Original Master's Thesis On The American Revolution

INTRODUCTION
This thesis contends that the moment at which the American Revolution began occurred
at the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1774, when it formed America’s first
centralized government in practice. This government reflected the political and economic
interests of the colonists. This thesis challenges the traditional historical teachings of the start of
the American Revolution by claiming that the self-consciousness of being Virginians and South
Carolinians instead of British occurred earlier than traditionally taught; because of this mental
shift, the First Continental Congress met and formed the first centralized government of what
would be known as the United States. This mental shift in sovereignty was the start of the
American Revolution.
There are many points at which historians argue as the start of the American Revolution,
such as the first shots fired at Lexington and Concord in 1775 and the Declaration of
Independence in 1776. This thesis will argue that those events occurred as part of the American
Revolution, in support of the Revolution, but were not the start of it, because they occurred after
the mental shift from British to American. Additionally, this thesis will discuss earlier events
and protests that preceded the Revolution, and will show why those events and protests were not
a part of the Revolution, but rather the catalyst that led to it.
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Statement of Purpose
This thesis will argue that the point at which the American Revolution began was at the
First Continental Congress, which started on September 5, 1774. The First Continental Congress
ratified the Declaration and Resolves, which spelled out the anger of the colonists by calling the
Intolerable Acts “murderous” and spelled out ways to resist them.1 In addition, it formed the
Continental Association, which stated that all imports from the British Empire were to cease, and
set up punishments for those who disobeyed the Association’s rules.2
This thesis makes a distinction between the American Revolution and the War for
Independence, a distinction that is not apparent when one looks at children’s history books.
There is a difference, however. The American Revolution was not a physical struggle; rather it
was a shifting of colonists’ attitude toward England in general and Parliament specifically. John
Adams, in a letter to Hezekiah Niles in 1818, indicated that the American Revolution began and
occurred in “the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their
duties and obligations.”3 The statement “the hearts and minds of the people” implied that it was
the moment when the colonists ceased to be British subjects in their own minds.
To John Adams, the American Revolution occurred because “when they saw those
powers renouncing all the principles of authority, and bent upon the destruction of all the
securities of their lives, liberties, and properties, they thought it their duty to pray for the
1
Robert Middlekauff. The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 252.
2
“Articles of Association, October 20, 1774,” (New Haven: Yale University Avalon Project)
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/contcon_10-20-74.asp, accessed March 16, 2010.
3
John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, Quincy, 13 February 1818, in The Works of John Adams, Second President of the
United States: with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis Adams (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1856). 10 volumes. Vol. 10.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2127&chapter=193604&layout=html
&Itemid=27 (accessed January 13, 2011).
2
continental congress and all the thirteen State congresses....”4 According to Adams, the
Revolution began because the colonists believed their rights as British subjects were being
infringed upon, so the they fought for those rights.
Children’s books tell us that the American Revolution started with the first shots fired at
Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. For example, a book called A History of US: From
Colonies to Country, 1735-1791 stated about the battle at Lexington that, “when the smoke
cleared, eight American farmers lay dead. It was April 19, 1775. The American Revolution had
begun.”5 Others do not make the distinction between the American Revolution and the shooting
War for Independence at all, as evidenced by a children’s book called You Wouldn’t Want to be
at the Boston Tea Party: Wharf Water Tea You’d Rather Not Drink. In this book, the author
stated that, “these events will eventually lead to the American Revolution, an eight year long
struggle against the might of the British Empire.”6
These children’s books teach children that the start of the American Revolution was the
first shots fired at Lexington and Concord, because they do not make the distinction between the
American Revolution and the War for Independence; rather, the books tend to combine the two
events into one single event called the Revolutionary War. In the letter to Hezekiah Niles, John
Adams defined the word “revolution” as the “radical change in the principles, opinions,
4
Adams to Niles, 13 February 1818.
&Itemid=27
5
Joy Hakim. A History of US: From Colonies to Country, 1735-1791 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005),
73.
6
Peter Cook. You Wouldn’t Want to be at the Boston Tea Party: Wharf Water Tea You’d Rather Not Drink.
Illustrated by David Antram (New York: Franklin Watts, 2006), 5.
3
sentiments, and affections of the people.”7 In terms of the American Revolution, this change
happened when the American colonists stopped considering themselves to be British subjects,
and started to consider themselves Virginians, South Carolinians, Vermonters, etc, even if not
thoroughly Americans yet.
Another word this thesis uses is “sovereignty.” This thesis defines this word as a supreme
authority over someone or something else; in this thesis, it is used to describe having power over
the colonies specifically. This is a vital relationship to understand. Sovereignty is power; a
revolution overthrows that power.
It is impossible to know the actual number of people who went through that
transformation early, who did not consider themselves British before the First Continental
Congress met. However, while the number of delegates who met in Philadelphia was low, the
arguments and debates that occurred both for and against the acts proposed by the First Congress
and the Continental Association reveal that a majority of the delegates to the Congress had
undergone this transformation by 1774. For the revolutionaries, many of the lingering loyalties to
the Crown were irrelevant. To them, Parliament was the sovereign; the Crown was merely a
figurehead. Unlike today’s American government, which allows the President to veto a bill that
comes across his desk, there was no veto in eighteenth century England. Parliament passed a law,
and it went into effect. When it came to dealings with England, the revolutionaries did not really
have to deal with the Crown; they only dealt with Parliament. Therefore, to the revolutionaries,
Parliament was the problem, not the Crown. Everything they did, everything they wrote, talked
about the evils of Parliament more than anything else did because, to them, Parliament was the
problem.
7
&Itemid=27
4
It is obvious, then, that the American Revolution was something entirely different from
the shooting War for Independence, and should be treated as such.
Historical Background
In 1763, the French and Indian War between France and England ended. At the end of it,
Parliament issued the Proclamation of 1763, which stated, among other things, that Canada had
been acquired as a British colony and that settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains would
be prohibited to protect the Native Americans living in the territory. The colonists were upset at
this Proclamation for two reasons—one, the Québécois were still French, regardless of whether
Quebec was a British colony or not; and two, there was a lot of land past the Appalachians that
was now off-limits to the colonists. For the land-hungry colonists, this was a problem.
Next, in 1764, Parliament passed two acts of note. One was the Sugar Act, which
increased taxes on imported sugar and other items such as textiles, coffee, wines and indigo
(dye). The reason for the tax was mainly to recoup losses incurred by the French and Indian War.
The second was the Currency Act, which forbade the colonists from printing their own money
and forced them to use money that came on ships from England. However, British money came
straight from England on boats, which were subject to the perils of the sea. If a ship went down,
so would the entire money supply, leaving thousands of colonists with no way to pay their taxes
or buy goods, thus crippling the colonial economy.
The following year, Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which, similar to the Sugar Act
before it, sought to increase revenue. Parliament did this by requiring every piece of printed
material in the colonies to be taxed, including legal documents, newspapers, bills, and even
playing cards, among other things. It was the first tax paid directly to England instead of to local
governments, and it sparked severe outrage among colonists. Colonial response to this included
5
riots led by a group of important merchants calling themselves the Sons of Liberty. So unhappy
were the colonists en masse, that they formed a Congress to formally oppose the Stamp Act. This
Congress, named the Stamp Act Congress, formed a petition requesting the repeal not only of the
Stamp Act, but of the Sugar and Currency Acts of 1764, claiming that “no taxes be imposed on
them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives,” and that “the
people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the
House of Commons in Great Britain.”8 In addition, they claimed that it was against their rights
as British subjects to be taxed without the consent that they had not given. In addition to putting
forth this petition, the colonies enacted an embargo of British goods.9 While the petition was
largely ignored, the embargo was not. In 1766, King George III signed a bill that repealed the
Stamp Act. At the same time, Parliament passed a law called the Declaratory Act, which stated
that the British government had the power to legislate any law governing the colonies “in all
cases whatsoever.”10
A year after the Declaratory Act, Parliament passed the Townshend Revenue Act, which
taxed paper, paint, lead, glass, and tea imported into the colonies.11 Colonists did not produce
these items. As such, the colonists could only buy them from Great Britain. In 1768, Samuel
8
“Direct Taxation: The Stamp Act” in Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789, Jack Greene, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton
and Company, 1975), 42-43.
9
Richard Allan Gerber. Revolution and Union: The American Dilemma 1763-1877 (Mason, Ohio: Centage
Learning, 2008), 26.
10
“Repeal Without Yielding in Principle: The Declaratory Act (Mar. 18, 1766)” in Colonies to Nation, 85.
11
The Townshend Revenue Act was actually part of a group of five acts passed by Parliament in 1767. Other acts
included the Indemnity Act, which was intended to make the tea of the British East India Company more
competitive with smuggled Dutch tea and which also repealed taxes on tea imported to England, allowing it to be re-
exported more cheaply to the colonies; the New York Restraining Act suspended the power of the New York
Assembly until it complied with the Quartering Act; the Vice Admiralty Court Act, which created four district
courts, located at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, and for which purpose was to help customs officials
prosecute smugglers, since colonial juries were reluctant to convict persons for violating unpopular trade
regulations; and finally the Commissioners of Customs Act, to better collect the new taxes.
6
Adams wrote a public letter, referred to as the Circular Letter, in which he argued that the
Townshend Acts were unconstitutional because there was no proper representation of the
colonists in Parliament and further, that the old way of having a colonial legislature was
preferable to being legislated by Parliament.12 Also in response to the Townshend Acts, the
people of Boston, in their Non-Importation Agreement, declared they would place an embargo
on goods coming from England. The other colonies followed suit in what would be the second
embargo of British goods by the colonists. Due to colonial protest, Parliament repealed the
Townshend Acts in 1770.
After the Townshend Acts were repealed, the colonies entered a three-year period, which
this thesis refers to as the “period of calm.” During this time, there was very little in the way of
colonial agitation; if anything, these events display how little there was in the way of anti-British
sentiment during these years. In three years, there were three events. The first—the Golden Hill
Riot—involved the Sons of Liberty, and occurred in January of 1770. This group of merchants
had printed up pamphlets and signed British soldiers’ names on them. Understandably, the
soldiers tried to tear down the pamphlets, which then started riots that lasted for four days, and
culminated in the soldiers forced back into their barracks. The second event, which is
significantly better known, was the Boston Massacre, in which a group of British soldiers and a
mob of Bostonians clashed, and in which five citizens of the city were killed. One more event
occurred during that relatively calm period between the repeal of the Townshend Acts and 1773,
and that was the Gaspée Affair in 1772. A British customs vessel called the Gaspée ran aground
in Narragansett Bay off the coast of Rhode Island. A group of colonists, led by John Brown,
12
“Massachusetts Circular Letter to the Colonial Legislatures; February 11, 1768,” in Yale University Avalon
Project.
7
sailed out to the ship, forced the crew ashore, and burned the ship.13 These events were
unfortunate, but they were not as disruptive as anything that came before or after them. In fact,
during this period, officials enforced trade regulations better than ever in colonial history.
Customs duties were collected without incident, and it was conceivable that relations between
England and the colonies had settled down.14
The series of events that formed the direct catalyst of the American Revolution started
with the Tea Act of 1773. Parliament originally passed this act to help keep the East India
Company from going bankrupt, as its demise would cause irreparable economic damage to the
British Empire. The Tea Act maintained a three penny per pound import tax on tea arriving in the
colonies, which had already been in effect for six years. It also gave the near bankrupt British
East India Company a virtual tea monopoly by allowing it to sell directly to colonial agents,
bypassing any intermediaries, thus making it extremely cheap.15
While the British had hoped for American compliance with this law, it had the opposite
effect on the colonists—they were extremely angry, to the point of mob violence. In December
of 1773, a group of Bostonians, led by the same Samuel Adams that had written the Circular
Letter, dressed up as Mohawk Indians, boarded one of the tea cargo ships that had docked in
Boston Harbor, and dumped the entire cargo of tea into the harbor.
This blatant act of disobedience, generally known as the Boston Tea Party, greatly
angered Parliament and King George III. Parliament’s response to the Boston Tea Party was to
pass the Coercive Acts, known to the colonists as the Intolerable Acts. These four acts included
13
Gerber, Revolution, 34.
14
Gerber, Revolution, 32-35.
15
“A Rescue Operation: The Tea Act (May 10, 1773)” in Colonies to Nation, 196-197.
8
the Boston Port Bill, which effectively shut down all commercial shipping in Boston harbor until
Massachusetts paid the taxes owed on the tea dumped in the harbor and required Boston to
reimburse the East India Company for the loss of the tea. The second act under the Coercive Acts
was the Massachusetts Government Act, which unilaterally altered the government of
Massachusetts to bring it under control of the British government and severely limited the
activities of town meetings in Massachusetts. The third act Parliament passed was the
Administration of Justice Act, which allowed the governor to move trials of accused royal
officials to another colony or even to Great Britain if he believed the official could not get a fair
trial in Massachusetts. Lastly was the Quartering Act, which applied to all of the colonies and
sought to create a more effective method of housing British troops in America. A fifth act, the
Quebec Act, although not technically part of the Coercive Acts, gave the people of Quebec
certain rights that were taken away when France ceded Canada to the English, including the right
to French civil law, the right to practice the Catholic faith, and expanded the territory of Quebec
to include most of the Ohio country, including parts of Minnesota, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin and, obviously, Ohio.
The passage of the Coercive Acts, in turn, led to the First Continental Congress, in which
fifty-six men from twelve colonies (all but Georgia) met in Philadelphia in 1774 and passed the
Declaration and Resolves. The Declaration and Resolves, taken directly from the Suffolk
Resolves out of Massachusetts, stated that Parliament had absolutely no authority to govern the
colonies at all.
During the First Continental Congress, the delegates passed both a non-importation
agreement on goods from Great Britain, Ireland, or the British West Indies and later, a non-
exportation agreement on goods being sent to Great Britain, Ireland, or the British West Indies.
9
Claiming that they were looking for a remedy for what they viewed as “grievances which
threaten destruction to the lives, liberty, and property of his majesty’s subjects in North
America,” the colonists wrote that “a non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation
agreement, faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable
measure.”16
The Congress formed a Continental Association to enforce the agreements, calling for the
election of groups of inspectors “whose business it shall be attentively to observe the conduct of
all persons touching this association.”17 In addition, the Association indicated that those who
broke the agreements would be publically named, “that such majority do forthwith cause the
truth of the case to be published in the gazette; to the end, that all such foes of the rights of
British-America may be publically known…and thenceforth we respectively will break off all
dealings with him or her.”18 In addition, the colonists resolved to “have no trade, commerce,
dealings, or intercourse whatsoever, with any colony or province in North-America, which shall
not accede to, or which shall hereafter violate this association,”19 thus ensuring punishment of
those who went against the provisions within the agreement, even if it meant punishing whole
colonies.
According to historian Edmund Morgan, “the very meeting of the Continental Congress
appeared as a challenge to Parliament, and congressional measures, however hesitant, as outright
16
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C., 1904-37),
1:76; http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html, accessed December 20, 2010.
17
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1:79.
18
19
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treason.”20 It would not be outside the realm of possibility to imagine that those delegates,
knowing full well that what they were doing was illegal, did what they believed was required of
them as Americans.
Chapter Listing
Chapter One: Origins
The first chapter of the thesis will discuss the first stage of colonial protest. The chapter
will explain the origins of the American Revolution, giving a brief history of the series of events
starting in 1763 with the Proclamation of 1763 ending the Seven Years’ (also called the French
and Indian) War. It will also discuss the various different acts passed by Parliament that
indicated to the colonists that the period of benign neglect was over. These acts include the Sugar
Act, which increased taxes on imported sugar and other items, and the Currency Act, which
forbade the colonists from printing their own money and forced them to use money that came on
ships from England. It will also discuss the Stamp Act, which required taxes on every piece of
printed material in the colonies, such as legal documents and newspapers, and the Townshend
Revenue Acts, which taxed paper, paint, lead, glass, and tea that the colonists imported. It will
then examine British policy toward the colonies, especially concerning the passage of these acts,
as well as the increase in rhetoric that preceded colonial protest. There will be a discussion to
these acts, their consequences, and the colonists’ reactions to them to explain the history of the
early events leading up to the Revolution itself. It will discuss the Stamp Act Congress, which
then led to both the repeal of the Stamp Act and the passage of the Declaratory Act by
Parliament. In addition, this chapter will discuss the Townshend Acts passed by Parliament in
20
Edmund Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, repr. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977, 1992), 67. Citations are to the most recent reprinted edition.
11
1767, both in terms of British policy reasons for the passage of the Acts, as well as colonial
reaction to them.
Chapter Two: Interlude
Chapter two will discuss the relatively peaceful stage between the repeal of the
Townshend Acts in 1770 to the Tea Act in 1773. This thesis calls these three years the “period of
calm;” however, it will be shown that “calm” is relative, and that underneath the relative quiet of
the time, there was still some show of resistance and revolutionary thought, including the Boston
Massacre, the Golden Hill riot, and the Gaspée Affair. I will discuss what caused these events to
occur, the consequences these incidents caused, and how they further shifted the views and
beliefs of the colonists away from reconciliation with England and toward Revolution. While
these events seem to be large and violent, they are events that generally faded out of people’s
memories. Generally, colonists did not stay angry because of these events and actually mostly
forgot about them once they were over, thus leading to the idea of “calm.” In addition, during
this period, the acts that Parliament had already passed and kept were relatively well enforced.
The Golden Hill Riot started because some agitators did not want the British soldiers putting up
handbills attacking the Sons of Liberty. The Boston Massacre was a tragic event, but not a
massacre at all. Rather, a group of colonists provoked the British into firing their weapons,
hitting less than a dozen men and only killing five—tragic, but hardly a massacre. With the
Gaspée Affair, it was a group of Rhode Islanders who attacked the Gaspée after it ran aground.
