
Trabalhadores (CUT), the most powerful work- WSF process by elaborating on the experiences
ers’ union confederation in Brazil” (Kaneshiro of Palestinians and Israelis “coordinating and
et al. 2011, p. 201). The 2006 Caracas polycen- struggling as much against Israeli aggression
tric forum highlighted the theme of “capitalism as the gender exclusivity within both realities”
and threats to life,” which helped to bridge en- (Vargas 2003, p. 918). Finally, the Planeta Femea
vironmental activists concerned with issues such (Female Planet) was a space created within the
as global warming with those struggling for the WSF by Brazilian feminists to exchange experi-
rights to indigenous lands and sexual and repro- ences and strategies and to engage in cultural ac-
ductive rights (Kaneshiro et al. 2011). The WSF tivities. This was spearheaded by the September
process has thus helped to build alliances across 28 campaign, or the day of struggle for abortion
countries, but also across movements. in Latin America, that was also a protest against
then US President Bush’s policy of withdrawing
financial aid from NGOs that supported abor-
Women’s and Indigenous Movements tions and related legal reforms or medical coun-
seling regarding abortions (Vargas 2003).
The social forum process offers a new space for But while feminists have influenced the WSF
feminist activism and coalition building. Femi- process from its beginning, they have also strug-
nist presence at the WSF has significantly shaped gled for greater visibility within it. Few men
participants’ critiques of the current global econ- attended feminist workshops and the feminist
perspective was not broadly shared among WSF Venezuela, partly due to the expansiveness of
attendees and organizers. Women were generally the city and less-centralized panels (Becker and
underrepresented among panelists during the first Koda 2011).
few WSF meetings. Women from marginalized Like feminists, indigenous groups have criti-
groups, such as lesbians, migrant women, etc., cized the WSF process for marginalizing them.
were particularly marginalized. Through struggle Indigenous people report feelings of exclusion
and active participation in planning meetings and during WSF meetings, and suggest that their
WSF events, feminists increased their visibility small numbers and lack of resources mean that
within the WSF process over time; the inclu- their voices are not heard. For example, the 2005
sion of principles of equality and diversity in the WSF gathering created a space specifically des-
WSF Charter of Principles helped these efforts. ignated for indigenous groups, and while this
Women’s representation as speakers in large separate space offered an opportunity for open
WSF events increased in subsequent meetings, dialogue and discussion, it also limited commu-
while feminist themes in workshops became nication with nonindigenous activists involved
more prevalent (Eschle and Maiguashca 2010; in the WSF process. Similarly, the 2004 WSF
Hewitt and Karides 2011; Karides and Ponniah meeting held in India, focused on local issues
2008; Vargas 2005). Even so, support for particu- and failed to address the topics most pertinent to
lar feminist goals, such as women’s right to abor- the indigenous people of the Americas (Becker
tion, remains contested at Social Forum meetings and Koda 2011). While ensuring the inclusion of
where many religious activists participate, and indigenous people from the Amazon and beyond
support for feminism has varied across venues was a priority for organizers of the 2009 WSF
(Eschle and Maiguashca 2010; Willis and Ros- meeting in Belem, Brazil, the fact that transla-
kos 2007). Nevertheless, many feminists have tion was limited to a small number of the sessions
viewed the WSF as an important venue to raise made it challenging for all the voices to be heard.
consciousness about patriarchy and women’s Out of 2000, 1400 events were in Portuguese and
struggles around the world, and to build transna- better-resourced NGOs funded some self-orga-
tional alliances (Karides and Hewitt 2011). nized sessions, which reinforced “the communi-
Like feminists, many indigenous groups cation gap with local movements and activists”
view the WSF as a double edge sword. On the (Smythe and Byrd 2010, p. 103).
one hand, it is a useful tool and opportunity for
doing outreach to activists in other movements
and countries. On the other hand, WSF meetings Conclusion
have been perceived to be exclusionary, white
dominated, and generally uninterested in the Growing out of existing movements against
specific issues pertinent to indigenous communi- neoliberal globalization and rooted in Brazil’s
ties (Becker and Koda 2011). Given how coloni- Workers’ Party, the WSF has become the world’s
zation and neoliberal capitalism has negatively marquee international gathering of progressive
affected indigenous peoples’ rights to their land, social activists. Latin America has played a criti-
livelihoods, and culture, it is not surprising that cal role in the emergence and success of the WSF,
indigenous rights organizations have participated as 7 out of 12 years have seen the WSF hosted
in the WSF process from the beginning. Many by Brazilian or Venezuelan cities. Led by Bra-
saw the WSF as the perfect opportunity for in- zil, Latin America has been a hotbed for regional,
digenous activists to highlight issues central to national, and subnational social forums. While
their communities. Indigenous activists had an the presence of leftist Latin American politicians
expanded presence in the July 2004 Americas has sparked concern regarding the WSF’s au-
Social Forum in Quito and the 2005 WSF in tonomy from political parties and governments,
Porto Alegre. In contrast, they had much less of it also h ighlights the political influence of so-
a presence at the 2006 polycentric meeting in cialists in the region. While the struggle against
neoliberalism and for global justice has gener- Reese & E. Smythe, (Eds.), In Handbook on world
social forum activism (pp. . 105–124). Boulder, Colo-
ally predominated at WSF meetings, various rado: Paradigm Publishers.
movements struggling for specific causes and Corbeil, J. R. (2012). “The world social forum: An explo-
the rights of particular marginalized groups have ration of the movement through an alternative develop-
also participated and struggled for greater vis- ment lens.” ProQuest, Ann Arbor MI,.AAIMR79860.
Eschle, C., & Maiguashca, B. (2010). Making feminist
ibility within this process. In doing so, they have sense of the global justice movement. Lanham, MD:
helped to deepen the political consciousness of Rowman & Littlefield.
activists build alliances, and strengthen various Hammond, J. (2006). The possible world and the actual
social movement campaigns in Latin America state: The world social forum in Caracas. Latin Ameri-
can Perspectives, 33(3), 122–131.
and beyond. Harris, R. L. (2002). Resistance and alternatives to glo-
While scholars have explored the WSF process balization in Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin
in various contexts, more comparative research American Perspectives, 29(6), 136–151.
is needed on how the WSF process within Latin Hewitt, L., & Karides, M. (2011). More than a shadow of a
difference? Feminist participation in the World Social
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and leftist parties, especially in the context of IBASE (Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Anal-
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Liberation Theology and
Social Movements 8
Robert Mackin
For more than two generations, liberation theol- Booth 1985) and in Mexico with the Zapatistas
ogy has provided inspiration to popular move- (Harvey 1994; Kovic 2004). Lastly, liberation
ments in Latin America and beyond. In the 1960s theology continues to inspire new theological
and 1970s, Latin American bishops gathered in approaches in Latin America such as inculturated
regional conferences articulating the key prin- theology (Cleary and Steigenga 2004) and libera-
ciples of liberation theology, most forcefully at tion theologies of sexuality and gender equality
Medellín, Colombia in 1968. Lay movements (Althaus-Reid 2006b).
such as base ecclesial communities (CEBs) and Liberation theology also inspired movements
priest movements, such as the Movement of outside of Latin America. In the USA alone
Priests for the Third World in Argentina, alike there emerged a Black liberation theology (for
claimed some identification with liberation theol- a review see Antonio 2007). Feminist theolo-
ogy. In the 1980s and 1990s, liberationists were gians have also emerged, providing important
key players in movements for democratization critiques of liberation theologians (Althaus-Reid
throughout Latin America and since then have 2006; and, for a review see Grey 2007). More-
supported many of the candidacies of the “Pink over, liberation theology inspired middle-class,
Tide,” that is, the wave of left and center-left predominately white, Christian churches in the
governments in Latin America which have come USA, Canada, and Europe to focus on social jus-
to power over the last 10–15 years. This includes tice issues. Strongest in the 1980s, this solidarity
Brazil’s Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, a former fac- movement sought to counter Ronald Reagan’s
tory worker with strong ties to the liberationist policies in Central America (Smith 1996). Else-
church, as well as Lula’s successor, the recently where, liberation theology has influenced move-
reelected Dilma Rousseff. Scholars have also ments in Africa, Europe, and Asia (Smith 1991).
documented the way liberation theology inspired Yet, despite the impact the liberation theol-
activists and movements such as the Landless ogy movement has had on Latin American reli-
Workers Movement in Brazil (Wolford 2006) and gion and society, there is a near consensus among
the new wave of indigenous movements across scholars that liberation theology, if not dead, is
Latin America (Cleary and Steigenga 2004). Lib- in decline (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005;
eration theology’s relationship with revolution- Burdick 2004). Scholarly explanations for lib-
ary movements has also been explored in Nica- eration theology’s decline emphasize how a con-
ruagua with the Sandinistas (Berryman 1984; servative countermovement within the Catholic
Church successfully challenged liberation theol-
ogy (Stewart-Gambino 1992). Key to this contes-
R. Mackin ()
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA tation from within were efforts by the church hi-
e-mail: mackin@tamu.edu erarchy to control liberation theologians, starting
P. Almeida, A. Cordero Ulate (eds.), Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9912-6_8, 101
102 R. Mackin
with the 1972 election of conservative Archbishop debate across a variety of disciplines. Over the
Alfonso López Trujillo as Secretary General of the course of the chapter we shall see not only the
Latin American Bishops Conference Latin Ameri- important contributions social movement schol-
can Episcopal Council (CELAM) and continuing ars have made to the research on liberation theol-
with the Vatican’s policy under Pope John Paul II ogy but also how this research has contributed to
and Benedict XVI of replacing progressive bish- theorizing about social movements. As a result of
ops with more conservative ones. Cardinal Joseph the size and complexity of these literatures this
Ratzinger, who in 2005 became Pope Benedict chapter is limited to three objectives. First, I will
XVI, also attempted to delegitimize liberation describe the origins of the liberation theology
theology qua theology with two official teach- movement. Second, I will summarize the debates
ings issued by the Vatican’s Congregation for the on research addressing variation in liberation
Doctrine of the Faith. This dynamic of curtailing theology’s influence during its most influential
liberation theology also occurred at the local level, years (1960s and 1970s). And third, I will ex-
where bishops restricted the activities of Catholic plore whether or not or how liberation theology
movements and organizations, leading many lib- continues to influence contemporary movements.
erationists to pursue activism in movements with Taken together, the research examined makes
little or no tie to the church while others remained clear that secularization has had a major impact
active in their church, though they chafed at the on liberation theology as a movement. Setting
restrictions imposed by the hierarchy (Drogus and aside cases where liberationists participate in
Stewart-Gambino 2005). movements and organizations with formal ties to
Some scholars argue, however, that it would the Roman Catholic Church (such as CEBs), it is
be wrong to attribute liberation theology’s de- difficult to discern the religious roots of move-
cline to the efforts of the Catholic conservative ments which no longer openly identify as Catho-
countermovement alone. We should also consider lic or Christian. Thus, in the conclusion I take up
the negative impact of the 1991 fall of the Soviet the question of secularization, that is, the declin-
Union for all leftist movements, including libera- ing significance of religion—even in movements
tion theology, as well as the effect of significant with considerable participation of religious indi-
social change, such as the return to democracy viduals.
in many parts of Latin America in the 1980s and
1990s. Such scholars point out that social move-
ments often experience a phase of decline and The Origins of Liberation Theology
transformation after a period of large-scale social
change (see Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005). The turning point for the liberation theology
Moreover, Daniel Levine (2006) and Frances movement occurred at the second meeting of
Hagopian (2009) have noted that contemporary the Catholic Latin American Episcopal Confer-
Latin America is considerably more pluralist, not ence (CELAM) at Medellín, Colombia in 1968
only politically but also religiously, than it was (Smith 1991). The objective of the meeting was
two generations ago. The dramatic expansion of to apply the conclusions of the Second Vatican
Protestantism over the last three decades, espe- Council (1962–1965) to Latin America. Three
cially Pentecostalism and fundamentalism has conclusions of the conference set the agenda for
changed Latin American civil society (Chesnut the movement over the next several years. First,
2003; Gill 1998). As a result of this transfor- the Latin American church committed itself to
mation, the Roman Catholic Church no longer the plight of the poor and oppressed seen in the
enjoys a religious monopoly in Latin America notion of making a “preferential option for the
(Levine 2006). poor.” Second, the bishops suggested the best
Research on the liberation theology move- way for the church to be in solidarity with the
ment and its impact on Latin American social poor was to promote CEBs, which had been ex-
movements is vast and still inspires scholarly perimented with, first in Brazil and Panama, and
8 Liberation Theology and Social Movements 103
later in Chile and Mexico. Third, the bishops ar- II to distance the church from the radical conclu-
gued—clearly inspired by dependency theory— sions of Medellín. But in a surprising move, John
that Latin America’s structural dependence on Paul II endorsed CEBs in an address to the Pueb-
more developed countries resulted in “a sinful la conference. Soon thereafter the bishops who
situation” whereby inhabitants of the developed gathered affirmed many of the core conclusions
countries became wealthier while the poor of of Medellín, including that the church should
Latin America struggled to survive. make a “preferential option for the poor.” This,
One of the foundational texts of the move- however, did not settle the status of liberation
ment, A Theology of Liberation (1973), was writ- theology in the church.
ten by a young Peruvian priest, father Gustavo In 1984 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, head of
Gutiérrez, one of a number of liberationists who the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of
assisted the Latin American bishops with the the Faith, issued an “Instruction on Certain As-
composition of the key texts of Medellín. Gutiér- pects of the Theology of Liberation.” While ac-
rez (1973) made three key contributions. First, knowledging liberation as a legitimate topic for
he outlined a new way of doing theology which theologians, Ratzinger criticized three aspects
emphasized “praxis,” defined as “actively living of what he called “certain forms” of liberation
one’s faith” (McGovern 1989, p. 32). The concept theology which, he argued: reduced faith to poli-
of “praxis” has Marxian roots; however, it was tics; uncritically adopted Marxism; and, attacked
also inspired by father Joseph Cardijn’s “See- authority in the church. Liberationists sought to
Judge-Act” methodology, first used among the downplay the chilling effect of the “Instruction,”
Young Catholic Workers of Belgium in the 1920s noting that Ratzinger did not identify any indi-
(Horn 2009). Second, Gutiérrez emphasized lib- vidual theologian by name and that, in general,
eration as a core theme of the bible, drawing es- their ideas were consistent with those outlined by
pecially on the Book of Exodus which “showed Ratzinger (McGovern 1989). For one thing, Guti-
God acting in history through a political action, errez had clearly indicated in his early writings
which liberated the people from misery and op- that liberation was a complex process and should
pression in Egypt, formed them as a people, and be understood at three interdependent levels: “at
led to the construction of a new and more just a sociopolitical level, as the full development of
society” (emphasis in original, McGovern 1989, human persons, and, lastly, as liberation from sin”
p. 10). Third, he argued the church could not be (McGovern 1989, p. 224; Gutierrez 1973).
neutral; doing so would help sustain an unjust
status quo. He noted: “In our times and on our
continent, to be in solidarity with the ‘poor’… Explanations of Variation in Strength
means to run personal risks—even to put one’s of Liberation Theology
life in danger” (Gutiérrez 1973, p. 301).
Liberation theology offered a radical critique One of the most fruitful areas of research for
of society and called the Catholic Church to take scholars of liberation theology concerns expla-
a new role, one that was on the side of the poor nations of variation in the movement’s strength.
and the oppressed. Such a shift in emphasis, as Liberation theology was strongest in Brazil and
noted above, quickly resulted in a countermove- Chile (Adriance 1986; Hewitt 1991; Neuhouser
ment. Once elected General Secretary of CELAM 1989; Sanders 1969; Smith 1991; Vallier 1970,
in 1972, Archbishop (and later Cardinal) López 1972). In both of these places progressive bish-
Trujillo of Colombia sought to limit the influence ops joined priests, nuns, and laity both before
of liberation theology by removing progressives and after the onset of military dictatorship. For
from key posts in CELAM (Smith 1991). example, prior to the rise of the dictator Pinochet,
By the time of the third CELAM meeting in the Chilean hierarchy was regarded one of the
Puebla, Mexico in 1979, many expected the con- most progressive in Latin America, promoting
servatives and the newly installed Pope John Paul the formation of the Latin American Bishops
104 R. Mackin
Council (CELAM) and calling for agrarian re- elites, mass movements, or challenges in the or-
form in Chile while implementing an agrarian ganizational environment of the Church.
reform program for unused church lands (Gill Elite-dependence theorists argue that chang-
1998; Thiesenhusen 1966; Vallier 1972). At the es in the Catholic Church are either instigated
same time, they promoted activism among the by elites or only become widely disseminated
laity not only in CEBs, but also in officially spon- once they have elite approval. Due to the hier-
sored movements that had a longer history in the archy of control in the Catholic Church, inno-
church, including specialized Catholic Action vations and the movements they inspire falter
movements for students, workers, and peasants when elites withdraw their support (Kurtz 1986;
(Fernández Fernández 1996; Horn 2009; Mackin Smith 1991). Elite-dependence explanations of
2012; Poggi 1967). Prior to the coup of 1964 in the rise of liberation theology argue that reforms
Brazil, the Brazilian bishops had long promoted emanating from Vatican II unleashed a dramatic
reforms to better the lives of the poor (Bruneau series of changes throughout the Church, one of
1974, 1982; Mainwaring 1986; Neuhouser 1989). which was the liberation theology movement in
In the 1970s there were more CEB groups in Bra- Latin America (Levine 1992; Mainwaring 1986;
zil than anywhere else in Latin America (Dussel Sigmund 1990; Wilde 2004). Critics note that
1992). After the military came to power in both in many places, national and local church lead-
countries, the church hierarchy joined activists to ers carried out progressive reforms prior to Vati-
demand a return to democracy. can II. Specifically, research on the diocese of
Elsewhere liberation theology was remark- Cuernavaca, Mexico (Concha Malo et al 1986;
ably less influential. In Argentina, the church Mackin 2003; Suárez 1970), and the national
was seen as largely endorsing the military gov- episcopacies of Chile and Brazil demonstrate that
ernment, including during the dirty war years of ecclesiastical reforms began prior to the begin-
1976–1983 when repression was at its highest ning of Vatican II in 1962 (Bruneau 1974, 1982;
(Burdick 1995; Gill 1998; Torres 1992). While a Mainwaring 1986; Smith 1982; Stewart-Gambi-
progressive priest movement emerged in Argenti- no 1992; Vallier 1970, 1972).
na, the Movement of Priests for the Third World, A second approach to the study of social
they enjoyed little influence with the hierarchy change in the Catholic Church is mass-movement
and in society (Burdick 1995). In Colombia and theory. These scholars emphasize that changes
Venezuela, church hierarchies consistently sided among church elites, and in the Church more
with conservatives (Levine 1981). In Mexico, the generally, result from the mass mobilization of
church officially adopted an independent stance the laity. That is, pressure from marginalized and
vis-a-vis the state, though church leaders con- exploited groups who organize to protest poor
sistently marginalized progressives and defend- and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions best
ed state repression (Arias et al. 1981; Ceballos explain social change in the Catholic Church.
Ramírez 1991; Concha Malo et al. 1986). Even For example, many mass mobilization scholars
in El Salvador, one of the best-known progres- saw CEBs as a revolutionary force in the Latin
sive churches, Archbishop Oscar Romero was American church and society (Berryman 1984;
outnumbered by conservatives in the church hi- Lernoux 1980). Critics of this view argued, how-
erarchy (Berryman 1984). ever, that local bishops had a significant impact
Surveys of Latin American Catholicism reveal on the strength and political orientation of CEBs
liberationists in nearly every country, however it (Hewitt 1991; Levine 1981; Cleary and Stewart-
was only in a handful of countries that liberation- Gambino 1992; but see Cousineau 2003).
ists and progressives more generally defined a In recent years, a third approach has emerged
church’s “center of gravity” (Mainwaring and that focuses on how shifts in the organizational
Wilde 1989, p. 5). What explains this variation? environment affect changes in the Church (Neu-
Scholarly explanations of social change in the houser 1989; Scott 2003). Early work in this area
Catholic Church emphasize the role of church emphasized the importance of state repression in
the rise of liberation theology (Berryman 1984), Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005) but also
while more recent work has emphasized com- how the movement has influenced, or “spilled
petition from groups and movements outside over” into other movements (Meyer and Whittier
the Church (Gill 1998; Neuhouser 1989; Vallier 1994). This part of the chapter explores research
1970). Scholars in the first group emphasize how on the relationship between liberation theology
national churches that challenged repressive state and indigenous, political, and gender equality
regimes, calling for respect for human rights and movements.
democratization, moved towards the left. The
main criticism of this approach lies with the fact
that in many places (e.g., Chile and Brazil) the National and Transnational Indigenous
national Church was taking progressive stances Movements
prior to the onset of authoritarian regimes. Thus,
identifying state terror as the main causal factor Over the past 30 years there has been an explo-
in explaining the rise of liberation theology— sion of indigenous mobilization across Latin
across Latin America—is untenable. America. To give one example, Chase Smith
A second group of scholars who focus on the (cited in Cleary and Steigenga 2004) notes that
organizational environment have emphasized the in the 1990s approximately 70 % of the indig-
importance of competing religious movements in enous populations in Amazon Basin alone were
the rise of liberation theology. Most notable is the involved in some form of indigenous organiza-
work of Anthony Gill (1998), who suggests that tion. Indigenous movements function not only at
bishops are “parishioner maximizers” and thus a the local or community level, but also operate at
viable Protestant threat increases the probability the regional, national, and international level as
national bishops’ conferences will publicly con- movements comprised of more than one indig-
demn authoritarian regimes. Critics of this view enous group (Yashar 2005, p. 100). Liberationists
note how overreliance on environmental factors have been especially influential in the indigenous
of social change misses key internal explanations movements of Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, al-
(Mackin 2010; 2012). That being said, Gill’s though liberation theology and religion’s influ-
(1998) work has been crucial for understanding ence more generally has varied over time.
the relationship between religious competition After World War II, the Catholic Church in
and religious change. many parts of Latin America tried to organize
Currently, there is no consensus in the litera- the indigenous in officially sponsored move-
ture regarding why liberation theology emerged ments such as Catholic Action and Specialized
when and where it did. Early explanations em- Catholic Action (Calder 2004; Mackin 2012).
phasized church–state conflict and more recent These sponsored church movements emphasized
approaches have focused on church–society assimilation and developmentalism (Calder
conflict. Recently, Goldfrank and Rowell (2012) 2004). However, after Vatican II, and confront-
have called for a return to a focus on church–state ing a rapidly expanding Protestant population in
relations, arguing that where churches were more many parts of Latin America, Catholic leaders
autonomous from the state they were more likely developed a new approach, called the “pastoral
to challenge them on human rights abuses. indígena,” which embraced indigenous history
and culture. Over time, this has led to the en-
dorsement by the Vatican of inculturated the-
Liberation Theology and ology. In the case of Guatemala, for example,
Contemporary Social Movements there were no indigenous clergies nor did any
church official speak an indigenous language
Scholars have been interested in studying not in the immediate post-World War II era (Calder
only the emergence, maintenance, and decline of 2004). In an attempt to better respond to the in-
the liberation theology movement (Smith 1991; digenous population, Virginia Garrard-Burnett
106 R. Mackin
(2004, p. 125) notes the shift in Guatemala to Yashar 2005). Thus, scholars who attempt to
an inculturated theology that reflected an at- discern the religious roots of indigenous move-
tempt “…to decontextualize Christian narratives ments find that the character of religion and the
from their Western cultural references and re- nature of the religious official’s relationship to
position them within a Mayan telos, or cosmo- the movement changes over time.
vision.” Inculturated theology was developed in Scholarly explanations for the current wave of
many parts of Latin America, including southern indigenous mobilization emphasize three factors.
Mexico where Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia en- First, preexisting indigenous organizations and
couraged the development of “telogía india” or networks, such as labor unions and church-spon-
Indian Theology, which not only acknowledged sored movements were crucial (Yashar 2005).
an indigenous cosmovision but also the Catho- Even where these movements and organizations
lic church’s historical complicity in centuries of were designed as part of a conservative effort
colonization. This approach reflected clear ties to counter Marxist organizing among the indig-
to liberation theology, but was distinctly indigenous, many times these movements facilitated
enous in orientation (Cleary 2004). the emergence of more progressive and at times
It should be underscored that the Catholic radical movements later (see Mackin 2012 for
Church’s shift towards a “pastoral indígena” was more on this point). Second, scholars point to po-
not universally accepted by indigenous popula- litical and economic structural changes in Latin
tions; in general, indigenous groups tended to re- America that had a devastating impact on rural
spond in three ways. Some responded positively populations, especially the indigenous (Brysk
to the Catholic Church’s overtures, actively par- 2000; Cleary and Steigenga 2004; Yashar 2005).
ticipating in the development and application of The adoption of neoliberal development strate-
a Catholic inculturated theology (Judd 2004). gies in the 1980s and 1990s, reduced the capacity
Many indigenous turned to Protestanstism, es- of the state to address market inefficiencies and
pecially Pentecostalism and Fundamentalism, provide access to capital, while simultaneously
which over the years has increasingly become cutting social spending. Farmers were especially
more politically engaged and embraced social hit hard. By 1992 farmers in Latin America re-
justice activism and ecumenism (Freston 2008). ceived 30 % less for their products than in the
Yet another group not only rejected the “pastoral previous decade (Clearly 2004). Thus, neoliberal
indígena” but they also rejected Christianity as policies left indigenous and other rural popula-
a foreign religion that played an important role tions to fend for themselves (Cleary 2004, p. 55).
in subjugating indigenous populations in Latin Yashar (2005) argues that changes in the political
America. Many have sought to revitalize tradi- realm are also crucial to understand variation in
tional indigenous beliefs (Garrard-Burnett 2004). the character and success of indigenous move-
Within the Catholic Church, the adoption of a ments. In addition to economic policy shifts,
“pastoral indígena” has changed the content and agrarian reforms, changes in citizenship regimes,
form of the church’s relationship to indigenous and the presence of new “political associational
communities. In her study of liberation theology space[s] and transcommunity networks” also en-
in Peru, Peña (1995) notes that during the time couraged indigenous mobilization (Yashar 2005,
that liberation theology was strongest in Peru, p. 153).
priests played the role of organic intellectuals in These factors played out differently in differ-
progressive Catholic movements. However, re- ent places. For example, in Ecuador, the Catholic
cent studies suggest the current role for church Church, under Bishop Proaño, was a strong de-
officials is vastly different: instead of leaders, fender of the indigenous. Known as the Bishop
they are more likely to take on role of “broker” or of the Indians, Proaño “…held regular grassroots
interlocutor, helping to solve conflicts between assemblies, organized radio literacy campaigns,
indigenous movements and the state, corpora- returned church lands to Indians, … constructed
tions, or other actors (Brooks 1999; Brysk 2000; an Indian community meetinghouse…started
an indigenous seminary, [and]trained [a]large economic gain for the indigenous communities.
number of Indian pastoral agents…” (Brysk The case of southern Mexico thus demonstrates
2004, p. 32). But Catholics were not alone: many that it is the combination of church ties and struc-
Protestants, though slow to get involved, even- tural changes that often lead to indigenous mobi-
tually came to defend indigenous rights as well. lization (Brysk 2000; Yashar 2005).
Alison Brysk quotes one “disgruntled” evangeli- The indigenous are among the best organized
cal Indian who challenged his North American sectors in Latin America, influencing national
missionary pastors to be more socially engaged: elections in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as af-
“They [missionaries] prevented us from going fecting political debate in Mexico and Guatema-
out to protest, saying you just had to pray, now la. Were it not for the Shining Path, on the one
[anyway] we go out when there are problems, we hand, and the authoritarian policies of President
have to see the brothers who are hungry or who Alberto Fujimori on the other, Peru likely would
are maltreated on busses” (Brysk 2004, p. 28). In have had an indigenous movement as strong and
Ecuador, Catholic and Protestant churches were cohesive as those in Ecuador and Mexico (Clear-
crucial to the success of the indigenous move- ly 2004). In addition, the indigenous have been
ment. However, the presence of a very thorough key players in the transnational peasant move-
agrarian reform and a military government which ment, such as in “La Via Campesina,” which
encouraged the indigenous to mobilize were also began in Latin America but now has representa-
crucial factors in explaining the size and cohe- tives in North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa
sion of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement (Desmarais 2009). Latin American indigenous
(Brysk 2004; Yashar 2005). movements and “La Via Campesina” have been
In Mexico, the southern states are known for among the most important contributors to the
having the largest populations of indigenous, but “Another World is Possible,” anti-globalization
during the 1970s to 1990s, they were also known movement (Desmarais 2009; Martínez-Torres
for having the most progressive bishops. In the and Rosset 2010).
1970s, Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia of San Cris-
tobal de las Casas played an instrumental role in Liberation Theology and Political
mobilizing the indigenous into a national move- Movements
ment. Ironically, he did this with the approval Social movements have long been conceived as
and financial support of the federal government politics by “extra-institutional” (Snow and Soule
which sought to increase its legitimacy among 2010) or “unconventional” means (Della Porta
indigenous populations (Harvey 1994; Kovic and Diani 2006). However, in recent years schol-
2004). Bishop Ruiz trained a substantial num- ars have broadened the scope of their analysis.
ber of lay catechists who promoted liberationist Tilly (1993) and Foran’s (2005) suggest scholars
ideas. Later, San Cristobal became one of the should broaden the range of practices they study.
key places where a “teología India” was devel- At one end of this expanded spectrum is Foran’s
oped. After the fighting broke out on January 1, (2005) use of social movement theory to develop
1994 Bishop Ruiz was called in to help broker a general theory of revolutions. At the other end
the peace between the Zapatista Movement for of this continuum is Almeida’s (2006) notion of
National Liberation (EZLN) and the state. It is social movement partyism which conceptualizes
probably not an exaggeration to say that the Za- one way social movements seek to achieve their
patistas embodied the resistance to neoliberal- objectives, by mobilizing to support political par-
ism in Mexico and in many parts of the world in ties which share their objectives.
the 1990s. The Zapatistas and their charismatic In this part of the chapter, I draw on this broader
spokesperson Subcomandante Marcos criticized view of social movement activity to examine the
a development model that exported crucial re- relevance of liberation theology in contemporary
sources, such as energy, from predominately in- social movements in Latin America. Utilizing
digenous parts of Mexico while providing little this expanded view of collective action, we see
108 R. Mackin
liberation theology’s influence across a range of (1960s–1990s), liberationists were more likely
practices, from revolutionary movements to par- to protest than seek to violently overthrow these
ticipation in conventional political parties. Some- regimes. In Chile, for example, a broad range of
where in between these two extremes, liberation activists including liberationists worked through
theology has also shaped protest movements and the Archdiocese of Santiago’s “Vicaria de Soli-
movements of radical reform (McAdam 1996). daridad” (Vicariate of Solidarity) documenting
The relationship between liberationists and the human rights abuses of the Pinochet dicta-
revolutionary movements is long and complex. torship. Under the leadership and protection of
As previously noted, mass mobilization scholars Cardinal Silva Henríquez, activists articulated a
suggested that liberation theology reflected the moral critique of the dictatorship at great personal
growth of a radical movement springing from risk (Lowden 1996). Loveman (1998) notes that
the Catholic masses. Berryman’s (1984) classic, where the hierarchy of Latin American Catholic
the Religious Roots of Rebellion, documented the Churches actively supported human rights orga-
role of radical Christians, predominately Catho- nizations (HROs), as in Chile, HROs emerged
lics, in the revolutionary movements of Central earlier and had an easier time gaining access to
America. Other scholars have explored the ways resources to support their effort. In Uruguay, she
that Catholic organizations, movements, and notes the church was institutionally weak, slow
individuals developed radical oppositional con- to criticize the regime which came to power in an
sciousness (Almeida 2008; Booth 1985; Peterson autogolpe in 1973, and as a result human rights
1996; Viterna 2006; Wood 2003). In Nicaragua, organizations emerged later and weaker than they
Christians were very active in the Sandinista did in Chile. Argentina is an intermediate case,
movement, and when they ultimately unseated where Catholic and Protestant activists mobi-
the dictator Somoza in 1979, many liberationists lized against the military regime, but the Catho-
accepted roles in the new, revolutionary govern- lic Church hierarchy was regarded as allied with
ment. As Booth (1985, p. 212) notes, “[N]umer- the military regime (Loveman 1998). Liberation-
ous Roman Catholic clergymen held government ists engaged in high-risk non-violent activism
positions, including Minister of Foreign Rela- elsewhere in Latin America (e.g., for Brazil, see
tions Miguel d’Escoto Brockman, a Maryknoll Mainwaring 1986) and were important players in
priest, and Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal, the transition to democracy in the region (Cav-
a Trappist father.” Progressive and radical Chris- endish 1995; Fleet and Smith 1997; Smith 1991,
tians, both Catholic and Protestant, also played 1994).
important roles in the revolutionary movement Once democracy was restored to Latin Amer-
and in building the revolutionary state in Nica- ica, many activists chose to channel their efforts
ragua (Lancaster 1988). While Nicaragua is the into traditional political parties. In Brazil, many
only example of a Latin American revolutionary Christian and Catholic activists joined the Work-
movement apart from Cuba in 1959 successfully ers’ Party in support of Lula, who eventually
ousting a dictator through violent means, radical served as president for two-terms from 2003 to
Catholics and Protestants were crucial to the rev- 2011. In Chile and Peru, a similar process took
olutionary movement in El Salvador (Almeida place: Catholics and Protestants actively partici-
2008; Berryman 1984) though this was, in gen- pated in the democratization movement (Fleet
eral, not the case in Guatemala where Protestants and Smith 1997). The shift from church-based
were more closely allied to the regime (Brysk activism to political-party based activism did
2004; Calder 2004; Garrard-Burnet 2004). not reflect a change in religious beliefs. Instead,
Most liberationists, however, have not been for many it reflected changes in Catholic Church
and are not revolutionaries, choosing instead to hierarchy, which made being a Catholic activ-
participate in non-violent, broad-based move- ist much more problematic than in the past. In
ments. During the period of military bureaucratic their retrospective interviews with women CEB
authoritarian rule in many parts of Latin America activists, Drogus and Stewart-Gambino (2005)
found that an important reason many Brazilian laboratory to test the ideas of deliberative democ-
women changed the focus of their activism from racy (Baiocchi 2005). However, other Brazilian
church-based movements and organizations, cities have also experimented with this process
such as CEBS, to political parties, like the Work- with varying degrees of success (Baiocchi 2003).
ers’ Party, hinged on the declining support by Goldfrank and Schneider (2003, p. 157) define
the Catholic hierarchy for CEBs and progressive PB as “a process in which citizens meet in open
Catholic movements more generally. public assemblies to decide which investments
In addition to protest, liberationists have been and services are most important to their commu-
important in another type of unconventional ac- nity and for the public interest. After setting bud-
tivism, what scholars call radical reform move- get priorities, the participants elect regional dele-
ments (McAdam 1996). For example, in Brazil gates, who in turn elect budget councilors.” Then
the Movement of Rural Landless Workers or these officials go on to design and implement a
MST (Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais budget plan which is brought back to members of
Sem Terra) has been described by James Petras as the PB for evaluation. In an analysis of PB in the
“the most dynamic, best organized and effective state of Rio Grande do Sul, scholars found that
social movement” in the history of Brazil (quoted liberationist Catholics and Protestants were cru-
in Wolford 2006, p. 163). The MST carries out cial to the development of PB in smaller towns in
land invasions on unused agricultural land. Land the state (Goldfrank and Schneider 2003, p. 171).
owners have, not surprisingly, opposed the move- We see a similar dynamic elsewhere in Brazil:
ment. However, the MST has found consistent Catholic and Protestant churches have played
support from both the state, under Lula and the important roles in the successful implementa-
Workers’ Party, and from the church. Drawing on tion of PB (Baiocchi 2003). Liberation theology
social movement theory, Wendy Wolford (2006) continues to influence Latin American politics.
notes that the MST emerged in the 1980s due to In the past it influenced revolutionary activity
three factors. First, changes in the political op- now, for example in Brazil, it is more influential
portunity structure associated with democratiza- in formally nonreligious movements, such as the
tion in 1985 meant activists encountered a more Workers’ Party efforts at deliberative democracy
liberal environment to organize. Second, crucial and radical reform movements such as the MST.
institutional support was provided by progres-
sive Catholic and Protestant religious groups in Liberation Theology and Gender Equality
rural parts of Brazil. In fact, Miguel Carter (2009, Movements
p. 91) underscores the significance of liberation- Numerous scholars have acknowledged the
ists and progressive Catholics more generally for omission of feminism, women’s movements,
the MST: “…[I]ndeed, nowhere in the chronicle and gender equality issues more generally in the
of world religion has a leading spiritual institu- published statements of liberation theologians.
tion played as significant a role in support of land This pattern of omission was also reproduced in
reform as has the Brazilian Catholic Church.” much of the early research on liberation theol-
And, third, rural communities had grievances due ogy (Burdick 2004; Drogus 1992; Althaus-Reid
to agricultural restructuring in the 1970s, which 2006). Feminist liberationist critiques of libera-
resulted in the creation of a large landless class tion theology were slow to be acknowledged but
(Wolford 2006). While the MST does not identify have, over the years, come to be taken seriously
as a Catholic or Christian movement, like many by liberationists (Grey 2007). That being said,
other social movements, it has religious roots. it is only in recent years that we have seen the
Another example of radical reform can be seen small but growing influence of scholars who are
in participatory budgets (PB) in state and city developing a critical and systematic rethinking
governments administered by the Workers’ Party. of liberation theology in light of the oppression
Porto Alegre, Brazil—which hosted the World and marginalization of populations based on
Social Forum in 2006—has been an important gender and sexuality, that is, one’s identity as
110 R. Mackin
gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender (Althaus- and alcoholic spouses. Scholars have found that
Reid 2006; Petrella 2004). Liberation theology while Protestant and Pentecostal churches for-
was late to address gender (in)equality, despite mally encouraged congregants to adopt tradi-
the fact that most church-goers and most CEB tional gender roles, they also, unintentionally,
leaders and participants have been women. For encouraged women and men to see each other as
example, during the 1970s and 1980s, liberation equals (Steigenga and Smilde 1999). While Prot-
theology’s most influential period in Brazil, ap- estant and Pentecostal (but also many Catholic)
proximately 90 % of Brazilian CEB participants men and women are hesitant to self-identify as
and leaders were women (Drogus 1992). Why feminist, their views on equality overlap consid-
were liberationists, and Catholics more generally, erably with mainstream feminism (Steigenga and
averse to confronting issues of gender equality? Smilde 1999).
Liberationists were slow to address gender A second reason for liberation theology’s slow
(in)equality because, in its initial period, libera- acknowledgement of gender inequality stems
tion was focused on the intersection of spiritual from traditional Catholic gender norms which
liberation with political and economic liberation. draw from Natural Law theories emphasizing
As Althaus-Reid (2006, p. 1) notes: “[M]ost of gender complementarity, with clearly defined
the pioneer theologians of the 1970s, Catholics roles for men and women. Since the papacy of
and Protestants alike, concurred in a naïve Marx- John XXIII, the church has modified its stance on
ist understanding that the social revolution was women, especially regarding the rights of women
going to expunge every single area of injustice who work outside the home (see Dorr 1992). That
from our lives, including injustices relating to being said, Althaus-Reid (2006) notes that early
gender and race.” While Althaus-Reid overstates liberationists such as Enrique Dussel argued for
the influence of Marxism in liberation theol- social and economic liberation while expecting
ogy (McGovern 1989), the author does reflect the maintenance of traditional gender norms.
the findings of numerous scholars who find that Over time, Althaus-Reid (2006) notes, Dussel’s
liberationists and CEBs in particular had a clear views have evolved on gender equality but not
tendency to marginalize gender issues (Burdick his views on sexuality.
2004; Cleary and Stewart Gambino 1992). Crit- While liberationists were clearly influenced
ics note that this is still an issue, as reflected in by traditional Catholic views on gender, so were
the recent decisions by the male leadership of the the writings of many early feminist liberation
FSLN in Nicarauga and FMLN in El Salvador theologians who called for women to be valo-
to drop access to legal abortion as part of their rized, but did not challenge the traditional views
respective party platforms so as to accommodate on gender. Instead, they essentialized women as
the views of conservative Catholics (Kampwith mothers—known as Mariology—instead of theo-
2010; Viterna 2012). rizing a more critical perspective on gender and
The slow and uneven way liberationists, and sexuality (Althaus-Reid 2006).
CEBs in particular, addressed women’s issues is While these debates on gender and equal-
one reason many poor Latin Americans turned to ity among liberation theologians have continued
Protestant and Pentecostal churches over the last to evolve, scholars have also documented the
40–50 years (Burdick 2004; Cleary and Stewart- changing beliefs and practices among the laity.
Gambino 1992). This is not to say that women These scholars found that liberationist move-
found Protestant and Pentecostal churches seed- ments, especially CEBs, were crucial in the de-
beds of feminism. Rather, a partial explanation velopment of feminist consciousness among par-
for the success of Protestant, especially Pentecos- ticipants. Adriance (1995), for example, found
tal groups, among poor women reflects the fact that participation in CEBs in rural Brazil played
that these churches assisted women with the do- an important role in the development of feminist
mestic or “private” sphere, especially instances consciousness among women participants who
where women sought help addressing abusive developed leadership and communication skills
through their shared reading and analyzing of the liberation theology and CEBs in each country.
bible. Burdick (2004) argues that one of the lega- Drogus and Stewart-Gambino (2005) note that
cies of liberation theology in Brazil is the dra- while the Chilean activists were more closely
matic increase in attention given by the church tied to formal church structures, with weaker ties
to gender equality, including concerns about to other social movements in civil society, the op-
sexual and physical abuse of women and minors posite was the case in Brazil. There, women ac-
at home. tivists in CEBs were much more likely to develop
Despite the observed positive effect of CEB networks among oppositional political parties
participation on more egalitarian gender ideolo- and feminist movements, gaining new ideas and
gies, CEBs should not be painted with too broad developing new contacts precisely among people
a brush. There is considerable variation among who would present a more complex understand-
CEB activists in terms of their views on gender ing of feminism than they would have found in
equality and politics more generally (Drogus the Church alone.
1992; Hewitt 1991). In addition, while libera-
tionists and progressive Catholics more generally
embrace gender equality, many do not identify as Whither Liberation Theology?
feminist. If we factor in views on access to birth
control and legal abortion, there is even less con- The chapter has demonstrated the important
sensus among Latin American Catholics (Maier contributions scholars who study liberation
and Lebon 2010). theology have made to social movement the-
One explanation for the uneven and at times ory. Scholars have explored liberation theol-
uneasy relationship between liberationists and ogy’s emergence (Smith 1991), radicalization
feminists is due to the fact that, feminism is a (Neuhouser 1989), but also the role of threat
contested concept in Latin America (Álvarez (Almeida 2008) and repression (Loveman 1998;
2010). When liberationists self-identify as fem- Mainwaring 1986) in shaping the movement.
inist it is usually some form of “popular femi- Others have examined the importance of preex-
nism” (Di Marco 2010) or “grassroots feminism” isting ties (Adriance 1995; Mackin 2012); cleri-
(Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005) in contrast cal leadership (Peña 1995); and, the long-term
to the “hegemonic feminism” of the so-called consequences of activism (Drogus and Stewart-
second wave of feminism dominated by usually Gambino 2005). More recently scholars have
white, middle class activists (Di Marco 2010). explored the relationship between movement
Popular feminists affiliated with liberation theol- participation and the development of feminist
ogy frequently engage in a process of resignifica- consciousness (Adriance 1995; Burdick 2004;
tion which emphasizes class, race, and religious Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005); but also
identity in addition to gender identity. Drogus the importance of emotion to mobilization (Vit-
and Stewart-Gambino (2005) explored this topic erna 2006). Over the past 20 years, however, a
among Brazilian and Chilean women who began number of scholars have written liberation the-
their activist careers in CEBs or other church- ology’s obituary (see works reviewed in Drogus
sponsored movements. While women in both 1995; also in Levine 1995; Nagle 1995). The eu-
countries held similar views on gender equality logies have noted the movement was too radical,
they varied regarding their views on feminism. too Marxist, too materialistic, too patriarchal,
Brazilians were much more likely to embrace a too immune to its critics and too deaf to the cries
resignified feminism while Chileans were much of the poor who ultimately wanted something
more likely to reject the label feminism altogeth- else, usually Protestantism. In a recent paper,
er, regardless of qualification. The differences Daniel Levine quoted a Latin American friend
likely reflect, on the one hand, official Catholic who said, “while the Catholic Church was opt-
Church teaching which is very critical of femi- ing for the poor, the same poor were opting for
nism; but, on the other, the different histories of Protestantism (Levine 2006, p. 5).”
112 R. Mackin
In this chapter I have argued that liberation an open question: It can be slowed, stopped or
theology continues to inspire movements across even reversed.
Latin America and beyond. Liberation theology, Thus, scholars in the conflict model of secu-
which experienced its apex in the 1960s and larization suggest we distinguish between the
1970s, was always a minority movement in the individual, organizational and societal levels of
Latin American Catholic Church, and even more analysis (Chaves 1994). For example, consider
so in Protestant churches (Brooks 1999; Burdick the long-time Brazilian and Chilean CEB activ-
2004; Drogus 1992; Levine 1992; Stewart-Gam- ists previously described in Drogus and Stewart-
bino and Cleary 1992). As a movement which Gambino’s (2005) research. Examining this data
currently has dramatically less support among in light of a conflict model of secularization, one
the hierarchy and fewer adherents among the would see that, at an individual-level liberation
laity, liberation theology is also clearly less tied theology continues to motivate them. However,
to the institutional church than it was in the past. the form of activism the women engage has
As a result, it is harder to specify its influence changed considerably, mainly due to the changes
in the church and among contemporary move- in church policy implemented by conservative
ments. While liberation theology is weaker, it bishops in each country. In Brazil, this resulted in
is also more diverse than ever, encompassing a former CEB activists being more likely to partic-
greater variety of viewpoints and forms of mobi- ipate in movements which are independent of the
lization. I have elsewhere argued (Mackin 2010) church. In Chile, former CEB activists remain
that while liberationists may not share any one active in their church, but in movements that bear
characteristic (e.g. views on socialism, gender little resemblance to CEBs or other progressive
equality; or, types of activism, such as protest movements of the past.
or revolution), liberationists do have a “family In addition to a focus on the individual level
resemblance.” More importantly, unlike other of analysis, the conflict model of secularization
social movements, liberation theology, and in encourages an examination of secularization at
particular CEBs, began as a religious movement the organizational and societal level. Upon re-
(Cousineau 2003). Missing the religious dimen- viewing research on the movements described in
sion would lead us to overlook how faith moti- the latter half of the chapter–indigenous move-
vates activism (Pieper and Young 2010). ments, revolutionary movements, and so on—a
Nonetheless, when we examine the influence clear pattern emerges. Many of these movements
of liberation theology in contemporary social and organizations rarely identify as explicitly re-
movements we see a clear pattern, viz., secular- ligious, nor do they make religious legitimations,
ization, that is, the declining significance of reli- even though Catholic and Protestant churches
gion. There are two discernible paradigms in the were often crucial in the initial formation of the
debates on secularization. First, drawing on ra- movement. This suggests secularization of these
tional choice theories, religious economies schol- movements is occurring. Liberation theology is
ars suggest competitive religious markets lead to not dead, but it has been transformed.
increased religious vitality (see Chestnut 2003;
Gill 1998; Hagopian 2009). Critiques of this ap-
proach have been discussed earlier in this chapter References
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Beyond Clientelism: The
Piquetero Movement and the 9
State in Argentina
Federico M. Rossi
unemployed workers’ protests in Argentina, the

Introduction
movement has become increasingly organized as
a network of conflict-oriented actors that more
The piqueteros, Argentina’s unemployed work-
than a decade later continue to be active. As
ers’ movement, emerged in 1996. Since then it
with any movement, the piquetero movement is
has served as one of the main contentious ac-
composed of a number of social movement or-
tors in the resistance to the social consequences
ganizations (SMOs) (see Table 9.1). Concerning
of neoliberal reforms and in the struggle for the
their identity, notwithstanding the disparity of
reincorporation of the popular sectors in Argenti-
ideologies held by the various SMOs that make
na’s sociopolitical arena for almost two decades.
up the movement, all unemployed worker SMOs
The name piqueteros (picketers) is based on the
recognize themselves (and are recognized by
type of protest action that brought the movement
their opponents and allies) as part of a move-
to the public’s awareness: the picketing/block-
ment called piqueteros (cf. Svampa and Pereyra
ing of the country’s main roads in their demands
2003, Chap. 4). The piqueteros are defined by the
for jobs, unemployment subsidies, food, etc.1
struggle of unemployed people for sociopolitical
The piqueteros, as a collection of actors, fulfill
reincorporation as citizens and workers. Finally,
all the basic requisites to be considered a social
the use of protest is a constant and crucial dimen-
movement.2 Since the emergence of the first
sion of this movement.
In their struggle to see the end of the nega-
1 This does not mean that the piquetero movement only
tive social consequences of neoliberalism and
organizes pickets. Naming an actor after one of its ways
of making a claim may seem confusing, but preserving in
to secure jobs and/or unemployment subsidies
political and academic debates the name that is most well- as a means towards sociopolitical incorporation,
known and widely applied to this actor is a linguistically the piqueteros needed to deal with a wide array
pragmatic choice to allow for a clear understanding of the of actors, such as elected and appointed public
movement being studied.
2
officials, informal party and union brokers, the
I define a social movement as informal networks of
conflict-oriented interactions composed of individuals,
police, churches, and nongovernmental organiza-
groups, and/or organizations that, based on shared soli- tions (NGOs). The purpose of this chapter is to
darities, are provided with a collective political identity present the basic features of the piqueteros’ re-
and use protest as a means—among others—to present lationship with state institutions. I first show the
themselves in the public arena (Melucci 1989; Diani
1992; della Porta and Diani 1999, pp. 13–16; Snow et al.
limitations of the clientelism-based explanation
2004, pp. 3–15; Rossi 2006, pp. 243–246). of the interactions between the piqueteros and
state institutions. I then propose an alternative
F. M. Rossi () logic for the pattern of interaction in question,
Tulane University, New Orleans, USA which is based on two elements: the evolution of
e-mail: federicorossi@yahoo.com.ar
118 F. M. Rossi
Table 9.1 The piquetero movement. (Source: Adapted from Rossi (2013))
Main social movement Related political Ideology Main geographical loca-
organizations organizations tion (province)
Barrios de Pie Patria Libre—Movimiento National-populist Buenos Aires and
Libres del Sur Córdoba
Corriente Clasista y Combativa Partido Comunista Revolu- Maoist Buenos Aires, Salta, and
(CCC) cionario (PCR) Jujuy
Coordinadora de Trabajadores Movimiento Patriótico National-populist Buenos Aires
Desocupados (CTD) “Aníbal Revolucionario (MPR)
Verón” “Quebracho”
Frente Popular “Darío Santillán” None Autonomist Buenos Aires
(FPDS)
Federación de Trabajadores por la Central de Trabajadores de la Liberation theology Buenos Aires and Santa
Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat (FTV) Argentina (CTA) until 2006 and national-populist Fe
Movimiento Independiente de Jubi- None National-populist Buenos Aires, Chaco, and
lados y Desocupados (MIJD) Salta
Movimiento “Evita” None Left-wing Peronist Buenos Aires
Movimiento Sin Trabajo (MST) Movimiento Socialista de Trotskyist City of Buenos Aires
“Teresa Vive” Trabajadores
Movimiento de Trabajadores Deso- Movimiento Guevarista Guevarist Buenos Aires
cupados (MTD) “Aníbal Verón”
Movimiento de Trabajadores Deso- Coalición Cívica—Alianza Social-democratic Buenos Aires
cupados (MTD) of La Juanita por una República de Iguales
(CC–ARI) since 2007
Movimiento de Trabajadores None Autonomist Buenos Aires and Río
Desocupados (MTD) of Solano and Negro
allies
Movimiento Territorial Liberación Partido Comunista de la Marxist-Leninist City of Buenos Aires
(MTL) Argentina (PCA)
Movimiento de Trabajadores Movimiento Guevarista and Guevarist and Buenos Aires
Desocupados “Teresa Rodríguez” Partido Revolucionario de la Trotskyist
(MTR)—Coordinadora de Unidad Liberación
Barrial (CUBa)
Organización Barrial (OB) “Tupac CTA since 2003 National-populist and Jujuy
Amaru” indigenist
Polo Obrero (PO) Partido Obrero Trotskyist Buenos Aires and Salta
Unión de Trabajadores Desocupa- None Syndicalist Salta
dos (UTD) of Mosconi
public policies and the territorial dispute between the particularized exchange of votes and sup-
the movement and other political actors. I also port for goods, favors and services between the
briefly analyze the strategic interaction between poor and the elite” (Auyero 2000b, p. 19). This
the state and the main piquetero SMOs. has been approached via ethnographic perspec-
tives, quantitative analysis, case studies, and life
stories3. Although opinions are divided, they may
The Limitations of the Clientelism-
Based Explanation 3 The clientelism/patronage debate is a very rich one
among Argentina’s experts. Additional insights can be

The debate about the interaction of the pique gleaned from the variety of interpretations of the same
quantitative data on the captive vote between Brusco
tero movement with the state has been over- et al. (2004), Stokes (2005), and Nichter (2008). Con-
whelmingly focused on determining whether this cerning patronage, see Orlansky (2009) versus Calvo and
link is clientelistic or not (but see Pereyra et al. Murillo (2009) as a follow-up to the original contribution
2008). Clientelism is generally “understood as of Calvo and Murillo (2004). Finally, Auyero’s (2000a)
ethnographic analysis of shantytowns generated debate
9 Beyond Clientelism: The Piquetero Movement and the State in Argentina 119
be organized into two main types: (1) “upward” based on mutual trust and help that implies recip-
clientelism and (2) “downward” clientelism. Ac- rocal obligations, which are generally perceived
cording to Cerrutti and Grimson (2004, p. 53), in positive terms by the members, as long as the
this would mean, in the first case, the relation- individual feels integrated into the network.
ship between SMO leaders and the rank and file, As Auyero has illustrated with particular
and in the second case, the relationship between clarity, the relationship between clientelism and
piquetero SMOs and state institutions or another protest is not, as is generally understood, “an
political organization external to the SMOs. At arrangement that is the opposite of contentious
the same time, for most scholars, clientelism ap- collective action; as a form of atomization and
pears hand in hand with state repression (see the fragmentation of the electorate or of the ‘popular
chapter by Ortiz in this volume). I will show the sectors’…as a form of inhibition of collective or-
limitations of the clientelism-based approach for ganization and of discouraging real and effective
studying the piquetero–state interaction. political participation” (Auyero 2002, p. 204,
There is some interesting ethnographic and italics in original). Rather, he continues, “if we
case-study research that shows how leaders in net- look closer at specific contentious episodes we
works of organizations associated with a protest will see that clientelistic networks are profoundly
then become those in charge of the redistribution embedded in the genesis, course and result of
of the resources that have been obtained, and contentious collective action” (Auyero 2002,
how this then produces a series of asymmetric re- p. 204, italics in original). As a result, studying
lationships among the members. Ethnographies the political participation of the popular sec-
of the Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupa- tors requires an understanding that clientelism,
dos “Teresa Rodríguez” (Unemployed Workers protest, and social movement participation are all
Movement “Teresa Rodríguez”, MTR) of Flor- part of a wider repertoire of actions for the popu-
encio Varela, such as Quirós (2006) and Ferrauri lar sectors in their quest to reduce their distance
Curto (2006), show the difficulty in defining this from the state as a source of welfare and security.
“upward” relationship as clientelistic (Ferrauri In Merklen’s (2005, pp. 64–65) words:
Curto 2006) or in considering it as but only one It must be emphasized that the organizations situ-
of the many relational networks of the popular ate themselves within the wider context of survival
sectors (Quirós 2006). What is noteworthy in strategies, as an additional element of the hetero-
such ethnographic research is its capacity for geneous and unstable series of [survival] tools
used by a family. This aspect is important because
presenting evidence that avoids dichotomous or it allows us to better grasp the tension under which
oversimplified explanations and emphasizes the collective action operates, in the context of an
continuity between routine and contentious poli- articulation between the terms of ‘urgent need
tics (see also Auyero 2007). Quirós (2006) dem- [urgencia]’ and ‘long-term goal [proyecto]’. In this
way we can avoid the erroneous alternative, which
onstrates how apparently equivalent mechanisms tends to leave the popular sectors with a choice of
in different contexts have different meanings: citizenship versus clientelism. When mobilization
what in one context might seem to be clientelism, is conducted by organizations that last, that are
in another might actually be more akin to empow- stable, these are faced with the double require-
ment of building a collective project able to guide
erment. I would add how these asymmetric links actions and to organize at the grassroots, and to
might be further studied through their outcomes, respond to the urgency produced by the cyclical
whether positive or negative, for those involved. worsening of the conditions of misery due to the
As Merklen (2005) points out, the popular sec- fact that the reproduction of everyday life depends
on the resources controlled by the political system.
tors employ different kinds of survival strategies.
Also, as Auyero (2000a) highlights, this is not Several authors have argued that clientelism is
necessarily a manipulative relationship, but one but one of the many possible types of linkages
between the population and the state (Kitschelt
2000; Piattoni 2001). Kitschelt (2000 p. 873)
on some points from Peux (2006) and, partially, Torres
(2006). states, that, in many countries:
120 F. M. Rossi
In the absence of a redistributive welfare state, Peronist factions, left-wing parties,5 NGOs, for-
democratic politicians may contain distributive mer Christian-based communities, and piquetero
struggles from spinning out of control and threat-
ening the foundations of democracy4 by build- organizations that depend on informal groups
ing clientelist citizen-elite linkages wherever the or personalized leadership. Therefore, whereas
circumstances are conducive in terms of socio- within particular SMOs there might be cases of
economic development, state formation, political “upward” clientelistic bonds between leaders and
institutions, political-economic property relations,
or ethnocultural segmentation. For democracies members6—that could be explained in Auyero’s
from India to much of Latin America, clientelist (1999) terms as doxic experiences—the relation-
politics has constituted the functional equivalent of ship of the piquetero movement with different
the welfare state, appeasing the have-nots to abide governments and contending actors is varied.
by political orders that tremendously advantage the
haves. Whereas in some cases this might involve an ex-
change of resources for support or other “goods”
Although quite a few authors agree on the un- of some sort, the relationship is not between at-
equivocal relationship between clientelism and omized individuals, but rather between organized
neoliberal reforms, many of these accounts are groups disputing constituency and resources in a
based on an individualistic premise that fails to territory subject to tension between governability
nail down the defining characteristic of the re- and disruption.
lationship between the piquetero movement and One of the main leaders of the Corriente Cla-
the government or the Peronist Partido Justi- sista y Combativa (Classist and Combative Cur-
cialista (Justicialist Party, PJ). When the unit rent, CCC), one of the largest piquetero SMOs,
of analysis is the social movement, we are not illustrated this argument when he explained to
dealing with atomized individuals, but rather or- me in 2007 why his organization had been allied
ganized groups. Individuals may participate in with the PJ mayor of La Matanza, even though it
several networks simultaneously (Quirós 2006, depends on the Maoist and—at the time—absten-
2009), and clientelism may be one of many sur- tionist PCR:
vival strategies of the urban poor (such as the
Q: “It seems as if the way in which the [former]
“hunter” strategy studied by Merklen 2000). For mayor of La Matanza has administered the munici-
this reason, the relationship between the state pal government and managed its relationship with
and the urban poor, where they are organized as La Matanza’s social organizations is somehow dif-
a movement, should be seen as composed of a ferent from the one established by other mayors in
Greater Buenos Aires, don’t you think?”
polyadic rather than a dyadic bond, with internal A: “Yes, because we think that he does not want
subdivisions that are crucial. In other words, the any breach in the relationship with us (and for us
link between the PJ/state informal brokers and it would not be good for this relationship to be
the urban poor is not direct, but is rather medi- broken either, but if it happens, then it happens)
because I think that they have also realized that we
ated by numerous organizations and groups that are the only ones that can kick up a fuss [pudrirle
are at odds: several PJ factions compete among el rancho] here when a crisis emerges. We are not
themselves; some unions too, such as the Aso- the only ones, but we do constitute the main force
that it is able to create a rupture with the potential
ciación de Trabajadores del Estado (State Work-
to precipitate a political crisis. That is why he has to
ers’ Association, ATE) and the Unión de Obreros
de la Construcción de la República Argentina
(Construction Workers’ Union of the Repub- 5
Mainly, the Movimiento Popular Revolucionario “Que-
lic of Argentina, UOCRA); also, social service bracho” (Popular Revolutionary Movement “Quebra-
cho”, MPR), Patria Libre—Movimiento Libres del Sur
organizations of the Roman Catholic (mainly
(Free Homeland—Free South Movement), the Partido
Caritas) and Evangelical churches; and non-PJ Comunista Revolucionario (Communist Revolutionary
Party, PCR) and the Partido Obrero (Workers Party, PO).
6 Some excellent studies of the “upward” relationship
between SMO leaders and movement participants are
4 In my opinion, “democracy” here could well be re- Delmata (2004, 2005), Ferrauri Curto (2006), and Quirós
placed with “capitalism.” (2006), among others.
be careful with us, because if you get upset [te ponés cannot ignore each other. However, this does not
brisco], if you get like [president Néstor] Kirchner necessarily mean that the relationship is affective
did with us, hell, we’ll make a mess [te pudrimos]
and we’ll play the game until the last consequences or solely contentious—the bond is an instrumen-
[nos jugamos]. Maybe we’ll lose, but we’ll take that tal one.
risk and we’ll leave you with a mess in La Matanza. In addition, a series of articles have tried to
Therefore, in this relationship, he is very careful.” determine in quantitative terms whether the type
This piquetero leader was not the only one to of bond the piqueteros enjoy with the govern-
perceive this tension between the need for gov- ment can be described as clientelistic. The ques-
ernability and the movement’s power to disrupt. tion these studies have attempted to address is
A top-ranking politician also illustrated this argu- whether the allocation of public subsidies for
ment to me in 2008 with an anecdote from the unemployment is related to the type of party
period when he was a minister for the province in government or to the quantity of protests in
of Buenos Aires: the district. All quantitative research done until
now agrees—though to varying degrees—on
I was the Minister of [position] during the [immi-
nent] lootings at the end of 2002, and [in the end] the greater importance during the second Carlos
there were no lootings. We talked with everybody. Menem presidency (1995–1999) of the distribu-
I deployed all the police officers of the province tion of unemployment subsidies based on parti-
of Buenos Aires to negotiate with each piquet- sanship, compared with the succeeding presiden-
ero leader everywhere. Plus, at an assembly [of
a piquetero SMO] in Moreno where they had cy of Fernando De la Rúa (1999–2001), where
decided to loot anyway, I personally went to the there is no significant correlation that would
assembly because a police officer called me and allow us to assert that partisanship was the reason
told me: ‘Look, here they have decided to do it’. for subsidy allocation (Lodola 2005; Weitz-Shap-
The policeman called his chief, and he called his
superior, and then he called me saying: ‘Look, here iro 2006)7. At the same time, according to Lodola
there’s an assembly that is deciding that they will (2006, p. 532) protest becomes more relevant as
loot anyway [despite the agreements with the gov- the piquetero movement increases its capacity for
ernment]’. Why? Because they were coming from mobilization, while Weitz-Shapiro (2006, p. 139)
a more ideological, more political, position. So I
rushed to that assembly and I arrived when they concludes that “protest has a statistically and sub-
were almost finished. I implored them to listen stantively important effect on funding.” Finally,
to me. And then I told them: ‘Guys, I don’t think Giraudy (2007) has confirmed these results in an
there is an imminent military coup in Argentina, expanded time period (1993–2002), adding that
but let’s not give them reasons to plan one. If you
go and loot, and a youngster dies…If you do this, not only is protest an important factor, but also
think about it, people could get hurt: a shopkeeper, the social and economic needs of the province in
a policeman, or one of your kids…It is a crazy combination with characteristics of the Argentine
idea [huevada]. Let’s discuss the issue. What do federal institutions.8 To sum up, there seems to
you need?’ And they wrote me a list of demands, to
which I as a hostage, obviously, said yes to every- be a significant difference between resources that
thing, and later I started to eliminate from that list are allocated based on collective claims and those
everything that I knew was a lie…and in this way resulting from individualized links.
the situation was resolved. In addition to this, in Argentina the clientelis-
It is in this power relationship, based on mutual tic bond is far from producing a captive elector-
dependence, that the limitations of viewing the
relationship as merely clientelistic are revealed.
It is not a game with individuals in a position 7
The piqueteros emerged in the last three years of the
of absolute weakness, but rather a relationship second mandate of the Menem presidency, which might
between two collective actors, each with their explain the seemingly lesser relevance of protest if the
whole mandate is measured without taking this into con-
strengths and weaknesses and having something
sideration.
to offer in exchange, something that the contend- 8 These findings and conclusions were recently confirmed
ing actor also requires as a resource for his or and reiterated by Franceschelli and Ronconi (2009), who
her own political goals. It is due to this that they used a different methodological approach.
122 F. M. Rossi
ate.9 Despite the existence of patronage, it has a difficulty in classifying the relationship between
very minimal correlation with PJ’s electoral suc- piquetero SMOs and state institutions as clien-
cess, as, according to Calvo and Murillo (2004, telistically based on evidence obtained through
p. 750–751), “A 1 % increase in provincial public in-depth case studies and ethnographic research.
employment leads to a 0.066 % increase in the Moreover, in contrast to the overwhelming dis-
Peronist vote…. By contrast, public employment course about clientelism in the political arena
is not statistically significant in explaining the and the mass media, the quantitative data refute
UCR-Alianza vote.” Therefore, it could be ar- the assertion that clientelism is the main source
gued that there should logically be other simulta- of the piqueteros–state link. On the whole, these
neous—and sometimes alternative—types of or- scholarly works on the piqueteros thus far dem-
ganized political links between poor people and onstrate that we must look for a more refined ex-
state institutions producing patterns of interac- planation of the piqueteros’ pattern of interaction
tion that are not limited to clientelism or political with the state.
patronage. Without denying that protest—at least
in its embryonic stage—might be built on the
same networks on which clientelism is sustained Pattern of Interaction
(Auyero 2003; Quirós 2006), these are far from
being the only networks at work in the process The bond between state institutions and the pi-
of protest. As some of the recent scholarship has quetero movement is forged through formal and
shown, as the bond produced by the piqueteros’ informal channels. The pattern of interaction
interaction with the government is sustained over rests upon a foundation that is aptly described by
time, clientelism and patronage becomes less rel- one of the informal state brokers in the House of
evant as the main mechanism in the pattern of Government I interviewed in 2008: “The root of
interaction with the state (Massetti 2009; Pereyra the problem always lies in the harmonization of
et al. 2008; Pérez and Natalucci 2012). Simul- the network of vested interests; there is a rela-
taneously, the continued coordination of protest tionship based on interests.” Whether formal or
and other activities around political organizations informal, this relationship operates through per-
produce asymmetrical and varied bonds between sonal agreements and divisions that more often
state officials, the organized poor, and the SMOs than not are of an unofficial nature and applica-
leaders. In short, clientelism continues to occupy ble only to localized areas or districts, something
a central role in attempts by the poor to reduce characterized by this same state broker as “a non-
their distance from the state for survival purpos- public institutionality that exists.” The pattern of
es. That being said, other bonding mechanisms interaction of the piquetero movement with state
exist within a predominant repertoire of strate- institutions comprises two main elements:
gies used by the piquetero movement that remain
largely unexamined (Rossi 2015). 1. Evolution of public policy on unemployment:
To sum up, what these previous studies and the When relations between the movement and
examples I gave show—at the very least—is the the state have revolved around a claim for an
issue that is subject to a precise public policy
domain (such as, house building, food provi-
9 “Thus, the image of an extended ‘captive’ clientelist sion, etc.), the link has been through the state
electorate (stereo-typically portrayed by the media, and department responsible for that policy.
sometimes unreflectively adopted by scholars) is, in the
case I am analyzing, empirically shaky. Although signifi- 2. Tension around territorial governability-dis-
cant, the size of brokers’ inner circles can hardly account ruption: When relations between the move-
for the ‘conquest of the vote’ and ‘building of electoral ment and the state have been a result of a dis-
consensus’ that is usually attributed to clientelism. If we pute for territorial control and/or tension be-
are to use the word ‘clientelism’ we should therefore re-
strict it to the inner circle of doxic experience” (Auyero tween governability and disruption. The link
1999, p. 326). has been through some PJ factions or the Fre-
paso party during the De la Rúa government unemployment subsides, the Ministry of Social
or the divisions among the municipal, provin- Development was put in charge of the social
cial, and national governments. policies that support housing construction coop-
eratives, capacity building, and so on. Kirchner’s
In theoretical terms, the first element is that of the government took two predominant—and simul-
constitution, as a result of piquetero protests, of taneous—approaches to the distribution of unem-
a new piquetero policy domain according to spe- ployment subsidies: (1) Informal subsidies dis-
cific formal divisions and procedures of the state. tributed by operadores (informal state brokers)
The second element is based on the territorializa- as instruments for political negotiation and for
tion of politics and the tension between the orga- the resolution of concrete conflictive situations
nized disruption instigated by social movements and (2) the Planes de Emergencia Comunitaria
and the state’s attempts to control that disrup- (Communitarian Emergency Plans, PEC), for-
tion. For the first element, divisions within the mally institutionalized subsidies distributed by
state apparatus, such as disputes between min- the Secretary of Employment (Ministry of Labor)
istries, is crucial. For the second element, there for the coverage of individuals during periods of
are two possible types of elite divisions: within unemployment.
the same scale of action (for example, among Concerning the second element, the territorial
party members in the same governmental coali- dispute has evolved to reach the national scale as
tion), and through multiple scales of action (for a product of the 1999–2001 mayors–movement
example, between mayors and the governor in a relationship in the Florencio Varela (PJ, pro-Du-
province). In analyzing this, we should consider halde) and La Matanza districts (PJ, anti-Duhal-
political opportunities as consisting of a horizon- de) as those mayors competed among themselves
tal component (i.e., intra-scalar elite divisions) and with Duhalde (the main PJ leader in the prov-
and a vertical component (i.e., inter-scalar elite ince of Buenos Aires). In addition, this dispute
divisions). was part of the movement of opposition against
Regarding the first element of the pattern of the De la Rúa presidency—sectors of whose co-
interaction, changes took place in the type and use alition were, at the same time, supporting some
of unemployment subsidies. President Menem piquetero SMOs. This period went through a
used the Planes Trabajar (Working Plans) I, II, two-stage relational process. Until the end of De
and III as a solution to focalized conflictive situ- la Rúa presidency, what predominated was a re-
ations with no further unemployment policies. lationship based on the threat of disruption by the
There was a continuation of Menem’s types of movement and the provision of resources by the
subsidies during De la Rúa presidential mandate state to secure governability based on informal
with the addition of the Programa de Emergencia agreements (initially produced at the municipal
Laboral (Labor Emergency Program, PEL), but scale, then reaching the national scale at the end
the goal was to control PJ clientelism and redirect of 2001). The Duhalde presidency saw the start
it towards the expansion of territorialized support of a new predominant relationship that I term
for part of the government coalition. After De la as “agreements for the sustainability of govern-
Rúa’s forced resignation in late 2001, President ability”, a mode that applied to half of the main
Eduardo Duhalde expanded unemployment sub- group of piquetero SMOs,10 and that implied the
sidies to reach almost two million beneficiaries routinization of the logic initiated by De la Rúa.
with the Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar De-
sempleados (Unemployed Heads of Household
Program, PJJHD) in the quest to ensure govern- 10 The Federación de Trabajadores por la Tierra, Vivi-
ability in a highly conflictive situation. Finally, enda y Hábitat (Workers Federation for Land, Housing
President Néstor Kirchner ended the PJJHD and Habitat, FTV), the CCC, the Polo Obrero (Workers
distribution and divided the responsibility for Pole, PO), the Movimiento Sin Trabajo “Teresa Vive”
(Movement of Jobless “Teresa is Alive”, MST), the Mov-
the piquetero policy domain. While the Ministry imiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD) “Aníbal
of Labor would continue to be responsible for Verón”, and the Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y
124 F. M. Rossi
Under Duhalde’s successor, Néstor Kirchner la Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat, FTV, and CCC).
(and continued by Cristina Fernández de Kirch- A second group did not accept these agreements.
ner during the first half of her term), the multi- Within this group, there were two alternative
plicity of specific paths grew as the state attempt- strategies: one of disruption (MTR and Coordi-
ed to add a territorial base to its coalition while nadora de Trabajadores Desocupados “Aníbal
demobilizing—without the use of hard physical Verón” ( Coordination of Unemployed Workers
repression—those who declined to participate Aníbal Verón, CTD) and its later subdivisions),
in or support the government. It was during this and another of electoral vote-catching (Polo
period that the partial incorporation of the pique Obrero, PO, Movimiento Sin Trabajo, “Teresa
teros into the governing coalition expanded. Vive”, and Movimiento Independiente de Jubila-
dos y Desocupados, MIJD, mainly).
From the stabilization of the regime under Du-
Strategies of Interaction by Piquetero halde’s government, the pre-legitimation strate-
SMOs: A Summary gies of interaction were solely sustained until
December 2008 (the end of the analyzed period)
The pattern of interaction implies strategic ac- by those SMOs that had a very low degree of in-
tions taken by the state departments as well as ternal formalization and bureaucratization. These
by the piquetero SMOs. Through the rest of this were organizations that totally depended on one
chapter, I will show how the main SMOs of the or two leaders, and that as a result became sub-
piquetero movement followed different trajecto- jected to the PJ’s preference for informal and
ries within a common struggle for sociopolitical individualized links. On the one hand, this has
reincorporation. Even though this is a historical in effect happened with the Movimiento de Tra-
and dynamic process, it is possible to identify a bajadores Desocupados (MTD) “Aníbal Verón”,
specific pattern for each SMO, which I will sum- the MIJD, and the Unión de Trabajadores Deso-
marize here and illustrate through some of the cupados (Union of Unemployed Workers, UTD)
most relevant organizations. As I will show, one of Mosconi, whose leaders were able to show,
of the crucial elements differentiating the various through repeated instances of disruption, that
trajectories of the piquetero SMOs is that some their leadership was the crucial element in their
depend on a structured political party, while oth- SMO’s capacity to produce, and then control,
ers lack such a thing. disruption in an area. On the other hand, this has
From the emergence of the movement in 1996 not happened in the case of the MTR, despite it
to the legitimation of the piqueteros as a new na- being a personalized organization. The MTR’s
tional actor at the end of De la Rúa’s presidency vanguardist and focalist style of organization
and during the brief presidency of Adolfo Rodrí- produced a permanent rupture of agreements
guez Saá in December 2001, the strategy was one with allied members of the piquetero movement,
of exchange of governability for resources. This while challenging the main SMOs—the FTV and
involved mainly, but not only, unemployment CCC—for domination of the movement. As a re-
subsidies in exchange of refraining from picket- sult, the MTR showed an incapacity or lack of in-
ing. From the very beginning, but mostly since terest to respect informal agreements established
Duhalde’s presidency (2002–2003), the move- with PJ mayors (mainly in Florencio Varela), in-
ment has been divided into groups concerning its formal brokers of Federico Ruckauf’s governor-
relationship with the state. During Duhalde’s ten- ship (1999–2002), and Duhalde’s allied sector in
ure, a group of SMOs followed a path of estab- the province of Buenos Aires.
lishment of agreements for the sustainability of After the abrupt end to Duhalde’s government
governability ( Federación de Trabajadores por over the killings of two piquetero members, Nés-
tor Kirchner’s presidency further developed the
incorporation of the piqueteros into the coalition.
Desocupados (Independent Movement of the Retired and
Unemployed, MIJD). Kirchner’s government started from a very weak
position after winning with 22 % of the votes. During the 2004–2008 period, Barrios de Pie
Thus, in the quest for legitimation and rebuilding grounded its strategy of interaction in the produc-
a territorial base, Kirchner invited almost all the tion of individualized agreements with PJ leaders
SMOs to integrate—in a secondary role—into (as an internal government ally) with the goal of
the government coalition, ultimately accepting colonizing gatekeeper positions inside the state.
almost half of the movement. This decision re- This strategy was based on the ability of a nation-
configured the interaction of most of the SMOs, al, though small and very vertical, left-wing party
though not for the CCC and MTR, which had to establish agreements across districts, despite
already changed their relationship with the state the need for a separate negotiation with each
under Duhalde’s government. The main SMOs PJ leader—due to the decentralized and poorly
that integrated into Néstor Kirchner’s coalition structured organization of the PJ. Consequently,
were the FTV (2003 to the present) and Barrios though the structure of these agreements was not
de Pie (Standing Up Neighborhoods) (2004– formalized but rather ad hoc, the way they were
2008), and in 2003, the government, by means of set up ensured a much-valued sense of continu-
joining together sectors of several smaller SMOs, ity, helping to sustain the links between this SMO
created the Movimiento “Evita”.11 and its government allies. This strategy resulted
The strategy of interaction adopted by the in Barrios de Pie achieving multiple positions in
FTV during the period of 2003–2008 can be in- national and provincial ministries, as well as their
terpreted as an emulation of the PJ’s networked first elected posts (national and provincial depu-
and decentralized structure that had used the ex- ties) in several provinces.
change of governability for access to resources The last main government ally has been the
and/or electoral posts. Thus, the FTV can be de- Movimiento “Evita”, a particular case of creation
fined as a network of local territorial leaders that from above. The Movimiento “Evita” represents
share the use of the “FTV” emblem producing an attempt to build a territorial base for the pro-
local agreements with total autonomy (among Kirchner faction and reorganize some left-wing
themselves and with the national coordinators) groups associated with Montoneros within the PJ.
with equivalent “PJ” interlocutors (mostly, may- In the dispute for the control of territory in the cru-
ors and governors). This informal approach al- cial Greater Buenos Aires, the Movimiento “Evita”
lowed the FTV the flexibility and capability to was built based on a splitting off of the Peronist
adapt in the face of constant PJ fluctuations, but sector of the Movimiento Patriótico Revoluciona-
at the same time made it vulnerable and depen- rio (MPR) “Quebracho” political organization, as
dent on the resources provided by the PJ (which well as some MTD spinoffs from the CTD “Aníbal
came from the state). It is due to this that the FTV Verón”. After an initial period (2004) as an MTD,
regularly lost members at the grassroots level, the Movimiento “Evita” started to redefine itself
and some of its leaders coopted into agreements as a left-wing pro-Kirchner Peronist group or
with the PJ or state officials, as happened with agrupación that works inside and outside the PJ
some of the FTV’s founding members after they with a focus on consolidating a territorial base in
were integrated into the House of Government’s Greater Buenos Aires. Even though in 2007 its
informal brokers’ team. main leader became Secretary of Territorial Orga-
nizations of the PJ, the main difference between
the Movimiento “Evita” and the other PJ agru-
paciones has been that the Movimiento “Evita”
11
Later, the Organización Barrial “Tupac Amaru” is more autonomous from party leaders than a
(Neighborhood Association “Tupac Amaru”) of the prov-
ince of Jujuy joined the government-allied sector. This mayor-controlled PJ agrupación. The Movimiento
SMO has been growing rapidly due to its bonds with the “Evita” has its own leader with no electoral goals
national and provincial governments (Battezzati 2012). for himself, and thus works under the logic of
Though it is provincially important, this SMO is not cru- agreements rather than obedience in its quest for
cial for national dynamics because of Argentina’s political
centralization in Buenos Aires. colonizing political spaces inside the PJ.
126 F. M. Rossi
Regarding those piquetero SMOs that re- Finally, there is a strategy of interaction that
mained in the opposition, some of the main ones was solely followed by a small SMO, the MTD of
have been the MTR, PO, CCC, and MTD of La La Juanita, a pioneer organization in the forma-
Juanita. The MTR during this period continued tion of the movement. After rejecting the claim
with its previous strategy, but experienced dif- for unemployment subsidies, this MTD initiated a
ficulty in sustaining individualized and infor- strategy of mutation into an NGO. In other words,
mal agreements with PJ leaders as an external this SMO moderated its claims and contentious
actor. This difficulty of maintaining a basic level strategies, replacing them with donor-led project-
of trust with both allies and antagonists put the focused agendas of action. Operating in a man-
MTR in the position of being considered as an ner similar to any professionalized NGO, it al-
incontrollable actor by both parts. This led to a lied with private companies and the middle-class
gradual, but sustained, process of subdivisions Coalición Cívica–Alianza por una República de
and, eventually, almost dissolution, an outcome Iguales (Civic Coalition–Alliance for a Republic
hastened by some government officials and in- of Equal People, CC–ARI) party. Moreover, the
formal brokers. main leader’s tenure as a CC–ARI national par-
Though applying the same strategy of indi- liamentarian (2007–2011) represented a different
vidualized agreements with PJ leaders as an ex- approach to the Congress than the one taken by
ternal actor, the trajectory of the PO—reliant on Barrios de Pie, the FTV, or even the CCC. The
the vote-catching Trotskyist Partido Obrero—was parliamentarian agenda of the MTD of La Juan-
completely different from that of the MTR. From ita was focused on the legislative commissions
1999, the PO grew quickly through a strategy of of cooperatives and NGOs, rather than on those
self-restraint and limited disruption. As a result commissions linked to unemployment and land
of this approach, the PO was seen as particularly issues. The path adopted by this SMO is atypical
amenable to the establishment of “agreements for for a poor people’s movement in Argentina.
the sustainability of governability.” It increased its
political power mainly during Duhalde’s presiden-
cy and sustained it while the Kirchner–Duhalde Conclusion
co-government agreement was valid (2003–2005).
As happened with the MTR, the CCC—linked In this chapter I argued that collective-based di-
to the abstentionist Maoist PCR—continued mensions are stronger explanatory elements of
through 2008 with the same strategy of interac- the relational path taken by the piqueteros than
tion started before 2003. The CCC established in- individually-based explanations of state–pique
dividualized agreements with sectors of the cen- teros interaction. While in some cases this might
ter-right factions of the PJ and the Unión Cívica involve an exchange of resources for support or
Radical (Radical Civic Union, UCR) parties with other “goods” of some sort, as I have shown, the
the goal of constituting an insurrectional multi- relationship is not between atomized individuals,
class coalition. With this strategy in mind it pro- but rather between organized groups disputing
duced alliances with some anti-Kirchner groups constituency and resources in a territory subject
and leaders in exchange for support (offering a to tension between governability and disruption.
mass territorial base and electoral mobilization). In other words, when the unit of analysis is the so-
This type of strategic link reached the national cial movement, we are not dealing with atomized
scale during the one-week interim presidency of individuals, but rather organized groups. For this
Rodríguez Saá, and was used in 2003 to support reason, the relationship between the state and the
him in his candidacy for the presidency. In addi- urban poor, where they are organized as a move-
tion, the CCC’s strategy was very important in ment, should be seen as composed of a polyadic
the puebladas (social uprisings) of 1992–1999 in rather than a dyadic bond, with internal subdivi-
Jujuy and Salta, and in the 2008 national land- sions that are crucial (Table 9.1 synthesized the
owners’ tax revolt and lockout. internal diversity of the piquetero movement).
In addition, in a more than contentious po- Auyero, J. (2000b). The logic of clientelism in Argentina:
litical view of the pattern of interaction of the An ethnographic account. Latin American Research
Review, 35(3), 55–81.
piqueteros with the state, we could see that it Auyero, J. (2002). Los cambios en el repertorio de la pro-
is based on the combination of the evolution of testa social en la Argentina. Desarrollo Económico,
public policy on unemployment, and the territo- 42(166), 187–210.
rial tension between the state quest for govern- Auyero, J. (2003). Contentious lives: Two argentine
women, two protests, and the quest for recognition.
ability and the movement’s capacity to produce Durham: Duke University Press.
disruption. However, this does not necessarily Auyero, J. (2007). Routine politics and violence in Argen-
mean that the relationship is affective or solely tina: The grey zone of state power. Cambridge: Cam-
contentious—the bond is an instrumental one, bridge University Press.
Battezzati, S. (2012). La Tupac Amaru: intermediación
forged through formal and informal channels. de intereses de los sectores populares informales en
I hope that studies as the ones I have briefly la provincia de Jujuy. Desarrollo Económico, 52(205),
reviewed here and my own have made clear that 147–171.
the analysis of the piquetero–state relationship Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. (2004). Vote buy-
ing in Argentina. Latin American Research Review,
in terms of clientelism is at a dead end. Efforts 39(2), 66–88.
should be made to go deeper in order to under- Calvo, E., & Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who delivers? Parti-
stand the political process to which this move- san clients in the Argentine electoral market. Ameri-
ment is attached and the pattern of interaction can Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 742–757.
Calvo, E., & Murillo, M. V. (2009). Respuesta al comen-
which it has developed. In other words, clien- tario de Dora Orlansky: ‘¿Validez de una demos-
telism is just one of many types of interactive tración? Patronazgo y empleo público provincial’.
links available, and it is reductionist to restrict Desarrollo Económico, 48(192), 559–61.
the piqueteros–state relationship to these terms. Cerrutti, M., & Grimson, A. (2004). Buenos Aires, neo-
liberalismo y después. Cambios socioeconómicos y
Notwithstanding some important first steps that respuestas populares. Working Paper Series #04–04d.
have been taken to understand the relational di- The Center for Migration and Development—Princ-
mension of the piqueteros, they have been mostly eton University.
focused on the contentious dimension of the pro- Delamata, G. (2004). Los barrios desbordados. Las
organizaciones de desocupados del Gran Bue-
cess; thus, explaining the institutional expres- nos Aires. Buenos Aires: Centro Cultural Ricardo
sions of this pattern of interaction remains a work Rojas—EUDEBA.
in progress. If we acknowledge that the piquetero Delamata, G. (2005). Las organizaciones de desocupados
movement’s interaction with the state is partially del Gran Buenos Aires y la(s)crisis. In F. Schuster,
et al. (Eds.), Tomar la palabra. Estudios sobre pro-
contentious and includes clientelism, cooptation, testa social y acción colectiva en la Argentina con-
and patronage—while not being limited to any temporánea (pp. 365–385). Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
of them—a broader and more complex picture della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (1999). Social movements: An
emerges. For this to be done we need to create introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
Diani, M. 1992. The concept of social movements. Socio-
some additional analytical tools that will enrich logical Review, 40, 1–25.
the social movement literature by presenting a Ferrauri Curto, M. C. (2006). Lucha y papeles en una
multidimensional and non-dichotomist analysis organización piquetera del sur de Buenos Aires. In D.
of the spaces of interaction whose dynamics are Míguez & P. Semán (Eds.), Entre santos, cumbias y
piquetes: Las culturas populares en la Argentina reci-
not solely contentious and that are at the same ente (pp. 145–164). Buenos Aires: Biblos.
time multi-scalar and multi-institutional. Franceschelli, I., & Ronconi, L. (2009). The effect of
workfare policy on social movement mobilizations.
Economics Letters, 105(3), 315–317.
Giraudy, A. (2007). The distributive politics of emergency
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Part IV
Indigenous-Based Struggles Across
the Continent
Indigenous Peoples’
Movements, Developments, 10
and Politics in Ecuador and
Bolivia
Eduardo Silva
Setting the Stage into significantly more intense contact with the
dominant society.2
The Indigenous peoples of Bolivia and Ecuador This chapter traces the trajectory of the mod-
share a centuries long history of conquest, domi- ern indigenous peoples movement in these two
nation, and resistance dating back to the 1500s countries over three distinct periods: formative
(Stern 1987). Both the countries have large, pre- years under national populism (1960s–1980s),
dominantly rural, indigenous populations with leadership in cycles of anti-neoliberal contention
important distinctions between highland and (1980s–2005), and their relationship to the left
lowland nations; although at near 60 %, Bolivia’s governments that followed in the post neoliberal
indigenous population almost doubles that of period (2006–present). It tells the story of their
Ecuador.1 In both countries, the highland popula- rise, relative decline, and current struggles. It
tion is by far the more numerous, geographically also shows that for most of the national populist
denser, ethnically and culturally more homog- and neoliberal periods indigenous movements
enous, has a longer and more intense history of in Bolivia and Ecuador developed along simi-
contact with the dominant economy and society, lar paths and then diverged sharply in the post
and has developed a peasant-style agriculture neoliberal period. The narrative focuses on the
based on small holdings. By contrast, lowland in- largest movement campaigns, key protagonists,
digenous in the Amazon basin inhabit geographi- and changing relationships to the state from
cally much more extensive areas that are thinly the 1950s and 1960s to the present. These were
populated and who practice subsistence econo- deeply influenced by the distinctive socioeco-
my. It was not until the 1960s and later, with the nomic and political development models of each
development of hydrocarbon extraction and the
rapid expansion of agribusiness, that they came
2 In Bolivia, the highland population is predominantly
Quechua or Aymara, they also live in the mountain valleys
between highlands and lowlands. As the twentieth century
wore on rural to urban migration accelerated, especially
1
The figure for Bolivia is from the 2001 census and based to the city of El Alto that looms over La Paz. Roughly 17
on self-identification. The figure is controversial because different indigenous nations inhabit the lowlands, among
preliminary figures for the 2012 census—also based on them Guaraní, Chiquitano, and Moxeño. Ecuadorean
self-identification—is closer to 40 %. Hypothesis for this highland indigenous are mainly Quechua-speaking and
discrepancy abound, but in any case, Bolivia’s indigenous are the descendants of indigenous nations that inhabited
population remains larger than Ecuador’s. the area before the Inca. A sizeable migration to Quito and
Cuenca has also occurred. Amazon basin nations include
E. Silva () the Secoyas, Sionas, Cofan, Huaorani, Zaparo, Shuar, and
Tulane University, New Orleans, USA Achuar. Since Ecuador is not landlocked, there are also
e-mail: gesilva@tulane.edu coastal indigenous peoples such as the Chachis.
132 E. Silva
period, which shaped the political opportunities Bolivia The revolution of 1952, one of Latin
and threats that indigenous peoples movements America’s few social revolutions, which was
responded to. Of course, movement participants strongly supported by urban working classes
have agency, and so, drawing on a political pro- and led by militant mine workers, ushered in
cess model of movements, we also examine how the national populist period in Bolivia. Under
leaders perceived those opportunities and threats, the ensuing reformist democratic regime led by
built their organizations, and framed the issues, the middle-class Movimiento Nacional Revolu-
not just in terms of their movements, but in rela- cionario party (MNR), land reform, a key rural
tion to other popular sector movements, political indigenous-peasant demand, was begun and
parties and the state (Tarrow 2011; Goldstone the rural indigenous population organized into
2003). peasant unions to support it. Although land was
redistributed, the material backing for peasant
agriculture lagged. The military overthrew the
National Populism and Indigenous democratic regime in 1964, set up a military
Peoples’ Movements, 1950s-mid- government, and in the early 1970s established
1980s a Military–Peasant Pact to strengthen its rule.
The military unified peasant unions in a state
Following the crisis of mineral and agricultural controlled confederation and promised to address
elite-led oligarchic rule in the 1940s and 1950s peasant grievances. However, by the late1970s
that excluded popular sectors from politics, the land taxes and repression alienated leaders of
national populist period in Bolivia and Ecuador new peasant unions from the military govern-
turned to a more state-directed economic devel- ment (Klein 2003).
opment model. Progressive democratic and mili- As these organizational milestones unfolded,
tary governments alike also sought to include the two strands of indigenous ethno-cultural identity
political, economic, and social grievances and within them—Katarismo and Indianismo—stim-
demands of the popular sectors. Urban politics ulated the formation of an independent indige-
dominated the national-populist period, and so nous peasant movement between 1968 and 1979.
urban labor unions became the leading popular Katarismo, which initially dominated, combined
sector movement organizations (Collier and Col- class consciousness (defense of peasant interests)
lier 1991). with advocacy for ethnic and cultural rights. This
However, there was a rural component to the development had profound consequences for
national-populist project in both Bolivia and Ec- future struggles. First, it generated demands for
uador. During this period, the state mainly incor- a Bolivian state that was both tolerant of ethnic
porated the highland indigenous population in diversity and that included indigenous as well
the political arena via peasant unions, seeking as Western governing forms (Healy and Paul-
to integrate them into the nation on the basis of son 2000). These demands eventually became
class instead of indigenous identity. Land reform, enshrined in the constitution of the Plurinational
infrastructure development, and state financial State of Bolivia in 2009. Second, it facilitated al-
support for peasant agriculture benefited their liance building with other social movements and
communities. Lowland areas were just beginning leftist political parties (Van Cott 2005, p. 35),
to be integrated into the nation with the expan- such as the main militant labor organization the
sion of natural resource exploitation. Through- Central Obrera Boliviana (COB).
out this period, indigenous peasant unions were The upshot of this second development was
subordinate to urban labor unions, which were that, as the re-democratization movement was
considered the leading transformative sector of getting underway in 1978, the COB helped the
the working class in the struggle against capital- Katarista peasant union leaders to form a politi-
ist domination. cally independent unified peasant organization.
10 Indigenous Peoples’ Movements, Developments, and Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia 133
This was the Confederación Sindical Única de carimui, Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indian)
Trabajadores Campesinos Bolivianos (CSUTCB, and lowland indigenous formed the CONFENI-
Unitary Confederation of Syndicalized Bolvian AE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas
Peasant Workers). It mainly represented highland de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana, Confederation of
peasants, including those of the Cochabamba val- Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuadorian Amazo-
ley, and it was affiliated with the COB. However, nia). ECUARUNARI’s framing of indigenous
the CSUTCB did not enjoy much influence in people’s struggles mixed peasant issues such
the COB. The latter was dominated by mining as land, prices for agricultural production and
and manufacturing unions whose Marxist orien- products, subsidies, and working conditions with
tation demanded the subordination of peasants indigenous ethnic and identity consciousness
to the vanguard of the proletariat (Ticona 2000, raising. It steadily displaced the class-oriented
pp. 119–29). These difficulties aside, the indig- FENOC in indigenous communities. CONFENI-
enous-peasant movement’s proclivity to enter AE grew in response to land grabs by landown-
into cross-class and cross-ethnic alliances was a ers, colonists, and oil companies. Conserving and
key element in the development of cycles of anti- protecting territorial integrity was one of its top
neoliberal contention that developed in the 1990s issues because it was inseparable from cultural
and early 2000s. and ethnic survival (Benavides 2004, pp. 140–
41; Gerlach 2003; Selveston-Scher 2001; Yashar
Ecuador Much like in Bolivia, the national pop- 2005; Zamosc 2004).
ulist state had organized indigenous communities
under peasant identity and had a much greater
impact on the highland indigenous population. Neoliberalism, 1984–2005
Agrarian reform laws during the military govern-
ments of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged indig- As labor unions weakened during the neoliberal
enous peoples to register as peasants. Legally period in Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous peo-
chartered peasant communities strengthened ples’ movements rose to lead the struggle against
indigenous community authority and custom- free-market economic restructuring programs.
ary law (Guerrero 1993). In the 1960s, they cre- They stood at the core of heterogeneous leftist
ated the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones cross-class coalitions mobilizing against market
Campesinas (FENOC).3 With aid from FENOC, reforms and for the reinstatement of state led de-
communities organized along corporatist lines to velopment and welfare efforts. The period also
receive promised benefits, such as land, credit, witnessed the resurgence of indigenous iden-
and infrastructure improvement (Hurtado 1980; tity as a key organizing principle; thus demands
Isaacs 1993; Schodt 1987; Yashar 2005). Mean- mixed claims for indigenous autonomy with ma-
while in the Amazon region, oil development and terial needs. In addition, Indigenous movements
colonist land invasions stimulated organizing by created political parties to take their fight more
indigenous peoples, especially the Shuar (Ger- directly into the political arena. During this pe-
lach 2003). riod, lowland indigenous groups experienced tre-
In the 1970s, highland and lowland indige- mendous advances in the movement organization
nous had been organizing independently as well. adding their associational power to that of high-
By the late 1970s, highland indigenous organized land indigenous unions.
the ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runcunapac Ric- The neoliberal period was paradoxical. On the
one hand, it offered opportunities by encouraging
organizational development based on indigenous
3 The earliest indigenous people’s organization was the
identity in order to promote multiculturalism.
Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI), created along
The focus was on languages, festivals, rituals,
peasant-class lines in the 1940s. Agrarian reform was its
major demand and once that was achieved in the 1960s cosmology and how culture informs the routines
the FEI declined rapidly. of everyday life. On the other hand, neoliberal
134 E. Silva
economic reforms also presented threats (Almei- development that was environmentally sustain-
da 2007). They harmed indigenous peoples mate- able. NGOs teamed with fledgling indigenous
rially and systematically excluded them from the organizations to promote the demarcation of in-
policy process. This combination, with political digenous lands, national parks that would restrict
decentralization, fanned the fires of indigenous large-scale development projects, and support
mobilization. alternative, ecologically friendly, small-scale
community economies. They also advocated for
environmental legislation. This alliance of en-
Opportunities vironmental NGOs and indigenous people’s or-
ganizations was important in both the anti-neo-
In general, the neoliberal project excluded social liberal protests and in the struggles of the post
forces from economic and social policymaking. neoliberal period.
However, in the interest of promoting formal In Bolivia, beginning in the early 1980s,
equality the neoliberal project encouraged so- NGOs helped to organize two important orga-
cial movements as long as their activities were nizations. One was the Confederación de Pueb-
confined to non-economic arenas. Thus, govern- los Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB),
ments emphasized formal recognition of individ- the principal tropical lowland indigenous social
ual and cultural rights of heretofore marginalized movement organization.4 CIDOB’s principal
subaltern groups, such as indigenous peoples. It struggle is against the expansion of the agricul-
was assumed that formal equality before the law tural frontier and hydrocarbon exploration and
and promotion of cultural and ethnic diversity development. The other was the CONAMAQ,
would not impact economic policymaking. which represented highland Aymara and Quech-
A key policy objective of the neoliberal proj- ua who inhabit marginal pastoral lands and who
ect was to reduce the size and functions of the are weakly integrated into markets, hence still at-
state in the economy and to strengthen local civil tached to communal ways of production (Zegada
society. In order to bypass the state, international et al. 2008).
development agencies relied heavily on nongov- In Ecuador in the 1980s the Shuar nation in
ernmental organizations (NGOs) for the delivery Ecuador, along with NGOs, formed the Confed-
of services and programs and to promote civil eración de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Ama-
society organization independent of the state. zonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE, Confederation
NGOs penetrated most heavily in areas where the of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian
organizations developed during the national pop- Amazon).5 An important struggle was the fight
ulist period had little or no presence. As a result, against the environmental degradation of their
NGOs promoting indigenous rights were most lands and devastation of their communities due
effective organizing movements among lowland to oil exploitation (Gerlach 2003). In the 1980s
ethnic groups, which tended to be more margin- and 1990s, international environmental NGOs
alized from the overall capitalist economy, relied strongly supported their struggles against inter-
more on subsistence economies, and had lower national oil companies and the expansion of oil
density populations spread out over much larger field exploitation. Environmental NGOs also
territories. linked up with specific communities in efforts
The central role of NGOs had another im-
pact. They provided a link to the environmental
movement. Indigenous peoples, especially those 4 Peoples that formed CIDOB included the Chiquitanos,
living in Amazonian regions, were considered Ayoreos, Guarayos, and Guaraníes.

