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THE SCIENCE OF WAR: NUCLEAR HISTORY
special online issue no. 3
The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophes," Albert
Einstein wrote in 1946. Indeed, the development of nuclear weapons utterly transformed human warfare, as the mass destruction wreaked by
bombs dropped on Japan a year earlier made chillingly clear. Yet devastating though the outcomes often were, this was a time of extraordinary
discoveries in the field of physics. Scientific American has long covered the science of war. Our first special online issue housed a collection of arti-
cles about weapons. Now part two of our war anthology brings together recent contributions from experts on nuclear history.
In this issue, leading authorities discuss the science—and the scientists—that delivered us into the nuclear age, from Lise Meitner’s long-over-
looked contributions to the discovery of nuclear fission to Manhattan Project member Philip Morrison’s reflections on the first nuclear war and how
a second must be avoided. Other articles probe such topics as the contentious relationship between atomic bomb collaborators Enrico Fermi and
Leo Szilard, a mysterious meeting between Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, and the unlikely achievements of physicists in wartime Japan.
–The Editors
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Physicists in Wartime Japan
BY LAURIE M. BROWN AND YOICHIRO NAMBU; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, DECEMBER 1998
During the most trying years of Japan's history, two brilliant schools of theoretical physics flourished.
“The last seminar, given at a gorgeous house left unburned near Riken, was theory of electromagnetism, now known
dedicated to [electron] shower theories.... It was difficult to continue the semi- as quantum electrodynamics.
nars, because Minakawa’s house was burnt in April and the laboratory was badly When he returned to Japan in 1928,
destroyed in May. The laboratory moved to a village near Komoro in July; four Nishina brought with him the “spirit of
physics students including myself lived there. Tatuoki Miyazima also moved to the Copenhagen”—a democratic style of re-
same village, and we continued our studies there towards the end of 1945.” search in which anyone could speak his
—Satio Hayakawa, astrophysicist mind, contrasting with the authoritari-
an norm at Japanese universities—as well
B
as knowledge of modern problems and
etween 1935 and 1955 a hand- and Chinese. But after a trip abroad, he methods. Luminaries from the West,
ful of Japanese men turned their returned with loads of English textbooks such as Werner K. Heisenberg and Paul
minds to the unsolved prob- and apologized for having taught him A. M. Dirac, came to visit, lecturing to
lems of theoretical physics. They taught all the wrong subjects. At university, awed ranks of students and faculty.
themselves quantum mechanics, con- Nagaoka hesitated to take up science; Hiding near the back of the hall, Shin-
structed the quantum theory of electro- he was uncertain if Asians could master ichiro Tomonaga was one of the few to
magnetism and postulated the existence the craft. But after a year of perusing the understand Heisenberg’s lectures. He
of new particles. Much of the time their history of Chinese science, he decided had just spent a year and a half as an
lives were in turmoil, their homes de- the Japanese, too, might have a chance. undergraduate teaching himself quan-
molished and their bellies empty. But In 1903 Nagaoka proposed a model tum mechanics from all the original pa-
the worst of times for the scientists was of the atom that contained a small nu- pers. On the last day of lectures, Naga-
the best of times for the science. After cleus surrounded by a ring of electrons. oka scolded that Heisenberg and Dirac
the war, as a numbed Japan surveyed This “Saturnian” model was the first to had discovered a new theory in their 20s,
the devastation, its physicists brought contain a nucleus, discovered in 1911 whereas Japanese students were still pa-
home two Nobel Prizes. by Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish thetically copying lecture notes. “Na-
Their achievements were all the more Laboratory in Cambridge, England. gaoka’s pep talk really did not get me
remarkable in a society that had encoun- As measured by victories against Chi- anywhere,” Tomonaga later confessed.
tered the methods of science only decades na (1895), Russia (1905) and in World
earlier. In 1854 Commodore Matthew War I, Japan’s pursuit of technology Sons of Samurai
Perry’s warships forced the country open was a success. Its larger companies es-
to international trade, ending two cen-
turies of isolation. Japan realized that
without modern technology it was mili-
tablished research laboratories, and in
1917 a quasigovernmental institute
called Riken (the Institute of Physical
H e was, however, destined to go
places, along with his high school
and college classmate Hideki Yukawa.
tarily weak. A group of educated samu- and Chemical Research) came into be- Both men’s fathers had traveled abroad
rai forced the ruling shogun to step ing in Tokyo. Though designed to pro- and were academics: Tomonaga’s a pro-
down in 1868 and reinstated the em- vide technical support to industry, Ri- fessor of Western philosophy, Yukawa’s
peror, who had until then been only a ken also conducted basic research.
figurehead. The new regime sent young A young scientist at Riken, Yoshio Ni-
men to Germany, France, England and shina, was sent abroad in 1919, travel-
COURTESY OF YOICHIRO NAMBU
America to study languages, science, en- ing in England and Germany and spend- IN JANUARY 1942 author Yoichiro
Nambu reads in laboratory room 305 of
gineering and medicine and founded ing six years at Niels Bohr’s institute in
the physics department at the University
Western-style universities in Tokyo, Kyo- Copenhagen. Together with Oskar Klein, of Tokyo. Soon after, he was drafted.
to and elsewhere. Nishina calculated the probability of a When the war ended, Nambu lived in this
Hantaro Nagaoka was one of Japan’s photon, a quantum of light, bouncing room for three years; neighboring labora-
first physicists. His father, a former sam- off an electron. This interaction was tories were similarly occupied by home-
urai, initially taught his son calligraphy fundamental to the emerging quantum less and hungry scientists.