Chapter Three: Catalyst
This chapter discusses the events directly preceding the First Continental Congress,
including the Tea Act, in which the colonists could only purchase tea from the East India
Company, which resulted in the Boston Tea Party. It will also describe the Tea Party itself. The
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chapter will explain the Coercive Acts, made up of four (or five) separate acts punishing the
Bostonians. The increase in revolutionary rhetoric will show that the radicals and the
revolutionaries, while loud, were in the minority. This minority began to implement the
Revolution.
Chapter Four: Revolution
This chapter will include the author’s assertion that the American Revolution began at the
First Continental Congress, with the passage by the Congress of a few key pieces of legislation,
including the Suffolk Resolves and the Continental Association. This chapter will explain both
the Suffolk Resolves and the Continental Association in detail, as well as other options faced by
the Congress that did not pass. It will discuss the two main points of the Continental
Association—first, that it set up the consciousness of self-government; and second, that it was
very much a minority position that relied on other events, such as the shots fired at Lexington
and Concord, to keep it going. This chapter will also describe rules of the Association--what
they were allowed to do, what they were not and how people went along with this because it
could be enforced.
Chapter Five: Analysis of a Revolution
The fifth chapter will consist of an analysis of the First Continental Congress, as well as
reactions to and consequences of the Congress itself. This chapter discusses how the First
Continental Congress was the starting point to Revolution, that once the Congress met there
would be no reconciliation with England, and that the colonists, regardless of the fact that the
radicals were in the minority, would be able to unite and fight for what they believed in. This
was not just a protest movement; it had a purpose, with the specific goal of denying Parliament’s
authority and creating their own government. The revolutionaries knew exactly what they were
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doing and what it meant. This chapter will also counter the ideas of later starting points of the
Revolution, including the shots fired at Lexington and Concord and the Declaration of
Independence. It will also discuss events prior to the First Continental Congress in 1774,
including the Stamp Act Congress and the Boston Massacre. It will argue that the Revolution
could have only started after 1773, as it was passage of the Tea Act that caused colonists to leave
the period of calm and restart the protest that led to the Revolution.
Chapter Six: End of a Revolution
The final chapter will reiterate some of the arguments made throughout, including why
the First Continental Congress was the starting point of the American Revolution and why others
points were not.
Prior Historical Contributions of the American Revolution
Since the end of the American Revolution, historians have been writing on and
interpreting the revolution and its corresponding war. Some of the experts of the American
Revolution include Edmund Morgan, Gordon Wood, and John Ferling. Most of these books talk
about the First Continental Congress itself, in addition to the events preceding it, such as the
Stamp Act, the Tea Act, and the Coercive Acts. Most of these books have the dates 1763-1789 in
the title, indicating that they talk about the whole of the Revolution instead of focusing on parts.
Very few of these authors actually focused on the First Continental Congress as anything except
an event in the grand scheme of things. These books lay out a conventional view of the
American Revolution; that is, that the American Revolution began with the shots fired at
Lexington and Concord. They start at 1763 because that is where the period of colonial
autonomy ends and imperial reform begins.
14
Edmund Morgan, who is a professor emeritus at Yale University, is a Bancroft and
Pulitzer Prize winner, and has written many books on the subject of the Revolution, spent an
entire chapter in his book The Birth of the Republic, discussing the First Continental Congress,
who attended it, what was said, and what they came up with. The purpose behind Birth of the
Republic was to show the reader “the history of the Americans’ search for principles” and
“describe some of the difficulties overcome, some of the dangers encountered, and some of the
discoveries made in the course of it,” including, of course, the First Continental Congress and the
colonists’ views.21 Morgan informed readers that “with the members [of the First Continental
Congress] already committed to so radical a position [the Suffolk Resolves], it was a foregone
conclusion that they would adopt the non-importation, non-exportation, non-consumption
agreement they had met to consider.”22 In addition, because, as Morgan claimed, “many
Americans had long since arrived at the conclusion that [Parliament] did not” have authority over
the colonies at all, “at Philadelphia in 1774 many of the delegates had followed one route or
another to a total repudiation of Parliament.”23 Morgan made this argument by stating that
Parliament had denounced the colonists’ beliefs that legislation and taxation were not different.
Since the colonists believed that Parliament had no authority to tax them because they were
unrepresented, and Parliament apparently saw no distinction between taxation and legislation,
Parliament therefore had no authority to do either. This is important because Morgan makes it
known that the delegates to the First Continental Congress had already started to make the
transition from British to American.
21
Morgan, Birth, 3.
22
Morgan, Birth, 62.
23
Morgan, Birth, 62-65.
15
However, Morgan also made sure to note that the colonists had no thoughts of
independence. Morgan wrote that the colonists believed that the King who had granted the
colony’s first charter had meant for the colonies to be independent; however, the colonists took
that to mean independent of Parliament, not the King.24 He wrote that “Americans did not aspire
to independence” and that they were “genuinely eager to keep their grip on the past.” One of the
problems with Morgan’s assertion, however, is that he argued both sides. While the colonists
may not have aspired to independence, they most certainly knew that they could not go back, and
“were actually moving, if only half consciously…away from it.” 25
John Ferling, who is a professor emeritus of history at the University of West Georgia,
wrote many books on the subject of the American Revolution and the new republic that formed
the United States. One such book, A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American
Republic, is one of the better-written, comprehensive views of the Revolution. In A Leap in the
Dark, Ferling attempted to give the reader a political history of the American Revolution, and
tried to find “roots to that revolution entangled in the colonial past, and it sees the resolution of
what the American Revolution was to mean...”26
Ferling went into a great amount of detail about the events that occurred in the years
leading up to the American Revolution and the First Continental Congress, discussing the fact
that, as early as May 1774, “there was immediate talk of a national congress.”27 Ferling
discussed the differences between the factions within the colonies—the radicals, the moderates,
24
25
Morgan, Birth, 66.
26
John Ferling, A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003), xiv.
27
Ferling, Leap, 108.
16
and the conservatives. The radicals did not want a national congress, but preferred to “stick with
what had worked in the past, a widespread American boycott brought about through an appeal by
Massachusetts.”28 The moderates “believed that a national congress, under their direction, might
protect America’s interests while it simultaneously restrained the most dangerously zealous
activists;”29 for example, the Boston radicals, whom the moderates held responsible for the
Boston Tea Party and, as a result, the Coercive Acts. Finally, the conservatives “hoped to
prevent a national congress from convening... [because] a congress would make war
inevitable.”30
In addition, Ferling discussed how John Adams believed that Congress was divided into
“those who would support a boycott and those who feared that another embargo would mean
war,” but that it was more divided than Adams believed. Ferling mentioned that, within those
two sides, there were those who wanted to “deny that Parliament possessed any authority over
America” and that it was likely that “some within this faction…had been secretly committed to
American independence for some time.” Others, Ferling claimed, “held to the hope that a
peaceful solution was yet possible.” 31
He also explained the conflicts between some of the delegates, including the already
emerging conflicts between the North and South, stating “Congress divided immediately
between those who favored a boycott and those who were opposed...a split soon was evident
within the ranks of the proponents of a trade embargo, the first North vs. South clash in
28
Ferling, Leap, 109.
29
Ferling, Leap 110.
30
Ferling, Leap, 111.
31
Ferling, Leap, 113.
17
American history.”32 While explaining the First Continental Congress, he called it “the opening
chapter in America’s history as a nation.”33 In addition, Ferling stated about the First Continental
Congress that it “stood its ground, but it sought reconciliation.”34 However, Ferling also referred
to John Adams’s belief that “most Americans had experienced a transformation in their
sentiments about Great Britain and the empire in the decade after the Stamp Act crisis,”35
indicating that Ferling, too, believed that, while the Congress might have publically indicated
that they sought reconciliation, it was not what the delegates believed.
Ferling’s work is important to understanding the American Revolution because he
discussed the fundamental differences between radicals, moderates, and conservatives, as well as
discussing sectional issues between the North and the South. These issues were important to note
when it came time to discuss non-importation and the Continental Association, because the
debates on the embargo and the Association hinged on cooperation between the colonies.
Another author who discussed and analyzed the First Continental Congress was Gordon
Wood in his book, The American Revolution: A History. Wood is a professor emeritus of history
at Brown University in Rhode Island, and a winner of both the Pulitzer Prize and the Bancroft
Prize. In The American Revolution, Wood tried, and succeeded, in giving the reader a quick
synthesis of the Revolution itself, saying “how the Revolution came about, what its character
was, and what its consequences were…are the questions this brief history seeks to answer.”36
32
Ferling, Leap, 116.
33
Ferling, Leap, 115.
34
Ferling, Leap, 122.
35
Ferling, Leap, 122.
36
Gordon Wood, The American Revolution: A History (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), xxv.
18
The American Revolution explained that the First Continental Congress was the point of
revolution, without making it explicit; rather he allowed the reader to infer that the First
Continental Congress was that point. Wood said, “by 1774, however, it was unlikely, even if
Galloway’s plan had been adopted, that the Congress could have reversed the transfer of
authority that was taking place in the colonies. In the end, the Continental Congress simply
recognized the new local authorities…and gave them its blessing.”37 Wood seemed to have
recognized that, regardless of what happened after the First Congress, this was the point at which
the hearts and minds of the colonists began to change. This point is why Wood’s short synthesis
of the American Revolution was a useful addition to this topic.
Gordon Wood’s book The Radicalism of the American Revolution, also discussed the
American Revolution as “the most radical and most far-reaching event in American history.”38
He argued that the Revolution was radical because it invented a new political system, and it
“made the interests and property of the ordinary people—their pursuits of happiness—the goal of
society and government.”39 Wood viewed the Revolution from a different point of view,
choosing to focus on the vast number of changes it caused within American culture and politics.
He often argued that, although the American Revolution was different, it was not unique,
claiming that “the American revolutionary leaders do not fit our conventional image of
revolutionaries—angry, passionate, reckless, maybe even bloodthirsty for the sake of a cause.”40
However, Wood also made sure the reader understood that “if we measure radicalism by the
37
Wood, Revolution, 49.
38
Gordon Wood. The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 8.
39
Wood, Radicalism, 8.
40
19
amount of social change that actually took place…then the American Revolution was not
conservative at all; on the contrary: it was as radical and as revolutionary as any in history.”41
In this book, Wood did not give the reader a chronological synthesis of the American
Revolution, and as such, did not go into any kind of detail when discussing the events of 1774.
However, Wood enabled the reader to view the American Revolution in a new light, as an agent
of change that changed the course of future historical events.
One book that changed how people viewed the American Revolution was The Coming of
the Revolution: 1763-1775, by Lawrence Henry Gipson. Gipson was a Pulitzer Prize and
Bancroft Prize winning historian, and a professor of history at Lehigh University until his death
in 1971. In The Coming of the Revolution, Gipson not only spoke on the First Continental
Congress, but said that “the revolutionary movement …was virtually consummated in all the
essentials in the work of the Continental Congress in 1774.”42 Originally written in 1954, The
Coming of the Revolution gave the reader a small taste of what Gipson later expanded into his
thirteen-volume work, which was above mentioned. Gipson argued that the causes of the
American Revolution stemmed from two things—first, the necessity of the British Empire to
organize itself into a more efficient administration in the colonies; and second, by the belief in
the colonies of finally being free of hostile borders, due to the successful end of the French and
Indian War in 1763.43 While this is something taken for granted by modern historians, the idea
Gipson proposed in 1954 was quite a new one, and his works should be included here for that
reason.
41
42
Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Coming of the Revolution: 1763-1775, (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 231.
43
Gipson, Coming, xi.
20
Another book by Gipson which gives an in-depth look at the First Continental Congress
is The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776.44 In this volume, Gipson
lent an entire chapter to the First Continental Congress, and talked about the Suffolk Resolves
and the Galloway plan, in which he questioned its validity and the possibility that Great Britain
would approve it, stating, “the concept itself was revolutionary, since it implied a fundamental
reorganization of the constitution of the Empire.”45 Gipson declared that the colonists were
willing to declare independence if necessary, stating
the mood of the majority of the members of the Congress…was clearly not one of
compromise. They probably reasoned that since Americans had compelled Parliament in
1766 to repeal the Stamp Act, and in 1769 most of the Townshend Revenue Act…they
could again force the issue and gain acceptance of their own interpretation of the scope of
American rights...if not, they were prepared, but only as a last resort, to rebel and declare
their independence.46
Gipson mentioned that there was a proposal in the Congress for a continental militia, stating that
“a further step of resistance to the government of Great Britain was sought at this period in order
‘to apprize the public of danger, and of the necessity of putting the colonies in a state of
defence,’” further claiming that it was proposed that “‘the Congress do most earnestly
recommend…that a militia be forthwith appointed and well disciplined, and that it be well
provided with ammunition and proper arms.’”47 Gipson mentioned that this proposal was met
with resistance, and that, instead, a message to the King was drafted, informing the Crown that
the colonies could take care of themselves, stating “there was no need of parliamentary taxes in
America to…defend the colonies, since the colonies were in a position to care for these needs
44
Lawrence Henry Gipson. The British Empire Before the American Revolution, vol. 12, The Triumphant Empire:
Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).
45
Gipson, Empire XII, 248.
46
47
21
and, in case of war, would readily grant supplies for any additional forces that might be
necessary.”48 In terms of the First Continental Congress itself, Gipson said little, choosing
instead to hide whatever bias he maintained behind a strict synthesis of facts.
One of main tomes in American history is a book by Robert Middlekauff called The
Glorious Cause: The American Revolution 1763-1789. Middlekauff is a professor emeritus at
University of California, Berkeley. In The Glorious Cause, Middlekauff argued that those
involved in the Revolution were not fully aware of the implications of their actions in the 1760s,
but that as time went on, they recognized the importance of the course they had set for America.
The Glorious Cause is a synthesis of the American Revolution, like many of the books
mentioned here, but one that also gives evidence to the idea of an increased revolutionary
rhetoric that started in 1763 and ended (at least to Middlekauff) with the ratification of the
United States Constitution by the states starting in 1787.
While he spoke about the First Continental Congress and the events that took place
within, Middlekauff did not seem to analyze what, exactly, this meeting meant for the American
colonists. However, he wrote that “the delegates who rode into Philadelphia in late August and
early September felt excitement and pride and even awe at what they were doing—not rage at
Britain.”49 Using the words “pride” and “awe” indicates that the delegates knew they were
forming a new government out of necessity, and were extremely excited at the prospect. This one
innocuous statement allows the reader to infer that the delegates knew the importance of what
they were doing when they met in Philadelphia. Middlekauff gave the reader a better
understanding of the people within the First Continental Congress; he showed the reader that,
48
49
Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 245.
22
with the exception of one hothead delegate, almost no delegate in the First Continental Congress
wanted war, mostly because they were afraid that they would lose, and thus invite a “full-scale
despotism.” Interestingly, according to Middlekauff, some of the delegates, including Joseph
Galloway, spoke about American rights as though 1774 were the first time there was protest
against England; any earlier protests against British policy seemed to go unnoticed. 50
Middlekauff also showed the reader some of the dissent and tensions within the Congress
itself. He discussed South Carolina’s demand that rice and indigo were exempt from the ban on
exports, and that the delegates from that colony would not sign on with the Association unless
that demand was met.51 However, Middlekauff also mentioned that “the delegates departed
Philadelphia full of respect for one another. They had demonstrated that they and the people they
represented shared common interests and values…in the end they put together the Continental
Association.”52 This is important because it is an example of how the colonists started to unite as
Americans against Great Britain.
Bernard Bailyn, who is also a Pulitzer Prize winning author, is a professor emeritus of
history at Harvard and has written numerous books on the subject of the American Revolution
also, wrote a book called The Ideological Origins on the American Revolution. Bailyn informed
the reader that he went through numerous pamphlets in his search for the ideological origins of
the Revolution, stating that “it was in the context of the sources and patterns of ideas
presented…that I began to see a new meaning in phrases that I, like most historians, had readily
50
Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 248-259.
51
52
23
dismissed as mere rhetoric and propaganda: ‘slavery,’ ‘corruption,’ ‘conspiracy.’”53 Bailyn then
informed the reader that these patterns led to his argument, which was that “the fear of a
comprehensive conspiracy against liberty throughout the English-speaking world…lay at the
heart of the Revolutionary movement.”54 This, then, is what Bailyn argued throughout
Ideological Origins; that the Revolution was caused by colonialists’ fears of losing their liberties.
This was different from what Gipson had said; Gipson indicated that the American Revolution
stemmed from British reform, but stopped there without discussing fear or anger on the part of
the colonists. Bailyn went further in saying that the Revolution was caused by fear of losing
liberty, which came directly from British reform.
In Ideological Origins, Bailyn did not go into details about the historical events, nor did
he give the reader a timeline of events. Instead, Bailyn broke the book down into sections that
made it easier to explain those principles to the reader, including a section entirely on the
conspiracy belief. However, because of its intellectual considerations on the logic of rebellion
and its explanation of the question of virtual representation in the colonies it is still considered
one of the most important books when trying to understand the American Revolution, because it
evidence showing the shift from colonist to American.
Bernhard Knollenberg, who was not a professional historian, but a lawyer and also the
Librarian of Yale University Library before his death in 1973, wrote two volumes on the
American Revolution. In the first, Origins of the American Revolution 1759-1766, Knollenberg
wrote about the Seven Years’ War and the beginnings of colonial protest, including the
Proclamation of 1763, which is the start of the first phase of colonial protest after the Seven
53
Bernard Bailyn. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Enlarged Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992), xii-xiii.