victims of development. International organiza- 5 Theother members are the Kichwa, Acuar, Siona, Sec-
tions, especially the United Nations and later the oya, Cofan, and Huaorani. The principal advisory NGO
is CIPCA (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del
World Bank, promoted indigenous rights and
Campesinado).
to establish protected areas. The Yasuní National or drastically reduced state support for peasant
Park became emblematic; it sat atop substantial agriculture, and devalued the currency. Steeply
oil reserves.6 rising prices and income loss threatened already
precarious livelihoods among rural poor indig-
enous communities whose inhabitants mostly
Cycles of Anti-Neoliberal Contention owned tiny plots of land and depended on state
subsidies to peasant agriculture and supplemental
Despite these opportunities for cultural inclusion, income to make ends meet. Moreover, the admin-
the negative effects of neoliberal economic, so- istration’s emphasis on private enterprise and
cial, and political reforms drove the indigenous promotion of agribusiness threatened land tenure
movement organizations of Bolivia and Ecuador security in highlands and lowlands alike (Pal-
to protest with increasing intensity from 1990 to lares 2002, pp. 210–11; Zamosc 1994). Deepen-
the early 2000s (Silva 2009). Between the initia- ing poverty and loss of land or farming capacity
tions of neoliberal reforms in 1984/1985 to the would destroy indigenous communities and with
early 1990s, it became clear that labor unions it their culture.
were too weakened to lead the struggle. As anti- These threats spurred CONAIE to direct ac-
neoliberal contention gathered momentum, first tion.7 In June 1990, CONAIE organized the first
in Ecuador and then in Bolivia, the indigenous of several “National Indian Uprisings.” The mo-
people’s movement took on crucial leadership bilization lasted 10 days, drew in unaffiliated
roles and built heterogeneous coalitions with peasant and indigenous organizations, and their
labor, environmental, and urban popular sector novel forms of protest (such as the road block)
and middle-class organizations. The leadership paralyzed six commercially important highland
role was more clear cut in Ecuador under the provinces. The Indian Uprising transformed
direction of the Confederación Nacional de In- CONAIE into a national political actor and Ecua-
dígenas Ecuatorianos (CONAIE, National Con- dor’s leading social movement.
federation of Indigenous Ecuadorians) than in CONAIE adroitly translated the threats posed
Bolivia where no such overarching indigenous by neoliberal economic reforms into common
peoples confederation existed. We now turn to framing devices and demands that appealed to its
largest campaigns and their results. diverse base. Land and access to state resources
for community development and peasant agri-
Ecuador The next milestone in the development culture were central issues. Other key framing
of the Ecuadorian Indigenous peoples organiza- devices and demands were more political and
tion and power occurred in 1986 when ECUA- cultural, such as the right to self-management
RUNARI and CONFENIAE joined forces and ( autogestión) and self-government of indigenous
formed the CONAIE in reaction to the initia- communities. This eventually became the basis
tion of neoliberal economic reforms during the for constitutional claims for a plurinational state,
administration of León Febres Cordero (1984– which required the establishment of a constituent
1988) (Yashar 2005). The intertwining of land
and cultural survival issues united them. Febres
Cordero’s economic stabilization program,
7 Initially CONAIE chose to advocate for cultural is-
emphasizing fiscal retrenchment, cut subsidies to
consumption for poor households and state spon- sues. In the early part of Rodrigo Borjas’ administration
(1988–1992) CONAIE successfully lobbied for bilingual
sored construction work in rural areas, eliminated programs and in 1988 the government established an In-
tercultural Bilingual Education Program that CONAIE
would help to run (Zamosc 1994). CONAIE, however,
6 was also very responsive to regional and local indigenous
The Yasuni National Park is an area of 9820 km² be-
tween the Napo and Curaray rivers in Napo and Pastaza organizations. Highland members wanted CONAIE to
provinces in Amazonian Ecuador. It lies within the Napo fight for land issues, which meant taking a more conten-
moist forests ecoregion and is primarily rain forest. tious stance towards the government.
136 E. Silva
assembly as a necessary prior condition (Silva 1994 when CONAIE organized a Second Indian
2009). Uprising in reaction to the hasty passage of an
Sustained efforts by subsequent presiden- agribusiness-friendly agrarian development law.
cies to deepen market-oriented economic and This was a massive “Mobilization for Life” of
political reforms turned these demands into the highland and lowland indigenous peoples. Core
irreducible core of CONAIE’s platform. But demands remained the same as in 1990, only
CONAIE’s leaders concluded early on that the more clearly defined (CONAIE 1994). To en-
struggle against neoliberalism required alliances compass other protesting groups, the CONAIE’s
with other popular sector and middle-class or- framing stressed the common threat of neoliber-
ganizations that were also protesting, such as alism to all of the popular sectors, a menace that
labor unions, urban neighborhood associations, necessitated a solidary response. The CONAIE
anti-free trade movements, human rights groups, also demanded a referendum calling for a con-
teachers’ associations, and state employee stituent assembly. In the midst of rising diplomat-
unions. CONAIE took on a leadership role be- ic tensions with Peru, the government eventually
cause these groups were not strong enough to negotiated with protesters and offered conces-
organize massive, national mobilizations. It was sions on agrarian reform, credit to peasants, and
only when CONAIE entered the fray that govern- access to water rights (Silva 2009).
ments really took notice. And so, for the rest of Durán’s successor, Abdalá Bucaram, reneged
the decade, CONAIE led several cycles of anti- on those concessions and proposed to follow
neoliberal contention. In the process, CONAIE through with Durán’s original neoliberal pro-
extended its framing and expanded its demands gram, and added a twist: to fully dollarize the
to include the interests of other groups that were economy by using the dollar itself as the na-
protesting. Because governments refused to back tional currency. This would require a “shock
down (even though they sometimes negotiated treatment” type of fiscal stabilization program.
agreements only to renege on them) CONAIE- The CONAIE, labor unions, and a civil society
led mobilizations turned expressly political, de- broad front mobilized in early 1997. The cycle
manding the resignation of incumbent presidents. of anti-neoliberal contention that followed de-
We now turn to some of the major campaigns. manded Bucaram’s ouster. Bucaram lasted
In addition to stringent economic stabilization, barely 6 months in office (August 1996 to Feb-
Sixto Durán’s presidency (1992–1996) pursued ruary 1997) as the political establishment and
an aggressive economic structural adjustment large portions of the private sector also turned
program that included steep tariff reductions, fi- against him. The caretaker government that fol-
nancial market liberalization, capital market and lowed acquiesced to a constituent assembly. The
foreign investment liberalization, privatization of results for the CONAIE were mixed. Indigenous
state enterprises, and an agrarian reform in favor peoples gained many rights related to cultural,
of agribusiness (García 2003, pp. 87–88; North ethnic, and local administrative issues. However,
2004). The trigger for the CONAIE-led cycle of the CONAIE’s core socioeconomic platform was
mobilization that followed was Durán’s attempt defeated. Privatization, and thus the expansion
to push an enabling law through the legislature of agribusiness, was reaffirmed and demands for
that would give him free rein to implement his popular sector (hence CONAIE) participation in
modernization plan.8 policymaking did not prosper (Silva 2009).
Between 1993 and 1995 public and private A final cycle of anti-neoliberal contention in
sector labor unions, a large number of civil so- which CONAIE played a leading role resulted in
ciety organizations, and the CONAIE staged nu- the toppling of Ecuador’s next president, Jamil
merous protests that reached a crescendo in mid- Mahuad (1998–2000). Mahuad began his presi-
dency determined to push neoliberal reforms, a
8 Inpassing an enabling law a congress temporarily del- task made even more urgent by a deep economic
egates legislative capacity to the executive branch. crisis that elicited shock treatment economic sta-
bilization policies and a renewed determination focused on gaining government employment

to dollarize the economy. Another long cycle of (Wolff 2007; Zamosc 2007).
mobilization broke out, and CONAIE organized Throughout the neoliberal period, the
yet another Indian Uprising to lend it decisive CONAIE insistently demanded that governments
force. A dynamic was soon established in which recognize it as the representative of Ecuadorian
Mahuad negotiated with the CONAIE and other indigenous peoples and as such include it in the
protesting organizations, acquiesced to conces- policymaking process. To this end, CONAIE par-
sions, and subsequently reneged on them which ticipated in the formation of a political party in
sparked a new upsurge in the cycle (Silva 2009). 1995 so that indigenous peoples could put their
This pattern radicalized a faction of the own candidates in political office. The Mov-
CONAIE, which began to believe that indig- imiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik—
enous peoples would find no justice in Ecuador’s Nuevo País had moderate success at the national
democracy. They took a putschist stance and in and local levels. Its participation in the Constitu-
2000 supported maverick Colonel Lucio Gutiér- ent Assembly of 1998 was perhaps its finest hour
rez and some lower ranking officers in a coup (Andolina 2003). Pachakutik formally joined the
d’état. They successfully stormed the presiden- Gutiérrez government, but its ministers resigned
tial palace and, after Mahuad fled the scene, set after he changed stripes and began to implement
up a short-lived military-civic Government of the same neoliberal policies that harmed indig-
National Salvation that lasted barely 24 hours enous communities (Becker 2011a).
because the military high command quickly ne-
gotiated a return democratic rule (Zamosc 2007). Bolivia Bolivia’s indigenous people’s movement
The putschist adventure ushered in a period of never built an overarching confederation capable
decline for the CONAIE and, among other prob- of coordinating action like Ecuador’s (Yashar
lems, contributed to the loss of its leadership of 2005). Still, their organizations played leading
the popular sectors and civil society. It called the roles in the cycles of anti-neoliberal contention
CONAIE’s democratic credentials into question that wracked the country, especially from the
and generated debilitating internal strife. These mid-1990s on. We now turn to an examination
problems deepened when CONAIE supported of three of the major milestones in movement
former Colonel Lucio Gutierrez’s campaign for development and campaigns.
the presidency, which he won in late 2002. When When Bolivia’s neoliberal period got under-
he took office CONAIE leaders ascended to im- way during the presidency of Victor Paz Estens-
portant cabinet and other government appoint- soro (1985–1989) the CSUTCB was the major
ments. Gutiérrez, however, pulled a policy bait indigenous organization in Bolivia, although as a
and switch. He ran on a national populist plat- member of the COB it was subordinated to mine
form and once in office quickly changed stripes workers unions and urban labor unions (Zegada
implementing economic stabilization programs, et al. 2008). The unions, however, were unable to
running a corrupt and nepotistic government, resist aggressive neoliberal reforms effectively.
and manipulating internal divisions between EC- In this context, the success of CSUTCB-affiliat-
UARUNAI and CONFENAIE to his advantage. ed coca grower federations in the late 1980s be-
This political misadventure further weakened the came the first milestone in the rise of indigenous
CONAIE. Thus, when civil society rose to de- people’s movements to a leadership role among
pose Gutiérrez, CONAIE mobilized but could no the popular sectors and subaltern groups resisting
longer lead, not the least of their it because its neoliberalism. They were effective in combating
dirigentes lost the confidence of their its base in the US-sponsored coca eradication policies and
the communities and they no longer heeded their forcing the government to negotiate with them.
calls to mobilize. Moreover, the general public The coca federations used indigenist and cultural
now perceived CONAIE to be a narrow indig- images of resistance that appealed to both indig-
enist interest group whose leaders were primarily enous peasants and to urban labor organizations.
138 E. Silva
Coca had become a symbol of indigenous culture from a local to national level, eventually engulf-
and national resistance to external pressure on ing the departments of Oruru and Tarija too.
the economic front (Silva 2009). The Gas War of 2003 marked the high water
A second milestone occurred during the of cycles of anti-neoliberal contention in Bolivia.
first presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Indigenous peoples movements, especially the
(1993–1997) who pursued an aggressive neo- CSUTCB, played a leading role in it. The Gas
liberal economic, social, and political program War started when, in his second presidency, Gon-
when the CSUTCB, now under leadership of the zalo Sánchez de Lozada offered international
coca grower federations, organized a March for companies low taxes to expand gas field exploi-
Life, Coca, and National Sovereignty in 1994. In tation and to export natural gas to California. It
addition to the defense of coca, rural and urban culminated with his resignation in the same year.
popular sector organizations protested against Beginning in February 2003 the CSUTCB mo-
privatization and agribusiness-friendly policies. bilized against the government’s plans, claim-
They marched for the reinstatement of support ing that a precious and valuable natural resource
for peasant agriculture. A sign of the coca fed- was being given away to foreigners rather than
eration’s rising leadership was the fact that the used for national development (Crabtree 2005).
mobilization by labor unions and other groups Neighborhood organizations of the strategic city
petered out once the government met the princi- of El Alto that looms over La Paz joined in as did
pal demand of the coca growers: a pledge to end local labor unions. El Alto has a predominantly
forcible eradication of the plant (Pinto Ocampo indigenous population, many of them new mi-
2004). The campaign culminated in 1996 with grants from the countryside, and they responded
negotiations over a neoliberal-inspired agrarian to CSUTCB’s call (Lazar 2008). After a number
reform law. Highland indigenous gained protec- of fierce confrontations in February and October,
tions against land usurpation when they secured which involved a broad cross class, multiethnic
agreement that the agrarian superintendency coalition, Sánchez de Lozada was forced to re-
would not have authority to rule on land tenure sign and the gas concessions were put on hold
questions. Lowland indigenous gained an even (Assies 2004; Kohl and Farthing 2006).
more significant victory. The legislation recog- As in Ecuador, the indigenous peoples move-
nized communal property, which was much more ment formed a political party, the Movimiento al
prevalent in Amazonia (Silva 2009). Socialismo (Harten 2011; Zuazo 2009). It was
The Water War of Cochabamba in 2000 has organized along CSUTCB-peasant union lines.
became an icon of anti-neoliberal contention in Unlike Pachakutik in Ecuador, this was a mul-
Bolivia. Although it was not led by the major na- tiethnic and cross class party; thus, it appealed
tional indigenous movements per se, they played to a larger electorate. Its candidate, Evo Morales,
an important role in it. The struggle against water himself of indigenous extraction, a leader of the
privatization involved a cross class, multiethnic coca federations, took a close second place in the
coalition and many of the local organizations in 2002 presidential election. The MAS helped to
the small communities near Cochabamba and organize mass mobilization during the Gas War.
in city neighborhoods were controlled by indig- The Gas War had significant outcomes. The
enous peoples (Olivera and Lewis 2004; Assies caretaker government of Carlos Mesa abandoned
2003). The fight was fierce and epic. In the end, his predecessor’s international company-friendly
the water works of Cochabamba were not priva- concession policy. Equally important, it set the
tized. National indigenous movement organiza- agenda for a future MAS government, the so-
tions like CSUTCB played significant roles in called October Agenda. Its main planks were
the mobilization. CSUTCB put water rights on its a commitment to nationalize gas to fund state-
list of grievances and mobilized in La Paz, para- directed economic development with social eq-
lyzing the capital city and expanding the struggle uity; to establish a constitutional assembly to set
the legal foundations for the recovery of national highland indigenous organizations. At the begin-
sovereignty in the face of globalization; agrarian ning of his government, the major indigenous
reform to bring social justice to the countryside; social movement organization formed a Unity
and trials for criminal politicians. Pact (Silva 2013). The Unity Pact worked closely
with MAS representatives in the Constituent
Assembly. They insured the new constitution
Post Neoliberalism declared Bolivia a plurinational state in which
indigenous peoples had a right to autonomous
The cycles of indigenous peoples-led anti-neolib- territory and that they had to be consulted for
eral mobilization in Bolivia and Ecuador contrib- authorization regarding development projects on
uted to the election of left governments in both their land. It promoted decolonization and inter-
countries in the mid-2000s. In the first year or culturality. Economic rights also received con-
so of those governments they played significant stitutional standing, including decent wages and
roles in securing, or reinforcing, rights for their salaries, land reform, food sovereignty, health,
peoples in the constituent assemblies charged and social security (Garcés 2010). Indigenous
with recasting the nation state and its relation- people’s movements, especially CSUTCB, mobi-
ship to citizens.9 After that, however, the paths lized to defend Evo Morales’ government and
of the indigenous people’s movements in Bolivia the process of constitutional change from near
and Ecuador diverged sharply, especially in their insurrectionary and secessionist opposition from
relationship to left governments and the state. In lowland departments, the so-called Media Luna,
Bolivia, we see a changing mixture of coopera- led by the department of Santa Cruz, which had
tion and confrontation from 2006 to the present. become wealthy as a result of aggressive agri-
In Ecuador confrontation appears to dominate. In business expansion.
both countries, much of the conflict can be traced In Ecuador, Rafael Correa’s “citizen revolu-
back to the commodity boom that began in the tion” government had a conflicted relationship
early 2000s. It has encouraged intensified exploi- with the principal national indigenous confedera-
tation of renewable and non-renewable natural tion from the very beginning, largely for political
resources, which has sparked numerous defen- reasons (de la Torre 2012). However, CONAIE
sive protests against meg-development projects. working with Pachakutik in the Constituent As-
On balance, I think it fair to say that in both cases sembly, was able to reaffirm and strengthen
Indigenous peoples movements have weakened key indigenous rights clauses they had won in
from the peaks they achieved during the cycles of the 1998 Constituent Assembly (Acosta 2008).
anti-neoliberal mobilization, although deteriora- The new constitution promoted plurinationality,
tion seems more pronounced in Ecuador. interculturality, environmental protection and
collective rights, such as a commitment to food
Indigenous Peoples’ Movements and Constituent sovereignty and controls over the formation of
Assemblies in Bolivia and Ecuador In Bolivia, large landholdings. Economic rights similar to
the party that gained the presidency with Evo Bolivia’s also received constitutional standing
Morales in 2006, the MAS, included important (Becker 2011b).
9
Movement organizations played direct roles when the
clauses they drafted were included in the new constitu-
Divergent Fortunes
tion. At other times their effect was mediated by MAS
delegates to the constituent assembly. For a detailed re-
view of the connection between protest and policy see Bolivia Indigenous movement organizations in
Silva (2013a). For the involvement of indigenous peo-
Bolivia developed two parallel tracks in their
ples in those assemblies see Garcés (2010) and Becker
(2011a, b). relationship with Evo Morales’ government after
140 E. Silva
the new constitution was approved by national against CIDOB in support of the road (and the
referendum in 2009. The first track involves government’s preference). In protest, the CIDOB
mostly cooperative relations with the CSUTCB, and CONAMQ, with support from NGOs and en-
cocaleros and related highland groups, includ- vironmentalists, organized two indigenous peo-
ing an indigenous feminist organization that ple marches from the affected areas to La Paz.
were part of the core coalition of the MAS (Silva The first one, launched in August 2011, was suc-
2013b). Many of their members have received cessful. It received significant support and media
government posts in the central state and at the attention and the administration backed off the
subnational level (from ministers to clerical plan. When the administration started backtrack-
staff), have stood for (and won) MAS seats in ing, CIDOB and CONAMAQ launched a sec-
the new National Assembly and at the municipal ond march that was less successful (Lanzara and
level (Do Alto and Stefanoni 2010). CSUTCB, Arias 2010; Fundación 2012; Calla 2012). While
and other core MAS social movement organiza- the marchers were camped in front of the gov-
tions, also unconditionally support Evo Morales’ ernment house dissident factions of CIDOB or-
government on controversial policy issues and ganized an election in Santa Cruz to replace the
organize counter-movements when lowland sitting executive director who, along with most
indigenous, urban labor unions, and other social of the leadership that supported him, was in La
movements mobilized against specific policies of Paz with the marchers. They duly elected a fe-
Morales’ government after 2009 (Zuazo 2010).10 male executive director and the CIDOB is now
The second track involves conflictive rela- divided (Silva 2013). After much back and forth
tions with CIDOB and CONAMAQ, as well on whether to allow the highway to be built, the
with environmental movements, over two major Morales administration decided in 2013 to sus-
policy decisions by Morales’ government. On the pend construction until all pending controversies
one hand, the government favored large-scale de- could be resolved.
velopment projects, both infrastructure and min-
ing, and this required overriding local commu- Ecuador There are two principal reasons for
nity interests that often are against such projects. the tensions between Rafael Correa’s govern-
On the other hand, it delayed implementation of ment and CONAIE. First, CONAIE was a late
constitutionally mandated indigenous territorial supporter of his candidacy for the presidency.
autonomies. In reaction to their political misadventures with
These tensions came to a head in the conflict Gutiérrez, CONAIE/Pachakutik decided to run
over the Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Iso- their own candidate for president in 2006 with
boro Sécure (TIPNIS). The government decided embarrassingly poor results. Only then, did they
to build a tranche of paved highway connecting grudgingly support Correa in second round ballot-
two of Bolivia’s departments (as well as Bolivia ing (Larrea 2009). Second, Correa and his inner
to Brazil) in a protected area that claimed sta- circle believed that narrow interest groups were
tus as an autonomous indigenous territory. The obstacles to sound policymaking for the public
MAS administration did not—as it legally should good, and it thought of CONAIE as such an orga-
have—consult local communities as to whether nization. Hence, CONAIE should not be allowed
they approved of the road passing through their important roles in the policy process or co-gov-
territory. This rallied the CIDOB and the CONA- ern with the state in matters pertaining directly to
MAQ to defend the autonomy rights of the the interests of indigenous nations. CONAIE was
TIPNIS and pitted colonists and coca growers in a poor position to press its abiding interest in a
major policymaking role. Its political misadven-
tures had left it internally divided and it had lost
10 These developments have led to claims that the high- significant legitimacy on the national political
land indigenous movement has been co-opted by the gov- stage (Martínez Abarca 2011).
ernment.
The Correa administration’s efforts to sever Indigenous Movements and Karl

the connection between the national organization Polanyi’s Double Movement of
and its base in the local communities further de- Capitalist Society
bilitated CONAIE. The success of national and
regional indigenous social movement organiza- This chapter emphasized that, beginning in the
tions depended in part on their brokerage role 1970s and 1980s, the indigenous social move-
between state institutions and local indigenous ments of Ecuador and Bolivia successfully or-
communities to obtain goods, services, and leg- ganized around both cultural identity and mate-
islation for the community. Correa’s govern- rial interests. It is necessary to understand both
ment, however, chose to mobilize citizens elec- of these strands to their struggles if we are fully
torally around a policy agenda built on the one comprehend them. The narrative further em-
hammered out by the social movements that had phasized that indigenous peoples movements in
led the resistance to neoliberalism. Thus, where Ecuador and Bolivia played crucial roles in the
indigenous peoples are concerned, the govern- cycles of anti-neoliberal mobilization from the
ment established a direct connection to the base 1990s to the early 2000s that paved the way for
organizations of CONAIE: in the indigenous subsequent left governments. Once those left
communities themselves to deliver more public governments were in power the fate of those
goods such as infrastructure projects, educational movements diverged sharply—from partial in-
facilities, health, and other benefits (Tuaza 2011; corporation in Evo Morales’ to exclusion for the
Muñoz Eraso 2010). national and regional indigenous movement or-
As in Bolivia, a commitment to development ganizations in Ecuador.
based on the expansion of natural resources has Yet we also saw that there are similarities in
sparked new conflicts with indigenous social the fate of indigenous people’s movements in
movement and their allies in the environmental post neoliberal Bolivia and Ecuador. To begin
movement (Becker 2011a, pp. 176–184; Mar- with, they weakened from their peak during anti-
tínez Abarca 2011, pp. 109–112). At the level of neoliberal mobilization. The left governments
national politics, the flashpoint has been the fate addressed some of their material, cultural, and
of the Yasuní National Park. This is a protected political demands, partially demobilizing them.
area inhabited by indigenous peoples sitting on Left governments also intervened in them di-
top of substantial oil reserves. Local commu- rectly to reorganize their bases of sociopolitical
nities do not want oil development, given the support. Furthermore, the left governments’ eco-
disastrous experience with the Shuar and other nomic development model provoked conflicts
peoples in Amazonia. Correa’s administration because it was predicated on the intensification
initially committed to not exploit the reserves. of extraction of natural resources. This often pits
But in 2013 it reversed its decision and is now indigenous communities and their allies against
receptive to their development. It remains to be government-backed megaprojects.
seen whether CONAIE and other social move- What might the anti-neoliberal struggles and
ments find in this decision the opportunity to post neoliberal development in the indigenous
revive their capacity to mobilize their base and peoples movements of Ecuador and Bolivia
to reconstruct their coordination with a hetero- mean in a larger historical sense? Building on
geneous coalition that oppose the government’s Karl Polanyi (2001), even in their current rela-
development model. CONAIE, its member fed- tive decline, we can think of indigenous peoples
erations, and environmentalists would be build- movements as a new source of leadership in
ing on more localized social conflicts that have counter movements to the construction market
erupted due to the government’s need to increase society. Polanyi argued that free-market capital-
exports of renewable and nonrenewable natural ism seeks to intensify the commoditization land,
resources. labor, and capital as much as possible. In the pro-
142 E. Silva
cess, it seeks to subjugate politics and society to needs, and cultural demands it was only natu-
the utopia of a self-regulating market economy, ral that the movements should decline (Tarrow
meaning that politics and social organization 2011). Many of their demands were being met,
should shield market mechanisms from forces albeit selectively. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
that aim to distort them. Land, labor, and capi- indigenous peoples movements in Ecuador and
tal, however, are more than commodities, Po- Bolivia will remain significant, if not leading, so-
lanyi argued. They also embody social relations cial and political actors for a long time to come.
and livelihoods that give meaning and stability Even in their diminished condition they possess
to the lives of human beings. Therefore, people more associational power than other civil society
will naturally seek protection from markets when organizations.
these become too intrusive and disruptive to ev-
eryday life. This dynamic generates the double
movement of capitalist society. Capital attempts References
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imientos Sociales en tiempos de poder: articulaciones
Sliding Doors of Opportunity:
Zapatistas and Their Cycle 11
of Protest
María Inclán
Introduction worked as opportunities for the Zapatista cycle

of protest. The factors to be assessed are elec-
The emergence of the Ejército Zapatista de Lib- toral openings at the local and national levels, the
eración Nacional (EZLN) has been widely docu- presence of a potential political ally in power, the
mented and studied by scholars seeking to find Mexican state’s capacity for repression, and in-
and explain what drove the Maya Indians in Chi- ternationalization of the movement. Because the
apas to take up arms in 1994. The resulting large Zapatista movement developed during Mexico’s
body of literature points to declining economic transition to more competitive electoral politics,
conditions in the region due to neoliberal reforms studying it offers an opportunity to test the po-
implemented since the mid-1980s (Collier and litical opportunity approach within a changing
Quaratiello 1994; Estrada 2005; Harvey 1998; political environment, while providing some
Legorreta 1998; Leyva 2005). But the literature explanations as to how the Zapatista movement
also cites generations of deprivation suffered by developed when these changing conditions did
these peasants since colonial times (Benjamin not prove to be opportunities for advancing the
1996; Higgins 2004; Viqueira and Ruz 1995). Zapatista cause in relation to the Mexican state.
The present study will not attempt to explain the This study contributes to the comparative lit-
emergence of the Zapatista movement. Instead, it erature on social movements in three ways. First,
will analyze the conditions in which its cycle of it adds to the growing literature applying the po-
protest developed since the EZLN first surfaced litical opportunity approach to developing and
publicly in 1994 until 2003, when the Zapatistas authoritarian countries by looking at how elec-
abandoned their strategy of protesting and con- toral openings can turn into opportunities or ob-
centrated their efforts on setting up a structure stacles for a social movement (Einwohner 2003;
for autonomous rule. In particular, this study will Kurzman 1996; Loveman 1998; Noonan 1995;
examine four factors to determine whether they Oberschall 1996; Rasler 1996; Zdravomyslova
1996). Second, the study’s examination of op-
portunities at three different levels—local, na-
“Sliding Doors of Opportunity: Zapatistas and their
Cycle of Protests.” Mobilization: An International Jour- tional, and international—offers a rigorous com-
nal 14(1): 85–106. Copyright © 2009 by Mobilization: parative analysis of the relative effects of those
An International Journal. Reprinted with permission. conditions on a movement’s cycle of protest.
Third, this study presents a systematic quantita-
M. Inclán () tive analysis of Zapatista protests. Using a cross-
División de Estudios Políticos, Centro de Investigación sectional time-series event-count model, this
y Docencia Económicas, Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210
México, D.F., México study analyzes the effects of local, national, and
e-mail: maria.inclan@cide.edu; mainclan@gmail.com international political factors as opportunities
146 M. Inclán
in the development of the Zapatista cycle of discuss data and methods, and the final section
protest. Thus, the study both incorporates and will present the study’s findings and its contribu-
elaborates many of the arguments presented by tions to the literature on the structure of political
more qualitative analyses of the Zapatista move- opportunities in general and the Zapatista move-
ment. Such studies have examined three main is- ment in particular.
sues: the complexities of the conflict in Chiapas
(Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Harvey 1998;
Legorreta 1998; Leyva and Ascencio 1996; The Zapatista Cycle of Protest from
Mattiace 1997; Stephen 2002; Viqueira and Ruz 1994 to 2003
1995); the movement’s role in the Mexican dem-
ocratic transition (García de León 2005); and This cycle of protest emerged right after the
the importance of transnational nongovernmen- EZLN and the Mexican army agreed to a cease-
tal organizations (NGOs) and electronic media fire declared by the Mexican government on Jan-
in internationalizing the Zapatista movement uary 12, 1994. The images of war between the
(Bruhn 1999; Castells 1997; Collier and Collier two unbalanced forces portrayed on television
2005; Hellman 1999; Moksnes 2005; Rus 1995; and the Internet outraged viewers both inside and
Schulz 1998). outside Mexico and generated massive demon-
The first section will summarize the develop- strations demanding an end to hostilities against
ment of the Zapatista movement since the EZLN the poorly armed guerrilla group. Although these
uprising in 1994 until 2003, when the Zapatis- early responses took place outside the region of
tas officially set up their autonomous sources conflict, soon after the ceasefire began, Zapatista
of authority, the five Juntas de Buen Gobierno. sympathizers started demonstrating across Chi-
The second section will present the political op- apas despite the strong military cordon around
portunity hypotheses applicable to studying the their headquarters and strongholds. Figure 11.1
Zapatista cycle of protest. The third section will shows the distribution of protests in Chiapas.
3URWHVWVLQ&KLDSDV

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Fig. 11.1 Zapatista cycle of protest in Chiapas 1994–2003. (Source: Protests coded from accounts of protests reported
in La Jornada)
11 Sliding Doors of Opportunity: Zapatistas and Their Cycle of Protest 147
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SRVLWLRQV
Fig. 11.2 Military positions in Chiapas 1994–2003. (Source: Global Exchange and Centro de Investigaciones Económi-
cas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria 1999)
Protests varied in form from strikes, sit-ins, Zapatista demands. Roadblocks, marches, and
marches, and roadblocks, to the seizure of meet- building seizures arose from conflicts following
ings, buildings, and land. Because the demand local and national elections in 1994, 1997, 2000,
for land was a major, if not the main, cause of and 2003, and were targeted towards local and
the Zapatista uprising, land seizures were staged state authorities for fraud or for not fulfilling
during and right after the uprisings. More than their campaign promises once in office.
1700 land occupations claimed 148,000 ha inside In September 1996, dialogue between the
and outside the region of conflict (see Villafuerte EZLN and the federal delegation broke down
et al. 1999). The initial invasions took place after President Ernesto Zedillo failed to rec-
within this area, in what is now considered the ognize the San Andrés Accords that had been
Zapatista zone. Not all land invasions were con- signed in February granting autonomous rights
ducted by Zapatistas, however. Other peasant to the indigenous peoples of Mexico. The EZLN
organizations also took advantage of the turmoil opted instead to launch a resistance campaign
to seize land for their members. Land invasions using several tactics, among them silence on the
subsequently diminished following an agreement part of the EZLN’s spokesman, Subcomandante
to resolve the problem signed later that year by Marcos, rejection of any state program consid-
government representatives, the affected land- ered to oppose insurgents’ tactics, and cessation
owners, and the invading peasants (Villafuerte of payments for public services like electrici-
et al. 1999). Zapatista protesters then turned to ty.1 The Zapatista vow of silence reduced the
marches, meetings, roadblocks, and seizures of cycle of protest to its lowest point in 1997. By
official buildings. Most of the meetings took this time, military presence in the region had in-
place in support of the peace talks going on be- creased significantly (see Fig. 11.2; also Global
tween the EZLN and the Mexican government
from 1994 to 1996. These gatherings sought to 1
Personal interview with a member of the Centro de
generate proposals for resolving conflicts and Capacitación para el Autodesarrollo de los Pueblos Indí-
to create pressure on the government to meet genas in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, February
2003.
148 M. Inclán
Exchange and CIEPAC 1999). Meanwhile, ten- lost momentum in 2001 after the Mexican Con-
sions between pro- and anti-Zapatista communi- gress passed a diluted version of the bill. Feel-
ties were intensifying due to the harassment of ing betrayed again by the Mexican government,
local authorities against the Zapatista resistance Zapatistas turned their efforts to setting up their
campaign, which inadvertently isolated dissi- own autonomous ruling groups, the Juntas de
dent communities. The decision of anti-Zapatista Buen Gobierno, in their five regional capitals,
communities to take up arms also contributed to the Caracoles.
this tension (Hirales 1998). Tensions mounted Meanwhile, various electoral reforms had
in both the northern and highlands regions. On been implemented in the 1990s to guarantee
December 22, 1997, an anti-Zapatista group mas- the fairness and transparency of electoral pro-
sacred 45 persons in the town of Acteal, Chen- cesses. These reforms ensured that electoral pro-
alhó. The national government responded by cedures and results would be considered bind-
sending more troops to the region to preserve ing and accelerated opposition victories in all
order and contain the violence and protests. Al- levels of government. In 1997, the PRI lost its
though the military presence helped to contain absolute majority in Congress for the first time
the violence, protests flared again, now demand- since 1929. Prior to the Zapatista uprising, the
ing recognition of the San Andrés Accords and PRI controlled 64.2 % of the seats in the Cá-
withdrawal of the army from the region. mara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies of the
A round of protests occurred after the victory Congress), the rightist Partido Acción Nacional
in 2000 of Vicente Fox, the first presidential can- (PAN) held 18 %, and the leftist Partido de la
didate who did not belong to the Partido Revo- Revolución Democrática (PRD), 8 %. In 1997
lucionario Institucional (PRI), which had ruled the PRI was left with only 47.8 %, while the
Mexico since 1929. Fox’s victory brought new PAN increased to 24.2 % and the PRD to 25 %.
hope to the Zapatista movement because he had By the 2000 elections, the PRI had lost even
promised in his presidential campaign to resolve more ground, winning only 42 %, while the PAN
the Chiapas conflict by honoring the San Andrés reached 42.2 % and the PRD 10 %. In 2003, the
Accords and sending to the Mexican Congress PRI recovered a little by winning 44.8 %, while
the Indigenous Rights Bill (Ley COCOPA) that the PAN held 30.2 % and the PRD 19.4 % (IFE
had been drafted after the Accords in 1996 by the 2003). As noted, Vicente Fox of the PAN won the
Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación. presidency in 2000 in what are now considered
The EZLN responded positively to the pro- the first free and fair presidential elections in the
posal to resume the interrupted dialogue but set country. These electoral reforms also initiated
forth two more conditions: withdrawal of seven changes at the local level. In the case of Chiapas,
of the military positions surrounding the Za- until 1994 only 1 of the 111 localities was under
patista territory and liberation of all Zapatista PAN rule. All the others were dominated by the
prisoners (Subcomandante 2000). Once in of- PRI. But in the 1995 elections, the PAN gained 4
fice, President Fox withdrew the army from the municipalities, while the PRD won 18. By 2001,
seven points surrounding the EZLN headquar- the PRI had lost a total of 46 municipalities to
ters in the Lacandón jungle and many check- other parties. All of these changes could have
points across the state of Chiapas, sent the Indig- been perceived by Zapatista sympathizers as op-
enous Rights Bill to Congress, and liberated all portunities to mobilize. To analyze how these
Zapatista prisoners without criminal charges.2 institutional and specific openings affected the
Protests recurred in support of the Indigenous Zapatista cycle of protest, the next section will
Rights Bill, but the Zapatista cycle of protest contextualize these events within the theory of
political opportunities.
2 Personal interview in Mexico City in October 2002
with Chiapas Senator (PRD) and a member of COCOPA

(2000–2006).
Political Opportunities and the to the four dimensions that had appeared consis-
Zapatista Movement tently among the seminal studies of that period
(Brockett 1991; Kriesi et al. 1992; Rucht 1996;
Political opportunities have been defined as the Tarrow 1994): first, the openness of the political
institutional and informal power conditions that, system; second, the stability of elite alignments
if perceived as opportunities by political chal- underlying the political system; third, the pres-
lengers and dissident groups, provide incentives ence of allies; and fourth, the state’s capacity for
for their collective action (Meyer and Minkoff repression (McAdam 1996, p. 26). Despite this
2004; Rootes 2002; Tarrow 1994). In 1973, Peter attempt to reconcile differences among defini-
Eisinger coined the term political opportunity tions of political opportunity and results, the lack
structures while studying contentious political of consensus continued. In 2004, David Meyer
behavior across cities in the USA. His initial and Debra Minkoff offered a revision of the con-
work on political opportunities stimulated many cept of political opportunities in stating that the
more studies, and the political opportunity ap- choice of political opportunity measures should
proach flourished. Some scholars examined how depend on whether the variable to be explained
open opportunities in well-established Western was protest activity, organization, or outcomes.
democratic regimes fostered the emergence, de- For protest activity (the object of interest for the
velopment, and relative success of social move- present study), they suggested examining issue-
ments (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; 1995; specific measures rather than measures of gener-
Piven and Cloward 1979; Rucht 1996; Tarrow al political openness of the system (such as insti-
1994). Others focused on how the lack of politi- tutional settings) because protesters would look
cal opportunities could trigger mobilizations in for specific openings to launch protest activity,
authoritarian countries as well as in democratic whereas general institutional access by definition
political systems that continued to be closed to would diminish such activity.
dissident demands (Einwohner 2003; Kurzman According to the studies of social movements
1996; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1982; Noonan in open and closed settings, open political con-
1995; Rasler 1996; Tarrow 1989). Finally, some ditions serve as opportunities in democratic sce-
studies have looked at political opportunities for narios, while closed and repressive conditions in
social mobilization within democratic transi- authoritarian settings also function as “opportu-
tions (Foweraker and Craig 1990; O’Donnell and nities” for actors in social movements. Yet, so-
Schmitter 1986; Pickvance 1995; Zdravomys- cial movements also emerge within democratic
lova 1996). transitions and thus face changing political con-
This explosion of studies led to great disagree- ditions. This scenario resembles the conditions
ment about the definition and assessment of the highlighted by Eisinger (1973) as triggers of
structure of political opportunities. Some studies protest mobilization. He argued that contentious
have highlighted the influence of general institu- political behavior showed a curvilinear relation-
tional conditions of the political system as oppor- ship toward political conditions as opportunities,
tunities, while others have emphasized that issue- and protest activity was therefore more likely to
specific conditions would serve as opportunities occur in environments having a mixture of open
only to certain movements. In defining both and closed political conditions, whereas extreme-
these general and specific conditions, the schol- ly closed and very open environments were al-
arship diversified even further. Thus, in 1996 the most immune to protest events. During periods of
overall approach was proclaimed to be losing its democratic transition, when political conditions
explanatory power because it was in danger of are unstable, these situations combine open and
becoming “a sponge that soaks up every aspect closed opportunities for contention. While con-
of the social movement environment” (Gamson tention emerges initially in reaction to the lack
and Meyer 1996, p. 275). In response, Doug of political opportunities (Goodwin and Jasper
McAdam summarized the approach according 1999; Hipsher 1998; Jenkins and Schock 1992;
150 M. Inclán
Oberschall 2000; Schock 1999), as the structure conflict. The final factor analyzed consists of the
of the political system changes and new opportu- opportunities afforded to the Zapatistas by inter-
nities open up, social movement actors respond national media, approached by assessing inter-
first with more protests, encouraged by their national newspapers’ opinions expressed about
perceived success in pressuring for openings the Zapatistas and the Mexican government. Al-
(Tarrow 1994), and later by taking advantage of though this factor is not one of the mainstream
institutional openings to advance their demands measures of political opportunities, the large
further without having recourse to contentious amount of international media attention that the
activity (Pickvance 1995). Zapatistas attracted and maintained through their
Because the Zapatista movement emerged and cycle of protest could have opened new oppor-
developed during the same period that electoral tunities for the movement, such as catching the
reforms were being implemented and fairer elec- attention of transnational solidarity networks. It
tions were taking place, this study analyzes both can therefore be considered as a specific opportu-
general institutional and issue-specific dimen- nity factor for the development of the movement.
sions of political opportunity in order to under-
stand how institutional changes as well as spe-
cific openings to the Zapatistas shaped the devel- Openness of the Political System
opment of their cycle of protest. Studying both
institutional and specific political opportunities The EZLN uprising was launched against the
also allows testing the existence of a curvilin- authoritarian rule of the PRI. For more than six
ear relationship between political conditions and decades, the PRI had dominated local and na-
protest activity related to the argument that most tional political arenas and perpetrated socioeco-
contentious activity occurs during processes that nomic grievances in the region. These actions led
combine opening and closing political opportu- to the emergence of the guerrilla group (Collier
nities. At the same time, the present study tests and Quaratiello 1994; Harvey 1998; Legorreta
whether specific openings given to the Zapatistas 1998; Leyva and Ascencio 1996). It is therefore
during the periods of dialogue and passing of the reasonable to assume that at the outset the po-
Indigenous Rights Bill became opportunities to litical system was closed to any interest outside
increase the strength of their cycle of protest. the corporatist structure of interest representation
Five factors are considered as potential oppor- established by the PRI party-state regime. Hence,
tunities for the Zapatista cycle of protest. The first just as marginal constituents have been shown
is the openness of the Mexican political system as to behave in closed political settings (Meyer
measured by the changes in rule in local govern- 2004), the Zapatistas found it necessary to turn
ments and federal congressional elections and by to insurgency. Conditions changed in 1994, how-
specific openings to the Zapatistas created by the ever. At both the local and national levels, elec-
dialogues between the EZLN and the Mexican tions became more competitive and transparent,
government in 1996 and deliberations on the In- allowing electoral victories for the opposition.
digenous Rights Bill in the Mexican Congress The consequent pressure created by national and
in 2001. The second factor to be analyzed is the international public opinion forced the federal
stability of elite alignments underlying the local government for the first time to negotiate with
and national political systems, measured here by a rebel group. Twelve days into the uprising, the
the level of fractionalization in local and national federal government agreed to a ceasefire and ne-
elections. The third factor considered is the pres- gotiations. Other openings emerged later with the
ence of local and national allies, as assessed by signing of the San Andrés Accords in 1996 and
the level of PRD support in the region and at deliberations on the Indigenous Rights Bill in
the national level. The fourth factor is the state’s the Mexican Congress in 2001 (García de León
capacity for repression, calculated according to 2005).
the number of military positions in the region of
According to the bodies of literature on po- it can be hypothesized that as the electoral elites
litical opportunities and democratization, protest were realigning and being forced to respond,
activity should flourish during these transitional at least discursively, to the causes that led to
periods, while closed and very open settings the EZLN uprising, Zapatistas perceived these
should be almost immune to contentious activ- shifts in positions as opportunities and exerted
ity, following an inverted U-shape relationship more pressure with their protest activity. Greater
(Eisinger 1973; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; competition and elite instability over Zapatista
Tilly 1978; Pickvance 1995; Zdravomyslova demands should have created the perception of
1996). If this hypothesis is correct, then electoral potential opportunities for advancing them, and
openings at the local and national levels should Zapatistas could have been hopeful and encour-
have encouraged Zapatista protest mobilization, aged to protest.4
at least initially, because they could have per-
ceived these changes as opportunities to press the
new governments and expected them to react to Presence of Allies
protests more favorably than the PRI. Also, the
specific movement opportunities afforded by the Extensive research has shown that the presence
periods of dialogue and the passing of an indig- of allies is a key variable influencing the survival
enous rights bill in the national congress should and success of a movement (Cress and Snow
have generated more protest mobilization during 2000; Jenkins et al. 2003; Minkoff 1997; Piven
those periods to press for resolution of their de- and Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1994). In particular,
mands. One can therefore hypothesize that both when an alliance between social movement ac-
institutional and specific openings functioned as tors and political allies develops but is unable to
opportunities for the Zapatista cycle of protest. promote the movement’s goals, having influen-
tial political allies empowers the movement to
continue its struggle via contentious means (della
Stability of Elite Alignments Porta and Diani 1999; Katzenstein and Mueller
1987; Kriesi et al. 1995). Although the Zapatistas
The literature on political opportunities suggests never recognized any party as an official ally, the
that a social movement has better chances of suc- PRD was considered sympathetic to the Zapatista
ceeding when the underlying elites of a polity cause, especially during elections. It is therefore
realign around the issues presented by the move- possible to hypothesize a positive relationship
ment (Piven and Cloward 1979; Jenkins and between Zapatista protest activity and a higher
Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1994). PRD electoral presence, both locally and na-
The EZLN uprising demanded a response from tionally. But the PRD proved to be ineffective,
the federal government. However, it also led var- or unwilling in the Zapatistas’ view, to advance
ious political forces in Mexico to respond to the the movement’s goals of challenging the resilient
rebels’ claims by linking the rebellion’s causes PRI regime.5 Zapatistas and perredistas (PRD
to PRI incompetence and lack of will to respond
to the peasant and indigenous claims and siding
4
with the Zapatista demands, although condemn- It is important to differentiate Zapatista sympathizers
from EZLN members. Although the EZLN militia was not
ing the use of violence to resolve them.3 Thus,
interested in participating in the electoral process, mem-
bers of Zapatista communities voted in elections, except
3
On January 21, 1994, Diego Fernández de Cevallos, during the 1997 electoral boycott promoted by the EZLN.
then the PAN presidential candidate, and Cuauhtémoc Thus, members of the Zapatista communities could have
Cárdenas Solórzano, the PRD presidential candidate, both perceived opportunities for advancing their demands in
stated that the EZLN demands were just and unquestion- the opening of the electoral arena.
able and that an amnesty law was crucially needed to find 5
On June 19, 2000, Marcos stated that while the EZLN
solutions that would avoid more bloodshed (La Jornada believed that the PRD was a political force needed to rep-
January 22, 1994,p. 3). resent the Left in elections, the Zapatistas did not consider
152 M. Inclán
supporters) could have allied in a joint struggle raised the costs of repression. Zapatista advo-
of contentious means against the PRI, but once cates have argued that the army’s presence in the
the PRD gained power and proved incompetent, region did not intimidate the population as had
the alliance would have broken down. In both been expected but instead fostered protest mobi-
cases, these conditions should have increased lization.8 If this assertion is correct, then protests
protest activity: First, Zapatistas and perredistas should have grown despite (or in opposition to)
would have protested jointly against the PRI re- increased military presence in the region.
gime, then Zapatistas later would have protested
against PRD incompetence or unwillingness to
push the Zapatista agenda further. To assess how International Media Opportunities
the presence of allies invigorated the Zapatista
cycle of protest, it is necessary to examine set- The literature on transnational movements sug-
tings in which PRD support increased but was gests that the presence of international movement
not large enough to win elections. The measure organizations and the media help local actors
of the relative openness of the political system build a larger social movement by constructing
employed here already assesses whether Zapatis- shared identities across borders, creating net-
tas would have protested against sitting govern- works, and exerting pressure on the government
ments other than the PRI.6 either to respond to the local movement’s de-
mands or to stop hostilities against insurgents or
both (Bob 2002; Collier and Collier 2005; Keck
State Capacity for Repression and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). In the case of
the Zapatistas, it has been reported widely that
Repression can trigger further and more intense initial media attention focused on the uprising led
protest activity when repression or threat of its to a large presence of international nongovern-
use is applied inconsistently by the state (Almei- mental organizations that prevented the Mexican
da 2003; Feierabend et al. 1973; Goldstone and federal government from repressing the rebel
Tilly 2001; Rasler 1996). In this case, the capac- group, as in the boomerang effect suggested by
ity of the Mexican state to repress the Zapatistas Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998; see
was unquestionable. The military siege around also Collier and Collier 2005; Hellman 1999;
Zapatista communities and across the state was Rus 1995; Schulz 1998).9 Also, survival of the
designed to prevent the growth and spread of Zapatista struggle has been supported directly by
EZLN influence in the region (Hirales 1998; transnational organizations that have funneled
Legorreta 1998; Leyva and Ascencio 1996).7 resources into productive projects in the region
Accordingly, military personnel and their posi- of conflict (Moksnes 2005).10 Unfortunately, the
tions increased over time after the EZLN upris- clandestine and subversive nature of the EZLN
ing (Global Exchange and CIEPAC 1999). At
the same time, pressure exerted by national and
8 Personal interviews with members of Enlace Civil,
international public opinion on the Mexican state
Coordinación Regional de la Resistencia Civil de la So-
ciedad Civil de Los Altos de Chiapas and with represen-
themselves perredistas and continued to criticize all the tatives of Servicios Internacionales para la Paz (SIPAZ,
political parties for their distant behavior from society and International Services for Peace) in San Cristóbal de Las
their sole concern with winning electoral victories and Casas, Chiapas, February-April 2003.
not with representing the people’s agenda once in power 9 It is noteworthy, however, that no country exerted any
(Subcomandante Marcos 2000). pressure directly on the Mexican government to resolve
6 Because most of the local governments that changed the conflict in Chiapas.
away from the PRI shifted to the PRD, there was no risk 10 Personal interviews with members of Enlace Civil, De-
of other parties taking over the significant effect of the sarrollo Económico y Social de los Mexicanos Indígenas
presence of allies in power. (DESMI), Proyectos, Servicios de Consultoría para el De-
7 Chief Peace Negotiator (1995–1997), personal inter- sarrollo Social, and SIPAZ in San Cristóbal de Las Casas,
view in Mexico City, November 2002. Chiapas, February-April 2003.
makes it impossible to track the amount and the to access transnational resources and networks
origins of the resources made available to the because public opinion remained favorable to
Zapatistas. Only anecdotal information is avail- the Zapatista cause. This interpretation would
able.11 Systematic analysis of the role of transna- be valid under the assumption that the more
tional solidarity networks is therefore impossible information about the movement available to
to perform at this time. Nevertheless, one can at transnational organizations, the more likely they
least look at the amount of media opinion on the would have been to support the movement’s
movement and analyze whether this coverage cause (Smith 1997). With enhanced resources
had any effect on the movement locally. Accord- and support, Zapatistas could have felt encour-
ing to William Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld, the aged to continue protesting. It is important to
larger the audience of the media outlet, the great- note, however, that this assumption does not rep-
er the impact on the movement’s framing (1993, resent a direct relationship between the Zapatista
p. 123). Katy Pickvance (1997) has also asserted movement’s progress and international support,
that the larger and better informed the nonpartici- but only a first attempt to relate systematically
pant audience of the movement is, the greater the international media attention to the development
possibilities become that the movement will have of the movement.
a support base that will express its backing dur-
ing election campaigns by endorsing a candidate
who represents the movement’s demands. Variables and Data Collection
In the case of the Zapatista movement, some
nongovernmental organizations working in the Dependent Variable: Protests
area focused their efforts on keeping the remote
communities informed about reactions to the Zapatista protest activity is measured here by the
movement.12 This indirect way of relating inter- number of protests held annually by pro-Zapatis-
national media attention to mobilization provides tas in a given municipio from 1994 through 2003.
a glimpse of whether or not this situation repre- The unit of analysis is municipio/year, as data
sented an opportunity for the movement. In the are collected for each municipio and recorded by
case of the Zapatistas, help from transnational or- calendar year. Local and national newspaper ac-
ganizations increased after the EZLN caught the counts of Zapatista protest activity were coded to
eye of the international community in 1994. The determine the number of protests. Protest events
larger the amount of international attention and are defined here as “collective public action[s] by
the more favorable its opinion towards the move- nonstate actors, involving at least three people,
ment, the greater the chances for the movement and with the expressed purpose of critique or
to gain international support from transnational dissent together with societal and/or political de-
organizations. mands” (Rootes 2003, p. 53). To avoid data infla-
International media attention thus should have tion, protest events were coded as only one event
functioned as an opportunity for the movement even when they lasted several days (McCarthy
et al. 1996).
Most of the newspaper accounts were col-
11
While conducting fieldwork for this research, resis- lected from the Mexican national newspaper La
tance from activists working in the region was encoun-
Jornada. To control for potential selection and
tered when information about the international organiza-
tions supporting the Zapatista cause was requested. description bias, national and local newspaper
12
Melel Xojobal is one of the organizations working accounts were triangulated (Earl et al. 2004). For
to keep indigenous communities informed. Some other the period from 1994 through 1996, a newspaper
organizations devoted to this endeavor are Servicios In- published in San Cristóbal de Las Casas was con-
ternacionales para la Paz (SIPAZ), Centro de Investiga- sulted, namely El Tiempo (which later became La
ciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
(CIEPAC), Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé Foja Coleta). The Melel Xojobal (2003) dataset
de Las Casas (FrayBA), and Alianza Cívica. was used for the period from 1997 to 2003. This
154 M. Inclán
Table 11.1 Local and national newspaper articles on second dimension categorizes a governmental
protest events (selected years). (Source: Newspaper system as strong or weak according to its capac-
accounts of protests in La Jornada, La Foja Coleta, and
Melel Xojobal) ity to change policy to address those demands
1998 1999 2001 2002 (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992). Other schol-
Number of events 25 63 85 80 ars have further elaborated this second dimen-
reported in both sion by looking at issue-specific openings. These
local and national openings are specific to a particular movement
newspapers but not to all other types of movements. Exam-
Number of events 16 37 35 46
reported in local
ples are direct talks between the state and social
newspapers only movement actors, the issuing of policies, court
decisions, and the passing of laws that address a
dataset archives a daily synthesis of Chiapas news particular movement’s demands as opportunities
in local and national newspapers. The triangula- for that movement (Meyer and Minkoff 2004;
tion of local and national sources not only broad- van Cott 2001).
ens the coverage of events but also helps to avoid From the typology of political systems, only
possible reporting bias in the various news sourc- the open-closed dimension is utilized in this
es used. Table 11.1 summarizes the number of study. Assessment of the openness of the local
events reported in both local and national news- political system is determined by analyzing the
papers for the years 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002. party in power under the assumptions that PRI
Table 11.1 reveals the obvious disparity of governments were closed and that changes in
coverage between local and national sources. rule signaled openings because a non-PRI gov-
Roughly half of the events were not reported in ernment would be more open to previously ne-
the national newspaper La Jornada. Events not glected demands such as those of the Zapatistas.
reported there seemed consistently to be smaller A dichotomous variable was constructed to dif-
in magnitude than the ones reported in local cov- ferentiate priísta from non-priísta governments
erage. Including the smaller events allowed for every 3 years, the interval for local elections in
broadening the database. Moreover, running ad- Mexico. Data on parties in power were taken
ditional models with the locally reported events from electoral results available from the Instituto
only allowed controlling for possible divergent Estatal Electoral de Chiapas (IEE-Chiapas 2003).
results. No differences were found. Thus, de- Specific openings to the Zapatistas were identi-
spite the consistent bias in the number of protest fied by looking at periods of successful dialogue
events covered, the “hard news” of accounts re- between the EZLN and the national government
ported in local and national sources appeared to in 1996, when the San Andrés Accords were
be accurate and reliable for the purposes of this signed, as well as the passing of the Indigenous
study (Earl et al 2004, p. 72). Rights Bill in 2001. Another dichotomous vari-
able was used to identify these periods.
Explanatory Variables Stability of Elite Alignments

The stability of local and national electoral
Openness of the Political System politics is assessed by analyzing electoral data
Scholars who have focused on the institutional from local and national elections and by using
dimensions of the political opportunity approach Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart’s (1989)
have identified political systems using a typol- electoral fractionalization formula. The corre-
ogy in which one dimension characterizes the lation coefficient between these two variables
political system of a government as either open is 0.4351, which raises problems of multicol-
or closed depending on its openness to demands linearity. This potential problem was assessed by
presented by social movement actors while a running additional models (models 2 and 3) that
excluded one variable at a time. The fractional-
ization index is calculated by the following for- State Capacity for Repression
mula: ƒ = 1 − ∑( νi2), where νi is the proportion of Yearly counts of military positions and check-
votes won by each party. This measurement helps points per municipio were used to assess this
quantify the fragmentation of the electoral arena variable. Maps of military positions and check-
and thus the competitiveness of elections. The points were gathered from publications of the
higher the fractionalization index, the more frag- Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políti-
mented the electorate and the more competitive cas de Acción Comunitaria (see Global Exchange
the elections, and therefore the more unstable the and CIEPAC 1999; CIEPAC 2003). This measure
alignments of the polity. The IEE-Chiapas (2003) can be criticized for not accurately assessing the
and the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE 2003) state’s capacity to repress because the army is
provided the data on local and national congres- not the institution in charge of monitoring or re-
sional elections held every 3 years. But whereas pressing protest activity. Moreover, the data gath-
variation in local elections is cross-sectional as ered come not from an official source but from
well as temporal, variation in national results is a nongovernmental organization, which could
only temporal.13 introduce some reporting bias. Unfortunately,
Mexican police reports on protest events are not
Presence of Allies public information, nor are data on the number of
The same electoral data are used to assess the military personnel and military or police expens-
presence of PRD support both in Chiapas’s lo- es. Consequently, they cannot be used as mea-
calities and at the national level. The percentage sures of repression in Mexico as scholars have
of the PRD vote was considered a measure of done in studying repression of protests in other
the presence of political allies only when it was contexts (Earl et al. 2003). Newspaper reports on
not sufficient for the party to win power. This Zapatista protest events rarely mentioned wheth-
approach allows for differentiating this mea- er police or military personnel were present and
sure from the one used to identify openness of thus could not be used systematically. Although
the local political system. The correlation coef- a crude indicator and not a direct measure of re-
ficient between the two is only 0.2863, and thus pression, the information on military presence is
no major problem of muticollinearity exists. The considered to be the best approximation available
correlation test between local electoral fractional- for measuring repression given that military pres-
ization and PRD support was only 0.1612. Thus, ence in the region was intended as a threat to hold
the problem of covariance appears to be small. down Zapatista strength. It is assumed that the
Yet correlation between national electoral frac- effects of changes in the location and number of
tionalization and PRD support was 0.8780. This military checkpoints in the region could be per-
problem was corrected by running different mod- ceived only on future Zapatista protest activity.
els (models 2 and 3) that took one variable at a To this end, a lagged military presence variable is
time out of the model. Here again, variation at the included in the model.
local level is across cases and over time, whereas
at the national level, it is only temporal.14 International Media Opportunities
These opportunities were measured by examining
opinion articles on the movement published in
13
Addressing national electoral fractionalization at the
two newspapers: The New York Times in the USA
district level would make the national and the local mea-
sures difficult to differentiate. It would also increase the and El País in Spain. These newspapers were se-
multicollinearity between them and therefore bias the re- lected as reliable sources of attention devoted to
sults of the analysis. the Zapatista movement because of their broad
14 Measuring the presence of allies with district-level
coverage of international news. Using a dichoto-
data would fail to assess this variable at the national level,
as it would include only the districts within Chiapas rather
than all the electoral districts in the country. In addition, tween the local and national measures of this variable and
this approach would create problems in differentiating be- could increase the problem of multicollinearity.
156 M. Inclán
mous variable, opinions expressed in newspaper experiencing more protest activity, locality size
articles were coded as follows: Each article was was used as the exposure variable in the model
assigned two values to account for its opinion, (Long and Freese 2006). These data come from
one reflecting its opinion of the government, and the 1995, 2000, and 2005 national censuses taken
the other its opinion of the movement, with “1” by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geo-
assigned for a favorable opinion and “0” assigned grafía e Informática (INEGI 2005). Both of these
for an unfavorable one. Opinions were aggregated indicators reflect cross-sectional and temporal
by year and then a percentage variable was cre- variation between the first 6 years (1994–1999)
ated to assess the proportion of favorable and and the last four (2000–2003) of the period under
unfavorable opinions on each side from the total study. Finally, bandwagon effects of previous
of opinions published in both newspaper sources. protests on future protest activity was controlled
Lagged variables were used under the assumption by including the lagged values of the dependent
that current media opinion would be known by variable in the model (Rasler 1996).
Zapatistas only after a relatively long period of
time.15 Opinions favorable to the EZLN would
be positively related to protest activity, whereas Modeling Zapatista Protests
opinions unfavorable to the EZLN or favorable to
the Mexican government would show a negative Given that the dependent variable consists of
relationship to protest events. counts of Zapatista protests per locality per year,
the most appropriate estimation procedure to fol-
Control Variables low is an event-count model (Barron 1992; King
Sociodemographic data as well as data on local- 1989; Land et al. 1996). More specifically, a
ity size and previous protest activity in the mu- pooled cross-sectional time-series negative-bino-
nicipios were used as controls. A deprivation mial model was employed for event counts, using
index was included as a measure to control for population size as the exposure variable to correct
the effects of socioeconomic grievances across for the overdispersion of protest activity (Long
Chiapas in promoting protest events. The depri- and Freese 2006). When every case is observed
vation index refers to municipio-based conditions at the same fixed number of time points (years in
of education, occupation, and housing. A scale of this case), it is conventional to characterize the
five categories is used to define the municipio’s design as occasions crossed by cases over time
level of deprivation, with 1 equaling a very low (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992, p. 2). Moreover,
level of deprivation and 5 equaling very high. variation in higher-level variables (“Level 2”) is
Deprivation data were taken from the Consejo only temporal, and so what could be considered
Nacional de Población (CONAPO 2003), which “Level 2” predictors are the same for all cases
measured this indicator every 5 years in 1995, and can be modeled with a fixed-effects approach
2000, and 2005. To control for larger and more (Luke 2004, p. 21).
populous municipalities being at higher risk of The number of protests is reported as an inci-
dence rate of events over space and time. The av-
15 The savvy use of the internet by Zapatistas was mostly erage number of events in a municipio was 0.65
through the sympathizing NGOs in the region (as men- (with a variance of 6.93). In municipios having at
tioned in footnote 16). One cannot assume that in the least one protest in the time period, the average
remote areas of Chiapas the population which is the one number of protests was 3.35 events in a year (with
protesting will have immediate access to international
news. They only had access to it after NGOs, such as a variance of 26.49). This finding means that pro-
Melel Xojobal, provided a summary of the local, national, tests across municipios are overdispersed. While
and international news to the public in general. Thus, it some localities never had a single protest, others
can be assumed that there was a long period of time be- were continuous centers of protests and still others
tween the publication of opinions of the movement ex-
pressed in international newspapers and the time Zapatista experienced at least one in the same time period.
protestors knew about them and got organized to protest.
This overdispersion of protests across the a quicker response. The other source of overdis-
state of Chiapas arises from two different sourc- persion comes from the impact of previous EZLN
es. One relates to the assumed strategic behavior protest activity on subsequent protests. That is to
of Zapatista protesters that would make some lo- say, municipalities that had experi-enced protest
calities better targets for protests because of their events in the past were more likely to experience
political and socioeconomic Salience. Zapatista protest events in the future. This is the case of
protesters would choose to protest in cities or localities with a long tradition of peasant disputes
towns where they could achieve the highest im- and mobilization like Altamirano, San Andrés
pact and attract the most attention from the pub- Larráinzar, Simojovel, and Venustiano Carranza
lic, the state, and the media. Thus, larger cities (Harvey 1998). To account for the fact that pro-
with important political and economic structures test events in a municipio per year are not inde-
would make better targets for protests. Such pendent cases, the lagged values of the dependent
would be the case of cities like Tuxtla Gutiérrez variable were included in the model.
(the state capital), San Cristóbal de Las Casas and The overdispersion of protest events is repre-
Palenque (cultural centers), Tapachula (a border sented with a negative-binomial model instead of
city), and Comitán, Ocosingo, and Las Margari- a regular Poisson model (Long and Freese 2006),
tas (economic centers). By impacting regular using population size as the exposure variable.
functions of these centers, Zapatista protesters After controlling for population size, the average
could cause the state greater disruption and force number of protests in a locality per year became
Table 11.2 Factors predicting the likelihood of Zapatista protests in Chiapas 1994–2003
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Local variables
Openness of political system: 0.49 (0.20)** 0.38 (0.20)* 0.53 (0.19)***
PRI rule
Instability of elite alignments: − 1.82 (0.46)*** − 1.66 (0.46)*** − 1.99 (0.43)***
Electoral fractionalization
Presence of allies: − 0.33 (0.51) − 0.67 (0.50) − 0.27 (0.51)
PRD support
State’s capacity of repression: 0.06 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)***
Military checkpoints (lagged)
National variables
Openness of political system: Dummy negotiat- − 0.94 (0.30)*** − 1.38 (0.28)*** − 0.75 (0.23)***
ing period (1996 and 2001)
Instability of elite alignments: − 0.88 (86) − 3.55 (0.38)***
Electoral fractionalization
Presence of allies: PRD support − 0.18 (0.05)*** − 0.22 (0.02)***
International variables
Favorable to Zapatistas 0.04 (0.009) 0.02 (0.007)*** 0.01 (0.07)
Favorable to Mexican government 0.001 (0.006) 0.01 (0.005)** 0.02 (0.005)
Controls
Deprivation 0.32 (0.10)*** 0.35 (0.10)*** 0.31 (0.10)***
Previous protests (lagged dependent variable) 0.04 (0.02)** 0.04 (0.02)** 0.04 (0.02)**
Number of observations: 1095
Number of clusters: 111
Log likelihood = − 799.2955
Wald Chi 2(15): 498.68
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática
*Statistically significant at .10 %
**Statistically significant at .05 %
***Statistically significant at .00 %
158 M. Inclán
9.8, with a maximum of 10 and a minimum of 2 increase of 4.14 % (one standard deviation) in
protests. To correct for possible heteroscedastic- PRD support at the national level decreased ac-
ity and serial correlation, robust standard errors tivity by 0.22 fewer protest events ( p < 0.01 in
clustered by municipio were estimated. Estima- model 3). This trend appears to have persisted
tion results are presented in Table 11.2 and are even during periods of specific openings to the
discussed in the following section. Zapatistas. The San Andrés Accords in 1996 and
deliberations over the Indigenous Rights Bill in
2001 also decreased Zapatista protest activity
Results significantly. The results show that during the
negotiating years, 0.94 fewer protests occurred
Once the EZLN uprising triggered a cycle of than in other years ( p < 0.05). Thus, contrary to
protest in Chiapas, protest activity was expected predictions, specific openings did not function as
to increase for two reasons: first, to the specific protest triggers.
openings that the periods of dialogue offered to Significant bandwagon effects were also found
the Zapatistas; and, second, as a consequence of (Rasler 1996). Zapatistas tended to protest more
electoral openings that brought other parties to often where they had held protests before. One
power, increased the competitiveness of elec- additional protest event in the previous year trig-
tions, and allowed influential allies to emerge. gered 0.04 ( p < 0.05) more protests the following
The results show, however, that these openings year. These results suggest that these openings
reduced Zapatista protest activity in those locali- made the remaining closed environments—the
ties with more competitive elections while the PRI-ruled municipios with a larger military pres-
remaining localities under PRI rule with a higher ence—the targets of protest mobilization. To
repressive presence continued to be targeted by confirm this claim, I ran additional models to
protesters. In other words, Zapatista protest ac- check for a curvilinear effect of the openness of
tivity appeared to be less likely in local settings the political system on protest activity (Eisinger
that had experienced a change in rule away from 1973; Tilly 1978). Results of the second analysis
the PRI, held more competitive elections, and failed to confirm this claim. The quadratic term
witnessed a smaller presence of the army. Con- of openness at the local level, measured by the
versely, Zapatista protest activity appeared to be quadratic percentage of PRI votes, showed that
concentrated in those localities ruled by the PRI the relationship between these two variables was
that had more stable electoral alignments and a neither significant nor curvilinear.16
stronger army presence. PRI-ruled municipios Figure 11.3 illustrates how, in localities where
experienced 0.45 more protests than non-priísta another party had replaced the PRI, the number
municipios ( p < 0.05), whereas municipios with of protests was highest the year before the change
more competitive elections had 1.82 fewer pro- in administration and lowest in the year in which
test events ( p < 0.10). The addition of one more the new party took power. For example, Altami-
military checkpoint in the municipio increased rano experienced only one protest event during
the statistical likelihood of future protest activity the PRD rule from 1995 to 1998, compared with
by 0.06 ( p < 0.05). ten events during PRI rule from 1999 to 2001.
The results offered by variables at the national Another example in the same year is Ixtapa,
level confirm this pattern as well. As national
elections became more competitive and the pres-
ence of the PRD—a potential Zapatista ally—in-
creased in the national congress, Zapatista protest
activity decreased significantly. With an increase
16 The respective coefficients for the PRI percentage of
of 25 % (one standard deviation) in national elec-
the vote as a measure for openness of the local political
toral fractionalization, protest activity decreased system and its quadratic term were 0.26 (std. error = 1.51)
by 3.55 protest events ( p < 0.01 in model 2). An and 1.28 (std. error = 1.98).

3URWHVWV

35,UXOH &KDQJHLQUXOH 2WKHUSDUW\UXOH
Fig. 11.3 Changes in rule and average number of Zapatista protests in a Municipio. PRI Partido Revolucionario Insti-
tucional
where only two protest events were held during did the relationship reverse and indicate a nega-
PRD rule but seven during PRI rule.17 tive impact on future protest activities. In those
The claim that closed local political systems years, military presence decreased because Presi-
led to more Zapatista protest than open settings dent Fox in 2000 ordered the withdrawal of the
is supported by the positive relationship between army from the region. Thus, the military presence
the location of military positions and Zapatista in the region not only failed to deter Zapatistas
protests over time. Additional analyses were from protesting but actually encouraged protest
conducted to check whether expansion of mili- activity, as members of several nongovernmental
tary presence in the region followed increases in organizations have noted.18
protest activity or whether increases in protests Finally, the results for international media at-
followed expanded military checkpoints and po- tention appear to be significant only in model 2
sitions. but not in the other two models. The international
Table 11.3 shows that protest activity fol- media variables appeared susceptible to the mul-
lowed the increases in military checkpoints in ticollinearity between local and national electoral
the region. Zapatista protests grew as military fractionalization. Because the results in models
checkpoints multiplied. Only in the last 2 years 1 and 3 are consistent, their results are more re-
liable than those of model 2. These two models
show that the relationship between international
17 Other examples include Coapilla, with one event dur- media attention and protest activity was positive
ing rule by the Partido del Frente Cardenista de Recon-
strucción Nacional (PFCRN) from 1995 through 1998 and
two events during PRI rule (1999–2001); and Frontera Hi- 18 Personal interviews with members of CIEPAC, En-
dalgo, with one event during PRD rule (1995–1998) and lace Civil, COMPAZ, and SIPAZ in San Cristóbal de Las
two events during PRI rule (1999–2001). Casas, Chiapas, February–March 2003.
160 M. Inclán
Table 11.3 Military checkpoints and Zapatista protests structures have differing influences on protest
in Chiapas, 1994–2003 mobilization. Democratic settings are more like-
Dependent variable: yearly number Coefficients and ly to grant access and substantive concessions to
of Zapatista protest events per (robust standard
municipio errors) clustered social movements’ demands, especially when the
by municipio state is open and has the capacity to respond to
Prediction of protests demands presented by dissident actors (Kitschelt
State’s capacity of repression: 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992, 1995; Tarrow 1994). In
Military checkpoints in time t-3 0.20** closed and repressive settings, the lack of oppor-
(0.13) tunities is what triggers mobilization (Einwohner
Military checkpoints in time t-2 0.15**
2003; Kurzman 1996; Loveman 1998; McAdam
(0.04)
Military checkpoints in time t-1 0.17**
1982; Noonan 1995; Rasler 1996; Tarrow 1989).
(0.05) For a movement developing within electoral
Military checkpoints in time t 0.12* openings, the effects of these changes on protest
(0.01) activity cannot be predicted consistently because
Military checkpoints in time t + 1 0.18** they bring great uncertainty. This tendency is
(0.06)
even more pronounced when these openings do
Military checkpoints in time t + 2 − 0.46**
(0.18) not translate into substantive opportunities for
Military checkpoints in time t + 3 − 0.003 advancing the movement’s demands through in-
(0.18) stitutional channels and when negotiations with
Year 0.55** the state have brought only procedural rather
(0.13) than significant concessions.
Number of observations: 441 The theory of political opportunities predicts
Number of clusters: 111
that although protest activity would be triggered
Log likelihood = − 206.89
by the relatively closed nature of the political
Wald Chi 2(15): 41.96
system, once the environments begin to open up,
*Statistically significant at .05 %, **Statistically signifi-
cant at .00 % protest activity increases in a curvilinear fash-
ion (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978). But it should
not be forgotten that this theory was developed
but not significant. Thus, the link between these to explain contentious behavior within well-es-
two factors is a remote one despite the efforts of tablished democracies, not to explain a cycle of
nongovernmental organizations in the region to protest within democratic openings in develop-
keep the Zapatista communities informed about ing countries. In the latter case, change in ruling
the developments outside the region of conflict party, realignments of the political elites under-
affecting the movement. International media lying the established polity, and the increased
opinion could have opened opportunities for the presence of potential political allies—factors that
Zapatistas to reach out to the transnational social should have worked as opportunities for mobili-
movement sector for help but not have functioned zation as they do in democratic scenarios—be-
as a protest trigger. These results deserve further came depressors of protest activity. The explana-
analysis nonetheless. tion for this outcome could be that as opportuni-
ties arose for the opposition to gain more power,
the incentives to continue protesting decreased
Discussion (Pickvance 1995). But in the Zapatista case,
democratic openings stopped at the electoral
The results just reported suggest several impor- level and involved no major institutional changes
tant contributions to scholarly understanding of that would have opened opportunities for incor-
social movements in general and the Zapatista porating dissident interests like the Zapatistas
movement in particular. First, this study shows into the state’s agenda. Moreover, when the PRD,
that depending on context, political opportunity the potential Zapatista ally, proved to be incom-
petent (or unwilling in the Zapatistas view) to international media attention had no significant
represent Zapatista demands once it had gained effect on the development of the cycle of protest.
positions of power, the incipient alliance broke This topic nevertheless deserves further investi-
down. Thus, these opportunities were only tem- gation in the future when systematic data about
porary ones for the Zapatistas, an outcome that transnational networks working in the region be-
initially helped decrease protest activity in more come available. For now, scholars can rely only
open localities and concentrated it in the remain- on indirect data and isolated case studies to show
ing closed environments. When these openings the significant influence of international factors
later proved to be short-lived, they discouraged and actors in the survival of the Zapatista move-
Zapatistas from continuing to protest altogether. ment over time (Bob 2005; Collier and Collier
Issue-specific openings also proved to be 2005; Hellman 1999; Moksnes 2005; Rus 1995;
momentary opportunities. They brought no sub- Schultz 1998).
stantive concessions to the Zapatista movement.
Initially, however, they helped reduce protest ac-
tivity, perhaps due to a feeling of hope about the References
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and Popular Uprising in Bocas 12
del Toro
Giovanni Beluche V.
The Regional Context: Exclusion, poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, Central
Poverty, and Inequality America faces enormous problems of environ-
mental vulnerability (see Chaps. 1, 17, and 18 in
The past 30 years of history in Central America this volume). As early as 1999, the Report on the
show political instability ranging from explosive State of the Region1 pointed out the precarious
situations to apparent calm. This regional instabil- nature of the economic and political advances.
ity is driven by the productive, political, econom- Ten years later, we can see that the same weak-
ic, and cultural changes that have transformed nesses continue to prevail, and are even worse
Central American societies. The most difficult po- with the return of the coup d'état as a mechanism
litical processes took place throughout the 1980s, for resolving political disputes.
resulting in civil wars in several countries. All The new century began with a steep decline
of them, with the exception of Costa Rica, were in economic growth in almost all countries as a
governed by authoritarian regimes. Peace accords result of the slowdown in global economic activ-
were signed in the early 1990s, giving rise to for- ity, less expansion in world trade, the September
mal democratization processes (Almeida 2014), 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and factors specific to
but leaving the causes of the conflicts untouched: each country. Given that the USA is the primary
immense social exclusion, generalized poverty, destination for trade from Central America, the
and inequality. This initiated a phase of relative fluctuations in the US economy caused an imme-
political stability and economic reactivation with diate and palpable impact in the region. The first
little impact on social welfare, to the point that decade of the century came to a close with the
Central America is one of the regions with the consequences of the global capitalist crisis being
greatest inequality in the world. felt in the Central American economies, which
At the end of the first decade of the new cen- again demonstrates the dependence of the isth-
tury, there are few mechanisms in place for redis- mus on the US economy.
tribution of the wealth generated and democratic While there are differences between individ-
systems continue to be very fragile. In addition to ual countries, the dominant economic model is
one that increases poverty, widens the social gap,
increases unemployment and informal labor, im-
This chapter was translated from Spanish to English by poses labor flexibility, and deregulation of labor
Nancy Hand.
G. Beluche V. () 1 See State of the Nation (1999) State of the Region in
Extension and Social Action Division, Universidad sustainable human development. State of the Nation Proj-
Técnica Nacional de Costa Rica, San José, Costa Rica ect. Costa Rica.
e-mail: gbeluche@prodesarrollocr.com
166 G. Beluche V.
relations. Economic growth is unstable and does the standard of living for the great majority of
not foster social development. Poverty primar- Central Americans is still pending. The fragility
ily impacts children and households headed by of the democratization process in several coun-
women, and continues to be especially predomi- tries, the existing political polarization, and the
nant in rural areas. Poverty is also extremely models of accumulation chosen by the govern-
concentrated in border regions, indigenous and ments portend difficult years ahead on the road to
coastal territories, and densely populated urban building inclusive and more democratic societies.
zones.
Decades ago, the issue of political and eco-
nomic integration was placed on the agendas of Labor Flexibility Sets the Tone
governments, with no great progress. The advent
of neoliberal policies beginning in the 1980s Policies aimed at undermining labor rights and
favored free trade, but with no effort toward in- weakening labor union organizations are at the
tegration. This strategic objective is now regain- core of the conflict discussed in this chapter that
ing momentum, spurred by the negotiations and took place in the province of Bocas del Toro
signing of free trade agreements with the USA (Panama). The passage of a law that, among other
and the European Union.2 But the biggest bar- things, was perceived as an assault on the rights
rier to integration continues to be the unequal of the Panamanian working class triggered the
and combined development of the countries and crisis that will be examined below. In a series of
their subregions, which is reflected in enormous specialized publications, the NGO ASEPROLA3
disparities. The obstacles to integration and in- and its allied organizations, have been systemati-
clusive development are found in enormous dif- cally documenting and denouncing labor flexibi-
ferences in human development, contrasts be- lization practices and violations of labor rights
tween the rural and the urban sectors, disparities in Central America. Labor flexibilization strate-
between modern enclaves in the capital cities that gies are aimed at avoiding compliance with labor
exist alongside vast expanses of poverty and low rights in the context of the prevailing model of
productivity in the same cities, but especially in economic liberalization, as a competitive advan-
rural and border areas. In almost all of the coun- tage (increasing profit margins) for companies
tries, the Caribbean region remains disconnected based on reducing social and labor guarantees for
from the Pacific region, despite it being extensive the working class.
and very rich in biodiversity, natural resources, Following the same neoliberal logic of reduc-
and culture. The inequalities between different ing or eliminating any regulations considered
social groups are alarming and have excluded the barriers to the free functioning of the market,
majority from access to social services and the labor flexibilization is aimed at minimizing or
benefits of development—gaps between rich and eliminating laws created to protect the rights of
poor, between men and women, between indig- working people. Labor protections and collective
enous people, Afro-Caribbean people and non- bargaining are considered obstacles by elites to
indigenous. the economic development of the region. This
A brief review of the situation of the region, flexibility is two-pronged. One part is based on
in very broad strokes, makes clear that despite legal reforms, and the other—the most common
improvements in macroeconomic indicators, the and widespread throughout the region—is based
implementation of mechanisms for redistribution on de facto flexibility. Such reductions in previ-
of socially produced wealth in order to improve ously gained rights of labor unions involve both
national and international laws. Research under-
2
Panama and Belize have not been parties to these agree-
ments. 3 Asociation of Services for the Promotion of Labor.
12 Panama: Worker, Indigenous, and Popular Uprising in Bocas del Toro 167
taken by ASEPROLA and the Regional Cam- without paying interest. Outsourcing, through
paign against Labor Flexibility demonstrates the which the outsourced company keeps a por-
prevalence of six strategies for flexibilization:4 tion of wages.
5. Flexibilization strategies that violate the right
1. Flexibilization of labor contracts: is the pri- of working persons to medical/health care and
mary strategy for violating labor rights, it is social security: late payment or failure to pay
implemented through subcontracting, out- medical social security. Change of company
sourcing, generalization of professional ser- name in order to avoid claims. In outsource
vices (disguised labor relationship) and work companies, failure to pay medical social se-
at home practices. curity is common. Illegal deductions from
2. Flexibilization strategies that violate the right disabled persons or those on maternity leave.
of working persons to stable employment: are Company medical personnel sometimes cov-
implemented through changes in company er-up failure to pay medical social security be-
name, annual indemnification of the work- cause of a reduction in workers seeking care
force, minimization of seniority of the work- from medical social security facilities.
ing class, sudden closures of companies that
reopen with new names, temporary contracts,
of working persons to form labor unions:
dismissal after the probationary period, simul-
implemented by way of direct violation of
taneous registration of several firms in one
the right to union organizing or through per-
workplace, massive unjustified layoffs alleg-
secution of union leaders. Dismissal of union
ing financial problems, and absence of con-
leadership, harassment of union leaders, and
tracts in writing.
members.
of working persons to a limited work day: All of these practices violate social and labor
consists of the illegal extension of the work rights, in addition to violating legal regulations
day every day of the week, sometimes with- and human rights established in a number of
out payment for overtime. Equating of split international conventions. Despite these clear
shifts and night shifts with day shifts. Ac- violations, the agencies responsible for enforc-
counting of hours by the week (4 × 3 or 4 × 4) ing these rights implement a policy of impunity
rather than by the day, without payment for that benefits the business sector. These flexibili-
overtime. Elimination of breaks. Contracts by zation strategies are widespread throughout Cen-
production goals rather than by work shifts. tral America, but there are few sanctions, which
Work overloading and a policy of not hiring demonstrate the complacency of the responsible
replacements for disabilities, vacations, and authorities. The extreme has been the selective
dismissals. Combining multiple functions. murder of union leaders in several countries, par-
4. Flexibilization strategies that violate the right ticularly Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.
of working persons to a fair wage: operates
by way of extension of the work day without
payment for overtime. Payment by production
Background on the Bocas del Toro
targets. Weekly, biweekly, or monthly pro-
Uprising
duction bonuses contingent on meeting daily
production targets. Late payment of wages
The events that took place in Panama in July of
2010 have their proximate antecedents in the pop-
4 See Regional Campaign Against Labor Flexibility ular discontent caused by the lack of mechanisms
(2010) Lobar flexibility violates labor rights in Central for redistribution of socially produced wealth.
America, trends and cases. Regional Campaign Against The energetic growth of the Panamanian econo-
Labor Flexibility. Costa Rica.
my is clear: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) went
168 G. Beluche V.
from 23 billion dollars in 2004 to 42 billion dol- tion system, low wages that are not enough for the
lars in 2008. Economic growth reached 10.7 % basic food basket, widespread informal, an over-
in 2008, in a sustained upsurge starting in 2004. whelmed medical and health care system, and
The lowest growth rate of this period was 7.5 % heightened levels of social and criminal violence.
(2004). This vigorous growth did not translate
into improvements in the quality of life for the
vast majority. While there was talk of an official The Crisis of Bipartisanship
unemployment rate of 5.2 % in 2008, hidden be- and Government by Business
hind this figure was enormous concealed unem-
ployment, with an informal sector that has an im- With 73 % electoral participation, Ricardo Mar-
mediate visual impact in the major cities and that tinelli and his Democratic Change Party handily
represents 45 % of jobs. As a dollarized economy, won the elections conducted in May, 2009 with
the inflation rate in 2008 reached 8.7 %, the high- 60 % of the votes compared to 37 % obtained by
est since the 1970s. The dance of the millions his opponent, Balbina Herrera, the Pérez Ballad-
generated by the transportation economy of the ares (PRD) candidate. The large number of votes
Panama Canal,5 was increasingly concentrated received by Martinelli can be explained primarily
in a smaller and smaller privileged group, to the as a vote of punishment by the Panamanian peo-
point that Panama is among the three countries ple against the PRD and the shared bipartisanship
with the most extreme distortions in the distribu- with the different fractions of the Panameñista
tion of wealth in Latin America. While per capita Party.7 The voters expressed their discontent over
GDP was US $ 10,000 in 2009, the majority of the suffocating social inequality created by the
Panamanians do not benefit from the recent eco- neoliberal policies that have been implemented
nomic bonanza. In fact, the Gini coefficient was by each successive government since the military
56.4 in 2007, very close to those of Zimbabwe invasion by the USA in 1989 that ousted Gen-
(56.8), Brazil (56.7) and higher than that of Ni- eral Manuel Noriega. This discontent has been
caragua (55.1) and Honduras (55.0), respectively. channeled into an alternative provided by eco-
With barely 3.5 million inhabitants and an nomic elites (that is presented as the Democratic
impressive economic growth rate, Panama has a Change Party) that is the result of a divided left,8
shameful poverty rate of nearly 30 % at the na- and by the difficulty of an important sector with
tional level and 47 % in rural areas.6 The indige- influence over the popular classes to overcome
nous population totals about 200,000 inhabitants, barriers to build an anti-neoliberal alternative.9
and extreme poverty covers over 90 % of their ter- The Martinelli government, which took office
ritory according to United Nations Development on July 1, 2009, is made up of businessmen, of
Programme (UNDP) estimates. It is the country in their trusted employees from the private sector
Latin America with the highest number of people and by other conservative sectors such as Opus
jailed without trial. The social contrasts in Pana- Dei, which occupied strategic posts in the ad-
ma are extreme. There is an abundance of liquid
capital in circulation, and an ostentatious bour-
7 The Panameñista Party returned to executive power in
geoisie that displays a first world lifestyle. For
the May 2014 presidential elections, but the Democratic
purposes of comparison, daily life for the major- Change Party continues to hold the most seats in the Na-
ity is characterized by communities in metropoli- tional Assemby.
tan areas without access to water, public schools 8 A sector of the left proposed the economist Juan Jované
in poor condition, a collapsed public transporta- as an unaffiliated candidate, but the Electoral Tribunal re-
jected the candidacy. Three days prior to the elections, the
Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favor of Jované, but it
5 The
tertiary sector, historically tied to the transit route, was by then too late for him to be included on the ballot.
employs two thirds of the working population. 9 Partido Alternativa Popular (2009) Election Results. In-
6 ECLAC (2008) ECLAC Statistical Yearbook. Chile. ternet. Panama.
ministration. A brief family portrait would yield the skyscrapers, casinos, and upscale restaurants
a picture of a Martinelli who graduated from a where exclusive elites and beneficiaries of the
military academy in the USA and from INCAE; a prevailing neoliberal model reside.
vice president, education minister, and a foreign A shared characteristic of the social move-
minister who are Opus Dei activists. The honey- ments of the Central American region is the ex-
moon between civil society and the new govern- plosiveness of the methods of struggle. Govern-
ment would not last long. The social movement ments have demonstrated to the social organiza-
events of July 2010 are rooted in the historic tions that the only way to be heard is to resort to
discontent of the great majority of Panamanians, road blocks, strikes, and public demonstrations.
now disillusioned by the failure to deliver on Legal means and petitions have continued to be
promises for change put forth by the Democratic used alongside more nonconventional protests,
Change Party and President Martinelli who had but impunity continues to be the rule for offenses
already been part of the government of PRD and committed by politicians, businesspeople, and
of the cabinet of Mireya Moscoso (Panameñista transnational companies. The political regime
Party).10 has nullified the separation of powers, which is
the foundation of liberal democracy. The party
in power has control of the executive, legislative
The Social Movements Do Not Let Up and, judicial branches, as well as the comptroller.
The defense of business interests in order to
Neither the high electoral turnout nor the hon- implement labor flexibilization,11 has resulted
eymoon between the new government and the in serious conflicts with the working class and
people, demonstrated by the initial opinion polls, other groups over human rights violations. Of
was able to squelch the sustained popular dis- particular note is the confrontation with construc-
content, expressed through countless struggles tion workers, who seek safe working conditions,
throughout the Republic of Panama. It would be among other demands, because of the frequent
impossible to give a detailed account or a lengthy workplace deaths and accidents on construction
analysis in this venue. However, some of the sites. The response of the government has been
most significant aspects will be highlighted, by avoidance, repression, arbitrary detention, and
way of prefatory explanation of the social ex- arrest warrants for labor leaders. 12
plosion that took place in the province of Bocas Labor unions blame the Ministry of Labor for
del Toro, and later spread to the main urban violating labor rights. After one year in office, the
centers. Democratic Change administration has not pro-
The high cost of living, poverty wages, ex- cessed a single application by labor union organi-
tremely poor roads, predatory tourism, mining zations. Of the 19 requests submitted, it rejected
and damn projects, lack of access to water, un- 9 entirely arbitrarily. In less than 1 year in power,
derfunded public transportation, the prevalence the rabiblancos [“white tails”]13 have violated
of child labor, lack of public safety, deteriorating labor rights and international agreements signed
infrastructure and content of public education, by Panama, the administration has eliminated
neglected public health services, labor flexibili-
zation, the invasion of companies and colonists
in indigenous territories, and the effects of the
11 Gandásegui,
global financial crisis provide a glimpse of that Marco (2009) Analysis of the Elections.
other excluded Panama that is hidden behind Internet. Panama.
12 Labor leaders in the contstruction workers’ union have
also been killed at times during protest campaigns. These
10
Vázquez, Priscilla (2009) The Defeat of the PRD in the actions remain in impunity.
Elections Does Not Mean the End of Hunger Politics. In- 13 Panamanian popular slang for people from the domi-
ternet. Panama. nant classes.

