Crim Cases de Leon To Guillen

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179943 June 26, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon
Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta
and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security
guard; all employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were
on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station.3
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the driver’s side in order to
take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw through the
lowered window shield that there were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to
fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank. After doing this, he returned the key to the driver. While
returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle would not start.4 Eduardo Zulueta
offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra
III were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the
same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun
and .38 caliber pistol.5
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,6 while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near the Car
Wash Section.7 At that instance, guns were poked at them.8
Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet
containing a pawnshop ticket and ₱50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape
with a gun.9
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth
₱3,000.00.10 Those four robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.11
Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin Macahis' service firearm.12
After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately
leave the place.13 The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.14
When the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the
robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the
stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin Macahis to the
hospital.15 Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound.16
The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a gun at
him.17
However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his Tita Emma at
Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of January 6, at
approximately 9 o'clock, appellant asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine
Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger brother, accompanied appellant to the terminal.
While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant
and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to
hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other
passengers in the said vehicle.18
When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not allowed to do
so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road,
appellant fell asleep. When he woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia
and the other passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do
anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the gunshots, Christian Gersalia and
the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way, they were
followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then
that the vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him
behind. When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.19
As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against
appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes,
an alias "Rey," an alias "Jonard," an alias "Precie," and an alias "Renato," which read as:
Criminal Case No. 4747
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias " Precie" and Alias "Renato" whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and
mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band,
with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using
disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C.
Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings worth ₱3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of
said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of ₱3,000.00 and on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused
his death.
Contrary to law.
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating , together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias " Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring and
with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using
disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the
Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal
and carry away the following, to wit:
a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00
b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00
c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00
d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00
e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00

to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱4,325.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery,
the above-named accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and
confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex
Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his
death.
Contrary to law.
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and
means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal, and carry
away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with serial number 13265 valued at ₱12,000.00 owned by
Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its General Manager Alberto T.
Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in the
aforesaid amount of ₱12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused,
while armed with unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with
Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey",
Alias "Jonard", Alias " Precie" and Alias "Renato", whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his
trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring and
means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a gasoline
boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and
carry away the following to wit:
a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued
at ₱2,000.00
b) Cash money worth ₱50.00
to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery,
the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and
confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex
Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his
death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea
of not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad,20 then officer-in-charge of
Energex Gasoline Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis,21 a cousin of the deceased
security guard Edralin Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,22 a gasoline boy of the same gas station;
Eduardo Zulueta,23 also a gasoline boy of the same gas station, and Alberto Quintos,24 general
manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the deceased security guard was employed.
The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo,25 a cousin of
appellant and the appellant26 himself.
On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision27 convicting appellant beyond reasonable doubt
of all the charges against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date,
remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death,
taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an
aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned by Regino Natividad and represented
by Macario C. Natividad the amount of ₱3,000.00 as compensatory damages and to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable
aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;
ground of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the
aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
death indemnity; to pay ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if
restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further
aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery, in the amount of ₱2,050.00
as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer possible and to pay the
costs.
As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-large, let a
warrant of arrest be issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives
without prejudice to their reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.
As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias
"Jonard," Alias "Precie and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and are still at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without
prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification and apprehension of the said accused.
SO ORDERED.
The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,28 in conformity with the
Decision dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo
y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more
particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals
from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this Court, en banc dated September 19, 1995, in "Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's
power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and
allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court. This Court
transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The CA, on June 29, 2007,29 affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the dispositive
portion reading:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y
Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of only
one count.
Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty imposed upon
Marlon de Leon y Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,30 the penalty imposed being reclusion
perpetua.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu
of the Supplemental Brief31 dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental
brief, considering that appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a
supplemental brief.
Appellant filed a Manifestation32 on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and adopts his
Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.
Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME CHARGED
WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.
The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,34 insisted that all the elements of the crime and the appellant's
participation in the crime had been established.
Appellant, in his Reply Brief,35 argued that the penalty should not be death, but only reclusion
perpetua, because the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the
Information, was not alleged with specificity.
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
In People v. De Jesus,36 this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with homicide, thus:
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence
of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.37
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.38 The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life.39 The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes
or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration.40 There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or
simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would
still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
"homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal
property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of
the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the
property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered
by the owner.41 The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or
amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the
victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or
value involved.42
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears
that they endeavored to prevent the same.43
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty
only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with
homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery.
One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer
repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.44
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the
homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.
From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There was no mistaking from
the actions of all the accused that their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on
occasion of such robbery, a homicide was committed. The question now is whether there was
conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant, the prosecution failed to prove that
he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to appellant's argument.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is
proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.45 The prosecution was able to prove the presence
of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.
Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:
Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court whether those two (2) persons
who poked their guns at you were (sic) present now?
A: Only one, sir, and there he is.
(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the name of MARLON ALBERT
DE LEON when asked.)
Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon was guarding you?
A: His gun was poked at me, sir.
Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside from that?
A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.

Q: What else, Mr. Witness?
A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.
Q: Who hit you with a gun?
A: His other companion, sir.46
Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:
Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section and hit him, was he also
armed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?
A: Also .38 caliber, sir.
Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and ordered Zulueta to go to the
carwash section?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly point to him?
A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Marlon Albert de Leon).47
Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a
conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate
and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective
effort to achieve their common criminal objective.48 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,49 since all the conspirators are principals.
As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-settled rule in
this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the
result of the case.50
For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence during the
commission of the crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting
that he was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself
from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.51 Appellant offered no
evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to
prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the
defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct
them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive
evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.52
Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery with
homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from one criminal
resolution, which is to rob. As decided53 by the Court of Appeals:
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts
but all arising from one criminal resolution.54 Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime
committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.55
In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that is the
Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and
valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances
are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.56 This can be said of the case at hand.
Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,57 wherein the robbery that took place in several
houses belonging to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as
separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of the general plan to despoil all
those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor General argued that the [appellant] had committed
eight different robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and different acts of spoilation in
different houses, with several victimized persons.58 The Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that the
perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one another.59 Thus, the single
offense or crime.
Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision60 merely states that, in view of
the enactment of R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically
commuted to reclusion perpetua, but is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.1avvphi1
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same
Code provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one
aggravating circumstance.61 It must be remembered that the Informations filed with the RTC alleged
the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special
and not a generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by this
Court in Palaganas v. People:62
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned
in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the
effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to
the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven
during the trial in order to be appreciated.63 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to
increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to
the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged.64 It must
always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated.65 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating
circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it
CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance
provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,66 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,67 which is a
special law. Its pertinent provision states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to whether it
is generic or qualifying."68 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in
favor of the accused."69 Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner
compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and
increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an
unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance.70
This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic
Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered
as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.71 Republic Act No.
8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April
1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be
designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating
circumstance.
In another case,72 this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony,
even without the presentation of the firearm.73 In the said case, it was established that Elmer and
Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of
the slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle
and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant therein as one of
those who were holding a long firearm. It was also established that the same appellant was not a
licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the
use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of unlicensed
firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of
the firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm
holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to present written or testimonial evidence to
prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service
firearm if restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were
never proven during the trial. Hence, this Court's rulings74 on temperate damages apply, thus:
In People vs. Abrazaldo,75 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for
funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate
damages may be awarded in the amount of ₱25,00076 This doctrine specifically refers to a situation
where no evidence at all of funeral expenses was presented in the trial court. However, in instances
where actual expenses amounting to less than ₱25,000 are proved during the trial, as in the case at bar,
we apply the ruling in the more recent case of People vs. Villanueva77 which modified the Abrazaldo
doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that "when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount
to less than ₱25,000, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual
damages of a lesser amount." To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the victim’s
heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount less than ₱25,000 would be in a
worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to
₱25,000 temperate damages.78
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the
victim, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to the other civil indemnities and damages
adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERIO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’ Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate Justices Remedios S. Fernando and
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-23.
2 Penned by Judge Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now Justice of the Court of Appeals); CA rollo, pp. 36-54.
3 Records, pp. 206-209.
4 Id. at 207-208.
5 Id, at 206 and 208.
6 Id. at 206.
7 Id. at 208.
8 Id. at 206 and 208.
9 Id. at 208.
10 Id. at 208-209.
11 Id. at 206.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 208.
14 Id. at 206
15 Id. at 208
16 Id. at 205.
17 Id. at 208.
18 Id. at 210 and 211.
19 Id. at 211.
20 TSN, May 4, 2000.
21 TSN, May 11 and December 14, 2000.
22 TSN, May 18, 2000.
23 TSN, May 25 and June 7, 2000.
24 TSN, September 6 and 21, 2000.
25 TSN, May 3, 2001.
26 TSN, May 30, 2001 and July 3, 2001.
27 Records, pp. 203-219.

28 Rollo, p. 2.
29 Id. at 3-23.
30 Id. at 28
31 Id. at 29-30
32 Id. at 32-33.
33 CA rollo, pp. 66-94.
34 Id. at 122-145.
35 Records, pp. 152-156.
36 G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384.
37 Id. at 401-402, citing People v. Pedroso, 391 Phil. 43, 56 (2000).
38 People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67; People v. Abuyan, G.R. No. 77285,
September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582.
39 People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639.
40 People v. Mangulabnan, 99 Phil. 992 (1956).
41 See People v. Puloc, G.R. No. 92631, September 30, 1991, 202 SCRA 179, 186.
42 People v. Corre, Jr., 415 Phil. 386, 398 (2001).
43 People v. Carrozo, 396 Phil. 764, 782 (2002) People v. Pedroso, supra note 37; People v. Verzosa, G.R.
No. 118944, August 20, 1998, 294 SCRA 466.
44 People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545, 561 (2000).
45 People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 740, citing People v. Furugganan,
193 SCRA 471 (1991).
46 TSN, May 20, 2000, pp. 7-8.
47 TSN, May 18, 2000, p. 6.
48 People v. Tulin, 416 Phil. 364, 386 (2000).
49 People v. Quinicio, 417 Phil. 571, 586 (2000).
50 People v. Yatco, 429 Phil. 163, 173 (2000), see also People v. Boquirin, 432 Phil. 722, 728, 729 (2002),
People v. Taboga, 426 Phil. 908 (2002).
51 People of the Philippines v. Felipe dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, citing People v.
Dominador Werba, 431 SCRA 482 (2004); People v. Morial, 363 SCRA 96 (2001).
52 People v.Werba, supra, at 495.
53 Rollo, pp. 20-21.
54 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One (Fourteenth Ed., Revised 1998) p. 671.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 No. L-1745. May 23, 1950. En Banc. Listed as unpublished in 88 Phil. 784. Supreme Court Unpublished
Decisions (Volume 1), Judge David Nitafan and the Editorial Staff of the Central Lawbook Publishing Co.,
Inc., pp. 349-354.
58 Id. at 354.
59 Id.
60 Rollo, p. 22.
61 People v. Montinola, 413 Phil. 176, 192 (2000).
62 G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533, 557-559.
63 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Secs. 8 and 9.

64 People v. Agguihao, G.R. No. 104725, March 10, 1994, 231 SCRA 9, 21.
65 CA rollo, pp. 41-42; TSN, July 27, 1998, pp. 2-8.
66 CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,

ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING STIFFER
PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.
67 AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED:
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION
OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.( 6 June 1997)
68 Rollo, pp. 71-72.
69 Id. at 72.
70 Id.
71 People v. Malinao, G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34, 51; People v Castillo, 382 Phil.
503 (2002); People v. Lumilan, 380 Phil. 133, 145 (2000).
72 People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 174775, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 656.
73 People v. Malinao, 467 Phil. 432 (2004).
74 People v. Werba, supra note 51, at 499.

75 G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003, 397 SCRA 137.
76 Id.
77 456 Phil. 14 (2003).
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff�Appellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS

�MACHETE,� Accused�Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA�G.R.
CR�H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Para�aque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03�0763 to 03�0765, finding herein appellant
Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias �Machete� guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape,
thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to
pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each
count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Para�aque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above�named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who
took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or
intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent.
(Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against him.5
Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection
Unit, University of the Philippines �Philippine General Hospital (UP�PGH), who examined the victim.
The testimonies of the above�named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at
around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was
walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Para�aque City, two (2)
barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being
arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA�s companions, however,
managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods
to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested
that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA�s plea, however,
remained unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay
Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The
appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the
one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be
the one to bring AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San
Dionisio, Para�aque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once
she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle.
AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then
took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at
AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down
on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA�s vagina despite the latter�s plea not to rape her.
Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant,
once again, inserted his penis into AAA�s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the
appellant inserted again his penis into AAA�s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped
and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should
she tell anyone about what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in
Para�aque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should
she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply
advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and
her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan,11
which resulted in the following findings:
HYMEN Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o�clock area with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9
o�clock area with eccymosi at 8�10 o�clock area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic
� �
xxx �
� �
ANAL EXAMINATION Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 o�clock area. No evident injury at
the time of examination.
� �
xxx
IMPRESSIONS
� Disclosure of sexual abuse.

Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn statement
accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her assailant because the
former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with �Barangay Police,�as well as a Barangay Identification
Card, at the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuz�s direct examination, however, the parties made the following stipulations: (1)
that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and
he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to
12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o�clock a.m.;
and (3) that when he woke up at 5:00 o�clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these
stipulations, Corpuz�s testimony was dispensed with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a
different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall. His
task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls
from fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same day, he received a call from
his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that
transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he denied
that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he
was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of their
barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the
appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was
shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical, straightforward
and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the
appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266�A, in
relation to Article 266�B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court,
thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266�a par. 1(a) in relation to
Art. 266�B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis
and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial court�s Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION�S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24
August 2009 sustaining appellant�s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages
awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed that the appellant
succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAA�s vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one
after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating
his lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal briefs23 filed
with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation
attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged
sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her ordeal despite
the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus,
had all the opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human
experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility as a
witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA�s medical examination is quite disturbing as it
appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to this effect
in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period
of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit
three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a
single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages awarded in
favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime,
only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the complainant.
Following the above principles, this Court is duty�bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive
evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to reverse
the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266�A, in
relation to paragraph 2, Article 266�B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These provisions
specifically state:
ART. 266�A. Rape; When and How Committed. �Rape is committed �
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266�B. Penalties. � Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1) when
force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of
such character as could not be resisted � it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that
the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into
submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with
death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as observed by the
trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA�s categorical, straightforward and positive
testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she
was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life
and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his
penis into AAA�s vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA�s plea not to rape her.
And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone
about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was
still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and
intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted
his penis into AAA�s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual
intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been
instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant�s
reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any
resistance to his evil desires. AAA�s lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would
not in any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected
to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is
not an essential element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist�s embrace because of fear for her
life and personal safety. The victim�s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make
voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape
victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.
Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAA�s credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the appellant
puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA�s medical examination disclosing that even her anal
orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to
appellant�s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA�s testimony. As
this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of
the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even
though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that
she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the
appellant. She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her to Kabuboy
Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun;
and successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the
first penetration the appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant, once again,
inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the
appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the
medical findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA�s vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a
clear evidence of �blunt force or penetrating trauma� � a disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses are totally
inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or intimidation
thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported by
clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who,
in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her
chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight.
While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellant�s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall doing
his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past
12:00 midnight, almost the same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2)
hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellant�s presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill�motive on the part of AAA to testify
falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA�s accusation since no woman would concoct a tale
that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her family, and submit
herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by
her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellant�s guilt for the crime of rape
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that
he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was
motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim�s vagina; he then withdrew it and
ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the
victim�s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard
of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim�s vagina and
continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein
for only one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in
the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the
crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one
continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote
with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape.
It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part
of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes
wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the
[appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not
motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in
satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant�s conviction for three
counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266�B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
that �[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.� As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in
order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and should not
be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral damages, on the other hand, is
automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the
crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for
each count of rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of the use
of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent
jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA�G.R. CR�H.C. No. 03371
dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay
AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Acting C.J., Del Castillo, Mendoza** and Leonen,*** JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Per Special Order No. 1644 dated 25 February 2014.
** Per Raffle dated 13 January 2014.
*** Per Special Order No. 1636 dated 17 February 2014.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Estela M. Perlas�Bernabe
(now a member of this Court) and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2�13.
2 Penned by Judge Jaime M. Guray. CA rollo, pp. 20�33.
3 This is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), wherein this
Court resolved to withhold the real name of the victim�survivor and to use fictitious initials instead to
represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims�survivors or any
other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their
immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. The names of such victims, and of their
immediate family members other than the accused, shall appear as �AAA,��BBB,� �CCC,�and so
on. Addresses shall appear as �XXX�as in �No. XXX Street, XXX District, City of XXX.�
The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality of proceedings
involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
known as Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act; Sec. 44
of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as Anti�Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04�10�11�SC, known as Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children effective 15 November 2004.
4 Records, pp. 1�3.
5 Per Certificate of Arraignment and RTC Order both dated 24 September 2004. Id. at 34 and 36�37.
6 Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 4�6.chanrobleslaw
7 Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, p. 7.
8 Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 6�7.
9 Testimony of AAA, id. at 7�10; Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, pp. 10�13.
10 Testimony of AAA, id. at 10.
11 Testimony of AAA, id. at 11�12; Testimony of Dr. Merle Tan, TSN, 24 June 2005, p. 6.
12 Per Medico�Legal Report Number 2003�04�0078. Records, p. 11; Id. at 9�18.
13 Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 13�16; Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 August 2009.
Rollo, p. 5.
14 RTC Order dated 13 September 2007. Records, pp. 119�120.
15 Testimony of the appellant, TSN, 7 September 2006, p. 5.
16 Id. at 3�4, 7�9 and 13�16.
17 CA rollo, p. 33.
18 Per Notice of Appeal dated 20 May 2008. Id. at 34.
19 Appellant�s Brief dated 16 December 2008. Id. at 48.
20Rollo, p. 12.
21 Per Notice of Appeal dated 11 September 2009. Id. at 14�15.
22 Id. at 29�30 and 38�40.