Discoveries in Physics
Japan, 1900 to 1970 TOMONAGA SUPER-
SAKATA AND INOUE MANY-TIME THEORY
KLEIN-NISHINA TWO-MESON THEORY
FORMULA GELL-MANN–NISHIJIMA
NAGAOKA STRANGENESS FORMULA
NUCLEUS YAGI YUKAWA THEORY OF
ANTENNA NUCLEAR FORCE YUKAWA’S NOBEL TOMONAGA’S NOBEL
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 5
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recovered by the military police, Sagane N.J., proposed a similar solution.) Al- 20th century saw the discovery of an
learned of it only after the war. After though the method had its flaws, it even- abundance of subatomic particles, many
the Japanese surrender in August 1945, tually led Tomonaga’s group to figure of which were predicted years before.
the country was effectively under out how to dispose of the infinities, by a In 1947 new particles began to show
American occupation for seven years. method now known as renormalization. up that were so puzzling that they were
General Douglas MacArthur’s adminis- This time the results were published dubbed “strange.” Although they ap-
tration reformed, liberalized and ex- in Progress of Theoretical Physics, an peared rarely, they often did so in pairs
panded the university system. But ex- English-language journal founded by and, moreover, lived anomalously long.
perimental research in nuclear and re- Yukawa in 1946. In September 1947 Eventually Murray Gell-Mann of the
lated fields was essentially prohibited. Tomonaga read in Newsweek about a California Institute of Technology and,
All cyclotrons in Japan were dismantled striking experimental result obtained by independently, Kazuhiko Nishijima of
and thrown into the sea, for fear that Willis E. Lamb and Robert C. Rether- Osaka City University and other Japan-
they might be used to research an ford of Columbia University. The elec- ese researchers discovered a regularity
atomic bomb. tron in a hydrogen atom can occupy one behind their properties, described by a
In any case, the miserable economy of several quantum states; two of these quantum characteristic called “strange-
did not allow the luxury of experimen- states, previously thought to have iden- ness.” (Discerning this pattern was the
tal research. Tomonaga was living with tical energies, actually turned out to have first step in the three-stages theory.)
his family in a laboratory, half of which slightly different energies. In subsequent years Sakata and his as-
had been bombed to bits. Nambu ar- Right after the finding was reported, sociates became active in sorting through
rived at the University of Tokyo as a re- Hans Bethe of Cornell University had the abundance of particles that were
search assistant and lived for three years offered a quick, nonrelativistic calcula- turning up and postulated a mathemat-
in a laboratory, sleeping on a straw mat- tion of the “Lamb shift,” as the energy ical framework, or triad, that became
tress spread over his desk (and always difference came to be known. The ef- the forerunner of the quark model. (This
dressed in military uniform for lack of fect is a finite change in the infinite self- framework formed the second stage. At
other clothes). Neighboring offices were energy of the electron as it moves inside present, high-energy physics, with its
similarly occupied, one by a professor an atom. With his students, Tomonaga precise theory of particles and forces
and his family. soon obtained a relativistic result by known as the Standard Model, is in the
correctly accounting for the infinities. third and final stage.)
A Hungry Peace Their work strongly resembled that Meanwhile physicists in Japan were
being done, almost at the same time, by renewing ties with those in the U.S.
tute for Advanced Study, invited succeeded the Meson Club. In 1953 sity of Tokyo, submitted a thesis on the
Yukawa to visit. He spent a year there, Yukawa became the director of a new quantum behavior of semiconductors,
another at Columbia, and received the research institute at Kyoto, now known work that eventually led to the develop-
Nobel Prize in 1949. Tomo- as the Yukawa Institute for Theoretical ment of transistors. He would bring
naga also visited the institute and found Physics. home a third Japanese Nobel in
it extremely stimulating. But he was In the same year he and Tomonaga physics, shared with Ivar Giaever and
homesick. “I feel as if I am exiled in par- hosted an international conference on Brian D. Josephson, in 1973.
adise,” he wrote to his former students. theoretical physics in Tokyo and Kyoto. One wonders why the worst decades
He returned after a year to Japan, hav- Fifty-five foreign physicists attended, of the century for Japan were the most
ing worked on a theory of particles mov- including Oppenheimer. It is said that creative ones for its theoretical physi-
ing in one dimension that is currently Oppenheimer wished to visit the beauti- cists. Perhaps the troubled mind sought
proving useful to string theorists. ful Inland Sea but that Yukawa discour- escape from the horrors of war in the
From the early 1950s, younger physi- aged him, feeling that Oppenheimer pure contemplation of theory. Perhaps
cists also began to visit the U.S. Some, would find it too upsetting to see Hi- the war enhanced an isolation that
such as Nambu, stayed on. To an extent roshima, which was nearby. Despite served to prod originality. Certainly the
mitigating this brain drain, the expatri- their lifelong immersion in abstractions, traditional style of feudal allegiance to
ates retained ties with their colleagues Yukawa and Tomonaga became active professors and administrators broke
in Japan. One means was to send letters in the antinuclear movement and signed down for a while. Perhaps for once the
to an informal newsletter, Soryushiron several petitions calling for the destruc- physicists were free to follow their ideas.
Kenkyu, which was often read aloud tion of nuclear weapons. In 1959 Leo Or perhaps the period is just too ex-
during meetings of a research group that Esaki, a doctoral student at the Univer- traordinary to allow explanation.