170 G. Beluche V.
collective bargaining and “legalized” the “right” liberal government increased the sales tax from 5
of the police to terminate demonstrations. to 7 %, which directly affected the pocketbooks
In addition, freedom of expression and infor- of consumers; it passed the Carcelazo Law (Jail-
mation has been infringed. Beyond the media house Law), which criminalized social protest;
blockade based on state control and sweetheart and most importantly it rushed the so-called
relationships with the major media, a new ex- “chorizo” law (Law 30) through the National As-
treme was reached with the jailing of journalist sembly, which sought, among other measures, to
Carlos Jerónimo Núñez for alleged “libel and eliminate the labor bargaining.14 This law, also
slander” against a landowner in Chiriquí Prov- known as 9-in-1, hides changes to the Labor
ince, whom he denounced in several articles for Code, the Penal Code, and Judicial rules behind
environmental destruction. In a press release the title of “Promotion of Commercial Aviation.”
dated June 2, 2010, the organization Unidad de The new law gave the authority to make a dec-
Lucha Integral del Pueblo (ULIP) and others, laration of national interest for projects that are
denounced the closure of radio and television destructive to the environment at the discretion
programs with no explanation beyond “on orders of the Executive Branch, thereby avoiding en-
from higher up.” vironmental impact studies. As if that were not
enough, this panoply of laws reformed the Na-
tional Police law, creating new difficulties for
The Bocas del Toro Working Class citizens to be protected from the use of excessive
Shows the Way force.
The whole set of measures imposed during
The events that took place in Bocas del Toro the period prior to the Bocas del Toro uprising
province during the month of July of 2010 can be was aimed at infringing on citizen, economic,
categorized as a worker, popular, and indigenous and social rights, and they placed the burden of
uprising triggered by the struggle against Law the weight of the global economic crisis on the
30 (the Chorizo Law), but that also expressed back of the working class, in addition to deepen-
discontent built-up over a period of years. So- ing the prevailing neoliberal model. There were
cial sectors such as environmentalists, campesi- protests and denouncements in the capital city,
nos, native peoples, and human rights advocates but it was in the Province of Bocas del Toro that
joined with the working class and their tradition- the response of the popular sectors was the most
al methods of struggle. The mobilizations in the militant and sustained.
faraway province of Bocas del Toro and the gen-
eral strike that spread to other areas of the coun-
try brought about a political crisis for the Marti- Bocas del Toro: A Mix of Factors
nelli administration, the magnitude of which was
largely unforeseeable. It is worth asking why the most serious protest
To say that the magnitude of the crisis was un- eruption took place in the remote province of
foreseeable does not imply a failure to recognize Bocas del Toro. A document of the Alternative
the breeding ground that was generating popu- Popular Party includes an interesting reflection
lar discontent. But the pro-business government on the factors that led the banana workers to take
was preparing to celebrate its first year in power the lead against the government’s package.15 In
with high approval ratings in the polls. The po-
litical regime appeared to be solid, to the point 14 It undermines the right to strike, eliminates deduction
that it decided to implement a new package of
of union dues and creates a trade organization manipu-
neoliberal measures through the national parlia- lated by the Ministry of Labor.
ment, without calculating the resulting effects. 15 Alternative Popular Party (2010) National Situation.
During the 2 months prior to the crisis, the neo- National Political Directorate. Internet. Panama.
the indigenous areas that are found on the isth- responded with a show of bravado, the Ministry
mus of Panama, the extreme poverty rate is over of Security and the director of the police report-
90 %, the areas of Ngöbe—Buglé, Bri Bri, and edly made public statements against original
Naso—Teribe, where the majority of the work- peoples that it was a movement of “a handful of
ing class of banana workers of Bocas del Toro drunken Indians” (HREV 2010).
come from, are among the most affected by these The banana workers took to the streets and
conditions of indigence. Of the nearly 16,000 local communities came out in their support.
inhabitants of the province, 45 % are indigenous The government sent nearly a thousand police-
people of the cultures mentioned above. Six of men to contain the strike and the popular dem-
every ten people in Bocas del Toro are poor and onstrations. July 7 and 8 marked the worker and
four of every ten live in extreme poverty. Tourism popular uprising when violent and unjustified
operations increased in recent years, though they state repression was unleashed, leaving up to
are largely limited to the island areas and have eight dead, including leader Antonio Smith, an
generated limited jobs that require a certain basic affiliate of the National Convergence Central.
level of qualification, which the majority of the Hundreds were injured, at least fifty seriously;
original inhabitants do not possess. The banana those arrested by the security forces numbered in
activity continues to be an important source of the hundreds. None of this repression in making
employment in vast areas of the province under the workers of Bocas del Toro surrender, which
the control of the transnational company, Chiq- forced the government and the company to nego-
uita Brands. As in all banana-producing areas, tiate the suspension of the aspects of the chorizo
the company determines the pace of life in the re- law that violated union rights.
gion, with the protection and complacency of na-
tional and local authorities. The workers belong
to SITRAIBANA, a representative union organi- Brief Chronology of the Crisis
zation that is heir to a long tradition of struggle
bringing together some 4000 workers, both men Below I present a brief chronology of the events
and women.16 that took place in early July, 2010 in Bocas del
Both poverty and inequality, along with the Toro. For more information, the work of the
growing disillusionment with a new government human rights organization, HREV17 is recom-
that is furthering the same model of extraction mended, among other documents. In response to
and exclusion implemented by its predecessors, implementation of the chorizo law by the govern-
were the breeding ground for the incipient so- ment and the banana company and in demand of
cial explosion. The trigger was when the mul- a repeal of the articles harmful to labor, environ-
tinational banana company benefited from the mental, penal and repressive/police matters, the
government’s new chorizo law in an attempt to 48-h strike called by SITRAIBANA and four in-
debilitate the local labor union by refusing to col- dependent unions began on Friday, July 2, 2010.
lect and transfer union dues. The response of the The events forced the extension of the strike on
workers was to call a 48-h strike. The company Sunday, July 11. Families and people from the
did not yield and the strike was declared open- communities joined the protest. The govern-
ended during a banana worker mass meeting. The ment responded by deploying the security forces.
government, represented by the minister of labor, On July 2 and 3 there were demonstrations and
closed ranks with the company. The government blockades. On Saturday, July 3, the Bocas Fruit
Company held back payment of wages, which
16 While the last major banana strike was during the
1960s, the union has maintained a tradition of the classic 17 Based on HREV (2010) Report on Human Rights Vio-
methods of the working class: union assemblies, company lations in Changuinola. July 7 through 11, 2010. Human
control, pickets, worker monitoring in nearby areas, etc. Rigths Everywhere. Panamá.
172 G. Beluche V.
caused greater discontent. The protesters blocked who received multiple pellet wounds to the
the exit of the directors of the company in Plot 13 face.19 A report prepared by the human rights or-
of the region. ganization, HREV,20 reported the deaths of seven
In response to the authorities’ unwillingness to people. Antonio Smith and Virgilio Castillo died
negotiate and the retention of wages by the com- as a direct result of police actions; Rubén Becker
pany, on July 4 the local banana workers declared and Leonardo Santos from respiratory complica-
the strike to be indefinite. On Monday, July 5, tions attributable to the tear gas; Einar Quintero,
highway blockages increased, which isolated the Marcelina Carpintero, and Florinda Peña from
city of Changuinola, which affected educational, events apparently related to the repression, ac-
commercial, and tourism activities. The govern- cording to local NGOs. At the time the report was
ment’s sluggishness in responding to the crisis finalized, Valentín Palacios had been detained
was such that it was not until Tuesday, July 6 that and disappeared.
the minister of labor, Alma Cortés, arrived on the The document reports that at least 256 peo-
scene, but she did not reach an agreement with ple were injured as a result of pellets fired; 61
the strikers. Following the failure of the minis- of these cases were serious (58 to the eyes and
ter’s mission, the national police intensified its 3 with internal injuries). Some of the injuries
repressive actions. The popular resistance con- caused irreversible blindness. A detailed analysis
tinued on Wednesday July 7, despite the assault of the bodily areas impacted by the pellets indi-
by police. Clashes with demonstrators spread and cated that the majority of the victims sustained
union leaders and community members were ar- injuries above the belt, especially to the head,
rested. The workers demanded the presence of eyes, chest, back, and arms. Testimony collected
the president of the republic, who had to cancel by HREV (2010) denounced cases of torture,
his trip to the World Cup soccer play-offs, but did cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment by the
not go to Bocas del Toro. Instead, on Thursday, National Police against those detained. The po-
July 8 Martinelli, as chief of negotiations, sent lice also made arrests in hospitals or when the
the minister of the presidency, Jimmy Papadimi- victims were seeking or coming from receiving
triu. As back-up, on July 9, Vice President Juan medical care. Many were denied medical care
Carlos Varela, joined the delegation.18 Leaving a despite serious injuries. The repressive forces
trail of repression (including deaths, serious inju- reportedly used racist insults and insults of all
ries, and mass arrests), the strike ended on Sun- kinds and they denied food and kept detainees
day, July 11 with an agreement. An accord was from sleeping. Some prisoners were held incom-
reached to suspend the articles of Law 30 (the municado. The report includes details of other
chorizo law) that the union groups were demand- forms of degrading treatment, such as pointing
ing over the prior 3 months. a gun at a person’s head while the person was
handcuffed and on his/her knees; throwing vin-
egar on open wounds; use of pepper spray in the
Tally of Victims and Human Rights faces of detainees; spraying food with gasoline
Violations before serving it; and many people, including
women, were stripped naked (HREV 2010).
Human rights organizations, local NGOs, and
community members maintain that the National
Police used excessive force, shotguns with pel-
lets, assault rifles, helicopters, tear gas, and they
shot demonstrators in the face. One of the first
victims was indigenous worker, Antonio Smith, 19
Radio Temblor (2010). Alert, Panama at War. News
report, July 9, 2010. Panama. Internet.
20 HREV, op. cit.
18 Juan Carlos Varela won the presidency in May 2014.
Protest Spreads from Bocas del Toro the chorizo law, to take action and join in the call
made by the independent faction, ULIP23 to pro-
News of the popular uprising in Bocas del Toro claim a general strike. Until that time, the lead-
was reported quickly, particularly in the informal ers of CONATO had not even called a meeting
media and through civil society organizations. In of their Council of Delegates. The largest union
order to prevent news from spreading, the Police organization in Panama, constituted by FRE-
took control of the majority of public Internet NADESO, held its own strikes and mass mobili-
access points. The private agencies and private zations independently.
media cautiously reported the events. What little ULIP convened a national meeting when the
reporting there was of the events presented them chorizo law was sent to the National Assembly
as just another protest by union groups. Costa of Representatives and it had a major role in the
Rican television stations focused on tourists from General Strike of Tuesday, July 13. The Union
Costa Rica who were trapped in the province of of Coca Cola workers heeded the call, and com-
the neighboring country, placing little importance pletely paralyzed the company, the teachers’
on the magnitude of the social rebellion and even union and the Construction Union;24 the Authen-
less on the police violence. The electronic social tic Federation of Workers mobilized important
media became the primary tool of solidarity and sectors, notably workers in the dairy processing
information. Social media transmitted news and company, La Estrella Azul and Cemento Panamá.
expressions of support. In some Central Ameri- In the rest of the country the strike was not ef-
can cities, there were demonstrations in front of fective, with the exception of Bocas del Toro, al-
the Panamanian embassy, demanding that the though there were protest marches.
Panamanian government end the repression.
Television newscasts and print media in Central
America ignored the actions in solidarity and A Partial, Fragile Victory
continued giving very sparse information. How-
ever, political parties on the left, civil society, and The response to the call to strike was very par-
union organizations in the region attempted to tial, but two relative political triumphs attribut-
break the information blockade, using the means able to the Panamanian popular movements are
at their disposal. noteworthy:25 the entry onto the scene of indus-
The inspiring resistance of the people of trial workers who had not mobilized in years and
Bocas del Toro and the ineptitude of the Demo- the halting of the antipopular offensive waged by
cratic Change government in dealing with the the business government, which was obliged to
situation garnered the sympathy of majority of postpone implementation of the so-called chorizo
the Panamanian people. The national union lead- law and agree to a national commission to revise
ership, fearful at first and more concerned about the legislation. Beyond the fact that the commis-
their relative power, had no choice but to call for sion was a demobilizing factor and posed the
a general strike, which was partially observed, danger of legitimizing the law, the government
but with strong participation from key sectors. It intended to implement it immediately to disman-
is notable that the CTRP21 itself waited until July tle the union movement and eradicate resistance
9 to call a meeting of its Counsel of Delegates, to its neoliberal policies. The government led by
despite the fact that SITRAIBANA is affiliated
with this labor confederation. The insurgent
strike in Bocas del Toro forced the leadership of 23
Unidad de Lucha Integral del Pueblo (United People’s
CONATO,22 despite its denouncement against Struggle).
24 SUNTRACS.
25 Regarding popular movements see: Camacho, Daniel

21 Workers’ Central of the Republic of de Panama. and Menjívar, Rafael (1989) Los movimientos populares
22 National Council of Organized Workes. en América Latina. Edit. Siglo XXI. México.
174 G. Beluche V.
Martinelli received a short term setback (though anism of some of its most important leaders (a
it was not defeated). The neoliberal government trend which has continued through the May 2014
experienced deteriorating popular support and elections).
paid a political cost for its clumsy handling of the Nothing will be the same as before the Bocas
crisis. The public opinion firm Dichter y Neira, del Toro revolt, but the government can recover
with a poll conducted in early July showed a fall its ability to maneuver to the extent the opposi-
of 14 % in President Martinelli’s approval rat- tion allows it. The Panamanian social and popu-
ing. Although it stayed above 50 %, it reflects a lar movements were strengthened, but if they do
sizeable reduction since it went down from the not build their own political instruments and they
comfortable 80 % level where it was prior. When remain in splintered struggles, there could be a
asked if they would elect him president again, constitutional reform intended to promote the
60 % said no,26 “because he has not kept his cam- reelection of Martinelli or other alternative busi-
paign promises.” To the foregoing must be added nessmen.
the rejection of the population of almost the en- Nor can we discount the deepening of the
tire cabinet, especially the Minister of Labor and contradictions of the impromptu government al-
the Minister of Security. liance, stimulated by the need of the Panamañista
The new political context, created by the Party to avoid discrediting itself. The coming
Bocas del Toro uprising and its associated pro- popular struggles and mobilizations may widen
tests in the rest of the country, did not deepen those splits or, alternatively, the lack of unity and
the crisis of government because on the streets demobilization could have the effect of scarring
in the middle of the confrontation, there were over those wounds.
no visible alternatives with mass influence. The
discontent due to the political–economic situa-
tion that the great majority of Panamanians live Space for a Popular Political
in is still lacking channels of organized political Alternative
expression, perceived as an option (with the pos-
sibility of vying for power) that is different from Years after the Bocas del Toro crisis, the repres-
the traditional parties. As Martinelli assumed the sion committed during the uprising remained
presidency by presenting himself as the alterna- with impunity, while corruption is rampant and
tive for change, some populist measures helped there is no separation of powers of the State. The
him solidify his image. But if economic growth government maintains support among the middle
does not result in improvements in the quality of class and in the rural areas, the popular sectors
life and well-being of the popular classes, the dis- remain discontented, but the lack of alternatives
content will likely continue to exist. All indica- encourages a return to calm. The passage of time
tions are that the government aims at furthering and the passivity of the opposition from the left
the current trend toward concentration of wealth, have been the best allies of Martinelli, who con-
which, along with the discredit and internal crisis tinued to implement his economic plan. The PRD
of the PRD,27 opens opportunities for an alter- is not dead, but for now it has not recovered from
native from the Panamanian left, which has not its internal crisis and it continues to pay for it
managed to come together because of the sectari- after many years of governing in the interests of
large capital, which is the winner in the neolib-
26 Curiously, this information was removed from the Web
eral model. The Panameñista Party is a member
site the second day the results were presented. of the government and won the presidential elec-
27 Revolutionary Democratic Party, opposition force and tions in 2014. There remains an opportunity for
primary component of the bitartisanship that has charac- the creation of an alternative political option—a
terized the model of domination in Panama during the last visible one with influence of important segments
20 years. of the worker and popular movements in the form
of a broad front.
References HREV. (2010). Informe sobre la violación de los derechos

humanos en Changuinola. 7 al 11 de julio de 2010.
Human Rigths Everywhere. Panama.
Almeida, P. (2014). Mobilizing Democracy: Globaliza- Partido Alternativa Popular. (2009). Balance de las elec-
tion and Citizen Protest. Baltinore: Johns Hopkins ciones. Panama: Internet.
University Press. Partido Alternativa Popular. (2010). Situación nacional.
Camacho, D., & Menjívar, R. (Coordinadores) (1989). Directorio Político Nacional. Panama: Internet.
Los movimientos populares en América Latina. Mex- Radio Temblor. (2010). Alerta, Panamá en pie de lucha.
ico: Editorial Siglo XXI, Universidad de Las Naciones News report July 9, 2010. Panama. Internet.
Unidas. Vázquez, P. (2009). La derrota del PRD en las elecciones
ECLAC. (2008). Anuario Estadístico de CEPAL. Chile. no significa acabar con la política de hambre. Pan-
Gandásegui, M. (2009). Análisis de las elecciones. Pan- ama: Internet.
ama: Internet.
Part V
Urban-Based Movements in South
America
It Takes Two to Tango:
Students, Political Parties, 13
and Protest in Chile
(2005–2013)
Marisa von Bülow and Germán Bidegain Ponte
Introduction and political actors in general. In spite of the

war of numbers—the government and the police
In 2013, one of the key issues under debate during downplayed participation, while activists did the
the Chilean Presidential election was educational exact opposite—there is a general consensus that
policy. The winner, former President Michelle these have been the largest demonstrations in
Bachelet, campaigned on the promise to promote Chile since the transition to democracy in 1990
a very profound reform of the educational sys- (Segovia and Gamboa 2012; Somma 2012). Pub-
tem, including the unheard of promise to “ad- lic opinion polls showed that the majority of re-
vance decidedly toward universal gratuity.”1 Not spondents supported the street protests, that edu-
coincidentally, in the previous 2 years massive cation was among the public policy arenas that
protests, led by university students organizations, most worried Chileans, and that a meager 14 %
called for profound changes to the educational of those surveyed thought the government was
system, in a surge of mobilization that surprised doing a good or very good job on education.2
both the activists that coordinated these protests This chapter presents an analysis of this im-
portant movement, going back in time to explain
its development from 2005 onwards. It pays
Marisa von Bülow is a political science professor at the
University of Brasilia in Brazil and a researcher at the special attention to the relationship between
Pontificia Universidad Católica in Chile. Germán Bide- the student movement and the political system.
gain Ponte is a Ph.D. candidate at the Political Science More specifically, it presents an analysis about
Institute at PUC-Chile. its changing relationship with political parties.
By doing so, it seeks not only to contribute to the
1
See the section on education of the Government Pro-
gram presented during the campaign, available at http:// 2
According to the public opinion surveys conducted by
michellebachelet.cl/programa/, esp. p. 17. the Center for Public Studies (Centro de Estudios Públi-
cos—CEP) at the end of 2010, 38 % of those surveyed
thought that education was one of three key public policy
areas in which the government should focus its efforts.
M. von Bülow () This percentage increased to 44 % at the height of the pro-
Political Science Institute, University of Brasilia, Brazil tests (June–July 2011), losing in relevance only to securi-
Political Science Institute, Pontifícia Universidad ty issues (47 %). Data comparing answers to this question
Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile since 1990 shows that education had never been consid-
e-mail: marisavonbulow@gmail.com ered so important by so many Chileans. In mid-2013, on
the eve of the Presidential elections, education remained
G. Bidegain Ponte the key policy area for 44 % of those surveyed. At the end
Political Science Institute, Pontificia Universidad of 2011, over 60 % of respondents supported the organiza-
Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile tion of street protests by students. See the data available in
e-mail: germanbidegain@gmail.com www.cepchile.cl (accessed 08/31/2013).
180 M. von Bülow and G. Bidegain Ponte
specific debates about social movements in Chile the Chilean educational model, which, as we will
but also to the ongoing discussion in the social see, is one of the world’s most market-oriented
movement literature about the relationships be- systems. Thus, not unlike other recent protests
tween social movements and political parties in in the region, the Chilean student movement has
democratic contexts. mobilized around a master frame (Benford and
The relevance of the interaction between po- Snow 2000) that links neoliberal policies to in-
litical parties and social movements has been equality and injustice.
pointed out by many scholars in Latin America However, in countries such as Bolivia, Ec-
as well as elsewhere (Goldstone 2003; Van Cott uador, or Brazil, to give only three examples, at
2005; Arce 2010; Almeida 2010). In spite of these least some social movements have turned to elec-
contributions, there remains much to be learned toral politics and to political parties to gain the le-
about the ways in which these interactions occur verage needed to induce change (Almeida 2010).
and their changes through time. While we agree In spite of significant tensions and ambiguities in
with the assertion that boundaries between “insti- these countries, the center-to-left coalitions that
tutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics” are came to power in recent years have strong ties to
fuzzy and permeable (Goldstone 2003, p. 2), we social movements (Silva 2009). In Chile, though,
also argue that such a broad statement can only the student movement did not lead to stronger al-
be a point of departure. Most interesting to un- liances with political parties—quite the contrary.
derstand are the variations in this permeability, We show in this chapter that, between 2005
which depend on the specific political context and 2013, there has been a growing distancing
as well as on the strategies of actors. It has been between this social movement and Chilean po-
argued that “The party acts as a bridge between litical parties. Most especially, this process has
society and government, and it is a bridge that affected the relationship with center-to-left and
movement strategists cannot resist attempting to leftist parties that had maintained a strong pres-
cross” (Maguire 1995, p. 202). The case of the ence within the movement up until then. Un-
Chilean student movement shows that this is not doubtedly, this is part of a more general change
necessarily true. Walls separating social move- in the interactions between political parties and
ments and political parties can be built, demol- civil society. As several authors have pointed out,
ished, and again built on a different basis. It also in spite of the historical continuity and strength
shows that the possibility to cross that bridge can of its political party system, Chile has come to
create internal tensions within the movement, suffer from the syndrome that has also affected
with important consequences in terms of its strat- its neighbors, which is characterized by a grow-
egies and actions. ing distance between political parties and the
The student mobilizations are similar to other society, in parallel with an increased criticism
recent protests in Latin America to the extent that of electoral processes and representative institu-
they have put front and center the demand for a tions (Roberts 1998; Delamaza 2005; Altman and
greater role of the state in public policy making Luna 2011; Luna 2011).
and, more specifically, on regulating the role of However, while this general process is cer-
the market (Almeida 2006, 2007; Roberts 2008; tainly important, in this chapter we argue that the
Silva 2009; Bellinger and Arce 2011). Through changes in the relationship between the student
time, the movement has gone from presenting a movement and political parties are also the result
specific critique of the loans and grants system to of deliberate attempts by groups of activists to
increasingly broad demands that call for the end build a more autonomous movement, which have
of profit-making in the educational system, egali- had important consequences both within and out-
tarian access to education, the assurance of qual- side the movement. Internally, it entailed a loss by
ity in tertiary programs, and the internal democ- political parties of leadership positions in student
ratization of universities. These demands repre- organizations, and a strengthening of groups that
sent a strong challenge to the basic principles of are located to the left of the ideological spectrum
13 It Takes Two to Tango: Students, Political Parties, and Protest in Chile (2005–2013) 181
but reject any ties to traditional political parties. lyzes the student movement from 2005 to 2013,
Externally, it has meant that political brokers had with a special focus on the massive protests held
to face greater obstacles in their attempts to build in 2006 and especially in 2011. The analysis is
bridges with parliamentarians and government based on interviews with activists, held between
officials, and there is more resistance on the part October 2011 and August 2013,4 as well as on a
of leaders to accept taking part in negotiating are- review of documents produced by student orga-
nas with those actors. More generally, for many nizations and texts written by leaders.
student leaders the critique of the educational
system went hand-in-hand with a rejection of in-
stitutional politics and, more specifically, of the Education as a Right or as a Consumer
representative channels of democracy. Good? The Educational System and
This has not been a consensual process, but the Student Movement Demands
rather a very divisive and even contradictory one.
In fact, we can point to various leaders of the ¡Lo que el pueblo necesita es educación gratuita,
movement who publicly assumed and defended porque el pueblo está cansado de las leyes del
their membership to political parties. Neverthe- mercado!
less, these leaders were not a majority, and they (“What people need is free education, because
the people are tired of market laws!”
usually took pains to clarify that they did not act Students’ rhyming chant during the 2011
as party activists, but as representatives of the protests)
movement. In the 2013 elections, a few former
student leaders used the visibility and popularity On July 2011, while students demanded in the
gained during protests to launch successful cam- streets the recognition of education as a citizen’s
paigns for Congress.3 However, as they engaged right, President Piñera publicly declared that ter-
in partisan politics they had to face strong ques- tiary education was a consumer good that should
tioning from fellow activists, who denied them be conceived as a personal investment that im-
their formal support. Thus, in spite of significant proves the prospects of the people who acquire
disagreements within the movement, we show it.5 After several months of protests, this state-
that political parties are less present in student or- ment showed the abysmal gap that separated the
ganizations than in the past and argue that, even government and the mobilized students. In order
in the cases of the ones that still have influence, to understand this polarization, it is important to
their power has weakened in the period studied. understand the basic characteristics of the Chil-
This chapter is divided in two sections. The ean educational system.
first presents the demands of the student move- The current educational system was estab-
ment in light of the current situation of the edu- lished in the 1980s, during the military dictator-
cational system in Chile. It shows that in spite of ship (1973–1989). Following an economically
significant progress in terms of access to educa- liberal credo, the military regime made deep
tion, there are important problems related to the changes to the traditional educational system,
quality of education that unevenly affect different one of the main goals of which was to promote
socioeconomic groups. The second section ana-
4
Between February and November of 2013 we conduct-
3 The best-known examples are of the most visible 2011 ed 30 interviews with leaders (those that held key elected
leaders, both of whom won seats in the Chamber of Depu- positions in students’ organizations in 2006, 2010, 2011,
ties in 2013: Camila Vallejo, of the Communist Party, and 2012 and 2013) in the cities of Santiago, Concepción, An-
Giorgio Jackson, for a new independent movement, Revo- tofagasta, and Punta Arenas.
lución Democrática (Democratic Revolution). Besides 5 See: http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
Vallejo and Jackson, two other important student leaders
2011/07/19/493428/presidente-pinera-afirma-que-
were elected: Gabriel Boric from another independent
la-educacion-es-un-bien-de-consumo.html (accessed
movement, Izquierda Autónoma (Autonomous Left), and
08/21/2013).
Karol Cariola, also from the Communist Party.
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Fig. 13.1 Share of private expenditure on tertiary institutions, 2010 (% of total). (Source: Our own elaboration, based
on data published in OECD 2013)
a greater participation of the private sector in the 7.78 % came from other private entities.6 These
provision of educational services. After the 1990 data reflect the fact that since the reforms of the
democratic transition, the governments led by the 1980s, there is no free tertiary education in Chile.
center–left coalition Concertación de Partidos por The 2013 OECD Education at a Glance Report
la Democracia (hereafter Concertación) invested proposes a taxonomy that takes into account the
more state resources in the educational system, cost of the tuition fees and the financial support
aiming at improving the quality of the education available for the students in different countries of
as well as extending its coverage (Arellano 2004; the world. Chile is classified as part of the group
Donoso Díaz 2005). However, the basic structure of “countries with high tuition fees but less-de-
set by the dictatorship, which privileged market veloped student support systems” (OECD 2013,
provision and private funding, was maintained p. 228).
(Cox 2003, p. 16). There are two main financial support tools in
The changes made during the democratic place for low- and middle-income households:
period have yielded mixed results. On the one grants and loans. The grants are usually condi-
hand, they have been highly successful in terms tioned on the resources of the households and
of coverage. In 1990, only 52 % of the popula- the scores of the student in the university entry
tion between 20 and 24 years old had completed exam. In 2009, only 13.8 % of the students in ter-
high school. As of 2006, this percentage had tiary education institutions received some kind
risen to 80 % (OECD and IBRD 2009, p. 76). of grant (OECD 2009, p. 106).7 With respect to
With respect to tertiary education (universities, loans, there are two main state supported options.
technical colleges and post high school train- The most attractive one for the students (with
ing), the enrollment numbers are impressive as lower interest rates and softer conditions) is the
well: while in 1980 there were less than 120,000 Solidarity Loan ( Crédito Solidario, CS). None-
students (OECD and IBRD 2009), by 2011 there theless, only the students enrolled in 25 “tradi-
were over 1 million (OECD 2013). On the other tional” universities (the higher education institu-
hand, the country has persistently failed to ditions that existed before the reforms of the 1980s,
minish the inequality in access to high-quality which are also the most prestigious and the ones
education, and it has one of the lowest average
public expenditures for tertiary institutions in the
OECD (OECD 2013). Accordingly, as shown in 6 See the data available in http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
Fig. 13.1, it is the OECD country in which pri- 888932846975.

vate funds account for the highest share of expen- 7 Scholarships usually do not cover all the tuition fees.
ditures in tertiary institutions. In 2010, 70.12 % According to the OECD, “It is estimated that the scholar-
ships today cover between 63 and 70 % of the actual cost
of expenditures in tertiary institutions came from
of tuition fees. For the rest, students must take out loans”
households, 22.11 % was public expenditure, and (OECD 2009, p. 106).
ϯϱϬϬϬϬ
Number of beneficiaries
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Fig. 13.2 Number of beneficiaries by type of loan per year (2000–2012). CAE Crédito con Aval del Estado, CS Crédito
Solidario. (Source: Our own elaboration with Ministry of Education data, MINEDUC 2011b, 2013)
that demand the highest entry exam scores) have were very successful in rallying support around a
access to this program.8 The second loan pro- strong critique of the role of the market in educa-
gram was established in 2005, as a result of a tion. This was done by focusing initially on the
partnership between the Chilean state and private high levels of indebtedness of students and their
banks (but with worse terms than the CS loan). families.
This new loan, the Government Guaranteed Loan In direct connection with the critiques students
( Crédito con Aval del Estado, CAE), is available made of the financing system was the demand for
for all students, and it quickly became highly enforcement of the law that forbids universities
popular. In 2009, after 3 years of implementation, from making a profit. In fact, the most important
the number of CAE debtors was higher than the slogan of the 2011 student movement was “Say
number of debtors of the traditional CS loan (see no to profit.”10 Profit making was presented by
Fig. 13.2). student leaders as one of the core problems of the
Thus, the expansion of tertiary enrollment in educational system, one that was viewed as both
Chile occurred in parallel with the growing in- immoral and illegal. There are three types of ter-
debtedness of large sectors of the society. If we tiary institutions in the Chilean higher education-
only take into account the students that used the al system: universities, professional institutes—
CS and CAE loans, by 2012 almost half of all Institutos Profesionales (IPs) and technical train-
students were financing their education through ing centers—Centros de Formación Técnica
these two state-supported loans, a number that (CFTs). According to Chilean law, universities
is even higher if we add the students that con- are prohibited from profiting from their activi-
tracted private loans.9 The student organizations ties. Nonetheless, it is widely known in Chile that
many private universities do in fact earn a profit
8 Between 1994 and 2010, over half a million students
(Mönckeberg 2007), a situation that has been tac-
used the CS to pay for their education (MINEDUC 2011a,
itly accepted by all governments since the 1980s,
p. 11). regardless of political orientation. In the students’
9
It is very hard to know the exact number of private loans view, universities should reinvest all their profits
contracted, but the number is high. In only one case, of the in order to improve their quality. These two key
CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción de demands—a review of financing schema and the
Chile) loan, in 2012 there were 106,000 students indebted
enforcement of the prohibition to profit—were
with this type of loan. Information disclosed by the Exec-
utive Vice President of COFO during the the 11/06/2013 complemented by a third one which was to guar-
session of the Education, Sport and Recreation committee antee access to high-quality education for all.
of the House of Representatives. The session transcrip-
tion is available online: http://www.camara.cl/pdf.aspx?
prmID=15577&prmtipo=ACTACOMISION (accessed
08/09/2013). 10 “No al lucro” in Spanish.
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WƌŝǀĂƚĞĨĞĞͲƉĂǇŝŶŐƐĐŚŽŽůƐ WƌŝǀĂƚĞƐƵďƐŝĚŝǌĞĚƐĐŚŽŽůƐ
DƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůƐĐŚŽŽůƐ
Fig. 13.3 PSU scores by type of school per year (2004– ment of Evaluation, Measurement and Educational Regis-
2012). (Source: Authors’ own elaboration using data from try (DEMRE) is the institution in charge of the PSU test.
the Department of Evaluation, Measurement and Educa- The graph is based on data from their yearly statistical
tional Registry, DEMRE-University of Chile). (Depart- reports, available at www.demre.cl)
The inequality produced (and reproduced) lar sectors to higher education, often citing data
by the educational system can be presented as a from OECD reports. According to them, the PSU
two step process. First, primary and secondary system does not select the best students, but the
institutions segregate according to the economic wealthiest ones.
level of the families: poor students go to public From the 1990s onward, successive govern-
schools, middle-income groups attend publicly- ments have made efforts to enhance the quality of
subsidized private schools, and the high-income tertiary institutions. In 1999, the National Under-
sectors attend private fee-paying schools (Cox graduate Accreditation Commission was created,
2003; García Huidobro 2007).11 The second replaced in 2006 by the National Accreditation
consecutive step regards access to higher edu- Commission and the National System of Qual-
cation. In Chile, the “University Selection Test” ity Assurance of Superior Education. This system
(“Prueba de Selección Universitaria”, PSU) is does not mandate institutions to be accredited,
an entry test used by the best universities. The but accreditation entails some benefits12 and has
higher the score a student has in the PSU, the become a common practice among universities.
better the tertiary education he/she can choose. In 2011, 92 % of the universities were accredited.
The problem with the PSU selection system is The technical schools, which can grant profes-
that the scores obtained reflect the differences in sional and technical degrees, have a very differ-
the quality of the education that schools provide ent situation. Only 39 % of the IPs and 19 % of
(see Fig. 13.3). As the poorest strata go to public the CFTs were accredited in 2011 (Jiménez de
schools, they get lower PSU scores. The doors of la Jara, Lagos Rojas and Durán del Fierro 2011,
the best-ranked universities and technical schools p. 100). The quality of the education provided by
thus remain closed to them. Student leaders ar- those institutions was severely criticized by the
gued repeatedly that this was the hidden reality students, and a mandatory accreditation system
behind the celebrated increased access of popu- was demanded. Moreover, even if almost all uni-
versities are accredited, the students argued that
11 According to the Ministry of Education (2012), in 2011 the accreditation system has not been transparent
39 % of the students were enrolled in public schools, 52 % enough and, therefore, did not assure the quality
in private subsidized schools and 7 % in private paying
fees schools. The remaining 2 % of students were enrolled
in secondary institutions financed by the state but admin- 12 For instance, only the accredited institution’s students
istrated by private actors that provide technical and pro- can benefit from some government supported loans.
fessional qualification.
of the accredited institutions. Those suspicions nated by the authorities and in many cases the
were proven true in 2012, when a dramatic cor- right of association is denied (CONFECH 2011).
ruption scandal erupted that directly involved the The student movement denounces this practice as
president of the National Accreditation Commis- unconstitutional and the result of the deregulation
sion, who was accused of receiving bribes. As a of the university system. This situation accounts
result, he quit his post13 and the Ministry of Edu- for the many obstacles that must be overcome be-
cation announced a profound reform of the ac- fore even thinking in the possibility of establish-
creditation system.14 ing co-governance in Chilean higher education.
Finally, a very important component of the
educational reform demanded by the students
was the democratization of the higher education From “Betrayal” to Distancing:
institutions. The Chilean student movement has Students and Political Parties
traditionally demanded participatory processes
that foster the students’ involvement in the deci- In order to understand the students’ mobilizations
sion-making structures of their respective institu- and their relationship with the Chilean party sys-
tions. The traditional far-reaching demand of the tem, it is essential to present a very brief over-
movement is the institutionalization of co-gov- view of two important features of the country’s
ernment, which would assure the participation of political system. First, the electoral rules put in
the students and university workers and their right place by the military dictatorship present a strong
to vote in the decisive issues of the universities incentive toward the concentration of actors in
and technical schools, along with the faculty and two electoral alliances. Not only that, but the so-
administration. The current legal frame, inherited called binomial system in place for parliamen-
from the dictatorship, explicitly forbids all high- tary elections stipulates that, to win the two seats
er education institutions to give representatives available in each district, the most-voted coali-
of the student and university worker sectors the tion must receive twice the number of votes of
right to vote in their governmental bodies.15 In the second majority. Therefore, in the great ma-
fact, the current reality of the student organiza- jority of the districts each coalition wins one seat,
tions in the Chilean higher education system is splitting the final composition of the Congress in
quite far from the students’ demands. While the two parts. The electoral rules in place not only
“traditional” universities allow students to elect tend to overrepresent the first minority in Con-
representatives and form student federations, in gress but they also seriously restrict access to the
some universities the representatives are desig- political parties not included in one of the two
coalitions (Nohlen 2000; Navia 2008).
The coalitions that resulted from these rules
13 See: http://ciperchile.cl/2012/03/30/eugenio-diaz-re- are the “Concertación de Partidos por la Democ-
nuncio-a-la-cna/ (accessed 08/27/2013).
racia” (center to left parties) and the “Alianza por
14
On January 2013 the Executive sent a bill to Congress,
Chile” (center to right parties). Between 1990
which proposed a reform of the accreditation system of
tertiary education institutions. This bill is currently under and 2010, the Concertación won four presidential
debate. See: http://www.gob.cl/destacados/2013/01/08/ elections in a row. In 2010, the Alianza won the
presidente-pinera-firmo-proyecto-de-ley-que-crea- presidential elections for the first time since the
nuevo-sistema-de-acreditacion-para-la-educacion-sup.
country’s transition to democracy, but in 2013 it
htm (accessed 05/09/2013), and http://www.biobiochile.
cl/2012/12/17/ministro-beyer-pondra-suma-urgencia-a- lost again, this time to a wider alliance of politi-
proyecto-que-busca-reformar-sistema-de-acreditacion. cal parties that included the ones in the Concert-
shtml (accessed 08/27/2013). ación plus the Chilean Communist Party. This
15 DFL 2 2010, articles 56 (letter e), 67 (letter e) and 75
coalition, called Nueva Mayoría (New Majority),
(letter e). This was a reaction of the dictatorship against allowed Michelle Bachelet to win the Presidency
the institution of co-government in the universities in the
1968 Reform. once again, this time with a more left-wing plat-
form that included, among its main proposals, the ist president Michelle Bachelet, and catapulting
educational reform and a new constitution. the educational system to the top of the political
A second key characteristic of the political agenda.
system is that there are stringent rules regarding We argue that it is impossible to understand
the number of votes needed to make legislative the relationship between political parties and the
changes, which represent an important obstacle 2011 social movement without considering what
to reforms. Before abandoning power, the mili- happened in this period. However, in many as-
tary government promulgated constitutional laws pects the Penguin Revolution was very different
in strategic areas, including education. Changing from the protests that rocked the country 5 years
these laws require what is known in Chile as “su- later. First of all, it was led by junior high and
permajorities.” In practice, these voting require- high school students, in contrast to the university
ments, together with the electoral rules explained students that took the forefront in 2011. In fact,
above, ensure that each coalition can act as veto mobilized students were nicknamed “penguins”
player to any reform of the c onstitution. after the black-and-white uniforms they had to
While the Concertación has traditionally ar- wear for school. Thus, its demands had a some-
gued that it was unable to do substantial educa- what different focus: they called for the end to
tional reforms during their governments because public subsidies of private schools, the demu-
of the right-wing parties’ veto capacity, the stu- nicipalization16 of the system, and free public
dent movement progressively realized that within transportation. Furthermore, although they were
the Concertación itself there was a lot of resis- able to promote massive mobilizations, these
tance to some of its key demands. As we will were more limited in time. The wave of mobili-
argue below, the 2006 experience was an im- zations that began in 2011 has been much more
portant landmark in this process of learning that sustained and widespread.
whichever coalition is in power, broad changes Most importantly for this chapter, in 2006 at
to the educational system would be very hard to least part of the student leadership was closely
achieve without also making changes to the elec- aligned with political parties of the then ruling
toral system and the political party system. coalition. Parties such as the Socialist and the
Christian Democratic Parties, the largest in the
Concertación, had close ties with the student
The Student Movement in Time: movement, dating from before the dictatorship.
Back to 2006 As we will argue below, the gap between the
student movement and these traditional political
Bachelet, ¿estás con nosotros? (“Bachelet, are you parties became larger in 2011–2013 than it was
with us?” – during the 2006 protests.
students´ slogan, paraphrasing Presidential For the purposes of the analysis presented
candidate in this chapter, we will focus on this last differ-
Bachelet´s slogan “I am with you”)
ence. At first glance, the 2006 mobilizations are
The “Penguin Revolution” was not even close to a clear-cut case of a social movement that tries
really being a revolutionary movement. Its name to take advantage of the opening of the political
has to do less with impacts on public policy and opportunity structure. The election of a Social-
more with the surprising entrance of junior high
and high school students on the political scene,
16 The 1980s military reforms decentralized primary
an actor that nobody thought had an extensive
and secondary education. This process is known in Chile
mobilizing power. Between March and May of
as the “municipalización” of the education, because the
2006, massive protests called for changes in the municipalities became administratively responsible of
educational law, putting great pressure on the the schools located in their jurisdictions. The demand for
then newly elected government of the social- “demunicipalization” aimed at reinforcing the role of the
central government in public education provision.
ist president, who based her 2005 campaign dis- tional system. In 2007, the government sent a
course on the need for greater citizen participa- legislative proposal to Congress that did include
tion, was perceived by many Penguin leaders as the end of public funding for private profit-mak-
a positive moment, in which there would be less ing schools, among other changes. However, this
repression. At the same time, the presence of al- proposal was strongly criticized not only by the
lies in the government allowed for greater open- opposition but also by members of the govern-
ings for change (Donoso 2013a, p. 21). In fact, ing coalition. When a new educational law was
many students perceived that the government finally approved (the “General Law of Educa-
really wanted to make changes, but it was lim- tion”) with votes from both coalitions, in 2009,
ited to what it could do because of the strength of it did not include any of the key demands of the
the opposition in Parliament, and that the student Penguins’ Revolution. In fact, throughout 2008
movement could assist by exercising pressure students protested against the bill, but were un-
from below.17 able to reproduce the massiveness of the 2006
After several weeks of denial, in which the protests. Student leaders involved at the time tell
government either ignored the protests or criti- this story as one of frustration and, most impor-
cized them as “undemocratic” and violent,18 on tantly, of “betrayal” by those they perceived as
June of 2006 it reacted proactively, accepting political allies.
some of the more minor student demands, and Although the main leaders in 2011–2013 were
proposing the creation of a Presidential Advi- not the same ones that led the 2006 mobiliza-
sory Commission on the Quality of Education tions, they were socialized in the experience of
to discuss a broader reform proposal. The large the Penguins’ movement, and many participated
Commission announced by President Bachelet personally in both waves of protest. Evidence
counted 73 members, 12 of which represented of this continuity comes not only from the in-
student organizations.19 Whether or not to take terviews we have undertaken but also from the
part in this commission was a matter of strong documents and speeches that show the extent to
contention within the student movement. In the which the movement’s current vision has been
end, the majority decided to participate.20 shaped by the previous experience. As the presi-
However, a few days before the presenta- dent of one of the most important university fed-
tion of the Commission’s Report, in December erations in 2006 argued: “I don’t think I will ever
of 2006, the students’ representatives withdrew forgive Michelle Bachelet for the approval of the
from it, arguing that the text did not reflect their General Law of Education, and the picture of the
call for a clear and overall reform of the educa- presidents of the Concertación and the rightwing
with their hands in the air celebrating the agree-
17
ment. I mention this because in the political de-
Personal interview with Daniel Carrillo, 2006 high
school student leader, Concepción, August 30, 2013.
bate not only arguments and reason have weight,
18 but also experience, trust…”(Grau 2013). An-
President Bachelet’s first speech to the nation, in May
of 2011, ignored the students’ demands and focused on a other important leader in 2011 remembers the
critique of violence during the protests. same picture, which was taken when the new law
19
See: http://www.dii.uchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/ was approved: “Hand in hand… the presidents
2011/03/08_LA_TERCERA_Alto-nuuumero-de-inte- of the right-wing and the Concertación political
grantes-dificultaraaa-trabajo-de-Consejo-Asesor-de-Edu-
parties… This picture represented the answer of
caciooon.pdf (accessed 18/01/2014).
20 the political party system to 2006, and it had a
The final composition of the commission counted
with 82 members, 16 of them were student representa- profound impact among students, condition-
tives. See the final report of the commission, available at: ing the relationship that they would establish
http://www.facso.uchile.cl/psicologia/epe/_documentos/ with the political system in the following years”
GT_cultura_escolar_politica_educativa/recursos%20bib- (Figueroa 2012, p. 81).
liograficos/articulos%20relacionados/consejoasesorpresi-
dencialparalacalidaddelaeducacion(2006)informefinal.
pdf (accessed 18/01/2014).
The Student Movement used intensively, reaching their height in August

and the Political Parties in 2011 of that year.21
To understand the relationship between stu-
El pueblo, unido, avanza sin partido dent leaders and Piñera’s government, it is im-
(“The people, united, moves forward without portant to consider that none of the parties in the
political parties”, governmental coalition had any kind of represen-
Students’ chant during the 2011 protests, a vari- tation within the most important student orga-
ant of the famous chant of the early 1970s—“El
Pueblo Unido Jamás Será Vencido”) nizations. In Chile, the students of the so-called
“traditional universities” elect federations, which
In the beginning of 2011, a new wave of pro- meet regularly in an assembly: the Confedera-
tests was triggered by the delay in the payment tion of Chilean Students (Confederación de Es-
of public grants and by the outcry of students tudiantes de Chile, CONFECH). While each
of a private university (Universidad Central de university federation is autonomous, the CON-
Chile, UCEM), who mobilized against a reform FECH is an articulating space for strategic de-
that would, in practice, legalize profit-making cision making of the movement as a whole. At
practices in that institution. During the months the beginning of 2011, only one federation had
of June and July, these protests gathered an in- a right-wing president, but once the mobilization
creasing number of participants. Between May of gained importance this president was overthrown
2011 and September of 2013, a total of 23 mas- and replaced by a new leader, who was critical of
sive protests were held in Santiago and in sev- the government.22 Thus, the Alianza had no influ-
eral other major cities throughout the country. ence on the movements’ internal decision-mak-
An unknown number of universities and schools ing processes nor much access to information on
were paralyzed by students who occupied dozens what was being discussed within the student or-
of buildings for long periods of time throughout ganizations. Moreover, student organizations ad-
Chile. Although the peak of this movement was opted a defensive attitude toward the government
in July-August of 2011, mobilizations continued because they expected it to deepen the market
throughout 2012 and 2013, with promises of oriented focus of the Chilean educational model.
more to come in the near future. The 2010 president of the Universidad de Chile
At first, President Piñera’s reaction was to student federation put it this way: “When the
“wait and see,” betting that the movement would right won [the elections], this provoked a total
wear out eventually. However, as the president’s change in our agenda. We wanted to be in an of-
approval rates plummeted and support for the fensive stance but we had to assume a defensive
movement rose in public opinion polls, the Ex- one because the government arrived with a priva-
ecutive power tried to adjust its strategy to a “car- tization agenda.”23
rot and stick” one. In July of 2011, in a speech In contrast, during the previous Concertación
on national television, the President proposed a governments, that coalition had always counted
series of changes in educational policy. On that with allies inside the student movement, usually
occasion, he acknowledged the need to improve activists who belonged to the youths of center-to-
quality, access and funding, three cornerstones of left political parties. This meant that the govern-
the movement’s agenda. The President offered
a “Grand Agreement for Education” (GANE),
21 According to official police data, the protests orga-
which included more public funds for education,
an increase in the number of grants, and a decline nized on 4, 18, 24, and 25 of August resulted in 2434
demonstrators arrested (Data provided to the researchers
in interest rates for educational loans. However, by Carabineros de Chile).
the President also referred to the possibility of le- 22 See: http://www.diarioelcentro.cl/?q=noticia&id=6536
galizing profit-making universities. At the same (accessed 05/09/2013).
time, repressive tactics against protestors were 23 Personal interview with Julio Sarmiento, 2010 presi-
dent of the Universidad de Chile Students’ Federation,

Santiago, August 15, 2013.
ment could not only monitor what was happen- during the 2011 events. However, in 2012 even
ing inside the student organizations but also try to the Communist Party’s influence had declined,
influence its decision-making processes. Úrsula having lost many student federations to radical
Schüler, a former high school leader and leader at independent groups.
the Universidad de Chile in 2010, underlined the A moderate student leader that participated in
demobilization capacity of the Concertación, in the CONFECH explains: “There was a shifting
contrast with Piñera’s government: “the [politi- process…. At a time, the Communist youth and
cal] right in Chile… does not even have a direct the moderate independents were a clear majority.
communication line with leaders. The Concert- But as the year advanced, this group progressive-
ación did have that, it had its operatives in the ly retrenched. The Communists lost the control of
meetings (…) individuals that talked directly many of their federations, and the radical groups
to the ministry [of Education]…. If you were a became progressively more influential within the
militant of the Socialist Party, someone from the CONFECH27.” The will to negotiate with the
Socialist Party in the ministry would call and say parties during the conflict and their proximity
‘hey, tell me about the CONFECH meeting’… with the Concertación student leaders were two
and ‘don’t exaggerate, it’s enough’…. The right of the main recurrent arguments used by self-de-
had nothing that could compare to that.” 24 fined independent groups to successfully dispute
However, as argued in the last section, these the Communist presidencies in many federations.
ties weakened or disappeared after the 2006 These independent groups can be subdivided
Penguin Revolution and the approval of the new in two, according to their relationship with po-
educational law in 2009. Thus, although in 2011 litical authorities. The first was integrated by
there were some student leaders that belonged to moderate leaders who believed that it could be
or sympathized with the Concertación parties, desirable to reach agreements with the govern-
they did not have as much leverage as before ment and the opposition. Many of them had been
within the movement. As one of the participants affiliated with Concertación parties in the past,
argued: “I don’t think that in 2011 there was a but became independent as part of the process of
Concertación [within the movement]… There distancing from the coalition. One of these lead-
were only deputies and senators that were closer ers describes his interaction with the Socialist
to the movement, that talked more with Giorgio Party in the context of his campaign for a federa-
[Jackson, president of the Catholic University tion: “(…) the person in charge of the Socialist
Student Federation] and Camila [Vallejo, presi- youth in the universities called me to give me his
dent of the University of Chile Student Federa- support because I was, formally, still a militant.
tion] and with Camilo [Ballesteros, president of I asked him to please not show up nor support
the University of Santiago Student Federation]… me. If he wanted us to win the election, the best
.25” Among the opposition parties, the Commu- thing to do was not to show up—mostly, because
nist Party was undoubtedly the one with the most I did not identify with the party anymore. Plus,
important presence among the student leaders.26 nobody would trust you if you were supported by
Some of the most visible leaders belonged to the a party like the Socialist Party.28”
Communist Youth, and played an important role The second group of independents was
composed of more radical leaders that defined
themselves as “anti-partisan” and progressively
24 Personal interview with Úrsula Schüler, 2009 general
gained space in the CONFECH as the mobiliza-
secretary of the Universidad de Chile Students’ Federa- tions increased and larger sectors of the student
tion, Santiago, June 5, 2013.
25 Personal interview with Julián Parra, 2010 vice presi-
dent of the Universidad Católica Students’ Federation, 27 Personal interview with Sebastián Vielmas, 2011 gen-
Santiago, May 23, 2013. eral secretary of the Universidad Católica Students’ Fed-
26 In the Congress this was a very small party, with 3 eration, Santiago, June 11, 2013.
deputies out of 120 in the House of Representatives and 28
Personal interview with a 2011 student leader.
no Senators.
body were incorporated. Those leaders had a Using the 2006 experience as a mantra, many
very negative perception of all the political par- student leaders emphasized that “there can’t be
ties represented in Congress and tried to avoid negotiation without mobilization30,” that is, that
any possible alliances with them, arguing that they could never accept to demobilize as a con-
the movement could be manipulated. The anti- dition to open a dialogue. The 2006 experience
partisan student sectors are known in Chile as the was also important in the sense that it changed
“ultra,” even if many of their members disagree the perception with respect to whom could be the
with this label and there is an important diversity movements’ allies. According to the student lead-
among them. When asked about the way in which er Sebastián Vielmas, “(…) the 2006 experience
they would prefer to be identified, they provided was a ghost recurrently mentioned by everyone.
different answers: “revolutionary left,” “nontra- In the moments when we were debating about
ditional left,” “anti capitalist left,” “anti neolib- possible dialogue instances, one out of five in-
eral left,” or “non parliamentary left.” In spite of terventions was of someone stating that we could
their diversity, most of these groups are skepti- not be screwed again, as in 2006. (…) Learning
cal about representative institutions and call for has meant a total mistrust.” This mistrust of all
more horizontal organizational arrangements. political authorities often put student leaders
Among them there are libertarians, anarchists, in awkward situations, for example, when they
and those that defend the legacy of revolutionary were photographed with political party officials
groups of the 1960s–1980s. and this led to accusations of “selling out” the
One element that unified all three political movement.31
factions was their perception of Piñera’s govern- As a result, throughout 2011 the student
ment as a threat. Nonetheless, as the 2011 student movement prioritized confrontation, using its
movement started to gain momentum the differ- traditional repertoire of collective action: street
ences among them became increasingly evident. protests and occupation of public buildings and
While the “ultra” groups were vehemently op- schools. Some secondary students also went on
posed to any alliance with political parties, the hunger strikes, a radical tactic that was not sup-
Communists, the pro-Concertación, and the more ported by the entire leadership.
moderate independent sectors wanted to work As the movement gained momentum and pub-
with the opposition, in order to pressure the gov- lic opinion support, it broadened its collective ac-
ernment. The balance of power between those tion frame, focusing on an overall restructuring
two large groups conditioned the strategies of of the educational system as well as on criticisms
the student movement toward the Executive and of the electoral system and on calls for a fiscal
Congress. These tensions and their relevance in reform and for a new Constitution. Faced with an
the definition of the movements’ strategy were Executive power that was unwilling to negotiate
emphasized by the Communist student leader this broadened frame and with an internal debate
Camilo Ballesteros. While he disagrees with the on whether to do so even if there was an oppor-
more radical position toward institutionalized tunity, the student movement turned to the Leg-
politics, when asked what would have happened islative power as a platform from which to give
if those radicalized factions did not have an im- their critiques greater visibility. Such a move pre-
portant role, he answered: “Probably, in the first sented real limits in terms of achieving change,
round of negotiations I would have taken what because the possibility of getting the necessary
they offered me, I would have accepted that. But
in the end, the ‘ultra’ didn’t allow us to do that…
in the end, besides the role played by each one dents’ Federation, Santiago, August 15, 2013.
30 Personal interview with Pablo Iriarte, 2011 president
of us, what happened, the good and the bad, hap-
of the Universidad Católica del Norte Students’ Federa-
pened because we were all there29.” tion, Antofagasta, July 15, 2013.
31 Personal interview with Sebastián Vielmas, 2011 gen-
29 Personal interview with Camilo Ballesteros, 2010– eral secretary of the Universidad Católica Students’ Fed-
2011 president of the the Universidad de Santiago Stu- eration, Santiago, June 11, 2013.
votes for a reform was very slim, but by partici- stated before the 2013 elections: “The fact that
pating in public debates with parliamentarians we did not negotiate allowed the debate to remain
on issues that ranged from quality of education open which, in turn, permitted our demands to
to the next year’s national budget, they were reach higher levels (…) today they are part of the
able to have new “windows for the movement” Presidential debate (…) We are in a process in
(Figueroa, p. 144–145). Furthermore, these ini- which we can still continue to accumulate, de-
tiatives did not imply changes in the position of nounce and expose” (Donoso 2013b, pp. 27, 28).
rejection of alliances with political officials. In a meeting of the Confederation of Students’
In 2012, student leaders recognized that “we Federations, held in April of 2012, it was decided
have not been strong enough”32 to achieve the that the movement would think in terms of short
movement’s goals. In fact, the overall evaluation and long-term goals, “with the understanding that
of that year was a very pessimistic one, as well reaching short term goals does not mean the end
as the prospects for the future of the movement. of the students’ struggle.”34
Although the movement had been able to put Other activists decided to turn to electoral
education in the center of the political debate and politics, and, as a result, four well-known 2010–
had even led to the fall of Education Ministers, 2012 student leaders were elected for Parliament.
the only concrete change in public policy was the Not a small feat, considering the closeness of the
diminishing of interest rates charged in student Chilean political system that we described above.
loans. Because of the increasingly ambitious de- However, this outcome does not contradict the
mands, which aimed at a structural transforma- argument that we have put forward in this chapter
tion of the educational system, this change has about the increased distancing between the move-
not been considered by the student organizations ment and political parties. Rather, it demonstrates
as an important victory. Nonetheless, it should be that this has been a contentious process, filled
emphasized that the variation in the CAE loan with ambiguities and tensions.35 As the President
conditions had important consequences for the of the Federation of Students from the Catholic
365,000 indebted students that benefited from University (FEUC) clarified promptly, the new
this loan. The law promulgated on September deputies “are not representatives of the student
2012 reduced the interest rates from 6 to 2 %, and movement. They are not the student movement
conditioned the reimbursement of the loan on the in Parliament.”36 Such a statement, coming from
salary of the indebted students. While before the one of the more moderate factions within the
indebted people had to pay a fixed payment, ac- movement, reflects the continuing high levels of
cording to the new law the monthly payment of mistrust with political authorities, even those that
the debtors could not exceed 10 % of their sala- are born within the movement. Furthermore, it is
ry.33 Without any doubt, this law, a direct con- important to note that the CONFECH unambigu-
sequence of the student movement, benefited an ously refused to support any candidates in the
important number of low- and middle-income election, even those that campaigned on support
Chilean families. of the movement’s demands.
In this context, at least a part of the leader-
ship began to think of change in a broader time 34
Minute of CONFECH meeting, April 27, 2012.
frame. As Federico Huneeus, president of one of
35
It is also interesting to note that one of the student
the most important student federations in 2008,
leaders elected, Camila Vallejo, had lost her reelection as
President of the Federation of students at her university in
2012, to another student faction that criticized her affilia-
32 Mesa Directiva FECH, “Agosto Estudiantil: declaration to the Communist Party.
ción mesa FECH sobre la toma Casa Central Universidad 36 See the interview given by the FEUC President on De-
de Chile,” August 18, 2012. cember 26, in http://www.emol.com/tendenciasymujer/
33 See: http://www.gob.cl/informa/2012/09/26/presiden- Noticias/2013/12/26/25098/Naschla-Aburman-La-pingi-
te-pinera-promulga-ley-que-otorga-beneficios-a-deudo- na-que-aprendio-la-leccion-no-ceder-a-la-primera.aspx
res-cae.htm (accessed 06/09/2013). (accessed December 26, 2013).
For the Chilean student leadership, the ideolo- The recent evolution of political events in
gy of the governing coalition (right- or left-wing) Chile provides evidence of this. In 2013, Mi-
matters less than for previous generations of ac- chelle Bachelet once more was chosen as the
tivists, as does the political affiliation of repre- country’s president, supported by a broader co-
sentatives in Congress. As the Piñera government alition that included the Communist Party.37 This
did, the new Bachelet government will also have turn of events put 2011 Communist leaders in a
to face the challenge of reforming the educational hot spot, because they had continuously denied
system in dialogue with a radicalized movement, the possibility of collaborating with a Bachelet
whose basic demands have strong public opinion campaign.38
support but whose leadership has few and weak- Stearns and Almeida (2004) point out that
ened bridges to political parties. opposition parties are an important entry gate
for social movements to build state actor–so-
cial movement coalitions. According to these
Conclusion authors, this kind of coalition is an important
resource to provoke the policy reforms that so-
The year of 2011 went by without an end to the cial movements demand. However, the Chilean
students protests, which spilled over to 2012 and, case shows a different picture. While the recently
as we write this chapter (at the end of 2013), are elected government has included in its electoral
still ongoing. While 2011 was the peak of the campaign program many of the 2011 student’s
mobilization, in 2012 and 2013 massive demon- movement claims, the student organizations have
strations took place regularly throughout Chile, repeatedly insisted that they have no connec-
school or university occupations almost became tion with the Nueva Mayoría political coalition.
part of the normal political life, more Ministries Thus, if the new government keeps its promises
of Education fell, and legislative initiatives to re- and effectively reforms the education system in
form various aspects of education continued to the sense expected by the student movement, we
be discussed. Nevertheless, the core of the stu- would be facing a different scenario than the one
dents’ demands remains far from being achieved. described by Stearns and Almeida: a scenario
Therefore, it is still too soon to draw strong con- where the social movement manages to provoke
clusions about this case. However, as we have important policy reforms without participating
argued, it is possible to identify interesting trends in any state actor–social movement coalition but
that help to explain the paradox lived in the past keeping a skeptical and defiant attitude toward
3 years: the student movement has shown great all the political authorities.
resilience and mobilization capacity, but at the
same time it faces seemingly insurmountable ob- Acknowledgments Research discussed in this publica-
tion has been supported by various institutions: the Global
stacles to reaching the broad impacts it seeks. Development Network (GDN), Fondecyt Project 1130897
In order to understand this paradox, we have and the project RS130002 of the Iniciativa Científica
argued that it is important to consider the contra-
dictory and ambiguous but progressive distanc-
ing between the student movement and political 37
In 2009 the Concertación and the Communist Party
parties. This distancing is most clear in the case reached an electoral agreement that allowed the Com-
munists to have parliamentarians in Congress for the first
of parties such as the Socialist and the Christian
time since transition (three deputies were elected). None-
Democratic Parties, which have historically had theless, this electoral pact did not integrate the Commu-
a strong presence in social movements in gen- nist Party to the coalition. In fact, the Communist Party
eral, and in the students’ movement in particular. integrated a different coalition with its own presidential
candidate.
However, we have shown that the Communist
38 See, for example, declarations by Camila Vallejo in
Party has also been affected, and that, more gen-
http://www.lanacion.cl/camila-vallejo-jamas-haria-cam-
erally, there is a greater gap between this social pana-por-bachelet/noticias/2012-01-15/171839.html (ac-
movement and political institutions. cessed 06/09/2013).
Milenio of the Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Donoso, D. S. (2005). Reforma y Política Educacional en
Turismo. The views expressed in this chapter are not nec- Chile 1990–2004: El Neoliberalismo en Crisis. Estu-
essarily those of GDN or of the other supporting insti- dios Pedagógicos, XXXI(1), 113–135.
tutions. We thank Joaquín Rozas and the other members Donoso, S. (2013a). Dynamics of change in Chile:
of the Fondecyt research group for their help with the Explaining the emergence of the 2006 Pingüino
interviews conducted with student leaders, and Antoine Movement. Journal of Latin American Studies, 45(1),
Maillet and Sofía Donoso for comments on a previous 1–29.
version of this chapter. A preliminary version was debated Donoso, S. (2013b) (unpublished). Repoliticising edu-
in the seminar organized at the Political Science Institute cation policies and the politics behind them: Tracing
at PUC-Chile, and we thank the many comments and sug- the evolvement of the Chilean Student Movement’s
gestions received then. collective action frame. Paper prepared for the 2013
LASA Conference, May 29–June 1, Washington DC.
Figueroa, F. (2012). Llegamos Para Quedarnos: Crónicas
de la Revuelta Estudiantil. Santiago: LOM Ediciones.
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Urban Social Movements
in Venezuela 14
Sujatha Fernandes
Cities have played a major strategic role in con- constructed neighborhoods on the peripheries of
temporary processes of social change in Latin Brazilian cities fueled an “insurgent citizenship”
America, especially given the concentration of as residents contested the conditions of segrega-
the population in cities. According to Saskia Sas- tion and illegality through which they were ex-
sen, from the start of the 1980s the city emerged cluded from the formal city (Holston 2008). It is
as an important terrain for new conflicts and these kinds of social movement organizing in the
claims by both global capital and disadvantaged barrios of Caracas that I attempt to describe in
sectors of the population concentrated in urban this chapter.
areas (Sassen 1998). As emerging elite classes Urban social movements in Caracas are ex-
became increasingly powerful and transnational traordinarily variegated and heterogeneous.
under processes of neoliberal restructuring, the There are militant cadre-based groupings that
urban informal working class has become the have roots in the guerrilla struggles of the 1960s,
fastest growing class on the planet (Davis 2006). as well as collectives that operate through assem-
Disconnected from the formal economy, lack- blies and mass actions, and cultural groupings
ing structures of unionization or access to social based in music, song, and dance. These move-
welfare, and stigmatized by the middle classes, ments articulate together in “social movement
the “new cities of poverty” are important sites for webs,” defined by Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagni-
political organizing. The burgeoning population no, and Arturo Escobar as “ties established among
of an informal working class located in shanty- movement organizations, individual participants,
towns and shacks on the margins of major cities and other actors in civil and political society and
has implications for the sociology of protest that the state.” (Alvarez et al. 1998, pp. 15–16) As the
have been largely unexplored. authors state, the metaphor of the web allows us
Coming on the heels of James Scott’s charac- to imagine “the multilayered entanglements of
terizations of “micro politics” as everyday forms movement actors with the natural-environmen-
of resistance, scholars of Latin America have tal, political-institutional, and cultural-discursive
provided rich accounts of consciousness and cul- terrains in which they are embedded.” Cultural,
ture among urban shanty dwellers in a neoliberal political, and identity-based struggles take place
era. But alongside these everyday forms of resis- within defined spatial territories—the barrio, the
tance and survival, there are also growing spaces plaza, and the calle—suggesting the importance
for popular participation, where the urban poor of public space in the formation of social move-
have organized and asserted their rights. James ment webs. The contests over urban public space
Holston argues that the development of self- and the reclaiming of privatized areas is produc-
ing new means of public sphere, as arenas for de-
liberation and expression (Smith and Low 2006).
S. Fernandes ()
City University of New York, New York, USA I distinguish urban social movements from po-
e-mail: sujathaf@yahoo.com litical parties and trade unions by their basis in
196 S. Fernandes
the networks of everyday life, their location in Urban Political Histories

the space of the barrio rather than the party of-
fice or union hall, and their attempts to establish Historical memory and narratives of resistance
independent linkages with the state. While trade are central to the self-making of contemporary
unions tend to engage in concerns that are more urban movements. Community leaders in the
narrowly economic—such as wages, length of barrios trace their genealogy from the clandes-
the work week, and benefits—urban social move- tine movements against the military regime
ments see economic inequality as one dimension in the 1950s, through to the period of guerrilla
of the experience of marginality and have tended struggle in the 1960s, the cultural activism of the
to couch their actions in cultural-symbolic terms. 1970s and the emergence of new forms of urban
Urban social movements are strongly engaged resistance in the 1980s. At the same time, urban
in cultural politics, a concept that scholars of movements have participated in shifting clientil-
“new social movements” such as Alvarez, Dagni- ist relationships with the state, fostered over three
no, and Escobar, among others, have elaborated. decades of a redistributive welfare state, passing
Standard theories of collective action within soci- through a neoliberal state, and refashioned under
ology and political science are often criticized for radical leftist leader Hugo Chávez, who was in
their lack of attention to the cultural dimensions office from 1998 until his death in 2013. The ap-
of social movements, the discursive struggles in proach of contemporary urban sectors towards
which they engage, and the construction of iden- the Chávez government contained these elements
tity (Stephen 1997).1 Cultural politics does not of both autonomy as grounded in histories of
only refer to those groups explicitly deploying local struggle and mutual dependency that has
cultural protest or cultural forms. It also includes evolved over time. We can more fully understand
the attempts by social movements to challenge this contemporary dynamic by exploring the for-
and redefine the meanings and practices of the mation of urban social movements in the barrios
dominant cultural order. While some movements and their embeddedness in local political histo-
are successful at negotiating and processing their ries.
demands at the institutional level—which makes During the post-1958 period of national-pop-
them more visible to mainstream collective ac- ulist rule in Venezuela under the Acción Demo-
tion theorists—others are engaged in a cultural cratica (Democratic Action) party, also known as
politics that redefines the meaning of political AD or Adecos, machine-based politics created a
culture, questioning not just who is in power, but space for questions of redistribution and inequal-
how that power is exercised. ity to be addressed through the state apparatus,
thus controlling popular sectors and reducing
social antagonisms. Like in the case of Peronist
1
New social movement theorists go beyond a reduc- Argentina of the 1940s, the urban working class
tionist concept of politics and political culture as found masses in Venezuela were to be incorporated
in mainstream sociology and some resource mobilization into the polity as a recognized social force. This
theory to assess the multiple realms in which dominance
meant changes in the central idioms of everyday
is contested (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar, “Introduc-
tion,” 11). Although some scholarship on resource mobi- political language, with a greater emphasis on
lization theory, such as Sidney Tarrow’s “collective ac- dignity of workers and limits on the power of the
tion frames” and Debra Friedman and Doug McAdam’s upper classes to control wealth and resources. In
“identity incentives,” are concerned with theorizing cul-
the moral economy of the national-populist pe-
tural processes, others have been mostly concerned with
institutional and structural processes, and how movement riod, the ruler was representative of “el pueblo,”
demands are processed in institutional spheres (Alvarez, and charged with upholding its interests. Yet un-
Dagnino, and Escobar, “Introduction”). Also, while re- like the populist legitimism of the Sandinistas in
source mobilization theorists often assume the existence
Nicaragua, the populism of the Peronists and the
of collective identities, proponents of new social move-
ments theory are interested in the construction and nego- Adecos was reformist rather than revolutionary in
tiation of identities. character. The AD sought to build a multi-class,
14 Urban Social Movements in Venezuela 197
reformist party, in pursuit of capitalist develop- “combing” the barrios for insurgents; sometimes
ment together with propertied interests (Coronil they would come in plain clothes, wearing a
1997, p. 141, 218). The leadership demobilized handkerchief for identification to avoid killing
the working class and incorporated unions into each other by mistake.2 In La Vega, armed guer-
the state, establishing collective bargaining as the rillas carried out Robin Hood-type expropria-
only channel by which workers could exert pres- tions.3 Like during the earlier movement against
sure. The exclusion of the left from agreements military rule, the barrios once again became the
and pacts reinforced the shift of the AD towards focus of oppositional movements.
a centrist political program. The 1960s were the most intense years of the
While the clientilist political machine of the armed struggle. They were the formative years
Adecos developed deep roots in Venezuelan so- for many contemporary leaders of community or-
ciety, there were sectors and groups in the bar- ganizations in the barrios. “In one form or anoth-
rios who were dissatisfied with the conditions of er we are the result of all of this history that has
“pacted democracy.” The exclusion of the Com- to do with the parish,” says Juan. “We, especially
munist Party had serious repercussions for the myself and many compañeros who are today part
stability of the future regime. There were also of the Coordinadora, grew up seeing this. We are
dissenting voices within the AD, particularly the heirs of all these people, of all of this struggle
among the militant youth who had participated that began in those years and from a young age
in the clandestine struggle against military rule. we were incorporated into the political struggle.”
In April 1960, the youth branch of the AD left the Some activists such as Edgar “El Gordo” Pérez in
party and formed the Movement of the Revolu- La Vega later criticized what he saw as a “Cuban
tionary Left (MIR), allied with the Communist recipe for revolution” adopted by the guerrillas.
Party. The Cuban revolution under the leadership But the vision and the struggle of the guerrillas
of Fidel Castro had also taken place on January 1, remained in the memory of many barrio resi-
1959, and this had an important impact in Vene- dents, particularly the young people coming of
zuela and Latin America. Juan Contreras, a com- age in that period. The partial autonomy of urban
munity organizer who later founded the Coordi- social movements was established during these
nadora Simón Bolivar (CSB) in 23 de Enero, re- years of armed struggle, especially in parishes
lated that, “In this moment [1960s] people began such as 23 de Enero. Guerrilla activists forged an
to grow beards, take up arms and go to the moun- alternate pole of historical memory that existed
tains; whether or not it was justified they thought alongside and in contrast with deepening clientil-
they could do what Fidel had done.” Leftists and ist relationships between barrio residents and the
revolutionaries formed small guerilla units in the state.
mountains and in the barrios. In the period of the The decade of the 1970s was marked by a shift
1960s, there were many armed confrontations as away from the guerrilla tactics of the 1960s. In
guerrillas tried to take power. The barrio 23 de 1969, Rafael Caldera from the Christian Demo-
Enero was the focus of much conflict and urban cratic Party COPEI came to power. Caldera
insurgency. According to Juan: presided over what was known as the “pacifica-
The guerillas placed themselves on the roofs of the tion” of the guerrilla movements; this involved
buildings as snipers to confront the armed forces partially disarming the guerillas, although some
of public order, such as the police, the political groups remained actively clandestine. The fail-
police, the army, and the National Guard, and as ure of the strategy of armed struggle was con-
a consequence many youth were assassinated and
persecuted. fronted in a range of ways: some groups went on
The San Agustín community was also important 2 Interview with Luisa Alvarez, popular historian, San
to the development of the guerrilla movement, Agustín, May 2004.
and the barrios served as a refuge for the insur- 3 Interview with Héctor Ramírez, political activist, La
gents. During these days the police would come Vega, January 2004.
198 S. Fernandes
to form political parties such as the Movimiento of Urban Communities (FACUR).4 One of the
al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, MAS), aims of the neighborhood movement was to chal-
some created mass fronts, and others turned to a lenge city construction projects that violated of-
strategy of cultural activism. The turn away from ficial ordinances such as the installation of com-
armed resistance towards cultural struggle partly mercial shopping centers in residential areas or
reflected the depoliticization of the left as a result the elimination of green areas (Grohmann 1996).
of pacification. But at the same time, tactics of Neighborhood movements initially consisted of
cultural resistance were woven into the continu- advocacy groups that represented the shared in-
ing strands of community-based activism that terests of the middle and upper class residents of
sought to contest the ongoing segregation of the the sector.
barrios. The middle and upper classes began to play
Barrio residents in 23 de Enero had also begun an important role in politics during the 1980s,
to form sporting, cultural, and community-based especially given the declining legitimacy of po-
organizations during the 1970s. The residents litical parties due to their internal problems and
of the popular blocks engaged in similar pro- corruption. In 1978, middle class groups secured
test actions as residents of other barrios. They the passing of a law known as the Organic Law of
made demands on the government to address the Municipal Regimes (LORM) that gave neighbor-
problems of the buildings and the sector, such hood associations rights of exclusive representa-
as electricity, telephone services, and sanitation tion of their communities, as well as encouraging
(Contreras 2000). Alejandro Velasco argues that municipalities to form new associations. Follow-
pacification under Caldera had created an opening this ordinance, there was a boom in neigh-
ing for the kinds of community work that had borhood movements among different social sec-
been sidelined by both militants and the state tors and regions of Venezuela. Given the reduced
during the guerrilla era: “an alternative current resources available through political patronage
of activism gained force, one emphasizing com- to satisfy the subsistence needs of the poor, the
munity needs over political aims and resorting neighborhood movement began to spread to the
to unarmed, if not always passive, forms of col- barrios.5 But unlike the middle and upper class
lective action to achieve results.” Velasco (2011) neighborhood movements, the neighborhood as-
describes the emergence of cultural groups such sociations in the barrios functioned in a similar
as Movimiento Social, Cultural, y Artístico (So- way to the Juntas Pro-Mejoras and were strongly
cial, Cultural, and Artistic Movement, MOSCA) dominated by the AD.6 In La Vega, 56 neighbor-
in the Sierra Maestra sector, Como Gotas de Llu- hood movements were grouped into a Front for
via Sobre el Desierto (Like Desert Raindrops) Integration of the Community (FREINDECO),
in Zona E, theatre groups, and drug awareness which was said to be an initiative of the AD (Rol-
campaigns. There was a shift in focus from tak- lón and Luisa 1995). Like previous committees
ing state power to collective action focused on and organizations, the associations channeled
local concerns. local demands through political parties.
The 1980s saw the growth and consolidation By the period of the mid-1980s, a movement of
of the neighborhood associations ( asociaciones barrio-based organizations had begun to emerge
de vecinos), a self-help and cross-class move- in contrast to the neighborhood associations that
ment of residents organized to resolve local were linked with a middle class agenda. During
problems. The neighborhood movement had
emerged among middle and upper class sectors 4 Ellner, “Obstacles to the Consolidation of the Venezu-
in the early 1970s as a means of defending the
elan Neighborhood Movement,” 78.
interests of these sectors against political par- 5
López Maya, Smilde, and Stephany, Protesta y Cultura
ties and mayors (López Maya et al. 1999; Ellner en Venezuela, 63.
1999). In 1971, 14 wealthy neighborhood asso- 6 Ellner,
“Obstacles to the Consolidation of the Venezu-
ciations founded the Federation of Associations elan Neighborhood Movement,” 78–82.
the 1980s, barrio sectors were strongly impacted Ernesto Guevara de la Serna. The brigade paint-
by the debt crisis and subsequent currency deed murals in the barrio that would commemorate
valuation, which led to rising unemployment, a those martyred at the hands of delinquents or se-
drop in the value of real salaries, growing pov- curity forces, build consciousness, call attention
erty and inequality, an increase in violent crime, to issues, and help formulate complaints. The
and a marked deterioration in public services murals became an important tool of the organi-
(Buxton 2003). These conditions highlighted the zation. One of the main muralists of the group,
distinct concerns of popular sectors, and the need Nelson Santana, said that, “If they killed one of
for independent action to address those concerns. our compañeros or if we wanted to protest some-
Like Holston describes in the case of the com- thing with a compañero from another sector, we
munity organizations in Brazil such as the Soci- would go and paint a mural.” At the same time, as
ety of Friends of the Neighborhood (SABs) and Velasco describes, La Piedrita had an armed pres-
Christian Base Communities (CEBs) that broke ence in response to police violence, drawing on
away from clientilist relationships with the mili- the repertoire of 1960s groups such as the Tacti-
tary government in the 1980s,7 barrio-based or- cal Combat Units. According to Velasco, the case
ganizations in Caracas also developed new forms of La Piedrita helps to demonstrate the ways in
of civic participation demanding equal rights to which direct action and community work were
the city, claims to resources, and access to basic being synthesized in the parish.8 In this period,
services of the legal city. Their demands were not there was a convergence of the radical tactics
processed through the established channels of from guerrilla movements of the 1960s with the
mediation such as parties, neighborhood associa- locally oriented collective action of the 1970s
tions, and trade unions, but rather through new that found its eventual expression in the forma-
collectives with their roots in longer-term social tion of the militant, cadre-based organization Co-
movements. Barrio-based organizations engaged ordinadora Simón Bolívar by Juan Contreras and
in strikes, hijackings of public vehicles, and other others in 1993.
protest actions that were outside the repertoire
of the more advocacy-oriented neighborhood
movements. Contemporary Urban Social
One example of a barrio-based movement that Movements
incorporated direct action tactics was the Grupo
de Trabajo La Piedrita (GTLP), in the sector Ar- One of the main forms of contemporary social
bolitos II of 23 de Enero. The group was born on movement organizing in Venezuela, and one that
December 26, 1986, as a result of several popu- has united distinct social movements within the
lar assemblies in the sector. One member of the country, is that of community-based media. For
group, Valentín Santana, says that they took the the rest of this chapter, I will talk about the ex-
name La Piedrita (Little Stone) from the local periences of community based media, and make
name for the sector where they live, but also be- reference to the various urban social movements
cause, “a little stone in your shoe irritates you, who have used community-based media as a
so we wanted to become the irritation of the bar- means of networking and building their organi-
rio so that people would organize.” La Piedrita zations.
sought to rescue spaces taken over by narco- The surge in community media in Venezuela
traficking, through the organization of popular happened after 2002. While in 2002, there were
fiestas and the cleaning up of public spaces for 13 licensed community radio and television sta-
their use by the community. In homage to Che tions nationally, as of June 2007, there were 193.
Guevara, the group organized a brigade known as In addition to these 193 legally recognized and
7 Holston, Insurgent Citizenship, see Chapter 7. 8