23 CA rollo, pp. 46�61 and 88�113.
24People v. Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 576, 583�584.
25 Id. at 584.
26 Id.
27People v. Javier, 370 Phil. 128, 145 (1999).
28People v. Ca�ada, G.R. No. 175317, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 392.
29 Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, p. 10.
30People v. Alberio, G.R. No. 152584, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 469, 475.
31People v. Linsie, G.R. No. 199494, 27 November 2013.
32People v. Mercado, 419 Phil. 534, 543 (2001).
33 Id.
34People v. Linsie, supra note 31.

35 438 Phil. 296 (2002).
36 Rollo, p. 12.
37People v. Montemayor, 444 Phil. 169, 190 (2003).
38People v. Dimaanao, 506 Phil. 630, 652 (2005).
39People v. Montemayor, supra note 37 at 190.
40People v. Linsie, supra note 31.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NOS. 136300-02. September 24, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMMANUEL AARON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732 convicting herein appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, of one count of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000 as
civil indemnity.
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined and penalized
under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,[2] respectively, in three separate criminal
complaints filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G. Grajo, and subscribed and sworn to on
January 17, 1998 before 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar M. Lasam. Save for their docket
numbers, the said criminal complaints are identically worded thus:
That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with the offended party JONA G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of the latter, to her
damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused, Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by counsel of his choice,
entered the plea of not guilty to each of the three complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and
6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning,
the private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed (papag) inside her room on the second floor of
the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her brother-in-law, herein appellant Emmanuel
Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a blanket. Sensing that someone was inside
her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally
naked. Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona and poked a knife on her neck. Jonas attempt to cry
for help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly covered her mouth with his left hand.[3]
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could only
manage to cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down on the floor.
He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife still poked on Jonas neck.
Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie down near the headboard of the papag bed
where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still armed with a knife, and continued
making pumping motions (umiindayog).[4]
After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only after
Jona told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself (Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang pantog ko.)
but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the incident. Jona quickly put on her panty and
hurried down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket covering herself. Her cries drew
the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the apartment,
to no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona
revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law,[5] the appellant herein.
Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the latters arrival from the market and she
related the misfortune that had befallen her. At that instance, Emmanuel approached and warned her
to be careful with her words. Then he left for the house of Bong Talastas.[6]
After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and dressed up. Thereafter, she went to the police
station in Balanga, Bataan to report the incident.[7] Police Officers Rommel Morales and Edgardo Flores
proceeded to the residence of the private complainant who appeared very tense but the neighbors
informed them that Emmanuel had left. The police officers then proceeded to the house of Bong
Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, where the victim told them Emmanuel could have possibly gone.
On arrival there, they found Emmanuel conversing with Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested
the appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity.[8]
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers Morales and Flores accompanied Jona to
the provincial hospital in Bataan for physical examination. Thereupon, the attending physician at the
Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6,
9 oclock position(s), incomplete type in Jona Grajos private part.
At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signature[9] appearing on the lower right portion of the
medical certificate[10] and affirmed the medical findings contained therein. The multiple hymenal
lacerations sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in the medical certificate as 1 oclock, 3
oclock, 5 oclock, 6 oclock and 9 oclock could have been caused by sexual intercourse, masturbation,
strenuous exercises or penetration of any hard object. The appearance of a lacerated hymen could
indicate the approximate time when the laceration was sustained. In the case of Jona Grajo, her
hymenal lacerations were completely healed, indicating that the same were sustained at least one
month before she was examined on January 16, 1998. However, it was possible that she had sexual
intercourse immediately before the said examination.[11]
The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron
testified that he and his wife were residing in an apartment unit together with his sister-in-law, herein
private complainant, Jona Grajo.[12] Jona occupied a room on the second floor while the couple stayed
at the ground floor.[13]
On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and Jona were the only persons inside the
apartment. He had just arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at Base One restaurant in Balanga,
Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00 oclock in the morning as Bong was preparing to leave
his house while his wife had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his clothes upstairs where the
cabinet was located opposite the room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door of Jonas
room was partly open so he peeped through the narrow opening and saw her wearing only a panty. He
was about to close the door when Jona woke up and began shouting.[14]
Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even followed as Emmanuel descended the
stairs and she proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel went her to the store to
caution Jona about her words (Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo) because she was telling their landlady that
he raped her. However, Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong Talastas in San Jose,
Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the latter why Jona was accusing him of having raped her. Emmanuel
denied that he was armed with a knife during the incident, much less threatened Jona with it.[15]
On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,[16] the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty
provided by law. The accused is further required to indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel Aaron interposed the instant appeal. In his
Brief,[17] appellant raised a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Appellant argues that the account of the private complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged incidents of
rape appears incredible and contrary to common human experience. Based on her testimony, the
appellant suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand poking a knife on her neck and with
his left hand covering her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant removed her panty and succeeded in
inserting his penis into her private part even without previously opening his zipper or removing his
pants. Likewise, the private complainant did not offer any resistance although she could have done so.
After the alleged acts of rape, the victim did not even complain to her sister who, by then, had already
arrived from the market. The uncharacteristic behavior of the private complainant could only be
explained by the fact that she admittedly had several sexual experiences in the past with her boyfriend
and live-in partner Bong Talastas. The appellant theorizes that private complainant wanted to get back
at him for the embarrassment of being seen by him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left
the apartment. Appellant downplays the testimony of PO1 Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence
for lack of corroborative evidence. [18]
On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the appellant was already naked even before the
private complainant was awakened by his presence; that the private complainant could not effectively
offer any resistance as the appellant was armed with a knife which he used to intimidate her; and that
the private complainants being a non-virgin did not discount rape on January 16, 1998.[19]
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.-- Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above are present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B of the same Code provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties.Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this Court is almost invariably guided by three
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution and (3) the evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[20] In other words, the credibility of the
private complainant is determinative of the outcome of these cases for rape. Her consistency on
material points, or lack of it, that can sustain or negate conviction, becomes the single most important
matter in inquiry.[21]
After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo, sufficiently
established all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal knowledge of a woman and
(b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.[22] The gist of private complainants
testimony clearly shows that the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at around 7:00
oclock in the morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual assault started on the papag bed inside her room
on the second floor of their apartment unit. After going on top of the private complainant, the appellant
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after which he made pumping motions while poking a
knife on her neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina two more times on the same
occasion after transferring locations inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.
We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of private complainants credibility.
Her testimony during the trial was completely credible as it was given in an honest and straightforward
manner. As noted above, she gave a lucid and consistent account of the commission of the crime and
did not waiver in pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant, as the perpetrator thereof. Likewise,
her actuation after the incident vividly portrayed a confused and traumatized woman typical of victims
of rape. Thus, after she broke free of the appellant on the pretense that she urgently needed to relieve
herself, the private complainant quickly put on her panty and rushed to the street with only a blanket to
cover her naked body. Her neighbors took note of her obviously troubled condition and admonished her
to go back inside the apartment but she refused, claiming that she had been raped. She sought refuge at
the nearby store of their landlady to whom she confided that she was raped by her brother-in-law.
Private complainant hurried back to their apartment to get dressed only upon making sure that the
appellant had already left the place. Without losing time, she proceeded directly to the police station
and lodged a complaint for rape against the appellant.
Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga, Bataan, who was the police officer on duty at the
time Jona Grajo came to the police station, recounted during the trial that the private complainant was
crying and trembling on arrival at the Balanga, Bataan police station on January 16, 1998. Private
complainant took time to answer the queries of the police officer since she was crying uncontrollably.
When she finally got hold of herself, the private complainant reported that she had been raped by the
appellant who was subsequently arrested by the police. The actuations of the private complainant
immediately after the incident may be considered as part of the res gestae that substantially
strengthens her claim of sexual assault by the appellant.[23]
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is bare denial. He claims that he had just
changed his clothes on the second floor of their apartment where his cabinet was located when he
chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her room as the door was then slightly ajar. He did
not do anything further as the private complainant was awakened and she already started shouting. In
view of the positive and convincing testimony of the private complainant, however, the defense of
denial must fail. It is well-settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[24]
The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have inserted his penis into the private part of the
complainant without first opening his zipper or removing his pants. This argument of the appellant is
misleading for the reason that, per the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was already
naked when his presence roused her from her sleep:
PROS. LASAM:
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do you remember of any incident that
happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident?
A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a person inside my room and when I opened my
eyes, I saw that he is my brother-in-law.
Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom you pointed a while ago. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your room?
A: He was naked sitting beside me. [25]
That the private complainant did not offer sustained resistance despite having been ordered twice by
the appellant to change location inside the room can easily be explained by the fact that the appellant
was threatening to stab her if she resisted. The private complainant was obviously overwhelmed by
intense fear when she woke up with a knife pointed at her neck. The continuing intimidation of private
complainant cowed her into helpless submission to appellants lechery. She could only express her
disgust over the sexual attack of her brother-in-law silently in tears. In this connection, it has been ruled
that physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is used on the victim and the
latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for her life and personal
safety.[26]
The failure of the private complainant to confide the sexual assault to her sister who, appellant claimed,
had arrived from the market before she (private complainant) went to report the matter to the police is
quite understandable and far from being uncharacteristic of a rape victim, as what appellant would like
to make it appear. The workings of the human mind which is under a great deal of emotional and
psychological stress are unpredictable and different people will react differently to a given situation.[27]
Besides, the private complainant did not want to drag her sister into the controversy and hurt her in the
process. During the trial, the private complainant revealed that she kept from her sister the previous
sexual advances of the appellant in order not to destroy their good relationship. Private complainant
explained that she did not leave the apartment despite the said harassments of the appellant inasmuch
as she had no other place to go. However, she confided her ordeal to their landlady, a certain Elsa
Navarro. At any rate, what is important is that the private complainant reported the rape immediately
to the police.
Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with a certain Bong Talastas[28] and that she was
not innocent to the ways of the world. However, such fact alone does not negate the commission of
rape by the appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that although the lacerations found in the
private part of Jona Grajo were completely healed, such fact did not discount the possibility that she was
sexually molested immediately before she was examined on January 16, 1998. We emphasize that moral
character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the offender in the crime of rape. The Court
has ruled time and again that even a prostitute can be a victim of rape[29] as the essence is the victims
lack of consent to the sexual act.
Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible motive that could have impelled the private
complainant to testify falsely against him.[30] In a desperate attempt to avoid any responsibility for his
crime, however, the appellant theorizes that the private complainant merely wanted to exact revenge
from him for the embarrassment she experienced when he chanced upon her clad merely in a panty
inside her room. This alleged motive on the part of the private complainant is too shallow to merit even
scant consideration from this Court. If appellant were to be believed, would not private complainant
have instead opted to keep quiet about the incident to spare herself from further embarrassment?
Common experience dictates that no woman, especially one of tender age, will concoct a rape
complaint, allow a gynecological examination and permit herself to be subjected to public trial if she is
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[31] Indeed, coming
out in the open with the accusation of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law inevitably entailed
risking her relationship with her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However, the rape simply
proved too much for her to bear.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape. It may
appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the
appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no indication in the records, as
the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside
the room where the crime was committed.
Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the appellant with the use of a deadly weapon,
the imposable penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on the appellant. She is also entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). And
due to the emotional distress suffered by the private complainant who was only nineteen years old at
the time of the rape, she is also entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000).[32]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of one count of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that said appellant shall pay an additional fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) by way of
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Judge Lorenzo R. Silva, Jr., Rollo, pp. 25-30.
[2] Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code on rape was repealed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 that took effect on October 22, 1997. The act expanded
the definition rape which was reclassified as a crime against persons and incorporated into Title VIII
under Chapter III of the Revised Penal Code as Articles 266-A, 266-B, 266-C and 266-D.
[3] TSN, dated February 6, 1998, pp. 4-6.
[4] Id., pp.7-11.
[5] Id., pp. 12-15.
[6] Id., pp. 16-19.
[7] Id., pp. 19-20.
[8] TSN, dated March 20, 1998, pp. 3-6.
[9] Exhibit A-1.
[10] Exhibit A; also Exhibit 1-a for the defense.
[11] TSN, dated February 27, 1998, pp. 3-8.
[12] TSN, dated June 9, 1998, p. 8.

[13] Id., p. 11.
[14] Id., pp. 4-6; 12.
[15] Id., pp. 6-7.
[16] See Note No. 1.
[17] Rollo, pp. 60-73.
[18] Appellants Brief, Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[19] Appellees Brief, Rollo, pp. 97-108.
[20] People v. Peres, 270 SCRA 526, 531 (1997); People v. Florendo, 230 SCRA 599, 602-603 (1994).
[21] People v. Pajarillo, G.R. No. 143755-58, February 20, 2002 citing People v. Malabago, 271 SCRA 464,
475 (1997); People v. Quitoriano, 266 SCRA 373, 376 (1997).
[22] The Revised Penal Code by Luis B. Reyes, Book II, Fourteenth Edition, 1998, p. 528.
[23] People v. Jaca, 229 SCRA 332, 337 (1994).
[24] People v. Burce, 269 SCRA 293, 314 (1997).
[25] TSN, dated February 6, 1998, p. 5.