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 7
COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
originally published Auguest 1995
Recollections
of a Nuclear War
Two nuclear bombs were dropped on Japan 50 years ago this month.
The author, a member of the Manhattan Project, reflects on how the
nuclear age began and what the post–cold war future might hold
by Philip Morrison
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 9
COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
complex bombs, adding our unique but the difference between the all-out and even a few can bring grave disaster.
skills to those of scores of thousands of raids made on the cities of Japan and Passive shelter is little use, for the deep-
airmen on Tinian, where unending ship- those two nuclear attacks remains less er the costly shelter, the bigger the inex-
loads of gasoline and firebombs were in the nature or the scale of the human pensive bomb. No likely working mar-
entering the harbor. tragedy than in the chilling fact that gin of technical superiority will defend
The Hiroshima bomb, first to be read- now it was much easier to destroy the us either, for even a smaller nuclear
ied, was first to be used, on August 6, populous cities of humankind. Two nu- force can wreak its intolerable damage.
1945. That city was turned to rust-red clear bombs had perhaps doubled the
ruin by the uranium bomb nicknamed death count brought by air power to Legacy of the Bomb
Little Boy. The design had never been Japan.
tested before it was dropped, as the gun
design was so simple, though much
costlier in nuclear fuel. Then the second
Fission and then fusion offered havoc
wholesale, on the cheap. It was not
World War II that the atom’s nucleus
I think these views are as right today as
they were in 1945. Only one way re-
mains: comprehensive international
version of the just tested plutonium im- would most transform but the next agreement for putting an end to nuclear
plosion bomb Fat Man brought disaster great war. The past 50 years have been war, worked out in rich detail. It is
to Nagasaki. The war soon ended. ruled by one nuclear truth. In 1945 the striking that the laboratory leaders of
With the sense that I was completing U.S. deployed about 1,000 long-range the Manhattan Project said much the
my long witness to the entire tragedy, I B-29s. By the 1960s we had about 2,000 same thing as early as August 17, 1945,
accepted the assignment to join the pre- jet bombers, and by the 1980s maybe three days after the peace was made
liminary American party hurriedly sent 1,500 missiles. For more than four de- with Japan. But they wrote in secret to
from our Pacific base to enter Japan on cades we kept a striking force compara- the U.S. secretary of war, and their first
the first day of U.S. occupation. Joined ble with the one General Curtis E. Le- views remained hidden for many years.
by two other young Americans in uni- May commanded in 1945, each year The 1990s have given us an unex-
form, I traveled by train for a couple of becoming faster, more reliable, and so pected historical opportunity, as unex-
weeks across Japan, the rails crowded on. But now every single payload was pected as was fission itself. The U.S. and
with demobilizing troops. The Japanese not chemical explosive but nuclear fire, the former Soviet Union are right now
were disastrously impoverished and bringing tens or even hundreds of times dismantling some eight or 10 nuclear
hungry, yet still orderly. Along the greater death and destruction. The warheads every day, yet both have a
tracks, we saw cities large and small, ru- statesmen on both sides chose to arm long way to go. We have never had so
ined by 100 wildfires set with jelly gaso- and even threaten war with these weap- promising and so concrete an omen of
line by raids of up to 1,000 B-29 bomb- ons, a war that would be orders of mag- peace, but it is still mainly promise. We
ers, devastation that was the very mark nitude more violent than all before it. need resolute and widespread action.
of the old war. The damage in these oth- Yet the statesmen did not follow The task is not simple, but was any in-
er cities resembled the destruction visit- through on their threats; large-scale nu- ternational goal more important than
ed on Hiroshima by one single nuclear clear conflict is now recognized for securing the future against nuclear war?
explosion and its aftermath of fire. what it is, wholly intolerable. How could we ever have planned war
We had loosed our new kind of war, I returned from Japan at the end of with tens of thousands of nuclear war-
nuclear war in embryo, with only two September 1945 to learn that one young heads? Did we not know that America
bombs. A single bomber was now able man within our small group was gone, would lie in ruin as well? With nuclear
to destroy a good-size city, leaving hun- killed in the lab by a runaway radiation weapons, war achieves a final, futile
dreds of thousands dead. Yet there on burst. (He would not be the last, either.) symmetry of mutual destruction.
the ground, among all those who cruel- Our temerity about the nuclear dragon In 1963 Oppenheimer recalled that
ly suffered and died, there was not all had left its legacy in New Mexico as when Bohr first came to Los Alamos
that much difference between old fire well. America was at peace but clam- during the war, the visitor asked his
and new. Both ways brought unimag- orous, the new atomic bomb, in all its friend and host very seriously: “Is it big
ined inferno. True, we saw hundreds of terror, the center of interest. By the end enough?” Oppenheimer knew just
people lying along the railway platform of the year many scientists, including what Bohr meant: Was this new scale of
at Hiroshima; most of them would die myself, made clear, concerted, even dra- warfare big enough to challenge the in-
from burns or from the new epidemic of matic public statements about the fu- stitution of war itself? “I don’t know if
radiation sickness that we had sowed. ture of nuclear war. What we said then it was then,” Oppenheimer wrote, “but
But many other cities, including fire- was this: Secrecy will not defend us, for finally it did become big enough.” Then
bombed Tokyo, where 100,000 or atoms and skills are everywhere. No de- it became frighteningly too big, and it is
more had died in the first fire raid, also fenses are likely to make up for the still far too big, but at least no longer is
counted hosts of burned and scarred enormous energy release; it will never it luxuriantly growing. We can, if we
survivors. Radiation is no minor matter, be practical to intercept every bomb, persist, end its unparalleled threat.