Velasco, “We Are Still Rebels.”
200 S. Fernandes
funded stations, there have emerged over 300 functioning radio stations. Media activists went
unsanctioned community stations. There are also from urban to rural areas, bringing equipment
around 100 community newspapers. These are and demonstrating technical basics of radio
created and operated by a range of local groups, transmission. The idea caught on and before long
in the Amazonian south of Venezuela, the Ande- low power radios mushroomed in cities and rural
an regions, the coastal north of the country, and areas across Venezuela.
the barrios in the major urban centers. Urban social movements draw on place, local-
The boom of social movements organized ity, and cultural identity in creating alternative
through community media networks occurred languages of resistance and oppositional dis-
after the opposition-led coup against Chávez in courses to the private media. Community media
2002. One reason could be the desire of popular proponents have sought to ground their opera-
sectors to have control over the means of com- tions in the place of the barrio. Community media
munication following the media blackout engi- networks are based in local neighborhoods—for
neered by the opposition during the coup. Several instance Radio Perola is part of the community
people noted that the events of the coup were the of Caricuao, Radio Macarao in the parish Ma-
incentive that led to the formation of their own carao, Radio Al Son del 23 in the parish 23 de
radio station. Rafael Hernández was one of the Enero, Catia TVe in the parish of Catedral, and
founders of the movement Macarao y su Gente, Radio Negro Primero in Pinto Salinas. These sta-
which emerged during the late 1980s in the popu- tions are part of the social and cultural life of the
lar parish of Macarao. Although the movement barrio, they are used by organized social move-
had dissolved in the mid-1990s after the coup, ments, and they are often sustained by the barrio.
Rafael and some of the others formed a radio col- The interconnections between place, culture,
lective and began working to put their radio on and identity are apparent in the names of radio
air. stations. The station Radio Negro Primero takes
The combination of the new legislation, in- its name from both the barrio Negro Primero lo-
creased government funding available for the cated in the parish and a mythical hero. Accord-
community radio and television stations, and ing to media activist Madera, part of the project
the determination of the popular sectors to have of community radio is claiming these local he-
access to their own media following the coup roes who have been eclipsed by official history:
contributed to the growth in community and al- “Everyone knows Bolívar, Francisco de Miran-
ternative media. Certain radio stations with a lon- da, all the great leaders, but Negro Primero was
ger history and trajectory, such as Radio Negro a sergeant, a middle level cadre… We are revin-
Primero and Radio Perola, served as a nucleus dicating those from below, those eighty percent
for the multiplication of radio stations. A work- who are segregated by official history, from el
er at Radio Negro Primero described how once negro Sambo Andresote to Alí de España.” Other
they received their authorization, they duplicated stations also draw on the narratives of mythic
their application for other groups: “The detailed chiefs and anti-heroes as they describe their own
project that we presented to the government to projects. Angel from Radio Tiuna noted that the
obtain authorization was copied by twenty differ- station takes the name of a mythical indigenous
ent groups, they copied the same project and put chief because, “Tiuna is one of the chiefs from
their signature, they just changed the name of the here, from Venezuela. When the Spanish arrived
barrio”9 Legal assistance, technology, and tech- they fought with Tiuna, with Guaicaipuro, all of
nical skill was passed from one radio collective these chiefs who were here, who are native to this
to the next, allowing for the rapid creation of country.” Carlos Carles from Radio Perola incor-
porates the anti-heroes of Venezuelan history into
9 All interviews were conducted and observations made the popular figure of Bolívar. On the show To-
by the author during 10 months of field research conduct- mando Perola (Taking Perola), Carlos describes
ed in Caracas between January 2004 and January 2007. Bolívar: “Simón Bolívar was not Bolívar. Simón
Bolívar was also Páez, he was also Zamora, he tarizing the barrios. As Carlos says on Tomando
was also Boves, he was also Piar.” Carlos refers Perola: “We don’t have to militarize our barrios
to this mix of celebrated caudillos, radical popu- or our communities, rather, we have to fill them
lists, and anti-heroes, some of whom were sup- with happiness, with color, with collective expe-
pressed within official historical narratives, only riences, and important experiences.” Community
to be appropriated and re-circulated in popular media activists promote community-based mod-
oral traditions. els of violence-prevention, in contrast to a law
Community media producers make claims to enforcement model. This is a crucial step toward
indigenous and black identity as a way of posi- opening spaces for increased participation and
tioning themselves in broader relations of class renewed cultural life.
and marginality. Carlos identifies el pueblo as Barrio-based media producers make appeals
descendants of the indigenous chiefs: “We are to the local—they address local themes, they
the children of Guaicaipuro, those who screamed seek to integrate their programming into the life
in the last moments of their lives, ‘Come, Span- of the barrio, and they address local history. This
iards, and see how the last free man of this land space of the local is vital in defining new forms
dies.’” For Carlos, el pueblo is an embodiment of collectivity. Yet it is important to be aware of
of their ongoing struggle against the colonizer: the ways in which local forms are themselves
“We are children of indigenous resistance, Carib- integrated with and produced by broader global
bean indigenous resistance. They almost wiped forces. Most community radio stations and news-
out our population, but we will not accept that papers have websites, where they maintain blogs,
the invader, the colonizer, can wipe out our dig- livestream their shows, and connect with audi-
nity and our territory.” Carlos invokes the specter ences and publics outside their immediate vicin-
of indigenous resistance, not as a past historical ity. Like other locally based social movements
relic but as a means to recreate a sense of collec- who, as Arturo Escobar says, “borrow metro-
tive action. More broadly what is taking place is a politan discourses of identity,” (Escobar 2001)
reframing of el pueblo from the virtuous founda- community media activists draw on transnational
tions of the mixed-race nation to el pueblo as a articulations and narratives. Also, media activ-
marginalized, excluded majority who are seeking ists receive international support and participate
recognition and their rightful share in the coun- in global exchanges and forums. But at the same
try’s wealth. time, the defense of place serves as an ongoing
The construction of this place-based historical reminder of the power relations that shape the
memory is part of the project to create a sense configurations of what Dirlik has called “glocal-
of community and a shared past, and moreover ity.” It is through a reassertion of place-based
to reclaim public spaces that have been priva- memory and consciousness that corporate and
tized or abandoned in recent decades. As Freddy private claims can be contested.
Hurtado mentions in his show on Radio Perola, Critical debates and deliberation play an im-
the parish of Caricuao has no Casa de la Cultura portant role in the functioning of community
(Culture House), and the local sports center was media movements. Community media has be-
privatized. Spaces that were previously centers of come a central means by which barrio activists
community life were gradually sold to the private engage in dialogue about the issues facing their
sector by local politicians or occupied by gangs, community and formulate collective strategies.
taking them out of the hands of the community. Bolivian activist Oscar Olivera says that in the
As a result, public space has become more mili- contemporary era deliberation has shifted from
tarized, with an increased repressive police pres- unions and political party caucuses to the bar-
ence in the barrios. Part of the project of reclaim- rio as the site of working class politics: “Delib-
ing these spaces is not only confronting drug eration—which for us encompasses expressing
dealers or working with young people to give opinion, debating, deciding, and putting into
them employment and direction, but also demili- practice—now occurs in the new world of labor
202 S. Fernandes
that the modelo, or neoliberalism, has created.” Other stations such as Radio Negro Prim-
(Olivera 2004) The local radio station is used by ero, Radio Perola, and Radio Macarao, function
a range of groups to discuss ideas and promote through a constant process of assemblies, meet-
their activities, including land and health com- ings, and consultation. At Radio Negro Primero,
mittees, and soup kitchens. The producers of the process of decision-making is fairly diffuse
radio shows are often members of these different and fluid. There is a committee that consists of
committees and they report back on their prog- all those who are active in the functioning of the
ress and achievements. Although the missions radio and they meet twice a week, either early
and committees have often been designed and in the morning before people disperse to do their
received support from the Chávez government, work for the day or in the evening when people
the degree of democratic functioning depends on are back in the station. There are special meetings
the integration of these programs into organizing of the committee to discuss the budget, report-
structures, such as community assemblies and ing back on the previous year and projecting the
radio. budget for the year to come. If a serious dispute
Assemblies have been integral to the forma- arises, say between the radio station and the com-
tion of several community newspapers, radios, munity, or regarding something that was said on
or television stations. Sucre en Comunidad has air, then the committee reconvenes to discuss the
its origins in a broadsheet known as La Esquina issue and decide what to do. Rather than a fixed
Caliente (The Hot Corner) that was created by structure, there is what Fernando Barret refers to
participants of street assemblies who regularly as “a custom, a habit, a culture of convening as-
convened in the Plaza Bolívar. Radio Rebelde in semblies to discuss things … our decisions are
Catia emerged from an assembly called by the collective, talked about and discussed methodi-
community leaders. Assemblies continue to be cally.” The flexible structure helps them to re-
important in the daily functioning of many com- spond quickly to events. For instance, when I
munity radio stations. The space of radio stations was visiting the station one day, the activists were
can also be converted into assembly and meet- trying to decide whether to respond to the buhon-
ing halls. Radio Negro Primero has a large room eros (street vendors) who were demonstrating
from which it can broadcast and facilitate debates in Sabana Grande for relocation after their busi-
and discussions among members of the barrio nesses were shut down by the chavista mayor.
during the regular programming. They convened as an assembly in the morning
Community media networks vary in terms and decided that the issue was an important one
of their internal democracy, decision-making not being covered in the government press, and
structures, and participation. The radio station Al so they sent the director of the station to cover the
Son del 23 adheres more to a style of centralized events for the radio.
decision-making. Juan Contreras, the President Radio Perola also has a fluid and flexible
of the CSB, is the General Director of the radio structure. Decision-making is done through pop-
station and has the final decision about program- ular assembly, which is convened regularly by
ming and content. One of the station operators the coordinating team ( equipo de coordinación).
described the process: “If someone approaches There are small assemblies consisting of 15–20
us and has a well organized project, we will study people and larger assemblies of 50–70 people.
it and then Juan Contreras as the General Direc- Carlos describes the process of decision-making
tor takes the decision about whether or not to ac- as a “permanent assembly,” where “we reach
cept it.” This style of decision-making fits with agreements, we often say very critical things at
the general style of the CSB as a cadre-based times, but it is necessary in order to organize our-
organization with a strongly directive leadership. selves.” They will discuss their work plans, the
Although there is space for discussion and debate division of tasks, the programming, and the ev-
in meetings and on air, the parameters are often eryday functioning of the station. Like Fernando,
defined clearly by the directive.
Carlos sees this process of decision-making in Rafael recounted, there are people involved in the
assembly as a habit that is inculcated over time: daily running of the station who signed against
“It is a practice, that nobody instructs nobody, Chávez in the referendum, or do not identify with
nobody learns alone, human beings learn in col- chavismo. And there are people such as Rafael
lective and this process of collective learning is a himself, who support the current of change as-
process of liberation as well.” The assemblies are sociated with Chávez, but do not see themselves
not seen purely as decision-making forums, but as chavistas. This plurality is not the norm, and
as spheres of dialogue that help them collectively Radio Macarao members have come under criti-
build a political analysis and strategy. cism for it, and have even been accused of being
The efforts by some community radio stations escualidos.11 For Rafael, this is part of a struggle
to establish fluid mechanisms of deliberation, against unilateral modes of thinking: “There can-
flexible processes that can respond quickly to not be only one way of thinking, because this
events, and a culture or habit of decision-making goes against the principles that I conform to as
through assembly has strengthened the internal a communicator… Dialogue is confrontation,
democracy of those stations. However, at times discussion, collective growth. If we’re all in
the lack of a formalized structure can itself lead agreement, hey, it hardly makes sense, does it?”
to the emergence of an informal de facto leader- Listening, contentious argument, and respect are
ship. The absence of explicit and formally struc- crucial aspects of collective decision-making and
tured work teams may encourage the emergence community media production.
of cliques and concentrate power in a few lead-
ers. The General Directors of the radio stations
are male leaders or couples who have powers Conclusion
to give orientation and direction to the radio.10
Many of these leaders have a daily or weekly Contemporary urban social movement leaders
show, like Juan Contreras’ daily morning show, locate themselves within histories of guerrilla
Carlos Carles’ daily Tomando Perola, and Rafael insurgency, locally based collective action, and
Fernández’s weekly La Revista de la Mañana cultural resistance over a period of several de-
that sets the agenda for the radio. It is assumed cades. Juan Contreras noted that, “We came from
that these male leaders provide an ultimate guid- all this struggle, it has produced five generations
ance to the collective, an assumption that is part in this barrio who have thought about transform-
of the broader political culture of centralized ing the country: the generation of the 1960s, the
leadership. 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the generation
By participating in assemblies and work of the first four years of the twenty-first century.
teams, residents learn skills of deliberation and That is, five generations who have thought about
collective decision-making. This involves listen- change by different paths, the electoral path, the
ing to others, respecting the opinion of others peaceful path, and the path of arms.” Over this
even when it is different to one’s own, and learn- period, a state-society dynamic of patron–client
ing to lose when one is outvoted by other mem- relations also emerged alongside a redistributive
bers of the assembly. In principle, most radio welfare state, as another path by which barrio
stations adhere to the notion that communication residents engaged the political system. The his-
should be free, which means giving access to a tory of popular organization in the barrios has
plurality of voices on air. Radio Macarao allows been an interplay of independent action and link-
all residents of the barrio, regardless of their po- ages with the state, and the fashioning of creative
litical affiliation, to participate in the station. As strategies inside, outside, and against the political
system.
10
Notably, this is a mostly Caracas phenomenon, as out-
side of Caracas, there are radio stations which are led by
women. 11 Squalid ones, Chávez’s term for opposition supporters.
204 S. Fernandes
New forms of protagonism in contemporary Davis, M. (2006). Planet of slums (p. 178). London:
Verso.
Venezuela have produced a series of conflicts— Ellner, S. (1999). Obstacles to the consolidation of the
over cultural representations, over media owner- Venezuelan neighborhood movement: National and
ship and control, and over access to the state it- Local Cleavages. Journal of Latin American Studies,
self. Social movements have been able to bolster 31, 75–97.
Escobar, A. (2001). Place, Economy, and Culture in a
their autonomous presence by building a dense Post-Development Era. In R. Prazniak & A. Dirlik
network of assemblies, media collectives, cultur- (Eds.), Places and politics in a Age of Globaliza-
al groupings, and committees that are immersed tion (pp. 193–217). Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield
in everyday life and historical memory. Amidst Publishers.
Grohmann, M. (1996). Macarao y Su Gente: Movimiento
the plural and contestatory streams of thought Popular y Autogestión en los Barrios de Caracas
that have emerged from the contemporary pro- (p. 41). Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
cess of social change, community-based media Holston, J. (2008). Insurgent citizenship: Disjunctions of
collectives have sought to create an alternative democracy and modernity in Brazil. Oxford: Princ-
eton University Press.
pole based in human creativity, everyday life and López Maya, M., Smilde, D., & Stephany, K. (1999). Pro-
work, and subterranean cults of popular history. testa y Cultura en Venezuela: Los Marcos de Acción
Colectiva en 1999. Caracas: CENDES
Olivera, O. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia
(p. 130). Cambridge: South End Press.
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Propuestas: Identidad, Acción y Relevancia Política
Alvarez, S., Dagnino, E., & Escobar, A. (1998). Introduc- del Movimiento Vecinal en Venezuela (p. 97). Caracas:
tion: The cultural and the political in latin American Instituto de Estudios de Iberoamérica y Portugal.
social movements. In S. Alvarez, E. Dagnino, & A. Sassen, S. (1998). Whose city is it? Globalization and the
Escobar (Eds.), Cultures of politics/politics of cul- formation of new claims. In S. Sassen (Ed.), Global-
tures: Re-visioning Latin American social movements ization and its discontents. New York: The New Press.
(pp. 1–32). Colorado: Westview Press. Smith, N., & Low, S. (2006). Introduction: The imperative
Buxton, J. (2003). Economic policy and the rise of Hugo of public space. In S. Low & N. Smith (Eds.), The pol-
Chávez. In S. Ellner & D. Hellinger (Eds.), Venezu- itics of public space (pp. 1–16). London: Routledge.
elan politics in the Chávez Era: Class, polarization, Stephen, L. (1997). Women and social movements in Latin
and conflict (pp. 113–30). Boulder: Lynne Rienner America: Power from below. Austin: University of
Publishers. Texas Press.
Contreras, J. (2000). La Coordinadora Cultural Simón Velasco, A. (2011). We are still rebels: The challenge of
Bolívar: Una Experiencia de Construcción del Poder popular history in Bolviarian Venezuela. In D. Smilde
Local en la Parroquia ‘23 de Enero’. BA Thesis, & D. C. Hellinger (Eds.), Venezuela’s Bolivarian
Escuela del Trabajo Social, Universidad Central de democracy: Participation, Politics and Culture under
Venezuela, 54–6. Chávez (pp. 157–185) Duke University Press.
Coronil, F. (1997). The magical state: Nature, money, and
modernity in Venezuela (p. 141). Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Squatters and Politics
in Montevideo at the Turn 15
of the Century
María José Álvarez-Rivadulla
The last decades of the twentieth century com- did trigger different forms of collective action,
bined two conditions throughout Latin America especially among the middle and working classes
triggering mobilization: neoliberal reforms and that had enjoyed the benefits of the early and rel-
democratization (Johnston and Almeida 2006). atively robust Uruguayan welfare state. A land-
Hence, we witnessed the flourishing of indig- mark in that fight was the 1992 anti-privatization
enous rights movements in several countries, referendum (Moreira 2011). Another one was the
heightened activity by the Movimento dos Trab- successful campaign against water privatization
alhadores Rurais Sem Terra-MST (MST) (Move- which finished with a constitutional amendment
ment of Rural Landless Workers) in Brazil, the popularly voted on during the 2004 national elec-
mushrooming of NGOs and other civil society tions (Santos et al. 2006). It was exactlythat day
organizations, the emergence of the unemployed that the Frente Amplio, a coalition of leftist par-
piquetero movement in Argentina (see Chap. 9), ties, won the national office breaking the 175
and many other similar forms of austerity and years of electoral dominance by the traditional
anti-privatization protests especially among the Colorado and Blanco parties. This victory can
popular classes (Walton and Ragin 1990). also be interpreted on the grounds of this party’s
Uruguay was not an exception. The end of the consistent opposition to neoliberal reforms, in a
military dictatorship was pushed and welcomed context of deep economic crisis, albeit combined
by a wave of mobilization and a revival of civil with programmatic moderation (Luna 2007).1
society (Filgueira 1985). The labor movement, In the meantime, a silent urban revolution was
the cooperative housing movement, the human taking place. Although Montevideo’s squatters
rights movement, and the student movement took were not protesting against economic policy, they
the lead, but a myriad of smaller forms of col- were clearly a part of its consequences and, as
lective action such as soup kitchens and neigh- we will see, some of them implied collective and
borhood associations sprang up as well. Most of
this mobilization dissipated once political parties 1
For more on Uruguayan social movements, see for
recovered their traditional central role channel- instance: Bucheli et al. (2005) on the mobilization for
ing and co-opting civil society demands (Canel human rights against the crimes committed by the military
dictatorship; Midaglia (1992) also on the early stages of
1992). Yet, soon opposition to state retrenchment
the human rights movement and on the cooperative hous-
ing movement; Mirza (2006) on the cooperative housing
movement and the union movement in comparative per-
M. J. Álvarez-Rivadulla () spective; all the articles in Filgueira (1985) on gender, stu-
Programa de Sociología, Universidad del Rosario, dent, union, neighborhood, and rural movements during
Bogota, Colombia the democratic transition; Moreira (2011) for an updated
e-mail: mariaj.alvarez@urosario.edu.co; perspective on the recent relationship of social move-
majo.alvarez.rivadulla@gmail.com ments with the leftist government.
206 M. J. Álvarez-Rivadulla
contentious action. During the 1990s, Montevi- ter settlements and the state and politics has re-
deo squatters suffered a quantitative and qualita- ceived much more attention than in other parts
tive change. On the one hand they peaked in num- of the world, partly because this relationship has
ber, and on the other, they became increasingly been much stronger than anywhere else (Cas-
planned. Structural conditions, such as persistent tells 1983; Collier 1976; Cornelius 1974; Dietz
deindustrialization, poverty, state-retrenchment, 1998; Eckstein 1977; Gilbert 1994; Portes and
low-real wages, and perhaps even more directly, Walton 1976; Stokes 1991, 1995). Scholars of
rising rental prices in housing are undoubtedly the Middle East, for example, have pointed at
behind these changes (Alvarez-Rivadulla 2000; how Latin American squatters relate to the state
Amarante and Caffera 2003; Kaztman et al. in unprecedented ways considering their region
2005). Yet, the picture remains incomplete if we where depolitization and invisibility are precisely
do not look at how politics mediated between at the root of squatters’ survival (Alsayyad 1993;
people in need of housing and land seizures. As Alsayyad and Roy 2003; Bayat 2004). 2
much as it was shaped by economic changes, this Although rooted in the political process the-
wave of land squatting was also shaped by de- ory, this chapter acknowledges the tremendous
mocratization. importance of cultural frameworks (McAdam
Besides the already mentioned general effect et al. 1996). It was not until squatting became
of political opening on all types of mobilization, a viable alternative for the structurally down-
I argue that democratization triggered land squat- wardly mobile Montevideans that planned land
ting, particularly planned land squatting, through invasions entered their repertoire of collective
at least two specific political opportunities: (1) action (Tilly 1978). Planned squatting became a
electoral competition for the urban poor and (2) strategy to resist exclusion for the “seduced and
the decentralization policy implemented by the abandoned” urban poor, those that having incor-
leftist coalition after assuming the municipal porated expectations of full citizenship and stable
government in 1990. So, besides the relaxation jobs, are being expelled to the fringes of the city
of repression and therefore the increasing free- and the labor market (Kaztman 2001). Yet, for
dom for organization, democratization brought that, squatting needed to be resignified (Álvarez-
at least two other important political opportuni- Rivadulla 2012b). Organized squatters engaged
ties usually mentioned in the political process lit- in a spatial and symbolic fight that required dis-
erature: influential allies and institutional access tinguishing themselves from the poorest of the
(Almeida 2010; McAdam et al. 1996). While poor, those that squatted by accretion, associated
electoral competition gave squatters influential with scavenging and with very precarious living
allies through political networks with different conditions. The degree to which this fight suc-
political parties, decentralization increased their ceeded is dubious to most planned invasions.
institutional access to the municipal government. Only a few were able to become just a “regular
Yet, the effect of these opportunities on squat- neighborhood” as they framed it. Yet, as we will
ters was not homogeneous. It varied depending
on social networks and other resources. Thus,
2
leaders of the more planned squatter settlements, Interestingly, in the 1980s and early 1990s when many
countries in the region were undergoing re-democratiza-
who usually had experience participating in other tion processes there was a wave of squatter studies that
forms of collective organization such as trade interpreted them from a New Social Movements’ theory
unions, the cooperative housing movement or po- lenses. These studies focused on identities and autono-
litical parties, were better able to seize both these mous capacities (from state and politics) of squatters and
a myriad of other emergent social movements as well as
opportunities and transfer them to neighborhood on their grassroots horizontal ways of organizing (Calde-
level organization. ira 1990; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Evers 1985; Holston
Looking at the political opportunities and 1991; Oxhorn 1995; Touraine 1987). These studies have
squatters it seems particularly relevant in Latin received recent criticisms for overstating the autonomy of
social movements in the light of the recovered centrality
America, where the relationship between squat- of formal politics once democratization processes con-
solidated (Davis 1999; Roberts 1997).
15 Squatters and Politics in Montevideo at the Turn of the Century 207
Fig. 15.1 Number of land invasions per year, Montevideo 1947–2006
see in the conclusion, many conditions beyond cantegriles, existed in Montevideo before squat-
their control conspired against the squatters’ ting peaked in the 1990s, the Uruguayan capital
hopes, such as rising poverty in the early 2000s, developed differently than other Latin American
and economic and social crisis. cities. It was able to absorb the majority of rural
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted migrants coming to the city during state led in-
in Uruguay during 2006 and 2007 as well as in dustrialization in the formal city. Despite already
1998–1999 and on more recent field visits. It is starting to show signs of urban socioeconomic
part of a multi-method project that combines sta- inequality in the 1980s (Portes 1989), Montevi-
tistical analysis of squatting events and qualitative deo was more egalitarian than other cities of the
data, including case studies of some settlements. continent, both economically and spatially.
I here draw on both some of the quantitative data Even after the military regime carried out a
on the number and types of land invasions and on harsh policy of evictions and demolitions in the
some of the interviews and neighborhood histo- city center, where many poor people lived, there
ries. In the first section, I present a brief history was no massive move to squatter settlements
of land squatting in Montevideo, to later develop on the outskirts of the city. Instead of squatting,
the two opportunities that triggered and shaped many urban poor of Montevideo gravitated to an
land squatting during the 1990s decade, electoral already familiar strategy for coping with increas-
competition and decentralization. The following ing housing problems: crowding at relatives’
section explains how squatters’ varying resources homes (Benton 1986). The wave of land inva-
affected their ability to seize those opportunities. sions towards the end of the century becomes
I conclude by describing the decline of squatting therefore an interesting puzzle for explanation.
in the city and making some hypotheses about the A traveler who has not visited Montevideo in
reasons behind it, also based on the political pro- the last 20 years will find the growth of its urban
cess theory of mobilization. informality amazing (see Fig. 15.1). The capi-
tal city of a country once characterized as both
egalitarian and relatively well-off in comparison
The Case to the rest of Latin America, is today much closer
to the ideal type of a fragmented Latin American
The explosion of squatting in Montevideo took metropolis. Between 1984 and 1994 the number
place later than in other metropolises of the re- of houses in squatter settlements tripled (INTEC
gion. Although some land invasions, dubbed 1995). The population living in squatter settle-
ments grew to almost 145,000 in a city of less nizations during the military regime in Uruguay
than a million and a half inhabitants (INE-PIAI (Filgueira 1985). Moreover, toward the end of
2006). And the number of informal settlements dictatorship, and reacting toward a series of evic-
rose to more than 400. These figures become tion threats a movement of the poorest squatters,
more puzzling considering the city has had a some people evicted from buildings and some
stagnated population for decades. The informal parishes and NGOs emerged (Rodé et al. 1985).
city has grown without population growth. Con- It was dubbed MOVIDE, Spanish acronym for
trary to most Latin American squatters, these “movement in favor of a decent life.” It became
were not mainly rural–urban migrants. Most so important during the transition that it was one
were previously urban dwellers expelled from of the movements invited to participate at the
the city centre and searching for their “right to 1984–1985 multiparty consultations, known as
the city” (Harvey 2008) by invading plots in the National Conciliatory Program (Concertación
periphery of Montevideo. Nacional Programática or CONAPRO). But that
Until the end of the 1980s land invasions fame did not last much. As mentioned before,
in Montevideo were rare events and occurred many of these mobilization experiences during
mainly by accretion, that is, with one family the democratic transition lost strength or even
coming at a time and without planning. Cante- disappeared once political parties recovered their
griles3, their folk name, were associated with centrality.
rural–urban migration and with extreme pover- Most of these cantegriles are still in the city.
ty.4 Without a sewage system, drinking water, or And there are new ones similar to those as well.
any other service, houses were built by residents In fact, accretion is the prevalent type of land
with scrap plywood, corrugated metal, sheets of invasion. Yet, after democratization and, funda-
plastic, cardboard, and other found materials. mentally in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there
Their urban landscape looked very crowded, with was a shift in the number and type of land in-
no streets or public places. Often, you could see vasions by the urban poor. There was not only a
and smell piles of garbage and horses and horse- peak of them but planned land invasions become
carts because some of the inhabitants worked by the most frequent type (see Fig. 15.2). Planned
scavenging in the city and later classifying and invasions started as collective action with orga-
selling cardboard and other recyclable materials nization. A group seized an empty plot after find-
(Baudrón 1979; Bon Espasandín 1963; Mazzei ing out about its legal status and started divid-
and Veiga 1985). ing it in plots, marking streets, and sometimes
Mobilization was not absent from cantegriles. common spaces such as a square or a community
Some had an active involvement of Christian center, and negotiating with authorities first to
based communities. As in Chile (Schneider 1995) be able to stay, and later to get public services
or Argentina (Prévôt Schapira 1999), the Catho- and, eventually, legalization of land titles. After
lic church had an important role in popular orga- sometimes resisting police eviction, especially in
private plots, they immediately started to negoti-
ate with the authorities presenting a list of resi-
3
These early invasions were dubbed cantegriles, as an dents and justifying their right to stay on the basis
irony. In Punta del Este, the wealthiest seaside resort of of “necessity.”5 Residents still self-built their
the Uruguayan Atlantic coast and a point of reference
for the regional elite and jet set, there is a very exclusive
club named Cantegril Country Club, built in 1947. It is 5 The wave of planned land invasions that started with
unknown who started using that name, but some see it as the peak of 1989–1990 encountered legislation that made
a sign of popular resistance and imagination (Bon Espas- it difficult for land owners to evict squatters as well as a
andín 1963). weak policing of vacant land. This slowly changed first
4 Yet,although some did come from rural areas, most of in practice and more recently formally. First, squatters
them came from cities or towns from the “interior” of the could argue the “state of necessity,” a legal figure in the
country, that is from places outside the capital (Baudrón Uruguay Criminal Code that can exempt responsibility
1979). for the commission of crimes. Immediate police eviction
Fig. 15.2 Average yearly number of land invasions by type and political period. Montevideo 1947–2006
houses, but they used more solid materials such and sold it to people with low resources. They
as bricks or some sort of cement. Some of these are known as pirate subdivisions in other cities.6
settlements are, to an outsider, indistinguishable A few of these planned invasions had a utopic
from a poor but formal neighborhood. The only intention, at least at the beginning. Early resi-
difference is land ownership. There is yet a third dents wanted something more than solving basic
type, the minority of cases, which became more housing needs. They wanted to form a grassroots
common towards the end of the century. These organization, horizontal, without representatives.
settlements started as the individual action of an Leaders of these groups, generally coming from
entrepreneur, who might have had some politi- radical factions of the left, saw planned land
cal contacts, and who illegally subdivided a plot invasions as a sui generis land reform and as a
criticism to the state’s housing policies. Of all
land invasions they are the ones that better fit the
could happen only during the first 48 h of occupation and
this was why many planned invasions occurred on Fridays definition of a social movement, with common
or before a holiday. Besides, the Uruguayan Civil Code objectives oriented towards social change and in
states that after a year of peacefully occupying property opposition to authorities and with identity of its
you have possession rights. A 2007 reform to the Criminal members around them. Others, even if less utop-
Code harshened legal conditions for squatters. A new law
not only makes it easier to denounce cases of property ic, did organize for seizing land or improving the
usurpation but also broadens what is considered usurpa- neighborhood in various degrees. Like in the rest
tion. While before only a judge could denounce usurpa- of the region, squatter settlements in Uruguay are
tion in the first 48 h of its happening, now any witness the most vital manifestation of political action by
can, anytime. Besides, while before only clandestine or
violent invasions were considered usurpation cases, now the urban poor (Portes and Walton 1976).
any invasion of property, even if it occurs during the day
and without any use of force, is considered usurpation of
someone else’s property and therefore a crime. This new
law, originally intended for invasions of houses in the 6 57 % of the land invasions I could find information
prestigious Punta del Este seaside resort, has in practice about were accretion ones, 33 % had been planned and
also affected land invasions. Costs of invading have risen. 11 % had started as fraudulent land subdivision and sale.
Uruguay’s economic changes are undoubted- managed to get information about which plot to
ly behind the explosion of land invasions in the seize, services such as water and electricity, or
late 1980s and 1980s. Deindustrialization, state help building and maintaining their gravel roads.
retrenchment, and increasing wage differentials Although certainly not the only strategy for
by education brought by increasing economic neighborhood improvement (they combined po-
liberalization, have shrunk the number of pro- litical networks with direct petitioning and self-
tected, stable, and decently paid jobs available help and, more rarely, with disruption such as
particularly for those with low qualifications road blockading or sitting up at a state office), the
(Alvarez-Rivadulla 2000; Cecilio 1997; INTEC use of political ties seemed to be the faster and
1995; Kaztman et al. 2004). More specific fac- most successful route to accomplishing goals.
tors associated to housing, such as the insuffi- This was not particularly surprising given both
ciency and lack of efficacy of housing policies the body of literature that documents the role of
and urban policies in general, failures in the land clientelism among Latin American squatters7 and
market, skyrocketing rental prices, the excessive the one that documents Uruguay’s clientelism as
guarantees needed to rent something in Uruguay, a rooted institution that has historically linked
and the lack of coordination of the land titling civil society and a relatively generous welfare
programs, were also behind the wave of new land state (Luna 2006; Panizza and Pérez Piera 1988;
invasions (Amarante and Caffera 2003; Cecilio Rama 1971).
et al. 1999; Nahoum 2002; Semanario-Voces What surprised me was the variety of those
2011; Viana et al. 2006; Villamide s.d.). networks that one squatter settlement could have
However, these economic and policy based and how the networks had multiplied during a
explanations leave some variation unexplained. specific period of time, namely from the mid-
Why did squatting peak around 1989–1990 and 1980s until the early 2000s. Those were years of
not at other times with similar or greater levels of great electoral competition, particularly for the
poverty, unemployment, and housing problems? votes of the urban poor. Historically a stronghold
Why was there another (lower) peak around of the most populist factions of the traditionally
1994–1995? Following Tarrow (1989, p. 13), right wing Colorado Party, the left started slowly
“what needs to be explained is not why people winning the votes of the popular areas of Mon-
periodically petition, strike, demonstrate, riot, tevideo (Luna 2006; Luna 2007; Mieres 1988;
loot and burn, but rather why so many of them do Mieres 1994; Moreira 2005). Squatter settle-
so at particular times in their history, and if there ments as spaces of localized poverty became par-
is a logical sequence to their action.” We need ticularly relevant for campaigning. In addition,
an interactive theory of how grievances interact the goods and services the squatters needed were
with specific political opportunities at particular among the few that a reformed and retrenched
moments to better understand squatting. In the state could still deliver, as opposed to the pen-
following section, I develop how democratiza- sions and jobs that circulated through the politi-
tion transformed the number and type of land in- cal networks of the past (Filgueira et al. 2003;
vasions in a context of growing inequality. Luna 2006).
This was not easy for many Frente Amplio
politicians. They had to approach a different type
Electoral Competition as Political of popular local leader they were not used to,
Opportunity given the party’s traditional middle class and or-
ganized working class base of electoral support.
During fieldwork, one of the most recurrent fea- These leaders had “different codes” that the “sec-
tures in squatters’ stories, particularly the most
organized ones, was the close contact with poli- 7 (See for instance: Auyero 2000; Burgwal 1995; Corne-
ticians from different political parties and their lius 1977; Gay 1994; Gilbert 1994; Merklen 1997; Portes
factions. It was usually through them that they and Walton 1976; Stokes 1991).
tarian left” took time to understand, as a social- Thus, electoral competition constituted a po-
ist faction broker active in helping different land litical opportunity that increased squatters’ room
invasions told me. While in the 1984 electoral for agency. Contrary to the portrayal of clien-
campaign, the left could not enter into a squatter telism as synonym of manipulation and passive-
settlement, as a Frente Amplio campaign advisor ness, many scholars have shown how poor peo-
remembers, 10 years later in the 1994 campaign ple’s political networks, including clientelism,
(and after the left had governed the city for 4 leave room for agency (Burgwal 1995; Gay
years), “everything exploded. You entered and it 1994; Walton 1998) and even more, for mobiliza-
was like deification. I remember an image in the tion (Auyero et al. 2009). It is my contention that
Tres Ombues settlement: Arana [twice Mayor and in contexts of electoral competition that room for
later Housing Minister] and Astori [Economy agency and mobilization is even greater.
Minister and current Vice President] on a scav- Like in Chile before the dictatorship, when
enger’s cart, and people were taking them as if different factions from the left were fighting to
they were carnival queens … it was unbelievable. win pobladores’ votes (Handelman 1975; Hip-
And they were followed by a huge parade. Unbe- sher 1998; Özler 2003; Schneider 1995), land in-
lievable, that was definitely a turning point that vasions in general, and particularly planned inva-
continues until today.” sions, spiked in Montevideo. The Frente Amplio
Beyond campaigns, electoral competition broadened and sharpened electoral competition
continued from the government offices. Tra- and that benefited squatters giving them more
ditionally, the Blanco and Colorado party had elite allies. Nobody wanted to say no to potential
a pact of co-participation that guaranteed that voters. The growth of the left in the city and its
when any of them won, the other one would consolidation in the municipal government al-
still hold some positions in government. Thus, tered the incentives of all political actors to sup-
for example during the Colorado presidency of port squatters. As mentioned in the conclusion,
Sanguinetti between 1995 and 1999, two relevant it is only when the left consolidates itself in the
agencies for squatters, the Housing Ministry and city and nationally that the electoral competition
the Presidency of the Water Bureau were in the diminishes and so does tolerance with new land
Blanco Party’s hands. As mentioned before, at invasions.
the same time and since the 1989 election, the
municipal government was held by the Frente
Amplio. Thus, the three main parties held some Decentralization as a Political
office relevant for squatters. Opportunity
Many squatter leaders made use of this favor-
able context skillfully managing different politi- Following broader Latin American trends, Mon-
cal networks at the same time (Alvarez-Rivadulla tevideo entered the 1990s with the left in the
2012a). They did so in different ways. Some city government and a municipal decentraliza-
changed parties from the Colorado to the Frente tion process (Canel 2010; Chávez and Gold-
Amplio once the latter won the municipal gov- frank 2004; Goldfrank 2002; Myers and Dietz
ernment. Others worked with a division of labor 2002; Veneziano Esperón 2005). According to
with members of the neighborhood association. the electoral platform that took the Frente Am-
While one leader, a leftist militant, asked the mu- plio into the city administration, decentralization
nicipal government for help, another one secured was aimed at bringing the government closer to
the water access via contacts with the Blanco the citizens, especially the poorest citizens and
Party through his own political networks. A re- making it more accountable and efficient. Akin
current strategy was declaring “we are apoliti- to the new discourses on development, this de-
cal here,” by which they really meant they were centralization program had a strong faith in civil
hyper-political, made clear in another recurrent society’s participation and its transformative
phrase “we open doors to everybody.” power. It consisted of dividing the city into 18
zones, each with its local neighborhood gov- occupied. To a head of the local executive (Sec-
ernment (dubbed Centros Comunales Zonales retaria de la Junta Local) of the La Teja neigh-
(CCZ) or Zonal Community Centers). The origi- borhood, what distinguished the land invasions
nal project was resisted by the opposition and in of the 1980s was their willingness to legalize and
the end the decentralization ended up being more guarantee land titling as well as their negotiating
administrative than political or financial and thus attitude. They saw the state, and particularly the
far less ambitious than the famous Porto Alegre local state, as an ally.
experience in participatory budgeting (Baiocchi [Land invasions during the nineties] were like the
2005). Still every Zonal Community Center had García Márquez story, “a foretold death”. Nor-
an executive board and a local council that made mally you knew there was going to be an inva-
suggestions to the Mayor about big issues such as sion and normally you knew more or less where.
There was a negotiating attitude from the begin-
spending priorities in the area and some admin- ning.—Ok, we occupy here but we call the Junta so
istrative decisions such as small resource alloca- they come and legitimize our land invasion saying
tions within the zone.8 we are all workers from x place and we want to
The results of decentralization are not written negotiate to get this plot or, if this one is not avail-
able, then we can see which one is available. The
in stone. Some emphasize how it’s negotiated in- attitude was to occupy to accelerate bureaucratic
stitutional design “failed to boost civic engage- times, more than anything.
ment among city residents because the channels
of participation offered did not convince average Many squatters, especially those established in
citizens that their input in public forums would municipally owned land, rapidly incorporated
have a significant impact on governmental deci- themselves into the proposed participatory mech-
sions” (Goldfrank 2002, p. 51). Others, on the anisms as city councilors or members of local
contrary, emphasize the positive effects on par- land or health committees. Through that partici-
ticipation particularly in changing traditional pation they gained quicker access to information
clientelistic relationships with the municipal and services for their neighborhood. But that
government into more accountable ones (Canel process was not easy. As Canel (2010) vividly
2010; Veneziano Esperón 2005). Some, in turn, describes, older residents of impoverished areas
highlight how decentralization served the Frente of the city were not always happy to have squat-
Amplio electorally both by allowing it to enter ters in their neighborhoods and city councils.
into poor areas of the city and by rising its cred- They perceived them as an invasion, as a threat
ibility as a governing party rather than only as an to their working, cohesive and militant culture, as
oppositional party (Luna 2007). Most analysts, people with different values and traditions that do
however, stress decentralization’s role in bring- not even pay taxes which they perceive as unfair.
ing the city government closer to citizens. At the same time, local governments could never
This institutional opening was particularly fulfill the multiple demands based on the severe
relevant for squatters. Many of the squatter lead- needs of an increasing number of squatters. This
ers of planned invasions mentioned the zonal was frustrating for squatters and discouraged
community center (CCZ) or the local executive their participation.
(Junta Local) when asked about the person or Decentralization constituted a particular type
institution that helped them the most. The CCZ of institutional opening, one that promoted mo-
often became the first actor they called once they bilization at the neighborhood level. The Frente
Amplio decentralization project included a peda-
gogical branch, incarnated by an army of social
8 workers, which aimed at generating more partici-
More recently, in 2009, and following a national legis-
lation, the decentralization structure got more complex. patory local decisions. Electing representatives,
Besides the CCZs, eight municipalities were created, each holding frequent meetings, taking minutes, lis-
with elected local authorities including a local mayor. It tening to the population, and prioritizing needs
remains to be seen how this process is altering local and considering other equally needy communities
particularly squatters’ politics.
were part of the learning experience. Although conflicts within squatter settlements. In one of
some squatter leaders of planned invasions had them, there was an empty space to build a common
building for meetings and so, and a person took
previous experience participating in trade unions, it and built a grocery store there. How this can
neighborhood associations, the cooperative hous- happen? How can it be that we say “we are going
ing movement or other types of collective action, to build your streets, we are going to give you this
for many squatters participation in their neigh- and that” and there are still people that resist or do
not cooperate?
borhood associations, local councils, or com-
mittees was their first time in politics. Decen- Institutions require a level of organization that is
tralization was, for them, a school of grassroots difficult to reach in a neighborhood of “strangers”
political participation—and squatting in general (Roberts 1973). What strikes this official as un-
a politicizing experience.9 believable is the most common situation in squat-
Squatters learned about the convenience of ter settlements: problems with organization and
collective and formally organizing at the neigh- enforcement of collective norms among a popu-
borhood level through the interaction with other lation of newcomers that also frequently rotates.
institutions as well. As a squatter leader put it: The most repeatedly heard phrase among leaders
Having “personería jurídica” [legal status as an is “people do not participate” which corresponds
organization] enables us to sign agreements with with mistrust on the part of non-leaders, apathy
INAME [National Institute for Childhood] to or simple lack of time. Thus, multiple agencies
create a daycare center. Besides, you also can have gave squatters a consistent message about the
the help of INDA [National Institute for Nutri-
tion]. We can sign contracts and sign everything… benefits of disciplined participation at the local
You can even organize festivals. Because all the level which fits the broader worldwide change of
institutions require that you have the “personería development discourse from the state to civil so-
jurídica”. Besides, it gives a much more serious ciety as an agent of development (Hyden 1997).
image to the neighborhood. Having it, you repre-
sent the neighborhood in a different way. Yet, as Roberts and Portes (2006) point out
in their analysis of fin de siècle urban participa-
Being organized meant, for many state officials, tion in Latin America, decentralization can be a
being a disciplined and deserving squatter settle- double edged sword in the sense that by encour-
ment. In an interview in 1998, the first director aging local participation it may hinder scaling up,
of the mainly Inter-American Development Bank that is taking the urban struggles to broader ter-
(IADB) funded government program for titling ritorial levels by coordinating with others. There
and upgrading in informal neighborhoods, told was never a city wide movement of squatters in
me: Montevideo. Most organizations have been con-
We have an implicit slogan: “we are going to help strained at the settlement level, with some inter-
those that want to be helped”. (…) The amount of esting exceptions. In at least three cases there has
people that ask for help is so big, that we cannot been coordination among various squatter settle-
start searching for more demands (…). For a proj-
ect to be sustainable it is necessary to have the will ments within decentralized areas.10
of the population and you know there are great Finally, it becomes important to mention that
the opportunities decentralization opened for
9
The impact of decentralization on democratizing neigh-
borhood associations was by no means limited to squatter
10
settlements. In her census of Montevideo’s neighborhood For example: Comisión de Tierras in the CCZ 17, Co-
associations a year after decentralization had been imple- ordinadora de Asentamientos in the CCZ 9, Coordina-
mented, González finds that, in comparison to her previ- dora de Asentamientos CCZ 12. I interviewed members
ous census during the Colorado city administration right of these three umbrella organizations of squatters. None
after democratization (Gonzalez 1989), “there were high- of them was actively meeting at the moment of my field-
er percentages of associations that held regular meetings, work. All interviewees explained how hard it is to coor-
that elected their leaders, that held meetings in public dinate actions. In general coordinating efforts have been
places, that applied for legal status, and that had regular organized from above, from the municipal government.
contact with other organizations in their area” (Goldfrank To be fair, however, in the case of the CCZ 17 (Cerro
2002, pp. 71–72). neighborhood), the committee preceded decentralization.
squatters varied across the city. In his careful litical networks and in conflict resolution, than in
study of Montevideo’s decentralization Canel other areas of the city.
(2010) shows how the local experiences of de-
centralization were quite different depending on
each of the 18 areas’ associational cultures, the Variation Depending on
impact of socioeconomic conditions on the popu- Neighborhood and Leader’s Resources
lations’ dispositions to organize and participate
in community initiatives, and the ability of indi- The effect of the two political opportunities that I
vidual local officials to nurture trusting and co- have mentioned, increased electoral competition
operative relations with community activists. By for the urban poor and the novel decentralization
looking at the spatial distribution of squatter set- program, did not affect all squatters in the same
tlements in Montevideo we start to see a nonran- way. Those with more political networks as well
dom pattern. Planned land invasions are clustered as other resources such as organizational cul-
in the deindustrialized historically working class tures, pragmatic leaders, or relatively less pov-
neighborhoods of the west of the city, whereas in erty were better able to seize those opportunities
the traditionally poorer northeast there are mostly and transform them into collective goods for their
accretion invasions. While the local government neighborhoods. They did so by skillfully using a
in the Cerro neighborhood had to negotiate with variety of strategies, most of them to reach the
many organized invasions, the local government state, and others to organize internally.
of the 11th zone had to assist a growing number Many have emphasized the role of organiza-
of accretion squatters with excruciating needs. tional dynamics on collective action, but the per-
A traditionally working class increasingly de- spective that I find more useful is the political
prived area of the city surprised me for its ca- process model because it puts them into dialogue
pacity to care for public land, for its few land with broader contextual political factors (Mc-
invasions and for its experience in generating Adam 1982; McAdam et al. 1996; Tilly 1978).
cooperatives as an alternative for people with Other scholars have described differential strat-
housing needs. When a group of young neigh- egies and organizational types for squatters in
bors from Brandi, one of the neighborhoods of the same city and time. Gay (1994) and Stokes
the 13th Zone, invaded the soccer field of the (1995), for example, divide squatters into clien-
neighborhood and started dividing the plot and telistic and rebel for Rio and Lima, respectively.
building tents, neighbors reacted quickly. They More recently Dosh (2010) shows us, by compar-
called the local authorities who despite the fact ing squatter settlements in Lima and Quito, how
that it was a weekend, acted rapidly enough to some neighborhood organizations change strate-
evict the people in less than 48 h. A former city gies throughout their lives, adjusting themselves
councilor remembers this event with pride. The to different contexts choosing between conform-
city council mediation avoided both the invasion ist, militant, bootstrap, or rogue strategies to
and a violent eviction.11 Not surprisingly, it is this obtain neighborhood services, while others stay
region, the zone of Peñarol neighborhood and tied to only one of these types. Those community
surroundings, the one that better adapted to de- organizations that are more flexible, he argues,
centralization according to Canel (2010). Local are generally the most successful. This find-
associations, he argues, had a greater experience ing resonates with what I found in Montevideo.
in negotiating with the state through different po- Yet, we need to add one more possibility which
is the minimal use of collective strategies to ob-
tain neighborhood services, which is the case for
many accretion invasions.
11 Interview with Delia Rodriguez, city councilor from Even though, as stated before, accretion in-
the Socialist Party from 2000 to 2005 and later vice-direc-
tor of the Program for the Integration of Squatter Settle- vasions were the typical type during and before
ments (PIAI). dictatorship, whereas planned invasions were
the typical form of settlement formation after through political networks and lobbying that they
the democratic opening, accretion invasions kept managed to change their plot from rural to po-
growing in periods of intense electoral competi- tentially developable land and eventually entered
tion and decentralization. This puzzle can only the regularization program. Nuevo Amanecer
be solved by looking at the differential resources then became the first settlement to be legalized
that these settlements maintained. As an example, in the city.
around 1990 two very different settlements start- Although Victoria Nuevo and Nuevo Amanec-
ed in the west of the city. One, Victoria Nuevo, er emerged at the same time, the latter was much
was an accretion invasion that started to grow more endowed to seize the opportunities of elec-
out of nearby older cantegriles. Located next to toral competition and decentralization. Relative-
a polluted stream, piles of garbage surround very ly better off residents, with experience in other
precarious houses. When I asked a local official social movements and political parties, were
about this neighborhood, she took a long time to able to skillfully use various political networks
identify it. These squatters did not have a his- in their favor as well as use the recently opened
tory of relations with the local government, even decentralized spaces of participation. Yet, as al-
though they were on a municipally owned plot. ready mentioned, they also used other strategies,
They did not have a neighborhood organization from self-help to direct petitioning to the state
or representatives to the local council. They re- and lobbying. Their success resided in this eclec-
mained invisible for the most part. tic combination of strategies.
The other squatter, Nuevo Amanecer, had a Variation in the ability to seize political oppor-
very different story. A group of people that knew tunities did not only occur between accretion and
each other from their militancy in labor unions planned invasions. Planned invasions also varied
and that could not sustain the cost of living in in their resources and their spectrum of strate-
the city any longer started the organization. gies. More militant organizations, for example,
Through political networks with city councilors that did not want to establish networks with tra-
they found out about a state-owned plot in El ditional parties, were less able to seize the op-
Cerro neighborhood that they could occupy, the portunities of electoral competition in a context
councilors warned, as long as they did it in an of divided government. In fact, those that only
organized way. They occupied only after having had connections with one political party of any
everything planned. They were going to func- color did not succeed as much as the more flex-
tion like a cooperative (some had experience in ible ones.
the cooperative housing movement). Instead of Focusing on resources and strategies gives
every one only caring about their own house, they more room for agency than only focusing on op-
were going to do some tasks collectively. They portunities. As Gay (1994, p. 1) puts it to describe
received no eviction threat and quickly started to Rio’s squatters:
do what Luis, one of the founders and still leader Latin America’s urban poor are often portrayed as
of the neighborhood association describes as the the innocent victims of repressive and exclusionary
“real hard work.” Through direct petitioning they regimes Victims they undoubtedly are; innocent
received water and electricity. They also secured however, they are not. Indeed, there’s increasing
evidence from a variety of contexts that the urban
building materials from the recently inaugurated poor have been active, organized, and aggressive
leftist municipal administration. Luis started par- participants in the political process and that the
ticipating in the recent decentralization program popular organizations, in particular, have had a
as a city councilor. Yet, Luis’ contacts were not significant impact on the relationship between the
urban poor and political elites.
enough to build roads. They needed contacts with
the national government. Another neighbor that As much as this description fits many of my in-
worked side by side with Luis, from the Colo- terviewees, it becomes important to consider how
rado Party, brought the Transport Minister to the the capacity for agency varies across institutional
neighborhood and he built them the roads. It was
contexts, over time and depending on neighborhoods (Falero 2004). As shown in Figs. 15.1 and
hood resources as this section illustrated. 15.2 the yearly number of land invasions remains
high during the first Frente Amplio city adminis-
tration (1990–1994), has a new peak around the
The End of the Cycle and Some 1994 election and the following year, and starts
Concluding Remarks to drop. Notwithstanding the fact that the waves
of all types of mobilization do not last forever
The new century found Uruguay enmeshed in its and tend to have an inverted U shape (Tarrow
worst socioeconomic crisis. The recession period 1998; Tarrow 1999) or the fact that rental prices
starting in 1999 and epitomized by the banking had been decreasing and became particularly low
crisis of 2002 added a new layer to the long term at the time of the crisis (Semanario-Voces 2011),
trends of impoverishment and precarization. If there is a richer story to explain this paradox.
the period of unequal growth that characterized As suggested by political process theory, it
the 1990s had hurt the poor, this new recessive takes more than grievances to squat and even
period was even more harmful. Poverty and un- more so to do it in an organized manner. Chang-
employment rose to unprecedented levels and es in the political and institutional climate were
household incomes dropped considerably (Am- behind the drop in new land invasions. On the
arante and Arim 2004).12 Hunger and despair one hand, electoral competition decreased. In the
flooded the city. 1994 election, after its first term governing the
No wave of land invasions accompanied or city, the Frente Amplio experienced its greatest
followed this crisis. Although some settlements increase in voters from the lower strata (Luna
did receive new families during these years, be- 2007). By the 1999 election, the left had won
coming denser and even more precarious, land in- the lower class vote in the city, to finally win the
vading was not a massive strategy used by those national government in 2004 and be reelected in
affected by the crisis, at least in the city.13 Other 2008. On the other hand, decentralized local gov-
forms of mobilization did occur in existent squat- ernments started to be less flexible with new land
ter settlements such as the organization of soup invasions.14 This new generalized attitude might
kitchens, as they had in other popular neighbor- stem from the leverage power acquired with elec-
toral victories, but also from the gained experi-
12 Poverty reached 40.9 % of the Uruguayan households, ence in the city administration and the awareness
almost doubling the percentages for the 1990s decade that invasions generate new demands and prob-
(Arim and Vigorito 2007). lems to solve. The same happened with the na-
13 According to anecdotal evidence, squatter settlements tional government, which in 2011 officially op-
did grow in the metropolitan area around the crisis years posed an organized land invasion that ended with
(along the northern Costa de Oro, for example). Yet, there
is no information available about dates of settlement of
those neighborhoods. Regarding Montevideo city only,
according to a study conducted by the National Institute 14 The case of the El Cambio land invasion illustrates
of Statistics, there were already 120,000 people living in this. This invasion occurred in October 2004, right be-
squatter settlements in 1998 (INE 1998). That number fore the election that put the leftist coalition in the na-
had only risen to 133,546 in 2004 (according to the Na- tional government for the first time in Uruguayan history.
tional Institute of Statistics’ 2004 population count), and In fact, the invasion was named after the Frente Amplio’s
to 144,707 in 2006 (INE-PIAI 2006). Although these esti- campaign that year: El Cambio (The Change). Located in
mations are not strictly comparable, the number of people one of the areas of the city with the largest number of
living in squatter settlements seems to be going down land invasions, El Cerro, with a tradition of working class
since then. According to a 2008 estimation the number organization and with a permissive local government,
was 130,000 (Menéndez 2008) and the most recent one El Cambio was not evicted immediately. Yet contrary to
states 112,101 people are living in squatter settlements what happened to most land invasions in this area, after a
(PMB-PIAI 2013). This last estimation also reports a di- period of hesitation and after a change in local authorities,
minishing number of squatter neighborhoods because of the local council this time decided to oppose this invasion.
the upgrading and regularization program together with Moreover, it wrote a formal declaration opposing any new
no new land invasions. land invasion in the area.
a massive eviction of 270 families (covered in the of mobilization, from blockading a road to pro-
mass media). “The occupation is not the mecha- test because of issues such as not qualifying for
nism to demand housing,” said the Housing Sec- the conditional transfer program, not having the
retary to one of the national newspapers. 15 The school built the community has been demanding
political context had changed for squatters. for at least 10 years, to organizing soup kitchens
More recently, grievances changed as well. or filling a bus to go vote on election day. Even
While the global North struggles to recover from under the harshest conditions, mobilization ap-
the global financial crisis and its effects, Latin pears as one of the strategies people use to sur-
America is experiencing economic growth. Uru- vive, together with personal and family strate-
guay and Montevideo significantly reduced their gies or political networks, to mention only some.
poverty rates. An upgrading and titling program Again, remembering Tarrow’s (1999) advice,
is finally in action regularizing and improving understanding the timing at which mobilization
the living conditions of several squatter settle- becomes a prevalent strategy can be revealing of
ments.16 Union participation recovered with the the broader political context that usually affects
return of the wage councils. Yet, the city and collective action and of the reasons why people
society have changed. Durable fractures are evi- decide to use it as a strategy.
dent in rising delinquency and fear. Deep social Thinking comparatively, the prevalence of
exclusion is not easy to overcome even at times squatters greatly depends on population pres-
of economic recovery. And a group of Montevi- sures, the housing market, and the labor market.
deans living in some squatter settlements remain But as I have shown in this chapter, it also de-
deeply marginalized. pends on the relationship between the popular
The dream of belonging to the city and be- classes and the state. This relationship includes
coming a regular neighborhood that had inspired electoral politics and housing policy as well as
many planned land invasions could be reached by more specific actions towards those who squat.
some, those that were successful in reaching the State agencies may assist, encourage, tolerate, ig-
state and, at the same time, were able to control nore, harass, or crush squatter settlements. More
norms and the population living within its bor- often, however, their acts belong to a grey zone
ders. But for many that was an impossible task. that includes some tolerance, some repression,
“Organizing strangers” (Roberts 1973) is very some cooptation, and some assistance. In addi-
difficult, particularly in contexts of unbearable tion, and to add one more layer of complexity, the
needs, and new problems (such as the emergence state is not monolithic. Different state agencies
of drug consumption and trafficking). Some set- may pursue different policies or specific actions
tlements, mainly but not only those that grew by and those policies may change over time. State
accretion, are today considered “red zones” and actions tend to depend, in turn, on how organized
feared by the general population. squatters are and on how interested elites are in
Yet in all of the settlements informal networks squatters as political support. In other words,
of neighborhood are often the basis for new types harsh economic conditions are necessary but
not sufficient for the existence or prevalence of
squatter settlements in a city. Economic condi-
15
El Observador, “La ocupación no es el mecanismo para tions often interact with political factors to make
exigir vivienda.” January 19th, 2011.
squatting happen, and to shape how it happens.
16 The PIAI, financed both by the Inter-American Devel-
The prolific literature on social movements, con-
opment Bank and the Uruguayan government, is similar
to other programs in the region such as the famous Favela- tentious politics, and collective action more gen-
Bairro in Brazilian cities. While present in Uruguay since erally give us interesting theoretical lenses to un-
1998 it has been particularly active in Montevideo since derstand squatting. Even if squatter organizations
the Frente Amplio has the national government. Before, do not always exactly fit our definitions of what
given that the national and municipal governments be-
longed to opposing parties, the program was stagnant in a social movement is, this literature, illuminates
the city and more active in other parts of the country. aspects of squatters’ agency and strategizing as
well as of how they relate to their context that relationship. Latin American Politics and Society, 51,
1–31.
remain veiled if we only focus on the not less real Baiocchi, G. (2005). Militants and citizens: The politics
and definitely worrisome aspects of deprivation of participatory democracy in Porto Alegre. Stanford:
and exclusion. Stanford University Press.
Baudrón, S. (1979). Estudio Socioeconómico de algunos
barrios marginales de Montevideo. Montevideo: Fun-
dación de cultura Universitaria- Ciedur.
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Market City: Collective Action in Six Latin Ameri-
Part VI
Environmental Conflicts
The Environmentalism of
NGOs Versus Environmental- 16
ism of the Poor? Mexico’s
Social–Environmental
Coalitions
Jean Foyer and David Dumoulin Kervran
List of Terms
GIRA Grupo Interdisciplinario de tecnolo-
CCMSS Consejo Civil Mexicano para la gia Rural Apropiada (Interdisciplinary
Silvicultura Sostenible (Mexi- Group for Appropriate Rural technol-
can Civil Council for Sustain- ogy)
able Forestry) NAMA Asamblea Nacional de Afectados
CECCAM Centro de Estudios para el Cam- Ambientales (National Assembly of
bio en el Campo Mexicano- Environmentally Affected People)
Maderas del Pueblo del Sureste PAIR Programa de Aprovechamiento Inte-
(Center for the Study of Change gral de Recursos Naturales (Pro-
in the Mexican Countryside- gram for the Utilization of Natural
Maderas del Pueblo Southeast) Resources)
CIEPAC Centro de Investigaciones y Eco- PSSM Proyecto Sierra de Santa Marta (Sierra
nomicas Politicas Accion Comu- de Santa Marta Project)
nitaria (Center for Research on RAFI Rural Advancement Foundation Inter-
Political Economics and Com- national, renamed the ETC Group in
munity Action) 2001
CONCLAVE Coordinadora Nacional Contra
Laguna Verde (National Coor- In the early 1990s, caught up in the new wave of
dination Against the Laguna mobilization that followed the democratization of
Verde) Latin America, all of the countries of the region
ERA Estudios Rurales y Asesoria seemed to experience some kind of environmen-
(Rural Studies and Consulting) tal movement and the creation of national envi-
FECOMEX Federación Conservacionista ronmental agencies (García-Guadilla and Blauert
Mexicana (Mexican Conserva- 1994; Hochsteler and Mumme 1998; Alfie Cohen
tionist Federation) 2005a). The environmental struggle, alongside
indigenous rights and women’s rights, has often
been called a “new social movement (NSM),”
J. Foyer () distinguished from previous social movements
Institut des Sciences de la Communication, CNRS- by the higher social status of its members, by
Sorbonne Université-UPMC, Paris, France
e-mail: foyerjean@gmail.com
their identity-based and post-materialist causes,
and by the low priority they gave to direct action
D. Dumoulin Kervran
through extra-institutional means (Melucci
Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine
(IHEAL)—CREDA, 1999). While this label of “NSM” had every
Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, France
224 J. Foyer and D. Dumoulin Kervran
opportunity to highlight the emergence of new NGOs in “transnational activist networks” (Keck
forms of collective action, it also underscored the and Sikkink 1998). This new analytical frame-
environmental mobilizations’ elitist1 dimension work encompassing both social movements and
and the role given to NGOs. Hence in Mexico, NGOs established an evolutionary typology:
the existence of a national environmental social the formation of coalitions articulating hetero-
movement seemed self-evident to the rare analyst geneous actors through campaigns constituted a
who took it on as a specific topic (Simonian 1999; middle ground between a mere network of infor-
Diez 2008; Velazquez Garcia 2010; Durand et al. mation exchange on one hand, and the existence
2012), and their attention remained focused on of genuine transnational social movements based
NGOs. Indeed, even today, the very existence on a shared identity and strategy on the other
and demarcations of this “social movement” (Tarrow 2005; Bandy and Smith 2005).
remain highly controversial among its stakehold- This chapter, then, builds on analyses of mo-
ers, and each scholar of environmentalism must bilizations that have focused on the plurality of
question her or his own definitions. networks between organizations (Diani and Mc-
This broad dichotomy between the more elit- Adam 2003), an approach that has only been ap-
ist “NSMs” and the more grassroots mobiliza- plied to select aspects of the Mexican movement
tions is at the root of the two main sociological (Pacheco and Obdulia 2003; Velázquez García
frameworks currently used in the analysis of en- 2008). Unlike a somewhat idealized analysis of
vironmental mobilization in Latin America. On social movements focused solely on grassroots
one side, many publications emphasize the role mobilizations, an approach focused on coalitions
of NGOs and transnational coalitions, staying can show that the different actors mobilized are
closer to the discourse of the most visible actors connected to one another as much by comple-
(Kurzinger et al. 1991; Torres 1997; Umlas 1998; mentarity and division of labor, as by a shared set
Hogenboom 1998; Alfie Cohen 2005b; Pacheco of common values (Pacheco and Obdulia Vega
Vega 2005). On the other side, a more significant 2003). Environmentalism is often characterized
role is given to the grassroots organizations of by a “transclassist” heterogeneity of participants,
marginalized populations, and to confrontation and coalition building is therefore the most com-
strategies, through analytical frameworks like mon way to expand a mobilization. This is the
Martinez Alliez’s “environmentalism of the poor” distinct nexus between “elitist” and “grassroots”
(2002), or the “environmental justice movement” organizations, as well as the two distinct histori-
(Carruthers 2008; Leff 2001; Verduzco 2002). cal trajectories of alliances that allow us to em-
This latter approach emphasizes environmental pirically divide what we might call “Mexican
conflicts and local indigenous and/or peasant social environmentalism” into two components.2
movements that resist infrastructure construc- Conversely, we will not deal here with another
tion projects (hydraulics, mining, nuclear, petrol, organizational field, that of “conservationism,”
tourism, etc.). which brings together (many) organizations that
However, this broad opposition between re- work only in the management of protected areas
search programs on NGO activities on the one (Dumoulin 2003, 2007). Not because we take for
hand, and on the popular mobilizations on the granted the claims of many of the conservation-
other, was largely overcome during the 1990s ists of being apolitical, but rather, because their
(Clarke 1995). A convergence emerged between activities are too narrowly focused on “project
the study of the internationalization of social management” to fit into any definition of a social
movements (Smith et al. 1998), and the role of movement.
1 This elitism was fortified by the specific role played by 2 The term “social environmentalism” is not usually used
academics and by “information politics”: the use of scien- by the members of the organizations analyzed here. This
tific data was exceptionally intense within environmental analytical category was used for the 1st time by Gonzalez
mobilizations. Martinez (1992).
16 The Environmentalism of NGOs Versus Environmentalism of the Poor? 225
This study is based on several periods of field- Efraím Hernandez Xolocotzi, who advocated a
work in Mexico by the authors between 2000 and “ciencia de huarache” (science in sandals), mean-
20123. It builds on over a 100 interviews with ing a science based on fieldwork, on direct con-
participants of the organizations mentioned, as tact with rural people and the recognition of tra-
well as select periods of participant observation. ditional knowledge and practices. After creating
Each of the chapter’s two parts, then, explores the first autonomous ecology research centers,4
the construction of an “organizational field” built several groups embodied the growth of a move-
on coalitions between local populations, urban ment oriented toward sustainable community de-
elites, and international organizations: we call velopment.
the first “sustainable community development,” The founding members of the Grupo de Estu-
and the second “environmental resistance”; in the dios Ambientales (GEA), experimented first for
conclusion, we will return to the main advantages several years with new research programs, train-
of our way of constructing the object “environ- ing local populations, and assembling develop-
mentalist social movement.” ment projects at the community level (forestry,
traditional corn growing, etc.) before formally
establishing their NGO in 1977, and implement-
The Networks of Sustainable ing alternative projects in marginalized rural
Community Development: From the communities in various regions (Xalapa, Puebla,
Grassroots to the State and Funders Guerrero, etc.). A second major group consisted
of researchers from the National Autonomous
A. The Origin of Alliances between NGOs and University of Mexico (UNAM), essentially bi-
Rural Communities The first step in establish- ologists who assembled around ethnobotanist
ing a field consisted of urban groups, which were Victor Manuel Toledo and biologist Julia Cara-
often organized into civil society groups, forging bias, who were conducting left-wing opposi-
alliances with local communities. In the second tion to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (the
half of the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, an PRI).5 Thanks to the success of a first local ex-
environmentalist current emerged in Mexico that periment of an alternative development model,
was deeply rooted in the rural sector, and whose their group changed the scale of projects through
core activities were based more on the search for the Programa de Aprovechamiento Integral de
alternative community development than on na- Recursos Naturales (PAIR), which extended
ture conservation, which clearly distinguished it across the country’s various regions (Michoacán,
from the traditional conservationists (Carruthers Oaxaca, and Durango) (Carabias et al. 1994;
1996). In 1970, several student groups decided Toledo 1983). A third group of scholar-activists
to take the environmental crisis seriously and
seek alternatives in rural areas. They recognized
4
the influence of the different schools of thought, Alongside the Centro de Ecodesarollo, created in 1972,
and the Institúto d’Ecología (1974), we found that INRI-
often coming from Marxism and shockwaves of
REB—Instituto de Investigaciones sobre Recursos Bióti-
the 1968 repression in academe, but also from cos—which embodied the “social environmentalism”
thinkers like Ignacy Sachs and Ivan Illich (who movement (1975–1988). All the three remained very de-
led the Intercultural Center for Documentation pendent on the Mexican State.
5
in Mexico between 1961 and 1976). Another in- The Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM in Span-
ish) emerged from the fusion between the Mexican Com-
spiring persona was that of Mexican agronomist
munist Party and different currents of the Mexican left. It
won the municipal elections in the city of Alcozauca in
the state of Guerrero at the end of the 1970s. This victory
3 These fieldwork periods had very different durations: gave this group the opportunity to move from reflection to
from 2 years (during each of the authors’ PhD prepara- political action, and to implement an experimental project
tion) to numerous 1 month periods dedicated to different that was seen as a pioneering experience of sustainable
research projects on related thematics throughout the last development in the region (mainly environmental diag-
decade. nostics and a municipal management plan).
participated during the second half of 1980 in cropped up around the issue of sustainable rural
the state of Oaxaca’s Sierra de Juarez communi- development. To cite only a few salient exam-
ties’ movement to recover their forest territorial ples, they included the Grupo Interdisciplinario
rights from concessions to parastatal companies. de Tecnología Rural Apropiada (GIRA), which
They founded the organization Estudios Rurales operated within Michoacán’s indigenous com-
y Asesoria (ERA). This first mobilization was munities; the Proyecto Sierra de Santa Marta
part of the founding of one of the most interesting (PSSM), in the southern state of Veracruz; and
movements of community forestry, when a local the Grupo GAIA, on the coast of Oaxaca. There
organization, the Unión Zapoteca-Chinanteca was also an effort to coordinate at the national
(UZACHI), was trained in how to sustainably level, through the Consejo Civil Mexicano para
use the forest’s resources. In this way, two large la Silvicultura Sostenible (CCMSS), which
sectors—community forestry (Barton Bray and formed in the mid-1990s to try to capitalize on
Merino Perez 2004), and organic coffee produc- different local experiences and promote commu-
tion (Ejea and Hernández 1991)6—forged intense nity forestry on a national level, especially with
relationships between NGO supporters and com- the public authorities.
munity organizations, transforming modes of de- To understand the rapid development of
velopment and local political systems alike. The Mexican environmental NGOs, we must place
struggle for control of natural resources and land, it within the wider national context of the Mexi-
whether against the State or against local chief- can system’s democratization process, which left
tains, and the processes of organizing communi- room for certain experiences outside official cor-
ties into unions or cooperatives was fundamental poratism (Mollard and Lopez 2006). However, in
to this first phase. a nation-state that had been controlled by the PRI
The environmental movement thus served for nearly 70 years,7 and a party that was rooted
as a point of attachment between a highly po- in corporatism and patronage, the question of
liticized urban elite coming from the academic whether to forge a relationship with official in-
or religious world on one hand, and local com- stitutions presented a fundamental dilemma to all
munities engaged in struggles on the other. This Mexican social movements. The dilemma was
alliance sometimes led to long-term partnerships between maintaining independence at the risk of
between communities. The idea that there existed being cut off from all institutional leverage and
an indigenous environmentalist movement that resources,8 or maintaining access to jobs and
was locally anchored around traditional practices benefits (financial or other) at the much greater
(water, soil, and forest management) or in alter- risk of legitimizing a system set up by the PRI,
native modes of production (of coffee, honey, va- and suffering under its many constraints.
nilla, and so on) was then put forth by the move- Beginning in the mid-1990s, the group that
ment’s intellectuals, including Victor Manuel To- had formed around Julia Carabias and engen-
ledo, who went on to evoke the seductive idea of dered PAIR made the choice to institutionalize
“green Zapatistas” (Toledo 1992, 2000). because when Ernesto Zedillo came to power
in 1994, the opportunity presented itself to cre-
B. Institutionalization and State Relations In
the early 1990s, following the Earth Summit in
7
The PRI controlled Mexico from the end of the revolu-
Rio in 1992, a second generation of organizations
tion during the 1920s, until the year 2000. After a 12-year
transition dominated by the presidency of the right-wing
6 The most representative examples of this wave of ex- Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) party, the PRI returned
portation oriented around organic coffee cooperatives to the power in 2012, at both the national level and in
were the “Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región many states.
del Itsmo” (UCIRI) and the “Indígenas de la Sierra Madre 8 Indeed, a 1991 study (Kurzinger 1991) showed that
de Motozintla” (ISMAM). In these organizations, mem- 75 % of the organizations taken in account had some con-
bers of liberation theology-type groups were more influ- nection with the State, and that 30 % received State fund-
ential than members of academia. ing.
ate the first Mexican Ministry of Environment, predatory at the environmental level. One GEA
Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Natu- member explained the difficulties of translating
rales (SEMARNAT).9 This opportunity also cor- civil initiatives into public policy in this way: “If
responded to the greening of the Mexican gov- you don’t enter into it, if you don’t negotiate, they
ernment in the late 1980s in response to external marginalize you, and it’s important to position
pressure (North American Free Trade Agreement yourself politically, even if we may not be linked
(NAFTA) negotiations, entry into the Organisa- to any State power or party.” 11
tion for Economic Co-operation and Develop- Other field organizations that chose not to
ment (OECD)) and internal pressure, including enter into partnership with State authorities
the channeling of many environmental move- maintained a subtle position against the State:
ments and their emergence during this time as a beyond a certain amount of critical discourse that
dissident force (see Part II). might imply a wholesale rejection of the corpo-
The integration of Carabias’s entire team into rate State, some flexibility seems to have been
the State can therefore also be read as part of accepted through collaborations with environ-
the great Mexican tradition of co-opting social mental institutions. At the discretion of person-
movements. After appropriating the concept of nel changes in the SEMARNAT’s central offices
sustainable development, this team conducted as well as in different states, relationships with
6 years of considerable work to consolidate the members of government agencies, new pro-
official Mexican environmentalist institutional grams, and funding opportunities, gaps and “win-
and legal framework, to train administrative dows of opportunity” sometimes opened to mem-
staff in environmental issues, and to increase and bers of the movement for sustainable community
strengthen the supervision of natural protected development. A certain amount of pragmatism in
areas, all while taking into account human activi- relation to national and international institutions
ties.10 seemed to prevail.
Despite extremely virulent criticism by vari-
ous social movements against Carabias, from C. Globalization Connections: Funding and
her stance, which was deemed overly conserva- Professionalization Playing a perhaps marginal
tionist, to her positions against the neo-Zapatista but nonetheless pioneering role, social environ-
movement in Chiapas, Julia Carabias’s 6-year mentalism organizations were well-placed to
tenure accomplished unprecedented quantitative receive, beginning in 1992, the influx of interna-
and qualitative gains in terms of addressing major tional funding for sustainable development and
environmental issues in Mexico. This passage of biodiversity issues.12 A certain degree of simi-
NGOs into institutions and from the local to the larity in the international funding and “partner-
national often risks peril. If managed budgets ship” channels should be emphasized because
and implementation instruments are incommen- it illustrates the existence of the same transna-
surate with those of civil society, their means are tional networks, (the Ford Foundation, coop-
insignificant compared to other public policies eration agencies in Northern Europe, and the
like that of agriculture, and more structural and World Bank)13 as distinct from those of the envi-
11
9 The “Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Natu- Translated by L. Kraftowitz.
rales y Pesca” who, after having been reduced from the 12
During the1980s, a majority of these organizations
Fishing Sector at the end of the 1960s with J. Carabias were self-financed; more rarely, they were financed by
as head of the ministry, became the “Secretaria de Medio public funding.
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales” (SEMARNAT). See 13 The most visible is the Ford Foundation (alongside
Stearns and Almeida (2004) for the mutual reinforcing
the Foundations Rockfeller, McArthur and the German
benefits of social movement coalitions with state institu-
Friedrich Ebert), which was almost always present in sup-
tions.
porting these organizations, at least until the end of the
10
Julia Carabias, personal interview, October 14, 2004. 1990s. In addition, Oxfam Novib (the Dutch organization
Table 16.1 The construction of a dense “organizational field” for “sustainable community development”
Escalation of social network Types of links and coalitions Examples
mobilization
A NGO/local communities Long-term relationship of technical Relations between CCMSS and the
connections support, spokesperson, fundraiser, forest communities of the Sierra
and political support Norte de Oaxaca
B Connections between NGOs, local New relationship beginning in The relationship with the PROD-
organizations, and different levels 1994; mutual influence and finan- ERS program managers in the
of government cial interdependence. Old social states, and those of the FMCN in
networks between new environmen- Mexico City
tal entities, NGOs, etc.
C Trans-scalar connections with inter- Financial dependence, reciprocal Relations with the World Bank, the
national donors legitimacy UNDP, the Ford Foundation, or
Friedrich Ebert
ronmental resistance. However, we might ask themes to work on is partly determined by fund-
whether structural dependence vis-à-vis inter- ing opportunities. Luisa Paré, the organization’s
national institutional donors (as well as national founder and an environmental activist for over 20
funds, like those distributed by the Fondo Mexi- years, gave the following analysis:
cano para la Conservación de la Naturaleza), did We went from an era of activism with a strong
not help undermine the activist and alternative political commitment by those who lived and
aspects of community development organiza- worked in the communities, to a more professional
tions, transforming them into service providers attitude today, where people are really trying to
change things and prioritize the technical aspects
and local technical operators. of their work. I’m not judging, I’m just saying that
In this light, the PSSM example is significant. these are different times and forms of action.14
The organization eventually demonstrated such
a close relationship with the various institutions The arrival of foreign funds thus allowed for a
of the Los Tuxtlas Biosphere Reserve, whether certain amount of organizational professionaliza-
through its participation in its design of ecologi- tion, as well as the adoption of lines of work that,
cal scheduling, governing bodies, and the opera- while still related to the promotion of local devel-
tion of some of its programs, which we can le- opment projects, were increasingly institutional-
gitimately wonder if it did not become a part of ized and restricted to sustainable development.
the official system itself. In a national and inter- In the 1990s and 2000s, community development
national environmental context where environ- was increasingly inserted into managed networks
mental issues are institutionalized, the choice of and national and international institutional fund-
ing. To a large extent, the social and productive
alternative that sustainable rural development
for international development cooperation), as well as the
religious German organizations Misereor and Pan Por el might have represented was widely and gradual-
Mundo, and the cooperation agencies of northern Europe ly standardized as sustainable development came
(Scandinavia and Germany, but also the UK via DFID, to dominate national and international policies
and the Department for International Development). The (Leonard and Foyer 2011) (Table 16.1).
General Environmental Facility (GEF), managed by the
World Bank, was also an important source of financing,
enabling these actors to consolidate or create new orga-
nizations. Regarding the multifold relations existing be-
tween these NGOs and the World Bank, see for example
Deborah A. Bräutigam and Monique Segarra (2007). 14 Personal interview, on October 3, 2008.
Environmental Resistance: From In some cases, as with the famous victory

Coalitions against Local Projects to against the Tepoztlán tourist resort project (1994–
Coalitions against the Neoliberal 1995), peasant organizations led struggles where
Order the environment was only one element among
others. Conversely, certain coalitions had more
A. Resistance Coalitions to Mega-Projects and “naturalistic” and limited goals, tied to a number
National Coordination Parallel to and some- of NGOs in the national arena, like the demand
times crosswise with the organizational fields of for accountability for the slaughter of migratory
community development, some resistance cam- birds around the Silva Dam in 1994–1995. These
paigns against mega-development projects also various experiences connected a growing num-
created synergy between some urban elites and ber of local organizations scattered across many
local grassroots organizations. In the late 1970s states into an ad-hoc coalition, along with NGOs
and early 1980s, when environmentalists were that were involved in the national arenas, and
still rare, two coalitions gave visibility to a fledg- many successes contributed to creating shared
ling Mexican environmental movement opposed social ties and memories. However, overall co-
to the state: (1) the fight against planned defor- ordination between these “protest events” hardly
estation and (2) the relocation of the Chinante- existed, except through the existence of informal
cos to Uxpanapa (Veracruz 1973–1975). Even social networks.
more connected to populist organizations was the From 1985 to 1994, urban political ecology
emergence of mobilizations against oil drilling, groups in a state of rapid growth attempted to
and against the massive pollution by the national organize a national movement, to create a com-
petrol giant PEMEX, especially the 1976 Pacto mon identity under the banner of “contentious
Ribereño in the state of Tabasco (Velázquez politics.” Several initiatives brought together
Guzmán 1982). different coalitions, but without succeeding in
The 1987 anti-nuclear mobilization, Coordi- unifying them. National meetings of environmen-
nadora Nacional Contra Laguna Verde (CON- tal groups, attempts to unify the environmental
CLAVE), brought together large sectors of the movement in the Federación Conservacionista
population: farmers’ and fishers’ organizations, Mexicana (FECOMEX) in 1985, the same year
NGOs, intellectuals, mothers’ groups, and even of the great earthquake that catalyzed inter-
the Catholic Church (García-Gorena 1999; Paya sector organizational synergy, and also gener-
Porres and Víctor Alejandro 1994). This mobili- ated the “Pact of Environmental Groups” (PGE,
zation experienced episodes of radical confron- established with 50 organizations that shared a
tation (blocking streets, etc.), and is considered national agenda) were all attempts to organiza-
the movement’s founder. The 1990s was a the- tionally coordinate a national movement. UN
ater for large protests whose successes illustrated negotiations on the Rio-92 conference gener-
both the ability of NGOs to engage directly in ated the creation of FOROMEX, gathering more
political work with “grassroots organizations” in than 100 organizations around a common agen-
marginalized regions, and the central role they da (Diez 2008, p. 86). The main turning point
could play in mobilizing coalitions in an envi- was probably when coalitions formed around
ronmentalist framework (Verduzco 2002). This NAFTA between 1990 and 1994. Indeed, these
was especially true for mobilizations against dam initiatives required groups to develop a common
projects (in Guerrero against “Altos Balsas,” agenda against a common enemy, and the win-
beginning in 1990), against the proposed high- dow of opportunity gave them an entirely new
way in the Chimalapas region in 1991 (Umlas level of visibility and influence on the Mexican
1998), and against the construction of a salt fac- State (Torres 1997; Hogenboom 1998; Gallardo
tory in the San Ignacio Lagoon in Baja California 1999).
(1995–2000) (Castro-Soto 2005; Velasquez Gar-
cia 2010).
All of these alliances allowed for the gradu- organizations and transnational network cam-
al emergence of a shared multi-sector agenda15 paigners.16
and coalitions on a new transnational scale that Organizations that were implanted in Chi-
marked the protests that followed. But the insti- apas, like Maderas del Pueblo del Sureste and
tutionalization of the environmental cause also CIEPAC (Centro de Investigaciones y Económi-
divided and destabilized these coalitions, which cas Políticas de Acción Comunitaria) denounced
now contained an extremely diverse member- the Mexican government’s various environmen-
ship, with strongly held and sensitive ideological tal initiatives, like the relocation of local popula-
positions that preferred different strategies tions outside the Montes Azules Biosphere Re-
(Hogenboom 1998; Hogenboom et al. 2003). serve, its bioprospecting projects like the ICBG
Maya ICBG (Dumoulin Kervan and Foyer 2004),
B. Network Transnationalization and Anti- luxury ecotourism projects, and initiatives like
Neoliberal Resistance From the late 1990s on, the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC),
the environmental resistance network grew by which was considered as the environmental side
structuring itself around anti-neoliberal themes at of the Puebla-Panama regional trade initiative.
national and international levels. It was nearest Claiming a Zapatista autonomist approach in di-
to peasant and indigenous mobilizations, espe- rect rupture with the government, these organiza-
cially for organizations tasked with defending a tions moved away from community development
national agenda, actors close to the neo-Zapatista, activities and toward denunciation campaigns
and then the anti-globalization movement. At the against official environmentalism, which they
national level, an important organization was saw as overly conservationist, or as serving the
thus forming in Mexico to produce both tech- interests of multinational corporations.
nical and political expertise on environmental The second half of the 1990s and early 2000s
issues in rural areas. The Centro de Estudios para corresponded with the arrival of transnational
el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM), actors who influenced Mexican social environ-
was initially intended as a think tank to gener- mentalism’s already dense landscape. Catherine
ate political ideas for the peasant federation, Marielle of the GEA summed up what she con-
Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales sidered to be a new phase:
Campesinas Autónomas (UNORCA), a member The arrival of Greenpeace and the ETC Group is
of La Via Campesina. CECCAM’s discourse, much more recent. Unlike these organizations, we
which covered forestry, agro-ecology, and bio- do not have the time to really work on visibility
technology, highlighted the gradual penetration like Greenpeace does as a fundraising strategy.
This is a very distinct phase, and very new, with
of environmental issues into the world of rural its own characteristics corresponding to globaliza-
organizations. Organizations like CECCAM, tion. These organizations came after Rio 92.
which had a national perspective, exhibited some Before, our work was much more situated at the
social environmentalist maturation, halfway national level, whereas now we are participating in
international networks.17
between technical expertise and PR activism, a
stance that brought them closer to expert-activist
16 It is worth recalling the uprising of one of the first
peasant movements, which self-identified sharply as

ecologist from 1997 on. It took place in the Costa Grande
of the Guerrero State, with Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro
Cabrera as its two leaders. They were imprisoned from
15 Nevertheless, we have to take note that this agenda was 1999 to 2001, then forced into exile. In 2000, they won the
strongly influenced by the international agenda, much prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize for their work.
more than by some Mexico-specific features (cf. Miriam 17 Personalinterview, on January 22, 2006. Translation
Alfie Cohen 1995). by L. Kraftowitz.
Although Greenpeace had been present in lenge of this new period. Mobilizations during
Mexico as far back as 1993 for air pollution cam- the WTO summit in Cancun in 2003 empha-
paigns in Mexico City, against the Laguna Verde sized the divisions and risks of some NGOs’
nuclear power plant, and for toxic waste importa- desire to appropriate coordination networks.
tion campaigns, it was not until 1998 that it de- With this change in the perception of scale, a
cided to start a “genetic engineering” campaign part of Mexican environmentalism was drawn
in Mexico. Mexico was considered a strategic into the ideological reconfiguration represented
area for this issue because of its agricultural bio- by the opposition to neoliberal globalization.19
diversity and the risk posed by U.S. imports.18 Importantly enough, some key personalities
In 1999, Silvia Ribeiro, a representative from of this movement were incorporated into the
RAFI (the Rural Advancement Foundation Inter- new environmental ministry when it came to
national, which in 2001 was renamed the ETC be headed by Lichtinger in 2001, after the PRI
Group), experienced in advocacy journalism, was defeated. However, far from meeting ex-
arrived in Mexico from Uruguay. Despite their pectations, the ministry was unable to push for
organizational restraints, Greenpeace and the greater environmental justice, and instead lost
ETC Group played a central role in initiating and political power.
orchestrating campaigns against bio-prospecting In parallel, the 2000s also saw mobilizations
and against transgenic maize. Significantly, they continue against mega-projects, marked by this
introduced some major communicative methods radical new character of peasant and indigenous
to Mexico and became nodal points for an incipi- organizations, which were now integrating the
ent opposition network in training. environmental argument into an increasingly
They quickly created alliances with Mexi- unstructured political discourse in both the
can environmental and peasant organizations. rural and national arenas. While some successes
In this way, Greenpeace linked up with GEA followed violent struggles (like the mobiliza-
and ANEC (La Via Campesina’s other peas- tions against the airport in San Salvador Aten-
ant union) to found the Sin Maiz No Hay Pais co (2001–2002) (Davis and Rosan 2004), and
(“No Corn, No Country”) movement, while the against the “La Parota” dam in the state of Guer-
ETC Group became closer to CECCAM and rero (2003–2012) (Castro-Soto 2005), it was
UNORCA, and formed “Red en Defensa del above all an era of rapid advances of large-scale
Maiz”. Generally speaking, the arrival of these mining projects across a vast section of the na-
international organizations in the context of tional territory. The dynamism of the Asamblea
globalization appears to have “pulled” one sec- Nacional de Afectados Ambientales (NAMAs),
tion of Mexican social environmentalist actors born in 2008 out of previous coalitions and
from the local to the global, and from concrete “caravans” thus illustrates both the gravity of
problems rooted in local communities to more local conditions, and the attempt at a unified en-
structural problems defined in terms of national vironmental struggle against neoliberal policies
and international policy. The confluence of en- (Table 16.2).
vironmental mobilizations into multi-sectoral
coalitions therefore presented the great chal-
18 One of the objectives was to monitor and strengthen as
long as possible the moratorium on GMO corn that had 19 This ideological reconfiguration can be observed
been declared by the Mexican government at the time
(Gustavo Ampugnani, personal interview, January 23, through the systematic denunciation of the NAFTA com-
2006), as well as to impede the authorization of Mexi- mercial agreement, and through the strong support given
can GMO corn, notably through some activist and legal to the neo-Zapatista movement, which constitutes a main
measures. reference point of the alter-globalization movement.
Table 16.2 Four paths of mobilizing a radical oppositional repertoire on a broad social basis: From minimalist trans-
formative collective action to a strong social movement
Escalation of social network mobilization Examples
A Collective action based on one local–national Consejo Mexicano para la sylvicultura Sustentable
connection (CMSS) and its partners
B Coalition of a large number of national environmental Red Nacional de Derecho a la Información Ambi-
organizations enta (RNDIA) en 2001a. Pres Silva, Foromex
C Large coalitions connecting national/transnational Laguna Verde (1987–1988), Tepoztlan (1995–1996),
NGOs with strong local mobilization against big devel- San Salvador Atenco (2002), Presa La Parota
opment projects (2003–2012)
D Large inter-sectoral coalitions where environmental Tepozlán, the “Sin Maïs no hay Païs”, Campaign,
organizations are just one component of a broader Social Forums
social mobilization
a
“Su creación se dio en el marco del II Encuentro Nacional de Ecologistas, donde participaron 50 organizaciones de
26 estados del país” Voir Velazquez, 2005
Conclusion politics” in the name of the dominated20. These

two methods of aggregation not only define two
In the Mexican case, the opposition between, on sides of the Mexican environmental social move-
one hand, an “environmentalism of the poor,” ment, but also match two distinct scholarly defi-
with grassroots movements and mobilized local nitions of what a “social movement” is.21
communities as its basis, and on the other hand a Even though “sustainable community devel-
network of transnational NGOs, does not reflect opment” seems to fit quite well with the diagnosis
the complexity of the different components of the of NGOization and technification, the historical
environmental social movement. Based on the analysis of this particular type of mobilization
analysis of these different organizations and their demonstrates that it cannot be reduced to such
over 30-year-long trajectories, we argue in this a process. Broadly speaking, the tendency is not
chapter that this movement is composed of two unilaterally towards the “NGOization” of social
distinct “organizational fields.” Each one devel- movements through institutionalization (Álvarez
oped from a different coalition between NGOs 1999; Diez 2008). Some old formal organizations
and local organizations, which then became part were indeed in existence before larger mobiliza-
of broader national, international, or transnation- tions, and some cycles of re-politization have oc-
al networks. In these two fields, we can identify curred after a tendency to institutionalization. On
this kind of “transclassism,” a typical feature of the other hand, Alvarez (1999) accurately iden-
the environmental movements, as well as an ex- tified the “double identity” of the leaders who,
tension of coalitions from local to transnational. in spite of institutionalization conserve mixed
Beyond reciprocal stigmatizations claims of networks and repertoires, between NGO and
“elitism” and of “populism,” the best criteria for social movement dynamics (Velasquez 2005).
differentiating these two ways of articulation be- First of all, this field undeniably found its origin
tween local, regional, national, and transnational in the collective mobilizations, with an openly
organizations should be the repertoire of collec- political dimension. Indeed, direct opposition
tive action. Indeed, the sustainable community
development coalitions are more “reformist” and
20 This polarity is close to the one proposed by Pleyers
are focused on the construction of alternatives
(2010) in his in-depth analysis of the alter-globalization
for the poorest, while environmental resistance
movement: between experimentation and counter-exper-
movements put at the foreground “contentious tise.
21 Touraine (1981) could be cited as an example of the
first, and Tarrow (1998) of the second.
to the State and community participation played Locally rooted environmental organizations have
a crucial role; and today, a significant part of flourished over the last decade, but since they
these organizations still maintain close ties with lack visibility as they do not search for larger ac-
the “environmental resistance” field. Moreover, tions, the emerging in-depth analysis of some of
the very strong relations connecting the sustain- these local networks has great value (Velázquez
able community development NGOs to local 2009, Lutz Ley and Salazar Adams 2011).
organizations in marginalized regions, which Finally, who are the true environmentalists?
are even more “professionalized” today, have Those who are constructing development alterna-
always had and maintain a key role. In some tives with marginalized communities, or the ones
cases, this has resulted in long-term processes of who are involved in struggling against the more
organization, autonomy, and empowerment, and aggressive manifestations of a destructive model?
has allowed for the adoption of new productive This polemic, that rattles activists as well as ana-
practices (community forestry, organic coffee lysts, is actually pointless. These two components
growing, fair-trade…), which then transformed both oppose the dominant social order and consti-
the political relations that these communities had tute the two sides of what should rightly be called
with external actors. Of course, the institutional- “Mexican social environmentalism.”
ization of this component is sometimes perceived
as the death of an environmental movement
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Environmental Conflicts and
Social Movements in Postwar 17
El Salvador
Rafael E. Cartagena Cruz
El Salvador is the smallest and most densely This essay characterizes environmental
populated Central American nation, and it lacks struggles in El Salvador from 1992 to 2014; and
vast natural resources, unlike Brazil or Indonesia, discusses what type of environmentalism has
where local fights against extractive industries emerged from them.2 The chapter begins with an
influence worldwide news and even mainstream account of the political and sociological changes
cinema. Yet, post-civil-war ecological and pollu- in the last decades of Salvadoran history. Second,
tion struggles in El Salvador are relevant for envi- the essay presents an overview of post-civil-war
ronmental studies. Since the 1950s, the country environmental conflicts, describing issues at
has been considered one of the most deforested in stake and groups participating in the mobiliza-
Latin America and the Caribbean. Although esti- tions. Third, it discusses how local environmen-
mates of the extent of its forests vary depending tal conflicts have been the “breeding ground” of
on which tree cover categories are used (Hecht Salvadoran environmentalism. Finally, the con-
and Saatchi 2007; FAO 2010), landscapes exhibit clusion section argues that environmentalism in
prominent levels of anthropization due to long- El Salvador is a product of both environmental
term agrarian and urbanization processes.1 More- and social justice struggles and discourses.
over, Salvadorans are recovering from a devas-
tating civil war (1980–1992), and the transition
towards democracy coincided with a strict imple- Historical and Political Background
mentation of Washington Consensus guidelines
such as the privatization of public services and Salvadoran environmentalism was essentially
incentives to foreign investment (Almeida 2008; elitist when it emerged in the mid-twentieth cen-
Wade 2008). These factors have shaped the con- tury. For example, “Friends of the Earth”3 was
cerns and constituency of the Salvadoran envi- a well-known amateur association that boasted
ronmental movement.
2 Previous academic research on this topic is scarce (Na-
varro et al. 2007; Cartagena 2008, 2009a; 2009b; Valen-

1
cia 2012). Therefore, the study relied on sources such as
In a 2010 assessment of land cover, agriculture and pas- media accounts and NGOs reports. Methodology included
tures covered 74 % of the country, including coffee grown archival research, interviews, case studies, and cross-case
under tree cover (10 %). Urban land uses accounted for synthesis. The core of the data was gathered from Carta-
4 % (MARN 2013). gena (2009a), but this paper updates those analyses to in-
clude developments from 2009 to early 2014.
3
It is unrelated to the international homonymous net-
R. E. Cartagena Cruz () work. Friends of the Earth was founded in 1946, and four
San Salvador, El Salvador decades later, in 1987, it was a founding member of the
e-mail: re.cartagenac@gmail.com Unión Ecológica Salvadoreña (Salvadoran Ecological
238 R. E. Cartagena Cruz
among its board of directors some of the largest abundo Martí National Liberation Front) became
coffee planters of the country and the owner of the main opposition party to Alianza Republicana
a leading daily newspaper, which weekly pub- Nacionalista (ARENA, Nationalist Republican
lished a “Conservationist Page” in the 1950s, Alliance), which ruled from 1989 to 2009 with
addressing environmental topics from a neo- a pro-business agenda. Environmental conflicts
Malthusian perspective (El Diario de Hoy 1955a, often reproduced this polarization, to which ac-
1955b). In the early 1970s, some of its mem- tivists reacted. As put by one chief representative
bers and other businessmen financially and po- of Salvadoran environmentalism:
litically supported a conservationist agenda that We began promoting workshops for assembling
filtered into official plans for a “System of Na- bicycles, and have found ourselves most of the
tional Parks and Biological Reserves” (Cartagena time quarreling in the National Assembly with
2012).4 But the 1970s were a decade of intense right-wing conservative groups, who do not want
the situation to change. (Ricardo Navarro, presi-
social struggles staged by labor unions, student, dent of Centro de Tecnología Apropiada, Center
and peasant organizations, which coalesced into of Appropriate Technology, from an unpublished
large multi-sectoral coalitions linked to emerging interview quoted in Cartagena 2009a)
revolutionary organizations. A civil war erupted
in 1980 as the military regime that had served the The general elections of 2009 brought a historic
local economic elites for more than 40 years went change. The center-left alliance headed by the
into crisis (Almeida 2008). FMLN took over the executive branch of the
Following the Peace Accords of 1992, the government, with Mauricio Funes as president
public sphere opened to historically excluded (2009–2014). When choosing the heads of the
sectors. There was a salient surge in conflicts Ministerio de Ambiente y Recursos Naturales
related to policy and investment decisions that (MARN, Ministry of Environment and Natu-
endangered communities’ welfare and natural re- ral Resources), Funes appointed professionals
sources, driven by grassroots groups and accom- who had a trajectory in sustainable development
panied by a myriad of new NGOs. Meanwhile, NGOs. That resulted in some changes in the gov-
the mobilization capacity of trade unions, peas- ernment’s approach to environmental conflicts
ants, and student organizations withered, along and mobilizations.
with the prominence of their traditional claims.
Such changes are most evident in the country-
side, where rural dwellers started to oppose large Environmental Conflicts From 1992 to
infrastructure and waste management facilities, 2014
or mining explorations. Simultaneously, strug-
gles for agricultural wages have become rare. Many struggles to protect ecosystems or the en-
Pro-land reform mobilizations equally vanished vironment may include social justice demands
in the mid-1990s, when land distribution man- or economic objectives; while environmental
dated by the Peace Accords finished. values and discourses may appear in the (eco-
Meanwhile, a two-party system emerged from nomic) struggles for resource access and control
the 1994 general elections. The left-wing former (Hombergh 2004). Thus, environmental conflicts
revolutionary organization Frente Farabundo comprise mobilizations fostering environmental
Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, Far- values, as well as “resource conflicts,” that is,
struggles aimed to securing a natural resource
base for local economies. The third section of
Union, UNES; La Prensa Gráfica 1987), which became in
the 1990s one of the most vocal organizations. this chapter addresses in further detail the links
4 The plans were not implemented at the time, as reflect- between conflicts and environmentalist identity.
ed in the belated declaration of the first national park until This section draws on the analysis of 65 en-
1987, but it lead to the protection of the main forests that vironmental conflicts that took place from 1992
today compose the National System of Natural Protected to early 2013, which are listed in Tables 17.1 and
Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas).
17.2. Some clarifications elucidate the scope of
17 Environmental Conflicts and Social Movements in Postwar El Salvador 239
Table 17.1 Postwar environmental conflicts until the year 2011. El Salvador
Case# Description Time span
1 Waste incineration: proposal to install a tire incinerator in La Unión city port 1993
2 Water rights: proposal to exploit springs in Nahulingo for water provision of Son- 1993–1994
sonate city
3 Electricity production: construction of a diesel-powered facility in the outskirts of San 1995–1998
Salvador city
4 Water rights: proposal to exploit spring/wells in Izalco for water provision of Son- 1995
sonate city
5 Water rights: expansion of the water system in Panchimalco 1995
6 Water rights: expansion of the water system in the municipality of San Ramón, 1996
Cuscatlán
7 Waste incineration: proposal for waste disposal in the metropolitan area of San 1995–1997
Salvador
8 Water rights: conflict over community rights to manage public water service at rural 1995–1997
Tacuba
9 River pollution and soil erosion: extraction of materials from Jiboa River, El Rosario, 1995–1997
La Paz
10 Water rights: conflict over community rights to manage public water service in rural 1996
Ataco
11 Water rights: installation of bottled water and soft drinks industry in Nejapa 1996–1997
12 Landfill proposal for wastes from the metropolitan area of San Salvador 1996–1997
13 Energy: propane gas (cooking gas) containers set up in La Union city port 1997
14 Tenure rights and deforestation: struggle to prevent partition of El Espino farm, San 1991–1998
Salvador city
15 Water shortage: attributed to agri-business in rural San Martín 1998
16 River pollution: wastes from coffee mills dumped in rural Sonsonate, Santa Ana and 1990s
Ahuachapán
17 River pollution and soil erosion: extraction of stone materials from Angue River, 1995–2000
Metapán
18 Toxic waste: illegal burial of agrochemicals in rural Suchitoto 1998–2000
19 Toxic waste: agrochemicals stored in a warehouse in rural Cuisnahuat 1998–2000
20 Watercourse obstruction: construction debris dumped in El Garrobo Creek, San Salva- 1990s–2000s
dor city
21 Waste management: open dump disposal in Santa Cruz Michapa 1990s–2000s
22 Watercourse overflow: struggles for prevention measures in the metropolitan area 1990s–2000s
23 Waste management: disposal done at Ojos de Agua District, Cojutepeque 2001
24 Air pollution: ashes from sugar mill in San Miguel city felt over university campus 2000–2002
25 Municipal sewage system proposal in Apaneca 2002
26 Toxic waste: chemicals for the cooking gas industry dumped in El Tobalón, La Paz Early 2000s
27 River pollution and stench caused by a pig farm in San Julián, Sonsonate 2004–2005
28 Water shortage in suburban Residencial Los Chorros, Lourdes 2005
29 Water shortage in Colonia Montelimar, Olocuilta 2004–2006
30 By-pass road construction on the outskirts of Usulután city 2005–2006
31 Water rights: proposal to exploit wells in rural Ishuatán to provide water to Cuisna- 2005–2006
huat, Sonsonate
32 Water rights: expansion of the water system in Colonia Buena Vista, Ahuachapán 2005–2006
33 Landfill construction: design flaws and pollution at waste facility in rural El Carmen, 2006
La Union
34 Tenure rights: conflict over land property at site hit by the 2001 earthquake, Santa 2001–2007
Tecla city
35 Construction of beltway (“Anillo Periférico”) through the metropolitan area 2002–2007
Table 17.1 (continued)