[26] People v. Quiamco, 268 SCRA 516, 527 (1997); People v. Angeles, 222 SCRA 451, 462 (1993).
[27] People v. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693,706 (1997); People v. Gecomoo, 254 SCRA 82, 97 (1996).
[28] TSN, dated February 6, 1998, p. 26.
[29] People v. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189, 199 (1997).
[30] TSN, dated June 9, 1998, p. 9.
[31] People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246, 256 (1997).
[32] People v. Tabalesma, 277 SCRA 536, 549 (1997); People v. Joya, 227 SCRA 9, 28 (1993).
Today is Wednesday, July 25, 2018
Custom Search
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86728 April 6, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS VARGAS, JR. (AKA) "LUCKY", defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio A. Sindico for defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
It was at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 29, 1982, while Romeo Malones, Sr. was reading the
Bible by a kerosene lamp in his house at Barangay Banugan, Municipality of Dueñas, Iloilo, when his
house was sprayed with bullets causing his death as well as that of his daughter Rosalie, and physical
injuries to the remaining members of his family.
Romeo Malones, Jr. heard the first burst of gunfire that came from the back of the house. He was
resting in the extension of the house. His mother, brother and sisters were also resting in the receiving
room.
Romeo, Jr. peeped through the wall of bamboo strips (tadtad) and saw the brothers Jesus Vargas and
Fortunato Vargas firing at their house. They were armed with a long firearm and an armalite,
respectively. He recognized them because the moon was bright. It was a full moon and they stood only
about five (5) meters away from him. Besides, the Vargases were his relatives. Upon seeing them,
Romeo, Jr. lay flat on his stomach on the ground where his bed was situated, then he heard another set
of gunfire followed by many others. After the firing ceased he saw his father fall in the kitchen. He died
instantly. 1 His brother and sisters were also wounded. He told his mother what he saw and his mother
told him to inform his grandmother Leonora Malones and he did as he was instructed. The grandmother
went with him to the house. Simplicia Segura, Modesto Lorilla and some relatives came and brought the
victims to the hospital. His sister Rosalie died in the hospital. 2
Simplicia Segura was then the barangay captain of the barrio. When she learned about the incident she
immediately proceeded to the house of the Malones and she saw Romeo, Sr. already dead and the rest
of the family wounded. She conducted an investigation, and from her inquiries directed at those present
at the scene and the information furnished her by the victim's family, especially those of Florentino
Ladines and Romeo Malones, Jr., whom she interviewed, she learned that the person who was seen
armed at the time and who fired the shots at the house were Fortunato Vargas alias Nono and Jesus
Vargas alias Lucky. She knew the brothers personally ever since they were small boys. She also
remembered an untoward incident between the Vargas and the Malones family sometime in 1972 when
Romeo Malones, Sr. went to her to complain about an attempt on his life. Romeo, Sr. slept in her house
that night for fear of losing his life. The following morning she accompanied him to the police station to
report the incident.1âwphi1 The chief of police summoned Fortunato Vargas who appeared. Since
Romeo, Sr. was not wounded, upon suggestion of the chief of police the parties agreed to settle the case
amicably and Fortunato Vargas promised not to do it again.
At 11:00 o'clock in the morning of October 13, 1982, Dr. Melchor G. Tupaz, senior resident physician of
the Western Visayas Medical Center, attended to the Malones family for their wounds as follows:
a) Maribeth Malones for gunshot wounds in the right thigh and left leg (Exhibits "C" and "C-1 ");
b) Ronald Malones for abrasion in the anterior chest area (Exhibits "D" and "D-1");
c) Nona Malones for abrasions in the right thigh and left leg (Exhibits "E" and "E-1");
d) Sheila Malones for gunshot wound, through and through, in the lateral aspect of the left thigh.
The wound was serious and if not treated she "could have died secondary to hemorrhage" (Exhibits "F"
and "F-1");
e) Rosalie Malones for "head wound about 2 x 2 cm. right parietal area". There was no exit wound,
only entrance. "And when x-rayed there is extensive linear fracture at both parietal bone with single
irregular metallic density located at the soft tissue of the parietal area". She died in the emergency room
(Exhibits "G", "G-1 ", "H" and Tsn., August 25, 1986, pp. 2-11).
Dr. Ricardo H. Jaboneta, NBI medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the bodies of Romeo, Sr.
and Rosalie. 3 Romeo, Sr. died of four gunshot wounds in the liver, stomach and lungs.4 Rosalie Malones
died from one head wound.5
In due course, an information was filed against Fortunato Vargas and Jesus Vargas in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo. They were charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and attempted murder. In as much as the accused Fortunato Vargas was still at large, so only
the accused Jesus Vargas was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. The trial on the merits was
conducted at the termination of which a decision was rendered on June 24, 1988 finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jesus Vargas,
Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of —
a) Two separate murders for the fatal shooting of Romeo Malones, Sr. and Rosalie Malones for
which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each Murder;
b) Two separate less serious physical injuries for the gunshot wounds sustained by Maribeth and
Sheila Malones for which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of FOUR (4)
MONTHS of Arresto Mayor for each;
c) Two separate slight physical injuries for the abrasions suffered by Ronald and Nona Malones for
which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) DAYS of Arresto
Mayor for each;
d) To pay the surviving heirs of the deceased Romeo Malones, Sr., the sum of P30,000.00 as death
compensation and another sum of P30,000.00 for the heirs of the deceased Rosalie Malones as death
compensation;
e) To pay the surviving heirs of Romeo Malones, Sr., the sum of P9,983.70 by way of
reimbursement for funeral expenses; and,
f) To pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and,
g) To pay the costs.
The accused who is presently detained shall be credited with the entire period of his detention in
connection with this case.
This case was brought on automatic review to this Court as Jesus Vargas, Jr. was meted two life
sentences. Inasmuch as the death penalty may no longer be imposed under the 1987 Constitution so
that there is no more automatic review of capital offenses, the case is now treated as if it was brought
on ordinary appeal.
In this appeal the appellant raises the following errors:
THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED FOR ALL RESULTANT CRIMES AFTER FINDING THERE WAS
NO CONSPIRACY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROMEO MALONES, JR., THAT ACCUSED
WAS ONE OF TWO PERPETRATORS.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BY TREATING AS CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
CERTIFICATION OF PAGASA NOT INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL.
IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE ACCUSED DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The case of the prosecution must rise or fall on the strength of the testimony of Romeo Malones, Jr.
who was an eyewitness to the incident. The appellant argues that it could not have been possible that
upon hearing the gunshots Romeo, Jr. would still have the guts to stand up and peep to see who were
the assailants instead of lying flat on the floor to protect his life as any experienced Filipino soldier
would do. He also avers that it is not probable that he could have peeped through the bamboo walling
of the house when the wall of the house is of flattened bamboo known as tadtad which can hardly be
penetrated by wind, rain and light. He likewise states that even assuming that the moon was bright that
evening, the place where the two men were allegedly seen was darkened by the shadows of some
coffee plants.
Suffice it to say that Romeo, Jr. is not a Filipino soldier. He is a young man who was startled by the
gunshots. He stood up and looked through the slits of the wall of their house. Such bamboo poles when
dried would tend to shrink so that one inside could easily peep through the slits to see what is outside.
Romeo, Jr. also asserted that the moon was bright. As it was a full moon he had no difficulty recognizing
the two men. He testified as follows:
Q. While you were there resting in your house, could you please tell us if there was any unusual
incident that happened?
A. I heard bursts of firing.
Q. You said you heard bursts of firing. Where did it come from?
A. I heard bursts of firing coming at the back of our house outside the fence.
Q. When you heard bursts of firing, what did you do?
A. I observed.
Q. When you observed, what did you notice?
A. I saw two (2) men.
Q. What were those two (2) men doing that time?
A. They were firing at our house.
Q. These two (2) persons which you said you saw, do you know their names?
A Yes, sir.
Q. Who were the names of those two (2) persons?

A. Fortunato Vargas and Jesus Vargas, Jr."
xxx xxx xxx
Q. While ago you said that you saw two (2) persons firing at your house. With what weapon they
were firing at the time?
A. An armalite.
Q. Who was armed with an armalite that time?
A. I saw Fortunato was holding an armalite.
Q What about Jesus Vargas, Jr.
A. I saw that he was also holding a long firearm but I cannot identify what kind of firearm.
Q. Considering that it was nighttime at the time, how were you able to identify these two (2)
persons, Jesus Vargas, Jr. and Fortunato Vargas?
A. Because I peeped through the wall of our house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After you peeped through the wall of your house, how were you able to see these two (2)
persons as it was nighttime?
A. Because the moon was bright.
Q. When you saw these two (2) persons, how far were they from the place where you were?
A. A distance of about five (5) meters.
Q. If we take the place where you are sitting now, where were these two (2) persons at the place
where you were resting, where were these two (2)persons at the time you were resting?
A. A distance of five (5) meters, more or less.
Q. After you saw these two (2) persons firing at your house and after you laid flat on the ground,
what happened after that?
A. I heard another bursts of firing.
Q. How many bursts of firing did you hear?
A. Many.
Q. You said that you heard several bursts of firing, what happened?
A. I saw that my father was hit.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT
Q. Please demonstrate how they were delivering the shots; what was Fortunato Vargas actually
doing when you saw him?
A. He was standing firing his firearm towards our house.
Q. How about Jesus Vargas, Jr., what was he actually doing?
A. He was also firing facing our house. 6
While it is true that the trial court observed that conspiracy and evident premeditation have not been
established by the prosecution, it is equally true that the testimony of Romeo, Jr. is clear that at the time
he saw the accused Vargases fire simultaneously towards the Malones home with their respective
firearms and together they fled from the scene of the crime. These are clear indicia of conspiracy.
In the motion for a new trial filed by the appellant before the trial court, he alleged that the prosecution
failed to pinpoint who among the Vargases was responsible for the death of Romeo, Sr. and Rosalie
Malones and for the wounds inflicted on the rest of the family, that since there is no conspiracy as found
by the trial court and considering the alibi of the accused, consequently the acquittal of the accused is
sought. The motion was denied in an order dated September 19, 1988 wherein it was observed that the
weather bureau furnished the Court a certification that on the fateful evening of October 29, 1982, the
moon was bright when the incident happened.
The denial of the motion is well-taken. Indeed, there is a clear conspiracy between the two Vargases.
The act of one is the act of the other. There is no need for the prosecution to pinpoint which of the
victims was felled by the shots of the two.
The trial court committed no reversible error in considering the evidence presented consisting of the
certification of the weather bureau as corroborative evidence. This document that was submitted even
after the trial, upon the order of the court, was properly appreciated by the court. It is within the power
of the court to require the production of such evidence to satisfy itself in its search for the truth even
after the trial.
The appellant then argues that his alibi should be even credence.
In disposing of this defense, the trial court said:
The accused Jesus Vargas, Jr., anchors his defense on simple denials and alibi. While Romeo Malones, Jr.,
asserts having seen said accused and his brother Fortunato Vargas spray their house with bullets, herein
accused denies the same and maintains that he was in Brgy. Mabini, Buenavista, Guimaras, Iloilo, in the
evening of October 29, 1982 attending a barangay fiesta. Attempts by the defense to establish and
prove that the accused was elsewhere or away from the scene of the incident notwithstanding, the
Court noted glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of defense witnesses. Whereas, defense witness
Lolita Ferrer Vargas testified that the accused left their house at the New Poblacion, Buenavista,
Guimaras, before lunch and returned to their house at 10:00 o'clock that same evening, another defense
witness Rogelio Fernandez declared that he, the accused and their companions left the auditorium of
Brgy. Mabini, Buenavista, Guimaras, at 12:00 o'clock midnight when the dance was over. In fine, the
accused could not have returned to the house of his uncle Rodolfo Vargas at New Poblacion, Buenavista,
Guimaras, at 10:00 o'clock that evening because said accused was still at the auditorium of Brgy. Mabini
until 12:00 o'clock midnight. Whereas, accused Jesus Vargas, Jr., averred that he and his companions
were served dinner in the house of Brgy. Capt. Pablito Gabe and left the place at 8:30 o'clock in the
evening, defense witness Rodolfo Fernandez on the other hand, testified that they were only served
drinks in the house of Pablito Gabe leaving the place at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon and they returned
to the house of Fernandez for dinner (Gallon, pp. 4-5, tsn, October 28, 1987). This defense also
endeavored to establish the non-availability of regular means of sea and land transportation from
Buenavista, Guimaras to the Municipality of Dueñas, Iloilo. The Court takes judicial notice that it will only
take from 15 to 25 minutes by pumpboat to negotiate from Buenavista to Iloilo City and that special
hires could be obtained at very reasonable rates. The Municipality of Dueñas is barely 53 kilometers
from Iloilo City and it is not extremely difficult to reach the place via regular means of transportation.
In order that an alibi as a defense may prosper, the evidence to support it must be clear and convincing
as to preclude the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime, while the evidence as
to identification must be weak and insufficient (P. vs. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 813). This is not so in the
instant case. Besides the marked inconsistencies in the testimonies of defense witnesses which dented
their credibility, it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. More
importantly, the accused was positively identified by Romeo Malones, Jr., who was at a young age of 14
years when the incident happened and the Court has observed, Romeo showed he was able to relate
well what he saw that fateful evening on October 29, 1982 despite the rigid cross-examination he was
subjected to by the defense during the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution as well as the
rebuttal evidence. This Court noted that Romeo Malones, Jr., testified in almost straight-forward
manner, continuously and flawlessly and that he was not shaken during the cross-examination. His
testimony is admissible in evidence sans any showing that it was punctured with serious inconsistencies
as to lead one to believe that he was coached. 7
We agree.
In determining the offense or offenses committed the court reproduces with approval the disquisition of
the court a quo:
The shooting and/or spraying with series of gunfires the house of Romeo Malones, Sr., by accused Jesus
Vargas, Jr., resulted to the death of Romeo Malones, Sr., and his daughter Rosalie Malones (Exhs. "A"
and "B"), gunshot wounds to Maribeth and Sheila Malones requiring medical attendance for more than
nine (9) days but less than thirty (30) days (Exhs. "C" and "F") and abrasions to Ronald and Nona
Malones requiring medical attendance in less than nine (9) days (Exhs. "D" and "E"). The aforenamed
victims sustained gunshot wounds and abrasions because of the several bursts of fire delivered by
Fortunato and Jesus Vargas, Jr., (Tabud tsn, p. 305, March 2, 1987). A perusal of the Necropsy Report
(Exh. "A") and a reading of the testimony of Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI
Western Visayas Regional Office, reveal that Romeo Malones sustained one (1) grazing wound caused by
a bullet and four (4) gunshot wounds with three (3) deformed slugs recovered therefrom. As reflected in
another Necropsy Report (Exh. "B"), Rosalie Malones sustained gunshot wounds on the right side of her
head where a deformed slug was likewise recovered. Evidently, this is a case where several persons
were killed and others injured by successive shots. In the case of People vs. Mones, No. L- 2029, May 6,
1950; 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 11; 86 Phil. 331, the Supreme Court found the accused guilty of three distinct
and separate murders, each qualified by treachery, when said accused fires a series of shots killing three
persons attending a school commencement exercise. Similarly, in the case of People vs. Desierto, CA., 45
OG 4542, it was ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machinegun causing several deaths,
although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst
of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special
mechanism the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his
finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them
(L.B Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, pp. 559-560, Book I, 1971 Revised Ed.). This Court is of the
considered view and holds that the aforecited jurisprudence stand four-square with the case at bar.
Consequently, the accused should be held responsible for each of the resultant crimes, instead of the
complex crime of double murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 8
The guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the single
eyewitness, Romeo Malones, Jr. proved to be competent, credible and clear. It is corroborated by the
other evidence on record. Thus, the appeal must fail.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Exhibit A.
2 Exhibit H.
3 Exhibits A, A-1, B and B-1.
4 TSN, June 11, 1986, pages 8 to 15.
5 Exhibits 16 to 17; pages 88 to 92, Rollo.
6 TSN, March 2, 1987, pages, 2-5 and 13; pages 98 to 101, Rollo.
7 Pages 28-29, Rollo.
8 Pages 29-30, Rollo.
Custom Search
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174660 May 30, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICKY LADIANA y DAVAO,(at- large), Accused.
ANTONIO MANUEL UY, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00110 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114,
Pasay City, finding appellant Antonio Manuel Uy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.
In an Information3 dated July 16, 2001, appellant, together with a co-accused merely identified as John
Doe, was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of June 2001, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Antonio Manuel Uy y Suangan and John
Doe, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry
away the following jewelry, to wit:
QTY DESCRIPTION AMOUNT
3 Star ruby brooch 7 x 9 mm ₱1,920.00
5 Star ruby pendant plain 8 x 10 mm 825.00
4 Star ruby pendant plain 10 x 14 mm 1,220.00
6 Star ruby pendant w/ zircon 12 x 16 mm 4,170.00
2 Star ruby pendant w/ zircon 10 x 14 mm 1,730.00
4 Star ruby pendant plain 3,020.00
3 Star ruby bracelet 12 x 16 mm 4,500.00
3 Star ruby bracelet w/ zircon 8 x 10 mm 2,025.00
2 Star ruby bracelet w/ zircon 6 x 8 mm 1,050.00