54
Bailyn, Ideological Origins, xiii.
24
Years’ War. In Origins, Knollenberg argued that, although the Stamp Act was a spark for what
this thesis calls the first phase of colonial protest prior to the American Revolution, it was
actually a number of other actions by the British that had originally brought the colonists to the
brink of rebellion well before the Stamp Act, including the Sugar Act (which, as explained in the
chapter listing for chapter one increased the taxes on sugar and molasses) and the Currency Act
(which forbid the colonists from printing their own money). However, he also included earlier
actions, such as a bill in 1759 that forbid the governor of Virginia to sign any bill passed by the
legislation without approval by the Privy Council in England.55 Knollenberg’s Origins enables
the reader to gather a better idea of the British political system before colonial protests.
Knollenberg’s second book, Growth of the American Revolution 1766-1775, is
significantly longer and more in depth, covering everything from the repeal of the Stamp Act to
the shots fired at Lexington and Concord. In his introduction, Knollenberg argued that, although
the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766 averted the collision argued about in Origins, the passage of
the Declaratory Act in 1766 laid the foundation for the second crisis, which ended with the total
independence of the thirteen colonies.56 On the anger and alarm over the Coercive Acts,
Knollenberg informed the reader that, “the non-charter colonies…had a legislature consisting of
a Crown-appointed Governor and Council and an elected Assembly. Bills…were subject to
disallowance by the Privy Council. But, once an act was approved…it could not be repealed or
amended except through…the same process…”57 Knollenberg went on to explain why this was
important--because many of the older colonies, such as Massachusetts and Virginia, had, over
55
Bernhard Knollenberg. Origins of the American Revolution: 1759-1766. Ed. Bernard Sheehan (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 2002), xxi-xxiii.
56
Bernhard Knollenberg. Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775. Ed. Bernard Sheehan (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 2003), xxxiii.
57
Knollenberg, Growth, xlvi.
25
the course of one hundred years, built up a body of laws that colonists had thought were
untouchable. When Parliament passed the Massachusetts Government Act, which was part of the
Coercive Acts, it altered the charter of Massachusetts to allow for a number of frightening
options, including Parliament’s ability to strike down an eighty-year-old Massachusetts law if
necessary. According to Knollenberg, the colonists feared that “it could and might strike down
any existing act in any of the colonies and replace it by some other provision, no matter how
odious to the people of the colony.”58
This fear, of course, led to the First Continental Congress, about which Knollenberg has
six chapters explaining every aspect in great detail; however, Knollenberg, like the majority of
historians listed in this section, did not give any indication of the First Continental Congress as
anything but another step toward revolution. Knollenberg described the Congress in great detail,
from the election of delegates to what each delegate did, right down to the voting of where the
delegates sat in Carpenter’s Hall, but he did not mention the importance of the First Continental
Congress. Knollenberg did not claim anything in terms of the Congress; however, it can be
inferred that Knollenberg believed, or at least argued, that the American Revolution began at
Lexington and Concord, when he said that “appeals to self-interest and to ties of a common
English heritage were unavailing to prevail against the force of passion aroused by the shedding
of American blood on the nineteenth of April.”59
In his book The Long Fuse, Don Cook, who was a journalist, talked briefly about the
First Continental Congress, informing the reader of the predecessor to the First Congress (the
Committees of Correspondence). In addition, Cook spoke very briefly about what the First
58
Knollenberg, Growth, xlvi.
59
Knollenberg, Growth, 240.
26
Congress accomplished, including the Declaration and Resolves, which Cook called the
“forerunner to the Declaration of Independence,” the Continental Association, and the appeal to
King George, stating the colonies’ grievances and rights, and asking the king to intervene.60 At
the same time, however, Cook’s book mostly focused on the British actions and reactions during
colonial protests, including giving the reader an idea of where King George stood on the matter
of the First Continental Congress, stating that “‘the die is now cast, the colonies must either
submit or triumph.’”61 This was, as he stated in his introduction, the author’s main purpose in
writing The Long Fuse.
Finally, in The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord, Ray Raphael
wrote “The American Revolution did not start…on the morning of April 19, 1775….the real
revolution, the transfer of political authority to the American patriots, occurred the previous
summer when…farmers seized power from every Crown-appointed official in Massachusetts.”62
Raphael took a non-traditional view of the American Revolution Raphael argued that the transfer
of sovereignty happened in Massachusetts; however, the transfer of sovereignty of which
Raphael spoke was only in Massachusetts; to have a truly American Revolution requires the
other colonies as well. Because of this, the First Continental Congress was the start of the
American Revolution, not the point at which Raphael argued.
Primary Sources
The Lillian Goldman Law Library at the Yale University Law School collected the full
texts of a number of primary sources in a database called the Avalon Project. This database
60
Don Cook, The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785 (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1995), 197-198.
61
Cook, Long Fuse, 197.
62
Ray Raphael, The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord, (New York: The New Press, 2002),
1.
27
includes the full texts of some of the acts of Parliament from the first phase of protest, including
the Sugar Act of 1764, the Currency Act of 1764, and the Stamp Act of 1765, as well as the
Declaratory Act of 1766 and the Townshend Acts of 1767. In addition to this, the Avalon Project
also has the full text of Samuel Adams’s circular letter in 1768, as well as the non-importation
agreements following the Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts.63 From the second phase of
colonial protest, the Avalon Project also has full text of the Coercive Acts, including the Quebec
Act.64
The Library of Congress website, which has a collection in its American Memory section
called “A Century of Lawmaking,” links to the Journals of the Continental Congress, which
includes comments from every day the delegates met and what they discussed, such as the
Suffolk Resolves and Galloway’s Plan of Union, as well as the votes taken within the Congress.
In addition, the Library of Congress has also inputted the Letters to the Delegates of Congress,
which includes letters from Patrick Henry, John Adams, Samuel Adams, and others.
The book Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789: A Documentary History of the American
Revolution, edited by Jack P. Greene, a professor of history at Johns Hopkins University, also
includes many primary source selections. Where possible, I tried to find the full text of primary
sources but, failing that, this book was extremely useful as a compilation of primary source
documents to use. Colonies to Nation includes selections of laws passed by Parliament, including
the Sugar Act of 1764 and the Currency Act of 1764, as well as colonial response to those laws,
63
“The Sugar Act—September 29, 1764;” “The Currency Act—April 19,1764;” “The Stamp Act—March 22,
1765;” “New York Merchants Non-importation Agreement--October 31, 1765;” “The Declaratory Act—March 18,
1766;” “An Act Repealing the Stamp Act—March 18, 1766;” “The Townshend Acts—November 20, 1767;”
Massachusetts Circular Letter to the Colonial Legislatures--February 11, 1768;” “Boston Non-Importation
Agreement--August 1, 1768” in Yale University Avalon Project.
“The Boston Port Act—March 31, 1774;” “The Administration of Justice Act—May 20, 1774;” “The
64
Massachusetts Government Act—May 20, 1774;” “The Quartering Act—June 2, 1774;” “The Quebec Act—
October 7, 1774” in Yale University Avalon Project.
28
such as selections from James Otis’s “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved”
from 1764. In addition, it gives selections of letters and reports regarding battles and skirmishes,
such as Thomas Gage’s report on the shots fired at Lexington and Concord, and a report on the
Boston Massacre by a town committee.65
Finally, the Liberty Fund, which published both of Bernhard Knollenberg’s books in
2002 and 2003, also has a website, which has full text of a number of books, including John
Dickinson’s Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer and Works of John Adams.
Conclusion
The moment at which the American Revolution began occurred at the First Continental
Congress in Philadelphia in 1774. This thesis challenges the traditional historical idea of the start
of the American Revolution by claiming that the self-consciousness of being Virginians and
South Carolinians instead of British occurred earlier than traditionally taught, and occurred, as
said by John Adams, in “the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious
sentiments of their duties and obligations.”66 This is the point at which the change from being
British to being American occurred. Parliament passed so many laws and had refused to listen to
the colonists’ complaints that it led to the only possible outcome—revolution. Throughout the
eleven years between the Proclamation of 1763 and the Continental Association in 1774, the
65
“Beginnings of Parliamentary Taxation for Revenue: The Sugar Act of Apr. 6, 1764” (19-24); “Prohibition of
Legal-tender Paper Currency: the Currency Act of Apr. 19, 1764” (25-26); “No Legislature Has a Right to Make
Itself Arbitrary: James Otis, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764)” (28-33); “The
Outbreak of Hostilities: Governor Thomas Gage Reports on the Battles of Lexington and Concord to the Earl of
Dartmouth (April 22, 1775)” (253); “ ‘A Military Combination’: Report of a Committee of the Town of Boston
(1770)” (166-172) in Colonies to Nation.
66
&Itemid=27.
29
colonists had sent multiple petitions; they had enacted many boycotts; and their only request was
autonomy.
Knollenberg argued in Origins that:
had the alarming measures…been distributed over a long period, the effect of each might
have rippled away before the next was felt; but, concentrated in the span of a few years,
all contributed to the colonial fear that the British Government would go further and
further in depriving the colonists of the large measure of self-government in internal
affairs they had so long enjoyed and justly valued.67
While Knollenberg discussed the events from 1759 to 1764 in that quote, evidence shows that
the same could be said about the events from 1763 to 1774.
Many of the books on the American Revolution talk about the First Continental
Congress, the Suffolk Resolves and the Continental Association, but not the possibility that those
events started the American Revolution. Traditional views of the American Revolution are
inaccurate.
Fifty-six men got together and ratified Massachusetts’ Suffolk Resolves, which said that
Parliament should not be obeyed because it had no power to govern the colonies at all. They
formed the Continental Association to make sure that what they said would be followed.
These men knew exactly what they were doing. They knew they were proposing treason
and that, should they be caught and convicted, they would probably be hanged as traitors to the
Crown. They also knew that revolution was necessary. The real moment of revolution began in
the moment when those men decided that their current system of government was not working. It
must have taken great courage to start a revolution. Those fifty-six men who met in Philadelphia
dared to have the courage to tell Parliament and the world that they were starting a revolution.
They dared to change the world.
67
Knollenberg, Origins, xxiv.
30
CHAPTER ONE: ORIGINS
From 1754 to 1763, the British and the French were at war in the American colonies. By
1756, that war had spilled over into a conflict on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The French
went on to lose what the colonists’ called the French and Indian War, and whom those in Europe
called the Seven Years’ War. When the war officially ended on February 10, 1763 with the
signing of the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain had acquired the Canadian territory. The treaty
claimed that France “cedes and guaranties to his said Britannick Majesty, in full right, Canada,
with all its dependencies, as well as the island of Cape Breton, and all the other islands and
coasts in the gulph and river of St. Lawrence.”68 In addition, the treaty also granted land between
the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains to England. France ceded “in full right,
and guaranties to his Britannick Majesty the river and port of the Mobile, and every thing …on
the left side of the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans and the island in which it is
situated, which shall remain to France, provided that the navigation of the river Mississippi shall
be equally free.”69 Much of this land already had Native American tribes on it, although colonists
saw this expansion of the empire as a way to acquire more land for themselves.
68
“Treaty of Paris, 1763” in Yale University Avalon Project.
69“Treaty of Paris”; Alan Taylor. American Colonies: The Settling of North America. (New York: Penguin Books,
2001), 433.
31
Shortly after the Treaty of Paris, King George III signed the Proclamation of 1763, which
prohibited settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains, to protect the Native Americans living
there. The colonists were upset at this Proclamation, because the unsettled land past the
Appalachians were now off-limits to the land-hungry colonists. In addition, the Proclamation
informed them that Canada had been acquired as a British colony, and as such, the people who
lived there were now British subjects, required to submit to all the same laws and regulations of
the rest of the colonists throughout North America. To the colonists, the Québécois were still
French, regardless of whether Quebec was a British colony or not, and they did not appreciate
French-speaking Catholic citizens on their borders.70 It was not impossible that the English and
the French would go to war again, and the colonists in the old British colonies were very
distrustful of the new British colony to the north. After all, the day before the war ended, the
French were their enemies.
To complicate matters further, George Grenville, who in 1763 became Prime Minister,
firmly believed that the British government gave protection and economic growth to the
colonies, without making the colonies help pay for it. The acquisition of Canada as a colony
meant that the British felt it was necessary to establish a standing army in the colonies to make
protecting the colonists easier in the event of revolt from the Québécois during a future war
against France. Money was necessary to both pay the troops stationed in the colonies and pay
back the giant debt incurred, Grenville decided that it was time for the colonists to contribute to
the British Empire.
70
"Stopgap Regulations for the New Territories: The Proclamation of 1763" in Colonies to Nation, 16-18.
32
The British Empire had a post-war debt of over £137 million, an increase of £64 million
over the pre-war debt of £73 million.71 Per capita, the debt in England was eighteen pounds. In
the colonies, the estimated per capita debt was approximately eighteen shillings. 72 This amounts
to, in modern United States dollars, a per capita debt in England of $29, compared to a per capita
debt of $1.29 in the colonies. This discrepancy caused many in Parliament to agree with
Grenville’s belief that the colonies should be required to pay a larger share.73 As a result,
Parliament passed the first act designed, not to regulate trade, as the duties previously levied did,
but solely to raise revenue in the colonies.74
In 1764, Parliament passed the Sugar Act, which dropped the customs duty on foreign
molasses. There was already a sixpence per gallon tax on molasses, rum, and sugar from the
Molasses Act of 1733 to ensure the colonists purchased only from the British colonies producing
those products, as there was no tax to import from the British Caribbean.75 The purpose of the
original act was to give the British West Indian sugar interests a monopoly of the market within
the Empire, not to raise revenue, which in the colonies was a well-established principle of
colonial legislatures. The colonies raised money to support the Empire during the French and
Indian War, and raised money continuously to pay the salaries of people appointed to public
office by the Crown.76
71
Taylor, American Colonies, 439.
72
73
74
Knollenberg, Origins, 140.
75
Gipson, Coming, 63; Cook, Long Fuse, 54.
76
Knollenberg, Origins, 127; Cook, Long Fuse, 53.
33
The customs officials in the colonies, however, rarely collected the tax in its entirety, as
merchants often bribed the officials to look the other way when a cargo of foreign molasses came
into port. 77 In 1764, however, with the specter of debt over them, Parliament passed the Sugar
Act as a “just and necessary [act], that a revenue be raised in…America, for defraying the
expences of defending, protecting, and securing the same.”78 While it reduced the amount of the
tax on foreign molasses to threepence per gallon, the Act also extended the tax to all molasses,
even from the British West Indies, which had previously been exempt, for the purposes of raising
revenue.79
Another provision of the Act required customs officers in the colonies, both on land and
at sea, to be less cautious about seizing vessels and cargo suspected of violations of the trade
laws. Previously, officers were reluctant to seize vessels without strong evidence of these
violations because, if the owners of the vessels were found innocent, the officers would be liable
for damages to the cargo. This provision within the Sugar Act allowed for customs officers to be
less careful by providing that the officers could not be held liable for any damage.
The Act further allowed for the foundation of a new admiralty court for the trial and
condemnation of those seized vessels and cargo. Prior to this new court, customs officials could
only bring those charges within the colony in which the violation occurred. If they seized a ship
in Boston Harbor, for example, the trial could only be held in Massachusetts. Customs officials
could not bring it to New York or Pennsylvania. Under this new provision, however, such a trial
could be held anywhere, regardless of where the violation occurred. The colonists would have
77
Morgan, Birth, 11.
78
“Beginnings of Parliamentary Taxation for Revenue: The Sugar Act of (Apr. 5) 1764” in Colonies to Nation, 19.
79
34
been upset enough about this provision had Parliament established the new court in New York or
Pennsylvania. Instead, Parliament decided to establish the court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, far
away from any of the other big ports in America. The reason for this placement was so that local
colonists could not influence judges of the admiralty courts. In addition, the individual bringing
suit against a vessel could choose to bring suit in the admiralty court, thus depriving the
defendant of a trial by jury.80
Shortly thereafter, Parliament passed another law, the Currency Act of 1764, which
prohibited the printing of paper money in the colonies. There was already a law in place from
1751, prohibited the printing of paper money in New England, but this act extended that
prohibition to the rest of the colonies. There was a solid economic reason for both this act, and
the one passed for New England in 1751. During the first half of the eighteenth century, the
colonies had little to no legal gold or silver money in circulation. What little legal specie there
was in the colonies came from the West Indies trade, and colonial merchants used a majority of it
to pay their debts in England. To fix this problem, the colonies began to print paper money to
pay private debts, purchase goods and land, and pay taxes and duties. The colonists could not
send paper money to England to pay debts, but they could use it to buy the bills of exchange.
Some colonies, such as Pennsylvania, managed their currency very well. Other colonies,
specifically those in New England, issued too much currency or failed to collect it for taxes,
which depreciated the value, leading to the Currency Act of 1751.81
Parliament suspended the Currency Act of 1751 for the duration of the French and Indian
War, but opposition from England started again before the war was over. The consequence of
80
Knollenberg, Origins, 168-169.
81
Merrill Jensen. The Founding of A Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968.; repr. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2004), 53. All citations are to reprinted edition.