by Jeremy Bernstein
I
n September 1943 Niels Bohr ergy was all but impossible. That view the institute organized scientific meet-
learned that the gestapo in Copen- was reinforced in the spring of 1939, ings. Heisenberg was one of several Ger-
hagen intended to arrest him. A few when he realized an important detail man scientists who came under its aus-
weeks later, on the 29th, he, his wife concerning the fission of uranium. In pices to Copenhagen, in this case to a
and several others hoping to escape December 1938 the German physical meeting of astronomers. He had known
from Denmark crawled in complete chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strass- Bohr since 1922 and had spent a good
darkness to a beach outside Carlsberg. mann had discovered that uranium deal of time at Bohr’s institute in Copen-
There they boarded a boat and crossed could be fissioned if it was bombarded hagen, where Bohr had acted as a kind
the Øresund in secret to Sweden. On Oc- with neutrons. (Hahn’s former assistant of muse for the creation of quantum
tober 6 the British flew Bohr alone from Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto theory. Now Heisenberg had returned
Sweden to Scotland. Later that same day Frisch conjectured that the uranium nu- as a representative of a despised occu-
he traveled to London and in the evening cleus had actually been split in the ex- pying power, touting the certainty of its
met with Sir John Anderson, the phys- periments and so coined the name victory, according to some accounts.
ical chemist in charge of the nascent “fission” for the process.) The experi-
British atomic bomb project. Anderson ments used natural uranium, 99 percent Heisenberg’s Visit
gave the Danish physicist a briefing on of which is in the isotope uranium 238.
the Anglo-American program. Accord-
ing to Bohr’s son Aage, who followed
his father to England a week later and
About seven tenths of a percent is in the
isotope uranium 235, whose nucleus
contains three fewer neutrons.
H eisenberg spent a week in Copenha-
gen and visited Bohr’s institute on
several occasions. During one of these
was his assistant throughout the war, Chemically, the isotopes are indistin- visits, he and Bohr talked privately. Nei-
Bohr was deeply surprised—shocked guishable. What Bohr realized was that ther man seems to have made any notes,
may be a better description—by how because of their structural differences, so one cannot be entirely sure what was
far the Anglo-American program had only the very rare isotope uranium 235 said. Also, Bohr was a poor listener, so
already progressed. had fissioned in the Hahn-Strassmann the two may well have talked past each
Bohr’s alarm very likely had two experiments. He concluded, then, that other. Nevertheless, Bohr came away
sources. First, during the 1930s, when making a nuclear weapon would be al- from the discussion with the distinct im-
nuclear physics was developing, Bohr most impossible because it would re- pression that Heisenberg was working
had said on several occasions that he quire separating these isotopes—a on nuclear weapons. As Aage Bohr later
thought any practical use of nuclear en- daunting task. In December 1939 he recalled, “Heisenberg brought up the
said in a lecture, “With present techni- question of the military applications of
cal means it is, however, impossible to atomic energy. My father was very reti-
purify the rare uranium isotope in su - cent and expressed his skepticism be-
JEREMY BERNSTEIN is professor of cient quantity to realize the chain reac- cause of the great technical di culties
physics at the Stevens Institute of Technolo- tion.” One can therefore well under- that had to be overcome, but he had the
gy and an adjunct professor at the Rocke- stand why Bohr was shocked to learn impression that Heisenberg thought that
feller University. He also serves as a vice four years later that that was just what the new possibilities could decide the
president of the board of trustees of the As- the Allies intended to do. outcome of the war if the war dragged
pen Center for Physics. He has written some The second reason for Bohr’s alarm on.” Now, two years later, Bohr was
50 technical papers, 12 books and numerous can be traced back to a meeting he had learning for the first time of the Allied
magazine articles. He has worked as a staff had with the German physicist Werner nuclear weapons program. What had
writer at the New Yorker magazine, taught Heisenberg in mid-September 1941, al- the Germans done during those two
nonfiction writing at Princeton University and most two years before his escape to years? No wonder Bohr was alarmed.
won several science writing awards. He is a
Britain. By 1941 the Germans had oc- It would be fascinating to know in de-
cupied Denmark for more than a year. tail what was meant by “new possibili-
fellow of the American Physical Society, a
During that period, they established a ties,” but one can make an educated
Benjamin Franklin Fellow of the Royal Society so-called German Cultural Institute in guess. By the mid-1940s physicists on
of the Arts and a member of the French and Copenhagen to generate German cul- both sides of the conflict realized that
American Alpine Clubs. tural propaganda. Among its activities, aside from fissioning uranium, there
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 12
COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
Bohr was dead. Groves was dead. Who ber returned to Berkeley to work on the cember 1943 was especially called to
else could have seen that drawing? bomb with Oppenheimer. He was there show us what Niels Bohr knew about
in the summer of 1942 when Bethe and the Germans’ idea of a bomb.”