7 Star ruby bracelet plain 8 x 10 mm 4,375.00
2 Star ruby ring w/ zircon medium stone 1,760.00
2 Star ruby ring w/ zircon 10 x 12 mm 1,510.00
2 Star ruby ring w/ zircon large stone 2,010.00
1 Star ruby ring plain 10 x 15 mm 905.00
9 Star ruby ring plain 10 x 14 mm 7,110.00
6 Star ruby ring plain yg 4,350.00
1 Star ruby ring plain wg 685.00
6 Star ruby pendant small stone 4,140.00
1 Star sapphire earring pierced 10 x 12 mm 830.00
3 Star sapphire brooch 6 x 8 mm 1,965.00
26 Star sapphire tie tack 8 x 10 mm 4,180.00
1 Star sapphire tie tack & cufflinks set 6 x 8 mm 525.00
1 Star sapphire pendant 12 x 16 mm 390.00
1 Star sapphire earring pierced 6 x 8 mm 165.00
1 Star sapphire earring plain 6 x 8 mm 445.00
1 Star sapphire bracelet 360.00
11 Star sapphire tie pin wg 8 x 10 mm 2,090.00
3 Star sapphire tie tack & cufflinks set 1,380.00
3 Star sapphire tie tack & cufflinks set 2,745.00

1 Emerald ring 1,260.00
1 Diamond earring 4,450.00
1 Diamond ring 5,850.00
1 Diamond pendant w/ china jade 31,200.00
2 Italian gold bangles 3,000.00