Case# Description Time span
36 Gold mining explorations in eastern municipalities of department of Chalatenango 2005–2007
37 Landfill proposal for waste disposal at San Isidro, Cabañas 2005–2007
38 Damages to coral reef Los Cóbanos due to beach resort expansion, in Acajutla 2007
39 Landfill proposal for disposal of waste at the Cutumay Camones District of Santa Ana 2007
40 Toxic waste: agrochemical leakage in an abandoned warehouse, city of San Miguel 1999–2011
41 Tenure rights: legal dispute over land of rural settlement Santa Marta, Cabañas 1998–2011
Dates refer to a time span for which it was possible to document complaints, petitions, protests, or other public col-
lective actions
Table 17.2 Ongoing environmental conflicts circa 2012. El Salvador

Case# Description Start year
42 Floods caused by dam 15 de Septiembre: struggles for compensation and prevention 1990s
measures
43 Shortage of water in six municipalities of the metropolitan area of San Salvador 1990s
44 Conservation: community challenges to restrictions in El Impossible National Park 1990s
45 Deforestation of Cordillera del Bálsamo, as result of urban sprawl in the metropolitan area 1994
46 Beach resort and land tenure: proposal for urbanization at Garita Palmera, Ahuachapán 1995
47 Hydroelectric dam El Cimarron: proposal for taking water from Lempa River, 1997
Chalatenango
48 Deforestation of El Espino coffee farm: real estate projects and highway construction 1999
49 Hydroelectric dam El Chaparral: proposal for dam on Torola River, San Miguel 2000
50 Tenure rights: regularization of precarious urban settlements on the railway sides in Santa 2001
Ana
51 Landfill construction and operation in Salinas de Ayacachapa, Sonsonate 2002
52 Tenure rights: regularization of precarious urban settlements on the railway sides in San 2003
Salvador
53 Geothermal energy: pollution attributed to geothermal plant in Berlín, Usulután 2004
54 Gold mining explorations in eastern municipalities of the department of Cabañas 2005
55 Toxic waste: lead pollution from a car battery factory, in San Juan Opico 2005
56 Tenure rights: proposal to relocate precarious urban settlements in Antiguo Cuscatlán 2006
57 Water rights: crisis of the municipal public water system of rural Tacuba 2006
58 Power plants: proposal to build a power-facilities using coal or natural gas at city port of 2007
La Union
59 Mina San Sebastián: pollution from an abandoned mine, rural Santa Rosa de Lima 2008
60 Sugarcane: pollution of air and water bodies in departments La Paz and Usulután 2008
61 Conservation: local inhabitants demanding permits for shrimp farming in Jiquilisco’s 2010
mangroves
62 Landfill construction in Las Chinamas, outskirts of Ahuachapán city 2010
63 Landfill construction in El Zompopo District, rural Texistepeque 2011
64 Landfill redesign proposal in Melara District, rural La Libertad 2011
65 Deforestation in Mejicanos for building a megastore 2011
Dates refer to beginning of complaints, petitions, protests, and other public collective actions. Though these may have
faded away in some cases, concerns remain among local inhabitants
this sample. First, conflicts that did not evolve Environmental NGOs have addressed the lat-
into public debates and collective action were not ter vacuum channeling funding to forge regional
included in this study. Thus, the following analy- or national coalitions among grassroots groups;
sis comprises cases that prompted decisions from but those networks have a tendency to be short
either local or national authorities, as a result of lived. For instance, the Red de Ambientalistas
denunciations in the media, public petitions, ral- en Acción (Network of Environmentalists in Ac-
lies, or street protests.5 Second, the list focuses tion) engaged rural communities of the central
on conflicts triggered by threats or risks to local- and western regions; it was active through the
ized resources or ecosystems, as the aim of this mid-2000s, but fell into inactivity afterwards.
section is to point out local considerations behind The Asociación de Comunidades Afectadas por
environmental mobilization. Thus, most con- el Anillo Periférico y Bypass (Association of
flicts challenged decisions or interventions that Communities Affected by Beltway and Bypass
had local impacts. In 48 of the 65 cases, a single Projects) and Movimiento Nacional Anti-repre-
municipality6 was affected by direct impacts or sas (National Anti-dam Movement) experienced
risks. An increase in the scale of intervention cor- a similar fate in the early and mid-2000s, respec-
relates to uncertainty about the number of mu- tively. The only active networks 5 years after
nicipalities involved. Most cases appeared not to their launching are the Mesa Nacional Frente a la
reach farther than five neighboring municipali- Minería Metálica (National Roundtable against
ties. In the remaining cases, the extent of impacts Metallic Mining, known as Mesa Nacional) and
is disputable. the Foro Nacional para la Defensa, Derecho y
The Salvadoran environmental movement re- Sustentabilidad del Agua (National Forum for
flects the atomization of environmental conflicts. Water Defense, Rights, and Sustainability). These
Most struggles have been local driven by rural or networks survive because of strong involvement
urban grassroots groups, in alliance with profes- of professional NGOs.
sional NGOs that address environment, develop-
ment or human rights issues. These allies have
provided legal advice, knowledge, media con- Triggers of Citizens Concern
tacts, financial, and logistical resources (Almeida
and Stearns 1998). Yet, the Salvadoran environ- Since the 1980s, vast national transformations
mental organizations lack an articulated nation- reshaped investment priorities, which in turn
wide social base, or a large number of activists caused most decisions, actions, and proposals
and sympathizers to mobilize in solidarity with that sparked environmental struggles. Among
single local struggles. those transformations are a declining share of
agriculture in GDP and exports, urbanization,
and infrastructure expansion (Cartagena 2009a).
Table 17.3 shows the frequency of projects and
5
The sample is a selection from a larger list of cases iden-
economic activities that triggered the 65 conflicts
tified in bulletins, reports, memos, newspapers, and other
documents kept in environmental NGOs archives and examined. Unsurprisingly given the decline in ag-
repositories, as well as personally interviewing activists riculture, agricultural activities (cases # 15, 60),
(Cartagena 2009a). Thus, the sample may underestimate agro-industry (# 16, 24), and animal raising (#27)
the occurrence of conflicts of little interest to media and
seldom led to conflicts or did so indirectly, as
environmental groups.
6 The exemplified by unsafe disposal of unused pesti-
country is divided into 262 municipalities, each
managed by a mayor and city council elected every 3 cides (# 18, 19, 40). Also foreseeable due to the
years. Proactively or reactively, they confront environ- limited extension of officially protected conser-
mental issues for they must provide waste collection and vation areas7, restrictions imposed to local in-
management, construction permits and other relevant ser-
vices. There is an intermediate division into 14 depart-
ments, yet their appointed governors have a limited influ- 7 By late 2007, they comprised 0.5
% of the country
ence on environmental matters.
(Cartagena 2009a).
Table 17.3 Environmental conflicts prompted by economic activities and controversial projects. El Salvador, from
1992 to 2012
Type of project/economic activity Count % ( n = 65)
Conservation of natural areas (restrictions on the local inhabitants) 2 3.1
Public water systems 12 18.5
Expansion plans for water systems 7 10.8
Failure of public service 5 7.7
Collection and disposal of postconsumer wastea 11 16.9
Municipal landfill/dumping sites 10 15.4
Municipal sewage system 1 1.5
Urban expansion and urban land issues 12 18.5
Precarious urban settlements/eviction threats 3 4.6
Urbanization and construction 7 10.8
Road construction 2 3.1
Energy generation and distribution 10 15.4
Hydroelectric and geothermal 4 6.2
Thermal (diesel, carbon, gas) generation 2 3.1
Waste incineration (municipal waste, tires) 2 3.1
Storage and distribution of propane gas 2 3.1
Farming and rural settlements 7 10.8
Rural land tenure issues (agriculture and settlements) 1 1.5
Commercial agriculture 2 3.1
Farms (animal husbandry) 1 1.5
Disposal and storage of agrochemicals 3 4.6
Mining and quarrying 5 7.7
Exploration and mining (gold and silver) 3 4.6
Extraction of non-metallic materials 2 3.1
Industry and agro-industry (excluding energy) 4 6.2
Agro-industry 2 3.1
Other industries 2 3.1
Tourism and/or ecotourism 2 3.1
Hotels and other tourism infrastructure 1 1.5
Real estate development in coastal areas 1 1.5
Total 65 100
a
Waste incineration for energy generation is excluded
habitants rarely sparked high-profile opposition tion, and (d) collection and disposal of postcon-
(# 44, 61)8. sumer waste.
Struggles mainly rejected four types of proj-
ects or situations: (a) public water systems ex- Public water systems
pansion or failure, (b) urban expansion and urban The operation of public water services has been a
land issues, (c) energy generation and distribu- leading cause of conflicts, divided in three types.
First, rejection of projects that wanted to use a
source already serving a community, in order to
8
Low-public-profile conflicts were omitted, although all supply water to other settlements. Citizens feared
protected areas face hunting, firewood extraction, crops, that the new project would over-exploit the re-
or human settlements. For instance, the Montecristo Na- source (# 2, 4, 5, 6, 31, 32). Second, rural com-
tional Park is excluded from the sample but conflicts are
latent. Over a 100 families inhabit the park without secu- munities reacted to a precarious service trying to
rity of tenure (Cartagena 2012). take over the management of local water sources,
even by force (# 8, 10, 57). Third, protests to de- the reservoir’s water level approached safety lim-
mand solutions to water scarcity in urban areas, its, discharges occurred without enough warning
which could linger for weeks during the dry sea- time and evacuation previsions, as during Hur-
son (# 15, 28, 29, 43). ricane Mitch (1998). This has resulted in human
casualties and extensive loss of crops, livestock,
Urban expansion and urban land issues and homes in the lower Lempa River basin. Dur-
Land-use change in urban areas or land tenure ing the 1990s, two dams were designed and chal-
conflicts for urban use accounted for ten cases in lenged (#47, 49) on the grounds of population
the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (AMSS, displacement and river deviation, respectively.
Área Metropolitana de San Salvador) and two
more cases in inner cities.9 Land tenure conflicts Collection and disposal of postconsumer waste
evolved around informal settlements on public Almost a fifth of conflicts related to pollution or
lands (# 30, 50), long-established settlements of pollution risks resulting from waste management
colonos10 in private coffee farms transformed to issues elicited by municipal landfills, dumping
urban use (# 14, 56), and a contested memorial sites or incineration proposals. Ordinary (mu-
park for victims of the January 2001 earthquake nicipal) waste disposal spurred ten conflicts. In
(# 34). Deforestation was a salient trigger for two conflicts, communities fought municipalities
conflict in four cases, comprising clearance of that discarded waste in open dumps (#21, 23),
shaded coffee11 farms (#14, 45, 48) and of down- forbidden by the 1998 Environment Law. After-
town tree remnants (#65). In San Salvador, two wards, local governments preferred landfill con-
conflicts concerned flood risks: one related to struction, an option shunned by citizens. Seven
land use changes (#22), another to unsafe dispos- cases of public opposition emerged, resulting in
al of construction debris (#20). Finally, highway two halted projects (#37, 39) and one closed by
expansion/construction accounted for two cases MARN (#33).
(#30, 35). Notice that conflicts take place in pri- Conflicts related to waste management
vate and public (state and municipal) land. amount to almost a third of all cases, compris-
ing municipal services, energy utilities, mining,
Energy generation and distribution industry and agro-industry, agriculture, and con-
In the early postwar years, environmental orga- struction. Table 17.4 presents five types of waste
nizations successfully blocked two waste incin- management issues (not economic activities) in-
erator proposals (#1, 7). They also contested but volving ordinary, special, and hazardous wastes.
could not stop a diesel-powered facility (#3) and Hazardous waste disposal led to six cases
a propane gas storage farm (#13). Since the late (Table 17.4), including four milestone examples
1990s, energy disputes include concern for pollu- of advances in law enforcement and problem-
tion from a geothermal plant (#53), new propos- solving capacities by state institutions. In 1998, a
als for thermal facilities (#58), and hydropower trader company discarded dozens of agrochemi-
(#42, 47, 49). An early-1980s hydroelectric dam cals drums by burying them in an open field or
became a visible disaster threat (#42). In this case, a rural community (#18). When discovered, the
drums were taken to a warehouse in another mu-
9 nicipality, resulting in a new conflict with its own
This account excludes case #46 caused by tourist and
real estate interests in a rural coastal community. dynamics (#19). In 1999, an abandoned ware-
10
Agrarian labor precariously housed in latifundia with house stored dozens of drums leaking agrochem-
the right to cultivate a small area for self-subsistence. icals (#40), in the city of San Miguel. During
Colonos’ descendants still live in estates that became 2000, three people died after industrial chemicals
urban land or national parks.
were dumped on the sides of a country road (#
11 Coffee plantations grown under the shade of large trees 26). In 2007, the Ministry of Health shut a car
are valued as part of the country’s forests, because they
have strategic roles for biodiversity protection and climate battery factory, after blood samples taken from
change mitigation (Hecht and Saatchi 2007).
Table 17.4 Environmental conflicts prompted by waste management. El Salvador, from 1992 to 2012
Type of project/activity Count % ( n = 65)
Municipal landfills/dumping sites 10 15.4
Incineration proposals (municipal waste, tires) 2 3.1
Municipal sewage system 1 1.5
Hazardous/toxic wastes (chemicals, lead pollution) 6 9.2
Disposal of construction debris 1 1.5
Total 20 30.8
surrounding residents revealed high lead levels Ecosystem Services and Natural
(#55). The four cases were brought to trial and, Resources at Stake
although some suspects were declared innocent,
the practice of toxic disposal in open fields was The variegated issues and arguments raised in
largely eliminated. Meanwhile, the government environmental conflicts may be classified ac-
stepped up for proper mitigation. MARN shipped cording to types of ecosystem functions/services
the first set of toxic drums (#18, 19) to the Neth- damaged or threaten in each situation (Millen-
erlands for safe destruction, in 2002. Then, it paid nium Ecosystem Assessment 2003). Yet, Salva-
for the incineration of the second set of drums doran grassroots groups seldom expressed con-
(#40) in a cement factory operating in the coun- cerns in that academic type of vocabulary, but as
try, in 2010. That same year, MARN assessed the damages or risks for discrete goods and natural
presence of lead particles in soils and homes near resources (Cartagena 2009a). Table 17.5 classi-
the old batteries factory (#55), and began a defies environmental concerns conjoining the aca-
contamination program that continues with com- demic and popular languages.
munity monitoring. As stated in Table 17.5, three quarters of strug-
gles showed concerns for provisioning services,
that is, primary goods provided by ecosystems
Table 17.5 Natural resources at risk and associated ecosystem services, according to mobilized grassroots groups’
concerns. El Salvador, from 1992 to 2012. (Classification of ecosystem services based on Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2003, and Gómez-Baggethun and de Groot 2007)
Resources and ecosystem services involved Count % ( n = 65)
Functions or provision services 48 74
Water supply (provision services) 38 58
Crops/animals (provision services) 16 25
Fisheries and aquaculture (provision services) 8 12
Regulating functions or services 37 57
Water quality (regulating services) 18 28
Air quality (regulating services) 14 22
Flood control (regulating services) 7 11
Substrate services 18 28
Land for settlements and agriculture (substrate services) 18 28
Functions of habitat for flora and fauna 18 28
Rivers and lakes (habitat for flora and fauna) 9 14
Forests, mountains, tree cover (habitat for flora and fauna) 9 14
Cultural services 12 19
Rivers (cultural services) 6 9
Forests, mountains, tree cover (cultural services) 5 8
Marine and coastal resources (cultural services) 3 5
such as water sources, crops, livestock, and fire- Social Origins of Grassroots
wood. Citizens also feared the impacts of pollu- Mobilizations
tion and deforestation on issues such as air qual-
ity, water quality and availability, pests and local The social characteristics of those groups taking
climate. These concerns account for damages part in collective action reflect on their territo-
and risks to regulating services, that is, the water rial provenance, economic activities and income
cycle, water and air purification, microclimate source, gender, etc. The names of towns or com-
regulation, or pest control. People also contested munities which issued complaints are known
threats to land rights resulting from tenure con- for most cases; accordingly, it was possible to
flicts or evictions triggered by large infrastruc- determine that most of of the conflicts emerged
ture projects, such as roadways, freeways, and in rural communities or territories. However,
dams. These situations compromised substrate available records—found in media and NGO
services, which are suitable places for people to reports—provide meager information about the
locate settlements, crops, and livestock.12 locality’s income source or livelihood base to as-
Concerns about risks to wildlife or natural en- sess social class. Data about women’s participa-
vironments—that is, risks for habitat services— tion was even less reliable.13
showed up in struggles against deforestation, Table 17.6 summarizes references to the geo-
pollution of rivers, or damage to coral reefs. In graphic origins of mobilizations (urban or rural),
a lesser proportion, local grassroots groups also People from rural municipalities and rural pe-
worried about losing cultural services, meaning ripheries/districts (peasants, cattle raisers) en-
benefits attached to ecosystems, such as recre- gaged in 71 % of conflicts, while urban dwell-
ational, spiritual, or aesthetic experiences. Such ers from San Salvador and urban municipalities
conflicts usually referred to rivers and coastal re- showed up in 40 % of cases (see Table 17.6 notes
sources. The total number of conflicts involving for definitions).
water—provision, regulating, cultural and habi- Based on expressed concerns and communi-
tat services—amounts to 44 (68 %). Such a trend ties of origin, engaged rural and urban citizens do
reconfirms severe institutional failures in water not come from middle or upper classes. Rather,
management, and increased public awareness most participants come from the poor, as af-
about the country’s limited and polluted water firmed by one informant:
resources. The population that gives the fight is mainly the
Citizens also expressed anguish about en- vulnerable population, the [directly] affected…
vironment changes that do not fit into the re- there is no middle class that constitutes a [social]
sources/system classification of concerns in movement. Here, those who struggle against
NAFTA, against the Plan Puebla Panama are rural
Table 17.5. They listed conditions that may af- people, not the professionals from universities;
fect the quality of the living environment, such there is no middle-class movement. (Cecilia Oli-
as noise, pollution and odors; or the emergence vares, representative of the Salvadoran Ecological
of risks caused by new infrastructure or interven- Union, from an unpublished interview quoted in
Cartagena 2009a)
tions. Examples are a neighborhood corner trans-
formed into a crossing point of high-speed lanes
(#35), or a pleasant village where life is disturbed
by trucks taking garbage to a landfill (#51). At
least 17 conflicts (26 %) explicitly displayed this
type of concern.
13
Women were accounted only when they were indi-
vidual leaders (#6, 8, 56) or when women’s organizations
openly engaged in mobilizations (#53, 54). Such informa-
12 tion could indicate underreporting, since rural and urban
Substrate services are not considered in the Millenni-
um Ecosystem Assessment (2003) but in Gómez-Bagget- women have taken leadership and public roles in their
hun and de Groot (2007). communities during the postwar years (Herrera 2008).
Table 17.6 Environmental conflicts by territory of residence of mobilized population. El Salvador, from 1992
to 2012
Type of territorya Count % ( n = 65)
San Salvador Metropolitan Area (AMSS) 16 25
Popular urban sectors 8 12
Middle-class urban sectors 6 9
Residents of the rural periphery 7 11
Urban municipalities (except AMSS) 13 20
Main town mobilizations 10 15
Rural districts mobilizations 5 8
High-density rural municipalities 15 23
Main town mobilizations 8 12
Rural mobilizations 3 5
No data available for residence or occupation 4 6
Low-density rural municipalities 19 29
Urban mobilizations 18 28
Rural mobilizations 3 5
Urban environmental activism without local or grassroots mobilization 2 3
Total 65 100
a
AMSS includes 14 municipalities, but some conflicts involved adjacent municipalities
Urban municipalities defined as those where 50 % or more of its inhabitants lived in urban areas, according to the
2007 Census Threshold between low- and high-density rural municipalities defined at 150 inhabitants per km2 Rural
mobilizations comprise actions by people living in districts (or cantones) outside the main municipality “town” (casco
urbano), or population depending on agricultural livelihoods, fishing, and animal husbandry Urban and main town
mobilizations include actions by people living in the main municipality “town” (casco urbano)
A Typology of Involved Organizations have a thematic specialization derived from their

mission. Examples are municipal governments
There are two main types of civil society orga- and locally rooted NGOs (type I-b). Table 17.7
nizations engaged in environmental conflicts, summarizes the participation frequency of all
which differ in their territorial reach, resources, three types.
and relationship to stakeholders. First, there are Type I-a organizations took part in almost
groups representing local communities or territo- all cases (59 of 65), and type I-b organizations
ries with a direct stake in the conflict’s outcome joined half the cases, which is less than the type
(type I); secondly, those that join the struggle II involvement. The latter participated in 77 % of
because of their scope or mission statement, that all 65 cases. If only conflicts or struggles outside
is, organizations with headquarters in the capital of the metropolitan area are counted (49 cases),
city (type II). these capital-city-based organizations acted in 34
The first type can be subdivided into two sub- cases, that is 69 % of this subsample. Table 17.7
types. On the one hand, grassroots or civic orga- endorses two empirical findings. First, small
nizations that represent small communities, such urban and rural communities have a salient role
as community development associations (ADES- in environmental conflicts and environmental
CO), small cooperatives or ad hoc committees movements. Second, most struggles have taken
organized to coordinate collective action (type the form of coalitions between local grassroots
I-a). On the other hand, organizations and institu- groups and organizations with greater resources
tions that foster local interests, but are not limited acting as allies (see Almeida and Stearns 1998 for
to the realm of the small community. These usu- other similar cases in Asia).
ally have some paid employees; sometimes they
Table 17.7 Environmental conflicts by type of grouping mobilized. El Salvador, from 1992 to 2012
Count % ( n = 65)
Type I-a: Grassroots (community/neighborhood) organizations 59 91
Type I-b: Other local organizations 30 46
Type II: Extra-local organizations 50 77
The top local allies (type I-b) backing up mental conflicts. Of the two large hydropower
grassroots groups were municipal governments projects inherited from the ARENA era, the new
(23 % of conflicts); their support usually involves government ordered to fully redesign the El
local activists and leadership from the mayor’s Cimarrón project (#47), but refused to stop El
own party14 (Almeida 2010). Parties show dif- Chaparral (#49), since construction was under-
ferent participation patterns, FMLN backed 12 way. In the first case, there was no final decision
out of 15 cases with municipal involvement. The as to early 2013. In El Chaparral, the grassroots
latter trend indicates differences in Salvadoran movement changed its main objective, from stop-
political culture, since right-wing followers gen- ping the project to focus on a “fair bargaining”
erally reject social protests, while leftist activists (Valencia 2012).17
usually embrace environmental causes. The other Concerning anti-mining struggles, activists
relevant local allies are Catholic Church groups hoped that the Funes government would sup-
or representatives (11 %)15. Non-Catholic faith- port a definite ban on metallic mining. Instead,
based organizations have a less frequent role. in 2012, MARN proposed a law to the National
The main extra-local allies (type II) were envi- Assembly, which would temporarily suspend
ronmental organizations with headquarters in the mining permits until the national capacities to
capital city, as they turned up in 63 % of all con- regulate and control mining activities were im-
flicts. Human rights or development NGOs had proved. Meanwhile, the FMLN hesitated to
a much lesser involvement. Meanwhile, unions support its own bill to ban metallic mining, pro-
and students16 acting as allies account for just posed in 2006. MARN addressed other conflict-
one and three cases, respectively. generating situations, especially major pollution
cases (#40, 59, 55, 60). Also, it implemented a
program to support municipalities in construct-
Governmental Changes and ing landfills with new standards, which prompted
Environment Conflicts Since 2009 local opposition (#63, 64). Unlike before 2009,
those struggles were not supported by the most
The center-left government that took office in vocal environmental organizations in the postwar
2009 developed a new stance on many environ- years, the Unión Ecológica Salvadoreña (UNES,
Salvadoran Ecological Union) or the Centro de
Tecnología Apropiada (CESTA, Center of Ap-
14 Until2012, the winning party in municipal elections propriate Technology). Both NGOs, kept their
kept the mayor seat and 100 % of the council seats. Thus, critical stance on some governmental policies,
local government and political party completely over-
such as gold mining and hydroelectric dams, but
lapped.
15 at the same time avoided to stage conflictual mo-
Catholic Church representatives are considered here as
local instead of extra-local actor, since diocesan bodies bilizations that would suggest they were siding
engaged in conflicts recruited their members among the with the right-wing opposition to Funess gov-
local population. Even bishops have roots in the territo-
ries.
17
16 University students supported the El Espino case (#14) After a harsh storm showed compromising geological
and the anti-mining campaign (#54, 59). They also carried risks, construction of El Chaparral halted in May 2010
on a struggle against pollution in San Miguel (#24). and had not resumed by May 2015.
ernment. Thus, support for local communities Both types of concerns are evident in water
opposing the new landfills came from the Coor- conflicts. Thus, mobilizations stirred by con-
dinadora Nacional de Medio Ambiente (CNMA, tamination expose a discourse about protecting
National Coordination for the Environment), water. Others exploded when rural inhabitants
an organization hardly known before 2010. The learned of plans to build water systems using
CNMA is not linked to leading environmental or- local springs, not to serve the local communi-
ganizations or the FMLN, instead it drew support ties lacking access to water, but to “export” it
from ARENA deputies (Morán 2011). Moreover, to cities or other municipalities. In these cases,
some environmentalists affirm that the CNMA discourses showed both social justice issues and
gets funding from a private monopoly, whose worries about the over-exploitation of local water
business interests benefit when blocking the con- resources (cases #2, 6, 31).
struction of landfills (Flores 2011; Consejo So- However, water conflicts also demonstrate
cial 2011). that the link from environmental conflicts to en-
vironmentalism is not a direct one. For example,
protests triggered by water shortages in urban
From Environmental Conflicts to Envi- areas do not elaborate a discourse about ecologi-
ronmentalism cal conditions that affect water provision. Hence,
for struggles around natural resources to be con-
Many environmental struggles in Latin America sidered an expression of environmentalism, val-
are carried out by groups and individuals who do ues underlying mobilizations should relate to
not see themselves as environmentalists (Mar- ideas such as sustainable use of limited resourc-
tínez-Alier 1995; Folchi 2001; Fontaine 2003). es, or notions of human–nature interdependence
Accordingly, the environmental conflicts ap- (Folchi 2001). If based on these criteria, the only
proach that informed the previous analysis does environmental struggles in El Salvador discon-
not presuppose an environmentalist identity as a nected from environmentalism would be those
driver for collective action. However, at least in sparked exclusively by water scarcity, land tenure
El Salvador, such conflicts have been the “breed- issues, or restrictions resulting from conservation
ing ground” of a sort of new social movement we of ecosystems. Even in these cases though, en-
could call environmentalism. gaged actors may not be totally unaware of ideas
This recent Salvadoran environmentalism about sustainable use of resources.
seems to be of a hybrid type, because it reacts to
both classic environmentalist discourses and as
well as social justice issues. Notice in Table 17.6 Small and Large Environmental
that damages or risks for regulating ecosys- Coalitions
tem services appear in 57 % of the cases. When
summed up, concerns for regulating, habitat or Most environmental struggles in El Salvador
cultural ecosystem services account for 41 cases develop as coalitions between local groups that
(63 %); including pollution, clearance of forests usually show no explicit environmentalist identi-
and other natural areas. Such topics echo the ty and those that do. The latter may be recognized
1960s archetypal environmentalism of indus- by their names or stated objectives, as the talk
trialized countries. At the same time, 55 (85 %) about protecting nature or fighting anthropogenic
mobilizations contested threats or risks for pro- causes of environmental degradation.18
visioning or substrate ecosystem services , that
is, community livelihoods and assets. Thus, eco-
nomic distribution and social justice issues are
18
exceedingly relevant, as in depictions of the envi- However, other groups may adhere to values of envi-
ronmental protection and sustainability, but do not neces-
ronmentalism of the poor (Martínez-Alier 1995, sarily define their identity or mission accordingly.
2002) and eco-populism (Szasz 1994).
Table 17.8 Participation of environmental organizations in environmental conflicts, from 1992 to 2012
Count % ( n = 65)
Total cases involving environmental organizations 44 68
Grassroots community based 10 15
Local environmental NGOs 7 11
Environmental NGOs with national scope 41 63
Total cases without involvement of environmentalists 21 32
Consistent with Table 17.8, community or not every grassroots group facing a threat to its
grassroots groups who call themselves environ- natural resource base looked for allies among en-
mentalists19 turn up rather infrequently. Possibly, vironmentalists.21 On other hand, most cases (61
the social identities that unite or give meaning to of 65) account for the participation of entities dif-
local citizens in these struggles could be more ferent or additional to environmentalists, which
traditional; they may think of themselves as peas- confirms that a stated environmentalist identity is
ants, communities, the poor, or the people. How- not a precondition for involvement.
ever, grassroots organizations often look for allies By contrast, environmentalists rarely engage
among environmentalists. As Table 17.8 shows, in struggles if not allied to grassroots organiza-
environmental organizations from the capital city tions. Organizations such as UNES and CESTA
joined two thirds of all cases, and they tend to seem to fear that campaigns lacking local mo-
be the same organizations. In 32 out of the 44 bilization may have insufficient legitimacy, and
cases with environmentalist involvement, either low chances of success. Some activists think
UNES or CESTA joined.20 These NGOs repre- they should not engage in campaigns “if com-
sent a strand of the environmental social justice munities do not mobilize first to defend their
movement critical of capitalism, named counter- own resources” (Raquel Cruz, representative
hegemonic (Gudynas 1992) or critical ecology of the Center of Appropriate Technology, from
(see Chap. 18 in this volume). an unpublished interview quoted in Cartagena
Interestingly, one third of the conflicts evolved 2009a). Accordingly, the sample only shows
without engagement of any environmental orga- two cases of activism without local grassroots
nization (21 of 65 cases). Many were prompted support: pollution from an abandoned gold mine
by water system failures or plans that caused fear (#59) and the deforestation of El Espino farm
of over-exploitation of water sources (#6, 8, 10, after 1998 (#48). The former may be explained
11, 15, 28, 29, 32, 43). Others evolved around because local villagers are now engaged in
land tenure conflicts (#34, 41, 50, 52, 56), flood- artisanal mining22, while the latter will be ad-
ing risks (20, 22, 42), pollution (#3, 19, 24), and dressed in next section.
restrictions to livelihoods caused by conservation
measures (#61). Most were strictly local conflicts
around provisioning ecosystem services. Thus,
19
Using names like “ecologic group,” “environmental
committee,” or ”environmental monitoring committee” 21
(Grupo ecológico, comité ambiental, comité de monitoreo Interestingly, one sustainable development NGO sup-
ambiental, respectively). ported communities challenging strict conservation mea-
20 sures in El Imposible National Park (Martínez 1997).
Counted cases refer to having a salient role in the coali- 22 Insufficient information in four conflicts (#3, 7, 11, and
tion, but both UNES and CESTA have public statements
on a larger number of conflicts, including many not listed 38) does not enable to confirm or rule out local grassroots
in the sample. participation.
Two Landmark Coalitions: “El Espino” with nefarious metropolitan consequences—such

and Anti-Mining Mobilizations as increased flooding dangers during the rainy
season (#22). Few activists have staged protests
Some conflicts are particularly suited to trigger or denunciations, without much support from
the convergence of environmentalism with other public opinion, except journalistic publications.
social movements because of the wide range of Meanwhile, the municipalities of San Salvador
concerns they prompt. The top post-civil-war and Antiguo Cuscatlán preserved remnants of
alliances of this type are the 1990s campaign the coffee plantations as their joint “ecological”
to prevent the urbanization of Finca El Espino park. The cooperative also has its own “ecologi-
(#14) and the ongoing campaign against gold cal” park, but it has sold at least half of the re-
mining projects (# 36, 54, 59). maining land to real estate developers (Baires
El Espino is the largest shaded coffee planta- 2010; Labrador 2012).
tion adjacent to prime metropolitan real estate23. Gold mining prompted the other large coali-
The 1980 agrarian reform seized the property and tion in 2005. It started from rural struggles in
organized workers in the El Espino Cooperative. Chalatenango and Cabañas and has broadened up
A few years later, a court took part of the Coop- to a national scale with transnational allies and
erative’s property and returned it to the former scope. In the northern department of Chalatenan-
landowners, who planned to urbanize it at a high go, there is a strong sense of territorial identity
price (Martínez 2003). Struggles to prevent the marked by shared war experiences and a long
clearance of El Espino happened in two stages, trajectory of peasant and territorial organization
with actors and objectives changing to the point that predates war (Borgh 2003). Thus, citizens
that it can be considered two different conflicts and local governments cohesively rejected min-
(#14 from 1991 to 1998, and #48 since 1999). ing exploration and, in late 2005, they “expelled”
In the first stage, the court’s decision against a Canadian mining company while in the early
the tenure rights of the cooperative became exploratory stages (Cartagena 2009b). Contrast-
politically contested. Moreover, the peace ac- ingly, in the central department of Cabañas, the
cords strengthened the Comité de Defensa del Canadian company Pacific Rim built a support-
Espino ( El Espino Defense Committee), which ive social base among its employees, their fami-
amalgamated unions, peasants, cooperative fed- lies, and local governments. This region displays
erations, diverse religious groups, human rights a conservative political culture and clientelist tra-
NGOs, universities, political entities (including ditions. According to an anti-mining local leader,
the FMLN), students, and environmental orga- most communities in Cabañas “have been pretty
nizations. For many coalition members, before tough to organize, they do not like to get orga-
environmental concerns, the issue at stake was a nized” (Francisco Pineda, president of the Envi-
class confrontation between the cooperative and ronmental Committee of Cabañas, from an un-
the traditional elite. However, environmental- published interview quoted in Cartagena 2009a).
ists framed a discourse that raised environmental War memories and enduring impunity could be
awareness in the public eye (Martínez 2003). deterring collective actions due to fears of social
The second stage started in 1998, when the protest as the prelude to political violence:
Cooperative’s board of directors entered into an one compañera [fellow woman] was telling me…
agreement with the government and landowners, she is a religious person…that the priest advised
breaking the alliance. Afterwards, environmen- her not to attend today’s rally, that only God would
talists tried to stop development works. Yet, con- fix things, be careful not to get in trouble because
of the anti-terrorist law24 and that if we came to
struction of exclusive shopping centers, apart- this march we would be in danger. She did not
ment buildings, and town-houses continues still,
23 Thefarm is in the municipal terms of San Salvador, 24 Thepriest seemed to be referring to the Special Law
Santa Tecla, and Antiguo Cuscatlán. Against Terrorist Acts passed in 2006.
come. (Woman from the Cabañas Women’s Coali- gold mine where locals recommenced artisanal
tion, Coalición de Mujeres de Cabañas, from an
unpublished interview quoted in Cartagena 2009a) extractions, in San Sebastián (#59). In 2011,
the movement criticized the risks that a new
The movement strengthened its position though. gold mining project in Guatemala posed to El
In 2006, a group of NGOs formed the Mesa Na- Salvador, given its location on the binational
cional Frente a la Minería Metálica (National Lempa River basin. Recently, a support network
Roundtable Against Metallic Mining; Navarro emerged in the US and Canadian cities linked to
et al. 2007). By 2008, its 13 members included international environmentalism as well as Salva-
Catholic groups, development and environmen- doran immigrant communities in those countries
tal NGOs. In May 2007, the Episcopal Confer- (Stop El Salvador Mining 2013).
ence—which gathers the country’s Catholic bish- What type of environmental movement arises
ops—condemned metal mining. In 2008, more from these coalitions? Links among local strug-
people in Cabañas opposed Pacific Rim as some gles or grassroots groups are weak or nonexis-
water wells dried because of exploratory drill- tent; and local mobilizations have gone into a
ings. One of the movement’s achievements was sort of latent state once the (feared) threats are
to expose the flaws of the environmental impact no longer imminent. Meanwhile, environmental
assessment submitted by the Canadian company. organizations such as UNES and CESTA keep
Consequently, the Ministry of Environment de- supporting struggles in other communities, and
nied the permit needed to launch extractions. The they give these alliances a language to frame and
company suspended operations in June 2008 and disseminate their grievances and demands. But
lobbied to obtain the permit; yet President An- this framing does not develop into grassroots
tonio Saca spoke out against the project. Early identities under the label of “environmentalists.”
in 2009, Pacific Rim filed a lawsuit against the Even long-time activists may doubt to consider
Salvadoran government at the World Bank’s In- themselves as environmentalists (Valencia 2012).
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment One representative from UNES acknowledges
Disputes (Cartagena 2009b). that limitation:
Since 2008, the movement’s actions morphed It is ambitious to state that in El Salvador there
from a struggle focused in Cabañas into a na- exists an environmental movement, but since
tional campaign facing multiple issues, among these concepts have no frontiers, I think there is
them the assassination and harassment of activ- a growing social movement that bolsters among
its demands environmental issues, sustainability
ists. Between June 2009 and 2011, four activists issues. (Ángel Ibarra, president of the Salvadoran
from Cabañas were murdered. The Salvadorian Ecological Union. From an unpublished interview
judicial system prosecuted and sentenced sev- quoted in Argumedo et al. 2006)
eral local gang members. Yet, community lead-
ers and organizations criticized that prosecu- This statement echoes the concept of socio-
tors never searched for the intellectual authors. environmentalism; that is, the influence of en-
Activists also point to a 1994 report on “Illegal vironmentalism on other social movements
Armed Groups with Political Motives,” which (Viola 1994). Salvadoran environmentalism has
concluded that prior death squad structures were emerged from that type of influence working
tied to common and organized crime and could in both ways. There are community groups that
potentially participate in political violence (Mesa react to local environmental issues, but whose
Nacional 2012). concerns are not limited to the “environment.”
Contemporarily, the anti-mining movement Environmentalist discourses and frames char-
denounced the international lawsuit filed by Pa- acterize some NGOs, but even these ones seem
cific Rim, and the reluctance of legislators and to be a specialized, environment-focused branch
the government to issue a law banning metallic of a wider social movement, as demonstrated by
mining. Moreover, the movement began docu- their long-term links to social and political orga-
menting the impacts of a formerly abandoned
nizations and networks (Argumedo et al. 2006; postwar environmentalism was the physical and
Cartagena 2009a; Valencia 2012). human geography of the country, already charac-
terized by a high population density and reduced
extension of forests. The hardship of local eco-
Conclusions: The Convergence of logical conditions for rural people subsisting on a
Ecological Critique and Distributive deteriorated ecosystem and the limited income of
Critique the urban middle class divert most Salvadorans
from romantic preservationism25 and green anti-
Unlike the nonconfrontational trajectory of pre- consumerist discourses that characterize environ-
war Salvadoran environmentalism; its postwar mentalism elsewhere.
embodiment had a different social base, agenda, Instead, the Salvadoran environmental move-
concerns, and repertoire of action. The movement ment has been shaped by a two-way process of
confronted economic and political power holders socio-environmentalism (Viola 1994), as exhib-
through collective action; thus, it transformed en- ited in discourses that link social demands, such
vironmental concerns into political debates. This as the right to livelihoods, to questions about the
renovated environmentalism evolved through en- economic and political drivers of pollution, de-
gagement in dozens of environmental conflicts of forestation, water scarcity, etc. Thus, this social
limited geographic scope; the result is a loosely movement displays both a critique of distributive
articulated social movement. Most struggles for grievances as seen in the “old” or “classic” social
environmental protection have been carried out movements (i.e., peasants, revolutionary, etc.)
by limited alliances between grassroots groups and an ecologic critique expressed in the lan-
and environmental NGOs. Generally, local actors guage of the international environmental move-
retain their social and local identities, without be- ment (see Fig. 17.1).
coming explicit “environmentalists.” In short, environmental conflicts in El Salva-
When this movement was budding, the coun- dor have influenced not just the political agenda
try was ruled by a pro-business party that rarely but also the cultural frames of social movements
compromised on environmental struggles. As as they have bridged values and interests among
a result, the environmental movement found it- a small number of environmental groups and the
self to the left of the political spectrum and its broader sphere of entities working on human
potential social base reduced to those prone to rights, social justice, and local development. The
challenge political stigmatization for a seemingly postwar Salvadoran environmentalism is a prod-
lost cause—stopping investment projects that uct of this convergence.
threaten the environment. Another influence on
^ŽĐŝŽͲĞŶǀŝƌŽŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ͗
ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ŽƚŚĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐǲƐĨƌĂŵĞƐ
ůĂƐƐŝĐƐŽĐŝĂů
ŶǀŝƌŽŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵǲƐ
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝƐƚƌŝďƵƟǀĞ
ĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƌŝƟƋƵĞ
ƌŝƟƋƵĞ
Fig. 17.1 Socio-environmentalism
25 NGOs specialized in wildlife conservation have
emerged but they are delinked from grassroots struggles

(Cartagena 2008).
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Forest, Water, and Struggle:
Environmental Movements 18
in Costa Rica
Allen Cordero Ulate
Introduction (Environmental Decades later, the 1990s ushered in renewed

Struggles and Globalization) rounds of environmental struggles in Costa Rica.
These conflicts were more enduring and long
The richness of Costa Rican environmental term. The campaigns against Stone Container
struggles can be understood as another chapter in 1993–19941 and against strip mining (in San
in the civil resistance efforts against the spread Carlos from 1994 to 1998 and in Miramar from
of globalization in Central America. As I discuss 1996 to 1999) resulted in impressive mobiliza-
below, the modern Costa Rican social movement tions and important precedents in the history
began in 1970 with the campaign against of the Costa Rican environmental movement.
Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA). Behind these organized campaigns, stood an
This proto-environmental campaign was partly emerging social movement, which was less orga-
responsible for the newly created student move- nized and more local, but with an unprecedented
ment. The ALCOA campaign was the result of reach and depth within civil society. In a way,
a combination of political accountability re- these new environmental struggles were an ex-
garding sovereignty, on the one hand, and the tension of the first socio/environmental campaign
defense of the environment, on the other. In this represented by the mobilizations against ALCOA
way, this new social movement structured itself because they were also resistance movements
as a struggle against the expansionist desires of against transnational companies, and they were
a transnational bauxite corporation; hence, it in clear opposition to international capital forms
marked the inauguration of what in later decades of resource extraction and expansion. However,
would become struggles against globalization or by the 1990s activists used a more explicit envi-
neoliberalism. ronmental framing in their organizing activities
than in past struggles.
The tendencies experienced in the 1990s also
reached a new climax with the struggles against
This text is a summarized version of an essay
published under the same title as a chapter in the book
what came to be known as “combo ICE”2 in
Aproximaciones al movimiento ambiental en Centroamérica,
Margarita Hurtado and Irene Lungo, (comp.), FLACSO, 1
Guatemala, 2007. Far-reaching campaign led by the Asociación Ecolo-
gista Costarricense (Costa Rican Ecological Association)
that opposed a plan to sow and industrialize gmelina
A. Cordero Ulate () ( Gmelina sp)—raw material to make paper, located in the
FLACSO-Costa Rica and the Sociology School, Osa Peninsula, in the South Pacific area of the country.
Universidad de Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica 2 ICE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Costa
e-mail: acordero@flacso.or.cr Rican Institute of Electricity), founded in 1949, one of
256 A. Cordero Ulate
March and April 2000, the most important social Costa Rican Environmental
struggle since the fight against ALCOA (Almeida Movement: Structure and Action
2014). Even though the main motivation behind
“combo ICE” was not environmental but rather What is a social movement? This question has
the rejection of the imminent privatization of this no easy answer. A reductionist approach would
institution, there was an environmental compo- identify movements with structures, seeing
nent represented by the concerns about the nega- them as formal or institutionalized organiza-
tive environmental impact that would result from tions that aim at social representation in order to
the privatization of electricity services. Recently, make demands or claims. In comparison, there
the struggles against privatization have contin- is another perspective that emphasizes collective
ued with the long-term opposition to the Central social actions with several types of objectives.
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in the The perspective defended in this chapter attempts
2000s. Here, the relationship between environ- to combine the concepts of structure and action.
mentalism and resistance to neoliberalism was On the one hand, we believe on structure signals
more transparent. permanence, but, on the other hand, we look to
The present chapter focuses on the most re- relate those structures with specific collective
cent period, that is, the post-Combo/ICE stage actions. The correlation of particular social struc-
after 2000. I begin with the assertion that the tures with collective action is largely determined
Combo struggle inaugurated a new stage in Costa by more profound layers of social and cultural
Rican social movements, and as such, it had an reality. Structure’s role is not just one of the focal
important impact on civic involvement in sub- points or catalysts for social action. That is, at
sequent environmental issues. Briefly, it can be times of demobilization, social structures play
said that there are two main axes in Costa Rican the role of keepers or representatives of interests
environmental struggles. First, there is the strug- (Taylor 1989). Obviously, in such cases inter-
gle for land or natural resources, as represented play and equilibrium are not simple since struc-
by forestry and mining activities. Costa Rican tures can be separated from the deep reality of
environmentalism has been very zealous over social movements and become representations
modern and industrial extraction practices, espe- lacking support. Additionally, within a social
cially from transnational companies, that imply movement, there is an ongoing struggle for its
soil and subsoil alterations as well as changes in political-ideological direction, in such a way that
forest composition and depletion. The other axis the movement’s internal hegemonies are often
concerns the use of water, manifested in massive shifting, which is a response to the multiple con-
campaigns such as local plebiscites against dams. textual signals or to the movement’s own internal
At the local and municipal levels, the zeal to pro- processes.
tect and defend community sources of water has Every social movement has a historical origin,
experienced remarkable growth. That is why this a given continuity that is usually not uniform, but
chapter is called Forest, water, and struggle: which rather faces ups and downs. Social move-
Environmental movements in Costa Rica. The ments are initiatives that grow from society’s
“forest” serves as a symbol of the living and base or from social groups. In other words, social
bountiful earth and “water” as an indispensable movements exist independently of the state, and
resource of life. I add “struggle” as the concept sometimes movements oppose state policies or
that summarizes our main interest: environmen- try to influence the orientation of policies and the
tal movements in Costa Rica. material or symbolic resources that could result
from their application. On the other hand, there
are social organizations that play an intermediate
the emblematic institutions of the Costa Rican develop-
role. Even though they have been directly or
mentalist state. The “combo ICE” refers to a legislative
package that wanted to open and gradually privatize the indirectly promoted by the state, participants are
ICE. nongovernmental employees and volunteers and
18 Forest, Water, and Struggle: Environmental Movements in Costa Rica 257
they do not get payment or tax benefits for their resources. The idea of a real improvement in
social function. Sometimes, integration mecha- the environment is related with a deep change
nisms in these types of organizations might resort in the social and political order. Fallas himself
to open or extended calls and appeal to civil embraced this last category, becoming one of its
society for support. founding members.3
Following the previous outline, we now focus The cases studied by Fernández-González
on contextualizing the structures of the environ- (2003) include three local processes of environ-
mental movement. We prioritize those structures mental struggle or management. The first one
that have arisen as grassroots initiatives or those took the form of a battle against a powerful trans-
not dependent on the state. Then, we identify the national corporation, Stone Container, which
common collective actions used to express those from 1993 tried to develop a megaproject for the
structures of the environmental movement. production and commercialization of gmelina
( Gmelina sp), raw material for paper. The author
defines the participants in these struggles as “eco-
Typology of Costa Rican socialsts”. The conflict involved several local or-
Environmentalism ganizations labeled as communalist—local terri-
torial organizations found in southern Costa Rica.
Developing a typology of environmental The second case was the environmental improve-
movements contributes to understanding their ment in the banana-producing Caribbean region
diversity and how multiple perspectives result in that sprang up from several social pressure efforts
differentiated political-organizational discourses during 1992–1993. It is believed that its guiding
when dealing with environment-related initia- force was social Catholicism working together
tives or struggles. In the Costa Rican environ- with the former banana workers’ union. The third
mental literature, there are some previous ef- conflict, the struggle to protect access to water in
forts at defining ideological or organizational the Papagayo Gulf (Guanacaste province) is also
typologies. One of these efforts is by Fallas an example of social Catholicism, combined in
(1992), who favors an institutional or organiza- this case with the “communalist” trend.
tional criteria combined with ideological catego-
ries. So, it can be said that we are dealing with an
institutional-ideological typology. On the other A New Typology of Costa Rican
hand, Fernández-González (2003) performs a ty- Environmentalism
pological exercise from the study of three local
environmental struggles or instances of environ- This study continues the efforts of Fallas (1992)
mental management. and Fernández-González (2003) while at the
As for Fallas (1992), his typology encom- same time proposes a new typology of Costa
passes four trends: (1) state conservationism, Rican environmentalism. In the proposal outlined
(2) reactive conservationism, (3) developmental in the following paragraphs, the state will not be
conservationism, and (4) mature environmen- taken into account as an environmental actor.
talism. State conservationism evidently is the
one that comes from official institutions. Reac-
3 There is another author, Eduardo Mora, who partially
tive conservationism is organized by NGOs that
have local incidence. Developmental conserva- agrees with Fallas’s typology. Mora classifies “Costa
Rican environmentalists” in three categories. One focuses
tionism comes from international agencies. The on reconciling the current development model, plus slight
maturity of “environmentalisms” is expressed as modifications, with the recovery of natural equilibrium.
an ecological trend with an ideological profile. “Pure” conservationists focus on conservation without
That is, it looks to understand ecological prob- relating it with the current socio-political order. The last
looks for a socio-political change as an essential process
lems by relating them to an unequal and unfair to foster a different relationship between society and
social order that makes irrational use of natural nature (Mora 1998, p. 130).
Obviously, the Costa Rican state has developed as a result of the crisis of “historic” socialism.
several environmental initiatives, but the focus Critical ecology rather favors a discourse critical
here concentrates on a social movement per- of capitalism, that is, of its models of accumu-
spective, and the state is not a social movement. lation that are responsible for the destruction of
What will be considered as a major trend in Costa ecosystems in order to increase profit (O’Connor
Rican environmentalism is the social participa- 1997). In some cases, critical ecology has found
tion structures that, coming from the state, are its inspiration in pre-Colombian indigenous so-
successful in bringing community or grassroots cieties, which strived for a harmonious relation
groups together. Hence, we are dealing with a to nature.4 A subtrend of this type of ecology is
typology of structures that will be taken up again eco-anarchism, which, while directly criticiz-
later to develop a general mapping of collective ing capitalism, considers that no state can solve
actions that correspond to each structure. Specifi- ecological and social problems, and places the
cally, we aim at a typology made up of five main solution in the dissolution of the state. From this
types of organization that seem to characterize perspective adherents vindicate indigenous and
Costa Rican organized environmentalism. The rural communal living which is expressed not by
main criteria for a specific ideological-political large-scale historic civilizations, whether indig-
framework relates to how each party defines the enous or not, but rather in small state-free com-
relationship between nature and society and what munities or communities where political power
each proposes to solve that dilemma. Obviously, is diluted. Some of the discourses defended by
from each conception stems differentiated prac- these critical ecology subtypes tend to overlap.
tices both regarding environmental as well as
social and political activism. State-Originated Environmentalism
This modality takes into account civil engage-
Conservationist Environmentalism ment in environmental and vigilance matters orig-
Conservationist environmentalism emphasizes inally designed and formalized by the state. This
the protection of nature. Environmental dete- model of environmental action proved important
rioration is attributed to demographic growth in the national and international legitimization
and economic expansion, but it does not outline surrounding the United Nations Conference on
a discourse against economic development as a Environment and Development that took place in
criticism of capitalist expansion. In some cases, it Rio Janeiro in 1992. In Costa Rica, during the
holds some sort of apolitical or politicallyneutral term of President José Figueres Jr. (1994–1998)
stand. In its origins, this conservationist environ- some of the recommendations suggested in that
mentalism condemned practically every human conference were taken up again and resulted in
activity that made use of natural resources, but the conceptual framework for the formulation of
since the 1990s it has incorporated in its dis- “sustainable development” in Costa Rica, which
course a controlled use of natural resources by calls for civil society engagement in environ-
peasant and native communities (e.g., the 1992 mental matters. From the point of view of the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro). A key trait of its practical considerations of this orientation, so-
campaigns and proposals centers on buying land cial environmental action is led by governmental
for conservation purposes. institutions.
Critical Ecology
The origins of critical ecology reside in socialism
and leftist positions. Nevertheless, it would be a 4 In a paper that could be claimed as foundational of Costa
little farfetched to label this trend as eco-socialism Rican critical ecologism, renowned leader Oscar Fallas
since the socialist discourse has been abandoned traced Costa Rican environmental destruction back to the
by several social and environmental movements arrival of the Spaniards in 1492 (Fallas 1992, pp. 9–17).
Table 18.1 Costa Rican environmental organizations by typology

Type Organizations
Conservation environmentalism Asociación Conservacionista Monteverde, Asociación Preservacionista de
Flora y Fauna Silvestre (APREFLOFAS); Asociación Protectora de Árboles
(ARBOFILIA); Centro Científico Tropical (CCT); Centro de Capacitación
para el Desarrollo (CECADE); Centro de Derecho Ambiental y de Recursos
Naturales (CEDARENA); Justicia para la Naturaleza (JPN); Red Costarricense
de Reservas Naturales; Asociación de Voluntarios de Investigación y Desarrollo
Ambiental (VIDA); Fundación Arqueológica de los Sitios de Moravia (FALSM)
Critical ecology Federación Costarricense para la Conservación del Ambiente (FECON); Comu-
nidades Ecológicas la Ceiba (COECOCeiba); Oilwatch, Asociación de Ecología
Social(AES)
State-originated environmentalism Comités de Vigilancia de los Recursos Naturales (COVIRENA); Comisiones
Ambientales de las Municipalidades
Indigenous and agricultural Asociación Coordinadora Indígena Campesina de Agroforestería Comunitaria
organizations that deal with the (ACICAFOC); Mesa Campesina; Mesa Indígena; Comité Cívico de Cañas
environment
Environmental communalism Asociación para el Bienestar Ambiental del Sarapiquí, (ABAS); Asociación
Cristiana de Jóvenes (ACJ); Asociación Ramonense para la Protección del
Ambiente (ARCA); Asociación Ecológica Paquera, Lepanto, Cóbano (ASE-
PALECO; Cerro Las Vueltas; Asociación de Proyectos Alternativos para el
Desarrollo Social (PROAL); Asociación Ambientalista Shurakma; Asociación
Desamparedeña para el Desarrollo Sustentable (ADES); Asociación Ecologista
de Guatuso y Patarrá, Confraternidad Guanacasteca; Fundación Madre Selva
Environmentally Oriented Peasant ogy, we want to characterize a sample of major

and Indigenous Organizations Costa Rican environmental organizations (See
Environmentally oriented peasant and indige- Table 18.1). One of the criteria to select these
nous organizations have as their main activity so- organizations has been their membership in the
cioeconomic and cultural claims by rural and na- Costa Rican Environmental Federation (known
tive populations, but which have in recent years as FECON), the most recognized third-sector
incorporated environmental demands, whether group regarding conservation or environmental
as conservation or as controlled access to natural initiatives and struggles. In fact, there is no other
resources by agricultural and indigenous sectors. major federation of organizations in the Costa
Some of these organizations often advocate for Rican environmental movement. The second
both the social and the environmental issues. criterion is personal acquaintance, that is, organi-
zations I know work with the environment from
Communitarian Environmentalism previous fieldwork.
This environmentalism has a communal social Given this typology, we are well placed to
base. This base can be located in urban, semi- provide a general mapping of environmental
urban, rural and/or agricultural, and indig- events, actions, and struggles in Costa Rica.
enous communities. The actions of adherents
to communitarian environmentalism are mo-
tivated by local environmental problems, but Environmental Expressions and
their activities and discourse are relatively free Struggles
from ideological considerations. Nonetheless,
the type of socio-environmental actions they Historical Framework of Costa Rican
carry out usually involve some “ideological-en- Environmental Struggles
vironmental” justification, but these ideological
rationales are not consolidated conceptual struc- Environmental studies that have a “grassroots
tures as is the case of the previous four types of participation” approach have tried to closely
environmentalism described. Given this typol- relate the different stages of local development
with specific production methods used in the Agricultural Institute) founded in 1926 and
exploitation of nature. That is, a certain type of the Universidad de Costa Rica (University of
economic production has been related to a certain Costa Rica) founded in 1940, which eventually
form of nature use. Within this view that sees na- turned the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura into
ture as dependent on the economic model belong its Faculty of Agronomy. The final educational
environmental processes or struggles. That is, institution was the creation of the General Stud-
sociopolitical expressions have resulted from ies School at the Universidad de Costa Rica
each stage of economic production, whether as (1957). It was an educational milestone because
conservationist proposals in the field of “sustain- it became an influential place where new genera-
able management,” or as denunciations and com- tions of young adults were educated on renewed
plete opposition. The studies of Fournier (1991) humanistic values in the sociocultural field,
and Fallas (1992) have developed socioeconomic and conservationism in the environmental field.
chronological frameworks, each related to spe- Hence, Fournier’s chronological framework is in
cific environmental struggles or processes. In the a way determined by these institutional advances.
case of Fournier (1991), his framework outlines Specifically, the historical foundation of each of
five stages: pre-Colonial; Colonial up to 1845, these educational institutions he observes to be
1845–1927, 1927–1957; and from 1957 up to the fundamental in the “environmental” education of
present (the study covers up to 1991). Concern- several Costa Rican generations.
ing the environment, for Fournier, as Costa Rica It can be said that Fournier’s conception of the
historically evolved environmental conditions “Costa Rican conservation movement” is closely
progressively deteriorated. The main indicator related to the state’s “progressiveness,” especial-
exposed by the author is the deforestation rate. ly as reflected in its regulatory capacity. It is also
In 1903, deforestation was 13.5 % of the national closely related to the work of educational institu-
territory, but in 1984 it covered 67.8 % of the tions, especially the Universidad de Costa Rica.
land, and continues to increase through the pres- The framework offers a very wide conception of
ent. Fournier (1991) contends that the origins of the environmental movement, one that closely
the conservationist movement lie in indigenous relates it to institutional activity. It can be said
communities themselves, which, he contends, that for this author the movement expresses itself
lived in abundance and in a harmonious relation- through the state. Autonomous social movements
ship with nature. are not very visible in Fournier’s account.
Fournier finds that the creation of environ- Fallas (1992), as Fournier, locates conserva-
mental legislations comes early in the nation’s tionism and ecologism in indigenous cultures.
history. Since the beginning of the Republic But, their approaches differ. First, for Fallas,
some regulatory laws were approved, such as the ecological disaster begins in 1492 with the Span-
closed season for deer hunting dating from 1845. ish conquest of America. The chronological
The systematic development of laws related to framework of this author is also different. For
the environment proved to be a constant feature Fallas, there is a first stage that begins with col-
in Costa Rican regulatory history that intensi- onization and ends with the constitution of the
fied in the late twentieth century (1957–1991), Republic. This author calls this stage “indigenous
when the development of legislation became ecology of environmental chaos.” The second
prolific. Likewise, importance was placed on stage is called liberal hegemony and goes from
educational institutions, which have played a 1821 to 1930. The third stage relates to the peak
significant role through several decades in reedu- of the new model and spans from 1948 to 1978.
cating new generations about natural resources The last stage relates to the intensification of the
and the environment, and for their sociopolitical export model (currently named the globalization
influence in local history. Some of the educa- stage). The passing of time and the resulting new
tional institutions the author highlights include economic production models have resulted in
the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura (National greater and more intense exploitation of nature.
This over-exploitation of nature has developed that was considered damaging to the country’s
hand in hand with over-exploitation of human sovereignty and the environment—the mining
labor. So, the production model is the one that of bauxite in the region of Pérez Zeledón. There
determines the model for the exploitation of has been no systematic account of environmental
nature. struggles since 1970. For our purposes, we use
Fallas is unique in the placing of social move- secondary sources to attempt to make a list of the
ments as playing a central role in the evolution most significant struggles since that year. It is
of environmental consciousness. He highlights important to keep in mind that the data collected
social movement processes through the activities focuses on the most significant struggles, that is,
related to environmental development. According those that have been documented, especially by
to Fallas’s point of view, environmental citizen- the written press.
ship created itself. It would be from the middle There were some local struggles that had
and working classes that the main conservation- national impact. These local expressions can
related sociopolitical force emerged. For this be divided in two main stages of Costa Rican
author, the year 1970, with the struggles against socio-environmental struggles. The first one
ALCOA,5 initiated a period of growing social is the case of ALCOA. The second comprises
struggles (not only environmental in nature), the struggles known as “combo ICE” (Instituto
but where a conservationist current was present Costarricense de Electricidad). The “combo
in several socio-environmental activities. Fur- ICE” took place between March and April 2000
thermore, beginning in 1983, there was a new and was a massive social struggle against a group
upsurge of environmental struggles toward local of laws that wanted to implement the “opening
spaces, which resulted in the expansion and depth up” (gradual privatization) of ICE (telecommuni-
of the movement. cations and electrical power). The main concern
of this struggle was to avoid the privatization of
Environmental Struggles and Events the institution, but it is clear that there were envi-
During 1970–2000 ronmental concerns and demands behind it. If the
It seems appropriate to locate the beginning of law had been approved, this would have resulted
the modern Costa Rican environmental move- in more private initiatives for electricity genera-
ment in the struggle against ALCOA in 1970. tion, which in turned would have resulted in a
Existing literature suggests that before 1970 there widespread interest in the construction of private
were legislative and educational antecedents that dams.
already showed some concern for environmental Between these two major historic social strug-
protection. But it is the struggle against ALCOA gles (both with a strong environmental compo-
when a widely encompassing social movement nent), there were other environmental disputes,
took up the environmental cause. This movement still strong and massive that had a local focus but
was independent of the state; rather it was against national impact. In the 1970s, there were at least
it. Participants vehemently opposed a contract five major local environmental conflicts. Perhaps,
the most important conflicts were the struggles
5
ALCOA was the transnacional Aluminion Company against an oil pipeline in 1974, led by ASCONA
of America. In April 1970 a strong civil opposition to (Asociación Nacional para la Conservación de
ALCOA began. This involved the strong participation of la Naturaleza). Later, in 1983, there was another
student movements, especially from Universidad de Costa important episode of opposition to the pipeline.
Rica supported by thousands of high school students. The
arguments against ALCOA already included environmen- In this renewed round of environmental mobili-
tal issues, combined with political ones, exemplified by zation a committee was formed, named Comité
the criticism to the imminent damage to political sover- Nacional de Lucha contra el Oleoducto (National
eignty. A very lively description of the events is offered Committee against the Pipeline).
by Alvarado (2001). For a counterculture perspective, the
article “Alcoa, los artificios de la calle o de cuán densa According to Fallas (1992), starting in 1983
puede ser la irrealidad” by Jiménez (2000) is very useful. there was a growth in environmental social
movements. This is a defining moment for these public opinion beyond local media coverage,9 the
movements. As Fallas (1992, p. 87) put it: “It is growth of coordinated organizing at the national
not until the end of the 1980s that we can really level, and unification would be characteristics
talk about conservationist and ecological strug- that would be observed in more recent environ-
gles as a new social movement.” In the 1990s, mental campaigns in the early twenty-first cen-
there were several massive local environmental tury. Figure 18.1 charts the trajectory of the en-
struggles and new campaigns that had national vironmental movement between 1970 and 2000.
relevance. This would be the beginning of wide In summary, between 1970 and 2000 there
sociopolitical coalitions that mobilized in long- were two major struggles that had an environ-
term campaigns. There are several examples of mental component, even more so in the case of
such cases (Horton 2007). At the beginning of ALCOA than in the combo ICE. Throughout
1990s, specifically during 1993–1994, there was these intervening years, there were important
the campaign against Stone Container (a project local struggles that had a national impact. And
that sought to cultivate and produce 24.000 acres after the mid-1980s, there was a generalization
of gmelina in the southern part of the country6). and expansion of the environmental movement in
In the middle of the 1990s, specifically dur- local spaces (this has not been systematically or
ing 1994–1998, another notable campaign took fully documented). Beginning in the 1990s, there
place: The struggle against strip mining. The an- have been more enduring environmental cam-
ti-mining campaigns were an ongoing and grow- paigns (between 2 and 4 years) where different
ing struggle that covered many sociopolitical ef- socio-ideological coalitions came together.
forts against gold exploration and exploitation in
the towns of Cutris and Pocosol in San Carlos,
continuing through the late 2000s.7 The prob- What Has Happened After the Combo?
lem of the potential mining exploitation resulted
in another important campaign, in Bellavista de The main objective of this chapter is to offer an
Miramar, in the province of Puntarenas. Finally, updated view of the Costa Rican environmental
there was a campaign in defense of the forests in movement, taking as a starting point the struggle
the Osa Peninsula.8 In sum, the coalitional style against the privatization of ICE. This social strug-
of the campaigns, their national transcendence in gle has had a larger impact and that lasted longer
than any other protest campaign in the last three
6
decades until the campaign against the CAFTA
According to Baldotano and Rojas, this campaign had
in 2007 (Almeida 2014).10 The ICE campaign is
two great achievements: “it avoided the enclave, because
it was clear that there was not enough planning, that it especially relevant because, as mentioned above,
was not grounded on reality and far from the local social it also incorporated environmental demands.
perspectives and that it would have negative effects on To offer this updated information, we took the
local communities and the environment.” Besides, this
organizational typology that was presented in
campaign made it easier and called the attention of differ-
ent social sectors so that they began to reflect on develop- Table 18.1. For each type of organization, we
ment models, sustainability, and the right of communities
to plan and control their resources and define their future
(Baldotano and Rojas 2005, p. 11). 9
An example of this type of community participation is
7
The analysis of this environmental campaign was bril- the struggle by El Molino in the city of against the pollu-
liantly described and analyzed in a graduate thesis by tion of the El Molino River caused by a company named
Rafael Cartagena Cruz in his work “El público vs. Placer Mundimar.
Dome. Comunicación y Conflicto Ambiental en el Espa- 10
When this text was written in 2006, the struggle against
cio Público. Communication with emphasis on public re- the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),
lations thesis” Universidad de Costa Rica, San José, Costa which resulted in the referendum of October 2007, had
Rica., 2000. Other sources are Isla 2002 and Torres 2000b. not yet developed. Nevertheless, we can say that the envi-
8 ronmental movement participated in the struggle against
This campaign will be further described in the follow-
ing section since it is chronologically located in the analy- CAFTA, showing similar characteristics as during the ICE
sis scope of this research paper, the year 2000. struggle.
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Fig. 18.1 Trajectory of Costa Rican environmental movement 1970–2000
identified at least two key respondents to inter- • Struggle for energy

view. In Appendix 1 (Table 18.2), a list of the • Struggle for water
subjects’ names and roles is provided. In this • Struggles dealing with tourism management
case, the main objective of the interview was to • Struggle in favor of the forests
get detailed accounts of the most significant en- • Struggle against CAFTA
vironmental events, actions, and movements tak- Concerning electricity/energy, Rojas first men-
ing place between 2000 and 2005 that form the tions the struggles against policies, dams, and
perspective of leading environmental activists. electric cogeneration projects. In more general
What follows are the results of these interviews. terms, this environmental leader questioned the
In the case of respondents who identify them- energy-producing model (interview January 20,
selves as conservationists, the first mentioned 2006).
long-term campaign involves the defense of the One of the most documented and well-known
forests on the Osa Peninsula. This campaign can cases is the Pacuare River dam conflict, in the
be put side to side with the other three from the province of Cartago (southeast of Costa Rican’s
1990s mentioned before ( Stone Container and central mountainous area). Durán and Guido
the two cases against strip mining in San Carlos). (2002) report that aside from the flooding of
Thus, there were four long-term campaigns with- lands it would cause “lack of communication and
in a decade. In the case of ARBOFILIA, partici- isolation of indigenous communities that depend
pants mentioned an alternative forestry policy, a on selling and exchanging their agricultural prod-
proposal designed to regenerate the soil. In the ucts for their survival.” Nevertheless, the poten-
case of Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), the re- tial construction of that dam was ruled out by the
spondents mentioned a lobbying process in favor plebiscite that took place in Turrialba, on August
of environmental rights being incorporated into 28, 2005. The plebiscite was organized by the
the country’s Constitution. local municipality and it ruled out the possibil-
FECON’s respondent, Isaac Rojas, preferred ity of other hydroelectric projects on the Pacuare
to give his account based on five main struggles: River. The plebiscite resulted in 96 % of support
against the construction of the dam. Their slogan campaigns, this one resulted in an important
referred to the preservation of the river as a natu- sociopolitical grouping of communities, business
ral sanctuary. owners (especially those in tourism), ecological
The use of plebiscites has been a constant organizations, local community organizations,
pressure mechanism to deal with environ- municipalities, and the Ministry of the Environ-
mental issues, especially against the construc- ment and Energy (MINAE). At the end of 1999,
tion of dams. A United Nations Development indigenous community leaders in Talamanca
Programme (UNDP) study reports that during called a local meeting to form a network to
1998–2001 there were four plebiscites, two of oppose the government’s decision to approve oil
them dealing with environmental issues. In the exploitation in the Costa Rican Caribbean. This
case of the one in Guácimo, which took place on meeting was attended by 37 community and na-
October 28, 2001, the result supported the mu- tional organizations and local representatives of
nicipality in prohibiting lucrative activities in several public institutions (PNUD 2002, p. 248).
exploiting the aquifer areas. Civil involvement This public gathering resulted in the creation of
in the referendum was 27 % of registered voters; the Coordinadora Antipetrolera de Talamanca
a total of 17,288. 97.3 % voted against granting (ADELA). In September 2000, the Constitu-
permissions for private company activities tional Court declared the first concession null
around the aquifer (2.3 % agreed to it and 0.4 % and void based on the lack of prior consultation
annulled their votes” (PNUD 2002). The local with local indigenous communities. The Techni-
oppositional organizational structure was very cal Commission of SETENA, in a decision from
broad. The participants organizing the refer- the end of 2001, recommended the approval of
endum included the organization “Agua” from an environmental impact analysis (EIA). At the
Guácimo, the Jiménez community, Foro Emaús, beginning of 2002 ADELA strived to look for
Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores Bananeros further technical criteria to refute the decision.
(CONATRAB) and the municipality of Pococí. In February 2002, SETENA’s Full Board unani-
There was no single leadership, but it was rather mously refuted the EIA for the oil exploitation
a decentralized “participatory process.”11 project. In April, the Municipality of Talaman-
Another plebiscite occurred on September ca declared a moratorium on oil in this town.
24, 2000 in Sarapiquí. In this case, the elector- MINAE began the administrative process to can-
ate was made up of 17,432 local citizens and cel the contract since no new EIA was submitted
13 % showed up to vote. This plebiscite aimed (PNUD 2005).
to protect the basin of the Sarapiquí River and On the other hand, respondents from “state-
declare it Natural Historical Patrimony (Salas based environmentalism” mentioned other
2000). This initiative grew out of the community types of activities different from struggles and
and different organizations as a response to the campaigns. A respondent from FUPROVI-
damage caused to the Sarapiquí basin by hydro- RENA, Guillermo Esquivel, mentioned two
electric “use” (Salas 2000). local environmental management cases. First,
The case presented by the Asociación de the increasing interest municipalities showed
Ecología Social (AES) has been classified here to protect their local basins. Second, there was
as critical ecology. The most important issue a case when farmers became more concerned
during this period was oil exploitation that de- with environmental improvement issues. These
veloped as a campaign between 2000 and 2003. farmers were located around the Braulio Carrillo
This was the fifth environmental campaign in National Park between the provinces of San José
the decade. As was the case with many previous and Limón. Regarding municipal environmental
commissions, María Elena Saborío highlighted
11 Information the celebration of the environment day and week.
provided by Orlando Barrantes, General
Secretary of CONATRAB, one of the participating The municipality organized a painting contest for
organizations. children to raise awareness in the community of
environmental issues (Municipalidad de Vazquez Costa Rican tourists, those who camp and do not
de Coronado, located10 km northwest from San pay for lodging, and those who do not buy things,
José downtown. who do not pay” (La Prensa 2004).
Agricultural and indigenous organizations that In more recent years, 2006–2014, three large
work in environmental issues engage in lobby- environmental struggles stand out that have
ing regarding policies and resource management engaged in conflicts with relatively successful
to consulting organizations created under the outcomes against megaprojects promoted by
current environmental legislation. Concerning the the state and neoliberal economic elites. Each
Asociación Coordinadora Indígena y Campesina struggle had particular organizing strategies and
de Agroforestería Comunitaria Centroamericana dynamics. Nevertheless, these projects may return
(ACICAFOC), its director, Alberto Chinchilla, in another form in the future as for now, these are
learned about the negotiation process for the short-term victories. These newer environmental
organic agriculture legislation and how to favor conflicts include the struggle for the defense of
indigenous communities by obtaining payment water in the community of Sardinal, the collec-
for environmental services in implementing sus- tive battle against open pit mining in Crucitas in
tainable farming practives. Mesa Campesina par- the north of the country, and the struggle against
ticipated in organizations such as Fondo Nacional the hydroelectric dam project in Diquís.
de Financiamiento Forestal (FONAFIFO) and The struggle of the small community in
Comisión Nacional de Gestión de la Biodivers- Sardinal, Guanacaste took place between 2008
idad. According to Hilda Mora, president of this and 2010. A consortium of tourism investors
organization, their representation on those orga- in the nearby popular resort region of Playas
nizations allowed them to take part in policies del Coco intended to pipe water away from the
and assisted the Mesa Campesina in accessing working-class community of Sardinal to the
economic resources, such as payment for envi- resort a short 8 km down the road. The Sardinal
ronmental services. community resisted the incursion and received
As for communitarian environmentalism, the the support from public sector labor unions (la
representative of Confraternidad Guanacasteca Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos
mentioned an event that has had national sig- (ANEP)), student groups, and environmental-
nificance: the struggle for the access to water ists. In May of 2010, the Constitutional Court
in the coastal communities surrounding Golfo ordered the end of infrastructure construction to
de Papagayo, where big resorts that have golf siphon off the community’s ground water supply.
courses need large quantities of water and are a The people of Sardinal celebrated the ruling as a
threat to local communities and their subsistence major triumph (Cordero 2010, p. 177).
water supplies (such as the case of the commu- Another major environmental struggle erupted
nity of Sardinal in 2008). Another example is the over open-pit mining in an area called Crucitas
struggle to retain public access to beaches. This in Cutris, San Carlos province. The movement
right has been threatened by large-scale tourism was largely composed of environmental and
complexes and resorts that forbid entrance of student organizations. The battle took place be-
local people to the beach around their properties. tween 2008 and 2013. In 2011, the Costa Rican
Concerning access to beaches, in 2004 there was legislature and the constitutional branch of the
a new controversy when several social and en- Supreme Court reformed mining laws banning
vironmental organizations challenged authorities open-pit mining. The Canadian company invest-
from the Costa Rican Institute of Tourism (ICT) ing in the mine (Industrias Infinito) continues to
when it prohibited camping on beaches. Then seek legal indemnization of $ 1.2 billion lost in
two organizations (Asociación Confraternidad gold mining profits. The movement perceived the
Guanacasteca and the Federación Costarricense state actions against the Crucitas gold mine as a
para la Conservación del Ambiente) publicly de- major environmental victory (Chacón 2013).
clared that ICT “was discriminating against local
The movement against Diquís the Hydroelec- comprises almost 325,000 acres, a percentage
tric Dam Project is one of the longest-sustained relatively high if we consider that it would mean
campaigns in Costa Rica in recent years, from around 8.3 acres per person and some 41.4 acres
2003 to the present. The movement is led by per family and an average family has five mem-
the Térraba indigenous community in the can- bers. Nevertheless, in reality, the territories are
ton of Buenas Aires in the province of Puntar- far from controlled by these populations. Some
enas. This megaproject was set at an estimated territories are only symbolically occupied by
$ 2 billion (with $ 250 million already invested) indigenous people. This is the case of Guatuso,
and managed since 2005 by ICE. A campaign Qitirrrisí and Zapatón (with only a quarter of
led by the Térraba native peoples in coalition the territory actually managed by indigenous
with environmentalists and students reached the peoples). Boruca, Rey Curré, Térraba, and Ujar-
United Nations’ special rapporteur on indigenous rás own only a third of their respective territo-
peoples where enough pressure was placed on ries. For Conte Burica, Coto Brus, Guaymí de
the Costa Rican state to suspend the project’s Osa, Abrojo de Montezuma, Talamanca Bribri,
operations since 2011. Even though heavy ma- Kekoldi, Talamanca Cabécar, Nairi Awari, own-
chinery has been removed by the ICE in attempts ership is close to two thirds, which seems to be
to dam the Terraba River, the struggle is not com- the most common proportion under indigenous
pletely over. A future government may attempt control.
to reinitiate the construction of the hydroelectric The largest problem the indigenous population
plant (for a detailed study of this case, see Cor- faces is land ownership. Land is the basis for na-
dero 2013). tive people’s material survival, and it also serves
as the source of their cultural identity. Despite
all of the laws and official decrees that define
Indigenous Concerns and Their indigenous reservations that cannot be legally
Relationship with Conservation sold or transferred to nonindigenous people, this
ownership is not an accurate representation of the
The existing data on the size of the indigenous distribution of the native populations’ territory.
population in Costa Rica are not homogeneous. White or mestizo agricultural workers sell their
Mesa Indígena, a national-level indigenous or- land because they are poor. They later migrate
ganization, registers eight different indigenous into indigenous territories. In the tourist areas
towns in Costa Rica, for a total of 39,264 peo- surrounding indigenous communities, farmers
ple (Mesa Indígena 2000). On the other hand, who are near the coast sell their land and soon
Tenorio (2002) counts an indigenous population find themselves with no land and no money, so
of 63,876, which would mean 1.7 % of the total they have to migrate into indigenous communi-
population. In some provinces, the percentage is ties or natural reservations. Development proj-
higher. The highest is Limón (7.4 %), followed ects in the area of native lands have also resulted
by Puntarenas (7.3 %; Tenorio 2002, p. 9). in social conflicts. In Talamanca, indigenous
Indigenous local tribes include bruncas, teri- communities took part in the struggle against oil
bes, malekus, huetares, chorotegas, guaymies, exploitation (ADELA) that was organized during
bribris, and cabécares. Each one, in turn, is 2000–2003 to reject oil exploration and exploita-
divided into local territories, geographical places tion discussed above.12
where indigenous communities live, as well as
their farms and mountains. Some of these territo-
ries are legally recognized by special legislation,
12 In other countries, as is the case of Tela in Honduras,
while others are not legally recognized, but they
are considered indigenous territories since indig- hotel expansion resulted in conflicts with the Garifuna
population. They fought a tourism development style
enous populations have historically concentrated based on enclave and also for the manner in which resort
there. The extension of indigenous territories hotels dealt with the waste they produce (Alvarado 2008).
On the other hand, given the growing partici- Conclusion

pation of indigenous communities in the national
market, there has been a social differentiation When offering a general overview of the
process inside the communities themselves. Prof- development of the Costa Rican environmental
itable or relatively profitable productive activities movement, the economic and political context
make some indigenous workers adopt foreign is fundamental in understanding the move-
production techniques in order to increase pro- ment’s evolution. The context here is defined
ductivity. When such activities are successful, by the expansion of globalization. Even though
they accumulate some money that is then invest- this expansion of globalization is causing social
ed in buying land from less fortunate members conflicts and struggles in many countries, there
of the community. In those cases, the operation is no sign of a reverse in this growth. There are
is legal because commerce between indigenous resistance efforts that influence some tendencies
people is allowed. This process results in the con- in the expansion of globalization, but economic
centration of land within the community itself. expansion continues. The process of the interna-
Concerning the cases of the Talamanca Valley, tional circulation of goods continues to spread
Borge and Castillo (1997, p. 204) define land under a system of capitalist transnationalization
ownership as a serious problem. In a more recent (Robinson 2014), where even natural resources
study, Berger (2000) gives a detailed account of are organized and commercialized. CAFTA is
this process of land selling for each indigenous the most recent example of this international
territory. liberalization trend. Understanding the politi-
Indigenous land is very important for the cal economic context is important in order to
conservation of biodiversity. Despite its relative evaluate the situation and the perspectives for
exploitation (in some cases) by modern produc- the Costa Rican environmental movement since
tive systems, there also remain more traditional some of the more relevant and recent social strug-
productive and cultural activities that place more gles that had an environmental component are
emphasis on the preservation of ecosystems. As struggles against globalizing processes. The two
I mentioned elsewhere, in Salamanca there is a most important social conflicts that had an en-
relationship between indigenous women and vironmental undertone, ALCOA in 1970 and the
biodiversity: “There are productive systems in so-called combo ICE in 2000, centered on eco-
Talamanca that somehow represent a balance be- nomic transnationalization processes. In the first
tween market and culture. Among them, there is one, the attempt to exploit bauxite in the General
what we have called here ‘talamanqueña farms.’ Valley by an aluminum transnational company
Of course, the greater the market demands the and in the second one, the privatization process
greater the risk that these farms will focus on one of electricity services meant, environmentally
or more profitable products, as has been the case speaking, loosening of environmental controls
in other communities” (Cordero 2002, p. 363). under private models of electricity generation.
Environmental issues for indigenous communi- In between those two social movements, there
ties relate to their right to preserve their own ter- were some processes that also relate to the in-
ritories, and to recover lost ones. On the other ternational circulation of natural resources and
hand, some indigenous communities, because goods. Some of the most relevant struggles are:
of their cultural practices, want to exploit forest • Against Stone Container (1993–1994)
products in protected areas, which cause prob- • Against opencut gold exploitation in San
lems between environmental authorities and the Carlos (1994–1998)
communities. • Against opencut gold exploitation in
Miramar (1996–1999)
• Against oil exploitation in Talamanca-
Caribbean (2000–2003)
Hence, in between and after the two major also stands out. The so-called local empowering
defensive movements there were several others might sometimes oppose national policies, as is
that seem to be aftershocks of those two. In the the case of hydroelectric planning. More com-
two major battles of ALCOA and el Combo/ICE, munities have shown interest in controlling their
the generalized participation of the people was own water supply sources. Figure 18.2 illustrates
impressive; it even had political repercussions. the environmental movement within the shifting
For the campaigns mentioned above, participa- political-economic context from 1970 to 2005.
tion was more localized and specific, but this has In a broader sense, local participation has
been compensated by their duration and strategic moved towards vigilance, as is the case of CO-
flexibility; so, they have been labeled “long-term VIRENA.
campaigns.” In both the largest struggles and Other groups have moved toward environ-
the long-term campaigns, the social movements mental management and regeneration and inno-
have been the winners. ALCOA did not begin vative ways to protect ecosystems. Other fields
its exploitation, Stone interrupted its project, being explored by environmental organizations
one of the strip-mining projects did not prosper are organic agriculture, forest regeneration (using
(San Carlos), the liberalization of ICE was not indigenous techniques such as sustainable for-
approved, and the oil exploitations did not take estry), environmental education, or multifaceted
place.13 But, as stated by environmental leader struggles against pollution. It could be said that
Isaac Rojas, the achievements are not definite these efforts of civic participation are the wider
or long term. Interests seem to have a cyclic be- basis for the environmental movement. Also, the
havior, which forces social movements to start indigenous movement, because of its struggle
working together. It is likely then, if we take into for land and its traditions, coincides with envi-
account the economic liberalization efforts and ronmental movements. But in their cases, access
previous experiences, that in future years there to natural resources such as forests implies pro-
will be more conflicts and struggles and ongo- tection. Also, the participation of indigenous
ing unstable and contradicting situations. Once communities has been important in campaigns
CAFTA is fully implemented in Costa Rica, it is against several dams and oil exploration initia-
very likely that the projects successfully halted tives. Pollution has been less relevant in envi-
up to the present by environmental movements ronmental struggles, but there were some local
will be taken up again in the near future. struggles against river pollution. Garbage has
Another issue that has been present since the also been apposite in struggles during the last
period 1970–2000, but which has become more decades, especially in the case of the Rio Azul
relevant starting in 2000, involves the struggles landfill. In terms of pesticides, those affected by
and activities against the construction of hydro- Nemagon have founded CONATRAB, and they
electric dams. Local participation has been exten- have become a strong movement that has con-
sive and massive and has resulted in plebiscites demned agricultural practices of transnational
that favored opposing sectors. This reflects the banana producers. They have also requested
tendency of local populations desire to widely compensation and indemnity for those affected.
control the natural resources in their territories. From what we have seen so far, it is evident
As part of this phenomenon, the struggle for the that there is indeed a Costa Rican environmen-
protection and control of local water supplies tal movement. There are different environmental
ideologies and an integrated typology can be
constructed corresponding to five different
13 Inthe case of mine exploitation in (Puntarenas), it is types of ecological organizations. Also, using
currently in effect. The mining company has developed
an important public relations campaign in order to stop
the theoretical framework of this study, it can
community discontent. be said that there have been significant environ-
mental struggles and activities. Nevertheless,
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Fig. 18.2 General overview of the Costa Rican environmental movement
the environmental movement lacks one unify- could be said that the environmental movement
ing project; if there is one, it is fragmented—in acts as a new social movement (as conceptualized
other words, it does not have a shared vision. The by Touraine (1999)). That is, a movement that is
movement lacks the strength to make proposals essentially cultural. On the other hand, some of
at the macro-social and macro-political levels. its demands and achievements are against the
Also, it is necessary to describe the character- current form of capitalist development: neolib-
istics of this movement. It is not a permanent eral globalization. Participation is mostly by the
movement; it is rather discontinuous. There are common people, and without this component, the
few national campaigns because of the relative environmental campaigns would not have been
fragmentation of the movement. However, it can- as effective. To define the environmental move-
not be denied that there have been several local ment as having a strong social foundation and to
campaigns that achieved national relevance. make it possible for this foundation to appropri-
Participation has been mostly in campaigns that ate the struggle seems to offer the key challenges
resulted in ephemeral alliances, some brought faced by the current phase of ecological struggle
together different classes and ideologies. Given in Costa Rica.
its functioning, achievements, and participants, it
Appendix 1
Table 18.2 Interviewees and organization

Name Institution or organization
Luis Diego Marín President of Asociación Preservacionista de Flora y Fauna Silvestre (APREFLOFAS)
Miguel Soto President of Asociación Protectora de Arboles Arbofilia (ARBOFILIA),
Alfonso Mata Vice president of Centro Científico Tropical (CCT)
Isaac Rojas President of Federación Costarricense para la Conservación del Ambiente (FECON)
Mauricio Alvarez President of Asociación de Ecología Social(AES)
Guillermo Esquivel Vice president of Fundación Vigilancia de los Recursos Naturales (FUPROVIRENA)
María Elena Saborio, Councilwoman of Coronado and member of their Environmental Committee
Alberto Chinchilla Executive director of Asociación Coordinadora Indígena Campesina de Agroforestería
Comunitaria (ACICAFOC)
Hilda Mora President of Mesa Campesina
Gadi Amit Ex-president of Asociación Confraternidad Guanacasteca
Norma Boyd Secretary of the Board of Directors of Asociación Ecológica Paquera, Lepanto, Cóbano
(ASEPALECO)
Durán, O., & Guido, E. (2002). Asesinato del río Pacuare

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info2002/nacion8/Po-fortalecimiento/Informe%20 Nacional de Oposición a la Minería de Oro a Cielo
final%20acciones%20colectivas.pdf. Accessed 22 Oct Abierto. http://semueve.netfirms.com/arch_minas/
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Robinson, W. (2014). Global capitalism and the crisis of alizado al 28 de abril del 2000. Frente Nacional de
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Taylor, V. (1989). Social movement continuity: The wom-
en’s movement in abeyance. American Sociological
Review, 54(5):761–775.
Part VII
Country Case Studies
Protest and Social Movements
in Peru 19
Moisés Arce
In December 2008, an article in the international of events that take place in revolutions, social
magazine “The Economist” characterized the movements, and protests have been reconceptual-
current cycle of mobilizations in Peru as “The ized as simply various forms of “contentious pol-
Politics of Non-stop Protest” (The Economist itics” (McAdam et al. 2001). Goldstone (1998)
2008). This cycle of protest that began in the has also redefined the spectrum of social mobi-
early 2000s has attracted the interest of many lizations according to their scale and reach; this
researchers around the country and elsewhere scale ranges from protests to social movements
(e.g., Arce 2008; Bravo 2009, Caballero and and to revolutions, where revolutions represent
Cabrera 2008; Meléndez and León 2009; Pizarro the extreme value of this scale. Given that the like-
et al. 2004; Tanaka and Vera 2008; Tejada 2009). lihood of revolutions has declined (save perhaps
Regional protests like the “Arequipazo” in 2002 the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011), scholars
in the southern city of Arequipa against the priva- of contentious politics have shifted attention to
tization of the city’s electric companies, and the the analysis of everyday forms of collective re-
“Baguazo” in 2009 in the northern province of sistance (Fox and Starn 1997; Hellman 1997) as
Bagua against the opening of the Amazon for well as the new forms of mobilization that have
development have had nationwide consequences emerged in the context of economic liberalization
and resulted in policy changes demanded by and globalization (Almeida 2010). This chapter
aggrieved groups. In addition to these regional focuses on these new forms of collective action
mobilizations, there is a great diversity of pro- and less on social movements, though I make
tests against extractive activities, particularly references to both when it is necessary.
mining, and protests against elected officials and In the first part of this chapter, I review the
the outcomes of elections. These protests are for literature on contentious politics in order to bet-
the most part geographically dispersed through- ter understand the factors that explain social
out the country and center on specific demands protests. The second part presents and describes
of the aggrieved populations. a new dataset of protest in Peru. As explained
The study of political protest forms part of below, this is the data source with the largest
the larger social science literature that examines temporal and spatial coverage that exists on so-
other forms of mass-based collective action, such cial protests in the country. Using this dataset, I
as revolutions and rebellions. Recently, the types conclude this chapter by revisiting some of the
common explanations that have been made about
the current wave of protests in Peru today. The
M. Arce () analysis reveals the salience of political condi-
University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA tions over other explanatory factors.
e-mail: arcem@missouri.edu
276 M. Arce
Introduction (e.g., Lynch 1990; Parodi 1986; Ballón and

Castillo 1986; Adrianzén and Ballón 1992).
The social and political turmoil that emerged in Parodi, for example, examines the demobilization
the global North during the decade of 1960s and of industrial unionism in Peru at the end of the
1970s generated two great schools of thought second government of Belaúnde (1980–1985),
in the study of social movements: the USA and while Pezo et al. (1978) analyze the militancy
the European. The American school, which of teachers’ unions. In both cases, class identity
usually is less known in Peru, understands so- played an important role in the mobilization of
cial movements from the perspective of the these sectors, even when this identity was not
collective action problem as proposed by rational necessarily tied to a Marxist understanding of
choice theory (e.g., Olson 1965; Cohen 1985). class consciousness (see Parodi 1986).2
Following the strategic calculation that ratio- Although there are some studies that try to
nal individuals make, and taking into account combine the contributions of the American and
their self-interest (Olson 1965), an individual’s European schools (e.g., Cohen 1985; Munck
decision to participate in collective action rep- 1995), the contentious politics literature remains
resented a major hurdle to explain the emer- fragmented. In general, the research question
gence of social movements. The bulk of these justifies why an analysis follows the contri-
works, also referred to as the theory of “resource butions of one school and not another. On this
mobilization,” prioritizes the study of resources, point, Kitschelt (1986, p. 58) notes that the study
formal and informal, which facilitate the social of social movements on the basis of these schools
coordination of collective action. An individual’s is not necessarily inconsistent. Rather the empha-
participation in a protest movement is seen as sis on strategies is most useful in explaining the
a strategic action, and her actions represent an variation and the impact of social movements.
alternative to more conventional forms of partici- In this chapter, I follow the contributions of the
pating in politics. American school to explain the temporal and
In contrast to the American school, European spatial variation of social protests in Peru. These
scholars gave more importance to the structural contributions can be summarized based on the
analysis of class as well as the significance of following three analytical frameworks.
collective identity. As Touraine writes, “the
whole analysis begins with social relationships,
not actors,” such that “the identity of the actor Political Opportunities, Mobilizing
cannot be defined independently of the actual Structures, and Interpretive
conflict with the enemy or the recognition of Frameworks
the goal of struggle” (Touraine 1977, p. 312;
Touraine 1988, p. 49). Touraine distinguishes The literature on contentious politics advances
the social movements of the sixties and seven- three analytical frameworks for studying mo-
ties as lines of conflict that characterized the bilizations: political opportunities, mobilizing
collective identity of a postindustrial society. structures, and cultural interpretive frameworks.
Touraine argued that each society has a central McAdam et al. (1996) point out that these three
conflict; however, other authors went further and analytical approaches are the best way to study
acknowledged the plurality of conflicts within a how social movements arise and develop.3 These
society (e.g., Melucci 1989).1 authors suggest that social movements are initiat-
In the Peruvian context, as it is well known, ed as a result of social changes that transform the
the European school has had a broader reception existing political order, making it more accessible
1 2 For an English translation of this book, see Parodi

The American literature generally rejects the orientation
toward collective identity as the explanatory value of this (2000).
concept is “very elusive” and “difficult to evaluate” (El- 3 For a Spanish translation of this book, see McAdam
ster 1989, p. 468). et al. (1999).