The Investigation Teller arrived. By March 1943 he had Bethe o›ered a theory to explain the
moved, with the first batch of scientists, mystery: “Heisenberg thought that the
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 14
COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
originally published January 1998
Identifying Barium
In addition, they identified a simpler reaction:
M eitner and Hahn corresponded
constantly, and mail between
Stockholm and Berlin was delivered Process 3
overnight. She could scarcely believe
the radium result. To form radium, the 92U + 92U 93
uranium nucleus would have to emit 23
MINUTES
two alpha particles. Meitner was con-
vinced that it was energetically impossi-
ble for a thermal neutron to knock out
even one alpha particle—and certainly
not two. In November 1938 Meitner Meitner regarded process three as the most understandable, and later it
visited Niels Bohr’s Institute for Theo- was shown to be correct. But she was puzzled by processes one and two
retical Physics in Copenhagen, and because the decay chains were so long and paralleled each other. Ulti-
Hahn met her there on November 13. mately, when Hahn and Strassmann identified one of the reaction prod-
Outside the city their meeting was kept ucts as barium, Meitner and Frisch realized that the uranium nucleus had
secret to avoid political difficulties for
split into nuclei of barium and krypton, which began a series of beta emis-
Hahn, and he never mentioned it later
in his memoirs. But we know from
sions:
Hahn’s own pocket diary that they met,
and we know that Meitner objected
strenuously to the radium result. That 56Ba 57La 58Ce 59Pr
was the message Hahn brought back to 92U +
Strassmann in Berlin.
According to Strassmann, Hahn told 36Kr 37Rb 38Sr 39Y
him that Meitner “urgently pleaded”
that they verify the radium one more
time. “Fortunately, her opinion and These nuclei and other fission fragments account for the decay chains
judgment carried so much weight with of processes one and two. Meitner and Frisch proposed the name “nucle-
us that we immediately began the nec-
ar fission,” published the first theoretical explanation of the process and
essary control experiments,” Strassmann
remembered. With these experiments,
predicted the enormous energy released. —R.L.S.
JARED SCHNEIDMAN DESIGN
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 17
COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
clude that their “radium” was in fact of the nucleus as a liquid drop, but now as a “gift from heaven,” a miracle that
an isotope of barium, an element much they visualized it as a wobbly, oscillat- would protect him and his institute. As
lighter than uranium. ing drop that was ready to split in two. it turned out, it may not have been nec-
In December 1938, just before Christ- Frisch realized that the surface tension essary for Hahn to divorce himself
mas, Hahn told Meitner about the bari- of a nucleus as large as uranium might from Meitner and physics to make the
um. It was a “frightful result,” he wrote. be vanishingly small. Meitner did the “miracle” come true. That spring the
“We know uranium cannot really break mass defect calculation in her head and German military took an active interest
up into barium!” He hoped she could estimated the lost mass that was con- in the potential uses of the new discov-
propose “some fantastic explanation.” verted to enormous energy when the ery, and by the summer of 1939 Hahn
Meitner answered by return mail. Al- nucleus split. Everything fell into place: and his institute were secure. Later he
though she found it difficult to think of the theoretical interpretation itself was recalled that “fission saved that whole
a “thorough-going breakup,” she as- a beautiful discovery—and it was recog- situation.”
sured him that “one cannot uncondi- nized as such. The physics community After the atomic bomb, fission was
tionally say: it is impossible.” Her letter immediately adopted the term “fission” more sensational than ever, and Hahn
must have been the best Christmas that Meitner and Frisch proposed, and was a very famous man. In postwar Ger-
present he ever received. She had vehe- Bohr used their work as a starting point many, he was a major public figure for
mently objected to the radium result, but for a more extensive theory. a generation, lionized as a Nobel laure-
she was ready to consider the barium Hahn and Strassmann’s barium find- ate and a decent German who never
result as expanding, rather than contra- ing appeared in Naturwissenschaften in gave in to the Nazis, a scientist who did
dicting, existing theory. January 1939; Meitner and Frisch pub- not build a bomb. His treatment of
Later, Hahn was known to say that if lished their interpretation in Nature a Meitner, however, was anything but de-
Meitner had still been in Berlin, she few weeks later. On the surface, the dis- cent. Not once in his numerous articles,
might have talked him out of the bari- covery of fission was now completely interviews, memoirs or autobiographies
um result and might have “forbidden” divided—chemistry from physics, exper- did he mention her initiative for the
him from making the discovery. But iment from theory, Germans from refu- uranium project, her leadership of their
Meitner’s letter, which Hahn always had gees. To those who did not understand team in Berlin or their collaboration af-
in his possession, demonstrates that the the science or who did not care to un- ter she left. He died in Göttingen in
opposite is true. And at the time, Hahn derstand the politics, it might appear that 1968 at the age of 89.
clearly found her letter reassuring, be- chemists had discovered fission, where- In Sweden during the war, Meitner’s
cause only after he received it did he add as physicists had only interpreted it. professional status was poor. Her friends
a paragraph to the galley proofs of his In the weeks following the discovery, believed that she almost surely would
barium publication, suggesting that the Hahn exploited that artificial division. have been awarded a Nobel Prize had
uranium nucleus had split in two. Meit- He knew Meitner’s forced emigration she emigrated anywhere else. In 1943
ner was bitterly disappointed that she was unjust. He knew she had fully par- she was invited to Los Alamos to work
could not share in this “beautiful dis- ticipated in the discovery. But he could on the atomic bomb, but she refused.