1 Italian gold necklace 4,600.00
1 Italian gold bracelet 5,700.00
1 Gold pendant w/ topaz & onyx stone 3,400.00
1 Didien Lamarthe 11,000.00
1 Christian Dior 12,250.00
₱ 327,390.00
all belonging to JEEPNEY SHOPPING CENTER, represented by RICARDO M. SALVADOR and an ARMSCOR
.38 caliber revolver with SERIAL No. 64517 amounting to ₱9,000.00, more or less, belonging to
ENERGETIC SECURITY AGENCY represented by ROMEO SOLANO, to the damage and prejudice of
Jeepney Shopping Center in the total amount of ₱327,390.00 and Energetic Security Agency in the total
amount of ₱9,000.00 more or less; and on the occasion thereof, accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stabbed Gilbert V. Esmaquilan and hit on the head with a 2x2 wood Felix Arañez y Gida and
Delfin Biniahan y Cahtong, Security Guard, Janitor and maintenance of Jeepney Shopping Center(,)
respectively, thereby causing their death; and accused to facilitate their escape thereafter take, steal
and drive away a (sic) one (1) Black Honda Civic with Plate No. WFD-891 registered in the name of
OLIVER GATCHALIAN.
Contrary to law.4
During his arraignment on July 24, 2001, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty"
to the crime charged.5
The Information was subsequently amended to identify appellant's co- accused as Ricky Ladiana y Davao
(Ricky), without changing the allegations of the original information.6 However, accused Ricky remained
at-large.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution is aptly summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellee's brief as
follows:
Appellant Antonio Manuel Uy was one of the maintenance crew of the Jeepney Shopping Center located
at No. 1913, Taft Avenue, Pasay City, owned by Mr. Jerry Limpe.
Appellant used to be a stay-in employee of the Jeepney Shopping Center. However, appellant could not
get along with his co-employees and usually engaged in quarrels with them. In their letter dated March
29, 2001 addressed to Michael Limpe, the son of Jerry Limpe, the co-employees of appellant requested
that he be ordered to leave the employees’ quarters. Resultantly, appellant was ordered by Michael
Limpe to leave the quarters and transfer to another place. Appellant was forced to rent a house in
Sandejas St., Pasay City.
When appellant was removed from the employees’ quarters, Cecilio Aranez, also a member of the
maintenance crew of the Jeepney Shopping Center, heard appellant made a threat, saying "Balang araw
makagaganti ako."
Sometime in the first week of June 2001, the co-employees of appellant, including Neptali Tamayo, had
a drinking spree at Juz Café along Taft Avenue, Pasay City. The drinking session lasted until 3:00 o’clock
in the morning of the following day. On their way home, the group noticed two persons outside the
guardhouse of the Jeepney Shopping Center peeping inside. One of these persons was appellant. When
the group approached them, they hid themselves inside the guardhouse. Later on, appellant came out
from where he hid himself and uttered a joke. Thereafter, appellant and his companion left.
Around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of June 26, 2001, appellant, through a text message, informed Roger
Tan, the Supervisor of the Maintenance Department of the Jeepney Shopping Center, that he (appellant)
was not feeling well and would not be able to report for work.
Around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, Joel Adol, the security guard of Chang Juat Ltd. Company located at
No. 1906, Taft Avenue, Pasay City, saw appellant with a companion standing at the gate of the Jeepney
Shopping Center. The security guard had a clear and unobstructed view of the Jeepney Shopping Center
as Chang Juat Ltd. Company was just adjacent to it and the Jeepney Shopping Center was brightly
lighted. Joel Adol recognized appellant because he used to see him cleaning the premises of the Jeepney
Shopping Center and directing traffic in the area. Joel Adol observed that appellant and his companion
were looking at his post and were peeping inside the Jeepney Shopping Center. When Joel Adol went
inside the building of Chang Juat Ltd. Company around 12:00 o’clock in the evening, he noticed that
appellant and his companion were still at the gate of the Jeepney Shopping Center.
Around 5:30 in the morning of June 27, 2001, Carpio Bahatan, a stay-in employee of the Jeepney
Shopping Center, discovered the lifeless bodies of Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan at the second floor
and third floor, respectively, of the main building of the Jeepney Shopping Center. Another stay-in
employee, Rico Victor Arbas, discovered the dead body of the security guard, Gilbert Esmaquilan, lying
near the guardhouse which was inside the Jeepney Shopping Center compound.
A piece of wood with blood stains was found about three to five meters from the body of Gilbert
Esmaquilan. Another blood-stained piece of wood was found in the locker room within the compound
but outside the main building of the Jeepney Shopping Center.
At the opening leading to the comfort room in the ground floor of the main building, there were found
pieces of jalousie slabs and frames scattered on the ground.
At the second floor, the lifeless body of Felix Aranez was found, lying face down and with feet and hands
tied with yellow plastic straw. A piece of cloth was stuck in his mouth and his nape had an incise wound.
A bunch of keys was found inside the display cabinet which was in disarray. It was discovered that some
pieces of jewelry inside the display cabinet were missing.
At the third floor, the dead body of Delfin Biniahan was found lying on a folding bed between two glass
cabinets. He sustained injuries on the upper part of his body. The glass cabinets were splattered with
blood. The door of the Administrative Office had been destroyed and bore some traces of blood.
Police Senior Inspector Emmanuel Reyes, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Southern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of the
three victims. The examination on the body of Felix Aranez revealed that he sustained a hack wound on
the nape, measuring 0.3 cm. x 0.7 cm., which could have been caused by a bladed weapon, and
hematoma on the occipital region or on the right side of the head, measuring 8 cm. x 8 cm., and on the
frontal region just above the right eye which may have been caused by a blunt object. Delfin Biniahan
sustained five lacerated wounds on the frontal region, particularly on the forehead, which could have
been caused by the application of a hard object, and his lower jaw was displaced toward the left side,
which could have been caused by a hard blow. The cause of death of Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan
was "intracranial hemorrhages secondary to traumatic injuries of the head." Gilbert Esmaquilan
sustained multiple stab wounds on the left mammary region piercing the aorta near its attachment to
the heart; the left subcostal region piercing the stomach; the vertebral region piercing the underlying
soft tissues; the left posterior rib; the right infrascapular region piercing the 7th right posterior
intercostal muscle and the lower and upper lobes of the right lung; and the right costal region piercing
the posterior right 8th intercostal muscle and the lower and upper lobes of the right lung. The fatal
wounds were those which pierced his heart and lungs. The cause of death of Gilbert Esmaquilan was
"hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the body."
Around 8:30 in the evening of June 28, 2001, appellant met with his girlfriend, Richlie Ladiana ("Richlie"),
in the latter’s workplace in Panorama Street, SSS Village, Marikina City and gave her ₱6,000.00.
Appellant was with co-accused Ricky Ladiana ("Ricky"), Richlie’s brother. Richlie noticed that at that
time, appellant appeared to have a problem, while Ricky looked stern. After giving the money to Richlie,
appellant and Ricky immediately left.
Around 8:30 in the morning, of the following day, June 29, 2001, appellant called up Richlie and asked
her to drop by the house of Ricky in Cupang, Antipolo City where he was.
At 8:57 that same morning. appellant also sent a text message to their head supervisor, Roger Tan,
which read, "Boss, Gud morning. Bukas na ako papasok o kaya Lunes ang sama talaga ng trangkaso
nabasa K C ako ng ulan nong Martes pag diliver namin." At 9:57, appellant sent another text message to
Roger Tan, which read, "Boss, balita daw na ako ang suspek sa nangyari dyan boss matagal na ako sa
companya kahit alam kong inaapi ako nyo wala akong ginawa na masama sa trabaho ko."
When Richlie arrived at the house of Ricky, appellant gave her ₱500.00 and asked her to buy him some
tee-shirts and shorts. Appellant also asked Richlie to return the ₱6,000.00 which he had earlier given to
her because he was leaving for the province.
Around 2:30 in the afternoon, Richlie again dropped by the house of Ricky before going to school.
Appellant requested her not to attend her classes anymore because he was leaving for the province.
Richlie stayed with appellant in the house of Ricky until 7:00 o’clock in the evening. While appellant was
putting on his clothes, Richlie noticed that appellant was wearing a cross pendant. Thereafter, appellant
handed to her something wrapped in a newspaper. When she opened the newspaper to look what was
inside, she saw 4 pairs of earrings, a pairless earring, and 5 ladies’ rings.
Around 9:00 that same evening, appellant and Ricky went to the house of Eduardo dela Cruz
("Eduardo") in Cupang, Antipolo City. Eduardo was the second cousin of the mother of Richlie and Ricky.
Ricky looked very nervous and his eyes were reddish, while appellant was very quiet. Ricky told Eduardo
that they were in trouble and asked him to accompany appellant to the house of Panfilo dela Cruz,
Eduardo’s first cousin, in Sitio Tibol, Barangay Salasa, Palauig, Iba, Zambales. Ricky told Eduardo that
appellant will be staying in Zambales for two to three days. Eduardo acceded to such request.
Eduardo and appellant proceeded to the bus terminal of Victory Liner in Cubao, Quezon City. When they
arrived in Cubao around 11:30 that same evening, the last trip for Zambales had already left. Appellant
told Eduardo that they will just get a taxi in going to Olongapo City. They were able to hire a taxi for
₱1,500.00. They arrived in Olongapo City around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, June
30, 2001. While waiting for a bus going to Zambales, they drank coffee in a nearby store. During their
conversation, Eduardo asked appellant what happened. Appellant confessed to Eduardo that he and
Ricky entered a place in Pasay City and they killed two persons and seriously wounded another whom
they left fighting for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which contained money and
that if "he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will live comfortably." Further, appellant
told Eduardo that nothing will be traced to him because his hands were wrapped such that no
fingerprints would be recovered from the crime scene. They arrived at the house of Panfilo dela Cruz
around 6:00 o’clock in the morning. Eduardo introduced appellant to Panfilo dela Cruz and told the
latter that appellant will be staying there for about two (2) days. At noontime, Eduardo went back to
Manila.
After a week, Eduardo went to SPO3 Rodrigo Urbina of the PNP Regional Mobile Patrol Group. Eduardo
told SPO3 Urbina what was confessed to him by appellant and that he brought appellant to Zambales.
SPO3 Urbano coordinated with the Pasay City Police Station, Crime Investigation Division, for appellant’s
arrest.
Around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of July 12, 2001, the joint team of the Regional Mobile Patrol Group,
the Pasay City Police Station and the Palauig Police Station arrested appellant in the house of Panfilo
dela Cruz. Appellant was frisked and a cross pendant was recovered from his pocket.
The inventory conducted by Cresilda Tigolo, the accounting clerk of Jeepney Shopping Center, revealed
that 191 pieces of jewelry in the amount of ₱304,140.00 and 2 imported bags worth ₱23,250.00 were
stolen. The stolen items had a total value of ₱327,390.00.
The gold pendant recovered from appellant was worth ₱3,400.00. Also recovered were a diamond
earring worth [₱]6,700.00 and a diamond ring worth ₱5,450.00 which Richlie had pawned through a
friend Wilfredo Mazo. Said pawned items were recovered from Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., in Marikina
City. Thus, the total amount of the pieces of jewelry recovered was ₱15,550.00.
The .38 Caliber Armscor revolver service weapon of victim Gilbert Esmaquilan, owned by the Energetic
Security Specialist, was recovered by PO3 Edison Cabotaje in the house of Ricky Ladiana.
The Honda VTEC 1999 model car with plate no. WFD 891, owned by a certain Oliver Gatchalian, which
had been used as the "getaway" car by appellant, was recovered somewhere in Quezon City.7
For his part, appellant denied having committed the crime charged against him. He testified that on June
26, 2001, he called up Jeepney Shopping Center to inform them that he was sick. He later decided to go
to the house of his niece Lea Ezra Uy in Caloocan to have a massage. He was there from 8:30 p.m. until
the following morning. At noontime of June 27, 2001, Richlie, his girlfriend and Ricky's sister, called him
up asking for money to pay for her tuition fee. At around 7 p.m., he met with her in Marikina and gave
her ₱6,000.00.8
On June 28, 2001, appellant went to Richlie's place and saw her and her brother Ricky arguing about an
incident that happened at Jeepney Shopping Center. Richlie showed appellant a newspaper where his
name appeared as a suspect. Ricky then put his arms around him saying "huwag ka na lang maingay." He
then told Ricky that he could not keep quiet because he was afraid that he might be implicated since he
knew that Ricky and his companions were the ones responsible for the incident. Ricky then gave him a
package containing two pairs of earrings and three pieces of rings but declined to accept them as he
already had many.9
After a while, Eduardo dela Cruz, Ricky's uncle, arrived and invited them to drink. Eduardo told him that
he should be acquainted with Richlie's relatives in Zambales. Although appellant knew that he only had
three days leave, he agreed to go with Eduardo to Zambales. Before he left for Zambales, he gave the
pieces of jewelry which Ricky gave him to Richlie. Richlie gave him back the ₱6,000.00 he earlier gave
her saying he might be needing the money for his trip.10
Around 9 p.m. of June 29, 2001, he and Eduardo rode a taxi going to Olongapo City. They were not able
to talk to each other since he was asleep the whole trip. Then they boarded a bus going to Zambales.
They reached the house of Panfilo dela Cruz, Eduardo's cousin, in Palauig, Zambales around 4 a.m. the
following day, Eduardo introduced him to Panfilo as Richlie's fiancé. After breakfast, Eduardo told him
that he was going back to Manila and would just fetch him after two or three days.11
On July 12, 2001, three policemen entered his room and arrested him. They boarded him in a van and
brought him to the Zambales Police Station. PO3 Michael Manarang took a pendant from his pocket and
told him that he already had an evidence against him. He was tortured to admit the crime.12
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision13 convicting appellant of robbery with homicide
and imposing upon him the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, after considering the qualifying/aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime, finds the accused Antonio Manuel Uy y Suangan GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, of the Special Complex Crime of Robbery with Homicide in violation of paragraph 1,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify
the following:
a) the legal heirs of the late Aranez the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b) the legal heirs of the late Biniahan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
c) the legal heirs of the late Esmaquilan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
d) the Jeepney Shopping Center the sum of ₱311,840.00 as reparation of the damage caused; and
e) the Energetic Security Agency the sum of ₱49,784.75 for the funeral expenses of guard Esmaquilan.
Considering the penalty imposed, let the records of this case be forwarded for automatic review by the
Honorable Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than fifteen days after promulgation
of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.14
The case was elevated to Us on automatic review. In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2004, pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo,16 we referred the case to the CA.
On July 18, 2006, the CA issued the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Trial Court in convicting Antonio Manuel Uy of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and MODIFIES the penalty imposed from death penalty to reclusion
perpetua.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the following:
a) the legal heirs of the late Aranez the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b) the legal heirs of the late Biniahan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
c) the legal heirs of the late Esmaquilan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
d) the Jeepney Shopping Center the sum of ₱311,840.00 as reparation of the damage caused; and
e) the Energetic Security Agency the sum of ₱49,784.75 for the funeral expenses of guard Esmaquilan.
SO ORDERED.17
In a Resolution18 dated November 20, 2006, we accepted the appeal, the penalty imposed being
reclusion perpetua. We required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire.
Appellant filed a Manifestation19 dated February 8, 2007 stating that he adopts his Appellant's Brief as
Supplemental Brief.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Manifestation and Motion20 dated March 2, 2007, in
lieu of the supplemental brief, stating that it will adopt its Appellee's Brief as its Supplemental Brief in
order to avoid repetitious discussions of the issues that had been addressed in its appellee's brief and to
prevent further delay.
In his Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY.21
We find no merit in this appeal.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the
robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed.22 A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23 The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.24
In this case, we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution had established beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. As the CA correctly observed:
x x x The removal of the jalousies in the restroom of the Jeepney Shopping Center to gain entrance, the
destruction of the display cabinet where the items were kept, the destruction of the lock leading to the
cashier's office on the third floor of the building; and the inventory of missing items makes the situation
possess the first essential element as stated above. In robbery by the taking of the property through
intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property
be the owner thereof, robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person who himself stole it. As
long as the taker of the personal property is not the owner, the second element exists. The third
element is animus lucrandi or intent to gain which is defined by the Supreme Court as "an internal act
which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstance reveal a different
intent on the part of the perpetrator." We agree with the finding of the trial court that: "the intent to
steal was likewise proven from accused's statement to Eduardo dela Cruz to the effect that if they were
able to open the vault, their families would have lived a good life even if they die in the process." On the
other hand, the accused was proven to be a friend of, and was with, Ricky Ladiana right after the
commission of the crime as testified to by Richlie Ladiana, his lover. Being so when the firearm of the
fallen guard was found from the abandoned house of Ricky, the conclusion is that Ricky and Antonio Uy
have been together at the shopping center and presumed the taker of a thing taken or doer in the doing
of a recent wrongful act. In the instant case, no special circumstance was present to belie the
presumption of the intent to gain of the accused-appellant. The existence of the fourth element is
incontestable. The homicide preceded the robbery but committed on the occasion thereof, the purpose
is to eliminate an obstacle to the commission of robbery. The grudge of the appellant against his former
co-workers Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan is not sufficient to overcome the presumption and evidence
of intent to gain, it is clear that the victims were killed on the occasion of robbery and to commit
robbery. Essential in robbery with homicide is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes
are committed at the same time.25
While there was no direct evidence to establish appellant's participation in the commission of the crime,
direct evidence is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt.26 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is
imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny
proper protection to the community.27 Thus, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on
circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of
all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.28
We have carefully gone over the records of the case and we find that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and his co-accused
Ricky conspired to commit the crime of robbery with homicide. We find apropos the CA's ratiocination in
this wise:
x x x We concord with the trial court that the success of the prosecution in discharging its duty to prove
the guilt of the accused is anchored in the circumstantial evidence present and proven in this case, to
wit:
1. Possession of the stolen goods by the accused and his girlfriend was not satisfactorily explained;
2. Intent to steal was evident in his confession to Eduardo dela Cruz who had no reason to lie as he even
helped him to escape;
3. Participation in the commission of the crime was proven by the tracing of the possession of the
deceased's firearm at Ricky Ladiana's house, accused Antonio's friend and companion right after the
killing;
4. Antonio Manuel Uy was seen in person by a guard at the scene of the crime on the night of the
robbery and killing;
5. Suspicious presence at the place of robbery immediately before the incident;
6. Antonio Manuel Uy's cellphone was established as the sender of text messages to at least two co-
employees of his; [and]
7. Confession/testimony of Richlie Ladiana, acknowledged sweetheart of accused Uy that the latter gave
her the jewelries, part of the stolen jewelries from the shopping center.
Another circumstance is the unexplained impromptu vacation of Antonio Manuel Uy. It has been ruled
that flight per se cannot prove the guilt of an accused. But if the same is considered in the light of other
circumstances, it may be deemed a strong indication of guilt. Considering the surrounding circumstances
when he left with Eduardo dela Cruz for Palauig, Zambales, We could draw a conclusion that he is trying
to evade something in his work place. Settled is the rule that flight of an accused, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 29
In his appeal with the CA and with Us, appellant contends that contrary to the RTC findings, he was able
to satisfactorily explain the circumstance of his possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry. He claims that
Ricky, Richlie's brother, insisted on giving him those pieces of jewelry, but since he was afraid he might
be implicated in the commission of the crime which Ricky and his companion had committed, he
decided to leave the pieces of jewelry to Richlie. As to the cross pendant which was also part of the
stolen items allegedly recovered from him, appellant claims that the same was merely planted on him
by PO3 Michael Manarang. He further contends that assuming there is truth to Richlie's allegation that
the pieces of jewelry which she pawned came from him, the stolen items did not prove his culpability for
robbery with homicide.
Appellant's explanations do not inspire belief.
Appellant testified that when Ricky gave him the valuable pieces of jewelry, he declined to receive them
saying that he already had many jewelry,30 yet he was still in possession of these items and he even
admitted giving them to Richlie.31 In fact, Richlie categorically declared that before they parted ways at
around 7 p.m. of June 29, 2001, appellant gave her something wrapped in a newspaper.32 Upon
reaching her house, she opened the wrapped newspaper which contained 4 pairs of diamond earrings, a
pairless diamond earring and 5 pieces of diamond rings.33 Richlie testified that appellant called her up
and instructed her to pawn the items as he needed money,34 thus, Richlie asked her friend Wilfredo
Mazo to pawn the diamond ring and a pair of earrings to Villarica pawnshop.35 Later, Mazo, together
with Richlie and SPO3 Rodrigo Urbina, went to the pawnshop and redeemed the items36 which were
proved to be part of the stolen items.
Appellant's claim that the cross pendant found on him at the time of his arrest was merely planted by
PO3 Manarang was not proven at all. In fact, P03 Manarang rebutted such claim by testifying that as
member of the arresting team of the Pasay Police, he saw PO3 Ernie Cabrega searched appellant's body
and recovered from him the cross pendant.37 PO3 Cabrega, in his direct examination, positively
declared that upon appellant's arrest, he searched the latter's body and found the cross pendant at the
back of his pocket.38 The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties was not
overcome as there was no evidence showing that the police officers were impelled by improper motive.
In fact, Richlie corroborated the testimonies of these two police officers when she declared that she saw
appellant wearing the cross pendant for the first time on June 29, 2001,39 thus, establishing appellant's
possession of the cross pendant even before his arrest on July 12, 2001. The recovery of the stolen items
which admittedly came from appellant gives rise to the legal presumption of guilt which he failed to
overcome, thus, he must necessarily be considered the author of the robbery and the killings.40
Appellant argues that his alleged confession to Eduardo dela Cruz was not sufficient to convict him of
the crime as the latter's testimony merely established that appellant admitted his intention to rob a
vault at an unspecified place; that even if he (appellant) allegedly admitted the killings, Eduardo did not
state who between him and his co-accused Ricky committed the killing.
Such argument deserves scant consideration.
Eduardo testified that appellant told him that the main purpose of appellant and his co-accused Ricky in
entering the Jeepney Shopping Center was to open the vault to get everything in it, which cost millions
of pesos that would make their families live comfortably;41 that when they entered the establishment,
they immediately looked for the vault and in the process killed three people.42 It has been established
that they were able to open the glass showcase containing the valuable pieces of jewelry.43 Cresilda
Tigolo, the shopping center's employee who is responsible for preparing the monthly inventory of the
pieces of jewelry for sale, testified that pieces of jewelry and imported bags with a total amount of
₱327,390.00 were missing.44 Moreover, it has also been proven that on the occasion of the robbery,
two stay-in staff and the guard on duty in the Jeepney Shopping Center were killed.lawphi1
Appellant's confession to Eduardo, who is not a police officer, is admissible in evidence.45 The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein, may be given in evidence against him.46 Appellant's admissions are not covered by
Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution,47 because they were not extracted while he was
under custodial investigation. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood all of it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance. 48
And case law has it that whenever homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless
it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.49 There was no showing that appellant
attempted to prevent the killing.
Appellant argues that neither the text messages he sent to his supervisor, Roger Tan (Tan), nor to a co-
worker, Bernardo Cruz (Cruz), would prove that he was responsible for the robbery with homicide.
We are not convinced.
At 8:57 a.m. of June 29, 2001, appellant texted Tan telling the latter that he will just report for work the
following day, or Monday, because he had a fever.50 At 9:57 a.m., appellant again texted Tan saying
that he learned that he was a suspect in the incident that happened in the shopping center and that he
did nothing wrong in his work.51 On July 1, 2001, appellant texted Cruz asking why he was considered a
suspect when he and his wife were on their honeymoon.52 Appellant's excuses for not reporting for
work since June 26, 2001 were contradictory showing their untruthfulness. Significantly, while appellant
already knew that he was considered a suspect to a very serious crime, he did not report for work
anymore. If he was really innocent of the crime as he professed to be, he should have immediately
thought of clearing himself of any suspicion. Instead, on the night of June 29, 2001, appellant hurriedly
left for Zambales and hid thereat until his arrest on July 12, 2001. Appellant's sudden and unexplained
trip to Zambales at the time that he was considered a suspect and had a work to report to was
undoubtedly flight from justice which is an indication of a guilty mind. "Indeed, the wicked man flees
though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion."53
Appellant contends that the recovery of the service firearm of the slain security guard Esmaquilan at
Ricky's house did not prove his participation in the commission of the crime. Appellant even pointed to
Ricky and his companions as the ones responsible for the crime of robbery with homicide.
Such defense is far from convincing.
Joel Adol, the security guard on duty at Chong Hwat Company located adjacent the shopping center,
testified that around 11 p.m. of June 26, 2001, he saw two persons, one of whom he identified as
appellant peeping inside the compound of the Jeepney Shopping Center.54 He was familiar with
appellant, as he had seen him directing traffic in the area and cleaning the premises of the shopping
center.55 He clearly saw appellant as there was a light coming from the bank beside the shopping
center, as well as the light coming from the guardhouse of the shopping center.56 Notably, that was the
night before the crime was discovered the following morning.
Also, Richlie testified that on June 28, 2001, i.e., the day after the crime was committed, appellant,
together with her brother, co-accused Ricky, came to see her at her employer's house in Marikina.57
She noticed that Ricky looked sterned while appellant looked bothered as if they have a problem58 and
then appellant gave her ₱6,000.00 and told her to study hard. On June 29, 2001, Richlie met again with
appellant and her brother at the latter's house in Antipolo, where appellant asked her to return the
money he gave her as he was leaving for the province.59 They were together in Ricky's house until she
left at 7 p.m.60
Moreover, Eduardo dela Cruz, Richlie and Ricky's uncle, testified that at 9 p.m. of June 29, 2001, Ricky,
together with appellant, came to his place in Cupang, Antipolo.61 Ricky asked him to bring appellant to
the house of Panfilo dela Cruz, Eduardo's cousin and Ricky's uncle, in Zambales because Ricky and
appellant were in trouble.62 He was told that appellant would stay in Panfilo's house for only two to
three days. Eduardo observed that Ricky's eyes were reddish and he was nervous, while appellant was
quiet.63 Eduardo obliged and brought appellant to Zambales and endorsed him to his cousin Panfilo. It
was during their trip that appellant told him what they did in Jeepney Shopping Center. In the
meantime, Ricky, together with his family, packed their things and left their house on June 30, 2001 and
never returned.64 The actuations of appellant and his co-accused Ricky are not the normal behavior of
innocent men. Their flight without plausible explanation, coupled with the recovery of the gun of the
slain security guard in Ricky's house, establish that they were together in committing the crime.
Appellant's defense consisted merely of alibi. To prosper, alibi must meet strictly the requirements of
time and place,65 meaning that the accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed, and that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.66
In this case, appellant claims that on June 26, 2001, he was at the house of his niece, Lea Ezra, in
Caloocan from 8:30 p.m. until the following day. Notably, appellant failed to present corroborating
witness to strengthen his alibi. Moreover, appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the locus criminis, considering that at nighttime, Caloocan would only be more than
an hour's travel to the crime scene in Pasay City. But most importantly, security guard Joel Adol
positively declared that he saw appellant with a companion at the Jeepney Shopping Center around 11
p.m. of June 26, 2001. And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.67
The CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC. We agree with the CA that the RTC erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery when they were not specifically
alleged in the information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that aggravating circumstances must
be alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if they are
proven during the trial.
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by reclusion perpetua to death. Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of
two (2) indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. 68Considering that there was no modifying
circumstance which attended the commission of the crime, the CA correctly modified the penalty to
reclusion perpetua.
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 each is
granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstances.69 These awards are
mandatory without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the fact
of the commission of the crime.70 In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, properly awarded the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The heirs of the victims are also entitled to the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00
each. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings
about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer
sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing.71
We likewise affirm the RTC's Order for appellant to indemnify the Jeepney Shopping Center the sum of
₱311,840.00 as reparation and the Energetic Security Agency the sum of ₱49,784.75 for the funeral
expenses of security guard Esmaquilan.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00110 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that petitioner is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of ₱50,000.00
each as moral damages.
The police and other law enforcement agencies of the government are ORDERED to immediately
implement the warrant of arrest issued against Ricky Ladiana y Davao, for him to stand trial.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per
Raffle dated May 30, 2011.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and
Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 198-222.
2 CA rollo, pp. 54-67.
3 Id. at 10-13.
4 Id. at 10-12.
5 Records, p. 25.
6 Id. at 43-46.
7 CA rollo, pp. 157-168

8 TSN, December 12, 2002, pp. 6-13.
9 Id. at 16-21.
10 Id. at 23-32.
11 Id. at 35-41.
12 TSN, January 10, 2003, pp. 13-15.
13 CA rollo, pp. 116-130; Per Judge Vicente L. Yap
14 Id. at 129-130.
15 Id. at 77.
16 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
17 CA rollo, p. 221.
18 Rollo, p. 28.
19 Id. at 32-33.
20 Id. at 35-37.
21 CA rollo, p. 83.
22 People v. Baron, G.R. No. 185209, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 646, 656; People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil.
405, 426-427 (2004), citing People v. Pedroso, 336 SCRA 163 (2000).
23 Id.
24 People v. Baron, supra note 22, citing People v. Dela Cruz, 575 SCRA 412, 436 (2008); People v. Musa,
G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009, 591 SCRA 619, 641.
25 CA rollo, pp. 216-217.
26 Salvador v. People, G.R. No. 164266, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 461, 469-470; People v. Almoguerra,
461 Phil. 340, 356 (2003).
27 Salvador v. People, supra, at 469-470, citing People v. Padua, 516 SCRA 590, 600-601 (2007).
28 Id. at 470.
29 CA rollo, pp. 217-218.
30 TSN, December 12, 2002, p. 21.
31 Id. at 32.
32 TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 11
33 Id.
34 TSN, April 16, 2002, p. 5.
35 TSN, April 10, 2002 , pp. 10-11.
36 TSN, April 16, 2002, p. 17; TSN, July 4, 2002, pp. 7-8.
37 TSN, March 25, 2003, p. 13.
38 TSN, June 11, 2002, pp. 11-12.
39 TSN, April 10, 2002, pp. 9, 14.
40 People v. Escote, Jr., 448 Phil. 749, 782 (2003).
41 TSN, March 21, 2002, p. 17.
42 Id. at 17; TSN, March 12, 2002, p. 19.
43 TSN, November 29, 2001, pp. 4-24.
44 TSN, December 18, 2001, p. 41.