19 Protest and Social Movements in Peru 277
to the demands of the movement. When social openness of the political system, and the capac-
movements see this opening for their demands, ity and propensity to state repression become
these changes in the political conditions are sub- the most useful dimensions to take into account
sequently converted into opportunities. However, (e.g., McAdam 1982;Tarrow 1989). In contrast,
for a successful social movement, participants of the informal dimensions of political opportuni-
this movement must have organizational capacity ties, such as the stability or instability of alliances
and resources available for their cause. Finally, among the elites, and the presence or absence of
it is not enough that these social actors feel allies among the elites have greater analytical
aggrieved, even if they are convinced of the po- weight if the research question focuses on the
tential benefits of collective action vis-à-vis other outcomes that social movements seek to achieve
possible strategies. These actors must develop a (e.g., Banaszak 1996; Giugni et al. 1998).
cultural interpretive framework to formulate One of the great contributions of the focus
their demands, and this framework needs to go on the structures of political opportunities has
beyond the specific interests of the core support- been in helping us understand how movements
ers of a movement. Only then the social move- emerge and grow in the presence of favorable
ment could survive, attracting new supporters or political conditions (e.g., Piven and Cloward
members, and later succeed politically. In short, 1979). Broadly stated, open, pluralistic political
these three analytical approaches are very useful systems are more flexible and accommodating,
to understand the origin and evolution of social and thus allow movements to gain power, and
movements. possibly alter the political order. Therefore, the
Political opportunities, according to the con- demands of social movements have a greater
tentious politics literature, are the institutional chance of success in the presence of an open and
structures or informal power relations within democratic political system. In Latin America,
a political system (e.g., Eisinger 1973; Brock- for instance, the formation and expansion of
ett 1991; Tarrow 1998). Although there is some indigenous movements have been explained in
consensus on the definition of political opportu- terms of political openness and changes in the
nity structures, several authors have examined structure of political opportunities (e.g., Yashar
different aspects of these institutional structures 1999; Van Cott 1994). By contrast, the capacity
or informal power relations. Following McAdam and propensity of state repression weakens social
(1996) and in an effort to organize this literature, movements, making it harder for them to survive
the four most important dimensions of these or succeed politically (e.g., Della Porta 1995).
political opportunities include: (a) the relative Other authors have noted that when the protest
openness of the institutionalized political system, actions of social movements are violent, these
(b) the stability or instability of alliances among actions usually invite a repressive response from
the elites, (c) the presence or absence of allies the state (e.g., Moore 2000). In other words, the
among the elites, and (d) the capacity and pro- response of the state is often adjusted according
pensity of state repression.4 to the nature, violent or not, of the initial protest
McAdam (1996) also observes that the actions of social movements.
research question shapes the relevance of some On the other hand, the mobilizing structures
of these dimensions in comparison to others. approach indicates that preexisting social net-
For example, to study the temporal and spatial works prone to mobilization are essential for
variation of social protest, the formal dimensions the organization and survival of social move-
of political opportunities, such as the relative ments. These organizations help strengthen the
movement, ensuring its permanence and pos-
sible future success. Several authors stress the
4 Meyer (2004) provides a review of the literature on po- importance of mobilizing human and financial
litical opportunities. For a critique of this concept—es-
pecially concerning its expansive use—see Goodwin and resources (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1997; Piven
Jasper (2004). and Cloward 1979; Cress and Snow 2000).
278 M. Arce
In addition, when it comes to marginalized some interpretive frameworks are more success-
groups, which lack political power, the collabo- ful than others in coordinating collective action
ration of external actors and other preexisting or supporting the causes of the social movement.
organizations are necessary for successful collec- For example, the interpretive frameworks that
tive action (e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly manage to link the social movement to themes
1978). In the case of some of the mining protests of injustice are more likely to succeed, and thus
in northern Peru, for example, the participation of more likely to be accepted by the population at
Oxfam and other nongovernmental organizations large.7
(NGOs) has been pivotal for the coordination of
collective action among aggrieved communities
affected by mineral resource extraction (Arce Protest and Social Movements in Peru
2008, pp. 52–55; Arce 2014).5
It is also worth noting that several works Having briefly reviewed the three main analyti-
focusing on “resource mobilization” as a central cal approaches in the literature of contentious
analytical concept reject the emphasis on griev- politics—political opportunities, mobilizing
ances to explain collective action. The theory of structures, and cultural interpretive frameworks—
“relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962) a clarification regarding the nature of protest ac-
points out that the discrepancy between expec- tivity in contemporary Peru is in order. As several
tations and the possibilities of meeting those authors have noted, and taking into account the
expectations generates anxiety, frustration, and fragmentation of traditional social organizations,
anger; these feelings of indignation, in turn, can such as political parties and trade unions, most
lead to violent behavior. Although no longer in of the recent protests in the country are rather
use (Della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 250; Brockett spontaneous, and have specific demands. They
2005, p. 49), this approach is perhaps one of the generally lack mobilizing resources in the form
frames that overemphasizes the importance of the of organizations or networks. Indeed, many of
individual as a central actor in collective action.6 the so-called Regional Fronts (Frentes Regio-
Finally, cultural interpretive frameworks are nales) or Defense Fronts (Frentes de Defensa)
social constructs that act as filters or “memes” that form around a protest simply disappear as
for interpreting the existing social reality. These soon the demands of challengers are met or the
filters help individuals to select items from their policy of the government changes (Arce 2008).
environment both present and past (e.g., Snow The ephemeral nature of these protests cannot be
and Benford 1988). The literature also stresses easily reconciled with the great goals of social
the need to synchronize the social movement’s change or transformation typical of social move-
discourse with the feelings of the general popu- ments, such as indigenous, ecological, or human
lation. If this synchronization occurs, it is easier rights movements. On this point, Touraine (1989)
for the social movement to win a larger number would argue that not every form of protest is
of sympathizers or adherents. Following Zald synonymous with a social movement, as social
(1996), the strategy of developing an effective movements require a clearly defined organiza-
cultural interpretive framework demands con- tional or ideological expression.
crete efforts in formulating a collective vision of This dichotomy between social movements
reality. This collective vision helps to legitimize and protests can also be seen in other works in
and encourage collective action. In this sense, Latin America. For example, the region’s tran-
sition to democracy in the late 1970s and early
1980s emphasized the study of social movements
5 Regarding protest against the extraction of mineral
resources, see Arce (2014); Scurrah (2008); Bebbington
(2007); De Echave (2009), among others. 7 Degregori (1993, 1998) and Pajuelo (2009) represent
6 Brush (1996) provides a review of the theory of examples of this analytical approach for the Peruvian
“relative deprivation.” case.
(e.g., Ballón and Barrig 1986). Such movements Sources of Mobilization Figures
held democratic and participatory internal struc- in Peru
tures, and their collective action was targeted
toward social change. In contrast, the notion of Much of the existing literature studying
protest highlights the fragmented character of mobilizations in Peru utilizes the data from the
contemporary collective action, and takes into ac- Ombudsman Office as a primary source to study
count its geographic segmentation, as well as the the variation of social conflicts (e.g., Bravo 2009;
diversity of demands and expressions surround- Caballero and Cabrera 2008; Meléndez and León
ing protest activity. Stated differently, it empha- 2009; Tanaka and Vera 2008). However, there
sizes the concrete, short-term political purpose of are two other sources of information on social
mobilizations. In the case of Peru, authors like protests in Peru. One comes from the Ministry
Toche (2003, p. 136) view the current wave of of Interior (MININTER), and the other is the
protests as a broad social movement “exhausted Base de Protestas Sociales del Perú (hereafter
on immediate needs.” Toche (2003, p. 136) also Base de Protestas) compiled by the author of this
adds that these protest movements “have devel- chapter.8 As detailed later, both the MININTER
oped a bit distant from politics,” in particular and the Base de Protestas figures measure the
the types of institutions like political parties that protest events themselves, while the figures of
are characteristic of a representative democracy. the Ombudsman Office summed up these events
Other authors, such as Pajuelo (2004), following based on the particular type of conflict (e.g.,
Touraine (1989), disagree in equating the current one environmental conflict with several protest
wave of social protest with the notion of social actions, such as marches, roadblocks, and sit-
movements. ins). Briefly, I present an overview of these data
In this chapter, I use the terminology of mo- sources.
bilization as a generic term that refers to both With national coverage, these three datasets
conflicts and social protests. The term conflict provide information on a number of variables,
comes from the Peruvian Ombudsman Office such as the type of demands (or claims), time and
(Defensoría del Pueblo) and emphasizes the type place of the protest event, and geographic setting.
of social struggle (for instance, environmental However, one of the limitations of the MININT-
conflicts, conflicts over local government affairs, ER figures is the discontinuity and access to the
and conflicts over illegal crops), while the termi- data. There is also not a lot of information avail-
nology of protests focuses more on the type of able that explains how these figures are collected
protest action (for instance, marches, roadblocks, (though one can safely assume that these figures
sit-ins, takeovers, land seizures, etc.). Thus, a come from police reports), or more generally, an
social conflict, following the nomenclature of the explanation of the different types of protest ac-
Ombudsman Office, may include various types tions.9 For example, in the MININTER website
of protest actions, which would result in a small- one can find the figures for the years 2006, 2007
er number of conflicts compared to the overall (until September), 2008, and 2009 (only for the
number of protests. Ultimately, and beyond month of February). Figures for other years are
seeking to spell out what is meant by conflict or not easily accessible, although they do exist.
protest, it is more important to explain the sys-
tematic variation of these events across time and
8 The Research Board and Research Council Grants from
space. As discussed later, I explain the temporal
the University of Missouri provided funding for the con-
variation of these mobilizations according to the struction of this database.
formal dimensions of political opportunities, in 9 The protest event types include: mobilizations, gen-
particular the relative degree of opening of the eral strikes, roadblocks, work stoppages, land invasions,
political system. clashes, hunger strike, tire burning, sit-ins, among others.
280 M. Arce
Fig. 19.1 Contentious activity and political liberaliza- which range from 1 to 7, with lower values indicating
tion in Peru, 1980–2010. (Sources: Contentious activity is greater freedom, yielding a theoretical range of 2–14 for
the sum of all types of protest activity as recorded in the the combined index. In the sample, the combined Free-
Base de Protestas Sociales del Perú. Political liberaliza- dom House index ranges from 4 to 11. I reserved these
tion scores were taken from Freedom House. It represents values and added 14 to create a range from 30 to 100, with
the sum of the civil liberties and political rights indices, higher values indicating greater democracy)
Compared to MININTER data, as it is widely recent years, Cleary (2006, p. 41) writes that the
recognized, the figures from the Ombudsman “protest politics, including strikes, demonstra-
Office are very accessible, and at the same time, tions, and roadblocks… are seen as a legitimate
provide very detailed information on the evolu- form of civil disobedience within a democratic
tion of conflicts. The temporal coverage of the system, rather than a direct challenge to the sys-
series, which begins in the month of April of tem itself.” In keeping with Cleary’s observation,
2004, is perhaps one of the biggest limitations of the 2009 Latinobarómetro survey reported that,
this data source. It is also not feasible to recre- on average, 92 % of Latin American respondents
ate these figures for earlier years as the types of viewed street mobilizations as a normal part of a
social struggles described in the present period democracy, a 29 % point increase from the 63 %
are very different compared to the ones in earlier response recorded in 2008 (Latinobarómetro
decades. In addition, the bias of order and the 2009). Quoting Tarrow (1989, p. 347), “disorder
presumed motivation to “prevent” conflicts (the and democracy are not opposed.”
administrative division that collects these fig- The Base de Protestas is more complete in
ures is called the “Unit of Prevention of Social terms of its temporal and spatial coverage (see
Conflicts and Governability of the Ombudsman Fig. 19.1). It covers 31 years of contentious
Office”) may not be ideal from the point of view activity, starting in January 1980 until December
of social science research. 2010, and spans across six different presidencies:
Specifically, the theme of order is intertwined Fernando Belaúnde (1980–1985), Alan García
with notions of political stability, which can be (1985–1990), Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000),
seen as a political goal sought by government Valentín Paniagua (2000–2001), Alejandro
officials, and therefore, may deviate from the Toledo (2001–2006), and Alan García (2006–
free mobilization or activism of civil society. 2011). The dataset comes from the local print
Simply stated, few research projects today equate media, utilizing three of the country’s largest
the presence of protest with the need for order newspapers based on circulation: El Comercio,
or political stability. For example, explaining the El Expreso, and La República. It records 17,035
resurgence of the political left in Latin America in protest events by date (day, month, and year) and
Table 19.1 Comparison of mobilization figures for 2006

MININTER Ombudsman’s Office Base de Protestas
Sociales del Perú
Total 858 96 226
North
Tumbes 4 0 5
Piura 25 3 9
Lambayeque 45 4 11
Cajamarca 48 8 5
La Libertad 22 7 9
Ancash 34 3 7
Center
Pasco 9 3 2
Junin 34 4 11
Huancavelica 42 5 6
Ica 29 2 8
Lima and Callao 135 2 88
Huánuco 11 5 2
South
Arequipa 88 3 19
Moquegua 45 2 5
Tacna 38 2 4
Ayacucho 24 7 5
Apurímac 17 2 1
Cusco 21 6 8
Puno 42 8 8
East
Amazonas 16 1 6
San Martín 50 9 2
Loreto 44 9 5
Ucayali 18 1 0
Madre de Dios 17 0 0
MININTER Ministry of Interior
location (district, province, and department or proximity of the newspaper to the protest event
region) across six main categories: the type of tends to inflate the reporting of some protests in
protest, the type of actor, the type of demand, the comparison to others. Moreover, the reporting of
target of protest, the level of violence, and the protest events could be influenced depending on
geographic setting of the protest event.10 the ideological orientation or “political culture”
Before describing some of these categories, of the newspapers (see Barranco and Wisler
a note on the advantages and disadvantages of 1999). Aside from these general concerns, the
using the print media to record protest events is Fujimori period poses additional challenges for
warranted. Generally, newspapers tend to overre- the Peruvian case. Specifically, Conaghan (2005)
port protest events when the number of protests is and others describe how the Fujimori regime
high, and conversely, underreport protest events (through Vladimiro Montesinos) utilized bribes
when protests are low. Similarly, the geographic to collude with the local print media, boasting
about the performance of the regime while be-
10 The figures for this database were collected starting in
littling the opposition. Consequently, the stifling
2004. Garay and Tanaka (2009) provide a partial repro- of a free press under Fujimori may have affected
duction of these figures for the years 1995–2006. For a the reporting of some protest events, particularly
description of the complete dataset, see Arce (2014).
282 M. Arce
in the late 1990s (see also McMillan and Zoido “active,” “latent,” “reactivated,” and “resolved.”
2004). In addition, the conflicts defined as “active” are
The Base de Protestas addresses some of the further sub-categorized as those “with dialogue”
disadvantages of using the print media to record and “no dialogue” taking place. However, it is not
protest events by using newspapers with different very clear at what point a conflict moves from
ideological perspectives or “political cultures.” one to another state, what sets of events consti-
For instance, La República emerged as a leading tute the presence or absence of dialogue, and
opposition newspaper during the Fujimori peri- how dialogue in general affects the categoriza-
od. El Comercio, El Expreso, and La República tion of the other types of conflicts. In the future,
also have national reach, and pre-date the cycles researchers should be aware of the limitations of
of protest documented in this chapter. El Comer- these data sources, and adjust their conclusions
cio, El Expreso, and La República were founded based on what constitutes a mobilization and
in 1839, 1961, and 1981, respectively. In this how it is measured.
way, the Base de Protestas corrects the potential
overreporting or underreporting of protest events
as a result of geographic proximity or the cycles The Limitations of Commonly Used
of contentious activity themselves. Explanations of Protest Trends in Peru
As a comparative exercise using these three
data sources, I provide the disaggregated figures Two broad cycles of protest can be observed
at the department level for the year 2006. Follow- since Peru’s transition to democracy in 1980: one
ing Table 19.1, it is obvious that the MININT- during the early to mid-1980s, and the other one
ER figures record the largest number of protest in the mid- to late 2000s (see Fig. 19.1). These
events (858 protests), and Lima concentrates the two cycles surfaced under starkly different so-
highest number of mobilizations (approximately ciopolitical and economic conditions. The 1980s
15 %). According to the Base de Protestas, Lima were a period of economic decline and increasing
is also the epicenter of protests throughout the political violence. The 2000s, in contrast, were a
country (39 %), more than double the percent- period of economic expansion taking place in a
age of the MININTER figures. In contrast, the context of overall pacification (Arce 2005). The
figures from the Ombudsman’s Office locate level of political liberalization was comparative-
the northern departments of San Martín, Loreto, ly similar across the 1980s and 2000s, and also
and Cajamarca, followed by Puno situated in higher than that of the 1990s—the Fujimori de-
the south of Peru, as the regions with the high- cade.11 In this final section of the chapter, I re-
est incidence of conflicts. In terms of geographic visit two of the commonly used arguments that
zones—and excluding the figures for Lima—it is have been formulated to explain protest trends in
worth noting that these three data sources agree Peru. These explanations include the state of the
that in 2006 the southern region of the country economy and the presence of political violence.
was the geographic area with the greatest number Turning to the economy, the conventional wis-
of mobilizations. dom suggests that crisis conditions emboldened
It is also worth noting that the mobilization popular sectors and middle classes to mobilize
figures from both the MININTER and Ombuds- (Silva 2009). The first cycle of protest of the
man’s Office are very different and not easily 1980s is consistent with this argument. The late
reconcilable, even though both are entities of the 1980s were a period of economic upheaval, and
same state. As I noted earlier, there is not much those mobilizations largely followed the “bad
information available about how the MININTER news” of the economy, e.g., higher consumer
figures are collected. Something similar also hap-
pens with the classification of conflicts accord- 11
Similar to Yashar (1999, p. 31), I define political
ing to the Ombudsman’s Office. Specifically, the liberalization as “increased freedoms of association,
Ombudsman’s Office categorizes conflicts as expression, and the press.”
Table 19.2 Average indicators by decade in Peru. (Sources: Economic indicators were taken from Banco Central
de Reserva del Perú. Political violence indicators were taken from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (2003).
Political violence average indicators for the period 1990–1999 also include the year 2000. Contentious activity figures
were taken from the Base de Protestas Sociales del Perú. Protests are the sum of mobilizations, roadblocks, sit-ins,
and takeovers)
1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2010
Economy
GDP growth % 0.65 3.24 5.46
GDP per capita − 3.2 2.1 4.4
growth %
Inflation % 528 794 2
Political violence
Deaths by the Shining 785 428 NA
Path
Deaths by the military 515 192 NA
Disappearances 233 94 NA
Tortures 360 258 NA
Extrajudicial killings 1431 745 NA
Contentious activity
Strikes 267 38 64
Protests 99 118 294
prices due to inflation, food shortages, and poor suggests that the relationship between the state of
provision of basic government services. The the economy and protest is more complex than it
second cycle of protest of the 2000s, however, appears. For this reason, it is imperative to speci-
defies the conventional wisdom that associates fy the sources of grievances linked to the state of
lackluster economic performance with greater the economy, especially at the subnational level.
levels of mobilizations. In the 2000s, the Peruvi- Turning to the political violence argument,
an economy rebounded and became a showcase several scholars have argued that the country’s
of economic stewardship. These mobilizations insurgency war made it difficult for social groups
trailed the “good news” of economic expansion to build organizational and coalitional capacity,
and improved performance, e.g., higher wages, which had been crucial in resisting economic
more benefits, and better provision of social ser- liberalization policies elsewhere (Arellano-
vices.12 President García (2006–2011) character- Yanguas 2008; Silva 2009). The Shining Path,
ized these protests as mobilizations “originated in particular, targeted and assassinated sev-
by the abundance” of natural resources (quoted eral leaders of grassroots organizations because
in Meléndez and León 2009, p. 606). Overall, these leaders were viewed as supportive of
the finding that protests are linked to the state of the existing political apparatus, instead of the
the economy when it is doing poorly (the 1980s) insurgency. A related set of arguments associ-
or well (the 2000s) suggests that national-level ates state repression as a result of political vio-
economic conditions are generally not a good lence with the decline of mobilizations. In brief,
predictor of mobilization and demobilization if political violence quells mobilizations due to
trends in the country.13 At the least, the evidence deaths or repressive activities, one would expect
lower levels of mobilizations when violence is
generally high. However, as Table 19.2 shows,
12 The distinction between “good” and “bad” news comes
both violence and protests coexisted during the
from Almeida (2010).
13 1980s, thus it is not immediately clear if political
Cross national studies show that economic indicators,
such as GDP per capita and GDP growth, are not good violence made the presence of anti-government
predictors of mobilizations. mobilizations unlikely. The information about
284 M. Arce
political violence comes from the National Truth the system-wide political opportunities advanced
Commission (renamed the National Truth and by democratization that are favorable for popu-
Reconciliation Commission under Toledo), and lar mobilization. Compared to nondemocratic
covers the period of the country’s insurgency war regimes, democracies foster collective mobili-
starting in 1980 and lasting until 2000. In addi- zation by relaxing repression (Francisco 2009),
tion, the arguments about state repression cen- encouraging associational life, and opening
ter mostly on Fujimori, given his extensive use channels of popular participation (Johnston
of military intelligence and selective repression and Almeida 2006). Other literature portrays
to halt the country’s insurgency war. However, democracies as “movement societies” (Meyer
according to the Physical Integrity Rights Index and Tarrow 1998), where political protest is
(Cingranelli and Richards 2010), which is a com- accepted and even encouraged as a “normal part
posite indicator measuring tortures, extrajudicial of politics” (Goldstone 2004, p. 348). Conceptu-
killings, political imprisonments, and disap- alizing “democracy as opportunity” helps explain
pearances, the worst period of human rights the variation of protest across countries and over
violations in Peru was the late 1980s under the time (Arce and Bellinger 2007), showing that the
first government of García, not the 1990s under political opportunity for protest is generally high-
Fujimori. To summarize, the argument that po- er in democracies compared to nondemocratic
litical violence discouraged protest activity is regimes (similar Tilly and Tarrow 2006, p. 66).
not entirely convincing because high levels of This political opportunity approach can also
political violence and protest overlapped consid- help us understand national trends within Peru.
erably during the 1980s. Figure 19.1 shows that the country’s level of
In conclusion, the longer time horizon democracy is closely tied to the two different
captured by the Peruvian protest event dataset waves of popular contention referenced above.
unveils two broad cycles of protest, and these In fact, since the country’s transition to democ-
cycles cast doubt on the salience of two com- racy in mid-1980, Peru’s level of democracy has
monly used explanations of protest trends in the approximated an N-shaped curve: higher in the
country, as the arguments about the state of the 1980s, lower in the 1990s, and higher again in the
economy and the presence of political violence 2000s. Echoing this observation, Freedom House
are validated in some periods and not others. scores for political rights and civil liberties clas-
These findings reaffirm the need to look beyond sified Peru as “free” in the 1980s, “partly free”
short-term contextual factors, which can be in the 1990s, and “free” in the 2000s.14 With re-
misleading indicators of the causes of long-term spect to mobilizations, again their level was also
protest activity. higher during the “free” periods of the 1980s and
2000s compared to the “partly free” period of the
1990s. The information supports the general idea
Democracy as Opportunity that democracy provides a favorable environ-
ment to undertake collective action, producing
Elsewhere I have argued that the broader politi- distinct waves and modes of popular contention.
cal context in which protests emerge provides Broadly stated, in the 1980s, the traditional labor
a better explanation for the incidence of popu- unions led popular mobilizations using strikes. In
lar contention (e.g., Arce 2008; Arce and Bell-
inger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011). Scholars 14 Freedom House classifies regimes as “free,” “partly
of social movements, in fact, have long argued free,” and “not free” using the average of their civil liber-
that in the absence of a political environment that ties and political rights indices, which range from 1 to 7,
affects the incentives for people to undertake col- with higher values indicating less freedom. Regimes that
lective action (Tarrow 1998), people with intense have an average rating 2.5 or below are considered “free,”
regimes with an average rating in the 3–5 range are con-
grievances may pose only negligible challenges sidered “partly free,” and regimes rated 5.5 or higher are
to existing regimes. In this chapter, I emphasize considered “not free.”
Fig. 19.2 Strikes and protests in Peru, 1980–2010. (Source: Strikes and protests figures were taken from the Base de
Protestas Sociales del Perú (see Appendix). Protests are the sum of mobilizations, roadblocks, sit-ins, and takeovers)
the 2000s, new actors, such as Regional Fronts as the “end of politics.” Figure 19.2 compares the
(Frentes Regionales) and Defense Fronts (Fren- country’s national level of strikes with protest for
tes de Defensa), led protest movements using the period of my study. Paralleling trends in other
mobilizations, roadblocks, sit-ins, and takeovers. Latin American countries, the graph reveals the
Peru’s current cycle of protest (the mid- to late changing basis of anti-government mobilizations
2000s), which is the main focus of this chapter, following Peru’s transition to a market economy.
has unfolded under a context of greater political This figure depicts the paradoxical effect of eco-
liberalization, with a livelier and freer press fol- nomic liberalization: It shows organized labor’s
lowing the end of the Fujimori regime, and the decline in political clout, which made room for
opening of new outlets for political representa- new actors and other forms of popular resistance
tion with the election of subnational regional (similar Arce 2008, p. 42; Arce 2014).
governments. Overall, Fig. 19.1 highlights the The decline in labor activism can further be
importance of political, rather than economic seen by comparing the number of workers who
conditions, in providing a better explanation for participate in strikes. On average, the number
the emergence of contentious activity. of workers involved in strikes was 508,840 dur-
A few additional observations with relevance ing the 1980s, decreasing sharply to 81,107 dur-
to the literature on the resurgence of contention in ing the 1990s, and even further to 3,813 during
response to economic liberalization can be drawn the 2000s.15 The sharp decline in the level of
from the dataset. First, research that emphasizes strikes and workers participating in strikes sug-
the demobilizing effects of economic liberaliza- gests that vertical, national-level trade unions,
tion expects a widespread decline in mobiliza- such as the General Confederation of Workers in
tions as market reforms move forward. For in- Peru (Confederación General de Trabajadores del
stance, Kurtz (2004) argues that market reforms Perú, CGTP), the National Federation of Mining
destroy the organizational capacity of social re- Workers (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores
sistance, especially through their effects on labor. Mineros, Metalúrgicos y Siderúrgicos del Perú,
Similarly, Oxhorn (2006) suggests that neoliber-
alism transforms citizenship into a relatively hol-
15 On average, the number of workers involved in strikes
low kind of consumerism, ending distributional
was 470,325 during the 1970s. These figures were taken
conflicts, or what Colburn (2002) characterized from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática.
286 M. Arce
FNTMMSP), and the Sole Union of Workers of Conclusion

Peruvian Education (Sindicato Único de Tra-
bajadores de la Educación Peruana, SUTEP), Large-scale protests have become increasingly
among others, no longer define national common in Latin America, and Peru has had
outcomes following the onset of economic lib- more than its share of mobilizations. However,
eralization. However, other actors with greater unlike the national-level strikes led by major
autonomy from the state and party institutions trade unions during the 1980s and early 1990s,
have emerged. For instance, the dataset shows the bulk of mobilizations in the present period
that Regional Fronts and Defense Fronts were is highly localized and focused on claims spe-
the second most common type of actor involved cific to aggrieved groups. New actors have also
in protest events across the period 1980–2010. emerged in response to economic liberalization
These Fronts are the typical types of organiza- and globalization. In the Peruvian case, both the
tions that will emerge in the aftermath of mobi- state of the economy and the presence of politi-
lizations against extractive activities. With few cal violence have been invoked to explain pro-
exceptions, most of these organizations did not test trends in the country. These explanations,
gather up into national confederations or develop as I have shown in this chapter, overemphasize
ties with political parties as part of a programmat- short-term contextual factors specific to certain
ic alternative to neoliberalism, yet their partici- periods. The longer time horizon provided by
pation in protest events increased steadily during the Base de Protestas, in contrast, unveils two
the first decade of the 2000s. Their repertoires of broad cycles of protest, and together highlights
protest, including mobilizations, roadblocks, sit- the salience of political conditions (what I called
ins, and takeovers, affected national outcomes, “democracy as opportunity”) over other explana-
and summed up well the repoliticization effects tory factors.
of economic liberalization (Arce 2014). Future research should consider the advan-
Second, research that dwells on the demo- tages and disadvantages offered by the three data
bilizing effects of economic liberalization also sources reported in this chapter as these sources
suggests that exposure to worldwide competi- can help answer some research questions and not
tion produces a “powerless” post-globalization others. The figures from the Ombudsman Office,
state with constrained capacities, particularly in for instance, provide very detailed information
the areas of monetary and fiscal policies, and on the evolution of conflicts, and they can help
as such, this literature has argued that the state identify the types of human and financial re-
no longer represents a worthy target of popu- sources that are seen as critical for the success
lar mobilization (Kurtz 2004, p. 271). In con- of protest movements. In contrast, the Base de
trast, the Base de Protestas shows that the state Protestas can help explain the variation of protest
remains the main target of contention as 29.4 % trends over time. It can also help us understand
of mobilizations are directed at the ministries of the subnational or local variation of mobiliza-
the executive branch of government, which is tions, a topic of increasing scholarly interest (see,
consistent with Silva (2009, p. 28). After these for instance, Almeida 2012; Arce and Mangonnet
ministries, the central government is the sec- 2013).
ond most common type of institution demanded Finally, several studies examining protest
(25.7 %). As one would expect, the nature of the movements in Peru have emphasized the need
demands directed at the national government infor political stability or order. Some of these
volved labor petitions. Altogether, this implies works were perhaps considering how street mo-
that popular subjects directed their demands to bilizations led to forced resignation of presidents
the state in an effort to seek some form of protec- in neighboring countries, such as Bolivia and
tion or compensation from market forces, even Ecuador. Other studies have emphasized the need
when economic liberalization policies succeeded to maintain the financial reputation of the coun-
in retiring the state from economic activities. try in an era of global economic order, including
the USA—Peru Free Trade Agreement, and thus Barranco, J., & Wisler D. (1999). Validity and systema-
view rising mobilizations as incompatible with ticity of newspaper data in event analysis. European
Sociological Review, 15(3): 301–322.
these goals. Nevertheless, it is worth remember- Bebbington, A. (Hrsg.). (2007). Minería, movimien-
ing that political order may not necessarily be the tos sociales y respuestas campesinas: Una ecología
most important dimension in a democracy. And política de transformaciones territoriales. Lima: Insti-
as Goldstone (2004, p. 361) reminds us, demo- tuto de Estudios Peruanos.
Bellinger, P. T., & Arce M. (2011). Protest and democ-
cratic politics—however imperfect—ought to racy in Latin America’s market era. Political Research
encourage collective political activity, not render Quarterly, 64(3): 688–704.
it obsolete. Bravo, F. (2009). El Desempeño del estado y la conflictiv-
idad social. Coyuntura: Análisis Económico y Social
de Actualidad, 5(24): 10–13.
Brockett, C. D. (1991). The structure of political oppor-
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Social Movement Contention
in Colombia, 1958–2014 20
Marcela Velasco
In Colombia’s contentious political system, sta- movements. Movements have also responded to
ble democratic institutions that sustain regular widespread material necessities, all made worse
elections and citizen participation have endured by class contradictions and wealth concentration
despite an unyielding war against ordinary peo- (Gilhodes 1970; Zamosc 1989), and by wide-
ple, the state, and the economic infrastructure. spread collective beliefs that something is unjust
Such levels of violence together with the failure and immoral (Archila 2003b).
to effectively alleviate the needs of a signifi- This chapter draws on previously published
cant portion of the population have produced an work where I have generally argued that social
unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Social move- contention results from the fact that citizens have
ments have formed in this context and react to obtained enough rights and capabilities to orga-
it. They contest incomplete democratization and nize, yet tend to experience the loss of acquired
economic marginalization while demanding the benefits, whereas the state has developed uneven
rights of diverse categories of people. Colom- capabilities to implement policies, offer security,
bia is culturally, regionally, and economically and protect human rights (Velasco 2007, 2011).
diverse, and with 47 million people, it is the third Here, I differentiate Colombia’s social move-
largest country in Latin America. It is an upper ments from other forms of contentious politics,
middle-income country with a poverty level of present protest cycles in the backdrop of regime
37 % in 2012—down from 50 % in 2002—and change, and offer a broad description of the ac-
high wealth inequality with a GINI coefficient of tors, motives and types of actions behind social
0.54, down from 0.57 in 2002 (DNP 2013). movement struggles.
Social protests in Colombia have been un-
derstood as a reaction to the absence of political
representation and centralization of power (San- Contentious Politics in Colombia
tana 1983; Leal 1991), leaving people no other
option than to organize and protest to impact Social movements constitute one type of conten-
politics (Urrutia 1969). Social movements are tious politics, or public, collective actions such as
also motivated by international events such as protests or revolutions. Politically marginalized
the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution (Archila or economically excluded categories of people,
2003a), or by dependent economic relations with as well as groups who seek to influence authori-
capitalist countries (Pécaut 1973) that weaken ties, resort to disruptive political mechanisms to
Colombia’s economy and inspire nationalist change public attitudes about an issue or trans-
form politics in general (McAdam et al. 2001).
In addition to social movements, contention in
M. Velasco ()
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, USA Colombia includes guerrilla and paramilitary ac-
e-mail: Marcela.Velasco@colostate.edu tions. However, guerrillas and paramilitaries are
292 M. Velasco
violent, seek to overthrow the regime and/or defy In comparison, social movements generally
constitutional limits (Almeida 2008). In contrast, make claims by way of symbolic, public, com-
social movements are the open and peaceful munal, and, more often than not, nonviolent ac-
struggles for social change of ordinary citizens. tions (Archila 2003a). Depending on the context
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- however, social movements incite government
bia (FARC) is the oldest and largest guerrilla repression producing episodes of violence.
organization whose origins date back to the self- Though contentious in nature, social movements
defense groups formed to protect peasant lives reject the deliberate and premeditated use of vio-
and lands from landowner-sponsored private lence to achieve their aims and use formal insti-
militias during La Violencia, a period of political tutional channels of representation in combina-
party violence between 1948 and 1958 (Bush- tion with informal mechanisms (e.g., protests) to
nell 1993). By 1964 the FARC had emerged as make their claims. Given Colombia’s context of
a communist guerrilla force seeking land reform contention, social movements go to great lengths
and to overthrow the oligarchic regime. The Na- to label themselves as examples of “social,”
tional Army of Liberation (ELN) and the Popular “civic,” or “civil” struggles to signal to detrac-
Army of Liberation (EPL) also appeared around tors that they are not guerrillas.
this time, whereas the April 19 Movement (M- Social movement associations are more likely
19) formed in the 1970s. They emerged in dif- to connect to the political opposition organized
ferent parts of the country, represented program- in programmatically and ideologically diverse
matic and ideological differences, but openly es- parties such as the Communist Party, the M-19,
poused the combination of all forms of struggles the Independent and Revolutionary Worker’s
to achieve their aims (Pizarro 1992). Guerrillas Movement (MOIR), the Indigenous Social Alli-
financed themselves by extorting and kidnapping ance, among others (Archila 2003b). In the early
regional landowners or other wealthy groups. In 2000s Colombia’s atomized left founded the Polo
the late-1980s after the government increased Democrático Alternativo to unify an opposition,
openings for political participation, most of these organize a congressional voting block, and ag-
groups lost ground as a political alternative to a gregate votes (Gutiérrez 2006). As an associa-
closed, oligarchic regime. The M-19 demobilized tion of different political groups, the Polo tried
and became a political party in the 1990s, where- to gather intellectuals, opposition parties, and a
as the EPL and ELN were eventually weakened broad spectrum of social movement delegations.
militarily. The FARC sustained itself through Though the Polo has enjoyed electoral success
kidnappings, taxing drug trafficking, and control- in some regions and in Bogotá, the party has not
ling some local economies. been able to overcome a number of sectarian di-
In reaction to the expansion of guerrillas, visions, including those pertaining to the relation-
paramilitaries were established in the 1980s to ship between the “democratic” and “insurgent”
provide protection to landowners and, arguably, left. The most current division of the Polo gave
to cover for the state’s incapacity to contain rise to a new left current known as Progresistas.
subversion (Romero 2000). Paramilitaries used Given the state of politics in Colombia, am-
terror to keep in check entire population and to bivalence about rejecting armed conflict as a way
reclaim—without any constitutional limitation— to produce political change is not only criticized
parts of the country’s territory for the state or for by the democratic left but seen with suspicion
local elites. Paramilitaries may be catalogued as by the violent right who believes that the left
contentious actors because they do not enjoy sup- practices “double militancy” by supporting both
port from all state elites, they contradict pluralist civic and armed left factions. This ambivalence
or inclusive state policies, and their actions are endangers entire collectivities as happened to
unconstitutional. During the 1990s, both guerril- the Patriotic Union, a leftist party formed in the
las and paramilitaries were responsible for gross 1980s whose ranks were filled by some FARC
human rights violations. militants, and was consequently targeted by
20 Social Movement Contention in Colombia, 1958–2014 293
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Fig. 20.1 Social movements and political regime in Colombia (1958–2010). (Sources: Protest data 1958–1975 (Ar-
chila 2003b); 1975–2010 (CINEP 2013))
paramilitaries who assassinated about 3000 UP During the National Front’s less democratic
followers (Delgado 2008; Duque 2012). Some rule, contentious actions averaged 172 per year,
parties on the right also have demonstrated links with the exception of 1971, when 540 events
to violent paramilitary groups and use coercion were recorded as a result of widespread land in-
to force constituencies to vote for their preferred vasions carried out by peasants. At the end of the
candidates. They have also been responsible, as 1960s and early 1970s, the number of protests
discussed below, of persecuting and assassinat- increased as social discontent with restricted de-
ing social movement activists. mocracy spread. The Front brought to power a
coalition of Liberals and Conservatives who rep-
resented coffee growers, industrialists, and land-
Social Movements and Political owners (Palacios 2001) and precluded political
Regime (1958–2014) institutions that favored the interests of subaltern
groups (Archila 1995). Party elites shared gov-
Social movements are contained by broader po- ernment to conciliate interparty fighting that led
litical dynamics affecting the resources available to numerous civil wars, prevent the independent
to organize collective action (Jenkins 1995). This organization of the opposition and stem populist
section considers the main developments in Co- economic measures (c.f. Kline 1995). Not sur-
lombian politics between 1958 and 2014, and prisingly, Colombia’s four main guerrilla groups
divides these developments into three political formed during this time.
regimes: The National Front (1958–1974), the National Front governments used states of
Transitional Period (1975–1990) and the Neo- siege to suppress independent civil society orga-
liberal Period (1991–2014). This political his- nizing (Archila 2003b) and criminalized strikes
tory has a great deal of relevance in analyzing the in the economically strategic sectors of com-
determinants of social contention. Figure 20.1 munications, social security, and oil (Londoño
summarizes social movement actions against the 1989). However, they passed economic modern-
different political regimes and demonstrates that ization measures and enabled peasants and work-
contention has followed an increasing tendency ers representation in corporatist organizations
over time. controlled by the government, which would later
serve as platforms for independent association.
294 M. Velasco
Disgruntled Conservative rural elites, however, of the opposition in a constituent assembly. The
particularly opposed the agrarian reforms of the constitution promised a Social State under the
Liberal Alberto Lleras (1966–1970) and sup- Rule of Law following principles of economic
ported the Conservative Misael Pastrana (1970– and political democracy favoring participation by
1974), who disassembled the agrarian reform and different social actors (c.f. Garay 2002). Protests
secured the power of rural elites over peasants declined after its ratification in the short term, but
(Silva 1989). This counter-reform explains the subsequent governments experienced a higher
peak of protests in 1971 when peasant land take- number of protests than prior administrations.
overs peaked. Hopes were high that the constitution would
Protests reached an average of 471 during produce a more inclusive and democratic politi-
the Transitional governments, when the Front cal system, but this was in part discouraged by
had officially ended, yet many of its institutions market reforms that increased inequality (Garay
remained in place. Only in 1986 would a gov- 2002) and government failure to attenuate the
ernment form after competitive elections (Kline effects of armed conflict. In the 1990s people
1995). Transitional governments tend to pass generally protested neoliberal austerity measures
political reforms that failed to assuage popular designed under International Monetary Fund
demands, yet raised high expectations. The 1975 guidelines to rationalize fiscal spending by in-
crest coincides with the beginning of a new ad- creasing indirect taxes, cutting social programs,
ministration that promised increased political privatizing utility companies, increasing public
participation and socioeconomic reforms, but utility rates, and reducing the budgets of local ad-
failed to comply. This government confronted ministrations (Ahumada 2000). Meanwhile pro-
the unprecedented wave of social uprising with tests against violence, displacement, and human
repression of activists, but also passed benefi- rights violations continued unabated.
cial economic reforms. The Liberal Julio César Social contention was at its highest during
Turbay (1978–1982) then reduced protests by Alvaro Uribe’s government (2002–2010), an
increasing repression and passing the 1978 Secu- administration that concentrated power and in-
rity Statute that included severe measures to decreased repression. Elected by Colombians tired
tain, interrogate, and prosecute civilians suspect- of guerrilla abuse, Uribe enjoyed high approval
ed of subversion or drug trafficking but which ratings and was expected to pacify the country at
were used to pursue any civil opposition (Arch- any cost. He amended the Constitution to allow
ila 2003b). The Conservative Belisario Betancur for his reelection, merged several ministries, and
(1982–1986) enabled local elections and initiated was involved in a confrontation with the Supreme
peace talks with guerrilla groups, but his reforms Court of Justice, the body in charge of investigat-
were limited by poor economic performance and ing relations between the government, members
increasing violence. International pressures, such of congress, and paramilitary groups that led to
as those coming from the United States’ strict the arrest of 32 congressmen who forged alli-
antinarcotics policies, exacerbated the problem. ances and even planned crimes against human-
At the same time, a politicized and increasingly ity with paramilitary forces (Valencia 2007).1 His
active citizenry continued to pressure for social government was tainted by high-level corruption,
change and political liberalization. as well as massive human rights violations in-
This period ended with a generalized sense of cluding the military’s practice of showing results
political crisis which most political groups be- in their anti-insurgency war by killing civilians
lieved could only be addressed by drafting a new and passing them as guerrillas or staging mass
constitution. The 1991 Constitution replaced the detentions of innocent people accused of sub-
1886 conservative document and liberalized the
economy and democratized politics. It was nego- 1 “Corte pide investigar a funcionarios del Gobierno por
tiated by the traditional parties along with repre- intentar deslegitimarla.” El Espectador.com, agosto 14,
sentatives from social movements and members 2008.
Table 20.1 Actors, organizations, actions, and motives of social struggles. Colombia (1975–2010). (Source CINEP
(2013)
Social actors % of total Organizations that % of total Types of % of total Motives % of total
called for collective actions
action
Wage 27 Labor unions 29 Marches and 38 Rightsa 19
earners mobilizations
Urban 23 No information 27 Strikes 31 Government 17
residents noncompliance
Peasants 16 Civic groups 12 Land 10 Policies 16
invasions
Students 14 Students 10 Road blocks 9 Land/Housing 12
Victims of 6 Authorities 6 Takeovers of 7 Utilities/ 11
violence entities Infrastructure
Independent 5 Victims of violence 5 Riots and 4 Social services 7
workers disturbances
Guilds 3 Guilds 3 Hunger 0.4 Labor rights 7
strikes
Ethnic 3 Peasants 3 Civil 0.3 Public authorities 4
groups resistance
Women and 1.5 Ethnic organizations 1.4 Solidarity 3
LGBT
Prisoners 1 Peace and human 1.3 Environment 2
rights
Women and LGBT 1 Commemorations 1.5
Others 1 Others 1
Religious 0.5
congregations
Percentages based on 18,397 recorded events
a
The rights category covers demands for life, liberty, personal integrity; political, economic, and social rights; cultural
and ethnic rights; and adherence to International Humanitarian Law, the framework that regulates armed conflict.
version (Pachón 2009). As a result, polarization mental social movement opposition, especially
increased, and so did protests, which peaked at on issues of water, and small and large-scale min-
1017 in 2007. ing (Delgado 2012).
The current administration of Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-present) has continued neoliberal
economic policies—it has signed a number of Who Protests, How and Why
bilateral free trade agreements contested by the
labor and rural movements—and maintained an- Table 20.1 presents a snapshot of the social ac-
tisubversive and security policies to weaken the tors, organizations, actions, and motives behind
FARC and contain the remnants of paramilitary the 18,397 events observed by the Center for
groups. Ten years after President Andrés Pas- Research and Popular Education’s (CINEP) So-
trana’s (1998–2002) failed peace talks with the cial Struggle Data Base, the most comprehen-
FARC, Santos is currently holding bilateral talks sive source of information on Colombia’s social
with a weaker guerrilla movement. Though there movements. According to this data, the bulk of
is widespread support by social movements for a movement claims centers on basic human rights,
negotiated end to war, indigenous organizations, material demands and complaints against gov-
and victims of violence, among others, are pro- ernment policies or government inefficiency, in-
testing their exclusion from the negotiating table cluding the violation of civil and political rights,
(Restrepo and García 2012). Finally, this admin- and noncompliance with pacts or laws in force or
istration has faced a more vociferous environ- agreements reached during previous negotiations
296 M. Velasco
(CINEP 2013). Workers, urban residents, peas- to mobilize their claims. Conventional activism,
ants, and students lead 80 % of protests. How- such as strikes, assemblies, and collective bar-
ever, other vocal political identities are emerging gaining to negotiate specific labor concerns, de-
such as with women and ethnic groups who have clined. Adverse conditions also prompted inter-
gained rights but continue to be subjugated. national alliances and lobbying efforts, helping
The labor movement was the most impor- postpone bilateral trade agreements with the USA
tant contentious social actor the 1970s (Pécaut and the European Union by highlighting Colom-
1973; Moncayo and Rojas 1978) and continues bia’s deplorable conditions for workers (Delgado
to predominate, even if weakened by violence 2007). Although labor groups generally object to
and a decline of unionization. In the 1990s for trade agreements that will negatively affect em-
example, it became common practice to point to ployment, unions forced labor rights as a central
unions as mainly responsible for macroeconomic point of negotiation in bilateral trade treaties. In
problems. Such accusations were ramped up just alliance with other groups, labor reacted against
before a state-owned corporation was about to each new government’s neoliberal development
be liquidated. For example, President César Ga- plans and was especially critical of privatiza-
viria (1990–1994) took advantage of the fact that tions and cutbacks set to reduce fiscal transfers
union members were a minority to paint them as to finance municipal education and health bud-
part of an elite protected by labor laws and regu- gets. Activists also mobilized against plebiscite-
lations to discredit their opposition to neoliberal rian measures to change the 1991 Constitution to
reforms.2 allow the president’s reelection—especially to
As the neoliberal reforms moved forward, the allow the indefinite reelection of President Ál-
foundations of the labor movement were under- varo Uribe—and to deepen the market reforms.
mined. The lowering of tariffs caused the bank- In sum, the labor movement is heavily invested
ruptcy of at least 25,000 factories (Valderrama in protesting human rights violations and has lost
1998), reducing the industrial workforce and the ground in collective bargaining capacities.
number of unionized workers, which dropped Peasant organization has declined over the
from 16 % of the economically active population years as a result of violence against leaders and
in 1980 to less than 5 % by 2010 (Vidal 2012). associations, and counter-agrarian reform forc-
Violence by extreme right groups has also under- ing peasants off their land (Corredor 1990). Be-
mined unionization. Correa (2007) recorded the tween 2000 and 2008, about 385,000 rural fami-
assassination of 2245 union leaders and activists lies abandoned by force 5.5 million hectares or
between 1991 and 2006, whereas the Interna- about 11 % of Colombia’s agricultural land, los-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions found ing an estimated 12 % of the country’s gross na-
that between 1999 and 2005 a total of 1174 union tional product (CODHES 2009). In all, more than
members were killed around the world and 73 % 5 million people left their land between 1985 and
of all these assassinations occurred in Colombia 2011, or the equivalent of 10 % of Colombia’s
(Vidal 2012). current population (CODHES 2011). In addition,
State-sector unions, mainly in health and a 2012 Oxfam report warned that the free trade
education, have retained capacities to negotiate agreements signed by the government exposed
sector-specific labor demands, whereas adverse unprotected small farmers to competition against
conditions for the exercise of labor rights forced subsidized US products, leading to an estimated
a change in activism (Archila 2012). Workers 16 % fall in their average incomes.3
increasingly organized protests against human These devastating conditions in the coun-
rights violations and neoliberal reforms, and tryside explain the recent escalation of peasant
reached out to groups and activists outside labor
3 Norby, Michael, Fitzpatrick, Brian. “The Horrific Costs
of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement.” The Nation,

2
“La oligarquía del overol,” Semana, May 19, 1992. May 31, 2013.
protests. In 2013, a surge in protests culminated not outcasts of the system (Ramírez 2001), and
in a Paro Nacional Agrario (Agrarian National continued to demonstrate against the criminaliza-
Strike) that positioned rural demands at the cen- tion of their economic activity into the 2000s.
ter of the government’s agenda. The year began Proof of the high levels of violence affecting
with a national mobilization of coffee produc- civilians is the upsurge of the “Victims of Vio-
ers demanding subsidies to cover losses from a lence” category, which was largely inexistent be-
steep decline in coffee prices. To assuage protest- tween 1975 and 1995, when analysts observed
ers, the government agreed to some subsidies. fewer than 25 events. But after 1996, CINEP re-
By June, peasants from the Catatumbo region in corded more than 1000 social movement events
northeast Colombia, blocked roads and paralyzed by such groups. Displaced persons, victims of
all economic activities in protest of the national state violence, and other victims of human rights
government’s repressive coca eradication poli- violations largely demand the right to a safe re-
cies, stigmatization of the area’s civilian popu- turn to their lands, compensation for lost proper-
lation treated as FARC supporters, and lack of ties, or fair treatment in the government’s peace
social investment. In August, the Paro Nacional negotiations, such as the Justice and Peace Law
began in the department of Boyacá, and eventu- of 2005 that negotiated the disbandment of para-
ally mobilized small farmers across the country, militaries but largely ignored the interests of their
unifying grassroots groups—including indig- victims (Sarmiento 2008).
enous organizations—and established organiza- In the case of new political actors, women and
tions such as coffee, potato, and milk produc- Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people
ers, among others. The Paro has received over- (LGBT) merit special attention, though their ac-
whelming support from urban Colombians, was tions hardly register. Their actions have expanded
joined by small miners, truck drivers, students the meaning of civil rights and impacted public
and teacher unions, and produced public scrutiny policy. In 2006, the Constitutional Court legal-
of the aggregated effects of two decades of vio- ized abortion when the pregnancy is the result of
lent counter agrarian reform and neoliberal mar- rape, in the case of malformations, or when the
ket reforms. As of October 2013, the Paro has mother’s health is at risk, a rare victory for the
ended after negotiations with the government, feminist movement. In February 2007, the court
though critics argue that the promised subsidies ruled in favor of a claim filed by the organiza-
and other benefits will not be a durable solution tion Colombia Diversa, an NGO that backs the
for structural problems in the countryside.4 LGBT movement, and approved property rights
Though they fail to register in the statistics, for same-sex couples who have cohabited for at
the protests of peasant coca growers warrant least 2 years.5
some attention. As USA demands for stringent The information on the organizations call-
control of coca production intensified in the ing for collective action (see columns 3–4 in
1990s, so did political repression in coca growing Table 20.1) again underscores the leading role
regions. Aerial fumigations also increased using of labor unions, but also of civic groups and stu-
glyphosate targeted at coca crops, but also af- dents, who were behind 29, 12, and 10 % of the
fecting legal crops, forests, and water sources. In protests, respectively. The student category in-
1996 over 200,000 cocaleros rose up against the cludes 50 % university and 42 % high school stu-
government demanding recognition as citizens, dents whose protests primarily contest deteriora-
tion in the quality of education (including social
services and infrastructure), and more recently,
4
Sandoval, Héctor. “Manifestaciones atienden a modelo the privatization of higher education and increas-
económico, entrevista a Mauricio Archila, investiga- ing tuition (CINEP 2013).
dor del CINEP.” Elespectador.com, August 18, 2013.
URL: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/
manifestaciones-atienden-al-modelo-economico-articu- 5
Hernando Salazar, “Colombia: derechos a parejas gay,”
lo−440855. BBCMundo.com, February 8, 2007.
298 M. Velasco
Civic groups have a long history in Colom- their main organization, the Cauca Regional In-
bia and represent urban or territorial actors with digenous Council, which was behind the most
varied socioeconomic identities and organiza- successful ethnic social movement in the coun-
tional affiliations. These actors are normally try (Rodríguez et al. 2005). Since the 1980s, the
associated with poor towns or neighborhoods FARC has antagonized and killed indigenous
where services are deficient or the government leaders, prompting the short-lived founding of
has failed to develop community infrastructure an Indian self-defense group, the Manuel Quintín
(Santana 1983). They are defined by using civic Lame Movement, to guard Indian leaders and re-
strikes that stop most socioeconomic activities as serves. Fed up with FARC attacks in the 1990s,
a peaceful mechanism to draw the government’s indigenous civilians in four towns joined forces
attention to a communal problem. to stop them by surrounding the police in a hu-
The “authorities” category looks at depart- manitarian circle to save their lives.8 They also
mental and municipal officials using protests to made clear to the government that its military
object the actions of armed actors or to pressure presence turned people and civilian infrastruc-
the central government. For example, in 2002 the ture into FARC military targets. Civil resistance
mayors of 23 municipalities in Antioquia protest- has developed into a strategy that includes a call
ed FARC guerrilla murder threats to force them for territorial autonomy, or territories of peace,
out of their office, and against the government where local people in high conflict areas have
for failing to offer security,6 whereas authorities declared themselves neutral vis-à-vis the conflict
in southern Colombia joined the general popula- (Bouvier 2009).
tion in protesting coca-eradication policies that
increased repression and militarization.7 Protests
by local authorities largely followed the enact- Conclusions
ment of decentralization laws in 1986, which
handed over responsibilities to local administra- Colombian social movements are a testament
tions that often lacked the expertise or necessary to the country’s complex history of illiberalism,
resources to perform new functions. incomplete democratization, and economic in-
Strikes, mobilizations, invasions, and road- equality. First, many of the participatory mecha-
blocks account for 88 % of types of protest activi- nisms approved by the 1991 Constitution, osten-
ties. In comparison, civil resistance hardly regis- sibly designed to reduce conflict, continue to be
ters at 0.3 %, yet constitutes the most important meaningless as a result of government incapac-
innovation in Colombia’s history of contention. ity to put them into practice or to follow up on
In 2001 people in several primarily indigenous agreements reached. Second, the illiberal and
towns in the Cauca department organized peace- violent practices of drug traffickers, guerrillas,
ful actions against armed groups operating in paramilitaries, and some government elites have
their region in a context of increased military ha- further contributed to the deterioration of many
rassment of the civilian population. At the time, institutions and to the reduction of the rights of
the FARC had increased attacks in remote towns, citizens. Finally, in the face of widespread eco-
killing or abducting policemen and using uncon- nomic and human insecurity, the government’s
ventional weapons to destroy the civil infrastruc- policies of economic development, most re-
ture. cently following free-market principles, are seen
In Cauca, the FARC have historically refused as counter-productive as their end-results are
to accept indigenous people’s autonomy and wealth and land concentration. At any rate, so-
cial movement activism has increased as political
6 Leonardo Herrera, “Municipios, a la deriva y sin alcal-
des,” in El Tiempo, June 23, 2002. 8

“Toribío salvó a sus policías,” El Tiempo, July 13,
7
“Somos patriotas, pero no pendejos,” in El Tiempo, July 2002; Álvaro Sierra, “La guerra en el norte del Cauca,” El
9, 2002. Tiempo, May 10, 2005.
opportunities for participation improved, even if CODHES (Consulting Office for Human Rights and
Displacement). (2009). Víctimas emergentes: Des-
repression and violence attempts to deter popular plazamiento, derechos humanos y conflicto en 2008.
mobilization. Bogotá: CODHES.
In total, social movements widely respond to CODHES. (2011). De la seguridad a la prosperidad
the effects of a state that has failed to impart jus- democrática en medio de la guerra. Documentos
CODHES, 23, 1–73.
tice, and which has, on occasions, actively par- Correa, G. (2007). 2.515 o esa siniestra facilidad para
ticipated in the violation of basic human rights. olvidar: veintiún años de asesinatos sistemáticos y
Movements generally defend expanding and re- selectivos contra sindicalistas en Colombia (1986–
defining civil, political, social rights as well as 2006). Cuadernos de Derechos Humanos, 19, 1–149.
Corredor, C. 1990. Crisis agraria, reforma y paz: De la
communal rights, ranging from gender equality, violencia homicida al genocidio. In C Corredor, J
the cultural rights of indigenous and Afro-Co- González & F Zambrano (Eds.), Un país en construc-
lombians, environmental well-being, and decent ción: Poblamiento, problema agrario y conflicto
employment and land. In doing so, Colombian social (pp. 19–80). Bogotá: CINEP.
Delgado, Á. (2007). Afirmaciones y sorpresas de la
movements reflect a pluralist political culture protesta laboral. Cien Días vistos por CINEP 61.
seeking representation and as such, constitute a http://www.cinep.org.co/index.php?option=com_doc
bedrock of democracy. man&Itemid=126&limitstart=14. Accessed 19 June
2013.
Delgado, Á. (2008). “Anotaciones a la política del par-
tido comunista.” Controversia 190. Especial Issue.
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Ramírez, M. (2001). Entre el estado y la guerrilla: iden- 1991 sobre la protesta social en Colombia: un análi-
tidad y ciudadanía en el movimiento de los campesi- sis estadístico. Revista Colombiana de Sociología, 28,
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Santana, P. (1983). Desarrollo regional y paros cívicos en protest: Latin American social movements (pp. 102–
Colombia. Bogotá: CINEP. 131). Berkeley, University of California Press.
Social Movements in
Nicaragua (1979–2014): 21
An Exceptional Case
Salvador Martí i Puig
Insurgency: History of FSLN Nicaragua during the first third of the twentieth
and the Sandinista Movement century.
Once the FSLN had been created, carrying out
Following the example set by the Cuban revo- guerrilla activities and reaching rural areas were
lution, various revolutionary groups emerged prioritized over organization, the political educa-
throughout Latin America. In 1961, the Frente tion of the masses, and creating unrest in urban
de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation areas. The Sandinista guerrilla was, throughout
Front-FLN) was created in Nicaragua, which most of its history, a small guerrilla foco based
after a short time added a reference to Sandino, in the mountains in the north and center of the
thus becoming the Frente sandinista liberación country and made up, mostly, of students. This
nacional (FSLN). It was the result of the will of experience gave way to a mythology known as
young radicals who were opposed to traditional the mystic of the mountains, telling the story of
and dominant political groups and detested the how the embryonic guerrilla activity developed
fact that Anastasio Somoza García had installed (Cabezas 1982). In any case, despite its early
a regime that was patrimonial in nature and foundation, political analysts agree in classifying
had co-opted opposition supporters and trade the FSLN as a guerrilla organization that belongs
unions. Along with Marxism, there were three to the “second guerrilla wave” in Latin America,
other theoretical currents on which the FSLN given that it became politically relevant after
would base its identity: vanguardism, foquismo, 1975 (Wickham-Crowley 1993; 2014). The her-
and nationalism. From reading Lenin and Dé- metic nature of Somoza’s regime and its rejection
bray and studying the war in Algeria and other of any possibility of reform united a considerable
revolutions, the Sandinistas took the concept of part of the opposing groups, organizations, and
the revolutionary vanguard. Foquismo for its movements in insurrection. In this way, only dur-
part was a legacy of the Cuban revolution. Na- ing the years prior to insurrection (and despite the
tionalism and anti-imperialism came from the internal divisions within the FSLN1) that such
myth of Augusto César Sandino, a liberal poli- activities were carried out to actively penetrate
tician and guerrilla chief, who was a figure that the urban groups. It is important, in this sense,
led the rejection of North American presence in
1 Two divisions occurred during the 1970s leading to

three internal tendencies: the GPP which was oriented to-
wards foquismo, the Tendencia Proletaria (Proletariat Ten-
S. Martí i Puig () dency) which was more oriented towards the workers, and
Girona University, Girona, Spain the Tendencia Tercerista/Insurreccional (Tertiary or Insur-
e-mail: salvador.marti@udg.edu rectional Tendency) that proposed an inter-class alliance.
302 S. Martí i Puig
to remember the urban and student origins of power5, it was characterized by its simplicity.
most of the Sandinista guerrilla leaders and the The resources of organizational power were con-
role of schools and universities as a breeding centrated in and managed by the leadership. An
ground for opponents of Somoza. Another im- issue of vital importance was the nature of the
portant element was the impact of the diffusion relationship between the Front and the grassroots
of liberation theology among Christian groups, organizations and social movements which in
which gave rise to the Comunidades Eclesiales many cases had been created under the auspices
de Base (Grassroots Ecclesiastical Communi- of the FSLN itself. This relationship was char-
ties; see chapter by Mackin in this volume)2. In acterized by the dependence of the organizations
this sense, the guerrilla that had been located in on the FSLN’s interests in relation to the armed
rural areas and that supported peasants became struggle. In this respect, the articulation between
aware of the emergence of these new social sub- the guerrilla and the popular movement in Nica-
jects3. The uprising of urban groups in the late ragua was the opposite of what happened in the
1970s led by the FSLN represented a sponta- majority of countries in Latin America and, par-
neous expression of the mass rejection of the ticularly, in El Salvador and Guatemala where
economic, social, and political measures of the first came the activation of the popular move-
dictatorship. ment and only later the linkage with or creation
Above all, the FSLN was a political actor of guerrilla platforms that were unitary in nature.
characterized by a specific activity—armed Such was the case of the Frente Farabundo Martí
struggle—in a specific context—the hostile and para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in the first
repressive framework of Somoza’s regime with case (Almeida 2008) and Unidad Revoluciona-
the central aim to obtain state power. Conse- ria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in the latter.
quently, the FSLN was a political military group Consequently, the mass organizations and social
that was highly centralized, built on vertical link- movements that supported the fight against the
ages and a rigid, hermetic organizational struc- dictatorship adhered to and obeyed the Front’s
ture. The grassroots units were the militias and orders.
cells. The militants, given the clandestine nature As a result, the tradition of popular organiza-
of the organization, committed to a series of re- tion in Nicaragua was relatively scarce up until
sponsibilities that entailed an exclusive and dis- the mid-1970s. The birth and activation of move-
ciplined dedication. ments were, to a great extent, the result of San-
The FSLN was always very small in size4. dinista militants who aimed to articulate wide
With regard to the structure of organizational groups in support of the armed struggle. This was
how the Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo
(Association of Rural Workers—ATC) and the
2 The literature on the influence of and role played by Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios (Front of
religion in the Nicaraguan political process is abundant.
Nevertheless, the following works stand out: Berryman
Revolutionary Students—FER) emerged. In this
(1984), Cabestero (1983) Girardi and Randall (1989). For way, in contrast to what happened in El Salvador,
an analysis of this phenomenon in the Latin American re-
gion it is worthwhile consulting (Levine 1986, 1992 and
Mackin in this volume).
in the organization’s membership. Nevertheless, after
3
According to Vilas (Vilas 1984, pp. 169–198), the basic carrying out an exhaustive count of all the members
characteristics of the revolutionary group were its youth and collaborators of the three groups, the figure never
and popular nature in a general sense of working masses reached 500 (Arce en Invernizzi et al. 1986; Dunkerley
rather than the proletariat. 1988).
4 During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the 5 We use the concept as Angelo Panebianco presents it in
organization had barely 150 members in total, including his work (Panebianco 1990). The structure of organiza-
both legal and clandestine adherents. If we include col- tional power is based in the so-called “resources of orga-
laborators the number increases somewhat. As of 1977, nizational power” in relation to the factors around which
with the progressive decomposition of Somoza’s regime an organization’s vital activities are carried out: competi-
and the different insurrections, there was a clear increase tion, relations with the environment, communication, for-
mal rules, financing, and recruitment.
21 Social Movements in Nicaragua (1979–2014): An Exceptional Case 303
where the associative grassroots network had a dominated the political scene and took control
long tradition and was never unconditionally of state institutions and the armed forces, with
subordinated to the guidelines of the guerrilla its objective being to create a new social, politi-
groups (for the benefit of greater independence, cal, and economic model that its leaders called
but in detriment to the efficiency and speed of the “Revolución Popular Sandinista” (Sandinista
the insurgent fight), in Nicaragua the absolute de- Popular Revolution).
pendence of these organizations on the FSLN’s Yet at the same time as the principles and
guidelines meant a noticeable synchronization rules of the new institutions were being estab-
with the armed struggle. The result was the tri- lished, a political process also developed within
umph of the insurrection that toppled the Somoza civil society as a result of the traumatic way in
dynasty on 19 July 1979. However, the same de- which the events of the revolution took place.
pendence of popular mobilization on the FSLN’s The violent rupture with the old order was not
leadership would also mean a limitation of the only felt in the juridical administrative spheres
movements’ autonomous development at a later of government but also in each and every in-
stage. stance of power. In this sense, the key issue in
social revolutions is that it is not only necessary
to construct a new state but also to articulate, at
The Sandinista Revolution: the same time, a new civil society (Foran 2005).
Mobilization and War Yet the fall of the dictatorship was followed by
a stampede of the entire military, political, and
Nicaragua’s revolutionary project, as is the case juridical administrative apparatus, in such a way
with any social revolution in a developing coun- that the emerging power had to rebuild the en-
try, combined several aims. Social revolutions in tire organizational framework necessary to meet
peripheral societies are about three basic issues: the population’s basic needs (Núñez et al. 1988,
the issue of democracy, the issue of national sov- pp. 195–196).
ereignty, and the issue of development and the In this context, a few days after the revolu-
transformation of social and economic structures. tionary victory, the official newspaper of the
The problem with this process, however, is the FSLN—Barricada—proclaimed the slogan:
preeminence of one of these issues over the oth- ¡Organización, organización, organización! (or-
ers. In turn, this situation is related to the rela- ganization, organization, organization!) (Gilbert
tionships between the actors that promote (or 1988, p. 41). This meant that the cadres and lead-
hinder) and lead (or fight against) the revolution- ers of the Sandinista social organizations had to
ary process. For that reason, in 1979 a dynamic set aside their role as activists to occupy positions
began in which different actors sought to domi- of institutional responsibility where the popula-
nate the political community and the very struction’s daily life was reorganized and attempts
tures of the system. One major issue was that the were made at providing public goods. In this way,
unity created in the overthrowing of the regime the grassroots organizations that had emerged as
(that was considered to be dictatorial) stood in a rearguard in support of the revolutionary strug-
contrast to the project of how to transform the gle, later on became the infrastructure to generate
material and institutional foundations of Nica- institutions and a new order. Among the organi-
raguan society and to what extent. The alliances zations that existed prior to the triumph of the in-
that were created with the aim of fighting against surrection were the Association of Rural Workers
a common enemy were weakened, when it came (ATC), the Asociación Nacional de Educadores
to managing and constructing a shared project of de Nicaragua (National Association of Educators
social transformation. Some observed Somoza’s of Nicaragua—ANDEN), the Federación de Tra-
fall as the end of a process and others as the be- bajadores de la Salud (the Federation of Health
ginning. In this tense situation, the FSLN quickly Workers—FETSALUD), the Unión de Periodis-
tas de Nicaragua (the Union of Nicaraguan Jour- men and women, mainly belonging to the lower
nalists—UPN), the Comités de Defensa Civil classes6.”
(the Committees of Civil Defense)—later on the However, the Sandinista popular movement
Comités de Defensa Sandinista (Committees of had limitations and difficulties in creating its own
Sandinista Defense–CDS)—the Asociación de perspectives and projecting itself to society inde-
Mujeres sobre la Problemática Nacional (the As- pendently from the FSLN and state institutions7.
sociation of Women for the National Problem— This limited autonomy, in turn, eroded as a result
AMPRONAC)—later the Asociación de Mujeres of the conflict that broke out with the Contra war
Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza (the Ni- at the start of the 1980s. (Martí i Puig 1997). The
caraguan Women’s Association Luisa Amanda war, as well as putting a halt to many social poli-
Espinoza—AMNLAE). All of them remained in cies, created the conditions for greater control,
operation throughout the revolutionary regime centralization, and more vertical hierarchy in
and became consolidated as spaces for citizen governance. This phenomenon was felt at all lev-
participation. Furthermore, after the triumph of els, but particularly in the social movements that
the insurrection and revolution, new organiza- supported the Sandinistas. These movements,
tions inspired by the Sandinistas emerged with which maintained semi-organic links with the
the aim of organizing and linking all areas of FSLN, ended up by becoming a “transmission
the country’s social and productive activities. chain” for the regime’s strategic necessities and
Thus, the Unión Nacional de Empleados (Na- the FSLN’s interests at that time. In this logic, the
tional Union of Employees—UNE), the Central FSLN called for and mobilized the organizations
Sandinista de Trabajadores (Sandinista Union of of the popular movement as if they were chess
Workers—CST), the Asociación Sandinista de pieces. This tendency, furthermore, increased
Trabajadores de la Cultura (Sandinista Associa- with the intensification of the war and the greater
tion of Culture Workers—ASTC), the Juventud economic restrictions. In this new context, there
Sandinista 19 de Julio (the 19 July Sandinista were increasing contradictions between people’s
Youth—JS19J), the Asociación de Niños Luís immediate and everyday interests and those that
Alfonso Velásquez (the Luis Alfonso Velásquez the Sandinista leadership called “strategic inter-
Children’s Association ANS) and the Unión ests” to defend the revolutionary project. The re-
Nacional de Agricultores y Granjeros (National sult was that popular participation began to fall
Union of Farmers—UNAG) were born. given that the organizations of the popular move-
Initially, the Sandinista grassroots movement were expected to convince people that they
ment—which was known as Organizaciones de had to work hard, recruit youngsters for the front
Masas (Organizations of the Masses)—was an (to go to war), and to play down their specific
indispensable instrument in articulating partici- demands (Vilas 1990, p. 24).
pation and organizing the community-orientated In these circumstances the FSLN put off the
tasks that the state could not carry out. Accord- treatment of the people’s specific demands with
ing to Vilas (1991, p. 20), due to this web of or- the argument of the war and the necessity to pri-
ganizations “the Nicaraguan people regained a oritize all efforts to that end. Thus, criticisms
voice to make its problems heard and strength- were blocked, demands were sidelined, and the
ened its capacity for collective action. For the
first time in many years—and for many, the first 6
Original in Spanish, author’s own translation into
time in their lives—people began to feel part of English.
a national community, of a shared whole. The 7 At the same time, the function which the FSLN assigned
revolution’s great social achievements—literacy, to these organizations was never clear, although officially
preventive medicine, or the education of adults— their task was to oversee and work to strengthen the revo-
lution and offer the instruments for the expression of the
were made possible by the massive, voluntary, masses’ most important demands (Núñez en Pozas 1988,
and optimistic involvement of a multitude of pp. 20–21).
need for discipline became more acute. At the the party apparatus that had previously protected
same time, a discourse was adopted in which the them.8
counter-revolution was only based in the anti- In terms of conquering greater areas of auton-
Sandinista policy of the North American govern- omy, like many other organizations linked to the
ment, which the Contra obeyed due to essentially FSLN, trade unions never thought that the San-
external reasons. This argument, although it was dinistas would lose the elections and, therefore,
effective in maintaining a wide internal solidar- they did not worry about ensuring their legal or
ity for defeating the pretension of the Reagan financial future. In order to survive the electoral
administration to isolate Nicaragua, also made defeat of the FSLN, the trade union organiza-
the acknowledgement of more domestic social tions that were in favor of the FSLN organized
problems related to the manner and style of the themselves into the Frente Nacional de Traba-
Sandinista project more difficult (Martí i Puig jadores (National Workers’ Front—FNT) with
2007). the aim of creating a solid union block. From
In this context, characterized by fragile loyal- this point forward, the relationship between the
ties and alliances, the FSLN established a call for FSLN and the trade unions became more com-
elections in 1990. The opening up of spaces for plex and tense. The styles of bureaucratic man-
dissent within the framework of the regime’s in- agement and the imposition of leaders became an
stitutions could have meant the consolidation of object of criticism. In any case, the FNT’s pri-
the revolutionary project, but in this moment of ority was to challenge the new administration’s
acute crisis and war, the Sandinistas’ supporters policy and it became a main opposition force.
did not approve of the FSLN’s deployment of a With regard to the trade unions that did not sup-
rather festive electoral campaign, with a generous port the Sandinistas (grouped together around
distribution of gifts (Vickers 1990; Vilas1990). the organization called the Congreso Perman-
The slogan created by the Front’s militants was ente de los Trabajadores (Permanent Congress
ꜟTodo será mejor! (Everything will get bet- of Workers—CPT)), although initially they sup-
ter!) led many Nicaraguans to ask themselves: ported the executive, later on they would distance
Can things get any worse? The fact is that the themselves from it, creating a single opposition
1990 elections had an unexpected result: it gave force.
power to the opposition coalition (made up of However, in the first years of the 1990s, what
14 political parties) led by Violeta Barrios de sometimes began as a labor conflict ended up as
Chamorro. an insurrection (Almeida 2014). In fact, at one
stage the mobilizations almost turned into a civil
conflict given the violent clashes between pro-
Electoral Defeat and the End testers and anti-Sandinista armed groups. Faced
of the Revolution: Neoliberalism with this situation, the leaders of the FSLN had
and the Sandinistas’ Internal Debate a role as mediators between the movements
and the government. Thus, for almost 5 years
With the FSLN’s withdrawal from power and
the implementation of neoliberal policies, the
Sandinista popular movement became an unex- 8 On this issue, a trade union leader stated in an inter-
pected and paradoxical protagonist. After nearly view: “During the Revolution we never needed to fight
for social demands such as canteens, transport, food, or
11 years of a paternalistic relationship between medicine. They were gifts given by the Frente Sandinista.
trade unions and the state, with the execution of In return, we supported the government’s policy: we or-
the “new” policies of economic adjustment, the ganised workers into brigades to go and collect coffee, to
trade unions modified their role and challenged educate, to enroll in Military Service… Now everything
has changed. From now on we won’t achieve anything if
the executive on one hand and, on the other, they we don’t fight for it…” (Original in Spanish, author’s own
began to conquer new spaces of autonomy from translation) (Martí i Puig 2007, p. 136).
between 1990 and1995, the FSLN became a organization of the FSLN) and autonomous femi-
mediator with the aim of “creating agreements” nism9 (Kampwirth 2004, pp. 63–65). This move-
over labor or privatization policies (López 2013). ment would later give rise to strong advocacy
In this environment, one of the most noteworthy networks for women’s rights which, in contrast
situations was that the trade union organizations, to the previous decade, would be ideologically
which in prior years had been divided due to their and socially transformative, such as the National
relationships with the Sandinista regime, sat on Coalition of Women that sought promises from
the same side in the negotiating table, defend- all parties in the months prior to the national elec-
ing similar interests, while the ex-administrators tion of 1996. Throughout the decade, the wom-
of the revolutionary state and the yuppies of the en’s movement not only evolved but it also had
new executive became businessmen (Stahler- to confront the policies created by the state with
Sholk1994, p. 77). As a result, the process of both presidencies of Doña Violeta Chamorro and
conflict and negotiation due to the privatizations Arnoldo Alemán, and in this respect it was no co-
brought about the autonomy of the trade unions, incidence that the Minister for Education was the
highlighting class differences, beyond the party same in both administrations. It was during this
lines. period when the debate on therapeutic abortion
It was in this new context characterized by began (with an attempt to prohibit it) at the same
the redefinition of the roles of the state and the time that a campaign to disqualify NGOs also
breaking up of party loyalties and preferences started.
that some union leaders realized the importance With regard to the neighbor movement, the
of articulating a union movement that would be activities undertaken by the neighborhood com-
able to confront the new business elite (includ- munities are considerable. They were articulated
ing some Sandinistas) and neoliberal policies. around several platforms that went from Grass-
Beyond the union sector, other social actors roots Ecclesiastic Communities to the political
also became more important in the 1990s. These militancy of the Communal Movement, which
groups included the neighbors’ movements and was Sandinista in affiliation. The objective of
the women’s movement. After the Sandinista this movement was to protect itself from an
electoral defeat in 1990, the movement that most “every man for himself” type of society that was
intensely sought autonomy and criticized the emerging under neoliberalism. Undoubtedly, it
FSLN’s strict hierarchy was the women’s move- was the organizational capacity of Nicaraguan
ment. Yet it did not only oppose the FSLN, which society that helps us understand the resistance
it progressively criticized as machista, but it also of a considerable part of the population against
had to directly confront a new government that the drastic structural adjustment policies and the
promoted a legal counter-revolution in moral increasing economic and social uncertainty. This
and gender issues. In this direction, it is neces- was the case of a United Nations Report (Envío
sary to concur with Kampwirth (2008) that one 1994/155) which found the following: “75 % of
of the most surprising events in the 1990 election Nicaraguan families live below the poverty line
was neither the peaceful end of the Sandinista and 44 % are in extreme poverty (…). Faced
revolution nor the demobilization of the Con-
tras, but rather the explosive rise of autonomous
9 Also after the elections of 1990, several organizations
feminism, including lesbian feminism. The of-
were founded: SHOMOS (a gay rights organization) the
ficial presentation of this new women’s move- Fundación Nimehuatzín (an AIDS foundation) and Noso-
ment took place on 8 March 1991 (International tras (a feminist group). In 1991, an organization for the
Women’s Day) with an activity named Festival protection of the rights of sexual minorities—Fundación
del 52 % (the Festival of the 52 %), which repre- Xochiquetzál—opened, followed by lesbian organiza-
tions such as Entre Amigas and el Grupo por la Visibilidad
sented a definitive and public break between the Lésbica. In 1992 over 25 groups joined the Campaign for
AMNLAE (the official and organic Sandinista a Prejudice-Free Sexuality (Kampwirth 2008).
with the increasing social impoverishment, it is with a transnational network that was critical of
significant that more social explosions have not globalization and inspired by Zapatismo (Rovira
taken place (…). Probably, a determining factor 2009). The movement participated in the regional
of this resistance is the rooted tradition of orga- meetings against neoliberalism, but was never as
nization, social discipline, and solidarity of the significant as the anti-CAFTA mobilizations in
Nicaraguan people10.” In the 1990s, the deep Costa Rica.
economic crisis, the massive layoffs of public
employees, and the drastic cuts in social servic-
es meant that the decisions taken in the public The Pacto of 2000 and Ortega’s
sphere would erupt with force in the domestic Coming to Power (2000–2014)
sphere, meaning the emergence of social actors
that had previously appeared at a subordinated With the signing of the pact in 2000, citizen mo-
level. bilization followed a different logic: over the fol-
However, the mobilizations that saw a surge lowing years mobilizations were not led by trade
during the first half of the decade declined no- unions or neighborhood associations against
ticeably as of 1997 and, particularly, after the the policies enacted by the government; rather,
signing of the pact between Arnoldo Alemán citizen-organized civil networks (many of which
(President between 1996 and 2001 and leader of were linked to or supported by NGOs) protested
the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista—Liberal over the reduction of “accountability spaces” due
Constitutionalist Party) and Daniel Ortega (the to the agreement between Alemán and Ortega
FSLN’s only ever leader) in 200011. Since then, as well as the policies to facilitate the govern-
the massive mobilizations against neoliberal pol- ment’s control over and intervention in NGOs,
icies gave way to other protests that focused on particularly after the tragedy of Hurricane Mitch,
denouncing the impunity of power and the lack where the episode of the incompetent and cor-
of transparency with which politicians were act- rupt management of the disaster by the Alemán
ing. Finally, it is worth pointing out that in the administration stood out13. In this new phase of
same period in Nicaragua an activist movement protests two types of mobilizations stood out: on
also emerged—against the Plan Puebla Pan- one hand, those that reacted against conservative
amá—called Otro mundo es posible (Collombon policies on moral issues and reproductive health
2012), which later languished. Likewise, there led by the liberals and the FSLN itself14 (Kamp-
was also a movement against the Freed Trade wirth 2009); and on the other hand the protests
Agreement which became consolidated in Cen- over the erosion of liberties and rights as a result
tral America with the CAFTA-RD (see Chap. 23 of the politicization of the administration of jus-
in this volume)12. The local movement linked up tice and of the state in general. This second type
10
Author’s translation 13
The episode of Hurricane Mitch and the confronta-
11
For further information on the pact sealed between tion between the Alemán government and the NGOs is
Ortega and Alemán in 2000, see Martí i Puig (2008) and described in detail in Kampwirth (2004).
Close et al. (2012). 14
On the issue of morality and gender, it is worth not-
12
In relation to this network, it is worth pointing out that ing the FSLN’s vote against therapeutic abortion in 2006.
Nicaraguan representatives were present at the Foro Me- According to Kampwirth 2008, the key reason why the
soamericano por la Autodeterminación y Resistencia de Sandinista representatives in the National Assembly voted
los Pueblos (Mesoamerican Forum for the Self-Determi- that way was for fear that, if not, the party would lose
nation and Resistance of the Peoples) that took place in the Presidential elections in November. However, beyond
2001 in Tapachula (Mexico). However, the delegates were the discourse of the Sandinista leadership, it is also worth
not key actors given that the FSLN (in contrast with the pointing out Daniel Ortega’s desire to weaken the femi-
other left-wing parties in the region) held an ambiguous nists, a movement which had already distanced itself from
position (Collombon 2012). the FSLN some years before and denounced it openly.
of protest increased since Daniel Ortega came to ported by a sector of big business and the Catho-
power15. lic Church, many citizens mobilized. As a result,
One fundamental issue is that the FSLN that many sectors of civil society, nongovernmental
conquered the Presidency with Ortega in late organizations (NGOs), and journalists denounced
2006 was very different from the Sandinista in- on the streets the “kidnapping” of institutions by
surgency that defeated Somoza in 1979. Since Ortega. In reply, the government carried out, on
1990 Daniel Ortega, who served as Secretary one hand, strategies to dissuade and intimidate,
General of the FSLN Party, triumphed in all of and the other, created innovative social policies
the internal battles of the party and ultimately his with the aim of winning political support. With
faction controlled the FSLN’s entire organiza- regard to the dissuasion strategies, the policies to
tional capacity, shaped the FSLN to his prefer- control the press and NGOs are particularly note-
ences despite the electoral defeats of 1990, 1996, worthy. For instance, the episode of accusations
and 2001 (Martí i Puig 2010). The “successful” against an information and research center18 and
adaptation of the FSLN to electoral defeats and two NGOs (Oxfam-UK and the Movimiento
institutional change meant a profound change to Autónomo de Mujeres—Autonomous Women’s
the extent that it became dependent on the will of Movement) of money laundering and acting
its leader (and his wife Rosario Murillo) and that against the government (Martí i Puig and Close
it recruits its members en masse via the state and 2009, p. 431).
expels the dissidents. Ortega, furthermore, with On the other hand, the FSLN also built up a
the aim of neutralizing his traditional enemies, base of popular support rooted in the beneficia-
ended up by making pacts with them and adopt- ries from the policies that the Ortega administra-
ing part of their agenda. This was the case, for tion had implemented via the Consejos del Poder
example, with the issue of therapeutic abortion. Ciudadano (CPCs—Councils of Citizen Power).
Thus, when Daniel Ortega became President These CPCs are similar in structure to the Comi-
in 2007, he brought about a new cycle of relation- tés de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Commit-
ships between civil society, social movements, tees of Defense) which were in operation during
and the government. This dynamic was the result the revolutionary decade. However, if they are
of the new government’s scarce desire for con- observed more closely, they are clearly para-
sensus and the promotion of their own interests state organizations with a hierarchical structure,
when approaching critical issues such as the re- controlled by the FSLN (the maximum leader of
form of the judiciary, women’s rights, the imple- which is Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo) in order
mentation of social policy financed by ALBA to distribute funds and resources from the focal-
and, as of 2008, electoral transparency16. ized social policies with the goal of maintaining
In the face of this discretional, arbitrary ad- loyalties. This type of organization, the CPCs,
ministration, with hegemonic aims17 and sup- rather than generating a bottom-up participa-
tion created a top-down client–patron relation-
ship. This social base, which has mobilized from
15
For an analysis of the Presidential elections of 2006 time to time, was used as a “shock force” against
and the victory of Daniel Ortega, see the study by Martí those who protested against the government’s
i Puig (2008).
measures or the FSLN’s “foretold victories” after
16
The municipal elections of 2008 and 2012, as well as
the presidential, legislative, and elections to the Central
American Parliament of 2011, were full of irregularities. uary 2010 or of the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of
In this context, the importance of organizations such as the 30th September—when it met without the necessary
Ética y Transparencia (founded in 1996) for monitoring quorum and in an unofficial way—to modify Article 147
elections has become clear. The organization Hagamos of the Constitution in order to open up the way to Ortega’s
Democracia has also worked in the same way. reelection. For more information see (Martí i Puig 2013).
17 18
Since it has been in power, the FSLN has passed de- The center in question was the Centro de Investiga-
crees which have enabled it to control all of the state insi- ciones de la Comunicación (Center for Communication
titutions, as was the case with the “decretazo” of the 9 Jan- Research—CINCO).
each electoral contest since the municipal elec- in both issues—the maquilas and mining—the
tions of 2008.19 mobilizations are less forceful and massive than
Yet beyond the tension between those who what could be expected given the past contention
support Ortega and those who are in opposition, carried out by the FSLN.
mobilizations linked directly to “class” issues Another question for the future is the issue of
still take place in Nicaragua, such as those that the laws passed on 14 June 2013 by the National
emphasize labor rights in a legal context that Assembly, offering a concession (for up to 50
leaves both rural and urban workers unprotected. years) of territory of a strip of the country to a
In relation to this issue, the organizations that de- Chinese firm to construct an interoceanic canal
nounce the abusive treatment in the maquila sec- and develop areas of free commerce and infra-
tor20 and the (community-based) organizations structure.22 If the initiative is indeed implement-
that fight against the extraction of minerals21 are ed, it is likely that there will be multiple protests
particularly noteworthy. Nevertheless in the case over its social and environmental impact23, as
of the latter, the Nicaraguan organizations have well as the lawsuits with neighboring countries
not protested as intensively as in neighboring and indigenous communities on the Caribbean
countries and there is still no Nicaraguan rep- coast.
resentative in the Movimiento Mesoamericano
contra el Modelo Extractivo Minero (Mesoamer-
ican Movement Against the Extractive Mining An Evaluation and New Challenges
Model—M4) in which 49 organizations from
8 Latin American countries participate, includ- The change experienced by Nicaraguan social
ing 32 from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras movements has been very intense since the 1970s
and Guatemala (Spalding 2014). Undoubtedly through 2014. Furthermore, these movements
have taken unexpected directions that are very
different from the rest of the region and Latin
19
The municipal elections of 2008 were particularly trau- America. As noted, during the 1970s, emancipa-
matic due to street clashes between supporters and oppo- tory social movements in Nicaragua joined (and
nents of the Sandinistas. The results in Managua and León
some were even a result of) the antiauthoritarian
were the most controversial, since the results in the oppo-
sition’s hands gave a clear victory to their leader, despite and anti-imperialist struggle led by the FSLN.
the fact that at 11:00 p.m. at night the same day, the streets Consequently, the movements maintained one
were filled with pro-Sandinistas celebrating their victory. main advantage (the unity of action and disci-
In the days following the elections there were bitter clash-
pline) at the price of losing autonomy. The result,
es in the streets. The opposition called for civil disobedi-
ence and the FSLN’s sympathizers occupied roads with however, seemed to be worth it: the triumph of
the aim of dissuading any protest. the insurrection and the victory of the revolution.
20
On this issue, the work of the Movimiento de Mu- During the 1980s the movements continued with
jeres Trabajadoras y Desempleadas María Elena Cuadra the same logic of subordination to the FSLN’s
(Movement of Working and Unemployed Women María
authority while it was in power. Yet this subor-
Elena Cuadra—MEC) is worth pointing out, which with-
out confronting companies or the maquila activity in a dination also meant the conquest of the classic
radical fashion, aims to improve the situation of women demands of the popular movement: education,
who work in the sector. For further information see the
organization’s website: www.mec.org.ni. Reference from
9 July 2013. 22
This legislative package concedes the macro-project
21
Currently mining activities have been denounced in el offered to a company registered in Hong Kong (and tax
Río Mico, el Río San Juan and Mina Limón. On these resident in the Cayman Islands) called Nicaragua Canal
projects see the reports by the Latin American Mining Development Investment (HKC) which belongs to a Chi-
Conflict Observatory (OCMAL) at: http://www.olca. nese citizen named Wang Jing.
cl/ocmal/. Reference from 9 July 2013. On the reality 23
This project would have an irreversible impact on the
of extraction and mining in Nicaragua, see http://www. people, wildlife, and crops on the edge of the Lake of Ni-
movimientom4.org/2013/06/la-mineria-en-tiempos-de- caragua and on the quality of the area’s sweet water (even
ortega/. Reference from 9 July 2013. for drinking).
work, health, public space, civic participation, Ortega and the FSLN’s strategy and those who
etc. The problem was that over time—and as a wanted renewal and were critical. Furthermore,
result of the aggressive war of the Contra—many as of 2007 (when Daniel Ortega assumed the
of the spaces for participation turned into spaces Presidency of the Republic again) the main de-
for mobilization and discipline at the discretion mand articulated in many of the protests was the
of a regime that, hounded by war, chose to “close denouncement of irregular and opaque practices,
ranks.” together with impunity. Furthermore, manipula-
The expressive emergence—typical of move- tion and fraud in elections were condemned.
ments—did not take place until 1990, after the However, the episodes of protests denouncing
unexpected defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 Ortega’s project do not mean that the popular or
presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elec- class-based movements have disappeared; it is
tions. With the loss of power, many movements simply worth noting that their logic has been very
were freed from the FSLN’s vanguardist and different from the other countries in the region.
vertical logic. In this contradictory context that Today in Nicaragua there is still a movement that
combined, on one hand, the conquest of greater defends labor rights, denounces the harmful ef-
quotas of autonomy and on the other, the impact fects that megaprojects have on the environment,
of neoliberal economic measures and reaction- fights against the mistreatment of migrants, and
ary moral policies, there was an explosion of proclaims the emancipating will of the youth.
movements that was expressed in several ways. However, the obstacles of constructing an alter-
One of them was the emergence of a solid and native, unitary, and transformative agenda in the
combative feminist network which would remain country leave a certain sense of frustration. In
intact through the present. Another, with a lesser any case, the “nation-building projects”—as they
impact (given that it began to decline in the mid- were presented (or dreamed of) during the 1970s
1990s) was the grassroots trade union movement and 1980s—are not very likely in a context of
that protested against neoliberal policies, privati- economic globalization. Furthermore, there is no
zations, and mass redundancies of civil servants agreement among the supposed political left and
(Almeida 2014). It was a process that would social movements; there is neither a strategic nor
take place several years later in the rest of the tactical agreement on what role the state and the
region. market should play.
During the 1990s, the movements had a rather
schizophrenic relationship with the FSLN. On
one hand, all (or almost all of them) had their ori- References
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The Movement Against
the Coup in Honduras 22
Eugenio Sosa
Introduction1 gathering at the home of the president in the early