covery,” as she called it, but they all not say so. He was afraid for himself For a brief period after the war ended,
knew that it was impossible to include a and for his position and terribly afraid she was a celebrity in the U.S. and
“non-Aryan” in the publication. that others would find out that he and Britain, miscast as the Jewish refugee
Strassmann had continued to collabo- who escaped the Nazis with the secret
Revising Nuclear Theory rate with Meitner after she left Berlin. of the bomb. But Meitner was a private
He decided that the discovery of person who detested publicity. She nev-
The
Odd Couple
and the
Bomb
Like a story by Victor Hugo as told to Neil Simon, the events leading up to
the first controlled nuclear chain reaction involved accidental encounters
among larger-than-life figures, especially two who did not exactly get
along— but had to by William Lanouette
JENNIFER JOHANSEN
positively charged protons and neutral trons. Szilard loaned Fermi his English enriched uranium fuel.) But heavy water
neutrons. Having no charge, a neutron neutron source, which gave much clear- was expensive and scarce. The large-
hurled at an atom might stealthily pene- er results. scale experiments that Szilard had in
trate the nucleus without being repelled. The two men then attempted to work mind would require a more common
Szilard imagined that if a neutron hit a together— with a resounding clash of and affordable moderator. He would
nucleus and split the atom, the breakup individual styles. Szilard shunned man- discover one that his German counter-
might release the binding energy that ual labor in favor of brainstorming, but parts had overlooked.
holds the atom together. Some of that Fermi expected all his team members to As Szilard had feared, German atom-
atom’s neutrons might in turn be re- participate in hands-on experiments. bomb research was well under way by
leased, which could hit and split other Although the men respected the other’s the spring of 1939. Both German and
atoms. If more than one neutron was re- abilities, they bristled in the other’s com- American physicists also recognized
leased from each split atom, the process pany. Recognizing their mutual need, that graphite— the soft form of carbon
could exponentially expand, with mil- however, they reached out to Columbia’s that is used as pencil lead— could be a
lions of atoms splitting in a fraction of a physics department chairman, George moderator. But German scientists gave
second and freeing vast amounts of en- Pegram, who agreed to coordinate their up on it because it absorbed too many
ergy. (Szilard would later learn that separate work. Pegram’s shuttle diplo- neutrons; they instead concentrated on
Bohr’s news enabled Fermi likewise to macy harnessed Fermi’s precision and heavy water, always in short supply. Szi-
envision a chain reaction, although he Szilard’s prescience. With Anderson, lard, who often personally took trains to
considered one extremely unlikely.) the combative colleagues succeeded in Boston or Buffalo to procure raw mate-
While Szilard was filing his patent in determining that by using slow neu- rials for Fermi’s experiments, realized
1934, Fermi was in Rome, becoming trons “a nuclear chain reaction could that commercial graphite also contained
the world’s expert on neutron bombard- be maintained.” small amounts of boron— a voracious
ment of atoms. He found that by pass- absorber of neutrons. He ordered cus-
ing the neutrons through paraffin wax Building the Chain tom-made, boron-free graphite, which
he could slow them down, increasing eventually led to one of the most caustic
the chance that they would be absorbed
by the target nucleus. His work with
uranium was puzzling. Sometimes the
A lthough collisions between Fermi
and Szilard were all too common,
collisions between neutrons and nuclei
Fermi/Szilard confrontations.
Anderson measured neutron absorp-
tion in the pure graphite and found that
nucleus absorbed neutrons. (Because were at first too rare. Passing the neu- it would indeed make a good modera-
atomic identity is governed by the num- trons through so-called moderators, tor. Szilard recommended that the test
ber of protons, the neutron absorption such as Fermi’s paraffin, helped to slow results remain secret. Fermi, ever the
produced only heavier variants, or iso- them, making their collision with an professional scientist, objected to the
topes, of uranium.) But sometimes neu- atom’s nucleus more likely. By 1939 breach of the long-standing academic
tron bombardment created entirely new physicists also knew that “heavy water” tradition of peer-reviewed journal publi-
elements. German chemist Ida Nod- was an efficient moderator. Ordinary, or cation. “Fermi really lost his temper,”
dack, following Fermi’s experiments in “light water,” consists of two hydrogen Szilard would later recall. “He really
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 21
COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
lard for a cup of coffee but also his driv- Had the army been heeded, of selves alone with their reactor. They
er.” Edward Teller was thus present course, funds would have run out, and shook hands, Szilard remembered, “and
when Einstein, wearing an old robe and all the embryonic federal atomic re- I said I thought this day would go down
slippers, read and agreed to sign the search by Fermi and Szilard would as a black day in the history of man-
now well known letter to President have ceased. This mistake was averted kind.”
Roosevelt. The letter, dated August 2, when the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
1939, began, “Some recent work by E. tion, under pressure from the White Later Conflicts and Harmony
Fermi and L. Szilard. . . . ” It proceeded House, was ordered to “verify their loy-
to warn of German atomic weapons re-
search and urged the U.S. to do its own.
Szilard passed the letter to investment
alty to the United States.” FBI director J.
Edgar Hoover sent agents to interview
Einstein (whose pacifist views would
N ear the war’s end in 1945, Fermi
and Szilard differed once again.