45 People v. Suela, 424 Phil. 196, 228 (2002), citing People v. Aringue, 263 SCRA 291 (1997), People v.
Andan, 269 SCRA 95, (1997) and People v. Tawat, 129 SCRA 431, (1984).
46 Id. at 229, citing Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 33.
47 Id., citing People v. Andan, supra note 45.
48 Id., citing People v. Tawat, supra note 45, at 436-437.
49 People v. Escote, supra, note 40, at 631, citing People v. Cando, 344 SCRA 330 (2000).
50 TSN, February 14, 2002, p. 18.
51 Id. at 20.
52 TSN, December 11, 2001, pp. 50, 53.
53 People v. Dela Cruz, 459 Phil. 130, 137 (2003).
54 TSN, November 20, 2001, p. 11.
55 Id. at 14.
56 Id. at 13.
57 TSN, April 3, 2002, p. 34.
58 Id. at 36.
59 TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 7.
60 Id. at 9.
61 TSN, March 12, 2002, p.
62 Id. at 8.
63 Id. at 9.
64 TSN April 10, 2002, p. 16.
65 People v. Piandiong, 335 Phil. 1028, 1042 (1997), citing People v. Matildo, 230 SCRA 635 (1994) and
People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 (1994).
66 Id., citing People v. Saguban, 231 SCRA 744 (1994) and People v. Dolor, 231 SCRA 414 (1994).
67 People v. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635, November 15, 2010.
68 Crisostomo v. People, G.R. No. 171526, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 590, 603, citing People v. Musa,
591 SCRA 619, 643-644 (2009).
69 Id. at 603.
70 People v. Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367.
71 People v. Musa, supra note 68, at 644; People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 839; (2002), cited in People v.
Rubiso, 447 Phil. 374, 383 (2003).
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 178321
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in
Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,[2] which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000,
alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault
and hit with the said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA.[3] The second
Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and hitting with a lead pipe
one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and
while in such defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter tried
jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old at the time
of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her
neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near
the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice
pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete
wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and
to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with
the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head
several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless
position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra.
He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA,
appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her
uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.[7] When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle,
BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for
more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant accosted
them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he
would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he was at his rice field at
Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and then fell down. The woman
was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind her.
However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman as AAA, his
granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her face was swollen, with her hair
covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what happened to her, and AAA uttered, Si
Tata Coni referring to appellant who is his son-in-law.[10] With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA
home.[11] AAA was later brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for three
weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited AAA at the
hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere
at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista where they
found Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already bloated.[12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan, conducted the
autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and
abdomen are swollen; desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in the
head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from the nose, mouth,
genital region and at the site of wounds, three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the
submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the chest of the victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head and
trunk.[13]
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers
mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent
P25,000 for Jennifers funeral and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at home
cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay,
Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was arrested by the police
officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he went
wild that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their
house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and
rape.[15]
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they would
ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa
hut but they left the following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his house to have
his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was the time when he went wild
after seeing his wife with another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters
away from the scene of the crime.[16]
The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to appellants
house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He
recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA and his
uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived before midnight on June 5, 2000 and
slept with AAA. The following morning, at around six oclock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and
appellant meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe
repaired while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision[18] on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran,
the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the private complainant
the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement in People v.
Mateo,[20] the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts judgment. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000,
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is
further ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual damages.
The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced
to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction for both crimes of rape
and murder. In a Resolution[22] dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties to submit their
respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties submitted separate
Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their respective briefs filed in
the CA. Appellant had raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[23]
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the prosecutions main
witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of the crimes charged. According
to him, AAAs narration that he waylaid them while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply
for work negates evident premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was their usual
route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the
killing of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been shown in
order to determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome the victim physically or whether
the victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast
doubt upon AAAs testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and
stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfathers farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that
the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts[24] and absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings,
particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case.[25] This rule is even
more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court.[26]
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of
AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and was herself brutally attacked by appellant who also
raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial courts
evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer to the trial courts firsthand
observations on AAAs deportment while testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the trepidations of a
woman outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with
trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were constantly fixed on
the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man she was about to testify against. After a few
questions in direct, the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and she burst into tears, badly
shaken, unfit to continue any further with her testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation,
this Court has to defer her direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue with her
aborted questioning, this time, composed and collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all
vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished.[27]
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness stand for
the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct examination. However, during the next
hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward manner, describing
in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe
and ice pick before raping her. We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that youre not able to reach your place of
work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.

Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir.

Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?

A: She fell down, sir.
Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
A: He came back to me, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.

Q: And what happened to you?
A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my blouse and my bra.
Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: Then, what happened?
A: He sucked my breast, sir.

Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: After that, he stood up, sir.

Q: And where did he go?
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform and when asked his name, answered: Conrado
Laog.
x x x x[28]
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at the
time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense,
however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively
identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that positive
identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose
testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[29] AAA was firm and unrelenting in
pointing to appellant as the one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before
raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives by affinity. As
correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the commission
of the crime, her identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon
encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own uncle would harm her and her
friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of
the perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed.[30] There
is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to
falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.[31]
In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in
the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly,
alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly,
in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else
during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to
be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June 6, 2000. In
fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house was more or less only 100 meters
from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added reason that he
has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial and alibi deserve no
consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive identification and
categorical testimony of a rape victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she testified on
being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that
when she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also
contends that the prosecution should have presented the physician who examined AAA to prove her
allegations that she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra were merely
lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments were just pulled down, which therefore explains why she still
had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this matter raised by
appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape.
Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the crime
-- do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as
these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in
the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the
innocence of the appellant for the crime charged.[35] It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility
of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the trial, we
find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims
testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is
not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict.[37] Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in
rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear,
unequivocal and credible,[38] as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and
killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder
and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one
not raised by the parties.[39] The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by
appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.[40]
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2)
robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,
and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of
the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject
of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code by adding thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed;[] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped on
the occasion and in connection with her detention and was killed subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof. Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses,
appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. x x x[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty
in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People
v. Barros,[43] explained that composite crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the
rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single
act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an
offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single
penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite
acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of
Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision.
There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once
she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the
original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAAs
body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by
passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to
cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were consummated,
and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the
rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the
component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on
the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,[45] we expounded on the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no
such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would
still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.[46]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
rape.[47] Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the
same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with
homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes
against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a
generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in
defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife
by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such
treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a
composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no
special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part
of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could
not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the
penalty to be imposed.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to
the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime.[50] It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then
stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain
Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless
and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike
in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression,
taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse
of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense,
although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
[a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack caught the victim off-guard
rendering her defenseless.[52]
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to be
considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines the Court is mandated to
impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[53]
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly weapon have
greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While the trial court and CA were
correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to
the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to
exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal knowledge of
a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-A (a), whenever such rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance
would justify the award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with
Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the information but
admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?

A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship to appellant will not bar the
consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Citing
our earlier ruling in the case of People v. Catubig,[55] this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary
damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the
information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of
the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in
the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating
circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent
are the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages
based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged,
so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules
which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised
Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of
Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been
alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste,
People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v.
Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the
Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets
rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damagestaking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is
enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as
a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally,
but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,
the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendantassociated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the injury. The
terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes
an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the
very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter
other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman.
Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and
The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the
latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to
justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her
separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he application of Article 2230 of
the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy
behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example or correction for the public good.[57]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his niece-in-law
who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the
award of exemplary damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several times on
the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and
blouse and pulling down her undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position,
covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and
outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who
sustained more stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code
allows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow
the courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.[58] In
line with current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer as
exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal
the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral
damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.[59]
Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to conform with recent
jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly
awarded her heirs the amount of P25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated by the
parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well as the
award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of
rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado
Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso
and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
[2] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[3] Consistent with our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 419, the real name of the rape victim in this case is withheld and instead fictitious initials are used
to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to
establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members,
are not disclosed in this decision.
[4] Records, Vol. II, p. 1.
[5] TSN, June 20, 2001, pp. 3-4; TSN, December 12, 2001, pp. 3-7.
[6] Id. at 4-5.
[7] Id. at 6; TSN, December 12, 2001, pp. 12-13.
[8] Id. at 6-7.
[9] TSN, December 12, 2001, p. 7.
[10] TSN, January 16, 2002, pp. 5-7.

[11] Id. at 8.
[12] TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 4-7.
[13] TSN, February 27, 2002, p. 5.
[14] CA rollo, p. 31.
[15] TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 3-5.
[16] Id. at 4-7.
[17] TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 3-5.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 29-33.
[19] Id. at 32-33.
[20] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[21] Rollo, p. 15.
[22] Id. at 20.