35
this economic unrest was the Currency Act of 1764, which stated that “great quantities of paper
bills of credit have been created and issued in his Majesty’s colonies,” and that “such bills of
credit have greatly depreciated in their value, by means whereof debts have been discharged with
a muss less value than was contracted for.”82 To rectify this problem of depreciation, the
Currency Act stated that “no act, order, resolution, or vote of assembly…shall be made, for
creating or issuing any paper bills, or bills of credit…declaring such paper bills, or bills of credit,
to be legal tender in payment of any bargains, contracts, debts, dues, or demands whatsoever.”83
The act did not remedy the issue that caused the colonies to print paper money to begin
with—the lack of gold and silver specie in the colonies. Additionally, specie coming straight
from England on boats was subject to the perils of the sea. If a ship went down, the entire money
supply on the boat went down with it, leaving thousands of colonists with no way to pay their
taxes or buy goods, thus crippling the colonial economy.84
In July of 1764, a lawyer from Boston named James Otis wrote a document entitled “The
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” in which he posited that Parliament could
not tax the colonies without proper colonial representation within Parliament, as that taxation
was unconstitutional. Otis claimed that “no parts of his Majesty’s dominions can be taxed
without their consent: that every part has a right to be represented….that the refusal of this would
seem to be a contradiction in practice to the theory of the constitution…”85 Therefore, until the
colonies could be properly represented, Parliament could not tax them. Otis was not implying
82
“Prohibition of Legal-Tender Paper Currency: The Currency Act of 1764” in Colonies to Nation, 25.
83
“The Currency Act” in Colonies to Nation, 25.
84
Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan. The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1995), 31.
85
James Otis. “Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved” in Colonies to Nation, 33.
36
that Parliament did not have the power to tax the colonies; only that it was unconstitutional,
according to the English constitution, to tax the colonies without proper representation.
Another protest about Parliamentary taxation of the colonies for the purposes of revenue
came in the form of a petition from the New York Colonial Assembly to the House of Commons
in October of 1764. The New York Assembly willing admitted that Parliament had the right to
regulate trade, stating that “the Authority of the Parliament of Great-Britain, to model the Trade
of the whole Empire, so as to subserve the interest of her own, we are ready to recognize in the
most extensive and positive Terms.”86 The petition went on to say that “such a Preference is
naturally founded upon her Superiority...and therefore…the Colonies cannot, would not ask for a
License to import woolen Manufactures from France; or to go into the most lucrative Branches
of Commerce, in the least Degree incompatible with the Trade and Interest of Great-Britain.”87
However, the New York Assembly insisted that Parliament did not have the jurisdiction to tax
the colonies for the purposes of raising revenue. The petition said that “an Exemption from all
Duties in such a Course of Commerce, is humbly claimed by the Colonies, as the most essential
of all the Rights to which they are entitled.”88 The statement that “the General Assembly of New-
York…cannot but express the most earnest Supplication, that the Parliament will charge our
Commerce with no other Duties, than a necessary Regard to the particular Trade of Great-
Britain, evidently demands; but leave it to the legislative Power of the Colony, to impose all
other Burthens upon its own people”89 followed this claim.
86
“The New York Petition to the House of Commons” in Colonies to Nation, 37.
87
88
89
37
The Massachusetts House of Representatives sent a petition to the House of Commons as
well, stating that the taxes “must necessarily bring many burdens upon the inhabitants of these
colonies and plantations, which your petitioners conceive would not have been imposed if a full
representation of the state of the colonies had been made to your honourable House.” 90 The
petition also said that that the inability to print paper money in the colonies would cripple them,
and that “the extension of the powers of courts of vice-admiralty has, so far as the jurisdiction of
the said courts hath been extended, deprived the colonies of one of the' most valuable of English
liberties, trials by juries.”91
These two acts and the colonists’ responses reveal the beginning of the escalation of
rhetoric within the colonies. After the passage of the Sugar and Currency Acts, the colonists’
reactions were those of “no taxation without consent” and to a lesser degree, “no taxation
without representation.” The colonists believed they had not consented to any of the taxes or
legislation passed by Parliament because they were not properly represented within Parliament
itself. While the petitions and pamphlets stated that the colonists would not consent to taxation
for the purpose of raising revenue, they did indicate that Parliament had the authority to regulate
trade.
These two acts alone were enough to upset some of the colonists, but with the addition of
the Stamp Act of 1765, many of the colonists went from irritated to angry.
The Stamp Act Crisis
Parliament passed the Stamp Act, like the Sugar Act before it, to increase revenue.
Parliament did this by taxing every piece of printed material in the colonies. These included legal
“Petition from the Massachusetts House of Representatives to the House of Commons; November 3, 1764” in
90
Yale University Avalon Project.
“Petition from the Massachusetts House of Representatives to the House of Commons; November 3, 1764” in
91
Yale University Avalon Project.
38
papers, business contracts, playing cards, liquor licenses, academic degrees, newspapers, the
advertisements within the newspapers, and pamphlets, among other things. The taxes would
range from a few shillings for a pack of playing cards to £10 for attorney’s licenses. In addition
to the tax, the Stamp Act also provided for the enforcement of the Act in either common-law or
admiralty courts.92 Traditionally, admiralty courts in England had been confined to trying cases
arising on the high seas and on navigable rivers. Thus, the provision in the Sugar Act for
allowing a suit to be heard in an admiralty court made sense. The Stamp Act, however, could not
be interpreted in such a way. 93
The first hint of colonial defiance against the Stamp Act came in the form of Patrick
Henry, a young Virginian lawyer who proposed seven resolutions against the idea of the Stamp
Act, four of which were passed by the Virginia House of Burgesses.94 First, the Resolves stated
that the original settlers of the colonies “brought with them, and transmitted to their
Posterity…all the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities that have…been held,
enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great-Britain,” and that “by two royal Charters…the
Colonists aforesaid are declared entitled to all Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities of Denizens
and natural Subjects…as if they had been abiding and born within the Realm of England.”95 In
addition, the Resolves claimed that “the Taxation of the People by themselves, or by Persons
92
“The Stamp Act” in Colonies to Nation, 42-43.
93
Morgan and Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 73-74.
94
A fifth resolution was also passed, and later rescinded, by the House of Burgesses, which stated that only
Virginians had the power to tax Virginians and that, should anyone else attempt to tax Virginians, it would destroy
American freedom. Two other resolutions which were not passed stated that the people of Virginia were not
required to follow any taxation laws except those passed by their own legislature, and that anyone who believed or
said otherwise would be considered an enemy to the colony. See Knollenberg, Origins, 217; Morgan and Morgan,
95-96.
95
“Call to Resistance: The Virginia Resolves” in Colonies to Nation, 60.
39
chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know what Taxes the People are able to
bear…is the only Security against a burthensome Taxation” and that it is “the distinguishing
Characteristick of British Freedom, without which the ancient Constitution cannot exist.”96
Third, the Resolves claimed that the people of the colonies had “without Interruption enjoyed the
inestimable Right of being governed by such Laws, respecting their internal Policy and Taxation,
as are derived from their own Consent...and hath been constantly recognized by the Kinds and
People of Great Britain.”97
The colonists in general responded to this particular tax with numerous acts of violence.
Those men who had been appointed Stamp Distributors got the worst of it. In Massachusetts,
some Bostonians hung an effigy of Stamp Distributor Andrew Oliver in the liberty tree in
Boston. A mob further tore through town looking for Oliver and destroying his home when they
could not find him. Oliver resigned his post before his commission had even come from
England. Thomas Hutchinson, Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, was the next target, as he
supported both the Stamp Act in general and Andrew Oliver in particular. Hutchinson managed
to escape a large mob en route to his home; the mob destroyed everything nailed down, and stole
everything that was not.98
The violence was not limited to Massachusetts, however. In Maryland, by the time Stamp
Distributor Zachariah Hood reached Annapolis, having come from England to purchase items to
supply his store, he had been hanged in effigy in numerous places. In addition, people with
whom he had once been friendly now treated him with utmost contempt. Realizing that he was
96
“The Virginia Resolves” in Colonies to Nation, 61.
97
“The Virginia Resolves” in Colonies to Nation, 61.
98
40
not safe in Maryland, he traveled to New York to place himself under the protection of Thomas
Gage, the commander-in-chief of British forces in America. Hood resigned his post shortly
thereafter, under pressure from the Sons of Liberty.99
The Sons of Liberty was a group of people formed by Samuel Adams. Adams knew the
dangers of mob violence, and knew that such a thing would not only repel a number of
potentially influential allies, but would also invite a larger British intervention. Instead, he
formed the Sons of Liberty, which served several functions in this early stage of protest. It was a
foundation for mass protests in the streets, and could be used for violence when necessary, but it
was also the medium for preventing violence and disorder. Adams understood the anger and
frustration of the people, and used the Sons of Liberty as a vehicle to bring the people together,
so that worker and merchant would work together toward the common goal of the repeal of the
Stamp Act.100
The colonists were angry enough to form a Congress with the purpose of formally
opposing the Stamp Act. This Congress formed a petition requesting the repeal not only of the
Stamp Act, but of the Sugar and Currency Acts of 1764, claiming that “no taxes be imposed on
them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives,”101 and that “the
people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the
House of Commons in Great Britain.”102 In addition to claiming that they could not be taxed
without consent, they also claimed that it was against their rights as British subjects to be taxed
99
Wood, Revolution, 29-30.
100
Ferling, Leap, 66-67.
“The Official Colonial Protest: The Declaration of the Stamp Act Congress (Oct. 19, 1765)” in Colonies to
101
Nation, 64.
102
“The Stamp Act Congress” in Colonies to Nation, 64.
41
without that consent. For the first time, the colonists were uniting for a common cause, and
participating in violent acts to make themselves heard.103 As loyal British subjects, they believed
that Parliament would listen.
Shortly thereafter, merchants in New York set forth a non-importation agreement—in
essence, an embargo, on British goods. The agreement stated that the colonists order nothing
new from England, as well as cancelling what they already ordered. In addition, it stated that
none of the merchants would sell goods that had come from England until Parliament repealed
the Stamp Act.104
Elsewhere, the protests focused on the stamps themselves. In some colonies, the stamps
were not even landing. Colonial authorities in Virginia declared that the stamps were illegal and
not to be used. South Carolina’s governor ordered the stamps locked up and guarded; this did not
stop a band of the Sons of Liberty from breaking in, finding the stamps and burning them. New
Jersey’s stamps stayed upon the ship which they came.105 Parliament ignored the petitions and
complaints of the colonists, but not the embargo.
In response to the drastic consequences of the colonies’ non-importation agreement,
British merchants petitioned Parliament. Already in trouble due to an economic depression
caused by the end of the Seven Years’ War, these merchants were further distressed by not being
able to import their goods into the colonies. The merchants held no ill will toward the colonists,
realizing the colonies apparently needed to do whatever necessary to garner results. Instead, they
103
104
“New York Merchants Non-importation Agreement; October 31, 1765” in Yale University Avalon Project.
105
Cook, Long Fuse, 79-80.
42
put all the blame upon Grenville and his ideas, and petitioned Parliament loudly and
continuously that the embargo would ruin them unless Parliament helped them.106
In 1766, William Pitt, a political strength in the House of Commons and a former
Secretary of State in England, took the floor of Parliament and declared that the Stamp Act
needed to be repealed immediately. Pitt believed the Stamp Act was based on a flawed principle,
but asserted that Parliament held authority over the colonies to legislate as it saw fit, short of
going over to the colonies and becoming pickpockets.107
William Pitt was not the only person to appeal to Parliament. Benjamin Franklin, a
colonial agent to Parliament from Pennsylvania, gave four hours of testimony to the House of
Commons as to why the Stamp Act should be repealed. Franklin testified that the taxes already
placed upon the colonists were numerous and heavy, having been instituted largely to help pay
the costs of having a standing army in the colonies and help pay off the debt from the Seven
Years’ War. He testified that not everyone could pay the taxes, being somewhat poor and far
away from civilization, and that, even those colonists who were well off could not pay the taxes
as there was not “gold and silver enough in the colonies to pay the stamp duty for one year.”108
Most importantly, Franklin testified that the attitudes of the colonists toward Parliament
were markedly different than they had been before 1765. He claimed that, while at one point the
colonists were respectful of Parliament’s authority and grateful for its security, those feelings had
drastically lessened. Franklin explained the difference, at least to colonists, between external
taxes (which were appropriate), and internal taxes (which were not). An external tax, according
106
Morgan and Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 275.
107
108
“Examination of Benjamin Franklin in the House of Commons, Feb. 13, 1766” in Colonies to Nation , 72.
43
to Franklin, was one that was attached to an imported good as part of the price—if a colonist did
not like the price of the good, the colonist would not purchase said good. However, an internal
tax, according to Franklin, was one that was forced upon the colonists in such a manner that all
activity would stop; in the example of the Stamp Act, all legal activity would cease and would
cause the colonists’ ruin if they refused to pay it.109
Between Pitt’s speech, Franklin’s testimony, and the merchants’ petitions, the Marquess
of Rockingham, Grenville’s replacement as Prime Minister, succeeded in bringing forth a repeal
of the Stamp Act. However, Parliament attached the repeal of the Stamp Act to the Declaratory
Act of 1766. William Pitt had stated that though Parliament did not have the authority to tax the
colonies, it did have the power to assert its sovereignty through all legislation.110 Parliament used
this argument in the Declaratory Act of 1766, which stated that the colonies were subordinate to
Parliament and that Parliament had the full authority to make laws that applied to the colonies in
all cases whatsoever. It also declared any law made in the colonies that denies the authority of
Parliament null and void in all purposes whatsoever.111
With the news that Parliament had repealed the Stamp Act, celebrations commenced
throughout many of the colonies. The colonists in New York voted to erect a statue of King
George III, taverns on the Philadelphia waterfront gave free drinks to every sailor on the ship
that brought news of the repeal, and South Carolina voted to erect a statue of William Pitt.112 The
parties, however, did not last long.
109
“Examination of Benjamin Franklin” in Colonies to Nation, 72-78; see also Cook, Fuse, 94-103.
110
111
“The Declaratory Act; March 18, 1766” in Yale University Avalon Project.
112
44
While many did not notice the passage of the Declaratory Act at first, those who did were
concerned about the tone of the words “to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever.” Those who
did read it seemed to think Parliament did not mean to include taxation. The attitudes of the
British merchants toward the colonists were more ominous, however. The fact that British
merchants were claiming success in getting the Stamp Act repealed was not the problem; indeed,
the colonists had depended upon the British merchants to support them in order to protect British
commerce. Rather, it was the attitude of the British merchants that they had saved the colonists
from themselves that caused disquiet among the colonists. Even more disconcerting was the fact
that many of the merchants, according to Middlekauff, did not really think that the colonists truly
believed in the principles they professed.113 Though Parliament did repeal the Stamp Act,
colonial suspicions of British intents lingered.
The Townshend Crisis
These suspicions seemed to be founded when, a year later, Parliament passed the
Townshend Acts. The Townshend Acts, named after Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles
Townshend, were a group of acts meant to increase revenue and help support the Empire.114
William Pitt, now known as the Earl of Chatham, had never been healthy. As a result,
shortly after appointing the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chatham departed to a health spa,
leaving Charles Townshend at the helm.115 Townshend claimed to be able to acquire revenue
113
114
Pitt, until this point, had played out his role in the House of Commons, not the House of Lords. Pitt wanted more
than to be the Great Commoner—he wanted admittance into the inner circle of the aristocracy. Thus, William Pitt
appealed to King George III and became the Earl of Chatham. Pitt’s strengths in the House of Commons lay in his
character; with his new appointment as the Earl of Chatham, confidence and credibility in his leadership were
diminished. According to the Whitehall Evening Post, as quoted in Don Cook, “Pitt was adored—but Chatham is
quite unknown.” See Cook, Long Fuse, 111-113.
115
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from the colonies during a Parliamentary debate in 1767. In April of 1767, he presented his
package of American measures to Parliament.116
Townshend started with a request to suspend the New York Assembly until it complied
with General Thomas Gage’s request for funds under the Quartering Act of 1765. The colonists
of New York had taken offense to the fact that a majority of the English troops were stationed in
New York, putting a burden on the New York colonists. As a result, the New York Assembly
refused to pay the cost of supplies and housing for the troops.117
In addition to the suspension of the New York Assembly, Townshend proposed to move
British troops stationed in the frontier areas of the colonies closer to the Atlantic coast, claiming
that it would save money on their deployment. Townshend claimed that “‘an army in America,
and consequently American revenue, is essentially necessary.’”118
Townshend also included a list of new taxes on imported goods such as paper, paint, lead,
glass, and tea. In addition, Townshend stated that there would be a new Board of Customs
Commissioners, sent to America and headquartered in Boston, to oversee the collection of these
new taxes. Lastly, Townshend indicated that he would revise payment for officials appointed by
the Crown. Up until this point, the colonies themselves paid the salaries for royal governors,
lieutenant governors, customs officials, and others appointed by the Crown. Townshend’s plan
would put these appointees on a “civil list,” much like civil servants in England, whose salaries
would be paid by the revenue collected under the new taxes Townshend proposed. This allowed
London to control the salaries directly, instead of locally by the colonial governments.
116
117
118
46
Townshend believed this package would protect officials appointed by the Crown from having
their pay withheld by angry colonists. Aware of the opposition to the vote, and realizing that
Lord Chatham was extremely sick, Townshend threatened to resign if his package did not pass.
Townshend’s package went to a vote, and Parliament passed the Townshend Acts on May 15,
1767.119
The Townshend Acts included five separate bills. The Revenue Act taxed imported
paper, paint, lead, glass, and tea. These items were not produced in North America; the colonists
were only allowed to buy these items from Great Britain. The Revenue Act also allowed for part
of the revenue coming in from the duties to go to
making a more certain and adequate provision for the charge of the administration of
justice, and the support of civil government, in such of the said colonies and plantations
where it shall be found necessary; and that the residue of such duties shall be paid into
the receipt of his Majesty’s exchequer, and shall be entered separate and apart from all
other monies paid or payable to his Majesty, his heirs, or successors; and shall be there
reserved, to be from time to time disposed of by parliament towards defraying the
necessary expences of defending, protecting, and securing, the British colonies and
plantations in America.120
The duties from the Townshend Acts would go toward paying for the British troops stationed in
the colonies, as well as the salaries of those on the civil list in the colonies.