Szilard had hastened the A-bomb’s de-
banker Alexander Sachs, who was a later cause his own loyalty to be ques- velopment as a weapon of defense
New Deal adviser and had access to the tioned). With Einstein’s good word, fed- against Germany. With Hitler’s defeat,
president. World War II began on Sep- eral money flowed in to Columbia in Szilard argued that the bomb should not
tember 1, and in October, when Roo- November 1940, although suspicions of be used offensively against Japan but in-
sevelt finally received the letter, he Fermi and Szilard would abate only stead be demonstrated to encourage sur-
agreed that some action was needed “to years after they became U.S. citizens. render. Fermi, as scientific adviser to the
see that the Nazis don’t blow us up.” To Funding in place, Fermi’s team now administration’s high-level committee on
that end, he created a federal Uranium worked systematically to construct options for bomb use, argued that a
Committee, with Szilard and other émi- “piles” (Szilard’s lattice) of uranium and demonstration would be impractical.
gré scientists as members. Within weeks graphite, to test for the ratio and geom- The administration agreed, with the sub-
they had gained a commitment of etry that would optimize a chain reac- sequent August devastation of the cities
$6,000 for research at Columbia. tion. The day before the Japanese attack of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After the war, Einstein said he had “re- on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt After the war, Fermi favored continu-
ally only acted as a mailbox” for Szilard. approved an all-out federal commit- ing army control of atomic research,
In 1940, however, Einstein was once ment to research the A-bomb. In the while Szilard successfully lobbied Con-
again forced to play a decisive role when spring of 1942 Fermi, Szilard and the gress for a new, civilian Atomic Energy
the U.S. Army almost denied Fermi and rest of the Columbia team moved to the Commission. The two men found com-
Szilard security clearance. Investigators, University of Chicago, where they es- mon ground in opposition to Szilard’s
basing their conclusions on information tablished a top-secret “metallurgical old friend Teller in 1950, when both
from “highly reliable sources,” came to laboratory” for chain-reaction research. objected to U.S. development of the hy-
the paradoxical conclusions that Fermi, The army’s Manhattan Project took drogen bomb. Fermi called the H-
a refugee from fascism, was “undoubt- over control of the effort in June. Ironi- bomb “a weapon which in practical ef-
edly a Fascist” and that Szilard, in terror cally, at this same moment in history, fect is almost one of genocide.”
of the Nazis, was “very pro-German.” Germany scaled down its own A-bomb A joint patent for the Fermi-Szilard
Perhaps Szilard’s cries that Germany work, convinced that the undertaking “neutronic reactor” was first published
could win the war accounted for the lat- was impractical for the current war. in 1955, a year after Fermi’s death. Szi-
ter misinterpretation. (The report also In the fall, a pile was constructed, with lard pursued molecular biology and nu-
spelled Szilard’s name in two different uranium spheres embedded in graphite clear arms control until his death in
ways, both of which were wrong.) The blocks. On December 2, 1942, in a 1964. Fermi summed up Szilard by call-
army decided of each man that “em- squash court under Stagg Field, the uni- ing him “extremely brilliant” but some-
ployment of this person on secret work versity’s football stadium, Fermi directed one who “seems to enjoy startling peo-
is not recommended,” despite the fact the experiment that initiated the world’s ple.” Szilard reflected on Fermi by writ-
that the only secret work in question in first controlled, self-sustaining nuclear ing, “I liked him best on the rare
the U.S. at the time was taking place in chain reaction. After the historic experi- occasions when he got mad (except of
the minds of Fermi and Szilard. ment, Fermi and Szilard found them- course when he got mad at me).”
J. Robert Oppenheimer:
Before the War
Although Oppenheimer is now best remembered for his
influence during World War II, he made many important
contributions to theoretical physics in the 1930s
by John S. Rigden
F
ifty years ago this month, on July can theoretical physics a decade before interests and coursework were very di-
16, 1945, an unearthly blast of the war, which is unfortunate for two verse, he claimed later to have received
light seared the predawn sky over reasons. First, Oppenheimer became a only “a very quick, superficial, eager fa-
the desert in New Mexico. The witness- physicist at the rarest of times, when the miliarization with some parts of phys-
es of this event included many of this theories of quantum mechanics and nu- ics.” He wrote: “Although I liked to
century’s most distinguished physicists. clear physics were being formed, revis- work, I spread myself very thin and got
As they watched the boiling glare ing a great deal of traditional thought in by with murder; I got A’s in all these
through their welding goggles, a sober the field. Second, although he is some- courses which I don’t think I should
reality bore into them: the nuclear age times characterized as an underachiever, have.” Whether that was true or not,
had begun. The chief witness—the per- Oppenheimer had in fact made many Oppenheimer did gain valuable experi-
son who had directed the atomic bomb significant contributions to several ma- ence working in Percy W. Bridgman’s
project from its inception—was J. Rob- jor areas of physical research before laboratory—a privilege granted to him
ert Oppenheimer. taking his post at Los Alamos. by virtue of his advanced standing. In
Oppenheimer was a rare individual. Oppenheimer built the foundation the 1920s American physics was domi-
His intellectual acuity, diverse interests, for contemporary studies of molecular nated by experimentalists such as Bridg-
frail physique and ethereal personality physics. He was the first to recognize man, who was among the first to inves-
made him a man of legendary propor- quantum-mechanical tunneling, which tigate the properties of matter under
tions. After World War II Oppenheimer is the basis of the scanning tunneling high pressure and built much of the ap-
became a public figure, known for lead- microscope, used to reveal the structure paratus needed to do so. Thus, from his
ing the physicists who built the atomic of surfaces atom by atom. He fell just student experiences, Oppenheimer did
bomb at Los Alamos Laboratory. His short of predicting the existence of the not distinguish between experimental
success as the director of the Manhattan positron, the electron’s antiparticle. He and theoretical physics, the latter being
Project provided him with a base of raised several crucial difficulties in the largely a European activity. “I didn’t
influence, and, for a time, he enjoyed theory of quantum electrodynamics. He know you could earn your living that
the authority and power that were his. developed the theory of cosmic-ray way [as a theoretical physicist],” he
Then, in June 1954, amid the anti- showers. And long before neutron stars once said, looking back on his under-
communism paranoia of McCarthyism, and black holes were part of our celes- graduate days.