[23] CA rollo, p. 70.
[24] People v. Nieto, G.R. No. 177756, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 511, 524.
[25] People v. Dominguez, Jr., G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 134, 161.
[26] Id.
[27] CA rollo, pp. 31-32.
[28] TSN, June 20, 2001, pp. 3-5.
[29] People v. Caada, G.R. No. 175317, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 393.
[30] People v. Honra, Jr., G.R. Nos. 136012-16, September 26, 2000, 341 SCRA 110, 127, citing People v.
Pulusan, G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 353, 372.
[31] See People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 817, 827.
[32] Supra note 24 at 527-528.
[33] People v. Orande, G.R. Nos. 141724-27, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 699, 708.
[34] People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 345.
[35] People v. Villarino, G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 372, 387, citing People v. Masapol,
G.R. No. 121997, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 371, 377.
[36] People v. Wasit, G.R. No. 182454, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 721, 729.
[37] People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 655, 663, citing People v. Espino, Jr., G.R.
No. 176742, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682, 700-701.
[38] People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 188855, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 672, 688, citing People v. Arivan,
G.R. No. 176065, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 448, 468-469.
[39] People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 613-614, citing Esqueda v.
People, G.R. No. 170222, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 489, 506.
[40] The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.
[41] G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530.
[42] Id. at 580.
[43] G.R. Nos. 101107-08, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 312, 323-332.
[44] Id. at 328-329.
[45] G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 178.
[46] Id. at 192-193, citing People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67; People v.
Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453,
December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639; and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).
[47] People v. Nanas, G.R. No. 137299, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 452, 469-470, citing People v.
Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564 and People v. Sequio, G.R. No. 117397,
November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA 79, 101.
[48] G.R. No. 111102, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 429.
[49] Id. at 442, citing People v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 111124, June 20, 1996, 257 SCRA 489, 507 and
People v. Vivas, G.R. No. 100914, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 238, 242.
[50] See People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 275, 284.
[51] Id.
[52] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[53] People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 389.
[54] TSN, December 4, 2002, p. 3.
[55] G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.
[56] G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807.
[57] Id. at 817-821.
[58] People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 390.
[59] People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 457.
[60] People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 180915, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 383, 393.
[61] Supra note 38 at 475.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126368. September 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHNNY CALABROSO, SONNY BOY MATOS, RICHARD
SATA and LEONARDO DUMRIQUE, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHNNY CALABROSO, SONNY BOY MATOS, RICHARD SATA and LEONARDO DUMRIQUE were charged
with carnapping for taking away on 19 May 1994, in conspiracy with one another, a TMX Honda
motorized tricycle owned and driven by one Tranquilino Nacnac, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation.[1] They were also charged with robbery with homicide for taking away
on the same day P400.00 belonging to Nacnac, again in conspiracy with one another, also with intent to
gain and by means of violence and intimidation; and, on the occasion and by reason thereof, inflicted
upon Nacnac multiple stab wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused his death.[2]
On 15 March 1996 the trial court found all four (4) accused guilty of carnapping and sentenced them to
life imprisonment, to pay the costs, and required the police of Roxas, Isabela, to return the tricycle to
the widow of Nacnac. As regards the charge of robbery with homicide, only Johnny Calabroso and
Leonardo Dumrique were found guilty thereof for which they were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of Nacnac in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The court acquitted accused Richard Sata and Sonny Boy Matos.[3]
The factual backdrop: Danilo Cerveza was lining up his tricycle at the waiting lane in Centro, Barangay
Nuesa, Roxas, Isabela, at about six o'clock in the evening of 19 May 1994. Four (4) men, later identified
as Johnny Calabroso, Sonny Boy Matos, Richard Sata and Leonardo Dumrique, ages eighteen (18) to
twenty-one (21), boarded Cerveza's tricycle and asked him to take them to Gabit, Barangay Nuesa,
Roxas, Isabela. They offered him P35.00 for their fare but he wanted P40.00. Since they could not agree,
the men alighted and proceeded westward. Some thirty (30) meters away they flagged down another
tricycle. It was driven by Tranquilino Nacnac, Cerveza's compadre. Nacnac agreed to transport them to
their destination.
The following morning, Nacnac was found dead in Gabit, Barangay Nuesa. He bore twenty-two (22) stab
wounds on the head, torso and upper limbs.[4]
The police authorities of Kiangan, Ifugao, received a report that same morning that the sidecar of a
motorcycle was spotted at the bottom of a ten (10) to fifteen (15) - meter deep ravine. They retrieved
the sidecar. It was splattered with dried blood. A wallet containing a driver's license, an ID picture and a
certificate of registration of the tricycle belonging to Tranquilino Nacnac were found therein. In the
ensuing investigation, the police learned that a tricycle was seen parked the previous day at a certain
house in the neighborhood. When Police Inspector Antonio Malingan visited the house he was informed
that the owner had four (4) visitors the night before, or 19 May 1994, one of whom was his former
houseboy, Sonny Boy Matos, who came in a motorized tricycle. He also told Malingan that shortly
thereafter the three (3) companions of Matos went away on board the motorcycle, at that time already
stripped of its sidecar, while Matos stayed behind. Malingan then took Matos to the police station for
investigation where he revealed that his three (3) companions went to Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of the
motorcycle but promised to come back for him. Malingan sent two (2) of his men to Nueva Vizcaya. The
two (2) however failed to find there the companions of Matos, so the police decided to wait instead for
their return.
Two (2) days later, Calabroso, Sata and Dumrique returned to Kiangan with the motorcycle, so the
authorities invited them to the police station for investigation. Thereafter, the four (4) suspects, with the
tricycle and the wallet of Nacnac, were turned over to the Roxas police, Isabela.
From the suspects it was gathered that at six-thirty in the evening of 19 May 1994 they boarded a
tricycle driven by Nacnac to attend a dance party in Gabit. When they reached the place, Dumrique
tendered P12.00 since he knew that the regular fare was P3.00/head. But Nacnac demanded P40.00.
Dumrique refused to pay, so Nacnac boxed him five (5) times on the neck which caused him to fall to the
ground. Matos pacified them but Nacnac simultaneously drew a veinte nueve[5] from his waist.
Dumrique, who was still lying prostrate on the ground, saw Nacnac near his feet. Taking advantage of
the situation to disable Nacnac, Dumrique kicked him at his sex organ. Nacnac doubled up in pain.
Calabroso then grabbed the knife from Nacnac. When Calabroso was about to step backwards, Nacnac
held his right elbow, so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac. For his part, Matos tried to stop Calabroso but the
latter kept on swinging the knife. Sata, seated inside the tricycle, was stunned. Dumrique was not able
to do anything because he was still reeling from the punches he received from Nacnac. Thereafter,
Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle while Calabroso pulled Matos and joined Sata inside the
tricycle. All four (4) companions fled to Kiangan, Ifugao, leaving the bloodied Nacnac behind.
The trial court appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the four (4) accused in taking away the
tricycle of Nacnac as aptly demonstrated by them when they all boarded the same tricycle and sped
away from the crime scene.
As to the charge of robbery with homicide, the trial court ruled that the claim that the victim was
robbed of his money was not duly established, but was nonetheless convinced that Calabroso and
Dumrique were responsible for his death. The court ratiocinated that since it was already nighttime,
Nacnac was justified in asking P40.00 from the four (4) passengers; in fact, it was the amount previously
demanded by Cerveza. It further reasoned out that Dumrique started the fight by refusing to pay the
amount demanded by Nacnac while Calabroso had no compelling reason to stab Nacnac, repeatedly at
that, considering that the latter had already been reportedly disarmed and was in fact alone.
Nevertheless, the lower court convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with homicide, instead of
homicide alone, and exonerated Sata and Matos since it was its finding that Sata did not participate in
the fight while Matos only attempted to pacify the protagonists.
Accused-appellants Calabroso and Dumrique argue that the trial court erred in convicting them of
robbery with homicide since its discussion was clear that the prosecution failed to establish the robbery;
besides, Dumrique did not participate in stabbing Nacnac while Calabroso acted in incomplete self-
defense and in defense of his friends when he stabbed Nacnac even as he admitted that reasonable
means to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression by Nacnac was wanting. Accused-appellants also
submit that the trial court erred in awarding an indemnity of P50,000.00 because it was exorbitant and
devoid of legal basis.
At the outset we must stress that the trial court was categorical in its finding that "[n]obody declared
that the victim was robbed of anything."[6] Yet it convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with
homicide. This is glaring error. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the
charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted only of the offense
proved.[7] To be specific, absent any evidence that the accused indeed robbed the victim the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide cannot stand.[8] Having ruled out robbery for want of evidence
and satisfied of the equal liability of Calabroso and Dumrique for the death of Nacnac, the trial court
should have convicted them only of homicide.
Where the accused invokes self-defense, as Calabroso does, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.[9] There are three (3) requisites to
prove the claim of self-defense under Art. 11, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, namely, (a) unlawful
aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In the same manner, an accused who
invokes defense of a stranger pursuant to Art. 11, par. 3, of the same Code, has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory cause that would save him from conviction.[10] The first
two (2) requisites of self-defense should also be present in defense of a stranger. A third requisite is that
the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.[11]
The defense narrated that Nacnac and Dumrique continuously argued over the tricycle fare from Centro
to Gabit. Nacnac insisted on P40.00 but Dumrique believed it should only be P12.00 at P3.00/person.
Their verbal clash escalated into a full blown fight. Nacnac initiated the blows which landed on the neck
of Dumrique. As a consequence, Dumrique fell down. Matos pacified them but Nacnac simultaneously
drew a veinte nueve from his waist and nicked the left wrist of Matos. Still lying on the ground,
Dumrique saw Nacnac standing near his feet. Dumrique aimed at the sex organ of Nacnac and kicked it.
Nacnac grimaced in pain and bent his body. While Nacnac was in this position and about to stab
Dumrique, Calabroso grabbed the knife. Calabroso was about to step backward when his right elbow
was caught by Nacnac so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac in self-defense.
As the trial court opined, Nacnac was right in charging P40.00 since it was already nighttime and this was
the same amount earlier demanded by Cerveza when accused-appellants offered to hire his tricycle.
Dumrique drew the ire of Nacnac when he refused to pay the higher fare. The trial court thus concluded
that Nacnac was not an unlawful aggressor.
We share the view of the trial court although our reasoning springs from a different perspective.
Dumrique claimed there was no understanding with Nacnac as to the fare. He merely assumed that
Nacnac would be charging the regular fare of P3.00 per passenger,[12] implying that they readily rode in
the tricycle without bothering to inquire about the fare. This claim is hard to believe. According to
Cerveza, accused-appellants offered him P35.00 for their tricycle fare but he turned it down because he
wanted P40.00; thereafter they flagged down the tricycle of Nacnac. The trial court assessed the
testimony of Cerveza to be credible, and we find no cogent reason to believe otherwise because no
material fact appears to have been overlooked nor was any palpable error committed in the
process.[13] What was more in accord with the natural course of events was that accused-appellants
must have also offered to pay Nacnac P35.00 but Nacnac likewise demanded P40.00. Considering that
they boarded the tricycle of Nacnac they must have accepted his counter-offer. However, upon reaching
their destination, Dumrique presumably reneged on their agreement and insisted instead on paying only
P12.00.
The P28.00 - difference to some may be just a drop in the bucket. But to a tricycle driver every centavo
counts. The circumstance that Nacnac boxed Dumrique on the neck, when taken by itself, may appear to
be a sufficient provocation. But it should not be taken in isolation from the other antecedents. All
significant details must be pieced together to complete the scenario which was immediately preceeded
by the denial of accused-appellants to pay the agreed fare. If indeed Nacnac struck the first blows, it
could have only been provoked by their reneging on their undertaking. Thus, the initial blows delivered
by Nacnac could hardly be treated as the unlawful aggression contemplated in the law as an element of
self-defense.[14]
Calabroso also made it appear that Nacnac was the unlawful aggressor when the latter allegedly held his
right elbow when he was about to step back. But this version of Calabroso is at best self-serving. For, not
even one (1) of his co-accused corroborated his version. On the contrary, Dumrique,[15] Sata[16] and
Matos[17] were one in their narration that when Nacnac was in a bent position Calabroso grabbed
Nacnac's knife and stabbed him several times. It also surfaced from the evidence that Matos tried to
stop Calabroso but the latter was beyond control. Self-defense to be successfully invoked must be
established with certainty and proved with sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It may not be justifiably
entertained when it is uncorroborated by separate competent evidence.[18]
Assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression by Nacnac against Dumrique, it ceased to exist
after Nacnac was disarmed by Calabroso. By then, there was nothing else to prevent or repel.[19] Again
assuming that unlawful aggression originated from Nacnac, but this time against Calabroso, the means
Calabroso employed, as he himself admitted, was unreasonable. The examining physician found that
twenty-two (22) stab wounds were inflicted on Nacnac, nine (9) on the chest, ten (10) above the right
nipple and three (3) lateral to the nipple.[20] The location, number and severity of the wounds obviously
belie the claim of self-defense.[21] Moreover, Calabroso did not raise self-defense, nor even hint at it,
when apprehended by the police. A protestation of innocence or justification could have been the
logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who finds himself in such an inculpatory predicament.[22]
Hence, thre can be no other conclusion than that Calabroso is liable for homicide for the death of
Tranquilino Nacnac.
The charge against Dumrique should be treated differently. While Dumrique was lying on the ground,
Nacnac was beside his feet attacking Matos with a knife. Dumrique saw this as an opportunity to
neutralize Nacnac; so he kicked the latter's groin. The evidence clearly disclosed that the intention of
Dumrique was merely to disable Nacnac, not to kill him, and his attack was confined only to that.
Dumrique did not actively participate in killing Nacnac nor did he join in any other manner to further the
objective of Calabroso.[23] Conspiracy, which exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decide to commit it,[24] was not established
between Dumrique and Calabroso. The trial court, while ruling out conspiracy between the two (2) in
the killing of Nacnac, erroneously held that Dumrique was equally responsible with Calabroso for the
victim's death; hence, Dumrique must be acquitted.
Accused-appellants assail the trial court for concluding that they conspired in carnapping the tricycle of
Tranquilino Nacnac. They assert that their individual participations were distinct from each other's, i.e.,
Sata was seated quietly inside the tricycle; Matos was merely pulled into the tricycle by Calabroso;
Dumrique drove the vehicle, while Calabroso was only a passenger. Moreover, they allege that they
used the tricycle only as a getaway vehicle, without intent to gain, for when they reached Kiangan the
following morning they intended to surrender it, as they did, to the police. Lastly, they argue that the
trial court erred in imposing life imprisonment because such penalty is no longer provided in Sec. 14 of
RA 6539 as amended.
Carnapping is defined in Sec. 2, par. 2, RA 6539, as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things. The elements of carnapping therefore are: (a) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (b) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and, (c) the taking is done
with intent to gain.
As mentioned earlier, the trial court was of the view that when accused-appellants fled the crime scene
on board the tricycle conspiracy was established. We agree. All the elements of carnapping were
present in the instant case. After Nacnac was fatally stabbed Dumrique started the engine of the
tricycle, while Calabroso dragged Matos into the tricycle to join Sata who was already seated inside.
They fled to Kiangan, Ifugao. Intent to gain is presumed when one takes a property belonging to another
against his will.[25] The following morning of the incident, the police retrieved from a ravine the sidecar
of the motorcycle belonging to Nacnac. Police Inspector Malingan gathered from his investigation that
upon reaching Kiangan, the group proceeded to the house of the former employer of Matos. After a
while, Matos was left behind while his three (3) companions went to Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of the
motorcycle. They promised to fetch Matos afterwards. When the three (3) returned two (2) days later,
the motorcycle was still in their possession. They were invited for questioning by the policemen. The
intent to gain became an established fact when accused-appellants remained in possession of the
motorcycle even after the lapse of two (2) days from the commission of the crime. Given the choice
between their gratuitous claim that they utilized the vehicle only as a means of escape and surrendered
it to the police upon reaching Kiangan the following morning, and that of the police, we sustain the
latter. When police officers have no motive for testifying falsely against the accused, as Inspector
Malingan and members of his team were not so falsely motivated, courts will uphold the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties.[26]
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have

performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.[27]
When Calabroso, Matos and Dumrique joined Sata inside the tricycle and fled towards Kiangan after
Nacnac was stabbed they performed well-coordinated acts indicating a common purpose to steal the
vehicle.[28] Conspiracy is also inferred not only from their conduct before and during the commission of
the crime but also thereafter, showing that they acted in unison with each other.[29] Calabroso,
Dumrique and Sata proceeded to Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of the motorcycle. Matos stayed behind as
his companions promised to pick him up later. As promised, they returned to Kiangan still with the
vehicle. Conspiracy having been proven, accused-appellants are equally liable for carnapping the tricycle
of Nacnac.[30]
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Sec. 14 of RA 6539 as amended by Sec. 20 of RA 7659 - [31]
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping x x x x shall, irrespective
of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.
Prior to the amendment of Sec. 14 abovequoted, the last clause of its original version read: "x x x and
the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping." In still imposing the penalty of life
imprisonment on accused-appellants, the trial court clearly overlooked the 1993 amendment of Sec. 14.
The theory of the Solicitor General is that the killing of Nacnac is deemed absorbed in the "graver
offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated from." The carnapping and killing can be
considered as a "single or indivisible crime" or "a special complex crime" which is not covered by Art. 48
of the Penal Code.[32] Hence, accused-appellants Dumrique and Calabroso should be held liable for
qualified carnapping and penalized with reclusion perpetua.
We disagree. The taking away of the tricycle of Nacnac followed the killing apparently as an afterthought
of accused-appellants. In fact, their original design was not to commit any crime but to attend a dance
party. There is no direct relation, a causal connection, between the carnapping and the killing, i.e.,
whether the killing be prior or subsequent to the carnapping, or whether both crimes be committed at
the same time.[33] Therefore, the penalty applicable is imprisonment of not less than fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, since the
carnapping was committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused-appellants a prison term of
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and ten (10) days as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, four (4)
months and twenty (20) days as maximum.
As regards the homicide of which we find accused-appellant Johnny Calabroso guilty, the imposable
penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) one day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court
may impose upon accused-appellant a prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum.[34]
The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency was properly granted. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the
heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for the death without need of any
evidence or proof of damages.[35]
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from finding accused-appellants Johnny Calabroso, Sonny Boy
Matos, Richard Sata and Leonardo Dumrique guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping is AFFIRMED
subject to the MODIFICATION that the indeterminate prison term imposed is fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and ten (10) days as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days as
maximum.
The conviction for robbery with homicide of Johnny Calabroso and Leonardo Dumrique is SET ASIDE. We
find Calabroso alone guilty of homicide and impose upon him an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In addition, he is
ordered to pay death indemnity to the heirs of Tranquilino Nacnac in the amount of P50,000.00.
Dumrique is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to present the quantum of proof mandated by
law to establish conspiracy in the killing of Tranquilino Nacnac. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Filed pursuant to RA 6539, The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
[2] Filed pursuant to Art. 294, par. 1, The Revised Penal Code.
[3] Decision penned by Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, RTC-Br. 23, Roxas, Isabela; Rollo, p. 107.
[4] Certificate of Death, Exh. B; Records of Crim. Case No. 23-587, p. 14.
[5] A "veinte nueve" is a local term for a deadly knife measuring 29 cm. long together with its handle.
[6] Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 116.
[7] United States v. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil. 330 (1918).
[8] People v. Bajar, G.R. No. 118240, 28 October 1997, 281 SCRA 262.
[9] People v. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18 September 1990, 189 SCRA 700,
[10] People v. Almeda, G.R. No. 120853, 13 March 1997, 269 SCRA 643.
[11] People v. Tobias, G.R. No. 114185, 30 January 1997, 267 SCRA 229.
[12] TSN, 18 October 1995, p. 24.
[13] People v. Julian, G.R. Nos. 113692-93, 4 April 1997, 270 SCRA 733.
[14] People v. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285, 28 June 1989, 174 SCRA 285.
[15] TSN, 18 October 1995, pp. 10 and 20.
[16] TSN, 13 October 1995, pp. 10, 17, 21-22.
[17] TSN, 11 September 1995, p. 11.
[18] People v. Mercado, No. L-33492, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 453.
[19] People v. Masangkay, G.R. No. 73461, 27 October 1987, 155 SCRA 113.
[20] TSN, 13 January 1995, p. 15.
[21] People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, 2 August 1989, 176 SCRA 46.
[22] People v. Manansala, No. L-23514, 17 February 1970, 31 SCRA 401.
[23] People v. Alas, G.R. Nos. 118335-36, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 310.
[24] People v. Bergonia, G.R. No. 89369, 9 June 1997, 273 SCRA 79.
[25] People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 113785, 14 September 1995, 248 SCRA 207.
[26] People v. Guiamil, G.R. No. 119696, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 658.
[27] People v. De Roxas, G.R. No. 106783, 15 February 1995, 241 SCRA 369.
[28] People v. Navales, G.R. No. 112977, 23 January 1997, 266 SCRA 569.
[29] People v. Apongan, G.R. No. 112369, 4 April 1997, 270 SCRA 713.
[30] People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 111165, 17 July 1997, 275 SCRA 581.
[31] The Death Penalty Law took effect on 31 December 1993. Crime subject of instant case was
committed on 19 May 1994.
[32] Brief for the Appellee; Rollo, p. 164.
[33] Applying by analogy People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953) which involved robbery with homicide.
[34] Art. 65 in relation to Art. 64 of The Revised Penal Code.
[35] People v. Espanola, G.R. No. 119308, 18 April 1997, 271 SCRA 689.
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
- versus -
PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG,
Appellants.
G.R. No. 171655
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 22, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Appellant Maritess Ang (Maritess) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City with
kidnapping for ransom, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th of October 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE CHUA, a businessman, from the Casa Leonisa Bar located at Examiner
Street, Quezon City and brought him to an unknown place and detained him up to the present for the
purpose of extorting ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00, Philippine Currency, thereby
depriving him of his liberty from October 10, 1995 up to the present, to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.[1]
The Information was subsequently amended to implead the other appellant, Pablo Estacio, Jr. (Estacio),
and to change the charge from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. The accusatory
portion of the Amended Information reads:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippipnes, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with another person whose true name and identity has not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap one CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA, a businessman, with the use of motor vehicle from Casa Leonisa
Bar located at Examiner Street, Quezon City and brought him to BRGY. STO. CRISTO, San Jose, del
Monte, Bulacan and thereafter with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly stab said CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA on the
different parts of his body with the use of [a] fan knife, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Charlie Mancillan Chua.[2] (Underscoring in the original.)
Still later, the Information was further amended to additionally implead one Hildo Sumipo (Sumipo)[3]
who was, however, subsequently discharged as state witness.[4]
The evidence for the prosecution presents the following version of events:[5]
At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived
at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the three of them would meet
with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt
to the victim and then deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim].[6] Sumipo assumed,
however, that Maritess was just joking.
After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a short while, the group boarded his
car, Maritess taking the seat beside the victim who was driving, as Estacio and Sumipo took the
backseat.
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim
complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the
backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victims hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth.
Estacio then directed Sumipo to take over the wheels as he did.[7]
While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they would kill the
victim so that he would not take revenge.[8] Thereupon, the victim told Maritess, bakit mo nagawa sa
akin
ito sa kabila ng lahat?, to which she replied, Bayad na ako sa utang ko sa iyo ngayon.
On Estacios instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded
place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to
a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.
The three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On the way, Estacio and Maritess talked
about how they killed the victim, Estacio telling Maritess, Honey, wala na tayong problema dahil
siguradong patay na si Charlie sa dami ng saksak na nakuha niya.
On Estacios and Maritess directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug store where Maritess bought alcohol to
clean their hands. Along the way, Maritess and Estacio threw out the victims attach case. Maritess later
told Estacio Honey, sana hindi muna natin pinatay si Charlie para makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga
magulang [niya].
The three later abandoned the car in Malinta.
The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up by telephone the
victims mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied, however, that she could not
afford that amount.
In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipos residence again where Estacio
again called up the victims mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000 which she
still found to be too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future calls, as they might get caught,
but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that call would be the last.
The group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again called up the victims mother, still lowering
the ransom demand to P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of which should be advanced. The victims mother having
agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza
Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they
were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways.
Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chuas gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds
of which he was given P7,000.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio
surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victims mother that Estacio had admitted
having killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene.
The police, accompanied by the victims mother and Estacio, went to the crime scene and recovered the
remains of the victim who was identified by his mother by the clothes attached to his bones. The victims
dentist found his teeth to match his dental record.
Sumipo explained in an affidavit,[9] which he identified in open court,[10] that Maritess got angry with
the victim after he lent money to her husband, one Robert Ong,[11] enabling him to leave the country
without her knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the victim with whom Maritess had a
relationship.[12]
In his affidavit[13] which he identified in open court, Estacio claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car
between the victim and Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify the two, but the
victim got angry at him, prompting him to point a fan knife at his neck; and that he then asked Sumipo
to drive the car up to Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where he dragged the victim
away from the car and accidentally stabbed him.
When asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was accidental, Estacio replied that he and Maritess
originally planned to leave the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk of the victim getting back at
them, he got confused and so it happened.[14]
Maritess for her part denied[15] having conspired with Estacio. She claimed that while on board the car,
the victim took issue with her friendship with Estacio, whom he insulted. Incensed, Estacio grabbed the
victim by the collar, prompting the victim to pull out a gun from under the drivers seat which he aimed
at Estacio.
Continuing, Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the quarreling men; that the car stopped at San
Jose del Monte and the three men alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car and was later followed by
Estacio who said Masama raw ang nangyari,[16] he adding that he did not intend to stab the victim.
Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both Estacio and Maritess guilty of kidnapping on the occasion
of which the victim was killed, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Pablo Estacio, Jr. and Maritess Ang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was killed, the court hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the maximum penalty of Death; to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Charlie Chua the
amount of P200,000.00, as actual damages, and P1,000,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[17] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review.[18] However, the Court referred it to the
Court of Appeals for intermediate review following People v. Mateo.[19]
Estacio faulted the trial court for:
x x x FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED WAS
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
x x x CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE

PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF DETENTION AND LOCK UP.[20] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As for Maritess, she faulted the trial court for:

A. x x x Discharging Sumipo as State Witness and in Relying on His Testimony for the Conviction of
Appellant Ang.[21]
xxx
B. x x x Finding That There was Kidnapping with Murder and That Appellant Ang is Guilty Thereof.
C. x x x Not Concluding that the Crime Committed was Plain Homicide, and That Accused Estacio is
Solely Responsible Therefor.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
By Decision[23] of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the trial courts
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. Q-95-63818 finding accused-appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them to each suffer
the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as moral damages.
In view of the death penalty imposed, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for further review.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellants manifested before this Court that supplemental pleadings would not be necessary, all
relevant matters having already been taken up.[25]
Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court because of the trial courts unique advantage in observing
and monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment, and conduct of the witnesses as they
testify.[26] This Court need not thus pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they
have been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court, as in the present case.[27] Nevertheless, the Court
combed through the records of the case and found no ground to merit a reversal of appellants
conviction.
The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously
designated.
Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with
murder, defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex
crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.[28]
In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua
and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because
they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted
no time in killing him. That appellants intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by
the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill
him so that it would not create noise.[29] The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought
which did not qualify appellants prior acts as kidnapping.
People v. Padica[30] instructs:

We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill,
the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim
was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill
them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latters purpose was actually to
detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of
murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony
to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of
Masilang, et. al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed
him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not
convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the
crime committed was only murder.
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill the victim
can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life
once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no
evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the
victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom
appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victims
family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among
the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.
x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the
liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or
deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of
the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom
of movement would at most constitute coercion.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was
gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent
him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.
This Courts finding that the offense committed is Murder notwithstanding, the resulting penalty is the
same. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. The use of a motor vehicle, having been alleged in the Information and proven, can be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. There being one generic aggravating circumstance,
the resulting penalty is death. In view, however, of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24,
2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie.
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.[32]
These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than
appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he
could positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to be the most
guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that
Maritess was joking when she said, Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie. He tried to dissuade appellants
from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself
from the attempts to extract ransom from the victims family.
Sumipos testimony was corroborated on material points. The victims mother testified regarding the
demands for ransom.[33] Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim,
Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time in question.[34] Henry Hong, the
victims cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victims brother during the scheduled
delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions.[35] And the victims skeletal
remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacios information and direction.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error
would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.[36]
Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It was she who
bound the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess company, brought the victim to the
scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacios hands were bloodied.
Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess friend who visited her in prison, testified
that Maritess admitted having killed Chua.[37] And the prosecution presented letters from Maritess to
Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.[38]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The Court finds appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. And in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Information, records, p. 1.
[2] Id. at 49.
[3] Id. at 52.
[4] Id. at 167.
[5] Vide TSN, September 24, 1996, pp. 2-75; TSN, September 30, 1996, pp. 2-59; TSN, October 8, 1996,
pp. 2-84; TSN, October 14, 1996, pp. 2-56; TSN, October 22, 1996, pp. 3-34; TSN, November 4, 1996, pp.
2-47; TSN, November 7, 1996, pp. 3-91; TSN, November 11, 1996, pp. 3-27; TSN, December 4, 1996, pp.
2-32; TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 3-81; TSN, February 24, 1997, pp. 3-77; TSN, March 5, 1997, pp. 3-45;
TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-35; TSN, May 5, 1997, pp. 2-30; RTC records, pp. 171-241, 243.
[6] TSN, January 15, 1997, p. 12.
[7] TSN, Jan. 15, 1997, p. 25.
[8] Id. at 26-29.
[9] Records, pp. 237-240.

[10] TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 61-62.
[11] TSN, Oct. 13, 1997, p. 93.
[12] Records, p. 237.
[13] Exhibit AA, supra note 9.
[14] TSN, July 16, 1997, p. 10.
[15] Vide TSN, October 13, 1997, pp. 3-146.
[16] Id. at 54.
[17] Records, p. 402.
[18] Rollo, p. 1.
[19] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 656. Vide rollo, p. 2.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 161-162.
[21] Id. at 54.
[22] Id. at 56.

[23] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Arturo D. Brion. CA rollo, pp. 225-246.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 245-246.
[25] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[26] Vide Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 369, 376-377.
[27] First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526
SCRA 564, 575.
[28] People v. Larraaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530, 580.
[29] TSN, February 24, 1997, p. 70-71.
[30] G.R. No. 102645, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 362.
[31] Id. at 371-372.
[32] RULES OF COURT, Rule 119, Section 17.
[33] TSN, September 30, 1996, pp. 5-18.
[34] TSN, October 14, 1996, pp. 6-56.

[35] TSN, November 7, 1996, pp. 3-24.
[36] Vide People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 118670, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA 131, 141.
[37] TSN, September 24, 1996, p. 14.
[38] Exhibit N -4, (transcript), pp. 209-210. Original: Exhibit C-5, records, p. 185.
Custom Search
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were,
after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector
at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or
alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez,
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a
copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They
were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector,
the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining
Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private
Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When
this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further
inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to
her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door
where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where
the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector,
informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta,
referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a
.32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus
indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up."
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis
fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after
having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while
the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only
thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then
apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they
are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently
watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta
testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was
awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter
was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It
is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the
crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with
and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a
certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to
Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by
a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus
corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the
stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting
the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all
indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these
circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial
court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards
the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be
Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the
question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the
case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after
having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is
there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a
chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a
kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A
common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at
night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his
money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the
pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the
hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any
fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the
accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to
Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to
get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified
in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the
new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and
the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
(Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may
be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him
when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is
asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right
to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official
conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of
imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can
make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies
a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of
human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there
exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably
prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el
malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que
ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad
como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by
this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful
act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to
such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the
first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is
wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of
their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him
and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances,
they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be
Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the
provinces. Receiving information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by
telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to
the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto
Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a
newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private, after being told
by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to
follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of Irene was
located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks
in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked
by Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was
sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted
"Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting the man who was found by them lying down beside a
woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by
Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and
sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2
months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order
issued by the Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get
Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter
became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a record that made him extremely
dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether
dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot
be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted
man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want
to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be
commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or
ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without
hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only
after being overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial
Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in
Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the
appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until they have been
overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial
whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the
facts exist that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary
authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental,
in view only of the fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while
he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be
consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will
always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in
due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his
life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact
Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They
also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but
Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith.
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said
article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as
already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as
the defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed
another by mistake, would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario
Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs.
Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro
Almasan after he had already surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and that the said
defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must
be taken by storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever
said criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta
in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both
officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and according to the attitude of not only
the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be
assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It
appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod
stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties
concerned honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had
escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person
whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas,
informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling
the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his
intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt
offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his mistress.
In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants to employ force and to
make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according to their
belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking
into consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the
doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the
case supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the
accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be
invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should
be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying
circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who
acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the application
of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper,
in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines,
and which was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No.
94 of the Department of Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69,
said that the justifying circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject
matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, state of
necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11
dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed
within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal
Code of 1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una
fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de
un deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del
que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener
aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad
de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el
autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc.,
etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o
inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas
rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que
falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el
mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The
word "conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying
circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order that this circumstance may
be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that these two requisites
concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given to the
appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was
with a bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a
warning to the supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt.
Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in
favor of the acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this
accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45
caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his
superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of
the Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This
gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied
said accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon
order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the witness with five .45 caliber
bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant
Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of
December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession
of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated
that he had fired only one shot and missed. This testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert
who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the deceased,
causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, —
had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of the constabulary station in
Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when
Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased was none other than
Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta
should carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from
wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver
bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45
caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been
caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm.,
the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in this
case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All
other wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by
bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or
kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he should be declared criminally responsible for
said death.
Custom Search
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in
the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon
Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by
the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and
the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel
de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to him
in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement,
ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should
report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the board of medical
experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not
insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14,
reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment
during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was
determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after
the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen.
He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature
of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the
motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a
sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes,
irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is
seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory
he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it
his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to
a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr.
Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one
of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in
relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an
individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of
one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that
Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in
question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor
General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal
case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946.
Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and
subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became
disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises
made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when,
according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and
campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the
President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the
opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent
in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech
expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the
Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to
Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said
firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He
had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or
following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon)
where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to
carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for
him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon,
when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting
held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents
of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by
myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to
my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would
not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and
there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had
deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went
to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should not continue
any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And
why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences
of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only
displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew,
was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said
Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag
which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located
close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which
he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President
when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was
about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his
presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space
where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with
his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and
exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion
ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had
seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the result of mortal
wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a
barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of
the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen
offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some
detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under
arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were
investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom
Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen
for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the
explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the
occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and
identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object which
exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the
same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his
captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which
was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the
other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who
investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are
satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the
trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in
determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence
of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission
of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows
beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand
grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well
that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to
explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being
killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out
his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of
transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose
was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the
President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to
the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word, although it was
not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing
them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide
through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries
in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be
sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which
shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with
article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article
4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be
qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene;
where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may
not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's
Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose
negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido
un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de
fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no
intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de
c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y
condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional
por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de
homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se
propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien
debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y
que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al
reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo,
o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros
articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de
agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case
before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing
highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely:
(1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which
President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of
People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended
to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up
defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying
circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the
defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over
acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other
persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the
provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others
the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the
execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral
campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the
hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the
commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the
single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it
necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its
maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art.
248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it
upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do
so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court
may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

Crim Cases de Leon To Guillen

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Crim Cases de Leon To Guillen

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 179943 June 26, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4747

Criminal Case No. 4748

a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00

b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00

c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00

d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00

e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00

Criminal Case No. 4749

b) Cash money worth ₱50.00

Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors:

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

(2) the property taken belongs to another;

(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and

(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.37

A: Only one, sir, and there he is.

A: His gun was poked at me, sir.

A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.

A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.

Q: Who hit you with a gun?

A: His other companion, sir.46

Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:

Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?

A: Also .38 caliber, sir.

Q: Kindly point to him?

Associate Justice PRESBITERIO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Third Division, Chairperson

5 Id, at 206 and 208.

8 Id. at 206 and 208.

18 Id. at 210 and 211.

20 TSN, May 4, 2000.

21 TSN, May 11 and December 14, 2000.

22 TSN, May 18, 2000.

23 TSN, May 25 and June 7, 2000.

24 TSN, September 6 and 21, 2000.

25 TSN, May 3, 2001.

26 TSN, May 30, 2001 and July 3, 2001.

27 Records, pp. 203-219.

33 CA rollo, pp. 66-94.

35 Records, pp. 152-156.

36 G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384.

37 Id. at 401-402, citing People v. Pedroso, 391 Phil. 43, 56 (2000).

42 People v. Corre, Jr., 415 Phil. 386, 398 (2001).

44 People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545, 561 (2000).

46 TSN, May 20, 2000, pp. 7-8.

47 TSN, May 18, 2000, p. 6.

48 People v. Tulin, 416 Phil. 364, 386 (2000).

49 People v. Quinicio, 417 Phil. 571, 586 (2000).

53 Rollo, pp. 20-21.

61 People v. Montinola, 413 Phil. 176, 192 (2000).

63 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Secs. 8 and 9.

65 CA rollo, pp. 41-42; TSN, July 27, 1998, pp. 2-8.

66 CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,

68 Rollo, pp. 71-72.

73 People v. Malinao, 467 Phil. 432 (2004).

74 People v. Werba, supra note 51, at 499.

77 456 Phil. 14 (2003).

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS