Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Word count:1,994
Date: 07.11.2018
Essay 1., Q.4 “Did Central and Eastern European States lose or gain
power when they entered the European Union”
1.0 Introduction
Freed from the shackles of the interference and bureaucracy of the
Soviet state machine citizens of the Eastern Bloc wanted self
determination, political freedom and economic opportunity.
In parallel, with the collapse of the USSR, the European Union had grown
from 5 countries to 27 by 2008. The fundamental purpose of the European
Union was and is to promote greater social, political and economic
harmony among the nations of Europe with respect for human dignity and
human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.
To answer the question of whether states have gained or lost power we
should understand and define the meaning of ‘Power’, and also develop a
robust methodology to measure the power of states pre and post EU
membership.
2.0 Power – Evolution of concept
Much of the research literature tries to establish universal tags to
define Power. The theory of ‘Elitism’ suggests that societies are
divided along class lines and that an upperclass elite will rule1.
Conversely, Pluralism suggests that the concentration of power ought not
to be considered excessive as it would always be balanced by another,
contra group.
1
The original Marxist view of the bourgeoisie and the state
Two important books examined Elitism in the 1950s: ‘The Power Elite by
C. W. Mills2 and Community Power Structure by Floyd Hunter3 based on a
hypothetical city of population 500,000. Both writers contended that the
‘elite’ members of respective groups made decisions, at every level of
society, in private and public organisations.
Hunter and Mill’s ideas were lambasted by Robert Dahl (an ardent
Pluralist), a vocal critic of their work, (American Political Science
Review, 1958), writing that the existence of a ruling elite can only be
tested if there is a large sample base with the necessary control
groups.
Overriding outcomes from the ideas of the Elitist and Pluralist schools
of thought were ‘How is it possible to empirically measure, define and
investigate power – and how pluralistic or democratic is its
distribution?
According to Przeworski4, a workable idealogy must express citizen’s
interests and aspirations. A few individuals can be mistaken but
delusions cannot be perpetuated on a mass scale.
Steven Lukes, in his book ‘Power – A Radical View5 was interested in ‘how
to think about power theoretically, and how to study it empirically’. In
the 1970s the question asked was what explained the persistence of
capitalism and cohesion of liberal democracies? Equally, asked by Tilly6,
‘why do subordinates comply?’. And for Michel Foucault7 ‘mental illness
is a result of alienation by capitalism!’
According to Lukes, Pluralists assume that interests are to be
understood as policy preferences – they are opposed to any suggestion
that interest might be unarticulated or unobservable (as succinctly put
2
CW Mills – The Power Elite, 2nd ed. 2000
3
F.Hunter – Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers
4
(Przeworski 1985 )
5
(Lukes 2005)
6
(C.Tilly n.d.)
7
(Foucault 1975)
by Schattschneider8, “because organization is the mobilization of bias”).
Lukes suggested that neither the 1dimensional view of the Elitists nor
the 2dimensional view of the pluralists fully defines power proposing a
3dimensional view considering:
- decision making and control over a political agenda
- observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict
- subjective and real interests
Power, according to Lukes, is better defined by 3dimensions suggesting
its character is evaluative in every aspect; echoed by Joseph Schumpeter9
that democracy should be seen as ‘that institutional arrangement’ for
arriving at political decisions’. Lukes explains how political systems
prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made.
On the notion of ‘Power over’ a process or a person, group or
association, Thomas Wartenberg10 cited the enforcement of seat belt
wearing as a societal good.
3.0 EU accession by Central and East European countries (CEECs)
3.1 Poland
Analysis focuses on Poland and Hungary (Central) and Bulgaria and
Romania (Eastern Europe).
Poland joined the EU in 2004, gaining independence from the USSR in 1991
although in charge of its own affairs many years before this according
to historian Tony Judt11.
Poland gained significant EU funding from the EU and exterior
investment. Despite GDP growth public debt has ballooned, and citizens
feel impoverished compared with many of its neighbours12 Economic
stats13.
8
E(Schnattschneider 1960)
9
(Schumpeter 1962 revised (1950) )
10
(Wartenberg 199)
11
(Judt 2005)
12
2004 -2014 GDP rose from PLN(Zloty) 884 Billion – 1600 Billion with Poland taking advantage of large EU funds and benign policies to modernize the
country. Investment capital rushed in – PLN 405 Bn (period 2004-2013) Exports to the West tripled in the period resulting in a surplus of PLN 100 Bn
13
(Misssala January 2016 )
This has created powerful social frustration, powering economic
migration on a drastic scale. Between 2004–2016 almost 2 million Poles
left the country – majority destined for Germany and UK.
Foreign policy implementation has been an issue for successive
governments. In 2012 Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski reiterated:
“Poland supports an EU where the member states are forever sovereign,
with the right to leave the EU”, and it’s work with CEECs seeking EU
membership to be “a Polish brand in the EU”14.
The Law and Justice Party 20072008 and 2015 was and is Eurosceptic,
according to Professor Missala “it will cherry pick those policies for
its purpose for the influential people who control the country”15.
By 2015 Poland’s image as pro EU was sullied by its skepticism of mass
immigration of refugees and migrants.16 October 2015 the LJP came into
power adopting new laws to circumnavigate the constitutional process,
affecting:
- The Constitutional Court
- National Broadcasting Council
This led to protests across Poland which outraged the EU parliament.
Poland’s PM, Beata Sydlo, said “constitutional changes in Poland are an
internal matter” and foreign minister Waszczlkowski “European states
should have unequivocal rights to take decisions unilaterally about its
citizens”.
3.2 Hungary – the rise of the Right
Until recently Hungary was judged a success story, economically,
socially and politically. Economically the country has prospered from EU
loans, support and outside investment. The population is welleducated
14
https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minister_radoslaw_sikorski_on_eu_for_european_newspapers_1
15
Agnieszka Bienń czyk-Missala is Assistant Professor of Strategic Studies at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw
16
At the end of 2015 800,000 immigrants from Ukraine had found work in Poland.
and unemployment low 4% for 20172018. Hungary recorded government
debt equivalent to 73.60 percent of the country's GDP in 2017.
EU funding has been essential to Hungary’s success e.g. ‘from 20072013
alone, Hungary’s allocation from Cohesion Policy funding was € 25.3
billion. These funds created more than 75,000 jobs’17 which supports
the idea of legitimate power18 as the people willingly integrate into
jobs created by the government.
Prime Minister Viktor Orban suffered a stinging rebuke from his European
political allies on Wednesday19 when the EU’s parliament voted for the
first time to censure his country over ‘possible breaches of bloc rules
and values’20. Further, The EU is suing Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic over their refusal to accept refugees and taking separate legal
action against Poland and Hungary over reforms that allegedly undermine
the rule of law.
The transition to a free market economy post 1990 proved to be an
extremely difficult process. Hungary appeared at the forefront but the
speed of modernisation was deemed too fast, alienating large parts of
the population from the capitalist system – “Where this will lead in the
future is currently hard to evaluate21”.
Victor Orban visited Warsaw citing Poland as a major conservative ally,
resisting so called “EU liberal efforts to weaken sovereign nations”22.
The Orban government has been accused of a nationalist propaganda
against ‘outsiders’ including migrants and refugees and appears to be
heading for a major clash with Brussels over fundamental identities of
EU states.
17
h(Salgoń 2018)
18
In£uence exists where A, ‘with- out resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe depriva- tion, causes [B] to change his course
of action’ (p.30). In a situation involving authority, ‘B complies because he recognises that [A’s] command is reasonable in terms of his
own values’ ^ either because its content is legitimate and reasonable
19
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/european-parliament-votes-to-rebuke-hungary-1.3627051
20
(Financial times n.d.)
21
(Ungvań ry n.d.)
22
(i 2018) (trading economics 2018)
3.3 Romania and Bulgaria – corruption, the right and democracy
The first period of communist rule in Romania, 19441958, is defined by
Professor Stefan Fisher Gelati23 as ‘the loss of national identity by the
destruction of the bourgeois nationalist legacy and diminution of Romania’s
national sovereignty under a virtual Soviet occupation’.
The regime of President Nicolae Ceausescu officially began in 1965 and ended in
execution in 198924. Ceausescu’s regime bankrupted the country in the 1970s
impoverishing citizens for over 20 years. The NSF (19902004) undertook
economic reform and privatisation. The SDP regained power in 2000 until 2004,
collapsing under allegations of corruption, replaced by the National Liberal
Party (PNL).
GDP per capita (PPP) in Romania averaged US$14469.02 from 1990 until 2017,
reaching an alltime high of 23313.20 USD in 2017 and a record low of 9237.08
USD in 1992.
The 20062008 period was the best for Romania in terms of investment inflows,
until the 2008 global crisis. Inflows of €8 billion pre crisis, FDI flows
dropped abruptly to €2 billion 20092013, thence €4.8 billion in 2017.
Despite national growth (7%2017,4% 2018) income levels are low and a large
part of the population faces poverty. Emigration to Western Europe has been
dramatic – population 2008 at 20.64 million and 2018 19.52 million25.
Allegations of corruption by government have been omnipresent before and since
Romania joined the EU26. Demonstrations over new laws that critics allege will
put the justice system under political control are ongoing.