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission tial landscape, Oppenheimer showed For this reason, as his graduation in
(AEC) concluded that Oppenheimer that massive stars can collapse under 1925 grew near, he aspired to work un-
had defects in his character and deemed the influence of gravitational forces. der Ernest Rutherford, one of the great-
him a national security risk. Albert Ein- est experimentalists of the century, at
stein and others at the Institute for Ad- To Physics from Chemistry the Cavendish Laboratory in Cam-
vanced Study in Princeton, N.J., where bridge, England. Rutherford had con-
Oppenheimer was then director, de-
clared their support for him. In October
the trustees of the institute reelected him
L ike many physicists of his era, Op-
penheimer studied chemistry first.
“Compared to physics,” he said,
ducted the first trials to reveal that atoms
contained extremely small, heavy cores,
or nuclei. He was, however, unimpressed
to another term as director, a position “[chemistry] starts right in the heart of with Oppenheimer’s credentials and re-
he then held until a year before his things.” As a freshman at Harvard Uni- jected his application. Oppenheimer
death in February 1967. Still, after the versity he realized that “what I liked in next wrote to Joseph John Thomson,
AEC’s actions, Oppenheimer’s slight chemistry was very close to physics.” So another renowned experimentalist at
frame became the depiction of a broken that spring, he submitted a reading list the Cavendish. Thomson accepted Op-
man. to the physics department and was penheimer as a research student and put
Few historians have written about the granted graduate standing. He enrolled him to work in a corner of the laborato-
Oppenheimer who invigorated Ameri- in many physics classes, but because his ry, depositing thin films on a base of
The Science of War: Nuclear History SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL ONLINE ISSUE 25
The Metamorphosis of
Andrei Sakharov
The inventor of the Soviet hydrogen bomb
became an advocate of peace and human rights.
What led him to his fateful decision?
by Gennady Gorelik
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COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.
Sakharov’s many fruitless attempts
to stop unnecessary tests at last
led to his realizing how little control
he had over the weapons
he had created.
stance, declined an offer to be elected to the Council of Peo- tions.” He was also troubled that “this crime is committed
ple’s Deputies, a legislative body at Arzamas. The “defects” with complete impunity, since it is impossible to prove that a
were to get worse. particular death was caused by radiation.”
In November 1955 the Soviets tested the unlimited hydro- In the same year Teller published a book, Our Nuclear Fu-
gen bomb. This time the shock wave from the blast col- ture, laying out the majority view of both American and Sovi-
lapsed a distant trench, killing a soldier, and crumbled a et hydrogen-bomb experts— who did not share Sakharov’s
building, killing a toddler. These events weighed heavily on concern. Teller estimated the radiation dose from testing as
Sakharov. When asked to propose a toast at the celebratory roughly 100th of that from other sources (such as cosmic rays
banquet that night, he announced, “May all our devices ex- and medical x-ray examinations). He also noted that radia-
plode as successfully as today’s, but always over test sites and tion from testing reduced life expectancy by about two days,
never over cities.” Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin replied with an whereas a pack of cigarettes a day or a sedentary job reduced
obscene joke, whose point was that scientists should just it by 1,000 times more. “It has been claimed,” he concluded,
make the bombs and let military men decide where they “that it is wrong to endanger any human life. Is it not more
should explode. It was designed to put Sakharov in his place. realistic and in fact more in keeping with the ideals of human-
As variations of the basic thermonuclear devices continued itarianism to strive toward a better life for all mankind?” To
to be tested, Sakharov became increasingly concerned about Sakharov, that statement sounded a lot like the Soviet slogan
the unidentifiable victims of each blast. He taught himself “when you chop wood, chips fly.” He felt personally respon-
enough genetics to calculate how many persons worldwide sible for any deaths from the fallout of testing.
would be affected by cancers and other mutations as a result Meanwhile the U.S. and Britain continued testing, and af-
of nuclear testing. ter six months, a furious Khrushchev ordered that testing be
In 1957 the U.S. press reported the development of a resumed. Deeply concerned— because of the deaths he was
“clean bomb,” a fusion bomb that used almost no fissionable convinced would ensue—Sakharov persuaded Igor Kurcha-
material and seemingly produced no radioactive fallout. Sak- tov, the scientific head of the atomic project, to visit
harov found, however, on the basis of available biological Khrushchev and explain how computers, limited experi-
data that a one-megaton (equivalent to a million tons of ments and other kinds of modeling could make testing un-
TNT) clean bomb would result in 6,600 deaths worldwide necessary. Khrushchev did not agree, nor did he welcome the
over a period of 8,000 years because of the proliferation of advice. Sakharov repeated his efforts in 1961, when after a
radioactive carbon 14 (produced when neutrons from the ex- de facto moratorium the premier again announced new tests.
plosion interacted with atmospheric nitrogen). He published Khrushchev angrily told him to leave politics to those who
his results in 1958 in the Soviet journal Atomic Energy, con- understood it.
cluding that the atmospheric testing of any hydrogen In 1962 Sakharov learned that tests of two very similar de-
bomb — “clean” or not— is harmful to humans. signs of hydrogen bombs were going to be carried out. He
tried his best to stop the duplicate test. He pulled all the
The Chips Fly strings he could, pleaded with Khrushchev, enraged his col-
leagues and bosses— all to no avail. When the second bomb
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