morning hours of June 28 to protest the ouster
On June 28, 2009 at 05:35 a.m., the private home of President Zelaya, and in the afternoon, the
of the president of Honduras, José Manuel Ze- National Front for Resistance against the Coup
laya Rosales, who had been elected for the term was founded, which for the following 2 years
running from January 27, 2006 to January 27, organized mass mobilizations throughout the
2010, was raided by the military. The president country. The magnitude and duration of the anti-
was arrested, put on a plane, and taken to Costa coup movement was unprecedented in Honduran
Rica. That same day a citizen consultation was history. National and regional analysts were sur-
to take place to allow citizens to express their prised by the capacity for mobilization and re-
approval or disapproval of including a “Fourth sistance demonstrated by the Honduran people.
Ballot Box” in the November 29, 2009 general This chapter seeks to help answer two questions:
elections, to vote YES or NO on convening a Na- first, what factors explain the development of
tional Constitutional Convention.2 People began a broad, mass movement following the coup?;
second, what are the characteristics of this social
protest movement?
1
This essay addresses the anti-coup movement, which
was carried out by the National Front for Resistance
against the Coup. The movement is now in a new phase,
and has assumed the name, National Popular Resistance Factors that Encouraged Lasting Mass
Front and a new political party—Libertad y Refundación Protest Against the Coup
(LIBRE). In this second phase, the movement exhibits
other characteristics that are not addressed in this chapter. We can approach an answer to the question about
2 Itwas called the “Fourth Ballot Box” because general the factors that explain the emergence and devel-
elections in Honduras include three ballots: The first for
president of the republic, the second for representatives to
opment of the lasting, mass movement against
the National Congress, and the third for mayor and coun- the military coup by examining four aspects:
cil members. The “Fourth Ballot” would be a referendum (1) the alliance of social movement organizations
with President Zelaya, (2) the trend toward reac-
tivation of social protest in the country, (3) the
This chapter was translated from Spanish to English by existence of “mobilizing structures,” and (4) the
Nancy Hand. defense of democracy as a general ideological
framework.
E. Sosa ()
UNAH, Tegucigalpa, Honduras or plebiscite on whether or not to convene a National Con-
e-mail: jesosai@yahoo.es stitutional Convention.
314 E. Sosa
The Alliance of Organizations ecutors’ Hunger Strike,” which lasted for 37 days
with President Zelaya during the months of April and May of 2008.
The prosecutors were denouncing the complic-
With the majority of Honduran presidents, even ity of the Public Ministry, the Supreme Court of
during the era of democracy, popular movement Justice, and the National Congress in blocking
organizations have maintained an attitude that corruption investigations involving people from
fluctuates between mistrust and confrontation, the country’s political and economic elite. The
primarily because they see the executive branch executive branch played the role of mediator, and
as representing the interests of the country’s eco- even supporter of the prosecutors’ movement.
nomic elite. In the case of President José Manuel The prosecutors’ hunger strike generated mobili-
Zelaya Rosales (Liberal Party), who took of- zations in solidarity, known in some cases as na-
fice January 27, 2006, there was no reason for tional civic strikes, among different segments of
the situation to be any different. In addition, in society, and some even joined the hunger strike.
this case, there was an additional historical event However, the issue that sealed the alliance be-
that was deeply entrenched in the consciousness tween President Zelaya and the Honduran popu-
of the Honduran popular organizations. Namely, lar organizations was the incorporation of Hondu-
the responsibility of Manuel Zelaya (the father ras into the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
of the president) in the “Horcones” (Olancho) (ALBA). On August 25, 2008, Presidents Hugo
campesino massacre on his ranch, carried out on Chávez Frías of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bo-
June 25, 1975,3 when a campesino mobilization livia, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and the Vice
was being organized throughout the country that President of Cuba, Carlos Lage visited Teguci-
would converge in Tegucigalpa. This mobiliza- galpa to attend a public act to incorporate Hondu-
tion was known as “The Hunger March.” Even ras into ALBA. The Honduran popular organiza-
though once in office President Zelaya took actions turned out for the event en masse. The alli-
tions that affected groups in power and benefited ance between President Zelaya and the popular
the popular classes (such as a change in the for- organizations was strengthened by the decision
mula for calculating the price of fuels and other of the executive branch, in December of 2008,
similar measures), the Honduran popular move- to raise the minimum wage by 60 %. President
ment maintained a degree of mistrust in relation Zelaya faced a series of legal actions brought by
to the “progressive” and “left-leaning” position business interests seeking to declare the execu-
of President Zelaya given his family’s historical tive decree illegal. In response, various popular
connection to the repression in Olancho in the organizations mobilized in support of President
1970s. Zelaya’s wage policy. Shortly after, in March of
An initial warming between President Zelaya 2009, the executive launched the “Fourth Ballot
and the popular organizations took place during Box” project to consult the voters regarding the
the social movement known as the “Public Pros- convening of a National Constitutional Conven-
tion. The popular organizations staged a massive
3 march on May 1, 2009, international workers’
“The 1975 march set out simultaneously on June 25
from Olancho, Choluteca, San Pedro Sula and el Pro- day, in support of the minimum wage measure
greso, and it was estimated it would arrive in the capital and the “Fourth Ballot Box” initiative for the
in 6 days. It was repressed from day one throughout the Constitutional Convention.
country. The army intercepted marchers and detained their
Thus, popular organizations found allies
leaders. In Olancho the repression was more violent. On
June 25, landowners and members of the military per- among the Honduran political elite, and at the
petrated the terrible massacres of campesinos, women, same time, the elite exhibited internal contra-
and priests in the “Santa Clara” Training Center and on dictions. From the theoretical perspective of
the “Horcones” ranch. The investigating commission of
the structure of political opportunity (SPO), the
the armed forces found that Manuel Zelaya (senior) was
among the perpetrators. Vida Laboral Magazine, year 5, social movements arose and were at least stimu-
edition 20, June 2005. lated by the signals, which could represent op-
22 The Movement Against the Coup in Honduras 315
portunities, they received from the political sys- movement maintained an ongoing assembly at
tem (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; Meyer 2004). the presidential palace and had already founded
President Zelaya represented an influential ally the Front for the “Fourth Ballot Box” with Presi-
for the popular organizations, which, according dent Zelaya as the “head.” With the military high
to Tarrow (1994), is one of the indicators of the command’s refusal to take responsibility for the
existence of political opportunities. For Tarrow, logistics, the June 28, 2009 referendum elections
the dynamics of social movements are boosted were under the responsibility of the president, a
when they find influential allies, whether among few ministers, and the Honduran popular move-
the military, the courts, or among high-level poli- ment.
ticians. The support of religious elites, powerful Given this background, it is not possible to
political parties, and large media outlets with sig- maintain that the anti-coup movement sprouted
nificant influence in society could be included as up spontaneously on June 28. The grassroots or-
well (Tarrow [1996]1999, pp. 90–92). ganizations of the Honduran popular movement
The lack of alignment or division between were, in some sense, already organized and pre-
the executive and judicial branches around the pared to implement the citizen consultation ini-
“Fourth Ballot Box” project is another indicator tiative. What the popular movement leaders did
of political opportunity that spurred the social in response to the coup was to change course.
mobilization. Following Tarrow, there are empir- Once the referendum had been aborted with the
ical studies that demonstrate that when there are ouster of President Zelaya, they proceeded to
unstable alignments or divisions among elites, the Presidential Palace where they called for the
this spurs social mobilizations or protests (Al- Honduran people to resist the coup en masse.
meida and Stearns 1998). Collective action tends After the president was removed from his per-
to arise when there are cracks, windows, or doors sonal residence, and as the hours passed, there
in the walls of elite unity. When the elite become was unanimous condemnation of the coup on the
fractured, split, or divided, they open the field for part of the international community. This was
actors to participate in the conflict, which encour- also a stimulus for the massive growth of the an-
ages people and social groups to participate in ti-coup movement. The international rejection of
protest actions (Tarrow [1996]1999, pp. 90–92). the coup and of the de facto regime is another in-
By June 2009, the political crisis had taken dicator of political opportunity for the anti-coup
very clear shape. The parties to the dispute were movement which spurred mass participation in
President Zelaya and part of his administration collective action.
along with the popular organizations on one side,
and the National Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Public Ministry, the major media, business The Trend Toward Reactivation
organizations, and organizations calling them- of Social Protest in the Country
selves civil society organizations on the other
side. During the last week of June 2009, when the In the past two decades, the cycles of social
confrontation between the branches of the gov- protest, defined by neoliberalism and economic
ernment reached one of its most tense moments structural adjustment programs, are not only the
around the dismissal of the Joint Chief of Staff product of political opportunity but also of the
of the Armed Forces,4 the Honduran popular threats posed by these policies, which benefit
large economic groups and are promoted by the
4 As a result of the refusal of the Joint Chief of Staff of government. These threats may be of three types:
the Armed Forces, Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, to support
the installation of the polling places and the material for
the referendum, he was dismissed by President Zelaya him to the post. That same day, President Zelaya, along
on Wednesday, June 24. The following day, June 25, the with hundreds of popular movement leaders, entered the
Supreme Court declared illegal the dismissal of Romeo Air Force Base to recover the material for the referendum
Vásquez Velásquez and the National Congress reinstated and take direct responsibility for its distribution.
316 E. Sosa
“(1) economic tensions, (2) weakening of social operatives. The result for union and campesino
rights, and (3) government repression” (Almeida organizations was wholly negative. Thousands
2002, p. 179). This perspective may explain the of public employees were laid off, unions such
resurgence of social protest in Latin America. as the National Electric Power Company Union
There is more or less a consensus around and (STENEE, its Spanish acronym), the Union of
acceptance of the idea that Latin America is in a National Housing Institute Employees (SITRA-
new cycle of social movements and social protest INVA, its Spanish acronym), Honduran Institute
(Almeida 2007). What is not consensus about is for Agricultural Marketing Employees’ Union
when this cycle began. Some analysts put forth (SITRAIHMA, its Spanish acronym), Union of
1989 as the starting point of this new cycle of Graphics Industry Workers (SITRAINGRA, its
social protest, with the Caracazo protests in Ven- Spanish acronym), and the National Association
ezuela—a country that saw large-scale mobiliza- of Public Employees of Honduras (ANDEPH,
tions against neoliberal measures, and where su- its Spanish acronym) were destroyed, and par-
permarkets and other businesses were ransacked allel boards of directors were installed at other
(see Chap. 14 in this volume). Others place it at unions such as the Telecommunications Workers’
an intermediate date of 1994, when the Zapatista Union (SITRATEL, its Spanish acronym) and the
upraising occurred in Mexico. There are those Union of Roads, Maintenance and Transportation
who place the start at a later date, during the ini- Public Employees (SEPCAMAT, its Spanish ac-
tial years of the first decade of the twenty-first ronym). The campesino sector was repressed, the
century, specifically in 2001, with the mobiliza- number of prisoners from the agricultural sector
tions and falls of governments in South America: increased, and there were severe clashes between
Bolivia, Argentina, and Ecuador (Silva 2009). campesinos and landowner paramilitary groups.
The reactivation of social protest in Hondu- The government was also able to weaken the
ras can be identified as beginning in the year campesino movement through co-opting organi-
2003, after 10 years of weakening, fragmenta- zations and creating parallel organizations. The
tion, and dispersion of social protests. Between government orchestrated the creation of the Na-
1990 and 1992, President Rafael Leonardo tional Campesino Council (CNC), which was in
Callejas (1990–1994) promoted an Economic alignment with its neoliberal policies, and which
Structural Adjustment Program.5 Intense cam- functioned as a counterweight to the Coordinat-
paigns were waged by public and private sector ing Council of Campesino Organizations of Hon-
labor unions, campesinos, and urban residents duras (COCOH, its Spanish acronym).
against neoliberal policies (Sosa 2010). In 1992, Neoliberal policies and the advent of a new
the Agricultural Modernization Law was passed, model of capitalist accumulation meant the de-
which put an end to the weak attempts at agrar- struction of the “material and symbolic basis”
ian reform that had been made in the country of what García Linera (2001) calls the “union
and opened the way for the sale of lands in the formation” and to which we could add the
“reformed sector” and those of agricultural co- “campesino league formation.” It is not a matter
of there no longer being workers, but rather that
the classic, organizational forms of labor unions
5 On March 04, 1990, the National Congress of the Re- as we have known them are no longer histori-
public approved Legislative Decree 18–90, the Economic cally possible.
Structural Reorganization Law. This Decree eliminated Beginning in 2003, social protest in Honduras
tax relief and increased income taxes. In addition, new
taxes were created and some existing taxes were in- entered a new cycle. This reactivation of social
creased, such as sales, petroleum derivatives, sugar pro- protest centered on mobilizations against priva-
duction, beer, matches, vehicle registration. The price of tization and the signing of the Central American
fuel, transportation, and public services, such as electrici- Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the struggle of
ty, water, and national and international telephone service,
increased. Interest rates on bank loans were liberalized as the teachers in defense of the Teachers’ Charter,
well. the struggles of communities and regions in de-
fense of natural resources, and the hunger strike July 2003 and continued until August 09, 2003.
and mobilizations against corruption headed by In 2006, under the administration of José Manuel
the public prosecutors. During 2003, 2004, and Zelaya Rosales, the teachers resumed the fight
part of 2005, organizations united by or convened for compliance with the Teacher’s Charter, and
by the Popular Block (Bloque Popular) and the an agreement was reached in August of that year.
National Coordinating Body of Popular Resis- The teachers have triumphed in their fights and
tance (CNRP, its Spanish acronym) opposed and demands in recent years—a situation that has
mobilized against privatizations and the signing strengthened them.
of the CAFTA. Another significant social move- During April and May 2008, a small group of
ment during this period was the social protests of public prosecutors declared a hunger strike be-
the Olancho Environmental Movement (MAO, cause of the indifference and negligence of the
its Spanish acronym) in defense of the forest. Supreme Court of Justice and the Public Ministry
This movement’s primary strategy involved what in prosecuting corruption cases against people
were called “marches for life,” in which the com- with ties to the country’s political and econom-
munities of the department of Olancho marched ic elite. The hunger strike, which started with 3
toward Tegucigalpa, covering some 180 km, to public prosecutors, was joined by others and ul-
make their demands heard. The first “march for timately included 30 people, and was concluded
life” was held in 2003, the second in 2004, and on May 24. This fight of the public prosecutors
the third in 2008. Protests also took place in other led to an ongoing mobilization in the halls of the
departments and municipalities of the country National Parliament and movements in solidarity
against the environmental impacts and the pol- throughout the country. The important point here
lution left behind by transnational companies in- is that, at the time of the June 28, 2009 coup, the
volved in open-pit mining. These movements in popular movement was trending toward reactiva-
defense of natural resources also took over high- tion of social protest, following the weakening
ways in different areas of the country. and disbanding that had been caused by the eco-
The teachers’ struggles were reactivated dur- nomic structural adjustment programs and neo-
ing the decade of the 1990s. During the 1980s, it liberal policies. In this sense, the anti-coup social
was among the movements that experienced the movement and the National Front for Resistance
repressive policies of the Cold War. Union lead- against the Coup are the continuation and the
ers disappeared and governments encouraged high point of the reactivation of social protest in
assaults and internal divisions among its organi- Honduras during the first decade of the twenty-
zations. After a long struggle, on September 11, first century.
1997, the Teacher’s Charter was approved. As
a result of the tragedy of hurricane Mitch,6 the
government in power, headed by Carlos Roberto Existing Structures of Social
Flores Facussé, was able to reach an agreement Mobilization
to suspend the economic clauses of the charter
until 2002. On January 27, 2002, Ricardo Ernesto The advent of political opportunities and threats
Maduro Joest (2002–2006) took office as presi- is not sufficient to generate collective action or
dent, promising to end the teachers’ struggles. social protest. Subjects must also have a social
However, one of the most intense conflicts be- base, organization, and resources, in general, in
tween the teachers and the government in recent order to be able to take advantage of those politi-
years ensued. This period of struggle began in cal opportunities. This is what some authors call
“mobilizing structures.” Mobilizing structures
refer to the mechanisms and channels, whether
6
On October 30 and November 1 of 1998, the country formal or informal, which function as an orga-
was devastated by hurricane and tropical storm Mitch,
which left in its wake great material losses and loss of nizing base for the development of collective ac-
human life in Honduras. tion. This refers to networks, organizing bases,
318 E. Sosa
environments, and resources in general that le- activist members of other political parties such as
verage social mobilization (McCarthy 1996). Unificación Democrática (UD) (Democratic Uni-
The risk implicit in the theoretical perspective fication), Partido de Innovación y Unidad Social
is that of confusion between formal social orga- Demócrata (PINU-SD) (Social Democratic Party
nizations and social movements. For some time for Innovation and Unity), and various groups on
it was thought that the perspectives of political the left. In addition, campesino, indigenous and
opportunities and mobilizing structures were mu- ethnic organizations, local and regional commu-
tually exclusive; however, as a result of numer- nity organizations, women’s organizations and
ous empirical studies, “specialists have become feminist organizations, student organizations and
aware of the enormous variety of environments youth organizations, environmental organiza-
in which collective action takes place, as well as tions and natural resource protection organiza-
the diversity of organizational forms that social tions, human rights organizations, Tegucigalpa
movements spawn” (McAdam et al. [1996]1999, neighborhood organizations, and non-organized
pp. 25–26). The central question is whether the citizens participated in the Resistance movement.
movement has the networks, structures, and While not very prominent in the anti-coup mo-
general resources not only to launch the social bilizations, union organizations have also provid-
movement but also to keep it going and sustain ed organizational support. In this case, they were
it. Although it cannot be ignored that once a so- represented by the General Workers’ Central
cial movement has gotten underway, the organi- (CGT), Workers’ Central of Honduras (CUT),
zational forms and structures it takes may vary Union of Workers in the Beverage and Simi-
significantly. In this area, it is essential to study lar Industries (STIBYS, its Spanish acronym),
the profile of the social groups that sustain the Union of Workers of the National Autonomous
movement. Aqueduct and Sewer Workers (SITRASANAA,
One of the organized social movements or its Spanish acronym), Union of Medical and
base organizations of the anti-coup social move- Similar Workers of Honduras (SITRAMEDHYS,
ment was the teachers’ organizations, grouped its Spanish acronym), Union of Workers of the
in the Federation of Teachers’ Organizations National Autonomous University of Honduras
(FOMH, its Spanish acronym). The participation (SITRAUNAH, its Spanish acronym), and the
of the teachers in the protests against the coup Union of Workers of the National Electric Com-
during the initial months of the movement was pany (STENEE, its Spanish acronym). Had these
of such a magnitude that they were considered structures of mobilization not gone into action,
the backbone of the FNRP. In addition, teach- it is difficult to imagine that the movement of
ers are spread out around the country, including the FNRP would have achieved the importance
in the most isolated villages and communities, it reached.
which allows them to contribute, especially with
their leadership, to encourage social protest. The
popular social base of the Liberal Party (which Defense of Democracy as a General
President Zelaya comes from) and base level and Ideological Framework
mid-level party leaders was also one of the key
social forces that was part of the “mobilizing The social movements were also spawned and
structures” that sustained the anti-coup move- developed as a response to what they consider
ment. to be an attack, a breach of the shared values of
We must add to the teachers’ organizational the society, or the installation of an illegitimate
structures and Liberal Party organizational struc- authority. That is, social movements need a fram-
tures, a series of groups, organizations, and insti- ing process to justify their actions (Benford and
tutions that joined the anti-coup movement, and Snow 2000). From the perspective of framing
that also constituted part of the mobilizing struc- processes, political opportunities and mobilizing
tures of the movement. We are referring to the structures are recognized as constituting the basis
for the emergence and development of social a military coup. This debate over what to call the
movements, social protests, and collective ac- overthrow of President Zelaya both at the na-
tions in general. However, these elements alone tional and international levels, and the primary
are not sufficient and are affected by other fac- battlefield was the media. The framing process
tors such as ideology and culture. Some authors and the ideological dispute between the actors
return to the concept of framing processes and re- and antagonists of the anti-coup movement were
define them as “the conscious strategic efforts by clearly defined. It was over the values and princi-
groups of people to fashion shared understand- ples of democracy or of a democratic political re-
ings of the world and of themselves that legiti- gime. Democracy is always a project in dispute.
mate and motivate collective action.” (McAdam Social actors enter into a political battle, some for
et al. [1996]1999, p. 27. Italics in original). In es- greater degrees of democratization and others for
sence, framing processes refer to the role played generating de-democratization processes.7
by ideology and culture in social movements. The other matter in dispute revolved around
Identities are an important part of framing pro- the National Constitutional Convention. The
cesses. anti-coup movement argued that the organiza-
Hunt et al. (1994) identify three fields of iden- tion of a convention was essential for advanc-
tity construction in social movements. First, the ing toward participatory democracy and political
actors are the individuals who promote and sym- inclusion of the sectors that had been marginal-
pathize with the meta values and practices of the ized up to that time. While the de facto regime
social movement; these actors are also the benefi- and the countermovement maintained that it was
ciaries of movement actions. Second, the antago- not necessary to conduct a convention for a new
nists are the set of people and groups that appear constitution, the constitution currently in effect
to be unified in opposition to the efforts of the allowed for a large number of reforms in order to
actors. Third, the audience is the group of people advance toward participatory democracy. Thus,
who are neutral or who are uninvolved observers, ideas about democracy became the primary ideo-
although some may respond to or report on the logical factor within Honduran political culture
events they witness. These categories of identi- for justifying the mobilization, both for the actors
ties are also referred to by the authors as “identity and the antagonists of the anti-coup movement.
fields,” due to the fact that the identities in each
category overlap and remain unified and because
they are elastic categories that expand and con- Characteristics
tract over time (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 221). The of the Anti-coup Movement
creation of collective action frames and identity
fields of social movements is, in turn, part of the As mentioned above, there is a high level of con-
political dispute and struggle. sensus in Latin America about the fact that we
The FNRP raised the battle cry of democracy are in a new cycle of social movements and so-
and a return to constitutional rule which was to cial protest. But there is an open debate regard-
be achieved by the return of José Manuel Zelaya
Rosales to the presidency of the Republic. The 7
But how do we understand democratization? Democra-
ideological struggle that took place in the early tization is an increase in the scope of civil, political, and
hours of June 28, after the overthrow of President social/economic rights of citizens. Increase in the breadth
Zelaya, was bloody and bitter. On the one side, and equality of relations between government agents and
members of the population, in binding consultation of a
the de facto regime and the countermovement government’s population with respect to governmental
organized in the Civic Democratic Union (UCD personnel, resources, and policy, and in protection of that
its Spanish acronym) argued that it was a normal population from arbitrary action by governmental agents
presidential succession under the Constitution of and groups with power in society. De-democratization
would be any substantial evolution that would imply a
the Republic, the anti-coup movement presented departure from the democratizing processes mentioned
the counterargument that what had occurred was above (Tilly 2007).
320 E. Sosa
ing the characteristics of the social movements of of forces; and (l) the use of old and new forms of
this new stage. Raúl Zibechi, analyzing the cur- communication. We will briefly examine each of
rent cycle of social movements in Latin America, these characteristics.
identifies six central characteristics in the con-
figuration of these movements. These character- a. Its ideological framework is the fight for
istics are: democracy and against neoliberalism.
The FNRP is a movement that advocates for
1. Territorialization of the movements. the struggle for democracy; it is not a move-
2. The search for autonomy, both material and ment that proposes a struggle for socialism,
symbolic, with respect to the State and politi- national liberation, or another type of politi-
cal parties. cal demand. Its platform has been clearly de-
3. The revaluing of the society’s culture and af- fined as in favor of the return to constitutional
firmation of the identity of its people and so- rule and the reinstatement of overthrown
cial sectors, in particular different ethnicities president, José Manuel Zelaya Rosales. In
and gender. the heat of battle, the call to convene a Na-
4. The ability to produce its own intellectuals. tional Constitutional Convention to approve a
5. The new role of women. new constitution began to acquire legitimacy
6. The concern for reorganization of work and among the citizenry. While there is no clear
the relationship to nature. proposal as of yet, one can easily deduce from
7. The repertoire of struggle or forms of ac- the discourse of the different sectors of the
tion from the past—the classic expression population that the Constitutional Convention
of which is the strike—while not ceasing to and the new constitution aspires to participa-
exist, is giving way to self-affirming forms of tory democracy, the expansion of the rights
struggle through which new social subjects of indigenous peoples, communities, women,
become visible and reaffirm the characteris- youth, and in general, the recreation of the
tics and marks of their identity (Zibechi 2003, State and society. But the ideological frame-
pp. 186–187 OSAL 9). work of the FNRP does not stop at demands
for democracy, rather it also includes its re-
Using this classification proposed by Zibechi as jection of the neoliberal policies that have af-
a frame of reference, while seeking to identify fected their social and economic rights. Thus,
the particularities of the anti-coup movement in the anti-coup movement includes democratic
Honduras, we find that this social movement is and social demands and ideologically links
characterized by the following: (a) its ideological the deepening of Honduran democracy with
framework is the fight for democracy and against rejection of neoliberal-style economic mea-
neoliberalism; (b) it is broad in terms of the sub- sures.
jects that constitute it and it has no vanguard sub- b. It is broad in terms of the subjects that consti-
ject; (c) it is organized by sector and territory; (d) tute it and it has no vanguard subject.
it forges a common identity while preserving and The anti-coup movement represents the di-
recreating individual identities; (e) a substantial versity and plurality of Honduran society. It
degree of decentralization and autonomy in the brings together anti-coup political forces, such
way it is run, (f) more horizontal, flexible, and as Liberal Party sympathizers, supporters of
democratic in decision-making; (g) turnover in the PINU and UD parties, and to a lesser ex-
leadership and emergence of new leadership; (h) tent, nationalists and Christian democrats. It
few and concrete lines of articulation; (i) the end also includes forces from defined sectors such
of old forms of struggle and the emergence of as the revolutionary Left which dates from
new ones; (j) a zeal for the political autonomy the decade of the 1980s. Socially, it brings
of the movement; (k) beyond spontaneity of ac- together middle sectors such as teachers and
tion and the presence of historical accumulation students, women and youth, marginalized
neighborhoods, communities, and rural and The centralized management style of the “cen-
semirural areas. However, no social or politi- tral command orders,” “central board of direc-
cal sector proclaims itself the vanguard of the tors orders,” or the “central strike committee
movement, as often occurred in the past. In orders” is a thing of the past for the FNRP.
other words, it is a movement that brings to- Despite the fact that it was directed at a na-
gether people who are socially, politically, and tional level, though certainly not very visibly,
ideologically diverse. with the exception of about three of its lead-
c. It is a movement that is organized by sector ers, the activities of the Resistance were run
and territory. with important degrees of decentralization
Because of the breadth and diversity of the and autonomy. Each sector or territory, teach-
FNRP, it has been successful in connecting ers, campesinos, students, youth, women, and
popular forces both socially and in terms of communities and regions, decided on a series
territory. It brings together workers, teachers, of actions for themselves, only guided by the
youth, students, homemakers, indigenous and general demands of the Front. Thus, women
ethnic organizations, campesinos, etc.; but it have carried out specific actions, the Univer-
has also been organized territorially by re- sity Resistance has implemented its own ac-
gions, municipalities, and communities. tions, campesinos, for their part, took over
d. It is a movement that was able to forge a com- the offices of the National Agrarian Institute
mon identity while preserving and recreating (INA), and the different regions have con-
individual identities. ducted their territorial specific actions. That
One of the key factors for the FNRP is that it is to say that we are witnessing a movement
was able to force a unique, common national and a struggle in which decentralization and
identity that even transcended the movement autonomy have been important in the deciding
itself. We are referring to the fact that referring what actions to take.
to oneself as “belonging to the resistance,” “I
belong to the resistance,” or “to be in resis- The social movement has become national in
tance” became very commonplace among scope, although the epicenter is located in the
broad sectors of Honduran society. Hence, the capital, Tegucigalpa. San Pedro Sula, called the
coup created a disruptive event that allowed industrial capital of the country, has been the site
for the emergence of a new collective move- of major protest actions and mass mobilizations.
ment identity (Viterna 2013). But, at the same In addition, marches and highway blockades have
time, different social sectors sought to simul- also taken place in La Ceiba, Tocoa, Trujillo, El
taneously differentiate and connect to the Progreso, Santa Bárbara, Santa Rosa de Copán,
common identity by adapting it to their spe- La Esperanza, Comayagua, Choluteca, Olancho,
cific sector by claiming their visibility. Thus, and El Paraíso. However, the important issue to
we find political identities such as the “Liberal emphasize is that there is autonomy of leadership
Resistance,” sector-based identities such as and decision-making in each territory, and each
the “University Resistance,” “Women in Re- resistance group has its own forms of assembly. It
sistance,” “Feminists in Resistance,” “Youth is a national movement with a significant level of
in Resistance,” and territorial identities such coordination while also being decentralized and
as the “Resistance of Santa Bárbara,” “Resis- the characteristics of the larger movement (its
tance of Choluteca,” “Resistance of Occiden- plurality and network nature) are reproduced on
te,” “Resistance of San Pedro Sula,” etc. That a smaller scale, combined with characteristics of
is, there was a fusion of a common identity the community.
that was combined with specific sector and García Linera describes the concepts of the
territory-based identities. “crowd formation” and the “community forma-
e. Greater degrees of decentralization and au- tion” as new modalities or forms of collective
tonomy in the way it is run. action. “The crowd is a very flexible organizing
322 E. Sosa
network, loose to some extent, which has a very opinions to the media or other groups. In ad-
solid and permanent point of coalescence, is ca- dition, people also feel free to speak publicly
pable of convening, leading, and mobilizing an about the resistance movement against the
enormous number of “loose” citizens, who, due coup. Also, each of these sectors, organiza-
to their precarious labor situation, due to the pro- tions, groups, or movements have their own
cesses of modernization and individualization, dynamics and make decisions about their av-
lack traditional loyalties” (García Linera 2001, enues of participation in the FNRP. It must be
p. 186). The primary characteristic of the “com- added as well that working groups have also
munity formation” of the anti-coup movement in been organized, which function with a great
communities, municipalities, and regions, was deal of autonomy.
the organization of assemblies as open spaces of b. Turnover in leadership and emergence of new
deliberation regarding the actions to be taken in leadership.
each territory. As was once said, “leaders do not make
change, but rather they encounter it.” Often
a. Much more horizontal, flexible, and demo- in “normal” periods, there are people who
cratic decision-making. expend great efforts trying to be leaders of
The decision-making and functioning of the broad social movements, and in times of “cri-
different sectors and territories of the anti- sis,” there are those who find themselves in
coup movement have been much more hori- the right place, they have the personality to
zontal and democratic as a result, to some put themselves at the front of the crisis, and
extent, of the decentralized functioning of they end up leading the broad social move-
the different sectors and territories of the ments that others have dreamed. It is impor-
anti-coup movement. A national coordinating tant to recognize that the FNRP has allowed
body was established, functioning primarily for turnover in the leadership and recognition
in Tegucigalpa, with a circulating member- of old union and campesino leadership, in a
ship of a large number of leaders, some more true renewal. But it has also made it possible,
permanent than others. In addition, coordina- both at the national as well as the regional,
tion has been open, to some extent, to the par- municipal, and community level, for a sig-
ticipation of others. Another mechanism with nificant number of new or “recycled” leaders,
horizontal and democratic functional charac- both men and women, to emerge or to gain
teristics is the broad and open assemblies of visibility.
the Resistance, conducted in each of the cities c. Few and concrete lines of articulation.
and regions and at a national level, where the No movement as broad and diverse as the
major decisions have been made or approved. FNRP is able to represent the entirety of the
The movement against the coup also distin- specific interests and demands of the different
guishes itself from the classic centralized and social subjects. This usually results in disper-
vertical forms of leadership of historic social sion and division, not unification. Unification
movements (primarily worker and campesino of great diversity and plurality was possible
movements). However, neither can it be said because the demands and lines of struggle
that they are completely democratic, horizon- were few and concrete while being sufficient-
tal movements. But what is clear is that there ly inclusive. At the outset, the FNRP came
is a greater and more open degree of horizon- together around denouncing the coup and de-
tality and flexibility. manding reinstatement of President Zelaya. It
The flexibility of the movement is also re- later developed more strength in the different
flected in the fact that there are no official participating sectors and began to call for a
spokespersons as in the case of classic social National Constitutional Convention and the
movements. Anyone who participates in the formation of a new political party Libertad y
resistance actions feels free to express his/her Refundación (LIBRE).
d. The end of old forms of struggle and the emer- en masse during the early 1990s, and new hires
gence of new ones. were made under flexible labor policies, for short
If we review the “repertoires of action” of terms and without any guarantees of the basic
the FNRP, we find that the strike, the pro- labor rights set forth in the Labor Code. The vast
liferation of which would have been “nor- majority of public employees are hired as “con-
mal” in other times, has not been common sultants,” which is nothing more than the institu-
in this movement. This is due to the fact that tion of instability in public employment. Funda-
the emergence of a new pattern of capitalist mental changes have taken place in the private
growth and accumulation, plus the neoliberal sector in the working world, which have made it
policies implemented during the early 1990s, very difficult, if not impossible, to organize and
destroyed “the material and subjective basis consolidate union structures. Agricultural work-
for union and campesino organization,” both ers, particularly those of the banana companies,
in the private and public sectors. Thus, the have been drastically reduced as this export com-
dreamed-of “general strike” that some old modity has declined in importance in the national
Leftist activists still expected never arrived. economy. The maquila industry employs a large
However, the FNRP has taken up other forms number of workers, particularly women and
of struggle that have been used in the past, but youth—138,000 in 2003—but due to the flex-
it has also created and recreated others. The ible and unstable contracts and the absence of
“repertoire of action” of the front is broad: the State as guarantor of compliance with labor
street marches, rallies in front of institutions rights, unions have not been able to survive and
that symbolize public and private powers, cut- become consolidated (Anner 2011).
ting off of transportation routes or taking over Another important sector of the Honduran
of highways that connect the major cities of economy is the service sector. The employees are
the country, cultural events, internal mobiliza- spread out and divided, and also work under flex-
tions in neighborhoods, vehicle caravans, “ca- ible and unstable contracts. Union organizing has
cerolazos,” “bullaranga,” (“racket”), “torch not been feasible here either. In addition, a great
marches,” etc. majority of the economically active population is
self-employed independently or in the informal
Vigils and security protection programs were also economy. Under the circumstances set forth in
conducted for strategic allies who were threat- the preceding paragraphs, the weakness and near
ened by the de facto regime. This was the case absence of the “union formation” as a means of
of the vigils at the Venezuelan Embassy, whose organization of workers is the norm. Thus, this
diplomatic representatives were cancelled by the has meant adios to the strike as a form of action
de facto regime and at the oppositional Radio in the repertoire of the social movements. As a
Globo station, which was occupied by the mili- result, the de facto regime and the business own-
tary after the coup on June 28, and was thereafter ers that supported it did not face conflicts and
under ongoing threat. It is interesting to stop for a financial losses due to worker strikes or work
moment and think about the fact that despite the stoppages. Given the impossibility of the strike
magnitude reached by the anti-coup movement, and returning to the lessons of popular struggles
the strike was not an important form of struggle. in Latin America, the FNRP resorted to taking
Even more, it can be said that it was a form of over or blocking highways to deal a blow to
struggle that was absent from the repertoire of ac- the country’s economy. However, the de facto
tion of this social movement. This is due to the regime was more likely to unleash repression
fact that, as we have noted, as a result of neolib- against this type of action than against others.
eral policies and a new pattern of capitalist ac- The leaders of the anti-coup movement recog-
cumulation, the material and symbolic bases of nized this threat and chose not to continue them.
labor union organization have been destroyed. The tendency of the political regime to repress
Unionized public employees were dismissed or not to repress specific forms of social protest
324 E. Sosa
encourages or discourages their use by the social ship and democratic ideas were raised by the
movements. work of different organizations in recent de-
cades were out in the streets with the Resis-
a. A zeal for the political autonomy of the move- tance. Human rights organizations have done
ment. an excellent job of documenting abuses, de-
In practice, the FNRP has also claimed po- nouncing repression, and taking legal action,
litical autonomy. Thus, despite the fact that it putting into practice all of the accumulated
brings together leaders, activists, and support- experience from the 1980s. The Resistance
ers of political parties: Liberal, PINU, and UD has benefited from the recent accumulation of
members, and those from non-electoral po- experience from the “prosecutors’ strike,” as
litical forces that identify as on the left, they it was known. It would be difficult to attempt
have not been allowed to declare themselves to explain the movement of the FNRP without
the political drivers of the Resistance. This this historical accumulation of popular move-
zeal for political autonomy of the FNRP is not ment struggles.
only guarded against political parties but also c. The use of old and new forms of communica-
against certain types of nongovernmental enti- tion.
ties or organizations. One of the new topics of research and debate
b. Beyond spontaneity of action, the presence of is the relationship between social movements
historical accumulation. and new communications technologies. There
Some analysts, surprised by the size of the are those who suggest that new technologies
Resistance movement, see it as nothing more are changing the nature of social movements
than a spontaneous outpouring of Hondurans (Earl and Kimport 2011). One thing that is
into the streets. If we analyze the composition evident and needs no further discussion is
of the actors who make up the Resistance, it that the social movements of the twenty-first
is clear that it is a combination of actors who century have incorporated new technologies
have participated in the popular struggles of into their forms of organization and action.
at least the past three decades. Among the But the significant question is: To what extent
primary leaders of the Resistance are work- are these new technologies changing social
ers who participated in the union struggles of movements? Regarding this issue, Charles
the 1980s and 1990s, and former leaders of Tilly (2005) calls attention to four warnings or
the campesino movement, as well as women dangers. The first is to avoid technological de-
who have been fighting for women’s rights terminism since the changes in social move-
and gender equality for the past two decades. ments have more to do with the context than
In the Resistance we find the indigenous and with technological innovations. The second is
ethnic organizations that waged important that innovations in communications, just like
fights in the 1990s, and a variety of commu- in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, al-
nity and regional movements that have been ways have two effects: on the one hand, they
fed by the historical sediment left by the work lower the cost of communication and coordi-
of campesino organizations and the base com- nation between activists in social movements;
munity work of the Catholic Church. The and on the other, they exclude those who
teachers, having survived the neoliberal poli- do not have access to the new technologies.
cies of the 1990s and the assault of President The third is that the social movements of the
Ricardo Maduro in the early 2000s, were the twenty-first century continue to depend on
backbone of the Resistance during the initial local, regional, and national forms of orga-
weeks. Surviving groups from the univer- nization that already existed in the twentieth
sity and high school student movements par- century. Fourth, without denying the fact that
ticipated. A large number of citizens whose globalization shapes the distribution of social
awareness about human rights and citizen- movements, the current focus of confronta-
tion of social movements is not globaliza- the organizations and leaders in general have
tion and antiglobalization (Tilly 2005 p. 14). with actors in other countries, especially with al-
For Tilly it would be an illusion to think that ternative media and human rights organizations,
electronic messages will be what coordinates contributed to the social movement’s ability to
social movements. Rather, it is the changes in break the media blockade. But the FNRP also
the political and organizational context that made use of the long-standing means of commu-
have a much more direct and immediate effect nication, which constitute both a symbolic legacy
“on the functioning of the social movements and a communications legacy, including street
than technological changes themselves” (Tilly painting or graffiti, flyers, pronouncements, and
2005, p. 19). communiqués that each individual organization
or group produces and distributes to demonstra-
The incorporation of new technologies does not tors. We must add to this the production of an
mean abandonment of the old technologies and official written organ of the FNRP and a radio
forms of communication. This is the case of the program which were used to report the most im-
FNRP, which made use of both old and new tech- portant current events.
nologies and forms of communication because
the anti-coup movement was faced with a fero-
cious media blockade at the national level. The Conclusion
de facto regime was in control of the primary
television, radio, and print media. In response In sum, the resistance to the military coup was
to this situation, the anti-coup movement made built on decades of prior struggle to neoliberal-
use of not only the new technologies but also old ism. The FNRP is composed of a variety of social
forms of communication characteristic of classic sectors that sustained resistance for over 2 years
social movements, or of first generation “new” until the negotiated return of President Manuel
social movements such as the student movement. Zelaya in mid-2011. Between 2011 and 2013, the
The Internet was a key factor for reporting na- FNRP partially placed its efforts in constructing
tionally and internationally about what was hap- an innovative political party—LIBRE. LIBRE
pening in the country. It allowed access to the competed in the 2013 presidential elections and
media, which were censured and cancelled inter- gained nearly 900,000 votes in a contested and
nally, like TeleSur. In addition, centers for infor- controversial race (Sosa 2014). The new Left-
mation gathering and dissemination, such as the ist party emerged as the second largest politi-
Red de Desarrollo Sostenible (RDS) (Sustainable cal force in the country and broke the century
Development Network) and the Fian-Honduras long dominance of the two elite political parties,
Network, played a strategic role in movement with LIBRE counting the second largest num-
communications. ber of representatives in the national parliament.
Mobile telephone service served to make the LIBRE continues to mobilize with the FNRP and
coup known within a few minutes of its occur- social movements on the streets to denounce the
rence. It allowed for immediate and fluid com- imposition of neoliberal measures and acts of
munication within the movement for coordina- state repression.
tion. It was also a technological tool for making
reports to human rights organizations and the
media as repression by police and the military References
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Guatemalan Social
Movements: From the Peace 23
Process to a New Cycle of
Popular Struggle, (1996–2013)
Simona Violetta Yagenova
Introduction disappeared, the refugees and displaced popula-

tion, women and indigenous organizations. Dur-
This chapter presents an abbreviated panorama ing this period, they acquired important levels of
of the changes that have occurred during the unity around strategic demands such as democra-
struggle of social movements in Guatemala since tización, de-militarización, the high cost of liv-
the signing of the peace agreement that ended the ing, the violation of labor rights, the privatiza-
36 years of internal war in 1996. The cycle of tion of state enterprises, and the end of the war
popular struggle seen in Guatemala today con- and political violence, along with demands for
stitutes a response to structural and historical de- a negotiation about the causes that began armed
mands that were never attended and resolved, as struggle.
well as new factors such as the imposition of an As the peace negotiations evolved (1990–
economic model based on accumulation by dis- 1996), they canalized proposals hoping that the
possession. This occurs in a context of regression final content would reflect the civil society de-
in the process of democratization, respect for mands. This was only partially achieved, leaving
human rights, and the strengthening of political, deep frustration in peasant organizations who
economical, and military forces that seek the res- demanded a profound land reform, and dismay
toration of an authoritarian regime. in union organizations due to the fact that labor
rights were scarcely touched in the accords. It is
important to mention that during these years, the
Social Movements and the Peace labor movement witnessed a significant destruc-
Process tion of labor unions, especially in the private sec-
tor which after 1996 passed on to a weakening of
The social movements, which resurged (1984– the state sector unions (Yagenova 2010).
1990) after the most fierce counterinsurgency The unity of action that had been achieved
policies that included mass murder and geno- during the previous period (1984–1990), began
cide, were composed of historically contentious to dwindle as the dynamics of the peace process
groups (workers, peasants, students, and teach- required sectorial analysis, proposals, and ac-
ers) and also new actors such as those of vic- tions. This factor (the distribution of the peace
tims of human rights violations, families of the accords in different themes and national prob-
lems), would later be used by the political and
economical power holders to fracture their com-
pliance and contribute to the loss of the holistic
S. V. Yagenova ()
FLACSO-Guatemala, Guatemala City, Guatemala perspective from which they were negotiated.
e-mail: simona@flacso.edu.gt The popular sectors hoped, however, that with the
328 S. V. Yagenova
new democratic political climate the movements antee compliance of some of the peace accords
would have possibilities to grow and strengthen that were considered of special importance, such
its struggle. as those related to The Agreement on Identity and
The content of the peace agreement has to be Rights of the Indigenous People (AIDP), social,
understood in the context in which it was nego- economic and land issues The Agreement on So-
tiated, as a result of a determined political and cial, Economical aspects and the Agrarian Situ-
social power balance. It opened possibilities for ation (ASESA), and the strengthening of civil
those demands that could be tolerated within the forces and changes in military functions. The
framework of a liberal and representative democ- premise was that with dialogue and negotiation
racy, but not for those that would question neolib- it would be possible to advance in the direction
eralism or the model of accumulation. of state reforms strengthening citizen power and
Nevertheless, with the signing of the peace new political rights. This, unfortunately, did not
agreement in 1996 that ended 36 years of inter- occur.
nal war, many expectations were raised in Gua- By the year of 2003, it became clear that the
temalan society that this effort could lead to the peace process was coming to an end1. The most
construcción of a democratic state and open the substantial parts of the peace accords had not
possibilities to attend to the historical and struc- been fulfilled and the dominant class was impos-
tural problems of inequality, poverty, racism, dis- ing neoliberal measures that began molding insti-
crimination, and respect for human rights. From tutional and legal changes favoring private enter-
the revolutionary forces organized in the Unidad prise, the opening of markets, and accumulation
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), by dispossession. A teachers’ strike (lasting 53
the peace accords were considered instruments days) during which they confronted the state with
for political and social struggle that should force massive demonstrations, the occupation of state
a transition to strenghten popular and democratic buildings, airports, and border crossings, repre-
power and profoundly change the nature of the sented a rupture with how social movements pro-
political and economical system. However, for tested after the peace agreement.
the dominant class, it was seen as an opportunity The 2003 national elections resulted in a neo-
to benefit from the neoliberal globalization pro- liberal and defender of narrow private sector
cess. The private sector, initially reluctant to the interests gaining the presidency (Oscar Berger
peace process, never compromised itself with the 2004–2007) and marked a change in the political
possibility of economic and structural change. situation. During these 4 years, the government
During the years of 1996–2003, the social would take measures such as the adherence to the
movements and democratic forces concentrated The Dominican Republic-Central American Free
most of their efforts contributing to and demand- Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, and favor-
ing the compliance of the peace accords. It would ing the foreign economic investment that facili-
be no understatement to affirm that the limited tated an extractive model based on the mining
advances achieved were due to their pressure and industry, oil, natural resources, etc., which would
that of the international community. The social continue until the present moment in 2015. The
movements designed the most diverse strategies Berger regime was hostile to popular struggle
such as: elaborating proposals for public policies and human rights violations began to increase
and laws, implementing plans of advocacy with once again. Berger was, however, faced with an
political parties, the private sector and power important cycle of protest that converged in the
holding structures, promoting social commu- declaration of a national strike in June of 2004
nication, and political education to raise public
awareness on the need for the popular classes
1 The analysis of the pronouncements of the social move-
to organize themselves and defend their rights.
ments from 1997–2003 showed that their demands related
Many of the organizations participated in spaces to the peace process were in vain and begun to criticize
of political dialogue created specifically to guar- the non compliance.
23 Guatemalan Social Movements 329
in which participating labor union, peasants, riod of 2005 until 2012; a tendency which has
women, and indigenous organizations mobilized intensified and extended to new territories. 3The
against unwanted economical policies2, demand- many and varied demands that motivated men
ed solutions to the agrarian situation, workers and women to protest in public, reflects the level
salaries, etc. This was followed by other protests of organization that civil society has acquired in
that reached their highest point in the struggle the postwar years. It is evidence of the growing
against the CAFTA free trade treaty signed in inconformity, a new willingness to stand up in
March of 2005 (Yagenova 2012a). the defense of rights and hope for change. The
principal protagonists that realized social protests
were indigenous people, peasant organizations,
A New Cycle of Popular Struggle and rural communities who mobilized over earli-
(2003–2014) er historical and new emerging issues (Yagenova
2012b).
Cycles of popular struggle can be defined as: The struggle against the extractive model, es-
how in determined moments of history the social pecially the mining operations, was focused ini-
and democratic forces conceive system change, tially in the case of the “Mina Marlin,” property
their methods of struggle and collective action, of Goldcorp. S. A, located in Sipacapa and San
and how they construct their demands. Cycles Miguel Ixtahuacán, department of San Marcos. It
of popular struggle also determine if the popular is a paradigmatic case for the following reasons
classes are capable of generating concepts and (Yagenova 2012a):
critical political thoughts that demonstrate the es- • The first community popular consultation that
sence of the system of domination, the way these determined the will of the people about this
forces form alliances and recover a notion of “the mining project was realized on June 18, 2005
collective” and construct alternative and eman- when the local community decided to reject
cipatory proposals that have strategical direction mining by majority vote, based on ancient
to confront capitalism, and the dominant class Mayan practices. This popular referendum
and the power structures inserted in the legal and initiated a new form of resistance that would
institutional frame of the state (Yagenova 2011). extend to other territories inhabited by indige-
The actual cycle of popular struggle began in nous and mestizo populations (COPAE 2005).
2003, and left behind the “peace accord period” • Metallic mining was debated by many civil
a particular juncture characterized by a certain society sectors and placed on the national
openness for political dialogue, search for con- agenda, which influenced public opinion.
sensus and debate about important national issues According to a study released by ASIES
and its possible solutions. It is important to men- (2010) 57 % of the population was against this
tion that this context was created by the intense type of project and 72 % believed that mining
period of revolutionary and popular struggle from enterprises violate human rights (Yagenova
the 1960s to the early 1980s. The “peace period” 2012a).
offered the possibility to change the destiny of • The state acted in favor of the “Mina Mar-
the country if the accords would have been com- lin” project even though many violations of
plied in terms of its structural components and human rights were documented and the mine
not have lost its integrality; however, this politi- generated social conflict in the surrounding
cal and social pact was betrayed by the dominant communities. These events alerted different
class and their allies. groups of indigenous people about the poten-
Five thousand one hundred and seventy eight tial impacts of mining operations and gener-
social protests were registered during the pe- ated analysis and reflection about the relation
3 Based on statistics from the Social Movement study

2 Such as the elevation of the IVA tax from 12 to 15 %. group of FLACSO Guatemala.
330 S. V. Yagenova
Table 23.1 Number de consultations realized 2005–2013

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of consults realized against min- 3 7 12 15 8 6 8 5 8
ing, hydroelectric and oil projects
Social protest data 2004–2013: Social Movement study group, FLACSO Guatemala
between the state, capitalism, and indigenous Santa Rosa, Zacapa, Jalapa, El Petén, Baja y Alta
people’s rights. Verapaz (northern region), and Guatemala (cen-
• By 2010 the efforts of the struggle against tral region). Some of the organizations that have
mining in general and specifically in the case played the most important role in this process are
of the “Mina Marlin” had an impact on sev- the Consejo de los Pueblos de Occidente (CPO),
eral international human rights organizations. el Colectivo Madre Selva, el Centro de Acción
The ILO, CIDH, CERD, and the UN Spe- legal, ambiental y social (CALAS), la Coordi-
cial Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous nación y Convergencia Maya Waquib Kej, as
Peoples, James Anaya exhorted the Guate- well as the Comisión Pastoral Paz y Ecología
malan state to take immediate measures to (COPAE) (Table 23.1) (Fig. 23.1).
attend to the situation, comply with the United The political and symbolic importance of the
Nations Convenio 169 regarding the right for democratic forms of resistance, resides in:
consulting and respect for indigenous territo- 1. The questioning of the state’s authority to
ries. The CIDH gave protective measures to impose an economical model that the com-
18 communities of San Miguel Ixtahuacan munity considers a threat to their territories,
and Sipacapa and urged the government to cultures, natural resources, and future.
suspend this mining project. Even though in 2. That popular consultations are an exercise of
2011 CIDH changed these requirements, these direct democracy in a context where there is a
results were due to an intense political and profound questioning of the nature of the lib-
legal struggle in the national and international eral and representative democratic system.
arena (CERD 2010; CIDH 2009; CIDH 2011; 3. It has implicated a direct confrontation not
Consejo de los Pueblos de Occidente 2010). only with the state but also with private na-
• It is important to point out that the resistance tional and international enterprises, leading to
of communities and indigenous people against acts of violence and repression.
mining, hydroelectric and petroleum drilling
projects negatively impact the plans to rapidly
expand these investments by the state and pri-
vate enterprise.
Between 2005 and 2013, 73 community and
municipal consults have been successfully orga-
nized, in which by absolute majority the inhab-
itants of these local regions rejected projects of
exploration or exploitation of natural resources.
More than 1 million people have participated in
these profoundly democratic exercises, based
on ancient indigenous practices of consultation
or based on municipal law. These popular refer-
endums were implemented in 12 of the 22 Gua-
temalan departments, including: San Marcos,
Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango, Quiché (the
Fig. 23.1 Map of municipalities where these consultation
western mountain region populated mainly by processes have taken place (2005–2013). (Fuente: Elabo-
indigenous people), Retalhuleu (southern coast), ración propia)
23 Guatemalan Social Movements 331
Table 23.2 Cycles of protest in Guatemala, 1972–2013

2003–2013 1996–2003 1984–1996 1972–1984
Principal, social, Indigenous people Peasant movement Revolutionary Revolutionary
and politi- organizations organizations
cal forces that Peasant movement Indigenous people Unions Unions
demand system Communities Unions Peasant organizations Student movement
change
Human rights Victims of human Teachers movement
and pro-justice rights violations
organizations
Women organizations Women organizations Refugees and dis- Peasant movement
placed population
Principal methods Social struggle and Social and political Political, armed, and Political, armed, and
of struggle new forms of popular struggle social struggle social struggle
resistance defined as the
defense of the territory
Principal objective (a) Construction of a Political, social and Political transforma- Overthrow of the
of the struggle plurinational state economical reforms tion of the state with state amidst an armed
(b) State reforms with that would lead to a armed, and social and social revolution-
change in institutional o democratic political struggle, and after ary movement
legal system system and profound 1990 with the peace
(c) The strengthening changes in the eco- negotiation process
of counter hegemonic nomical system
relations and practices
that eventual produces
changes from above
Dominant concep- Alliances based on iden- Multisectorial Class and multisecto- Class alliances, espe-
tion of alliances tity (women, indigenous alliances rial alliances cially workers and
people) peasants
Sectoral alliances
Alliances based on
common criticism on
capitalism
Sectoral alliances
Principal systemic Accumulation by Agrarian situation Militarized and Military dictatorship
contradictions that dispossession counterinsurgency
lead to popular Structural racism Structural racism Politics and state Repression
protest patriarchy patriarchy
Class exploitation Class exploitation Class exploitation Class exploitation
Agrarian situation Agrarian situation Agrarian situation
Principal response Repression with reiter- Dialogue, negotia- Repression Repression
from state and ated failures of dialogue tion, repression, and
dominant class to reforms in legal and
popular protest institutional aspects
Militarization Militarization Militarization
4. It has led to important encounters, debates,

as determined by national and international
exchange of experiences, solidarity and alli-
law.
ances between the Mayan, Xinka, and mestizo
The actual cycle of popular struggle differs from
people that concur in rejecting these projects.
the previous one in the following aspects in
5. The popular consultations have contributed to Table 23.2.
strengthen the indigenous peoples demand for
autodetermination, and respect of their rights
332 S. V. Yagenova
The Crisis of Democratization and the but without a long-term strategic vision of po-
Return of Authoritarianism litical change. It has to be understood, that after
the civil war the social movements resurged not
The political pacts that led to the democratic only with a profound sense of autonomy but also
transition such as the constitution of 1985 and to with serious doubts about the possibility that the
the signing of the peace accords, have lost their system could be reformed by the result of elec-
strength and support, and there does not exist for tion processes. Despite the differences that exist
the moment a new political platform of national between the different social movements, such
consensus that would allow a redirection of the as their recent history, their organization forms,
country onto a different path. There is a profound identities, socioeconomic extractions, demands
ethical decline in political practices that respond and strategies of struggle, they agree on the ne-
more to the perverse logic of capitalistic relations cessity that there must be a drastic reform in the
(Yagenova 2013). The Guatemalan state seems to state and the political and economic system.
be virtually closed to profound political change. In a context, where the dominant class imposes
No new political spaces for popular participation a model based on accumulation by dispossession,
have been created and the state has shown a grow- when there is a new oligarchic-military alliance
ing incapacity of responding to the demands, and that aspires on returning to an authoritarian re-
aspirations of change that lies within the social gime and obvious regression in the fragile demo-
and democratic forces. The limited institutional cratic process, the protagonist forces of popular
and legal modifications that were implemented protest such as the indigenous people and peasant
in the post-civil war years, were the result of the communities carry the burden of this model and
social movements’ efforts and struggles, but did a new cycle of repression (El Observador 2013a,
not change the historically entrenched power b; Solano 2009). Eight election processes have
structures. passed since the beginning the the democratic
The new generation of Guatemalans born transition (1985), but the result of the last one
under the influence of neoliberalism and edu- (2011) in which the ex-general Otto Perez Mo-
cated in the minimalistic functioning of the lib- lina won the presidency (2012–2015), has meant
eral and representative democracy, have serious the return of active and non-active military per-
difficulties in becoming a renovating political sonnel in the state.
force. Meanwhile, the leftist political parties, The “reinvention” of the internal enemy con-
even though they represent the good intentions tained in the hemispheric security concept pro-
and a critical voice in the system, have not been moted by the USA was introduced in the security
able to direct or constitute themselves into a po- policy of the Guatemalan government, which
litical alternative that attracts mass support. It considers social conflict as one of the principal
could be said that at this point, even though there threats to the state. The defense of national sov-
is a growing inconformity with the functioning of ereignty and territory by the government is based
the political system, especially the parties, there on an absolute defense of private enterprise and
does not seem to be a political force that can for the model of accumulation by dispossession in
the moment capitalize this into a direction of an which the armed forces and their intricate net-
emancipatory horizon. work of collaborators, participate actively de-
Alliances between social movements and po- fending their own economic and political inter-
litical parties have been quiet tense and frustrat- ests (Yagenova 2012b). During the past 2 years
ing. This is a result of different experiences on (2012–2013), there has been a regression in the
the role that the political-electoral strategy holds respect of human rights and a renewed strategy
in the conception of popular struggle today and of repression and criminalization directed against
also due to political errors that were committed those that struggle to defend their territories and
by the parties that wanted to subordinate the so- indigenous peoples’ rights. The rebellion of the
cial movements to their own electoral dynamics, indigenous people that exercise their right to say
Table 23.3 Resistance against mining and hydroelectric projects, 2004–2013
Department Municipality Name of project State Assassination Armed Political Kidnapping Order of Search Violation or sexual
of attacks prisoners capture and aggression against
siege seizures women
23 Guatemalan Social Movements
Huehuetenango Santa Cruz Barillas Hidroeléctrica x x x x x x x x

(2012–2013) Hidro Santa Cruz
Santa Rosa Jalapa San Rafael Las Flores Mina El Escobal x x x x x x x x
(2011–2013) Santa Rosa de Lima,
Nueva Santa Rosa y Casil-
las.(Santa Rosa) Mata-
quescuintla y San Carlos
Alzatate (Jalapa)
San Marcos Sipacapa San Miguel Mina Marlín No x x x x x x x
(2004–2013) Ixtahuacán
Guatemala San José el Golfo y San Mina El Tambor, No x x No No x x No
(2011–2013) Pedro Ayampuc Progreso Derivado
VII
Guatemala San Juan Sacatepéquez Proyecto Minero x x x x x x x x
(2007–2013) Cemento Progreso
Izabal (2007–2012) El Estor Proyecto Minera No x x x No x No x
Félix CGN
x means it has occurred
333
334 S. V. Yagenova
“NO” to the politics of accumulation, confronts ical practices based on reciprocity, solidarity, the
a structure of power, historically constructed, profound compromise with justice and social
that requires for its reproduction the subordina- change, the defense of life, the self-determination
tion and exploitation of the indigenous people. of people, human respect and dignity, ecological
Throughout the history of the country, the domi- sustainability, equality, etc., question profoundly
nant class has systematically applied the use of the logic of the hegemonic system in its distinc-
violence to maintain their power and privileges, tive forms and expression. That these converge
which in the early 1980s reached the extreme into a political emancipatory project that dispute
level of implementing genocide. Table 23.3 pres- the real power of the dominant class is one of the
ents the cases of resistance against mining or major challenges that the struggle actually faces.
hydroelectric projects that are active today and
shows the type of violence that was implemented
by state or private security forces. This violence References
or repression aimed to debilitate the struggle and
resistance. Most of these cases have been de- ASIES. (2010). Estudio de opinión sobre Minería de Met-
ales en Guatemala, julio.
nounced in the international human rights orga- CERD. (2010). Informe referente a Guatemala, CERD/C/
nizations such as the CIDH. GTM/CO/12–13, marzo.
Having a favorable legal and institutional CIDH. (2009) “Derechos de los pueblos indígenas y trib-
frame, the dominant class and its allies perceive ales sobre sus tierras ancestrales y recursos naturales”.
CIDH. (2011). Actualización de las medidas cautelares a
that the popular struggles in defense of the in- favor de 18 comunidades de San Miguel Ixtahuacán y
digenous territories and self-determination that Sipacapa, diciembre 2011.
questions the liberal logic of the power of the Consejo de los Pueblos de Occidente. (2010). El derecho
state to use land and vital natural resources for a la consulta de los pueblos indígenas en Guatemala:
La ruptura entre el discurso y la práctica, Guatemala.
private gain, threaten their power of ongoing en- COPAE. (2005). La consulta comunitaria; la lucha del
richment and the status quo. For this reason, the pueblo maya Sipakapense contra el atropello y la
communities in resistance (indigenous and mesti- imposición, junio.
zo) find themselves in a situation of intense pres- El Observador. (2013a). No. 38/39; Modelo de acumu-
lación y competitividad, Año 7/8; diciembre 2012-
sure (repression-co-optation—struggle for self- Abril 2013.
determination), due to the fact that they have be- El Observador. (2013b). No: 40–41:Industrias extractivas,
come the strategic link for the reproduction of the despojo y destrucción, mayo a septiembre.
hegemonic system or that of emancipation and Solano, L. (2009). La transnacionalización de la indu-
stria extractiva. ElObservador, junio-julio 2009,
liberation. Thus, the actual phase of this cycle of Guatemala.
struggle occurs in a context of a profound dispute Yagenova, S. V. (2010). Los movimientos sociales frente
of territory, and a new round of repression and al Estado, la democracia y los partidos políticos,Tomo
violence that endangers the strengthening of the I. FLACSO, Guatemala.
Yagenova, S. V. (2011). Acumulación y desacumulación
social movements. en el seno de la clase: El actual ciclo de lucha popular
One important aspect is the revitalization of a en Guatemala, noviembre.
profound criticism of neoliberal capital and how Yagenova, S. V. (2012a). La industria extractiva en Gua-
it is related to reproducing patriarchy and struc- temala: políticas públicas, derechos humanos y pro-
cesos de resistencia popular en el período 2003–2011.
tural racism. The resignification of concepts, the FLACSO Guatemala.
critical analysis of social and political praxis, as Yagenova, S. V. (2012b). Guatemala: Configuración del
well as the search of alternatives that transcend un proyecto político autoritario, remilitarización y
the logic of authoritarian versions of liberal and protestas sociales, CLACSO, OSAL, diciembre.
Yagenova, S. V. (2013). Guatemala: 10 Apuntes sobre la
representative democracy, nourish the actual coyuntura, junio.
cycle of popular struggle. The contra-hegemon-
Trends of Social Protest
in Argentina: 1989–2007 24
Sebastián Pereyra, Germán J. Pérez
and Federico L. Schuster
Introduction: The Study of Social dynamics of particular actors and stressed the im-
Protest portance of certain situations or events in the re-
cent history of Argentine movements but without,
This chapter presents the results of empirical re- however, providing a comprehensive and long-
search supported by the notion of social protest as term vision on the presence and impact that politi-
beyond the study of specific organizations or epi- cal protest has had on national politics.
sodes of contention, and extending over a period of This chapter contributes to the social mapping
time long enough to interrogate the transformations and classification of collective actions as a means
of social mobilization in Argentina. The social sci- of demonstrating social demands and their modes
ences have paid much attention to the study of so- of expression. Thus, we conducted a systematic
cial movements and contentious politics in recent survey of protest actions registered by the na-
decades in Argentina—from studies on the human tional press in the period 1989–2007. Our work
rights movement in the transition to democracy has taken the notion of social protest as a unit of
in the 1980s, to current studies on environmental analysis, understood as a contentious public event
struggles and the movements of the unemployed produced by a social actor that involves efforts for
and the 2001 economic crisis.1 This important mobilizing resources (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978;
literature has both focused on the emergence and Tarrow 1997; Almeida 2008). We, therefore, con-
sider a unitary action to be one that derives from
1
Calderón and Jelin 1987; Jelin 1985, 2005; Brysk a unique effort of organization and mobilization
1994; Farinetti 1999; Schuster and Pereyra 2001; Auyero of resources, regardless of the continuation of the
2002; Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 2005; Lobato and Su- action.
riano 2003; Massetti 2004; Delamata 2004, 2006, 2013; Of the existing approaches that center on the
Merklen 2005; Schuster et al. 2005; Svampa 2005, 2008;
notion of a social movement, protest and direct
action have often been pushed into the back-
S. Pereyra ()
ground and have a subsidiary character in the
CONICET—Universidad Nacional de San Martín,
Buenos Aires, Argentina face of the collective identity of the participants
e-mail: sebpereyra@gmail.com or organizational dimensions of these mobiliza-
G. J. Pérez tions. Our focus from the beginning was not to
Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Buenos Aires, focus on identities or organizations but simply re-
Argentina cover the importance of the action dimension of
F. L. Schuster movements and test one type of analysis in which
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
F. L. Schuster Pereyra 2008; Pereyra et al. 2008; Palermo and Reboratti
e-mail: flschuster@gmail.com 2007; Svampa and Antonelli 2009.
336 S. Pereyra et al.
the action becomes independent, to some extent, everyday language identifies the social mobili-
of the social processes that ultimately make it zation process.4 At the same time, this category
possible. In recent years there are similar stud- avoids any reduction of articulation and organi-
ies using quantitative analysis of social mobilization that the different forms of mobilization
zation (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). In general, present. For that reason, we decided to make the
these types of works face an unavoidable tension unit of analysis as each one of the protest actions
when defining the unit of analysis. It can be said registered by the largest nationwide circulating
that there are two extremes when confronting the newspapers.5 The period covered by this study,
methodological decision: at one pole, the unit can 1989–2007, is particularly significant because it
be defined with a thematic approach that would reflects in a systematic way the protest activity
allow the operational handling of the notion of
conflict; the other pole is the one that ideally de- 4 It is worth adding that social protest is not only an ex-
fines the unit of analysis as a means of direct ac- pression used by the print media to organize and present
tion referred to by the sources.2 the stories about what is happening, but also a measure
Therefore, what we consider protest actions, employed by state officials, politicians, and actors in-
as well as a variety of other social actions, acquire volved in organizing the social reality.
5
unity by virtue of the meaning they carry. It is im- Like most research of this kind, the survey took the
national press as the source (newspapers Clarin and La
portant to note that protest actions are conceived Nacion). When they are available, this is usually coupled
and performed primarily with this unit of mean- with police or government files to become the primary
ing3; for this reason, we consider that a protest source to which such studies turn to for studies of large
action does not necessarily coincide with a direct periods of time and national politics (Koopmands and
Rucht 2002).
action even when this happens in the majority of
For this work, we assume that the print media are the
the cases. For example, in the case of a national most convenient source available to record the history of
strike, although we analytically find a multiplic- social mobilization. This first finding implies that com-
ity of specific direct measures (number of strikes munication on a national scale is primarily conveyed by
by area of activity, by public sector, company, the print media even when they tend to simplify the com-
plexity of information in relation to the information other
province, location, etc…), as long as all of these specialized audiences receive, and second, like any other
measures were coordinated and carried forward economic and political player, it represents interests that
with a sense of unity; for our purposes they rep- skew the issues and the coverage of political events. How-
resent one sole action of protest. ever, this type of approach allowed us to meet our two
main objectives: analyze globally the forms of manifesta-
This chapter seeks to contribute with an tion of collective action in national politics and focus on
analysis of the manner in which certain politi- the long-term analysis.
cal events become inscribed in national politics. As shown by other studies (Koopmans and Rucht 2002),
Its relevance and importance should be thought, controlling the bias of the sources (by contrasting surveys
with other sources) only allows us to better analyze the
then, not as an analysis of the organizations and information gathered but in no case they represent a more
movements that make up the universe of social faithful approach to the object. A survey, for example,
mobilization in the country but as an analysis of performed in a local or provincial newspaper in the same
the public record of the activities of such organi- period of our database will surely indicate protests that a
number of national newspapers did not cover. That means
zations and movements. In this sense, the notion that national newspapers do not consider all of the pro-
of social protest is conceptually productive and tests taking place in different local contexts. However,
at the same time coincides with the way in which it can not be argued that this new source is necessarily
more exhaustive but simply has a different bias (Koop-
mans and Rucht 2002, pp. 238–239). Any research of this
2 kind presupposes that one works not on the universe of
We refer to the research focused towards an analysis of the protests or demonstrations, but on those that were re-
the actions of protest, but several statistical works on po- corded by certain sources. Of course, the multiplication
litical dispute oriented by the most diverse objects exist of sources allows us to move in the direction of a broader
(Koopmans and Rucht 2002, pp. 235–237). universe of a practically infinite nature and, as in all re-
3 The unity criterion refers to the elements that allow it
search, it should be clear how and at what cost to keep
to answer the who, how, for what, and why questions of adding information.
an action.
24 Trends of Social Protest in Argentina: 1989–2007 337
in the past two decades of the country that have a process of political representation based on
been simultaneously framed by the stability of ideological cleavages and programmatic propos-
democratic institutions, as well as the unrests, als. In this regard, it is legitimate to ask for the
transformations, and fluctuations of the socio- impact these types of structural transformations
economic order. had on the constitution of the subjects of the pro-
In the context of a country that emerged from tests. In this sense, the period considered seems
a hyperinflationary crisis in 1989, a profound to be marked by a process of fragmentation of
transformation occurred in the relationship be- social protest in relationship to the actors and the
tween the state and the market. As a result of demands of the protest. As we shall see, the gen-
an accelerated deregulation of the economy and eral scenario that opens up at the beginning of the
the process of dismantling the Argentine wel- 1990s is none other than a crisis and transforma-
fare state, the trade unions notoriously lost—at tion of the labor union repertoire of confrontation
least in their traditional form—the ability to par- that characterized Argentinean politics at least
ticipate in the determination of public policies, since the 1930s. With our attention directed to
while the power of business corporations linked social protest, a decline and transformation into
to transnational capital increased in order to in- an irregular but steady process of multiplication
fluence the course of a social regime of accu- and diversification of actors, demands, and forms
mulation (Robinson 2008) marked by a strongly of social protest can be observed.
regressive income distribution and a notable de- For the analysis and presentation of the data
terioration in the labor market. The decade of the we have divided this work into two main parts.
1990s carried the banner of neoliberalism, and it In the first part, we concentrate on the analysis of
involved a process that could certainly be called the 1990s up to the 2001 crisis. To understand the
an “exclusive modernization” (Svampa 2005). impact that the transformations of the structural
These political–economic and cultural con- reforms and the political changes in the social
figurations oriented by pro-market policies col- mobilization scenario had, we explore in detail
lapsed, and they were altered by the crisis of the map of social protest and its main trends.
2001–2002. The type of economic political reori- Next, we evaluate whether the changes that oc-
entation that accompanied the end of the crisis curred during and after the crisis of 2001–2002
was the creation of the Kirchner coalition that altered the traits and the main trends described in
governed the country from 2003 to the present. the earlier period.
Even without achieving a significant variation of
some structural features in terms of production
and the socioeconomic aspects of the country, Main Aspects of Protest Activity
Kirchnerism has boosted a renovated spirit rela- during the 1990s: From Hyperinflation
tive to the 1990s, revitalizing the role of the state to the 2001 Crisis
in the economy and a series of policies aimed at
encouraging the development of the domestic Strong economic and political crises faced by
market, the maintenance of employment levels, Argentina in the years following the democratic
wage increases in the formal sector of the econ- transition depict inescapable circumstances when
omy, and a more universalistic and active social considering the social mobilization processes in
policy. the country. In this sense, both the hyperinfla-
The situation of political–economic reorienta- tionary crisis that lasted from 1989 to 1990, as
tion combined during these years with a politi- well as the one that erupted in 2001 and 2002,
cal system dominated by a strong personalization represents turning points in the political and
process of representation that allowed the gov- economic fluctuations that followed, and are
ernments to concentrate resources for decision- essential when thinking about the mobilization
making, but at the same time, it limited the pos- processes. The decade of the 1990s was marked
sibilities of the party subsystem to put together by strong political and economic transformations
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Fig. 24.1 Number of protests 1989–2003. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEP-
SAC))
between crises. In economic terms, the mandate throughout the decade that is linked less to the
to stabilize and fight against inflation produced classic mobilization actors in the country (politi-
a neoliberal economic program that transformed cal parties and national trade unions) and more to
the country’s productive structure and changed the expression of conflicts, demands of a differ-
the role the state had played in regulating the ent order, and a multiplication of the repertoires
economy and in the provision of services (Cortés of confrontation. The figure provides protest data
and Marshall 1999). Politically, those years in- about the period (Fig. 24.1).
volved a modification of the cleavages and party The total number of registered protests in
traditions that had emerged in the second half of the period 1989–20037 is 5268, and the average
the twentieth century and were still fundamental number of protests per year is 376. Most protests
in the early years of the transition to democracy were concentrated in 1997, with 17 % more than
(Acuña 1995). As a corollary to these transforma- in 1989, the initial year of the period. From 1998
tions, the Argentina of the 1990s was analyzed onwards, the protests per year are below the aver-
by the social sciences under the sign of apathy, age for the period. The distribution of total pro-
demobilization, depoliticization, and delegation tests per quarter reveals two cycles of protests.8
(O’Donnell 1997).
However, the first look at the retraction of the 7
Whenever we refer to the period 1989–2003, it should
social mobilization processes—in comparison to
be considered that our survey covers only until May 25 of
the high participation scenario that characterized 2003. For the same reason, most data line charts only go
the end of the dictatorship and the democratic up to 2002. Following this section, we include data from
opening—contrast with important events that the period after comparing both the previous and the post
2012 crisis period.
were happening throughout the decade, actions
8 With the concept of “cycle of protest,” Tarrow refers
of high intensity and of a strong episodic na-
to “a phase of increased conflict and confrontation in the
ture.6 Thus, the image of the retraction contrasts social system which includes a fast dissemination of the
with a steady process of collective mobilization collective action from the most mobilized sectors to the
less mobilized; an accelerated innovation rate in the forms
of confrontation; new or rebuilt frameworks for collec-
6 tive action; a combination of organized and unorganized
Marina Farinetti (2002) analyzed these events in terms
of social unrest, linking the protests and political crisis participation; and sequences of intensified interaction be-
that erupted in several provinces from 1993 onwards and tween dissidents and authorities that can end in reform,
that have some striking similarities with mobilization pro- repression and sometimes, in a revolution ” (Tarrow 1997,
cesses characteristic of the 2001–2002 crisis. pp. 263–264).
The first begins in the fourth quarter of 1993, businesspeople, and traders. The most prominent
reaching its peak a year later and then falls sys- conflicts took place in the provinces of Neuquén,
tematically until the third quarter of 1996. The Salta, and Córdoba, eventuating in the develop-
second cycle begins in the fourth quarter of 1996, ment of the piquetero movement in the country
reaches its peak in the second quarter of 1997 and (Svampa and Pereyra 2003).
then begins to decline, reaching its lowest point The data collected show that political crises
in the fourth quarter of 1999. If the first cycle are not necessarily produced as a result of an in-
reveals a gradual escalation of the conflicts over crease in the number of protests. In other words,
a year (1994), the second one, however, shows the amount, or scale of the protests is not directly
a significantly greater escalation. When compar- related to their political impact. Indeed, the year
ing the number of protests in the fourth quarter 1997 registered 56 % more protests than the year
of 1996 with the number in the second quarter 2001; however, the consequences of the earlier
of 1997 (the highest point of the cycle), it can ones were significantly less than the latter ones.
be seen that in 6 months, the number of protests Considering the entire period, 2001 is one of the 3
increased by 328 %. This increment comes in the years with fewer protests. Even during that year,
context of a major transformation in the structure there were more protests in the second quarter
of political opportunities nationwide. On the one than in the fourth, when the Fernando de la Rúa
hand, during that year the first electoral defeat government ended abruptly. However, the politi-
of the Menem government in the parliamentary cal impact of the protests of 2001 in general, and
elections occurred at the hands of an opposition the last quarter in particular, was remarkable.
coalition called ALIANZA (ALLIANCE)9 and, For the differentiation of different political
on the other, there are a series of high-impact periods, we consider the presidential terms be-
conflicts led by multisectoral groups that in- tween 1989 and May 2003. Figure 24.2 shows
clude, the unemployed, public workers, small the distribution of social protest on this basis.
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SAC))
9 Frepaso and UCR Coalition.

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Fig. 24.3 Type of organization. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y accincordance is that the
The largest proportion of protests is distributed p rotested more than any other organization. Of
in the two terms of Carlos Menem (42 and 32 %, all the protests registered in the period analyzed,
respectively). The average number of protests the unions organized nearly half of the mobiliza-
in each presidential term shows that there were tions. In the second place, we find the protests
more protests per month during the Menem gov- produced by organizations grouped under the
ernments than in the governments of De la Rúa name “civil society,”10 with 35 % of the total.
and Eduardo Duhalde. On the other hand, we dis- Other types of organizations reach values below
tinguish a number of economic periods. We call 7 %. This applies, for example, to the proportion
the first one “hyperinflation” period, and it covers of protests called by organizations of piquet-
the years 1989, 1990, and 1991; the second is the eros11: from the total of the protests of the period,
period from 1992 to 1995, characterized by the these organizations participated in only 6 % of
establishment of the Convertibility Law and im- the cases, the same proportion that corresponds
provement of the macroeconomic indicators; the to the protests conducted by business organiza-
third period covers the years following the tequila tions. Again, the difference between the number
effect, from 1996 to 1999; and finally, from 2000 of protests and their political impact should be
to May 2003, the last period includes the years noted. Although between 1989 and May 2003
in which the predominant financial crisis occurs. there was a similar magnitude of protests called
If the economic periods are taken into ac- by the organizations of piqueteros, as well as
count, we do not see considerable modifications business and political parties organizations, the
in the distribution of the number of protests. This political impact of the first has been clearly su-
means that although many protests have econom- perior, especially in the second half of the period
ic demands, as we shall see below, there is no (Fig. 24.4).
direct relationship between economic crisis and Collective demands are a central element of
the number of protests. The consequence of this social protest. What were the main demands?
lack of concordance is that the economic period
with the greater percentage of protests is also the
10 About the type of organization included in this catego-
one that shows a steady economic growth (1992–
ry, see Fig. 24.9 below.
1995).
11 To code the organization of a protest as piquetera, we
What types of organizations were the protago-
identify it by its distinctive acronyms (e.g. BAT, FTV,
nists of the social protests? Figure 24.3 shows etc.), or by the simple denomination piqueteros, “unem-
that between 1989 and May 2003, the unions ployed,” and “former workers.”
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Fig. 24.4 Grouped protest demands. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEPSAC))
When analyzing the demands of all the protests The visibility—the public character—of the
of the entire period, it shows that one in four was collective action is a necessary condition in order
a wage demand. If to this we add the work related to define it as a social protest. The “form” is the
demands, the result is a 37 % of all claims in the analytical dimension that precisely refers to the
period that were typical of employed workers. way the collective action gets recorded in the
The demands for work and direct social assis- public sphere (Schuster and Pereyra 2001). In
tance account for only 5 % of the total between other words, this dimension refers to the stag-
1989 and May 2003. After claims over salaries, ing of protests. In the study period, the most fre-
the economic demands12 (18 %) were the most quently used format is the demonstration: 45 % of
important. Social security demands followed,13 the protests used this format. On the other hand,
with an almost equal proportion of human rights almost one in four protests resorted to strikes
claims and administration of justice. Finally, the (24 %), the second in terms of importance. Com-
protests with demands for safety, environment or paring the proportion of demonstrations with the
consumer related matters do not exceed, in any strikes, it can be inferred that in this period the
case, 2 % of the total14 (Fig. 24.5). protest was gradually transforming, giving more
importance to the building of civic demands
12 What we call economic demands group two types of
in the public space rather than the distributive
claims: some refer to the national government’s economic struggle associated with more traditional labor-
policy (economic model) and others more specific sec- oriented strategies.
toral demands (e.g., tariff or tax policy for any economic On the other hand, it is remarkable the way
sector). in which a new a protest form emerges and how
13
The type of social security demand (15 %) includes the it reached a fundamental importance in the sec-
categories educational policy (7 %), and operation of the
educational system (3 %), health policy (1 %), and health ond half of the 1990s. Indeed, considering that
system performance (1 %), and claims of social security the roadblock consolidated as a protest form dur-
(3 %). ing the second half of the period, the overall inci-
14 This percentage, in the case of demands for security, dence is relatively high (10 %).
also accounts for the complexity of the relationship be-
tween number of protests and political impact. While this
issue formed a central part of the public agenda at various their impact in terms of the demands associated with the
points of the period, including significant legal reforms, protests is irrelevant.
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Fig. 24.5 Forms of the protest. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acciment or consumer relat
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Fig. 24.6 Protest evolution according to type of organization. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción
colectiva (GEPSAC))
Figure 24.6 shows the trend of union and nizations reach the first peak of growth in 1997,
civil organizations throughout the period. While and 2 years later, began a steady progress reach-
the civic organizations grew steadily until 1998 ing 23 % of the protests by 2002. The growth in
(51 %), in that same year labor unions reached the number of such protests is strongly linked
their lowest point (26 %). This trend reveals a to the organization of the unemployed workers.
major transformation of the actors of the protest Thus, while in 1997, five out of ten of the protests
because what we include under the term “civil encompassed in the “piqueteros/unemployed”
organizations,” represents a relatively heteroge- stand for “non-organized unemployed,” in 2001,
neous set of actors. Meanwhile, the social pro- the rate dropped to 40 %, and in 2002, to 23 %.
tests led by the piqueteros and unemployed orga- In 2002, the organizations of piqueteros protested
in a similar proportion to that year’s protests of of four), and both are below the level of protest
the “classic actor” (i.e., the unions). The political carried out by civil organizations (37 %). If we
party protest was low throughout the period and compare the distribution of union protests ac-
corporate protest was concentrated in 1994 and cording to political periods with the distribution
1999, respectively. Political parties participated by economic periods, we can conclude that the
in social protests in a relatively stable propor- activity of the trade unions protest is related more
tion between 1989 and 2003. Even in 1998 and to political than to economic situations. At least,
1999, political parties and business organizations these findings hold when we compare the union
participated in more protests than the organiza- protest activity in the period 1992–1995 to the
tions of piqueteros.15 The business protests grew period 2000–2003.
steadily from 1996 to eventually start a down- The data in Fig. 24.7 show that the union
ward trend after 1999. sectors that promoted the greatest number of
Labor union protest prevailed throughout the protests in the 1990s were the education unions
entire period. Only in the years 1996, 1998, and (34 %), public administration bodies (22 %), and
2002, there was another type of organization that other services (23 %),16 while the protests of the
participated in more social protests than labor industrial sector did not exceed 8 %. Also, from
unions. However, between 1989 and 2003, union the total of all protests involving unions, 8 %
protest decreased in absolute and relative terms. correspond to protests articulated by a workers’
If we consider the range of union protests, we confederation Confederación General del Tra-
note that, in 1989, the unions held 74 % of the bajo (CGT), Central de Trabajadores Argentinos
protests while in 1998 and 2002, they produced (CTA), Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos
only 26 %. Still worth noting is that even in the (MTA). The activity of the central unions protest
years of lower union protest activity, a union had shows a systematic growth from one economic
participated in one out of four protests. period to another. While in the period 1989–1991
During the last semester of Alfonsín (Janu- they make up 2.5 % of protests, during the fi-
ary–July 1989), the unions participated in seven nancial crisis that proportion grew to 19.2 %.
out ten protests. This proportion was reduced to Although important throughout the period, the
half during the second term of Menem (36 %). protests of the educational unions were particu-
The difference between the two periods resulted larly prevalent between 1989 and 1993, the years
in a relative increase in protests with the par- in which the Federal Education Law was enact-
ticipation of civil organizations that grew from ed.17 Between 1993 and 1996, and then follow-
a modest 13 % during the last semester of the ing the intensification of society-wide conflicts
Alfonsín government to a significant 40 % of the in 1997, protest activity of the education unions
protests during Menem’s second term. The De la gradually decreased. The public sector began a
Rúa government (1999–2001) brought no signifi- series of protests in 1992 that ended in 1998. The
cant variation of the union involvement in social highest point of this cycle is 1995, when 44 %
protests. By contrast, the strong emergence of of the union protests were driven by this sector
the piquetero protests (which increases from 3 to (Fig. 24.8).
16 %) resulted in an almost equivalent reduction Altogether, the data show a sharp contrast be-
of the “civil protest” (which decreases from 40 to tween the trajectory of the protests produced by
26 %). During the political period of the Duhalde
government, the proportion of the union protest
16
The service sector includes, among others, public and
is equivalent to the protest of the piqueteros (one
private services. Thus, it encompasses public administra-
tion and teachers. For this survey, we have distinguished
15 In most cases, the category of “business organiza- the protests of the public service unions and education,
tions,” accounts for protest activity of small and medium since the union action of such branches has been certainly
associations rather than the action of large business or- superior to that of other unions within this sector.
ganizations such as the UIA or the SRA. Also, as noted 17 The Federal Education Law changed the allocation of
above, until 1998 the category “unemployed/piqueteros” resources and decisively influenced the wage and educa-
mainly includes unemployed unorganized sectors. tion policies.
7RWDOUHFRUGVQ
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Fig. 24.7 Sector of activity. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEPSAC))

(GXFDWLRQ 3XEOLF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ,QGXVWU\ 6HUYLFHV

7RWDORIXQLyQSURWHVWVQ
Fig. 24.8 Evolution of the protest by sector of activity. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción
colectiva (GEPSAC))
education unions, public administration, other was connected to the political affinity between
services, and the one followed by the industrial labor organizations and the national government,
sector. The industrial sector not only maintained while other sectors (directly affected by market
almost from the beginning of the 1990s a smaller reforms) maintained and even increased their
proportion of protests than other sectors but also, levels of mobilization.
since 1994, the proportion of protests in which In Fig. 24.9 we noted that throughout the
it participated started to decrease. The records of period, the protests carried out by “civil organi-
the union protest in each area of activity seem to zations” were rising steadily until 1998. As we
be linked with the impact of wider scope econom- said, the group of civil organizations is a hetero-
ic transformations. At the same time, these data geneous one. The dominant organizations within
show that while a section of the unions continued this grouping—in terms of their participation in
to mobilize during the 1990s, a constant demo- social protests—are those of the neighbors and/or
bilization process occurred. The demobilization
08/7,3/(9$5,$%/(
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Fig. 24.9 Type of civil organizations. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEPSAC))
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Fig. 24.10 Evolution of the protest of the civil organizations. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción
colectiva (GEPSAC))
residents (28 %),18 students (20 %), followed by protests by neighbors and/or residents were sig-
human rights organizations (11 %), and relatives nificant, albeit with varying intensity throughout
of victims (9 %).19 Figure 24.10 shows how the the entire period: in proportional terms, the year
18 The category includes those groups in which the sourc-

bilization. In the 1990s, the most frequent cases have been
es appeared as residents, neighbors, inhabitants, etc. the family members of victims of police violence, but
19 This category refers to a set of different types of cases there are some cases involving the most diverse situations
in which relatives of a victim or a group of victims make (common crimes, addictions, traffic accidents, etc…).
up the main spokespersons in the processes of social mo- See, in this regard, the work of Maria Victoria Pita (2010).
08/7,3/(9$5,$%/(
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Fig. 24.11 Evolution of the main demands. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GE-
PSAC))
1990 and the period of 1992–1994 are highlight- protests with primarily salary-related demands.20
ed, as well as their systematic growth since 1999. More than half of the social protests in the first
Indeed, it is the only type of civil organization quarter of 1989 had wage demands, even though
that intensified its protest activity since 2001; salary claims decreased gradually. They increased
all of the others show a smaller proportion. The once again briefly in 1995. However, in 2002
retired workers organizations show a downward they did not reach 10 %. The decline in the pro-
trend that began after 1991 until almost disap- tests with salary demands follows a curve similar
pearing 10 years later. to the protests involving the unions. However,
Student organizations, however, followed a this does not happen with the other typical union
more sporadic logic, with periods of strong so- claims—labor condition demands that remained
cial protest activity (1992, 1995, and 2001), fol- much more stable over the whole period.21
lowed by years of moderate activity (1993–1994, Second, from 1998 onwards, the social pro-
1996, and 1998–2000). All the same, the student tests with economic demands acquire more rele-
movement has mobilized more than any other vance as the more general claims are linked to the
type of civil organization. It is true in that sense challenge of the entire economic model; at the
that these protests have been associated during same time, other demands related to economic is-
the above mentioned period with the claims of sues representing more specific claims decrease
the education and teachers’ unions. The human (such as salary or labor demands). Towards the
rights organizations and the victims’ relatives fol- end of the period, the demands for direct social
low a similar curve: the human rights organiza- assistance and labor—almost nonexistent during
tions begin a cycle of protest that starts in 1992, the first half of the period—reached the first peak
has its strongest years in 1996 and 1998, and then
declines through 2002. A similar pattern occurs
with the families of victim’s organizations with a 20 Regarding wage demands (26 %), requests for wage
cycle that begins in 1996 (Fig. 24.11). increases reached 14 %, claims for payments due by 10 %
and other wage demands by 2 %.
The evolution of the types of demands over
21 Regarding labor demands (11 %), claims for main-
time allows us to see a set of important trans-
tenance of jobs reached 7 %, compliance of collective
formations. First, we observe a decline in social agreements by 2 %, and for better working conditions by
1 %, as well as other labor demands.
Table 24.1 Demands by type of organization. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva
(GEPSAC))
81,21 &,9,/ 3,48(7(5$ 3$57,6$1

6$/$5<
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27+(56
in 1997 and grew steadily after 1998 to become, refers to the type of formulation of the demands:
along with the economic claims, one of the main in the first economic period, there are “micro”
types of demands.22 This evolution also high- demands, while in the second we find “macro”
lights the importance of protests with demands demands associated with the questioning and
for human rights and justice23 during Menem’s challenging of the neoliberal model.
second term (19 %). By comparing the most For example, if we consider the difference
important types of demands in the two periods between protests with sector-based economic
of crisis framed by convertibility (1989–1991) demands with protests with economic policy de-
and (2000–2003), we can observe two general mands, we find that in the crisis of the hyperinfla-
transformations in social protest. The first one is tionary period, 3 % are of the first type and 9 % of
related to the heterogeneity of the demands: in the latter, while during the financial crisis period,
the period of “hyperinflationary crisis” only two the first type account for 4 % of the total claims,
types of demands concentrate 58 % of the total and the latter 23 %.
(wage and labor), while in the period of “finan- The relationship between organization and de-
cial crisis” the two most important demands only mands is a predictable one (e.g., trade unions were
add up to 37 % (economic demands and social the ones maintaining most of the wage (85 %)
assistance and labor). The second transformation and labor condition demands (76 %)). Even so, as
Table 24.1 shows, during the period of analysis,
22 leading protest organizations have a relatively
In respect with such demands, 3 % were claims for di-
rect social assistance, and 2 % for jobs positions. wide variety of demands. It is worth noting, for
23 Although these demands have many similarities, they example, that 40 % of the demands of piquetero
were coded separately. Human rights claims are those organizations are not those that can be linked
which relate specifically to discussions of state terrorism directly with their claims. In this sense, it may
and military dictatorship, while what we call “administra- be noted that beyond the d ominance of demands
tion of justice” are those that relate to the functioning of
the judicial system, excluding those claims included in the for direct assistance (57 %), the piqueteros
human rights category. participated in typically union demands (10 %),
Table 24.2 Type of organization by demand of the protest. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción
colectiva (GEPSAC))
(03/2,(0(
62&,$/ +5,*+76 /$%25
6$/$5< (&2120,&6 32/,7,&6 17 62&
6(& -867,&( &21',7,216
$66,7

81,21
&,9,/
%86,1(66
3$57,6$1
3,48(7(5$
27+(56
1'
727$/
Table 24.3 Type of format by demand of the protest. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colec-
tiva (GEPSAC))
(03/2,(0(
62&,$/ +5,*+76 /$%25
6$/$5< (&2120,&6 32/,7,&6 17 62&
6(& -867,&( &21',7,216
$66,7

'(021675$7,21
675,.(
52$'%/2&.
2&&83$7,21
27+(56
1'
727$/
while the unions only participated in demands of Protest forms that are characteristic of labor
the piqueteros 2 % of the time. If we continue to union protests, such as strikes, have significantly
explore the types of claims held by the organi- declined in their relevance from the beginning to
zations of piqueteros, we also find a significant the end of the 1990s.24 Conversely, the roadblock
participation of the piqueteros in challenging the form that had a significantly meager importance
legitimacy of the social regime of accumulation at the beginning of the period systematically
and the political regime of the government (al- grew to become one of the main forms in the
most 30 %) (Table 24.2). early years of the new century (Silva 2009). As
Finally, we analyze the evolution of protest shown in Fig. 24.12, in 1997, and from 1999 on,
forms during the 1990s. The demonstration our sources record more roadblocks than work
is the form of social protest most frequently stoppages. This is one of the most interesting
used by Argentine citizens. While at the be- general transformations of the period. As an ex-
ginning of the period, demonstrations repre- ample, while in 1992 there was a roadblock for
sent a smaller percentage of protest forms than every seven strikes, in 2001, towards the end of
strikes, from 1992 onwards, street marches rep-
resent the predominant form of mobilization.
In that year, while strikes represented 26 % of 24 Interestingly, this drop does not respond to fluctuations
protest forms, the marches already make up in the wage demand that shows an increase in 1994 and
34 % (Table 24.3). 1995.
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'HPRQVWUDWLRQ 6WULNH 5RDGEORFN 2FFXSDWLRQ

%DVH7RWDOGHSURWHVWDVQ
Fig. 24.12 Evolution of the main protest forms. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva
(GEPSAC))
the period, there was twice the number of road- tion of cacerolazos is identical to work stoppages
blocks than that of work strikes. and labor strikes.
On the other hand, when comparing the dem- Table 24.4 shows, in principle, that the dem-
onstration form with that of the roadblocks, it is onstrations were mainly produced by civil orga-
observed that their unfolding has been the op- nizations (40 %) and trade unions (34 %). Even
posite since 1997. From that year until 2001, though other organizations also resorted to this
roadblocks increased while street marches de- form, the proportions do not in any case exceed
creased to almost represent similar proportions. 10 %. On the other hand, we observe that the re-
At the same time, in 2001, protest forms tended lationship between protest form and type of or-
to concentrate on these two types, as six out of ganization is more complex than it might be pre-
ten protests resorted to roadblocks or marches. A dicted. Forty-nine percent of the roadblocks were
first reading indicates a decrease in demonstra- not made by organizations of piqueteros but by
tions between the second government of Carlos trade unions and/or civil organizations.
Menem and the government of Fernando de la Interestingly, the business type of organization
Rúa, which is practically simultaneous with the performed 9 % of the roadblocks. However, we
growth of the roadblocks (roads and streets). must consider that this category is relatively het-
Moreover, we note that the “other” category erogeneous and includes not only large employer
maintains an important proportion during all associations but also small-scale producer’s or-
presidencies. For this reason, it was decided to ganizations. Indeed, 60 % of the roadblocks car-
disaggregate this heterogeneous category of pro- ried out by business organizations correspond to
test forms. We observe therefore that the com- rural and agricultural organizations. With regard
position in all periods is more or less stable and to the type of demand by form, Table 24.5 shows
similar, except during the Duhalde government that a third of the strikes have not been produced
in which the pot-banging protests or cacerolazos by typically union demands. In terms of street
(12 %) and public denunciations or escraches marches, demands sustained by demonstrations
(5 %) show a considerably higher percentage of have been linked to the economic issues (19 %),
protests than the rest. In this period the propor- human rights and justice administration (18 %),
social security (14 %), and salary claims (13 %).
Table 24.4 Type of organization by format of the protest. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción
colectiva (GEPSAC))
0$5&+$ 3$52+8(/*$ &257( 720$

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Table 24.5 Type of demands by form of the protest. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colec-
tiva (GEPSAC))
'(021675$7,21 675,.( 52$'%/2&. 2&&83$7,21

6$/$5<
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727$/
On the other hand, from all of the roadblocks, roadblocks as a form of protest. So far we have
only a quarter made the demand for direct social referred to the forms of protest that have per-
assistance and employment, a demand typically centages above 5 %. It is important to consider
considered as a piquetero claim. Almost the same as well those that were not relevant in statistical
proportion of roadblocks sustained economic or terms but have called the attention of the public.
political claims of a general character and even Among them are the following: cacerolazo, riot,
20 % have been for wage and labor claims. On hunger strike (each one reveals a proportion of
the other hand, we could say that the roadblock is 2 %), escrache, sitting, artistic performance, and
closer to the strike than the street march in regard human chain (with 1 %, respectively). If we add
to its modular nature. This form, used by differ- these repertoires into the “others” category along
ent types of organizations, allows challengers to with, telephone outages, cyber protest, tent cit-
express a heterogeneous set of demands, which ies, public denunciation, state of alert, garbage
in turns, refers to the modular character of the protest or basurazo, petition delivery, lock out,
camping, popular soup kitchen, whistling, boy- and state intervention can be seen from the year
cott and assembly, it follows that those who have 2003 onwards, which in turn inaugurates a cycle
used these types of protest forms the most have of economic growth that indicates an exit from
been civil (23 %) and party organizations (18 %). the 2001 crisis. In institutional terms, the first
As we noted, the diversification of organiza- presidency of Nestor Kirchner meant the consoli-
tions and the demands and forms of protest, pro- dation of the process of ending the crisis. We can
vide the key novel elements of the period extend- therefore analyze what effects were produced by
ing between the two great crises of the democratic the prior crisis and the new period of economic
transition in Argentina. In this context, focusing normalization on the forms and levels of public
on protest actions allows us to understand both protests. To this end, we decided to temporar-
the process of disaggregation as well as some ily group the protests into three distinct subpe-
mechanisms of accumulation and modularity that riods. The first corresponds to the precrisis and
have put into perspective (although they do not ranges from 1997 to late 2000. The second, the
cover nor exhaust all of the traits and characteris- crisis itself, involves the years of major politi-
tics) the crisis of 2001–2002 and the period that cal–institutional upheaval and economic instabil-
opens up after the crisis. ity (2001–2002), and the third period, is marked
by the reorganization already mentioned above
(2003–2007). Indeed, the essential issue turns out
Social Protest After the 2001 Crisis to be that the institutional restructuring after the
crisis did not imply a decrease in protests but, on
Most studies of social mobilization in Argen- the contrary, 2005 reveals the highest peak in the
tina agree in pointing out that the crisis of 2001 number of protests throughout the entire period
changed some of the major trends in political from 1989 to 2006 (Fig. 24.13).
and economic matters that had characterized the The average number of protests per year grew
country in the 1990s. In this sense, the crisis in- from 374 in the precrisis period to 519 in the
volved intense questioning of trends of socioeco- postcrisis period. The notably marked increase in
nomic exclusion and policy delegation (Svampa the number of protests is until the legislative elec-
2008). A restructuring of presidential authority tions of 2005 when the new coalition government
727$/2)
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Fig. 24.13 Number of protests per year, 1989–2006. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colec-
tiva (GEPSAC))
3HUFHQWDJHV

8QLRQ %XVLQHVV 3DUWLVDQ 3LTXHWHUD &LYLO

Fig. 24.14 Evolution of protest by type of organization. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción
colectiva (GEPSAC))
manages to prevail and control the territorial public problems, and finally, the configuration of
structure of the Peronist Party. The victory oc- new environmental claims linked to the exploita-
curs in the context of progressive fragmentation tion of natural resources (Fig. 24.14).
of the political expression of the opposition to Looking at the evolution of protest by type of
the government, both political–electoral as well organization analysis, a significant decrease in
as those from the collective actors who had par- the participation of organizations of piqueteros in
ticipated in the mobilizations without joining collective action since 2005 is noticeable at first.
the government. The progressive restructuring Beyond the electoral consolidation of the Frente
of the economy and the political normalization para la Victoria (Kirchner’s electoral coalition
achieved after the 2003 elections started to close comprising the PJ in nationwide elections in Oc-
down the intense mobilization cycle that charac- tober 23 of that year), the retraction of the mobi-
terized the 2001–2002 crisis First, with the rapid lization of the piqueteros can be explained by a
demobilization of the middle sectors and, later, successful government strategy—the integration
from a political realignment caused by Kirch- of the organizations by ideological affinity and
ner policies that generated popular support and access to public office on one hand, and on the
that progressively integrated many of the leaders other, the idea of a “normalization” of the con-
and the bases of the piquetero movements25 (see flict that, in conditions of employment growth
Chap. 9 in this volume), leading to an overall de- and recovery of state capacities, would gradually
cline in mass mobilization activities. lead piqueteros to abandon direct action and re-
In this context, from 2004 onwards, the sce- sort to more institutional channels (Pereyra et al.
nario of social mobilization began to transform 2008) (Fig. 24.15).
and reorganize significantly into three crucial The end of convertibility in 2002, along with
areas. On one hand, the resurgence of labor un- the economic growth and the increase of the
rest, on the other, the strong presence of civil inflation rate, recreated some of the conditions
actors linked to the claims of the great national under which union action returned to play an
important role. Recent years have been marked
by the return of claims focused on the wage
25 For a reconstruction of this process in terms of co-opta- and sectoral demands, basic aspects of the dis-
tion, see Svampa 2008. Another perspective to understand
the changes in terms of institutionalization can be found tributive struggle. The bulk of the wage nego-
in Pereyra et al. 2008. tiation was channeled through the institutional
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Fig. 24.15 Type of organization by period. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GE-
PSAC))
mechanisms of the CGT. In this regard, the Cen- had led him to the government, but also between
tral leadership, at present, maintains a dual strat- different types of mobilized social organizations,
egy that combines both the elite negotiating with those sectors with organizations under the CTA
the government and the support for new forms of umbrella.
conflict generated in the most precarious areas of However, there are other conflicts that escape
the working world. At the same time, it should be the union leadership’s decisions. Usually, the in-
noted that some systematic conflicts still remain ternal committees of the unions have powered
in the public sector, in health and education, that these conflicts. This is the case with the subway,
is, in spheres where the union movement devel- hospital, and telephone workers, all of which
oped. have shown a considerable mobilization capacity
In this regard, it is necessary to consider that as a condition for union negotiations. After many
the political positioning of the CTA had a num- years of absence of labor disputes, these claims
ber of problems that deepened after the crisis. that often lead to strikes in strategic public sec-
The strategy adopted by the central’s leadership tors—such as the utility companies—represent-
forgted the Political, Social and Cultural Move- ing a legitimacy test that these forms of mobiliza-
ment in December 2002. They fostered an un- tion have under a very different context from the
derstanding not only of the opportunities and former heyday of the neoliberal policies period.
risks triggered by the 2001 crisis -opportunities On the other hand, the intensification of the wage
to transform the country’s political leadership claim by the unions is also accompanied by a con-
and economic guidance- but also risks of politi- solidation of grassroots activism as well as ideo-
cal fragmentation. Nevertheless, the launching of logical diversification in the leadership. In this
the movement was, in that context, an attempt to sense, the emergence of a new leadership from
take a leap into the electoral game overshadowed the Left has promoted debates on trade union plu-
by the consolidation of Kirchnerism in 2003. The ralism and democratization (Table. 24.6).
CTA found difficulties in positioning itself with Contrary to the upward trend in the participa-
the leadership of Néstor Kirchner. In this case, tion of the trade unions in the conflict and the
the new president garnered significant success retraction of the participation of the piqueteros in
in rallying support not only within the PJ, which the precrisis period, civil organizations maintain
Table 24.6 Civil organizations by period. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva
(GEPSAC))
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a markedly higher level of participation in both relationship between the political regime of the
periods. However, in the postcrisis period there government and a mobilized society.
is a marked increase in the participation of three The changing demands coincide with the
types of civil organizations with respect to the transformation of the economic–political sce-
precrisis period. Human rights organizations nario. Between 1999 and 2003, both in absolute
went from 13 % in the precrisis period to 31 % in and percentage terms, the economic demands
the postcrisis; civilian environmental organiza- clearly dominate the landscape of the protests.
tions doubled their percentage share of 5 % in the This period coincides with the deepening of the
precrisis period to 10 % in the postcrisis, while state’s financial difficulties that were consistently
organized neighbors increased their percentage worsened by fiscal adjustment policies, and, at
just 1 percentage point (from 23 to 24 %) but, in the time of collapse in December 2001, by the
absolute terms, due to the growth of the partici- restriction of access to bank deposits. The ques-
pation of civil organizations in the postcrisis pe- tioning to the adjustments on pensions and public
riod, they went from participating in 158 protests wages, added with the protests against el corrali-
in the precrisis period to 322 in the postcrisis. to (bank freeze of the deposits), clearly marked
These data allow us to speculate that while the the rhythm of the demands at the height of the
protest of the piqueteros tends to drop in the postcrisis (Fig. 24.16).
crisis period, the institutionalization of the labor As we noted above, the postcrisis period
dispute was not enough to fully restructure the shows a significant growth in the wage demand
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Fig. 24.16 Evolution of the main demands. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GE-
PSAC))
within the context of economic improvement and had a significant increase in 1996 and 1997, at
job recovery. The end of the convertibility, poli- the beginning of the precrisis period, driven
cies oriented to the internal market, and job cre- mainly by a frame that linked the human rights
ation, reactivated the distributive struggle linked violations and the crimes of the last dictatorship
to salaries and incremented labor conflicts. It is to a series of problems of the judiciary system.
necessary to go back to 1995 to find the year in The term “impunity” was used by human rights
which the wage demand served as the main claim organizations during the first years of the demo-
of the protests. In other words, in the decade from cratic transition. It was ment to account for the
1995 to 2005, the wage demand, characteristic of inability of moving foward with the military tri-
the working world in a society functionally inte- als. Finally, it express the limitation of the justice
grated, did not recover the marked predominance system to respond to grievous crimes.
it had prior to the precrisis period (1989–1997). However, the growth of the demands of ad-
Finally, it is important to note with respect ministration of justice in the postcrisis era was
to the performance of wage demands that the also linked to some new elements. The main
claims for direct social assistance behave in an thrust was also produced by linking these claims
opposite manner than the work claims—typical with those related to the increment of crimes
of unemployed workers—which decreased sig- against property and persons that had in March
nificantly from 2004 onwards. Even attenuated, 2004, its paradigmatic expression after the kid-
the involvement of the piquetero organizations napping and murder of Axel Blumberg, the son
in the conflict is still higher than the volume of of a businessman. Under the leadership of Juan
demands for social assistance and labor, which Carlos Blumberg, Axel’s father, the problem of
reveal, once again, the significant process of po- security gained a strong presence in the public
liticization of the piquetero movement. Another agenda, questioning the judiciary. Undoubtedly,
claim that has increased considerably in the post- another major axis of conflict is environmental
crisis period is the one related to human rights protest and the demonstrations related to the ex-
and the administration of justice. This demand ploitation of natural resources. Argentina does
not have a long tradition of environmental move- s ocio-environmental claims in the country. Still,
ments. In the decade of the 1990s, and with little in many parts of the country, these claims have
public impact, the first conflicts related to Green- been articulated around a series of conflicts cen-
peace activity appeared. tered on a very particular axis: the focus has been
From 2001 onwards, a number of claims in placed especially on large mining projects that
different locations in the interior of the country began to develop in the country in the context of
took place. They challenged the mining by pri- the economic recovery. As a consequence, a dis-
vate companies because of the environmental cussion and a dispute emerged about the effects
consequences. These early claims achieved some and consequences of mega mining. Various en-
continuity and visibility and they had two main terprises with very different results and conflicts
features: first, the fact that the main actors of the were the framework for the emergence of com-
claims were groups that mobilized representing munity assemblies that have contested this type
their communities—generally, the inhabitants of of mining associated with a new development
small towns or villages near the places of exploi- model based on disproportionate use and abuse
tation—and, second, a stand in the defense of an of the natural resources (Palermo and Reborati
evaluation criterion for the environmental degra- 2007; Svampa and Antonelli 2009; Delamata
dation, taking into consideration the value attrib- 2013) (Fig. 24.17).
uted to nature and landscape resources. There has Finally, regarding protest forms, it should be
been, in this sense, an evolution in the dynamics mentioned the large amount of cacerolazos (pot-
of these movements towards a wider question- banging protests) made during the crisis, inaugu-
ing of the development model. In general, these rating a repertoire that would acquire a kind of
claims were organized by groups summoned in modularity in the following years. The increase
citizen assemblies and oriented to generate pres- in strikes does not affect the extraordinary num-
sure through the publicity of each case and its ber of marches and demonstrations that almost
impact on public opinion. doubled between the precrisis period (with
The history of these types of claims gained im- 762 cases) and the postcrisis period (with 1440
portance in recent years due to the impact of the cases reported). This is an important fact when
conflict that arose in the town of Gualeguaychú, analyzing the first 3 years of our data set where
Entre Ríos, following the installation of paper the strikes tripled the number of marches. This
mills along the coast of the Uruguay river. In July persistence of street demonstrations reveals a re-
2003 a group of Gualeguaychú neighbors, who orientation of collective action towards greater
later formed the Citizens Environmental Assem- public impact forms at the expense of strategies
bly of Gualeguaychú, protested the construction mostly focused on corporate pressure and more
of a pulp mill on the outskirts of the border town narrow interests.
of Fray Bentos (Uruguay). As in previous cases, The street and road blocks, meanwhile, main-
this claim had an eminent community character tain a significant presence as protest forms con-
(multisectoral) and counted, among others, with solidating their modularity. Both the actors—pi-
the participation of the local political authorities. queteros and multisectoral—, and the demands—
Several factors contributed to the high publicity labor and direct social assistance— declined in
of this case. In the first place, the members of the the postcrisis protests, but the roadblocks main-
assembly marked from the start, the intensity of tain a presence in absolute numbers of 232 re-
the conflict and their rejection of the construction cords in the precrisis and of 513 in the postcrisis
of the plant by blocking access to the internation- period. The modularity and form of the road-
al General San Martín Bridge. Second, the inter- block protest suggest that there are other actors
vention of the Argentine and Uruguayan govern- that express other demands than those of the past,
ments amplified the conflict and transformed it such is the situation with the environmental case
into an international dispute. paradigm mentioned before, in which the assem-
The Gualeguaychú case had a large im- blies blocked the border with Uruguay to prevent
pact and it gave an important impetus to other the installation of the paper mills (Table 24.7).
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Fig. 24.17 Evolution of the main formats. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEP-
SAC))
As we can see, the period that opens up after this way we can contribute to an analysis of this
the crisis of 2001 is of particular interest from phenomenon not limited to specific situations or
the point of view of the social mobilization pro- particular actors. For this reason, an overview
cesses because in the next decade, some of the over an extended period of time can broaden the
most problematic aspects of the 1990s in political horizon of the debate on the social mobilization
and economic matters get reversed. In particular, processes in Argentina. As we observed, the di-
the dimension related to the impact that neolib- versification (of organizations, demands, and
eral policies had on social exclusion. However, forms of protest) is the hallmark of the period
some features of structural order show continua- extending between the two great crises of Argen-
tion between the two decades. In that sense, it re- tinean democratic transition.
mains vital that the reactivation of union protest Within this general framework, the crises rep-
with expressions of civil claims oriented towards resent important circumstances that mark turning
public spaces, linked to subsequent agenda items points in terms of the structural conditions that
such as, community demands on environmental frame the protest. Thus, the hyperinflationary
issues, including a discussion of the develop- crisis led to a decade of dominance of market
ment model after the end of convertibility, and reforms in the country whose effects, mainly re-
the challenge of the judicial system in various lated to employment and labor conditions were
aspects (Table 24.8). crucial to understand the strong decline of union
activity during the 1990s. A fraction of the union
movement, honoring their Peronist affiliation
Final Words and loyalty to the national government, followed
with a major demobilization process. At the
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the same time, it coincides with the steady and the
main objective of our research was to provide increased mobilization of state workers, health,
empirical evidence on the recent transformation and education unions that have been hit the hard-
of social protest in Argentina. We believe that in est by the market reforms and the requirements of
Table 24.7 Organization by demand I. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEPSAC))
81,21 3,48(7(5$
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Table 24.8 Organization by demand II. (Source: Grupo de estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva (GEPSAC))
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fiscal discipline. At that particular time, a sharp a significant transformation in the basic ideologi-
drop in the number of strikes took place while cal cleavages that organized the political map. A
the demonstration consolidated as the main form progressive lack of differentiation of the political
of protest. Moreover, it has been shown that in class accompanied the emergence of new actors
the past 15 years the roadblocks rose and increas- in the protests positioned at times in outright op-
ingly became a modular contentious format. position to party politics. However, in contrast to
Thus displaying a contentious repertory with a the readings of the 1990s that proposed an image
greater disruptive power. Furthermore, the years of the social mobilizations focused on depolitici-
that followed the end of the dictatorship involved zation, apathy, and helplessness, our work reveals
that social protest played a significant role in na- s tudents; others have a novel quality such as the
tional politics and that it was a privileged area families of the victims or the piqueteros. In gen-
for the emergence of new actors, demands, and eral terms, it is necessary to consider that what
forms of social confrontation. contributes to define this scenario is the fact that
As we have seen, neither the presidencies nor some of the actors are more traditionally linked
the economic periods, significantly alter the dis- to the phenomena of social mobilization—with
tribution of the protests. The data collected show stable identities and organizational forms inde-
that political crises are not necessarily a result of pendent of the protest—are progressively exclud-
an increase in the number of protests. In other ed from these types of actions; at the same time,
words, we vehemently believe that the number new actors and social collectives emerge during
of protests is not directly related to their politi- this period and seemingly adopt new identities
cal impact. In this regard, it is still necessary to directly linked more to the actions, forms, or the
pay attention to the formulation of demands. We specific demands they carry out.
observed an increasingly diverse set of protest By comparing the protest data of the pre- and
demands in the late 1990s. In the crisis years of postcrisis 2001 periods, this perspective becomes
2001–2002, we documented the passage of par- enriched. Labor union protest notably recov-
ticular types of demands to more general claims. ers at the hands of a new political context. After
In this regard, it is important to note that the de- changes to the accumulation regime more direct-
mands of social protests during this period reflect ed towards consumer and domestic markets in
an increase in what it might be called a systemic the 2000s, the demands related to the protection
crisis. This can be verified in the importance of and promotion of rights and public space protest
the weight both demands challenging the politi- forms such as marches and roadblocks do not
cal system of government (10 %), and the social decrease but increase (e.g., the high peak of the
regime of accumulation (24 %), have. 2005 protests). That is, the data show that the re-
This work explicitly aimed at explaining the covery of the classical actors in mobilizing tends
main transformations of actors, demands and to join and complement the heterogeneous and
forms of protest between 1989 and 2007. Over- diverse protest scenario, giving evidence that so-
all, these processes of transformation can be ana- cial protest has a strong capacity to adjust to the
lysed in terms of their increasingly fragmented political conjuncture and express social problems
character. Still, it should be noted that labor union and place them on the public agenda.
protest prevailed throughout the entired period.
However, between 1989 and 2003, it decreased
in absolute and relative terms. If we consider the References
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Auyero, J. (2002). La protesta social en Argentina. Bue-
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Paidós.
Brazilian Social Movements in
the Last Decade 25
Maria da Glória Gohn
The New Scenario of Latin American ing of new policies marked by state refunding,
Social Movements as is the case of Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Uruguay, and Paraguay. Others capitalized on the
To understand the role of social movements in crisis, positioning themselves in niches of the in-
Brazil in the new millennium some preliminary ternational market, adopting strong social protec-
considerations about the sociopolitical, econom- tion policies, with social programs that promote
ic, and cultural setting in which these movements interaction between social movements, trade
take place are in order, so as to position these ac- unions, civic associations as well as government
tions in a Latin American context. Latin America organs. This interaction is achieved by means of
has presented different national answers to cy- institutionalized policies and can be observed in
clical economic crises, especially the one that the promotion of national conferences and in the
befell the globalized world at the end of 2008. policies focused on specific social sectors and
Significant changes in the global scenario, both groups, such as African descendents, or in poli-
international (globalization, wars, crises, new cies on social themes such as food security. All of
hegemonic disputes, etc.) as well as changes at the above policies incorporate inclusion or social
the regional level (a relatively more autonomous protection, as is the cases of Brazil, Colombia,
repositioning of Latin America in the world sys- and Mexico.
tem) have resulted in a sociopolitical context
which is both diverse and differentiated from that
of previous decades, from an economic, social, Basic Characteristics of Latin
and political viewpoint as well as being mani- American Social Movements in the
fested in countless cultural innovations. Current Conjuncture
Some countries, like Argentina, suffered sub-
stantial economic impacts from the 2001 debt In the twenty-first century, there is a new sce-
crisis and began to experience social problems nario in the field of associativism: novel types
such as mass unemployment and soaring poverty of social networks and social movements are
levels previously occurring on a smaller scale. surfacing. Innovations are emerging in the de-
Others underwent political transformations with mands, identities, repertories, and profile of the
the rise to power of new groups and the formulat- participants. Multi- and pluri-class movements
proliferate. In addition, transnational movements
M. d. G. Gohn () have emerged, crossing the frontiers of states
UNICAMP/ CNPq, Campinas, Brazil and nations with an alter- or antiglobalization
e-mail: mgohn@uol.com.br vision (Farro 2007; Players 2010). In the new
362 M. d. G. Gohn
millennium, movements with age-old demands, The new political conjuncture has a funda-
such as for farmland, have reemerged forcefully, mental role in explaining the current associativist
as is the case of Via Campesina as well as other scenario. In several countries there has been an
rural movements such as the MST-Movimento expansion in the form of deliberative manage-
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra (Landless ment, creating innumerable innovations in the
Rural Workers’ Movement). Social movements field of popular democratic participation, such as
addressing food security issues were created— electronic participation; in the same way as the
with regards to its production and distribution format of various social policies was constructed
throughout the world. Additionally, movements and/or redesigned by the use of large national
emerged that insisted on upholding a given life- conferences cosponsored by public organs. The
style, such as the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, conferences are structured in cycles of debates
Peru, and Ecuador (Dávalos 2005; 2012). Identi- between representatives of civil society and pub-
ty-based movements also proliferated, vindicat- lic administration, and result in proposals to pro-
ing the cultural rights for those considered dif- vide support for national policies. In Brazil there
ferent: ethnic, cultural, religious, immigrant, and are various examples, such as the new 10 year ed-
sexual rights. Community movements, united by ucation plan, in the health sector, or the creation
ideas and ideology, were weakened by the new of a state agency that manages food security, such
ways of policy-making, especially by new gov- as the creation of CONSEA- Conselho Nacional
ernment strategies, at all levels of administration. de Segurança Alimentar (National Council for
New communitarian movements emerged, some Food Security).
of which recreated traditional forms of self-help The State promoted reforms, decentralized
and self-organization, rendering their territories services in the social arena, created mediating
places of resistance and re-signifying new so- channels, and innumerable new social programs.
cial relations; others sprung up, with top–down New ways of addressing popular demands have
organization, as a result of social programs and been institutionalized. On the one hand, it can be
projects stimulated by social policies. Other or- seen that this fact constitutes a victory because
ganizational formats arose due to new commu- previous demands have been recognized as a
nication technologies and digital resources, such right, and are included in the practices of pub-
as those movements that exist through a transna- lic administration. On the other hand, the way in
tional network, such as the Coordinadora Latino- which these new policies have been implement-
americana de Organizações do Campo ( CLOC; ed, anchored in technocratic pragmatism, has re-
The Latin American Coordination of Rural Or- sulted in most of the social projects implemented
ganizations). It is a virtual movement, without being part of client-centered networks. The new
either headquarters or a high-profile organizing policies demobilize older movements and favor
group (Levy 2008; Martoz 2007; Seoane 2003 institutional set-ups and legal support for new
and Observatório 2007). players, organized in NGOs, associations, and
Innovations in the organizational field have organizations of the tertiary sector.
emerged, such as networking and a greater con- The institutionalization of channels and prac-
sciousness of environmental issues when pro- tices of civil society, in relation to political so-
posing projects that can be economically viable ciety, also produced new social movements, cre-
without destroying the environment. The new or- ated within the present conjuncture, articulated
ganizational formats have given rise to new ques- through NGOs. They are articulated in issues
tions, such as transnational rights in the case of related to the democratization of the State or of
immigrants, and forms of citizenship that are pre- public policies, as is the case of the Movimen-
sented as planetary: environmental movements, to de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral-MCCE,
for example. The “cosmopolitan” theme is an (Movement for Combating Electoral Corruption)
integral part of the agenda of the representations no Brazil. Availing themselves of constitutional
the movements seek to project socially. possibilities, in the case of projects shaped by
25 Brazilian Social Movements in the Last Decade 363
popular initiative, the MCCE drew up a draft law and collective action) as well as a renewal of
Projeto de Lei Ficha Limpa [Draft Law for Clean generations—young people predominate as new,
Record] (for candidates for elected positions in relevant political subjects (see Chap. 13 in this
the elections), passed in June 2010. The MCCE volume).
articulates as a network, and as such, has no It should also be noted that in recent years, es-
board of directors nor civil register. It counts on pecially in Brazil, the agenda of academic debates
the support of the OAB-Ordem dos Advogados do has been far more focused on public policies.
Brasil (the Order of Lawyers - the Brazilian Bar This revealed concerns more related to the “insti-
Association) and the CNBB- Conferência Nacio- tutionalization” of civil collective practices that
nal dos Bispos do Brasil (the Brazilian National the “new” players present, now incorporated into
Council of Bishops). the institutionalized political logic, as well as the-
The brand new wave of social movements matics on new forms of social administration and
that has been erupting throughout Europe and the the forms of political participation in the ambit of
Middle East since 2010 has also had repercus- different state entities. However, usually in these
sions in Brazil (Ali et all. 2012). As we know, in- debates, the new players appear to be discon-
numerable social movements rose up again after nected from the associative dimension that frame
the economic crisis in 2008, in response to new them in scenarios of political and social conflict;
austerity laws, such as the restriction of social creators of collective bodies of action, constantly
benefits for immigrants or specific ethnic groups gaining new meanings and occasional situations
such as the gypsies (Portugal, France, UK, Italy, of antagonism vis-à-vis the institutional political
Spain, etc.). From 2010 onward, a new wave of scenario. The new strategies of struggles and of
freedom movements arose in the Middle East. political agendas of the movements when faced
This set of events placed the theme of social with the recent crises of global financial capital-
movements back on the political agenda of vari- ism as well as the relations of the movements in
ous countries. Many of the movements looked to the context of paradigmatic changes in the gov-
Latin America because it was a center of popu- ernments, have not received due attention in de-
lar resistance during the struggle against mili- bates and resulting policies. The current debates
tary regimes that ruled over several countries. also show a growing tendency to voice criticism
The comparison to be made between the current towards “Western centrism.”
movements in Europe and similar ones occurring Other changes can be highlighted in interpret-
in Brazil, despite the differences in the socioeco- ing contemporary collective action, such as the
nomic contexts of the countries in question, is the questioning of paradigms and hegemonic theo-
occurrence of protest marches and occupations of ries not just of social movements, but also of so-
buildings. ciological, political, and democratic theories; the
We can observe that current movements are appearance of analyses that are not restricted to
vastly differentiated from one another, according the disciplines usually associated with the study
to the type and degree of organization, demands, of social movements (sociology, political science,
articulations, political projects, historical trajec- and history), but that maintain a dialogue with
tories, and experiences—mainly on the politi- other knowledge-producing fields (anthropology,
cal–organizational plane, as well as with regards geography, psychology, communications, inter-
to their scope. One major difference in relation national relations, etc.). Analyses that vindicate,
to past movements is in the profile of the par- in the case of Latin America, a decolonization of
ticipants, now known as activists, whereas they knowledge and power so as to shape the move-
were previously militants in causes with deep ments based on the particular experiences of the
ideological records. There has been a renewal southern continent, on a “sociology of absences
of the social players (who share and give differ- and emergencies” (Souza Santos 2006; Quijano
ent meanings to the arena of social mobilization 2004). In this context, the terms of the debate that
364 M. d. G. Gohn
took place in Europe in the 1990s with respect to The movement of the pickets in Argentina has
the subject of colonization, especially in Africa, a multiform and heterogeneous composition (see
are taken up once again (Spivak 2009). Chap. 9 in this volume). Strictly speaking, the
pickets’ movement subsists by linking to politi-
cal organizations as the Federación de Tierras y
Social Movements and Associativism Viviendas- FTV (Land and Housing Federation),
in Latin America During the Past linked to the Central Workers Union of Argenti-
Decade na-CTA, Corriente Classista y Combativa-CCC
(Classist and Combative Current); the Pólo Ob-
The first decade of this century saw, in the words rero (Workers’ Pole), and the Movimiento Tereza
of Touraine (1984), the return of the social player Rodrigues-MTR, which is better known as the
in the collective actions that spread across Latin Movimiento de los Trabajadores Desocupados-
America, in a decidedly contradictory fashion. In MTD (the Unemployed Workers’ Movement)
some countries, there was a radicalization of the (see Mirza 2006, p. 82). Svampa points out that
democratic process and a reappearance of social piquetero organizations are very ambivalent,
struggles held to be traditional some years ago, as with different political tones that range from a
is the case of the ethnic movements, especially of demand for reintegration into the system to the
the indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador, affirmation of anti-capitalist radicalism (Svampa
be they associated or not with nationalistic move- 2008, p. 181). The participants in these move-
ments such as the “bolivarianos” (Venezuela). In ments—with high levels of female representa-
the new millennium, the reoccurrence of urban tion, are people who are enrolled in social pro-
popular neighborhood movements (see Chap. 14 grams and projects of community work that, in
in this volume) or neo-communitarianism can contrast to the benefits these projects may bring,
also be observed, especially in Mexico and Ar- have the commitment to take part in protests and
gentina. All of these local movements made their mobilizations.
public appearance as agents of new conflicts Yet another thematic and important social
and the renewal of collective social struggles. movement in Latin America is that of environ-
In some cases, they elected their leaders to the mentalism. Sectors of the environmental move-
highest positions in the country, as occurred in ment became politicized in some regions, as was
Bolivia. Movements that were in the shadows the case of the struggle against the paper mills
and treated as insurgents reappear with organiza- to be installed in Uruguay (Longo 2008), or the
tional strength such as the pickets in Argentina, one against the open mining enterprises in the
cocaleros (cocaine plantation workers) in Bolivia region of Mendoza, Argentina, which cause seri-
and Peru, and zapatistas in Mexico. Others still ous socio-environmental problems (see Di marco
find their voice in networks composed of global and Palomino 2004, Baraldo 2006). In this latter
social movements, such as the Landless Rural region, the actions are organized in assemblies,
Movement Rural (MST) in Brazil and the Via with the União de Assembleias Cidadãs-UA
Campesina. Many of these were discriminated (The Union of Citizens’ Assemblies), made up
and criminalized by the media and some state of shopkeepers, small farmers, housewives, stu-
agencies. Global forums have provided a space dents, etc. In other words, it involves a hetero-
for these movements in large events, such as the geneous group, unlike the environmentalists who
World Social Forum (see Chap. 7 in this volume). took part in the social movements of the 1990s,
The latter, despite being presented as transna- driven by ecological ideas and ideologies. Today
tional, constitutes one of the specific innovations they participate in accordance with their belief
of Latin American associativism of this century in the importance of collective social action, en-
due to the fact that it began its existence in Porto compassing different social strata, regenerating
Alegre, Brazil. neighborhood associations as territorial units that
articulate the actions. Other environmental move- rary indigenous movements are not only focused
ments are linked to popular movements, such as on resistance but also a struggle for rights—the
in the region of the São Francisco River in Brazil recognition of their cultures and their very exis-
as well as the movement against building dams tence, land redistribution in the territories of their
and the movement of small farmers in various re- ancestors, and schooling in their mother tongue.
gions of Brazil and Argentina, such as the Movi- It should be pointed out that innumerable indig-
mento Campesino de Córdoba- MCC (Peasant enous territories in various countries became a
Movement of Cordoba). source of foreign capital penetration due to the
Many popular movements fight against proj- minerals and natural resources on native lands,
ects on the terrain of public policy in their reas well as water systems. Thus, basic issues that
gions because these projects affect the working underpin capitalist expansion, in terms of infra-
conditions that are their economic livelihood, structure, became a source of conflict between
such as the Movimento Nacional dos Pescadores, the population, mainly riverside dwellers or in-
MONAPE (Fishermen’s National Movement), in digenous (who fight for their territories as their
Brazil. Indeed, work has a central role in popular source of work/sustenance) and economic agents
struggles—to guarantee the right to work, work- interested in those lands and their wealth, as en-
ing conditions, or the creation of income genera- ergy sources, or to expand energy matrixes under
tion, either self-managed or through institution- their control, such as the conflicts over water in
alized employment. A large number of the orga- Cochabamba, in Bolivia, in 2000; the road blocks
nizations of “solidarity economies” ( economia of the Aymarás in Peru (Lima 2000–2001); and
solidaria) in Brazil, and the MTD-Movimiento the question of gas, also in Bolivia, in their nego-
de los Trabajadores Desocupados (Unemployed tiations with Brazil between 2003–2005.
Workers Movement) in Argentina, can be cited as In Bolivia, in 2011, a movement was created
examples. They aim to build productive projects by indigenous leaders against the construction, by
that are sustainable, self-managed, and guided by the government, of a 300 km highway that sought
community logic (see Vitullo 2007, pp. 154–161). to make trade between the lower Amazon region
With regard to popular urban movements, the of Bolivia and the Andean valley more dynamic.
struggle for housing continues to be foremost in This highway will, in fact, cross an environmen-
Brazil and other Latin American countries (see tal reserve of the National Park and Indigenous
Gohn 2013). Local, regional, and national or- Territory, 1.1 million ha in area, which is home
ganizations are prominent, as is the case of the to 13,000 indigenous people of different groups
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MSTS; (see Chap. 10 in this volume). This area was a
The Homeless Workers Movement) in Brazil. conquest of the indigenous people when in 1990,
As regional examples, there are areas that have they carried out the “Marcha para el Território
been negatively impacted from urban projects in y Dignidad” (March for Territory and Dignity).
recent years, such as in Tierra Del Fuego, Argen- Again in Brazil, the conflicts over indigenous
tina, due to the tourist projects for the Ushuaia lands in the Amazon Forest were exacerbated
region. This threat gave rise to the Foro Social after the new biofuel boom and frenzy to plant
Urbano (Urban Social Forum) of Ushuaia; or the sugarcane for the production of alcohol, seen as
haphazard expansion of El Alto, in the Altiplano the new alternative for energy consumption.
of Bolivia, a city close to La Paz, where the coun- In Latin America, Ecuador, and Bolivia are the
try’s international airport is located. countries where the indigenous movement made
Among the movements seeking identity in most progress in terms of organization, mobiliza-
Latin America, the movement of indigenous tions, and conquering social rights (see Chap. 10
people is at the forefront. The struggle of indig- in this volume). In Bolivia the popular sectors
enous people resisting European/white coloniza- elected the indigenous candidate to be President
tion has been recorded for centuries. Contempo- of the Republic. This fact was a milestone. The
366 M. d. G. Gohn
MAS-Movimento ao Socialismo (Movement to- against educational reforms and against corrup-
wards Socialism) is the most developed indig- tion and misuse of public money should be noted.
enous political party in Bolivia. The Bolivian Indeed, it is not only the students who have mo-
case is a typical example for an analysis of the bilized. The educational sector, especially educa-
development of institutional structures of partici- tion in elementary schools, has been a source of
pation, such as in the case of the Ley de Partici- massive protests, as was the case of Mexico in
pación y Control Social, (Participation and Social 2006 in the Oaxaca region. It should also be em-
Control Law) drawn up at the end of 2009, de- phasized that the field of education, given the po-
bated in the nine departments of the country and tential of educational and pedagogical processes
with national organizations, both indigenous and in the development of forms of sociability and
nonindigenous. In Brazil, the indigenous peoples the constitution and expansion of a political cul-
made significant conquests after the 1988 consti- ture, became a strategic area as well for popular
tution, such as the demarcation of their territo- movements such as the MST.
ries, the right to literacy in their own language, Also anchored in the struggle for rights and
and more recently, the attempt to sell their prod- identity-building, the LGBTTTS movement- Lés-
ucts, not in alternative markets, but for fair and bicas, Gays, Bissexuais, Travestis, Transexuais,
competitive prices in globalized markets. Trangêneros e Simpatizantes (lesbians, gays, bi-
The movement of Afro-descendents is more sexuals, transvestites, transexuals, transgenders,
organized in Brazil, given the predominance of and sympathizers)—should also be highlighted
the population of Afro-descents, especially in the in their different formats and combinations. The
North-East region and the great capitals of the recognition of stable relations between homosex-
South-east, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janei- uals, for example, not only legitimizes another
ro. The movement made progress in its struggles form of marriage, but it gives legal security in
in the past decade, with the policy of university relation to rights vis-à-vis pension, inheritance,
quotas, programs such as PROUNI, and the fight sharing insurance policy, and health insurance.
for the Estatuto da Igualdade Racial (Statute for Moreover, new laws protecting the rights of the
Racial Equality). This progress also reflects the LGBT community creates recognition for the
complexity of the social composition of Brazilian adoption of children.
society. Government support through public poli-
cies should be emphasized. The results are con-
tradictory: on one hand, social demands are pre- New Forms of Protest and
sented as rights, opening a space for participation Demonstrations
through citizens’ actions. On the other, there are
losses, mainly in the autonomy of the movement Street marches and demonstrations have a long
and the establishment of top-down structures of tradition in the sociopolitical history of Brazil, at
social control in government policies for the so- different moments and historical conjunctures,
cial movements. Social control is established, but and with different themes and demands (Gohn
its meaning is dictated by public policies, even 2011). At present, there are major differences in
though there may be citizen participation in set- Brazilian protest demonstrations, depending on
ting up its norms. the territory where they occur and their demands,
In this brief list of current social movements in the same way there were differences in rela-
in Latin America, the resurgence of the student tion to marches in the past. In the 1980s, marches
movement, especially in Chile with the Revolu- were common in favor of a return to democracy
ción de los Pingüinos (Penguin Revolt) (Zibas and in the 1990s, among the popular levels of so-
2008) and the Marches of 2011 for educational ciety, demonstrations were especially prevalent
reform (see Chap. 13 in this volume); and the sit- in the rural sector with the landless movement. In
ins at universities in Brazil, especially the pub- the new century, they have reemerged in the last
lic ones, for improving the quality of teaching, 2 years, both in Brazil and abroad, with young
people from the middle classes as protagonists. These new protests in different territories and
What are they demanding? Abroad, there are diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural
two central thematic axes: democracy and free- contexts and conjunctures, have much in com-
dom of expression in the Middle East (Egypt, mon. They are articulated through social net-
Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, etc.). In Europe, works, especially through social networks and
the citizens demonstrate against the recent neo- new digital technology in the Internet (blogs,
liberal economic reforms, the agreements with Facebook, twitter, etc.). They are made up of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the activists, recruited ad hoc for each case, even
rejection of a category of politicians, held to be though they may create memories and “tribes of
corrupt and alien to the interests of the population activists.” It is worthy to note that activists differ
(especially in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, from the militants of social movements in previ-
France, England, Germany, etc.). In other words, ous decades that were amalgamated by political
in these regions the marches took up socioeco- ideas and ideologies. Activists do not permanent-
nomic and political banners, somewhat forgotten ly belong to a given group. They are collectives
since the 1960s. They promoted public acts and with great media visibility, organized by people
sit-ins, as is the case of the Movimiento de los little known in the world of “official” politics,
Indignados, common in Spain Sampedro et al. usually liberal professionals, such as journalists.
2011. Even though they may be present, political party
In Brazil, the marches demand freedom of structures have little visibility. In several cases
expression ( Marcha da Liberdade, Marcha da they are rejected, as are trade union structures. In
Maconha) [Freedom March, Marijuana March], most cases, the manifestations take place outside
identity rights (relating to sex, color, ethnicity, the parties and unions.
etc.), public policies and benefits (Free Passes Many of the new protests are made up of
on public transport, for example), and the fight young people, usually students, from the middle
against prejudice ( Parada do Orgulho LGBT— classes, even though, in the case of Europe, there
lésbicas, gays, bissexuais, travestis e transex- is an intense participation of civil servants and re-
uais) [Gay Parade]. Some traditional marches, tired people, besides the students. There are a set
of religious groups (like the Marcha para Jesus, of tenets that unite them, similar to the one built
[March for Jesus] of the evangelicals), were also by the World Social Forum (WSF)—“Another
prominent in recent years. The new marches re- world is possible” mixed with libertarian utopias.
vealed moral indignation with regards to values, The new protests also extend beyond mere rejec-
habits, and behavior. In addition to the marches, tion, they postulate alternative employment mod-
should be added the actions of collectives of els (in the European case), new laws and new
young people who create their own forms of ways of dealing with questions of choice, which
political action through direct activism, as is relate to the personality and subjectivity of each
the case of the “Transparência Hacker” commu- person (in the Brazilian case). A unifying mantra
nity, Wikileaks, the “Anonymous” and the Lulz- of many of the newer global protests is freedom
Sec—who use networks and digital technology of expression. There is a belief that the discus-
for direct participation. The transnational group sion of taboo subjects such as marijuana cannot
of activists of LulzSec, that has a branch/link in be banned, nor can obstacles be created vis-à-vis
Brazil (LulzSecBrazil), attacked sites of the Pres- existing knowledge or knowledge that can be
idency of the Republic and governmental agen- generated through discussion.
cies in protest against the lack of transparency, Democracy (in its full sense and exercise) is
and attempts to control Internet. The hackers act another great articulating axis of the new global
through digital protest actions online; they acti- protests. Many protests, albeit peaceful, have
vate electronic robots that make a large number met with the problem of police repression. The
of demands on previously targeted sites, bringing movements demand the end of police repression
about a gridlock. and emphasize that most of the issues are social
368 M. d. G. Gohn
questions, some linked to public health. They ask works, and arranged horizontally and autono-
for protection and public security, not repression. mously. They are critical of traditional forms of
There are also proposals to create new spaces for politics at present—especially political parties
collaboration between civil society and public or- and trade unions. The convocations for the acts
gans to formulate relevant public policies. are made via the social networks and the main-
The new twenty-first century protests symbol- stream media contributes to the adhesion of the
ize a new way of engaging in politics. Not party population by publicizing the agenda and the
or official politics. Rather, it is politics in the locations and time of protest events. The 2013
Greek sense: the citizen who manifests himself demonstration have a particular aesthetic style—
and discusses in a public place. The new round of with fewer slogans and banners of political or-
contention shows that there is less alienation and ganizations. The movement did not use long
alternative perspectives to interpret the world. term strategic planning by organizations. The
The protests build solidarity based on rela- participants have more autonomy. Each takes his
tions—direct and/or virtual. Adherence is to a poster in cardboards; a new message can generate
cause and not to the ideology of a group. They a decision taken in the heat of the moment. An
are spaces for learning: a kind of nonformal edu- individual aesthetic prevails with the donning of
cation (learning and wisdom produced through black gas masks or other (such as Guy Fawkes,
protest experience). The global protests are con- Anonymous), and piercings. They have been the
tributing to the building of a new political cul- target of violent actions on the part of police re-
ture, in keeping with a more modern and tolerant pression. The movement has also connected to
society and against traditionalism and prejudice networks of international support and solidarity
(Tapia 2009; Hessel 2011). between them is a value and a principle. They are
education laboratories because for the yunger’s
it is a baptism in politics.
The Wave of Mobilizations in Brazil The demonstrations in June 2013 focused
in June 2013 on specific demands. The movement acted in
as a nonhierarchical collective, with decentral-
In June of 2013 a massive wave of Brazilia pro- ized management, without the coordination of
tests occurred in the streets of 12 state capitals central–vertical leadership. The participants
and in multiple other cities—one of the largest maintain values, principles, and forms of orga-
popular outbursts in the country only comparable nization distinct from other social movements,
to 1992, in the impeachment of former President trade unions, popular (rural and urban), as well
Collor de Melo; to 1984, with the “Diretas Já” as differ from identity movements (women, in-
movement, in the fight for the return to democ- digenous, quilombolas, etc.). The June demon-
racy in the period of the military regime; and to strations were triggered by collectives organized
the 1960s, in strikes and marches after the 1964 with the predominance of Movimento Passe
military coup, and in student movements in 1968 Livre (MPL; Free Fare Movement) from a protest
(Gohn 2015). against a planned public transit fare. The protests
In June of 2013 the people went to the streets quickly spread to Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre,
by joining a new kind of social movement. It is Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, and other major cities
estimated that over 1 million citizens participated across the country. The MPL was established in
in protest voicing a long list of grievances, rang- 2005 in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul during
ing from political corruption to human rights the World Social Forum (WSF) and was present
abuses and World Cup spending. The demonstra- at important events of students in Florianopolis
tions are part of a new form of social movement and Salvador. The central demand of the move-
composed mostly by young, educated, predomi- ment is a zero price increase for public transpor-
nantly middle classes, connected by digital net- tation. According to the website of MPL, it is
defined as, “a horizontal movement, as indepen- son, the Brazilian movements differ from Pro-
dent and non-partisan, but not anti-partisan. The tests of Europe, especially Spain, Portugal, and
independence of the MPL is not only from politi- Greece. The southern European countries were in
cal parties, but also NGOs, religious institutions, deep economic crisis caused by neoliberal poli-
financial, etc.” (www. bidwill. mpl.org. br/). cies of tax adjustments, control and monitoring
In Sao Paulo, in June 2013, I took part in by the “troika” (IMF + European Central Bank),
the demonstrations, along with the MPL, mem- loss of social rights, unemployment, low wages,
bers of left-wing parties PSOL PSTU, PCO, and dismissal of civil servants. The Brazilian
and some militants of PT. All party flags were protests are even more different than the Arab
rejected in the demonstrations, including gener- Spring uprisings due to authoritarianism and how
ating unrest among those who insisted on them. strong social control predominates in most of
Anarchist groups (Black Block, Anonymous, and those countries and the relationship between pol-
Kaos) were present, with masks or not Danet and itics and religion via Islam. Finally, the Brazilian
Bardeau 2011. The movement expressed a pro- national protests differ from Occupy Wall Street
found lack of confidence in every form of poli- not only because they adopted different ways of
tics. The demonstratrors want another country acting, but because they had, at first, a specific
where ethics and politics work together. They demand: against the increased public transporta-
want a revolution in how to operate the policy tion fare.
and not a piece meal reform or patch overs. Citi- The Brazilian June 2013 movement occupied
zen in the mobilizations desire policy changes a specific territory but not by marches, and the
where state services are performed at a higher roadblock tactic was used later, in acts following
level of quality. In other words, they demand a the June demonstrations, of truckers, couriers,
more efficient State. especially on National Day (7/11/2013), orga-
From national media accounts in recent months nized by the Trade Union Central, MST, UNE,
one can list the likely reasons for the anger that and housing movements bringing together about
led thousands of people to the streets, adhering to 105,000 people in the country. On this day the
the movement of young people, namely the sky- MPL/SP opted to support the demonstrations
high expenses with World Cup stadiums; mega regarding the subway system, but not all of the
events and use of public money in promoting the demonstrations, which they viewed as a broad
events; and most importantly, the poor quality of agenda, over-bureaucratized, and focused largely
public services, especially in transport, educa- on workers.
tion, health, and security. Other aggravating is- Collectives who participated in the June dem-
sues include the persistence of social inequality onstrations are inspired by various sources, ac-
indices; consumer inflation; reports of corruption cording to the membership of each group. They
and political patronage; the Proposta de Emenda rejected vertical organizations with central lead-
Constitucional 37/2011 (Projeto de Emenda Con- ers and the participants were not only motivated
stitucional (PEC) 37); the criminalization of so- by one ideology. Some protesters were inspired
cial movements-especially indigenous and rural; by teachings on the struggle against capital and
and the Bill that had been pending in Congress the forms of control and domination of contem-
about “gay curing/recovery.” In other words, porary capitalism, in search of emancipation.
despite government policies of social inclusion, Anarchism and libertarian socialist groups were
and the positive international image of the coun- influential in the protests by focusing on solidari-
try until recently, emerging as a success, to the ty, freedom of individuals, self-management, and
common sense of the people, was an unreal con- police repression. There is also a new humanism
struction. in some of the actions, expressed via holistic vi-
Protesters direct their claims to specific elites sions and communitarianism that criticizes the
and state branches of each country. For this rea- consumer society, individualism, and everyday
370 M. d. G. Gohn
criminal violence and drug use (Gohn 2012a; litical projects. But as there are many projects
2012b). that are heterogeneous, some of their agendas fell
Politicians and Government officials were apart, got lost, or redefined their identity, ideas,
surprised by the massive demonstrations in June and core viewpoints, altering the original project
2013. After the initial impact, the federal Govern- and the existing political culture. Some redefined
ment went on to create a new agenda to respond to themselves in accordance with other social play-
the wave of social mobilization. It demonstrates ers present. Others took advantage of the moment
a victory and a conquest of the June protests, far and connected with the possibilities offered by
beyond the reduction in public transit fares. The globalization: economic (which generated resis-
protests reached the international media around tance and protests) and cultural (which generated
the world. Most importantly, in terms of move- new sociabilities, new interactions, and learning
ment policy outcomes, the protests accelerated based on the pedagogy, of example—learning
approval, or rejection of social proposals in through observation—in the important transna-
Congress that had been shelved for years. The tional events or through Internet connections).
demonstrations also led, in July of 2013, to the The participants’ profile changed from militant
resumption of mobilization in the streets by the to activist. The Marches became the basic model
Union Central (CUT) and rural and urban popu- of protest Negri and Cocco 2005.
lar movements. Several analysts have warned of The current context of social movements has
the organizational weakness of the movement, changed, with the predominance of organized
its lack of strategic direction and leadership, and marches and occupations organized online via
the danger of being manipulated by conserva- social networks while rejecting traditional poli-
tive forces of the right, as has occurred in other tics. These movements are different from the re-
historic moments of social tension in Brazil. bellions of the 1960s, which constituted a great
However, one cannot forget the learning capac- cultural revolution, with engagement in politics.
ity of the activists, the power of reflection and They are also different from those occurred in the
preparation from the experience of participation years 1970–1980, that showed resistance to mili-
in the June protest movement. Many citizens are tary regimes. At that time, social movements had
in the first phase of baptism into Braziliam poli- essentially a sociopolitical nature, being instru-
tics. Other June protest participants are defining ments of mobilization and grassroots organizing.
future movement goals within the parameters of Moreover, they are different from the movements
the values in which they believe. It is too early of the 1990–2000 decade, when institutionalized
to detect another big protest wave resulting from practices of social organizations prevailed. The
the June 2013 mobilizations. The process may be economic and political developments of these
under way of the emergence of an entirely new past decades, with fiscal adjustment and global-
protest cycle (Badiou 2012). ization, have produced a generation of citizens
excluded by poverty and by the new rules of ac-
cess to the labor market, especially the young.
Conclusions Our analyses highlight the educational nature
of collective actions, organized in the shape of so-
A new moment and model has emerged in the tra- cial movements. The enlargement of this associa-
jectory of Latin American associativism. Some tive scenario beyond civil society, was enabled by
social movements once again have visibility and a penetrating new public spheres, as is the case of
central role as actors who push for social change. the national advisory councils and conferences,
Movements also underwent considerable chang- and the emergence of new forms of this associa-
es, with transformations in their identities, and tivism that now function essentially in networks.
incorporated other dimensions of social thought The State transformed its relations with orga-
and action. Collective actors modified their po- nized civil society, favoring participative public
policies, many of them coordinated by, or with Della Porta, D., & Tarrow, S. (2005). Transnational pro-
test and global activism (Orgs). London: Rowman &
the participation of, former leaders from within Littlefield Publi.
the social movements (especially in the cases of Di Marco, G., & Palomino, H. (2004). Reflexiones sobre
Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Bo- los movimientos sociales en la Argentina. Buenos
livia). The pursuit of institutionalizing practices, Aires: UNANSAM.
Farro, A., Thaler, H. (2007). Planetary Culture and
that were previously autonomous, became a con- Protest. Roma: Anti-Globalization to Alter-Global
stant. A new official regulating framework made Movements
it possible to create innumerable innovations in Gohn, M., G. (2011). Movimentos e lutas sociais na
the field of democratic management. From these História do Brasil (6a ed.). São Paulo: Loyola.
Gohn, M., G. (2012a). Novas teorias dos movimentos
state practices, there arose a contradictory sce- sociais (4ª Ed.). São Paulo: Loyola.
nario in which entities that seek mere integration Gohn, M., G. (2012b). Movimentos sociais e redes de
of the excluded through communitarian partici- mobilizações civis no Brasil contemporâneo (5ª ed.).
pation in exclusively compensatory social poli- Petrópolis: Vozes.
Gohn, M., G. (2012c). Teorias dos movimentos sociais.
cies exist side by side with movements, networks Paradigmas clássicos e contemporâneos (10ª Ed.).
and social forums that seek social transformation São Paulo: Loyola.
through changes in the development model that Gohn, M., G. (2012d). Sociologia dos movimentos soci-
predominates in the country, inspired by a new ais. São Paulo: Cortez Ed.
Gohn, M., G. (2013). Movimentos sociais e redes de
civilizing model where the exercise of citizen- mobilizações civis no Brasil contemporâneo (7ª ed.).
ship, ethics, justice, and social equality can exist. Petrópolis: Vozes.
We conclude with a reminder from Rancière, Gohn, M., G. (2015). Manifestações de Junho de 2013
who when he criticizes the non-emancipating no Brasil e Praça dos Indignados no Mundo. (2ª ed.).
Petrópolis: Vozes.
forms of participation, created solely to establish Hessel, S. (2011). Indignai-vos! (3ª ed.). Lisboa: Ed
consensus and control, states that in these cases, Objectiva.
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Index
Symbols Ascencio, G., 146, 150, 152

#YoSoy132, 54, 65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74 Assemblies, 91, 202, 204, 322, 364
Assies, W., 138
A Auyero, J., 32, 51, 52, 118, 119, 120, 122, 211
Acosta, A., 139 Azuela, A., 233
Acuña, C., 338
Adelman, J., 45 B
Adriance, M., 110, 111 Baiocchi, G., 109, 212
Ahumada, C., 294 Baires, R., 250
Albert, B., 45 Ballvé, T., 36
Albro, R., 52 Banaszak, L.A., 277
Alcañiz, I., 51, 53 Bandy, J., 224
Alexander, J., 62, 68, 70, 71 Barndt, W.T., 52
Alexander, R.J., 45 Barrig, M., 38
Alfie Cohen, M., 230 Barrios, 195, 197, 198, 201
Allahwala, A., 97 Barron, D., 156
Almeida, Paul D., 335 Barton Bray, D., 226
Almeida, P.D., 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 33, 34, 36, 43, 44, 45, Baudrón, S., 208
46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 90, 96, 97, 107, 134, 152, 165, Bayat, A., 206
180, 192, 237, 238, 241, 246, 256, 262, 275, 284, Becker, M., 18, 98, 137, 139, 141
286, 292, 302, 305, 310, 315, 316 Béjar, S., 51
Almeyra, G., 53 Bellinger, P.T., Jr., 4, 180, 284
Alsayyad, N., 206 Benavides, H., 133
Althaus-Reid, M., 101, 109, 110 Benford, R.D., 61, 68, 318
Altman, D., 180 Benjamin, T., 145
Alvarez, R., 94 Benton, L., 207
Alvarez-Rivadulla, María José, 206, 210, 211 Berryman, P., 101, 104, 108
Alvarez, S.E., 3, 6, 25, 27, 49, 50, 52, 111, 232 Birdsall, N., 34
Amarante, V., 206, 210, 216 Bizberg, I., 45
Andolina, R.J., 137 Blake, C.H., 46, 48, 49, 50
Anner, M., 5, 323 Bob, C., 152, 161
Antonelli, M., 356 Bolivia, 3, 8, 17, 33, 52, 132, 137, 138, 139, 140, 371
Antonio, E., 101 constituent assemblies, 139
Arce, M., 3, 4, 51, 52, 180, 278, 284, 285, 286 history of, 29
Archer, M.S., 61 peoples of, 131, 362
Archila, M., 291, 292, 293, 294, 296 Bon Espasandín, M., 208
Arellano, M., 182 Booth, J.A., 49
Arellano-Yanguas, J., 283 Borgh, Chris van der, 250
Argentina, 3, 5, 7, 9, 17, 32, 364 Borland, E., 49
military regimes of, 54 Bouvier, V., 298
Argumedo, N.O., 252 Bravo, F., 275, 279
Arias, B., 140 Brazil, 7, 13, 30, 31, 46, 98, 101, 361, 362, 365
Arias, P., 104 history of, 109, 366
Arim, R., 216 leaders of, 93
Armbruster-Sandoval, R., 5 wave of mobilizations in, 368, 369, 370
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9912-6,
374 Index
Brett, R., 48, 49 military regimes of, 54

Brockett, C.D., 43, 48, 149, 277, 278 Christina, R., 231
Brooks, S., 106, 112 Cingranelli, D.L., 284
Brown, C., 50 Civil society, 19, 49, 137, 211, 308
Bruhn, K., 146 activism of, 280
Bruneau, T.C., 104 co-opting, 205
Bryk, A.S., 156 types of, 246
Brysk, A., 106, 107, 108 Civil Society
Burdick, J., 101, 110, 111, 112 variety of, 5
Burdick, M.A., 104 Clarke, G., 224
Burgwal, G., 211 Cleary, E.L., 44, 50, 101, 104, 105, 106, 110, 112
Bushnell, D., 292 Cleary, M.R., 280
Byrd, S., 93, 98 Clientelism, 7
limitations of, 118, 119
role of, 210
C
Close, D.S., 308
Caballero, M., 275, 279
Cloward, R.A., 277
Cabezas, O., 301
Codato, A.N., 49
Caffera, M., 206, 210
Cohen, J.L., 276
Caldeira, T.P., 35
Colburn, F.D., 285
Calder, B., 105, 108
Collective action frames, 66, 68, 319
Calderón, F., 65, 66
application of, 74, 75
Calla, R., 140
Collier, D., 45, 47, 48, 206
Calvert, P., 45
Collier, G.A., 145, 146, 150, 152
Calvert, S., 45
Collier, R.B., 45, 47, 49
Calvo, E., 122
Collombon, M., 307
Canel, E., 205, 211, 212, 214
Colombia, 3, 9, 35, 291, 295, 297
Carabias, J., 225
contentious politics in, 291, 292
Caracas, 91, 92, 97, 195, 199
history of, 298
Cárdenas, N., 45
Colombian politics and society, 293
Cardoso, F.H., 19
Conaghan, C.M., 281
Carey, S.C., 43
Conflict, 3, 6, 7, 28, 112, 245
Carlsen, L., 19
church-state, 105
Carr, B., 45
classification of, 282
Carruthers, D.V., 224, 225
definition of, 63
Cartagena, Rafael E., 238, 241, 244, 250, 251, 252
environmental, 237, 238, 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 252,
Carter, M., 31, 109
279
Casanova, J., 112
model of, 112
Castañeda, J., 35
region of, 146, 147, 150, 152, 160, 161
Castells, M., 206
transformation of, 8
Catholic church, 7, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 109, 112,
types of, 282
308, 324
with class, 32
Cavendish, J., 108
Conservation, 5, 225, 248, 266, 267
Ceballos Ramírez, M., 104
Contentious politics, 63, 64, 119, 127, 229, 232, 233,
Cecilio, M., 210
275, 291, 292, 293
Cerrutti, M., 119
literature of, 278
Chacón, V., 265
Corbeil, J.R., 92
Charles, P., 151, 278
Cordero, A., 3, 7, 265, 267
Charles, R., 205
Cornelius, W.A., 206
Charles, T., 4, 152
Coronil, F., 33
Chase-Dunn, C., 14, 16
Correa, G., 296
Chaves, M., 112
Corredor, C., 296
Chávez, D., 211
Corruption, 35, 63, 65, 67, 362, 369
Chiapas, 4, 145, 155
definition of, 68
zapatista
Coser, L., 20
movement of, 8
Costa Rica, 3, 4, 6, 255, 256
uprising in, 16
environmentalism, typology of, 257, 258
Chile, 7, 8, 17, 18, 35, 46, 179, 180
environmental movement
DEMRE-university of, 184
overview of, 268
episcopacies of, 104
trajectory of, 262
exception of, 17
Index 375
environmental struggles, historical framework of, 260, Duque, J., 293

261 Durand, L., 224
Cox, C., 182, 184
Crabtree, J., 37, 138 E
Craig, A.L., 149 Earl, D., 53
Cress, D.M., 151, 277 Earl, J., 43, 153, 324
Crisp, B.F., 50 Eckstein, S., 32, 34, 36, 43, 44, 50, 52, 206
Cross-movement dialogues, 91 Ecology, 225, 229
Cultural critical, 258, 264
analysis, 62, 63, 64, 74 Economic crisis, 5, 170, 205, 216, 307, 369
artifacts, 64, 66, 69, 74 Ecuador, 3, 5, 8, 19, 20, 33, 45, 93, 131, 132, 133, 135,
performances, 61, 91 136, 137, 140, 361, 371
Culture, 27, 36, 62, 105, 201 movements of, 141, 142
political, 281, 368, 370 Education, 6, 8, 34, 37, 184, 296, 366
role of, 64 conditions of, 156, 181
sociology of, 61 general law of, 187
Cycle of protest, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 152, 161 non-formal, 368
Einwohner, R.L., 145, 149, 160
D Eisinger, P., 149, 151, 158, 160, 277
David, A., 151, 277, 318 Ejea G., 226
David, L., 284 Ejército zapatista de liberación nacional (EZLN), 18, 29,
David, S., 13, 149 50, 53, 145, 146, 147, 152, 157
Davies, J.C., 278 El Diario de Hoy, 238
Davis, D., 231 El salvador, 3, 5, 17, 46, 237, 251, 302
Davis, J.E., 61 Enríquez, L., 3
De Gregori, C.I., 48 Environmentalism, 18, 96, 237, 248, 258, 259, 260
Delamata, G., 356 communitarian, 259
Delamaza, G., 180 definition of, 224
de la Torre, C., 139 of the poor, 224, 232
Delgado, Á., 293, 295, 296 post-war, 252
Della Porta, D., 107, 151, 277, 278 state-originated, 258
Democracy, 13, 27, 49, 91, 137, 284 typology of, 257, 258
defense of, 313, 318, 319 Environmental movements, 52, 227, 232, 246, 256, 257,
deficit of, 73 268, 362
transformation of, 52 Eschle, C., 98
Democratic transition, 4, 49, 149, 182 Escobar, A., 7, 25, 27
Democratization, 35, 38, 47, 48, 49, 51, 105, 132, 180, Estela de Luz, 65, 73
205, 291 Estrada, M., 145
Desmarais, A.A., 107 Ewick, P., 61
Diani, M., 151, 224, 278
Dietz, H.A., 206, 211 F
Diez, J., 224, 229, 232 Facebook, 69, 71, 367
Digital artifacts, 73, 74 Falero, A., 216
DiMaggio, P.J., 62 Faletto, E., 19
Di Marco, G., 111 Fallas, O., 257, 260
Discrimination, 50, 97 Farthing, L., 138
status-group, 28 Favela, M., 47
Di Tella, T., 46 Feierabend, I.K., 152
Do Alto, H., 52, 140 Feoli, L., 52
Dodd, T.J., 46 Fernandes, B.M., 52
Doerr, N., 91 Fernández Fernández, D., 104
Domínguez, F., 21 Fernández-González, A., 257
Donoso Díaz, S., 182 Ferrauri Curto, M.C., 119
Donoso, S., 52, 187 Filgueira, C., 205, 206, 208
Donovan, M.C., 71 Fleet, M., 108
Dorr, D., 110 Flores, R., 248
Dosh, P., 214 Folchi, D., 248
Drogus, C.A., 109, 111, 112 Fontaine, G., 248
Dumoulin, D., 224, 230 Fontana, L.B., 18
376 Index
Foran, J., 17, 18, 107, 303 Guerrero, A., 133

Fournier, L., 260 Gutiérrez, F., 292
Foweraker, J., 49, 149 Gutierrez, G., 103
Foyer, J., 230
Francis, L.A., 13 H
Fraser, P., 52 Haber, P.L., 26
Freese, J., 156, 157 Hagopian, F., 49
Frente nacional de resistencia popular (FNRP), 4, 318, Hale, C.R., 37
319, 323, 324, 325 Hall, T.D., 14
Frente sandinista liberación nacional (FSLN), 48, 110, Halperin Donghi, T., 45
305, 306, 307, 309 Hammond, J.L., 31, 52, 92
history of, 301, 302, 303 Handelman, H., 211
Freston, P., 106 Harris, R.L., 90, 96
Frickel, S., 3 Harten, S., 138
Harvey, D., 208
G Harvey, N., 101, 107, 145, 150, 157
Gallardo, S.C., 229 Hayner, P.B., 48
Gamboa, L., 45 Healy, K., 132
Gamboa, R., 179 Hecht, S., 237
Gamson, W., 61, 71, 149, 335 Hellman, J.A., 47, 146, 152, 161, 275
Garay, L., 294 Henige, D., 14
Garcés, F., 139 Hernández, L., 226
Garcés, M., 48 Hewitt, L., 97, 98
García Castro, A., 48 Hewitt, W.E., 103, 104, 111
García de León, A., 146, 150 Higginbottom, A., 19
García Díaz, B., 45 Higgins, N.P., 145
García-Gorena, V., 229 Hipsher, P.L., 150, 211
Garrard-Burnett, V., 106 Hirales, G., 148, 152
Garuda, G., 50 Hirschman, A., 26
Gay, R., 211, 214, 215 Hochsteler, K., 223
Geffroy, C., 52 Hochstetler, K., 49
Gender, 27, 109, 110, 245 Hogenboom, B., 224, 229
Gerlach, A., 133, 134 Hombergh, Heleen van den, 238
Gilbert, A., 206 Honduras, 3, 4, 8, 46, 313, 316, 320
Gilbert, D., 303 Horn, G.-R., 103
Gilhodes, P., 291 Horton, L., 6, 262
Gill, A., 102, 104, 105, 112 Howard, P.N., 54
Gillespie, R., 49 Htun, M., 38
Gills, B., 16, 44 Hunt, S., 319
Giraudy, A., 121 Hurtado, O., 133
Giugni, M.G., 277 Hussain, M.M., 54
Globalization, 255, 267 Hyden, G., 213
forms of, 5, 97
opportunities of, 4, 5 I
threats of, 3, 4 Iglesias, S., 325
Godio, J., 45 Indigenous, 3, 5, 6, 52, 97, 98, 107, 131, 132, 139, 141,
Goffman, E., 68 166, 259
Gohn, M., 36, 365 explosion of, 105
Goldfrank, B., 109, 211, 212 goal of, 37
Goldstone, J.A., 4, 44, 132, 152, 180, 275, 284 non-violent, 52
Gómez-Baggethun, E., 244 pre-existing, 106, 266
Gómez-Barris, M., 48 roles of, 8
Goodwin, J., 44, 61, 150 Indigenous people, 8, 30, 36, 52, 133, 136, 139
Gorski, P.S., 112 Inequality, 17, 165
Grey, M., 101, 109 socioeconomic, 207
Grieb, K.J., 46 types of, 27, 40
Grimson, A., 119 Inglehart, R., 61
Guatemala, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 Ingram, H., 71
Gudynas, E., 249 Intercontinental youth camp, 91
Index 377
Isaacs, A., 133 parts of, 105, 108

Itkonen, T., 71 role of, 22
social movements
characteristics of, 361, 362, 363, 364
J
scenario of, 361
Jackson, J.E., 37
Latinobarómetro, 280
Jasper, J.M., 36, 61, 150
Lazar, S., 138
Jenkins, C., 293
Leal, F., 291
Jenkins, J.C., 150, 151, 278
Lebon, N., 111
Jiménez de la Jara, M., 184
Leff, E., 224
Joan, M.J., 224
Left governments, 101, 131, 139, 141, 142
Johnson, E.W., 3
Legorreta, María C., 146, 150, 152
Johnston, H., 6, 44, 49, 61, 62, 69, 72, 284
Legorreta, M.C., 145
Johnston, J.E., 36
Lernoux, P., 104
Judd, S.P., 106
Levine, D.H., 102, 104, 111
Juris, J., 91
Lewis, P.H., 49
Lewis, T., 51
K Leyva, X., 145, 146, 150, 152
Kaldor, M., 16 Liberation theology, 7, 101, 102, 105, 107, 108, 109,
Kampwirth, K., 306, 307 110, 111, 112
Kaneshiro, M., 92, 97 explanations of variation in, strength of, 103, 104, 105
Karides, M., 97, 98 origins of, 102, 103
Katrina, K., 324 Lichbach, M.I., 16
Katzenstein, M., 151 Linda brewster stearns, 241, 246, 315, 316
Kaztman, R., 206, 210 Linebaugh, P., 15
Keck, M.E., 152, 224 Lodola, G., 121
Keil, R., 97 Londoño, R., 293
Kelly, M.J., 50 Long, S.J., 156, 157
Kerswell, T., 91 López Castellanos, N., 306
King, G., 156 Lopez, E., 226
Kitschelt, H.P., 119, 149, 154, 276 López Maya, M., 36
Klandermans, B., 61 Loveman, M., 108, 111, 145, 149, 160
Klein, H.S., 45, 132 Lucero, J.A., 52
Kline, H.F., 44, 47, 293 Luke, D.A., 156
Koda, A.N., 98 Luna, J.L., 180
Kohl, B., 138 Luna, J.P., 180, 205, 210, 212, 216
Komadina, J., 52 Lynch Gamero, N., 276
Koopmans, R., 336
Korzeniewicz, R.P., 45, 46
M
Kovic, C., 101, 107
MacKinnon, M., 52
Krauze, E., 47
Macro-sociology, 26, 269
Kriesi, H., 149, 151, 154, 160
Maguire, D., 180
Krook, M.L., 38
Maier, E., 111
Kurtz, L.R., 104
Maiguashca, B., 98
Kurtz, M.J., 285, 286
Mainwaring, S., 49, 104, 108, 111
Kurzinger, E., 224
Maney, G.M., 6
Kurzman, C., 145, 149, 160
Mangonnet, J., 286
Markoff, J., 4
L Martha, G., 295
Labor flexibility, 4, 5, 165, 167 Martí i Puig, S., 304, 305, 308
Labrador, G., 250 Martin, B., 48
Lancaster, R.N., 108 Martínez Abarca, M., 140
Landinelli, J.E., 45 Martínez-Alier, J., 248
Land, K.C., 156 Martínez, N., 250
Landless movement (MST), 96, 366 Martínez-Torres, M.E., 107
Lanzara, G., 140 Martin, W.G., 15
La Prensa, 265 Massetti, A., 122
Larrea, G., 140 Mattiace, S.I., 146
Latin America, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, 25, 28, 31, Mazzei, E., 208
43, 44, 45, 49, 89, 102
378 Index
McAdam, D., 44, 108, 109, 149, 160, 206, 214, 275, Neuman, W., 67
276, 277, 291, 315, 318, 319 New global left, 19
McCarthy, J.D., 5, 153, 155, 277, 318 New social movements, 5, 6, 196, 224, 362
McGovern, A.F., 103, 110 Nicaragua, 3, 8, 17, 20, 301, 310
McMillan, J., 282 Niemeyer R.E., 16
McSherry, P., 54 Nieto, E.N., 69
Melucci, A., 276 Nieto, E.P., 69
Merino Perez, L., 226 Nohlen, D., 185
Merklen, D., 52, 119, 120 Nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 5, 134, 146,
Mexico, 3, 5, 7, 8, 18, 33, 35, 66, 93, 154, 224, 364 153, 159
Meyer, D.S., 4, 105, 149, 150, 154, 284, 315 Noonan, R.K., 145, 149, 160
Meyer, J.W., 8 Noronha, E.G., 32
Meza, V., 45, 46 North, L.L., 136
Microperformances, 67, 73, 74 Norton, A., 62
Mieres, P., 210 Novaro, M., 48, 49
Military Coup, 4, 313, 319, 368 Novelo, V., 45
Mining, 5, 8, 47, 224, 262, 265
open-pit, 317 O
Minkoff, D.C., 149, 151, 154 Oberschall, A., 145, 150
Mobilization, 3, 4, 7, 43, 192, 305 O’Connor, J., 258
anti-mining, 250, 251 O’Donnell, G., 48, 149, 151, 338
anti-neoliberal, 5, 139, 141 Olesen, T., 54
anti-nuclear, 229 Olivera, O., 51
comparison of, 282 Olson, M., 276
non-violent, 44 Ondetti, G., 30, 31, 52
social origins of grassroots, 245 Organizations, 3, 6, 31, 70, 136, 137, 166, 173, 229, 306
sources of, 279, 280, 282 alliance of, 314, 315
structures of social, 318 barrio-based, 198, 199
types of, 216, 217, 232 community-based, 198
wave of, 368, 369, 370 para-state, 308
Moksnes, H., 146, 152, 161 typology of, 246, 247
Mollard, E., 226 Ortega, D., 19, 307, 308, 310, 314
Molyneux, M., 48 Ortiz, D.G., 44, 48, 51
Moncayo, M., 296 Oxhorn, P., 285
Moore, W.H., 277 Özler, S.I., 211
Mora, M., 53
Morán, O., 248
Mora, S., 5 P
Moreira, C., 205, 210 Pacheco-Vega, R., 224
Mueller, C., 151 Pachón, M., 295
Mumme, S.P., 223 Paige, J., 31
Munck, G.L., 276 Pajuelo, R., 279
Muñoz Eraso, J.P., 141 Palacios, M., 293
Muñoz Ramírez, G., 53, 72 Palermo, V., 48, 49
Murillo, M.V., 122 Pallares, A., 135
Myers, D.J., 211 Pallister, E., 97
Panama, 3, 5, 8, 166, 173
Panizza, F., 210
N Parodi, J., 276
Nagle, R., 111 Partido de la revolución democrática (PRD), 148, 151,
Nahoum, B., 210 155, 160, 169
Nash, J., 29 Pastore, J., 34
Natalucci, A., 122 Pastor, M., 50
Navarro, A.C., 251 Paulson, S., 132
Navarro, M., 49 Pécaut, D., 291, 296
Navarro, Z., 52 Peña, M., 106, 111
Navia, P., 185 Pereira, A.W., 48, 49
Neoliberalism, 4, 16, 21, 51, 52, 133, 306, 325 Pereyra, S., 339, 352
popular opposition, 96, 97 Pereyra, Sebastián, 341
Neuhouser, K., 103, 104, 111 Pérez, G., 122
Index 379
Perrault, T., 51 Resource extraction, 8

Pescosolido, B., 29 Restrepo, A., 295
Peterson, A.L., 108 Revolucionario institutional (PRI), 47, 49, 71, 148, 151,
Peterson, B., 35 158
Petras, J., 44 Rice, R., 51, 52
Petrella, I., 110 Roberts, B.R., 13, 35, 213, 217, 278
Piattoni, S., 119 Roberts, K.M., 3, 180
Pickvance, C., 149, 150, 151, 160 Robinson, W.I., 6, 13, 16, 267
Pieper, C., 112 Robinson, William I., 337
Piera, A.P., 210 Rochon, T.R., 61
Pink tide, 13, 16, 17, 101 Rock, D., 44
Pinto Ocampo, M.T., 138 Rodé, P., 208
Piquetero movement, 52, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, Rodríguez, A., 298
126 Rojas, F., 296
Piven, F.F., 277 Romero, M., 292
Pizarro, E., 292 Romero, S., 67
Pizarro, R., 275 Rootes, C., 149, 153
Pleyers, G., 233 Rose, R.S., 49
Polanyi, K., 15, 141 Roskos, L.H., 98
Political Rosset, P.M., 107
economy, 25, 26, 32, 38 Rossi, F.M., 46, 51, 52, 53, 118, 122
opportunities, 46, 50, 53, 148, 149, 150, 160, 276, 277 Rothenberg, D., 48
organization, 14, 119, 122, 125, 364, 368 Rovira, G., 307
parties, 8, 46, 108, 179, 180, 185, 187, 188, 191, 369 Rubin, B., 29
sociology, 25, 26, 31, 40 Rucht, D., 149, 336
Politics, 3, 18, 28, 31, 54, 275, 279, 291 Rudé, G., 33
Polletta, F., 36, 61 Rus, J., 146, 152, 161
Pollution, 8, 229, 231, 237, 245, 248, 252, 268
Ponniah, T., 98 S
Portes, A., 13, 35, 206, 207, 209, 213 Saatchi, S., 237
Postero, N., 52 Sala de Touron, L., 45
Prashad, V., 36 Salas, B., 264
Prevost, G., 44, 49 Salazar, G., 48
Prévôt Schapira, Marie-France, 208 Salinas, D., 52
Protest, 34, 173, 278, 317 Salman, T., 48
anti-crime, 35 Sanders, T.G., 103
events, 9, 69, 153 Santana, P., 291, 298
explanations of, 282, 283, 284 Santos, C., 205
forms of, 366, 367, 368 Sanyal, A., 52
work-based, 31, 32 Sarmiento, F., 297
zapatista cycle of, 146, 147, 148 Scheier, M., 51, 53
Public policies, 118, 227, 366, 368 Schiller, H., 45
Public transportation, 316 Schmitter, P.C., 151
Schneider, A., 71, 109
Q Schneider, C.L., 208, 211
Quaratiello, E.L., 145, 146, 150, 152 Schock, K., 150
Quirós, J., 119, 120, 122 Schodt, D.W., 133
Schofer, E., 8
Schulz, Markus S., 146, 152
R
Schuster, Federico L.Y., 341
Rama, G., 210
Scott, J.C., 33
Ramirez, F., 38
Scott, W.R., 104
Ramírez, M., 297
Segovia, C., 179
Rasler, K., 145, 149, 152, 156, 158
Selveston-Scher, M., 133
Raudenbush, S.W., 156
Semanario-Voces, 210, 216
Raventos, C., 4
Semiperipheral development, 14, 17, 20
Rediker, M., 15
Shefner, J., 4
Reese, E., 16, 19, 95, 96
Shugart, M.S., 154
Religion, 68, 94, 101, 105, 112, 369
Sidney, T., 284
Resistance to neoliberalism, 90, 96, 256
380 Index
Sigmund, P., 104 Terhorst, P., 5

Sikkink, K., 48, 152, 224 Territorial politics, 123
Silbey, S., 61 Thiesenhusen, W.C., 104
Silva, E., 4, 51, 54, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 180, Thomas, M., 44
282, 286, 316 Thompson, E.P., 33
Silva, Eduardo, 348 Threats, 3, 4
Silva, G., 294 Ticona, E., 133
Silva, Nelson do Valle, 34 Tilly, C., 27, 44, 107, 151, 158, 160, 206, 214, 278, 284,
Simmel, G., 29 324, 335
Simmons, E., 3 Tilly, L., 27
Simonelli, J., 53 Toche, E., 279
Simonian, L., 224 Toledo, V.M., 225, 226
Sitrin, M.A., 52, 53 Torres, B., 224, 229
Skidmore, T.E., 49 Torres, C.A., 104
Skurski, J., 33 Touraine, A., 269, 276, 278
Smilde, D.A., 110 Trejo, G., 53
Smith, B.H., 104, 108 Tuaza, L., 141
Smith, C., 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 112
Smith, J., 5, 7, 89, 91, 92, 93, 153, 224 U
Smith, L.D., 13 Umlas, E., 224, 229
Smythe, E., 90, 92, 93, 98 Urrutia, M., 291
Snow, D.A., 61, 68, 107, 278 Uruguay, 3, 6, 46, 54, 108, 361, 364, 371
Social
classes, 27, 261
movements, 6, 7, 25, 101, 169, 199, 293, 294, 295, 364 V
assembly, 91 Valderrama, M., 296
Sosa, E., 316 Valdivia, G., 51
Soule, S.A., 107 Valencia, E., 45
Spalding, R.J., 48 Valencia, L., 294
Spivak, G.C., 364 Valencia, V., 247
Spronk, S., 5, 51, 52 Valenzuela, S., 54
Squatters, 213 Vallier, I., 103, 104
Stafanoni, P., 140 Van Cott, D.L., 132, 180, 277
Stahler-Sholk, R., 3, 36, 44, 52 Vanden, H.E., 44, 49
State-movements relations, 45, 46, 47 Vargas, V., 97, 98
State repression, 43, 44, 45 Vatican II, 104, 105
Stearns, L.B., 192 Veiga, D., 208
Steigenga, T.J., 101, 105, 106, 110 Velasco, M., 291
Steinberg, M.W., 61 Velázquez Guzmán, M.G., 229
Stephen, L., 146 Velázquez, M.A., 233
Stern, S.J., 48, 131 Vélez-Ibáñez, C., 38
Stewart-Gambino, H., 101, 104, 110, 112 Veltmeyer, H., 44
Stewart, J., 54 Veneziano Esperón, A., 211, 212
Stokes, S., 206, 214 Venezuela, 5, 13, 17, 18, 19, 33, 98, 196, 198, 364
Strikes, 298 Viana, I., 210
Stromquist, N.P., 52 Víctor y teresa cabrera espinoza, 275, 279
Stryker, S., 61 Vidal, J., 296
Suárez, L., 104 Villalón, R., 51, 53
Svampa, M., 337, 339, 351, 356, 364 Villamide, J., 210
Szasz, A., 248 Viola, E., 49, 251, 252
Viterna, J.S., 4, 48, 108, 111, 321
Vitullo, G., 365
T Von Bulow, M., 5
Taagepera, R., 154
Tarrow, S., 31, 40, 44, 132, 142, 149, 210, 216, 217,
224, 277, 284, 315 W
Taylor, V., 256 Wade, Christine J., 237
Teague, M., 19 Walker, E, 34
Teivainen, T., 90 Wallerstein, I., 15, 17
Tejada Sánchez, E., 275 Walter, K., 46
Tenorio, L., 266 Walton, J., 4, 13, 33, 205, 206, 209, 211
Index 381
Warren, K.B., 37 X
Webber, J.R., 51, 52 Xojobal, M., 153
Weber, M., 27, 33
Weitz-Shapiro, R., 121 Y
Whitten, N., Jr., 36 Yamane, D., 112
Wiarda, H.J., 44, 47 Yashar, D.J., 105, 106, 107, 133, 135, 137, 277
Wickham Crowley, T.P., 31, 36, 43, 44, 52 Ycaza, P., 45
Wilde, A., 104 Young, M.P., 61, 112
Wilde, M.J., 104 YouTube, 69, 71, 72
Wiley, N., 28
Willdavsky, A., 61
Willis, P.K., 98 Z
Wolfe, J., 45 Zald, M.N., 277, 278
Wolff, J., 137 Zamosc, L., 133, 137, 291
Wolford, W., 31, 52, 101, 109 Zapata, F., 45, 46, 47
Wolfsfeld, G., 71 Zapatista, 16, 29, 89, 90, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150,
Women’s movements, 97, 98, 308 156, 157
Wood, E.J., 48, 49, 108 Zegada, M.T., 134, 137
Wood, L., 91, 92 Zelaya, M., 18, 313, 314, 317, 319, 320, 325
Workers’ party, 90, 98, 108, 109 Zibechi, R., 52, 320
World revolution, 15 Zoido, P., 282
World social forum (WSF), 5, 7, 19, 89, 368 Zuazo, M., 140
World-system position, 14, 17, 20
Wright, A.L., 52
Wright, T.C., 33, 48

Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America

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Handbooks of Sociology and Social

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015940753

Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer Netherlands is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Part I Introduction: Movements Across Latin America

1 Social Movements Across Latin America�������������������������������������� 3

Part II Conceptual and Theoretical Advances

2 Social Movements and Progressive Regimes in

3 “There and Back Again”: Latin American Social

4 State Repression and Mobilization in Latin America������������������� 43

5 Protest Artifacts in the Mexican Social Movement

Part III Critical Themes in Contemporary Popular Mobilization

6 Women’s Movements in Latin America����������������������������������������� 79

7 Latin American Social Movements and the Social

8 Liberation Theology and Social Movements��������������������������������� 101

9 Beyond Clientelism: The Piquetero Movement and the

Part IV Indigenous-Based Struggles Across the Continent

10 Indigenous Peoples’ Movements, Developments, and Politics

12 Panama: Worker, Indigenous, and Popular Uprising

Part V Urban-Based Movements in South America

14 Urban Social Movements in Venezuela����������������������������������������� 195

15 Squatters and Politics in Montevideo at the Turn

Part VI Environmental Conflicts

16 The Environmentalism of NGOs Versus Environmentalism

17 Environmental Conflicts and Social Movements in

18 Forest, Water, and Struggle: Environmental Movements

Part VII Country Case Studies

19 Protest and Social Movements in Peru������������������������������������������ 275

20 Social Movement Contention in Colombia, 1958–2014���������������� 291

21 Social Movements in Nicaragua (1979–2014):

22 The Movement Against the Coup in Honduras����������������������������� 313

23 Guatemalan Social Movements: From the Peace Process

24 Trends of Social Protest in Argentina: 1989–2007������������������������ 335

25 Brazilian Social Movements in the Last Decade��������������������������� 361

Paul Almeida University of California, Merced, CA, USA

Maria da Glória Gohn UNICAMP/ CNPq, Campinas, Brazil

Christopher Chase-Dunn, Alessandro Morosin

C. Chase-Dunn () · A. Morosin · A. Álvarez

Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley and Susan Eva Eckstein

In the early 1990s publication of The Making Perspectives and Contributions

Protests over Access to Higher

arrays of collective resistance—for all aggrieved References

Introduction (i.e., do they pose a serious threat to the regime or

their transitions to electoral democracies, the Incipient Nations: Social Movements

Ligia Tavera Fenollosa and Hank Johnston

complex and reticulated character of interpreta-

The Estela de Luz (the Stela, or Monument of

into the present through the resignification of the Estela. -una-estela-de-oscuridad.

The emergence of oppositional signification municipal policy issue—but it quickly morphed

de 2012, p. 5. 14 La Organización Editorial Mexicana publishes 70

Introduction are further undermined by limitations they face

Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, Natasha Radojcic, Ellen

Introduction The Origins and Development of the

of survey respondents had 16 or more years of

unemployed workers’ protests in Argentina, the

among Argentina’s experts. Additional insights can be

living in Amazonian regions, were considered Ayoreos, Guarayos, and Guaraníes.

bilization policies and a renewed determination focused on gaining government employment

The Correa administration’s efforts to sever Indigenous Movements and Karl

Introduction worked as opportunities for the Zapatista cycle

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2 Social Movements and Progressive Regimes in

3 “There and Back Again”: Latin American Social

4 State Repression and Mobilization in Latin America�� 43

5 Protest Artifacts in the Mexican Social Movement

6 Women’s Movements in Latin America�� 79

7 Latin American Social Movements and the Social

8 Liberation Theology and Social Movements�� 101

9 Beyond Clientelism: The Piquetero Movement and the

10 Indigenous Peoples’ Movements, Developments, and Politics

12 Panama: Worker, Indigenous, and Popular Uprising

14 Urban Social Movements in Venezuela�� 195

15 Squatters and Politics in Montevideo at the Turn

16 The Environmentalism of NGOs Versus Environmentalism

17 Environmental Conflicts and Social Movements in

18 Forest, Water, and Struggle: Environmental Movements

19 Protest and Social Movements in Peru�� 275

20 Social Movement Contention in Colombia, 1958–2014�� 291

21 Social Movements in Nicaragua (1979–2014):

22 The Movement Against the Coup in Honduras�� 313

23 Guatemalan Social Movements: From the Peace Process

24 Trends of Social Protest in Argentina: 1989–2007�� 335

25 Brazilian Social Movements in the Last Decade�� 361

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