Romania’s anticorruption chief, Laura Kovesi (now fired), told Euronews last
month that the legislation would obstruct her fight to rid the country of
corruption “Romania is being dragged down a path which Hungary and Poland
have gone for some time now”.
23
Professor Galati took his doctorate at Harvard University and became Distinguished Professor at Colorado University. He was the director of the Center for
Slavic and East European Studies. Since 1967 , he has published the publication "East European Quarterly". Between 1951 and 1953 , he worked at the US State
Department, and during the administration Nixon became a consultant for the East European problems of the White House. Recognition in Romania At the
proposal of the Council of the Faculty of History and Political Sciences of Ovidius University Constanta, the Senate of the university center decided to award the
title of doctor honoris causa prof. Univ. Dr. Stephen Fischer-Galati.
24
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/07/nicolae-ceausescu-execution-anniversary-romania
25
https://tradingeconomics.com/romania/population] (trading economics 2018)
26
Financial Times report, PSD leader Liviu Dragnea, whose appeal against a criminal conviction in an abuse of office case starts on 15 th October 2018,
told reporters after voting “Yes” to the change on Saturday that Romanians had to decide the kind of country they wanted
Socalled Article 7 procedures launched against Hungary and Poland, which could
strip them of their EU voting rights, are hampered by the fact that each
country has vowed to protect the other. A similar process against Romania is
hardly possible with Bucharest taking the EU’s reins next year.
In 2017 Bulgaria’s GDP was 56.83 billion US dollars. GDP in Bulgaria
reached ‘an alltime high of 57.42 USD Billion in 2011 and a record low
of 9.70 USD Billion in 199427.’ Joining the EU has meant a large increase
of GDP for Bulgaria however, Bulgaria is still the poorest member of the
EU, ‘citizens taking home the lowest average wage €550 per month28’.
Bulgaria is dependent on the EU for financial aid, earmarked for €10
billion of European aid between 2014 and 2020, cash injections which
account for over half of the annual growth rate29.
Unsurprisingly Bulgaria seeks entry to the ERM however, the EU statement
was forthright, identifying Bulgaria's judicial reforms and the "fight
against corruption and organised crime", as important markers of the
country's readiness for euro membership.
4.0 Conclusion
The question of whether the CEECs30 have lost or gained power, affecting
sovereignty, and impacting on democracy can be answered in several ways
– economically the fact is that these countries have benefited; measures
of country wealth appear to suggest that the majority of CEECs’
economies have grown and investment from the EU and outside has
empowered the states and been beneficial for their citizens.
27
https://tradingeconomics.com/bulgaria/gdp
28
(insider 2018)
29
(insider, novinite.com 2018)
30
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=303
On the other hand there has been a sea change in the idealogical and
political drivers from the EU. A recent article by ex Italian Finance
Minister, Guilio Tremonti31 alludes to this:
“Over the last 20 years, the EU has failed to understand and
manage major political and economic phenomena, as it pushed ahead with
its plan to transform an entirely economic body into a political one”32
The European projects’ aim to bring most of Europe into the family has
and is having many unintended consequences on economics and wealth,
politics and power, culture, democracy and culture across the region.
The power base would appear to be a one way street but actually this
would appear to be mistaken as the EU cannot afford to alienate the
CEECS, who appear to be going their own way in terms of national
politics, state power over their own legal systems and hence their
people. The Phoenix rising would suggest that we will see a mini EU or
association of CEECs who want to have the economic success of the early
EU entry years unfettered by Brussel’s interference of state’s national
interests and if this means right wing governments with anti refugee and
migration laws, own budget determination, so be it. The injunction of
article 7 is unlikely to have an affect on the likes of Victor Orban,
Borissov, and Morawiecki.
Mr Junckers’ State of the Union address33 warned that the commission
would “resist any attack on the rule of law” and was “very concerned by
developments in some of our member states”.
31
Politico Online By GIULIO TREMONTI AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT MALLOCH 3/25/17, 4:35 AM CET Updated 3/28/17, 2:16 PM CET
32
First, Brussels missed the chance to manage globalization. It was caught unprepared, too busy perfecting an internal market to compete with various
types of economies. First, a financial crisis, then an economic crisis, and finally, a political crisis. Each evinced a decreasing faith in the project and left
Europeans increasingly anxious - (malloch 2017)
33
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf
The CEECs’ Power is growing as state entities, their citizens may well
be casualties of the their leaders’ autocratic leanings but it’s what
they voted for! The irony is that whilst the EU’s masters try to pull
the strings their fledgling CEECs are developing ever closer
relationships together – and with Putin’s Russia!