In addition, the Indemnity Act made the tea of the British East India Company more
competitive with smuggled Dutch tea. It repealed taxes on tea imported to England, allowing it
to be re-exported more cheaply to the colonies.
The New York Restraining Act, a third act within the Townshend Acts, suspended the
power of the New York Assembly until it complied with the Quartering Act of 1765. The Vice
Admiralty Court Act created four district courts, located at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and
119
120
“The Townshend Act, November 20, 1767” in Yale University Avalon Project.
47
Charleston, and to help customs officials prosecute smugglers, since colonial juries were
reluctant to convict persons for violating unpopular trade regulations. Finally, the
Commissioners of Customs Act was enacted to better collect the new taxes.121
The newly implemented acts did little to help the colonists’ views of the British, and
Parliament in particular. Colonial response to the Townshend Acts was not immediate, as it was
for the Stamp Act, nor was it as strong, but there was some protest. Starting in 1767, John
Dickinson, a lawyer in Philadelphia wrote a series of letters to the Pennsylvania Chronicle.
Speaking rather mildly, Dickinson claimed that Parliament, while entirely able to regulate
commerce in the colonies, had absolutely no right nor authority to tax the colonies for revenue
purposes.122 He called the Townshend Revenue Act “a most dangerous innovation” and claimed
it was both unconstitutional and “destructive to the liberties of the colonies.”123 Throughout his
letters, of which there are twelve, he argued that Parliament had absolutely no authority to tax
any colony for any reason, as the duties “which will inevitably be levied upon us—which are
now levying upon us—are expressly laid for the sole purpose of taking money. This is the true
definition of taxes.”124
John Dickinson was not the only one protesting through the written word. Samuel Adams
wrote a document in 1768, referred to as the Circular Letter because the Massachusetts
121
“The Townshend Acts” in Yale University Avalon Project.
122
123
Gipson, Empire XI, 146-147.
124
John Dickinson. “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania—Letter VII” in Colonies to Nation 132-133. See also
Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (John Dickinson). Letters from the Federal Farmer
(Richard Henry Lee), ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999).
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=690&Itemid=99999999.
This link allows access to the full text of all twelve of John Dickinson’s letters. Original emphasis placed on all
accounts.
48
Assembly circulated it among the colonies. Adams argued that the Townshend Acts were
unconstitutional because the colonists were not properly represented in Parliament; moreover,
colonial legislatures were more efficient than Parliament.125 The letter angered the new British
Secretary of State, Lord Hillsborough, previously the president of the board of trade.
Hillsborough sent an order to Massachusetts to rescind the letter; when the Massachusetts
Assembly refused the order, Hillsborough ordered the dissolution of the Assembly.126 The people
of Boston, once again taking the lead in protesting, passed another Non-Importation Agreement,
declaring once again that they would place an embargo on goods coming from England.127
While the colonists protested, Townshend’s Customs Commissioners began to collect the
taxes. In Boston, the commissioners searched the “Lydia,” a ship owned by John Hancock, one
of Boston’s richest merchants that had recently returned from London. The man searching the
“Lydia,” a minor customs official called a “tidesman,” went below decks without authorization
or writ of assistance. Hancock’s sailors removed him unceremoniously, and charges were filed
against Hancock for interfering with Customs officers in the performance of their duty. Charges
were dismissed on the grounds that Hancock had acted entirely within his rights.128
The commissioners appealed to London, claiming they had wanted to make an example
out of Hancock because of his political leanings. Because Hancock represented something of a
challenge to royal authority, to decide not to prosecute would be a blow to royal authority in the
colonies. When authorities declined to prosecute Hancock, the Customs Commissioners decided
125
“Massachusetts Circular Letter to the Colonial Legislatures; February 11, 1768,” in Yale University Avalon
Project.
126
“Circular Letter to the Governors in America; April 21, 1768” in Yale University Avalon Project; Morgan 41.
127
“Boston Non-Importation Agreement, August 1, 1768” in Yale University Avalon Project.
128
Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 170; Jensen, Founding, 281.
49
to seize his ship “Liberty” when it returned from Madeira with wine and other taxable goods in
June of 1768. When the townspeople of Boston went to the waterfront, presumably to help
Hancock by causing a commotion on the dock, authorities took the “Liberty” out of the harbor
and tied it up alongside a warship that had sailed into Boston Harbor. Colonists rioted, and the
Customs Commissioners asked for more troops to help suppress the riot. Already irritated at the
colonists, and Boston in particular, Hillsborough saw absolutely nothing wrong with sending
troops to suppress an area he viewed as a source of trouble.129 Bostonians took offense to the
stationing of troops in their city, and met illegally in 1768, passing a series of resolutions stating
that they were being unconstitutionally taxed and that having an army in their midst was also
unconstitutional.130
However, the colonists did not back down. Virginia’s House of Burgesses passed a series
of resolves stating that the only legislative body that was authorized to impose taxes on the
colony of Virginia was its own House of Burgesses.131 Horatio Sharpe, the governor of
Maryland, dissolved the Maryland Assembly after its members stated that their property could
not be taken away without their consent, asserting that Parliament could not tax them without
representation. Delaware followed suit and also had its assembly dismissed. North Carolina also
followed; however, its governor believed the mood within the colony was too explosive to
dismiss the assembly. South Carolina and Georgia, however, also had their respective assemblies
dismissed when they sided with Massachusetts and Virginia.132
129
Morgan, Birth, 39-41; Cook, Long Fuse, 130-131; Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 171.
130
“Resolutions of the Boston Town Meeting; September 13, 1768” in Yale University Avalon Project.
131
“Defying Parliament’s Resolves: The Virginia Resolves of May 16, 1769” in Colonies to Nation, 157-158.
132
50
Once again, the British merchants were in financial trouble because of colonial protest
over the Townshend Acts. Townshend, the man responsible for all this turmoil, promised that the
acts that possessed his name would bring in a significant amount of money from the colonies.133
By the spring of 1769, the Townshend Acts had brought in no more than £3,500, and the non-
importation agreement passed by the colonies caused British merchants to lose over £7 million.
A letter published by both the London Public Advertiser, as well as the Pennsylvania Gazette,
threatened that a continuation of the revenue policy would force all the colonies in North
America into rebellion. By the time the letter appeared, many in Parliament, as well as customs
officials in the colonies, believed that any attempt to collect on the Townshend duties was
politically unwise and economically unsound. 134
By 1769, Parliament started to hear arguments for repealing the Townshend Acts.
Charles Townshend had passed away shortly after the passage of the Townshend Acts, and
Parliament had seen more than one change in leadership in the two years since it passed the
Townshend Acts. Lord Hillsborough had not liked the Townshend Acts and firmly believed that
the Acts were the cause of the current problems in the colonies. However, as much as
Hillsborough wanted to repeal the Acts, he also wanted to make sure the colonists understood
that Parliament had every right to tax the colonies, and that the Townshend Acts “would not be
repealed on any constitutional grounds…only for the sake of ‘expediency.’”135 Publically, Lord
Hillsborough tried to stem the tide of protest in the colonies by ordering the colonies to rescind
or ignore the Circular Letter. Hillsborough also tried to station troops in Boston, and even asked
133
Morgan, Birth, 34.
134
Gipson, Coming, 193.
135
51
George III to alter the charter of Massachusetts. There were even those in Parliament who
demanded that American “traitors” be shipped to England for trial. Privately, however,
Hillsborough claimed a severe dislike of the Townshend Acts and, in a secret meeting with
colonial agents in London, revealed that he believed the Townshend Acts were the root of
current troubles, and that he wished they had never been passed. While he made sure to make
mention of the fact that the Townshend Acts would not be repealed on constitutional grounds, he
did make sure the agents knew that Parliament had made a mistake in passing the Acts.136 In
addition to Hillsborough’s distaste for the Townshend Acts, others in the British government
were setting up to get the Acts and the taxes therein repealed.
Thomas Pownall, a member of the House of Commons in England and formerly deputy
governor of New Jersey and royal governor of Massachusetts;“‘a friend of liberty,’”137 according
to John Adams, stated that compromise between the colonies and the British government was
necessary. Townshend argued that the revenue brought in by the Townshend Acts would go
toward paying the salaries of those officials appointed by the Crown to protect them from
nonpayment due to angry colonists. Pownall argued that the Townshend Acts were unjust
because the intent of the acts was to raise revenue to pay for royal governors and civil
servants.138 In addition to this particular argument, it had become apparent by the beginning of
1769 that the Townshend Acts were not producing a large enough income to support the military
and civil establishments, nor to pay the salaries of the people appointed by the Crown.139
136
Jensen, Founding, 322-323; Cook, Long Fuse, 140.
137
As quoted in Cook, Long Fuse, 141.
138
139
Gipson, Empire XI, 241.
52
Because of this, Lord North, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, argued for repeal of all
but the tax on tea in the Townshend Acts. The tea tax would stay, North argued, because tea was
the only thing the Townshend Acts had taxed that did not come from England; rather, tea came
from India. It was not, he argued, in England’s best interest to collect customs on its own
products; thus, Parliament should repeal the taxes on paper, paint, lead, and glass, but not the tax
on tea.140 King George III agreed, stating that, “‘there must always be one tax to keep up the
right, and as such I approve of the tea duty.’”141
By 1770, Lord North, always unshakably loyal to the Crown, had been appointed as
Prime Minister. In March of 1770, North proposed a repeal of all but one of the Townshend
taxes; the one George III ordered him to keep, the tax on tea, being the exception. The repeal of
the other Townshend Acts passed on a day for which the year 1770 is most well known—the
Boston Massacre.142 With the repeal of the Townshend Acts in 1770, a period of calm throughout the
colonies was about to commence.
140
141
142
53
CHAPTER TWO: INTERLUDE
For as much agitation as had occurred between the years 1763 and 1769, the three years
that followed the repeal of the Townshend Acts in 1770 were relatively quiet in terms of colonial
protest. Indeed, once Parliament repealed the Townshend Acts, the colonial non-importation
agreements, which had taken years to achieve, collapsed in months. There were charges of
cheating and profiteering against wealthy merchants, as well as arguments between colonies over
non-importation. The agreement in Baltimore, for example, allowed merchants there to import
many kinds of cloth that the Philadelphia agreement banned. In addition, Boston’s agreement
was only valid for the calendar year of 1769, while agreements in other colonies were binding
until Parliament repealed the tax on tea.143
The tenuous unity through the colonies was gone. As a result, radical leaders in the
colonies, such as Samuel Adams, worked extremely hard to keep colonial protest alive. This was
made more difficult by the fact that many who had previously protested against the Townshend
Acts felt they had won. They felt that Parliament repealed the Townshend Acts because of
colonial protests. However, Adams believed that Lord North, and Parliament in general, was
trying quietly to secure power for the imperial government, and tried to expose North’s plan to
143
Jensen, Founding, 355-359.
54
the colonists. Adams published pamphlets, calling North’s plans a “conspiracy” and stating that
“‘If…we are voluntarily silent…the tools of administration will interpret America’s silence as
acquiescence.’”144
As a result of the disintegration of the non-importation agreements, the colonists
continued to import tea and pay the taxes on it. They also imported molasses and paid the taxes
on that as well. While the threat of Parliamentary intervention remained after the repeal of the
Townshend Acts, it seemed to be much reduced from where it was at the beginning of 1770. The
principles of “no taxation without representation” were useful for the colonists to adopt during
the first phase of protest, and after the repeal of the Townshend Acts, Lord Hillsborough insisted
that there was no intention of taking further revenue from America.145 Parliament’s repeal of the
Townshend Acts renewed the good feelings previously held in the colonies toward England, and
impeded the advancement of questions about Parliament’s authority.
While historians often refer to the years between 1770 and 1773 as the “period of calm”
because of this lack of colonial protest and agitation, a few violent events occurred during these
three years. Even so, these events did little to instigate agitation in the colonies, which is why
historians refer to these years as the “period of calm.”
Golden Hill Riot
In January of 1770, there were riots in New York City forming around the “liberty pole,”
which was a symbol of the Sons of Liberty. British soldiers routinely cut down the poles, which
the Sons of Liberty quickly replaced. One such pole was chopped down in what is now City Hall
Park on January 16, 1770. After some bystanders jeered at them for tearing the pole down, the
soldiers vandalized a popular tavern nearby. Soon thereafter, a pamphlet was circulated through
144
145
55
New York City, insulting the soldiers and claiming that the money given to the soldiers should
be going to employment for the city’s poor. On January 16, the soldiers took down the Liberty
Pole. The next day, two men were caught posting pamphlets, written by the Sons of Liberty, but
signed with the names of British soldiers. This caused a riot, wherein over 3000 citizens of New
York forced British soldiers onto Golden Hill, where there was a small skirmish between the two
groups. The rioters drove the British soldiers back to their barracks in the city.146
Although the Golden Hill Riot was a grave event that could have caused more agitation,
it did not induce the type of continuing agitation seen in earlier periods. The riot itself did not
cause radicals in other states to rally to the aid of the New York Sons of Liberty. It might have,
had it not been followed by news of the repeal of the Townshend Acts. However, news of the
repeal did come, which calmed the tension in New York City.
The Boston Massacre
On March 5, 1770, a British soldier struck a young barber’s apprentice, a boy named
Edward Garrick or Gerrish,147 with the butt of a gun, because the boy taunted the soldier. Some
historians claim that other soldiers also attacked the boy, while others do not make mention of
it.148 A group of colonists, coming to help the boy, then started to taunt the soldiers and throw
snowballs and chunks of ice at them. As the crowd grew, the British officer in charge, Captain
Thomas Preston, chose to call for reinforcements, which caused a standoff between the mob of
146
Albert Ulmann. “The Battle of Golden Hill.” New York Times, September 17, 1898.
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FA071EFC3F5C11738DDDAE0994D1405B8885F0D3
(accessed December 22, 2010); Gerber, 34.; Knollenberg, Growth , 282-283. All citations to reprinted edition.
In his book Growth of the American Revolution, Knollenberg makes a note here that “an editorial note in Adams
147
Legal Papers III 94 says that the boy’s name was Gerrish” (note #45, 336).
148
Don Cook and Robert Middlekauff, both of whose books were written in the past 15 years, say that other soldiers
attacked the boy after the original soldier hit him with the gun. Earlier historians, such as Lawrence Henry Gipson in
volume XI of The British Empire (1965) and Knollenberg in Growth of the American Revolution (1975) make no
mention of British soldiers attacking the boy.
56
colonists and the British soldiers. As the colonists allegedly dared the soldiers to fire, someone
threw a chunk of ice, which caused a soldier to slip and fall. When the soldier regained his feet,
he fired, which caused the rest of the soldiers to open fire into the crowd as well. Three men,
Samuel Gray, James Caldwell, and the famous Crispus Attucks, died in the fighting. Two others,
Patrick Carr, and a seventeen-year-old boy named Samuel Maverick, died of their wounds
shortly thereafter. Six others, John Green, Robert Patterson, David Parker, Edward Payne,
Christopher Monk, and John Clark were wounded. The latter two were also only seventeen.149
Thomas Hutchinson, Acting Governor of Massachusetts, managed to turn away the mob
of people with the promise that he would see justice done. Captain Preston, the soldiers, and
four men in a nearby Customs House, accused of firing shots from the House, were arrested and
put on trial for murder. Three lawyers, one of whom was John Adams, defended Preston in a
separate trial in October of 1770. Evidence in the trial clearly showed that Preston had not fired
any of the deadly shots. In addition, the defense proved that Preston had gone to the Customs
House on official business. It was unclear at trial whether Preston gave the order to fire into the
crowd; some witnesses said he did give the order, others claimed he did not. A jury acquitted
Captain Preston not only of murder, but also of the lesser manslaughter charge.150
The other eight soldiers were tried in late November of the same year. John Adams
helped in their defense. The evidence in their case showed that the soldiers also entered the
Customs House legally. This meant that the group as a whole was not liable for the illegal act of
firing into the crowd. Evidence showed that two of the soldiers, Hugh Montgomery and Matthew
149
Cook, Long Fuse, 151-152; Knollenberg, Growth, 79; Gipson, Empire, volume XI, 276-277; Middlekauff,
Glorious Cause, 210-212; “A Military Combination: Report of a Committee of the Town of Boston (1770)” in
Colonies to Nation, 168.
150
Knollenberg, Growth, 87-88.
57
Killroy, had fired into the crowd, but only under extreme provocation on the part of the colonists.
Because of this evidence, only Montgomery and Killroy were found guilty of anything and, due
to the provocation under which they fired, they were only found guilty of manslaughter. The jury
acquitted the other six soldiers of all charges. 151
As unfortunate as this event was, and as angry as the colonists were because of it, the
Boston Massacre did not extend the kind of rhetoric that other events prior to this had. There
were no pamphlets written, no riots in the streets. Part of this had to do with the indisputable
evidence at the trials that the British soldiers had only fired upon the crowd once attacked. This
evidence helped calm the anger in Boston, although the acquittals did cause an increased sense of
distrust for a standing army in the colonies.152 In addition, the day after the “Massacre,” a Boston
town committee informed Acting Governor Hutchinson that he could calm the town by removing
British troops. As a result, Hutchinson ordered the withdrawal of troops from the city of Boston,
which further reduced the tension in the city, calming the populace.153
Every year, prominent figures in the city of Boston, such as John Hancock, memorialized
the Boston Massacre. Only those orations kept the event in the minds of the people. Hancock and
other radical leaders hoped to cause conflict using this propaganda. In fact, by 1775, many
listeners of the yearly orations had “forgotten” that the event was little more than a tragic street
brawl.154
151
Knollenberg, Growth, 88. In his notes to this section, Knollenberg makes mention of the fact that at least three
other soldiers had fired into the crowd, but there was no evidence to indicate that those shots had been fatal to
anyone in the crowd that night.
152
Jensen, Founding, 409.
153
154
Knollenberg, Growth, 89; Jensen, Founding, 413.
58
However, after the short-lived tumult of the Boston Massacre, life in the colonies seemed
relatively quiet. Many of the good feelings colonists felt toward England were resurrected after
the repeal of the Townshend Acts. Although there was still the tax on tea, the non-importation
agreements passed by New York and other colonies began to disintegrate. Merchants imported
tea and molasses, and paid the taxes on both that just a few short years earlier had caused such
massive inter-colonial protest.155
The Gaspeé Affair
Although there were no British troops stationed in Boston, the customs officials charged
with collecting the taxes on the items indicated in the revenue portion of the Townshend Acts
stayed in the city to collect the taxes on those goods. The British Navy had given them several
warships to use in the execution of their duties.156 One of those ships was a revenue schooner
called the Gaspeé. In June of 1772, the Gaspeé was patrolling the shores of Narragansett Bay,
when it ran aground after pursuing a ship believed to be smuggling tea from Holland. A group of
colonists from Rhode Island boarded the Gaspeé, removed the crew, and burned the ship to
ashes.157
Authorities offered a reward of one hundred pounds for information leading to the
conviction of the people responsible for the burning of the Gaspeé. The Crown appointed a
commission of men, including the Chief Justices of New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts,
Governor Wanton of Rhode Island, and the judge of the New England Admiralty District, to
investigate the incident. A new law passed in April, called the Dockyards Act of 1772, imposed
155
156
Morgan, Birth, 53.
157
59
a death sentence for “maliciously setting afire, burning, or otherwise destroying British men of
war, and, if the offense were committed outside the realm, for indictment and trial of the
offender or offenders ‘in any shire or county in this realm…any law, usage, or custom
notwithstanding.’”158 It was under this new law that authorities tried to send those who were
involved in the burning of the Gaspeé to England to face trial. This meant that if those who were
involved in the burning of the Gaspeé were caught, they could be sent to England to be hanged
for treason, as per the Dockyards Act of 1772. However, although the men who burned the ship
were well known in the community, and their participation in the incident was apparent, there
was no way to convict them. They were so well protected by their community and their
government that no evidence against them could be found.159 Because the perpetrators could not
be tried, the British government let the matter go without sending anyone to England to face
trial.160 It is an interesting coincidence to note that Parliament passed the Dockyards Act only
two months before the Gaspeé ran aground—time enough for news of the Dockyards Act to be
known in the colonies.
The three years after the repeal of the Townshend Acts were relatively quiet ones. There
was some agitation; however, the agitation that occurred during these three years was not very
much, and it did not last much past the events themselves. In fact, the Golden Hill Riot that
occurred in January of 1770 is an event that is rarely, if ever, mentioned when speaking about
this period before the American Revolution occurred. Unlike the first phase of protest from 1763
to 1769, where everything the British did incited a large colonial response that included
economic sanctions and published pamphlets, this period of quiet from 1770 to 1773 did not
158
“Dockyards Act of 1772” in Knollenberg, Growth, 94.
159
Gipson, Coming, 208-209.
160
60
incite any of that in the colonies. In fact, during those three years, officials enforced trade
restrictions and collected customs duties better than ever before in colonial history.161
Were something like the Golden Hill Riot to occur in the time between 1763 and 1769, or
were it to occur later, in the second phase of protest from 1773 to 1776, it would have incited
mass violence across all the colonies, not just a small riot in New York City that is rarely
mentioned. Something similar could be said for the Boston Massacre. If the Massacre had
occurred in either the first or the second phase of protest, it also would have incited violence
throughout the colonies, not just in Boston. News of these events did not even leave their
respective colonies, as few historians mention any of these events in conjunction with a response
in another colony. These situations broke out only in local situations where no other alternative
was available. In the case of the Gaspeé, for example, a group of Providence citizens complained
about the ship’s severity with all vessels along the coast of Rhode Island three months before the
burning of the ship, and they were ignored.162One could argue, then, that the reason these events
did not incite revolution is because the colonists were content to keep the status quo, and only
fought when no other alternative was available to them.
It is true that these events do not sound “quiet.” However, when compared to the unrest
that preceded these years, and the Revolution that followed, these are, in fact, quiet events that
do not make waves outside the places in which they occurred. Opposition to Parliament’s
taxation all but disappeared during these years, with merchants importing the items that had
previously been forbidden under the non-importation agreements, and attention turned away
161
162
Pauline Meier. From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial radicals and the development of American opposition to
Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971; repr. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1991), 11. All
citations to reprinted edition.
61
from such lofty ideals as whether or not Parliament had the right to tax the colonies. Indeed, the
way the non-importation agreements passed in protest of the Townshend Acts disintegrated in
the colonies put an end to the perceived unity of the colonies themselves.
Additionally, as one commentator stated, the reason for the decline of agitation was
because “‘they have already sufficiently informed the Parliament, and the people of Great-
Britain, what their sentiments and intentions are and are now waiting to see whether Great-
Britain will restore their liberties.’”163 Radicals, and some patriot historians164 tried to deny that
this period was calm, because it suited their purposes of arguing British “tyranny.” However, the
colonists had already exhausted peaceful modes of redress, and had no choice but to wait.
163
Meier, Resistance, 221.
164
John Ferling stated that the years between 1770 and 1773 should be called the “‘time of peril,’ as these were the
years of optimum danger for the popular movement.” See Ferling, Leap, 88.
62
CHAPTER THREE: CATALYST
By 1773, the East India Tea Company, one of the largest companies in the Empire, was
going bankrupt. Tea was a popular drink throughout the Empire, and by the mid-eighteenth
century, ninety percent of the East India Company’s profits came from the sale of tea. However,
the East India Company had to pay high taxes on its tea. The Company paid two taxes on its tea.
The first tax was paid when the tea landed in England and the second when the tea entered
America as part of the Townshend Acts. As a result, the price of English tea from the East India
Company was higher than the price of Dutch tea, which could be easily smuggled into the
colonies.165
In addition to the problem of smugglers, the East India Company had not adequately
handled its profits. In 1767, the Company believed it would be extremely prosperous, estimating
a profit of over £2.1 million. By 1773, the East India Company, having been required to pay a
yearly sum of £400,000 to the government, as well as the expense of renewing its charter and
trying to recoup losses from forts and wars, was over £800,000 in debt.166 As a result, by 1773
the East India Company was on the verge of collapse, which was dangerous to the British
165
166
Gipson, Empire XII, 12-13.
63
economy because the Company was very large, and the public at large invested money in the
Company itself.167
A third problem was the sudden failure of several important banks in the spring of 1772,
which set off a financial panic and an economic depression throughout Great Britain and Europe
as a whole for a full year. The Company’s sale of tea that fall was a complete failure. The
Company could not afford to repay its long overdue loan of £300,000, and the Bank of England
refused to grant another extension.168
It was within this atmosphere of panic that Lord North proposed the Tea Act, based on an
idea by Robert Herries169 in a pamphlet called The Present State of the East India Company’s
Affairs…. Herries pointed out that the East India Company had about 18 million pounds of tea in
storage. If the Company could sell the tea in Europe, even if it sold the tea at a loss, the
Company would be able to eliminate fees for storage, deterioration of the tea, and interest
charges. In addition, Herries argued that, although depositing that amount of tea into the
European market would lower prices, it was possible that other tea companies in Europe would
be driven out of the tea market altogether, leaving the entire market to the English.170
Lord North considered Herries proposal. North knew that the tea had accumulated
because the colonies refused to import the tea. New York, for example, imported only 530
pounds of English tea in 1772, whereas in 1767, 320,000 pounds of tea were imported.
167
168
Benjamin Woods Labaree. The Boston Tea Party (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1979) 61.
169
In The Boston Tea Party, Labaree makes mention of the fact that it is uncertain who Robert Herries was. Labaree
notes that there were two stockholders in the East India Company with this name, one designated “Sr.,” and the
other as “Esq.” There is also a banker with this name who was knighted and later sat in the 15 th Parliament. See
Labaree, 66-67.
170
Labaree, Tea Party, 67.
64
Philadelphia also decreased its importation of English tea, from 175,000 pounds in 1767 to just
128 pounds.171
North also knew that another part of this issue was the fact that the East India Company
paid two taxes on its tea. However, North proposed, were one of the two taxes to be eliminated,
the price of tea from the East India Company would be equal to or less than what it cost to
smuggle tea in from places such as Holland. This would fix the American market, restore the
relationship with the Americans, rid the storehouses of the mountains of tea that had built up,
and save the East India Tea Company, in a single action—or so Lord North thought.172 In May
of 1773, Parliament passed the Tea Act.
The Tea Act gave the East India Tea Company a monopoly on tea, stating “that there
shall be…allowed for all teas, which…shall be sold at the publick sales of the said united [East
India] company…and which shall…be exported from this kingdom, as merchandise, to any of
the British colonies or plantations in America, the whole of the duties of customs payable upon
the importation of such teas.”173 The colonists would not have seen much of a difference in
terms of monies paid toward tea; after all, there had been a tax on tea since the passage of the
Townshend Acts in 1767. The only thing that the Tea Act would have done was provide relief
for the East India Tea Company by way of making sure all tea imported into the colonies
belonged to it. The East India Tea Company demanded to be the sole importer of tea into the
colonies, thereby forming a monopoly on the tea trade.174
171
172
173
“A Rescue Operation: The Tea Act (May 10, 1773)” in Colonies to Nation, 196.
174
Gipson, Coming, 218.
65
At first, it did not seem as though the colonists would take issue with the new act.
Bernhard Knollenberg, using copies of the New York Gazette and the Connecticut Journal, stated
that the colonists seemed to think that the Tea Act repealed the duty on tea imposed by the
Townshend Acts. The Philadelphia Gazette, in its June 9, 1773 edition, published part of a letter,
stating, “it is now pretty certain that the Tea Act will be repealed.”175
However, it quickly became apparent that the duty on tea imposed by the Townshend
Acts was not repealed, and that the East India Company was to have a monopoly on tea. With
this news, the colonists exploded. To the colonists, the Tea Act did not give them a choice. It was
a monopoly for the East India Company that would run local merchants out of business; once it
did, the colonists thought, the price of tea would rise precipitously, and the tax on the tea would
rise with it.176 In addition to the possibility of a monopoly on tea, the colonists feared the East
India Company would then have the ability to secure legislation enabling it to have a monopoly
on all East Indian products.177
The Pennsylvania Gazette published a pamphlet that stated, “It must be strongly marked
on your minds, that the end of the last non-importation agreement, was to obtain a repeal of the
tyrannical act of Parliament, that imposed a duty on glass, painters colours, paper, tea, &c. which
was designed to raise a revenue from you without your consent.”178 The pamphlet went on to say
“Extract of a Letter from London, dated April 8,” Pennsylvania Gazette, June 9, 1773, found at http://0-
175
www.accessible.com.www.consuls.org/accessible/print?AADocList=2&AADocStyle=STYLED&AAStyleFile=&A
ABeanName=toc1&AANextPage=/printFullDocFromXML.jsp&AACheck=3.14.2.0.14, accessed December 3,
2010; Knollenberg, Growth, 107-108.
176
Morgan, Birth, 59.
177
“Handbill,” Pennsylvania Gazette, November 17, 1773, found at http://0-

178
www.accessible.com.www.consuls.org/accessible/print?AADocList=6&AADocStyle=STYLED&AAStyleFile=&A
ABeanName=toc1&AANextPage=/printFullDocFromXML.jsp&AACheck=2.14.6.0.4, accessed December 3, 2010.
66
that, until Parliament repealed the Tea Act, the only honorable thing to do was “to maintain the
non-importation agreement…and several resolutions…of the inhabitants of this city, declare, that
‘Whoever shall aid, or abet, the importation of any article, subject to a duty, by act of Parliament,
for the purpose of raising a revenue upon you, or otherwise assist in the execution of any such
acts , shall be deemed an enemy to the liberties of America.’”179
Colonists were angry because they assumed that, in order to help stabilize the East India
Company, Parliament would repeal the tea tax altogether.180 In addition, due to their English
heritage, colonists had a deep mistrust of monopolies as whole. Some colonists argued that the
Tea Act would allow the East India Company to enslave America as it had enslaved India.181 The
fact that the Company would have the ability to sell directly to colonial retailers, while keeping
the tax on it, caused concern that the Company’s monopoly would cause a rise in tea prices.182
More than that, colonists feared that if the East India Company had one monopoly, the Company
could monopolize all foreign commerce in the colonies.183
In addition, by 1773, the idea that Parliament had no right to tax the colonies was
widespread, even if the colonists did not make the argument public. Colonists believed that
Parliament was trying to drastically restructure the colonies, and to restrict liberty in every sector
of American life. This belief seemed to be made true when a series of letters written by
Hutchinson and Lieutenant Governor Andrew Oliver made their way to the colonies.184
179
“Handbill” in Pennsylvania Gazette.
180
181
182
183
184
Ferling, Leap, 100.
67
Early in 1773, Benjamin Franklin had come across a set of thirteen letters, dated from
1767 to 1769. Although the letters were old, their contents were no less volatile. In one letter,
Hutchinson wrote that “‘there must be an abridgement of what are called English liberties.’”185
Once the letters arrived in Massachusetts, Samuel Adams proceeded to circulate them throughout
the colony. Almost immediately, there was a demand to removed Hutchinson, insisting that he
was conspiring against the government established by the Massachusetts charter of 1691.186
When the petition to remove Hutchinson reached Parliament, the committee called
Franklin to testify on it. Instead, Parliament’s solicitor general, Alexander Wedderburn, verbally
attacked Franklin. The committee dismissed the petition to remove Hutchinson, and stripped
Franklin of his position as deputy postmaster-general for the American colonies.187 The attack
upon Franklin by Wedderburn and his removal from office caused Franklin to turn from the
British government and become more radical.
The Tea Act Protests
The passage of the Tea Act also caused more than just written vitriol. By November, the
first ships carrying the East India tea started to arrive in the colonies, but many of the Company’s
agents were not there to oversee it, as colonists in Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York
forced the agents to resign their posts.188 The first of the ships to land in the colonies was the
London, bound for Charleston, South Carolina. Although it sailed peacefully into the harbor,
colonists in the city prevented its cargo from being unloaded. The London idled in the harbor for
185
186
187
188
Christopher Hibbert. Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution through British Eyes. (New York: W.W.
Norton and Co., 2002), 20.
68
three weeks before the royal governor confiscated it for nonpayment of duties. However, instead
of the tea being put on the market to be sold, it sat in a warehouse for a full year while members
of Charleston’s Sons of Liberty guarded it.189
In New York, the news of the Tea Act caused such protest in the streets that that the royal
governor of New York wrote to London, claiming that “blood would run in New York’s streets if
an attempt was ever made to unload the dutied tea. If, and when, the Nancy arrived with its cargo
of tea…he would not permit it to enter New York Harbor.”190 Philadelphia followed a similar
track. When the Polly arrived at the foot of the Delaware River, several miles from Philadelphia
itself, it was made very clear that attempts to unload the tea would result in “ ‘ten gallons of
liquid tar decanted on your pate—with the feathers of a dozen wild geese laid over that”’191.
Instead of trying to unload the tea, the Polly promptly turned around and went back to London.192
The most explosive events happened in Boston. Three ships landed in Boston Harbor—
the Dartmouth first, followed by the Beaver and the Eleanor. When the Dartmouth landed, it
needed to pay the duties on its cargo within twenty days; if it did not, the cargo would be seized
and stored. The owner of the Dartmouth, Francis Rotch, wanted the ship unloaded, as there was
other cargo that Rotch wanted loaded onto the ship. Previously, however, Rotch had indicated
that he would send his ship back to England without having unloaded the tea. 193 The colonists in
Boston, however, wanted neither option. They were adamant that the tea stay on the ship. They
believed it was unacceptable to allow the tea to land and have the duties on it paid; it was
189
190
Ferling, Leap, 102.
191
192
193
69
likewise unacceptable to store the tea pending instructions from England, as either of these
options meant the possibility of the tea being available to sell on the market.194
There were only two ways for the Dartmouth to leave port without having to pay the
duties on the tea or have the tea seized: the captain would have to sail the Dartmouth out of port
secretly with the tea still on board, or sail her out openly with a pass from either the customs
officials of Boston or Governor Hutchinson. Hutchinson had already refused to allow vessels
without clearance to leave the harbor, thereby eliminating the first option. Hutchinson also
refused Rotch a pass to allow the Dartmouth to leave port, as did the customs officials in Boston,
thus removing the second option as well. Hutchinson seemed to have no idea that any harm
would come to the tea, considering that there was a significant number of troops guarding the
cargo.195 The East India Tea Company found that “at Boston it still had agents but no tea, at
Charleston, tea (held by the customs officials) but no agents, and at Philadelphia and New York
neither agents nor tea.”196
On the night of December 16, 1773, between fifty and one hundred men,197 disguised as
Mohawk Indians, boarded the three ships docked in Boston Harbor and, with what Ferling
described as military precision, brought the heavy tea chests on deck, broke them open with axes,
and dumped their contents over the sides of the ships. In a little over four hours, the men dumped
194
195
196
197
There are different interpretations of the men who were dressed as Mohawk Indians. In A Leap in the Dark, John
Ferling claims thirty men were dressed as Indians, and met up with 100 men “whom Samuel Adams subsequently
identified as residents of communities outside Boston and who consequently saw no need for any concealment
beyond a blackened face” (106). Middlekauff claims there were “about fifty men ‘dressed in Indian manner,’ face
darkened and bodies wrapped in blankets” (232), while Knollenberg (Growth) claims there were between forty and
fifty men (114).
70
over 300 chests of tea into the Harbor, and destroyed over $1 million in today’s currency.198
Nobody in Boston seemed to know anything, including the identity of the perpetrators.
Reactions in Charleston, New York, and Philadelphia were less severe, equating to non-
importation, as the protests there were limited to demanding the resignations of the tea agents
and refusing to allow the tea into harbors or markets. These actions were very similar to those
encountered during the Stamp Act crisis in 1765, and later, the Townshend Act crisis of 1767-
1769. Boston’s reaction, however, was quite different.
Boston’s reaction to the Tea Act was the most radical, and part of that is because, unlike
those in New York and Philadelphia, Boston’s tea agents refused to resign their commissions.
Instead, they fled into Castle William, the island in Boston Harbor where the British troops were
stationed.199 Likewise, Governor Hutchinson, unlike governors in other colonies, had nothing to
lose by being inflexible, and a great deal to lose if he did not make a good faith effort to enforce
the Tea Act.200
Another reason that Boston’s reaction was so volatile was to preserve the city’s
reputation. Bostonian merchants had imported over 3000 chests of English tea since 1768 in
violation of the non-importation agreements. This information damaged Boston’s reputation as
the center of radicalism in the colonies. The Boston Tea Party, then, was a desperate gamble to
restore Boston’s reputation, as well as gain back the confidence of radical leaders in other
colonies.201
198
Ferling, Leap, 106; Cook, Long Fuse, 177.
199
200
Ferling, Leap, 103.
201
Labaree, Tea Party, 112; Jensen, Founding, 452.
71
As news came in to England from other colonial ports, it was clear that only Boston
destroyed the tea. People ignored the fact that tea had not landed in Philadelphia or New York;
the fact that colonists in Boston destroyed private property caused a fierce outrage in London.202
Even other British subjects were angry; many believed the colonists were not justified in
their defiance. Newspapers in London began to receive letters advocating coercion as the only
method to restore Boston’s senses. Some insisted that all Bostonians had to do was refuse to
purchase the dutied tea.203
When the news of the Boston Tea Party reached Parliament, the reaction to it was
explosive. Those who had argued for reconciliation with the colonies were completely silenced.
Shock and indignation turned to anger and outrage at the colonies. The decision to move against
the colonies was almost unanimous—this time, it seemed, the colonists had gone too far. They
had destroyed private property when they threw the tea into the Harbor.204 If Parliament did
nothing about the colonies’ transgressions, the colonies would become completely independent.
If the supremacy of Parliament and the Crown were not asserted, it would be lost.205 For King
George III, the destruction of the tea was the last insolence he was willing to overlook. The tea
party represented an overt attack on England herself, and challenged England’s status as the
mother country. The Crown had attempted concessions; compulsion was necessary now.206 To
this end, North prepared the Coercive Acts.
202
Labaree, Tea Party, 176-177.
203
204
205
Ferling, Leap, 233.
206
Cook, Long Fuse, 180; Labaree, Tea Party, 178.
72
The Coercive Acts
The Coercive Acts, known in the colonies as the Intolerable Acts, were a series of four
acts aimed at punishing the colony of Massachusetts in general and the city of Boston
specifically. The first act was the Boston Port Act. This act closed the port of Boston, shutting
down all commercial shipping in Boston Harbor by forbidding “any goods, wares, or
merchandise whatsoever, to be transported or carried into any other country…or … any goods,
wares, or merchandise whatsoever, to be brought from any other country, province, or place.”207
The port of Boston would stay closed until the city paid for the damaged tea, stating “it shall
sufficiently appear…that full satisfaction hath been made…to the united company…for the
damage sustained…by the destruction of their goods sent to the said town of Boston.”208
The second act passed was the Massachusetts Government Act. The Massachusetts
Government Act altered the charter of Massachusetts by removing the ability of the colonists to
vote for members of the government. The act stated “that… much of the charter, granted …to the
inhabitants of …Massachusetts Bay… and all and every clause… which relates to the time and
manner of electing the assistants or counselors…be revoked, and is hereby revoked and made
void and of none effect.”209 The government of Massachusetts instead would be made up of
people appointed by King George, stating “the council… shall be… nominated and appointed by
his Majesty…agreeable to the practice now used in…his Majesty’s other colonies in
America.”210
207
“The Boston Port Act: March 31, 1774, article I” in Yale University Avalon Project.
208
“Boston Port Act, article X” in Yale University Avalon Project.
209
“Massachusetts Government Act: May 20, 1774, article I” in Yale University Avalon Project.
210
“Massachusetts Government Act: May 20, 1774, article I” in Yale University Avalon Project.
73
The Massachusetts Government Act also allowed the King to “nominate and appoint,
under the seal of the province…and also to remove, without the consent of the council, all judges
of the inferior courts…the attorney general, provosts, and other officers…”211
The third act, the Administration of Justice Act, allowed the governor to move trials of
accused royal officials to another colony or even to Great Britain if he believed the official could
not get a fair trial in Massachusetts, stating “that if any inquisition or indictment shall be
found…in the province of Massachusetts Bay…and it shall appear…that an indifferent trial
cannot be had within the said province, in that case, it shall…be tried in some other of his
Majesty’s colonies or in Great Britain….”212
The fourth act was the Quartering Act. The Quartering Act was the only Coercive Act
that applied to all the colonies equally, and sought to create a more effective method of housing
British troops in America. The Quartering Act required colonists to house British troops in their
homes “where no barracks are provided by the colonies.”213 In addition, the Quartering Act
allowed for the taking of “uninhabited houses, out-houses, barns, or other buildings, as he shall
think necessary…and make fit for the reception of such officers and soldiers, and to put and
quarter such officers and soldiers therein, for such time as he shall think proper.”214
A fifth act, the Quebec Act, was not technically part of the Coercive Acts. However,
because of the timing of the passage of this act, it was combined with the others in the minds of
the colonists as part of the Intolerable Acts. The Quebec Act stated “that his Majesty's Subjects,
211
“Massachusetts Government Act, article III” in Yale University Avalon Project.
212
“Administration of Justice Act: May 20, 1774, article I” in Yale University Avalon Project.
213
“The Quartering Act; June 2, 1774, article I” in Yale University Avalon Project.
214
“Quartering Act, article II” in Yale University Avalon Project.
74
professing the Religion of the Church of Rome of and in the said Province of Quebec, may have,
hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome.”215 In addition, the
Quebec Act gave the people of Quebec certain rights that were taken when France ceded Canada
to the English, including the right to French civil law, and expanded the territory of Quebec to
include most of the Ohio country, including parts of Minnesota, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin and Ohio.216 This piece of the law altered pieces of the Proclamation of 1763 by
expanding the boundaries of the Northwest Territory, as it permitted the establishment of civil
government over French settlements in that region. In addition, the Quebec Act removed the
military government under which Quebec had been living since 1763.217
To the colonists, the Quebec Act might have been the hardest to reconcile. Before the
Treaty of Paris in 1763 that ended the French and Indian War, the Québécois had been
thoroughly French and, as a result, the enemy of the American colonists. It was only with peace,
and the establishment of British law in Canada, that the Québécois became somewhat less of a
perceived threat to the colonists. With the passage of the Quebec Act, the Québécois no longer
had to follow British law; they could follow French law. They were no longer required to speak
English; they could speak French. The Act also recognized the Catholic Church. New
Englanders specifically perceived the Quebec Act as a systematic threat to English institutions
and law. France and England were enemies still; by allowing those on their borders to be
French, the Quebec Act made the Québécois a threat once again.218
215
“The Quebec Act: October 7, 1774, article V” in Yale University Avalon Project.
216
“The Quebec Act: October 7, 1774” in Yale University Avalon Project.
217
Knollenberg, Growth, 141-145. The Quebec Act had been projected before the Boston Tea Party occurred and,
had it been introduced without the taint of the Boston Tea Party, Parliament likely still would have passed it. See
218
75
The Coercive Acts mostly focused on Boston, and with good reason. Boston had a
reputation for being the heart of protest in the colonies, and the worst of the colonies in defying
the authority of England, dating back to the Stamp Act protests in 1765.
By June, Parliament passed, and King George III approved, four of the Coercive Acts.
Although the approval for the bills was overwhelming, there were a few voices in Parliament
who spoke against them. One such person was Edmund Burke, who stated that the root of the
problem in the colonies went back to England’s need to raise revenue there, and that “Parliament
was ‘meanly trying to sneak out of the difficulties into which [it] had proudly strutted.’”219 These
voices, however, were not heard.
219
76
CHAPTER FOUR: REVOLUTION
News of the passage of the Boston Port Act reached Boston on May 10, 1774. Three days
later, the Boston Committee of Correspondence, founded two years prior in response to
Hillsborough’s denial to allow the Massachusetts legislature to meet, responded with a circular
letter, stating that “This attack, though made immediately upon us, is doubtless designed for
every other colony who will not surrender their sacred rights and liberties into the hands of an
infamous ministry. Now therefore is the time when all should be united in opposition to this
violation of the liberties of all.”220 In addition, the Boston Committee called for non-importation
and –exportation agreements, stating that “The single question then is, whether you consider
Boston as now suffering in the common cause…If you do (and we cannot believe otherwise),
may we not from your approbation of our former conduct in defense of American liberty, rely on
your suspending your trade with Great Britain at least.”221
Boston sent out a rally call and a call for help to the rest of the colonies. Providence,
Philadelphia, and New York City all responded quickly. Providence indicated that the best move
would be to convene a Congress in order to reach a cohesive agreement as to what to do next.
220
“Circular Letter of the Boston Committee of Correspondence; May 13, 1774” in Yale University Avalon Project.
221
“Circular Letter of the Boston Committee of Correspondence” in Yale University Avalon Project.
77
Philadelphia and New York both balked at the possibility of yet another boycott on British
goods; in Philadelphia’s case, at least “until an effort had been made for ‘reconciliation and
future harmony with our mother country.’”222 New York said something similar, indicating that
they too believed a general Congress would be the logical next step. Virginia’s House of
Burgesses , however, was different. Before Boston’s plea made it to Virginia, the House of
Burgesses had already decided to make the first day of June “‘a day of Fasting, Humiliation and
Prayer, devoutly to implore the divine interposition for averting the heavy Calamity which
threatens destruction to our Civil Rights….’”223
The First Continental Congress
The idea to convene a general congress was greeted with acceptance. During the summer
of 1774, the colonies elected delegates to meet in Philadelphia in September for what is now
known as the First Continental Congress. On September 5, 1774, fifty-six delegates from twelve
colonies224 met in Philadelphia to decide the next course of action.
What is important to note here is the formation of the Congress itself. The formation of
the Congress signifies a shift in who the colonists believed was sovereign. If Parliament was
sovereign, then the colonists had no authority to decide and implement policy in this manner.
The fact that they did meet in this manner proves a shift in sovereignty. They met, formed policy,
and developed the means to enforce that policy. This is the point at the American Revolution
began.
222
223
As quoted in Knollenberg, Growth, 149.
224
Georgia was the only colony that did not send delegates to the First Continental Congress, due to its sparse
population and heavy dependence on Great Britain. (Knollenberg, Growth, 153).
78
Before the First Continental Congress could discuss anything, a troubling message came
from Boston. There were reports that “soldiers had fired on the People & Town at Boston”225
Another report stated that
During the meeting of the Congress an Express arriv'd to the Jersey Members giving
Intelligence that the soldiers had seized the powder in one of the Towns near Boston.
That a party was sent to take this; & that six of the Inhabitants had been killd in the
Skirmish. That all the Country was in arms down to Conneticut. That the Cannon fired
upon the Town the whole Night.226
The reports were wrong, as it turned out. General Gage had sent troops to Cambridge and
Charlestown to seize arms stored there by the colonists, and in response to the confused reports,
militia from around Massachusetts and as far south as Connecticut had descended upon Boston.
Known now as the Powder Alarm, this event had a significant effect on the Congress. Although
the provocation was on the British, not the colonists, it caused the Congress to realize that one
misstep by either side would start a chain reaction of violence that could end any chance for
peaceful resolution.227
Once the First Continental Congress realized the news from Boston was false, it turned to
matters of more import, such as how to vote. Larger, more populous colonies argued for a
population-based vote. Patrick Henry of Virginia argued that smaller colonies should not have
the same power as larger colonies to decide policy. John Sullivan, a delegate from New
225
Paul H. Smith, et al., eds. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789. 25 volumes, Washington, D.C.: Library
of Congress, 1976-2000), 1:32, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwdg.html, accessed December 29, 2010.
226
Letters of Delegates, 1:32.
227
Jack Rakove. Revolutionaries: A New History of the Invention of America. (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2010), 55.
79
Hampshire, argued the opposite—that smaller colonies should have just as much weight in
decisions as larger colonies.228
The delegates chose the method of one colony, one vote when it became apparent that the
Congress did not have the ability to properly proportion voting.229 This was important for two
reasons. The first is that it favored the smaller colonies, such as Rhode Island and Connecticut.
Secondly, this method of voting was indicative of future decisions--the Articles of
Confederation, America’s first independent government, required each state to have one vote. In
addition, one of the plans for the United States Constitution allowed for the idea of one state, one
vote.
The next thing Congress had to do was discuss the tone it would take with England. The
choice was between a declarative statement of rights versus a conciliatory attitude.230
The Congress also needed to answer the most important question: did Parliament have
the authority to tax the colonies? Many Americans had already arrived at the conclusion that
Parliament did not have that power well before the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1765; the
difference was that at that time, colonists believed Parliament had the power to legislate. The
colonists had made distinctions between taxation and legislation for years, protesting colonial
taxation but not protesting trade regulations passed by Parliament, thus allowing for
Parliamentary sovereignty.
By 1774, however, the consensus was that Parliament had no power over the colonies at
all. England had ridiculed colonial distinctions between taxation and legislation. In addition,
228
229
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1:25; Knollenberg, Growth, 169.
230
Jack Rakove. The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 27.
80
Parliament had made it abundantly clear through the years that the colonists’ liberties could be
taken away by either taxation or legislation. However, the colonists did not understand why
Parliament had a right to take those liberties away; as British subjects, they believed they had the
same rights as those living in England.
Many colonists had long ago concluded that, since they did not have proper
representation in Parliament, Parliament had no authority to tax them. However if, as Parliament
indicated, taxation and legislation were the same, Parliament therefore had no right to legislate
either, and thus no authority over the colonies at all.231 Not even Joseph Galloway, one of the
staunchest moderates in the First Congress, defended claims of parliamentary supremacy.232 The
affirmation that Parliament had no authority over the colonies is the first piece of evidence
showing the shift in sovereignty from the British government to the new American government.
The next issue put before the First Continental Congress was the question of the
colonists’ rights as British subjects. This was not a new issue, however. Colonists had been
arguing their rights as British subjects since James Otis’s “Rights of the British Colonies.” The
Congress appointed a committee, which included Richard Henry Lee from Virginia, Samuel
Adams and John Adams from Massachusetts, and Roger Sherman from Connecticut. The
purpose of the committee was for stating “the rights of the colonies in general, the several
instances in which these rights are violated or infringed, and the means most proper to be
pursued for obtaining a restoration of them.”233
231
Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 241; Morgan, Birth, 62-63.
232
Rakove, Beginnings, 60.
233
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1:26-29.
81
In early September, in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, a group of men met and
formulated the Suffolk Resolves. The Resolves was a list of resolves and declarations in protest
of the Intolerable Acts passed by Parliament. The Suffolk Resolves stated that the Intolerable
Acts were unconstitutional, stating that “late acts of the British parliament… are gross infractions
of those rights to which we are justly entitled by the laws of nature, the British constitution, and
the charter of the province.”234 The Suffolk Resolves answered the question of the rights of the
colonists.
In addition, the Suffolk Resolves argued that the colonists were not obligated to obey the
Intolerable Acts, instead stating that “they be rejected as the attempts of a wicked administration
to enslave America.”235
The Suffolk Resolves also stated that the Quebec Act was “dangerous in an extreme
degree to the Protestant religion and to the civil rights and liberties of all America; and,
therefore, as men and Protestant Christians, we are indispensably obliged to take all proper
measures for our security.”236 The Suffolk Resolves also made mention of a non-importation
agreement, stating
That until our rights are fully restored to us, we will, to the utmost of our power, and we
recommend the same to the other counties, to withhold all commercial intercourse with
Great-Britain, Ireland, and the West-Indies, and abstain from the consumption of British
merchandise and manufactures, and especially of East-Indies, and piece goods, with such
additions, alterations, and exceptions only, as the General Congress of the colonies may
agree to.237
234
235
236
237
82
The Suffolk Resolves were extremely fierce in wording, claiming the Intolerable Acts were not
simply unconstitutional; they claimed the charter of Massachusetts was “annihilated” and called
the Intolerable Acts “murderous.”238
However, there was more in the Suffolk Resolves than ire. Within the Suffolk Resolves
was also the promise of restraint. In the twelfth resolution, the Suffolk Resolves stated that
“nevertheless, from our affection to his majesty, which we have at all times evidenced, we are
determined to act merely upon the defensive, so long as such conduct may be vindicated by
reason and the principles of self-preservation, but no longer.”239 The Suffolk Resolves made it
very clear to whoever was reading it that the colonies would only react defensively, thus cutting
out the fear that the colonists would attack British soldiers first. Paul Revere went with a copy of
the Suffolk Resolves to the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia. It arrived on September
16, 1774, and was introduced to the Congress the following day.240
The Suffolk Resolves was not the only possible option before the Congress. Joseph
Galloway, a moderate delegate from Pennsylvania, put forth something now called Galloway’s
Plan of Union, on September 28, 1774. In a letter to Richard Jackson, a friend of Galloway’s
and a member of Parliament, Galloway asked “is it not high time…that both Countries should
retreat a little, and take other Ground, seeing That, which they are now upon, is likely to prove
dangerous and distressing to Both?”241 Galloway, it seemed, knew, or at least suspected, that the
238
239
240
Raphael, First American Revolution, 151.
“The Search for a Middle Way: Joseph Galloway to Richard Jackson (Aug. 10, 1774)” in Colonies to Nation,
241
240.
83
path the colonies were on would lead to separation with Great Britain, and was willing to do
anything he could to stop it.
Galloway stated that the colonies had profited from a relationship with Great Britain;
they were safe from outside forces due to British protection, they prospered under the British
Empire’s economy, and they had more freedoms than most other European countries.242
Galloway proposed a compromise that called for the establishment of an American legislature,
called the Grand Council, which would be “chosen by the Representatives of the people of the
several colonies, in their respective assemblies.”243 This Grand Council would govern relations
between the colonies themselves, but also would govern imperial affairs in America. Galloway
claimed that the Grand Council “be an inferior and distinct branch of the British legislature,
united and incorporated with it” and that “in time of war, all bills for granting aid to the crown,
prepared by the Grand Council and approved by the President General, shall be valid and passed
into law, without the assent of the British Parliament.”244 The President General for which
Galloway allowed was a person appointed by the King of England to oversee and work with the
Grand Council.245 Under this plan, the General Council in the colonies would exist as a third
house of Parliament, and would share power with the House of Commons and the House of
Lords. This meant that the General Council had to agree to taxes and other legislation before
242
Ferling, Leap, 117.
243
244
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1:51
245
84
enforcing such things in the colonies. With the addition of a General Council, the colonies would
finally have proper representation.246
Galloway’s Plan of Union attempted a compromise—something that would help the
colonies avoid war with Great Britain while retaining many of the freedoms the colonists had
come to enjoy. Galloway’s plan meant that the colonists would have adequate representation in
Congress—something they insisted they required in order to be taxed—and the King would
maintain sovereignty over the colonies. In return, the colonists would surrender a small portion
of their autonomy, and England would be required to relinquish some control over imperial
monopolies.247 On matters relating to the colonies, each body would have a veto over the other's
decisions. Galloway's plan would have kept the British Empire together, while allowing the
colonies to have some say over their own affairs, including the inflammatory issue of taxation.
The more popular leaders in Congress balked at Galloway’s plan. They claimed to want
to end disputes with England and establish American rights on a constitutional basis. While
Galloway’s plan was a solution, the popular leaders refused to acknowledge it.248 As a result,
when Galloway’s plan went up for a vote, the debate was fevered. However, it was defeated six
to five, with the delegates from Rhode Island unable to come to an agreement. On October 22,
Congress voted to remove all references to Galloway’s plan from the minutes.249 Considering
that many delegates believed that Parliament had no authority over them regardless, Galloway’s
246
247
Ferling, Leap, 119.
248
249
Rakove, Beginnings, 55.
85
Plan of Union seemed doomed almost from the start, as it required those same colonists to agree
that Parliament, in fact, did have some authority over them.
Galloway’s plan failed for three reasons. First, it would have required the colonists to
agree that Parliament had the right to tax them. Since the Stamp Act in 1765, the colonists had
resisted this idea. Galloway also had a consistent record of opposing any actions going against
the Crown, starting with the Stamp Act protests in 1765; therefore, he was not trusted among the
delegates in the First Continental Congress. Second, many people in Galloway’s conservative
faction during the Continental Congress opposed the non-importation agreement that later passed
and put into effect by the Continental Association. They opposed it knowing that merchants in
Philadelphia had already ceased ordering British goods, assuming another boycott would be put
into effect.250 Lastly, the mood of the majority of the delegates in Congress was not one of
compromise. They reasoned that, since Americans had compelled Parliament to rescind
unpopular laws twice before—in 1766 with the Stamp Act, and again in 1769 with the
Townshend Acts—there was no need to compromise.251
By contrast, the Suffolk Resolves reiterated everything the radical delegates in the First
Continental Congress wanted to hear. It declared that the Coercive Acts were unconstitutional
because Parliament had no authority over the colonies whatsoever, regardless of what Parliament
attempted in the Declaratory Act in 1766. The Suffolk Resolves confirmed the opinion of the
radicals in the Congress, and, as a result, the Congress passed the Resolves instead of Galloway’s
Plan of Union.
250
251
86
While Galloway’s plan was radical, when compared to the Suffolk Resolves, it seemed
almost too conservative. As a result, on October 14, 1774, the First Continental Congress agreed
to ratify the Suffolk Resolves, now called the Declaration of Rights and Resolves. These
Declarations and Resolves stated “that our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the
time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and
immunities of free and natural- born subjects, within the realm of England.” 252 As such, the
Declarations and Resolves states that “they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost any of
those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to the exercise and
enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circumstances enable them to exercise and
enjoy.”253
The passage of the Declarations and Resolves over Galloway’s plan is another example
of the shift in sovereignty from the British government to the new American government. Under
Galloway’s plan, Parliament was still sovereign. Even allowing for an American house in
Parliament, Parliament was still sovereign. Under the Declarations and Resolves, Parliament was
not sovereign. Congress did not pass Galloway’s plan; the colonists no longer viewed Parliament
as sovereign over them.
The next issue was how to implement the non-importation agreement spoken about in the
Suffolk Resolves. The problem arose in what, exactly, the colonies would boycott. The
consensus was that anything subjected to colonial duties levied by Parliament should be
boycotted, but there was less agreement on things considered to be indispensible yet could not be
smuggled from other countries, such as fishing equipment for New England or coarse cloth used
252
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1: 68.
253
87
for clothing slaves in the South. Furthermore, there was the argument of from where to boycott
these goods; many things came from other places within the British Empire, such as Ireland and
the West Indies.254
Because the delegates agreed that something had to be done, they passed a non-
importation agreement on goods from Great Britain, Ireland, or the British West Indies and later,
a non-exportation agreement on goods being sent to Great Britain, Ireland, or the British West
Indies. In addition, they passed a non-consumption agreement on all goods from Great Britain,
Ireland, or the British West Indies, including molasses, coffee, indigo, and slaves. This non-
importation, -exportation, and –consumption agreement was called the Continental Association.
In the Journals of the Continental Congress, the delegates explained the Continental
Association. They claimed that they were simply looking for a remedy for what they viewed as
“grievances which threaten destruction to the lives, liberty, and property of his majesty’s subjects
in North America.”255 The colonists believed that “a non-importation, non-consumption, and
non-exportation agreement, faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual, and
peaceable measure.”256 In the past, the colonists had implemented successful embargos of British
goods in protest of Parliamentary taxation, for the purpose of persuading Parliament to repeal the
taxation. The colonists believed this new embargo would give them political advantage against
Parliament—for what is uncertain, however Labaree mentioned that authorities were taking
254
255
256
88
enforcement of the Boston Port Act so seriously that even vessels carrying firewood had to stop
and be unloaded for inspection before proceeding to Boston.257
The formation of the Continental Association imparted authority into the local
committees, transforming them into administrative agencies, existing to implement policies
instituted by the First Continental Congress.258 This is the best evidence of the shift in
sovereignty. If the colonists believed Parliament was sovereign over the colonies, the Continental
Association would not have passed. The fact that Congress passed it, and the colonies
implemented it, indicates that the colonists no longer viewed Parliament as sovereign over them;
rather, the colonists believed that the First Continental Congress was the sovereign body whom
they would obey.
The agreements were put forth in the Association, and had provisions for the non-
importation, -exportation, and –consumption agreements. It also included a provision for the
structure of the Association. This meant an election of groups of inspectors “whose business it
shall be attentively to observe the conduct of all persons touching this association.”259 It also
allowed the inspectors to publically name those who broke the agreements, “that such majority
do forthwith cause the truth of the case to be published in the gazette; to the end, that all such
foes of the rights of British-America may be publically known…and thenceforth we respectively
will break off all dealings with him or her.”260 In addition, the colonists resolved to “have no
trade, commerce, dealings, or intercourse whatsoever, with any colony or province in North-
257
Rakove, Beginnings, 50; Labaree, Tea Party, 238.
258
Rakove, Beginnings, 50-52.
259
260
89
America, which shall not accede to, or which shall hereafter violate this association,”261 thus
making sure that those who went against the provisions within the agreement were punished,
even if it meant punishing whole colonies.
The formation of the First Continental Congress and the passage of the Declarations and
Resolves as well as the Continental Association, then, was where the American Revolution
started. The Congress was the first revolutionary government in the colonies. Parliament may
have viewed the Congress as extra-legal because the colonies had no authority to make such a
government. The colonists, on the other hand, had executed a shift in sovereignty from
Parliament to the First Continental Congress that rendered Parliament unnecessary. This shift in
sovereignty from Parliament to the Congress is evidence of the mental shift from British to
American that makes up the American Revolution. The Congress had both the power to make
policy and the power to enforce it under the Association—these two powers make up a
government. The Association empowered local committees to action, and in the process,
acquired for the Congress the authority to make policy decisions.
Lastly, the delegates to the First Continental Congress drafted a petition to King George
III. The delegates believed that sending the letter to King George instead of Parliament was the
right course of action; after all, Parliament was the governing body that had put forth all of these
damaging acts. The delegates wanted the burden to be on the King; however, King George III
was trained to be a constitutional monarch, one who deferred to Parliament’s authority to govern
the Empire. It was highly unlikely that the King, raised on these views, would retract them. This
was something the delegates knew very well, but the colonists had their own theory of empire,
one in which the colonial legislatures were equivalent to Parliament. In order to survive this
261
90
crisis, the government would have to accept this theory of empire, so the colonists placed that
burden on King George III.262 This theory, ironically, showed acceptance of Galloway’s Plan of
Union, as the colonists believed themselves equal to Parliament, but still under the authority of
King George III.
The letter to the King was extremely respectful, but not very submissive. Within this
letter, the delegates laid out for the King their grievances, including the fact that “A standing
army has been kept in these colonies, ever since the conclusion of the late war, without the
consent of our assemblies.”263 In addition, the colonists complained
Our property is taken from us without our consent, the trial by jury in many civil cases is
abolished, enormous forfeitures are incurred for slight offences, vexatious informers are
exempted from paying damages, to which they are justly liable, and oppressive security is
required from owners before they are allowed to defend their right.264
The complaints to King George were rights that colonists had previously held but now felt
Parliament was infringing. As a result, the colonists informed the King that
Your royal indignation, we hope, will rather fall on those designing and dangerous men,
who daringly interposing themselves between your royal person and your faithful
subjects, and for several years past incessantly employed to dissolve the bonds of society,
by abusing your majesty's authority, misrepresenting your American subjects and
prosecuting the most desperate and irritating projects of oppression, have at length
compelled us, by the force of accumulated injuries too severe to be any longer tolerable,
to disturb your majesty's repose by our complaints.265
While Congress knew that King George III committed to the policies passed by Parliament, it
also knew that it needed to send its grievances straight to the Crown, as the delegates, believing
262
Rakove, Revolutionaries, 62-63.
263
264
265
91
the Congress equal to Parliament would balk at the idea of Parliament hearing grievances that it
had so long ignored.
Following the sending of the petition to King George, the delegates to the First
Continental Congress went home, with the understanding that in May of 1775, they would
reconvene if necessary.
92
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF A REVOLUTION
Prior to 1774, the colonists had been irritated and angry with British Parliament for
taxing them. However, the colonists still considered themselves British subjects; in fact, that is
why they were so angry at Parliament. They firmly believed that, since their ancestors were
British subjects with all the same rights as those living within England itself, so too were they.
As their ancestors did not give up their rights when they immigrated to the colonies, the colonists
themselves still had all those same rights.
By 1774, however, something within the colonists had changed. They believed they were
no longer British. On the first day of the First Continental Congress, Patrick Henry stated that
provincial loyalties no longer applied; that he was, in fact, not just a Virginian, but also an
American.266 This is where the American Revolution started—with the belief that Parliament had
no power over the colonists at all. More, that the colonists were no longer British, but American.
The shift in sovereignty in the colonies is evidence of this.
Escalation of Political Rhetoric
There was an escalation in colonial political rhetoric that was a factor of revolution. Early
in first phase of protest that started in 1763, the first argument, which came from James Otis in
266
Rakove, Revolutionaries, 54.
93
response to the Sugar Act of 1764, was “no taxation without consent.” Otis claimed that
parliamentary power was not supreme. He claimed that “no parts of his Majesty’s dominions can
be taxed without their consent: that every part has a right to be represented….that the refusal of
this would seem to be a contradiction in practice to the theory of the constitution…”267
Therefore, until the colonies could be properly represented, they would not give their consent to
be taxed. Therefore, Parliament could not tax them.
The next argument was “no taxation without representation,” the argument made by
Patrick Henry after the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765. Colonial representation in Parliament
would not stop Parliament from taxing the colonies, as the colonial representatives would be
outvoted regardless. Representation was not Henry’s purpose, but the escalation from “consent”
to “representation” is a large one. It was much easier to garner consent from the colonists than
representation in Parliament.
Following this, the argument posited by the Massachusetts Circular Letter in 1768
indicated that the Townshend Acts were “Infringements of their [the colonists’] natural and
constitutional rights because as they are not represented in the British Parliament.”268 Moreover,
the Circular Letter’s argument stated that, since “their Constituents considering their local
Circumstances cannot by any possibility be represented in the Parliament,” the king should
“form a subordinate legislature here that their subjects might enjoy the unalienable Right of a
Representation.”269 Americans were not properly represented in Parliament, thus colonial
legislatures were equal to Parliament. This was an escalation in the revolutionary rhetoric.
267
James Otis. “Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved” in Colonies to Nation, 33.
“‘In All Free States the Constitution is Fixd’: Massachusetts Circular Letter (Feb. 11, 1768)” in Colonies to
268
Nation, 134.
269
“Massachusetts Circular Letter” in Colonies to Nation, 133-34.
94
The colonists argued their claim that Americans were not, and could not be, properly
represented in Parliament. England used a system called “virtual representation,” indicating that
someone could be represented in Parliament without having voted someone into Parliament. The
idea was that members of Parliament would be responsible for all British subjects without any
geographical ties to the different areas of the British Empire. Indeed, it was not the argument that
the colonies could not be properly represented that was revolutionary; rather, it was the idea that
the colonial legislatures were equal to Parliament. That would be the equivalent of a local
legislature claiming it had the same authority as the United States Congress.
The next escalation in rhetoric occurred in the Declarations and Resolves passed by the
First Continental Congress, which stated that Parliament did not have the authority to govern the
colonies at all. The document stated that “as the English colonists are not represented
and…cannot properly be represented in the British parliament, they are entitled to a free and
exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures…in all cases of taxation and
internal polity….”270 Parliament had no authority to tax the colonies, nor did it have the
authority to legislate the colonies. The only thing Parliament could do, according to the
delegates, was help regulate trade, stating “from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the
mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts...restricted
to the regulation of our external commerce…excluding every idea of taxation…for raising a
revenue on the subjects of America….”271 The delegates consented to give Parliament this power
through necessity, not through any right Parliament had. It is important to note here, however,
that the Declarations and Resolves said nothing against the king himself, only Parliament.
270
271
95
This particular escalation completely removed Parliament’s authority over the colonies.
In the Declarations and Resolves, the Congress asserted that it gave the power to regulate trade
to Parliament, because the delegates knew that previous acts of Parliament regulating trade had
established guidelines for trade that were beneficial to both the colonies and the British Empire
as a whole. However, when the Congress excluded the idea of any kind of taxation from that
right of trade regulation to which the delegates consented, they effectively removed all
Parliamentary authority from the colonies.
The First Continental Congress as Revolution
By 1774, the colonists no longer considered themselves British. This is evidenced by not
only the writings and articles published throughout the colonies, but by the speeches and actions
of the First Continental Congress, as well as the authority of the Congress. It is also evidenced in
how the colonists shifted sovereignty over the colonies from Parliament to the First Continental
Congress.
While the First Continental Congress debated the Suffolk Resolves out of Massachusetts,
Paul Revere rode to Philadelphia to inform the delegates that the British were erecting
fortifications around the city of Boston.272 The Congress rejected a motion to have the citizens of
Boston leave the city, claiming that “the removal of the people of Boston…would not only be
extremely difficult in the execution, but so important in its consequences, as to require the
utmost deliberation before it is adopted.”273 The Congress also rejected a motion to allow
Massachusetts to recommence legal government under its own authority, stating instead “that the
Congress recommend to the inhabitants of the colony of Massachusetts-bay, to submit to a
suspension of the administration of Justice, where it cannot be procured in a legal and peaceable
272
Rakove, Beginning, 49.
273
96
manner, under the rules of their present charter….”274 Instead, the Congress sent a letter to
General Thomas Gage, the leader of the British army in Boston, stating that “We entreat your
excellency to consider what a tendency this conduct must have to irritate & force a free people,
however well disposed to peaceable measure, into hostilities, which may prevent the endeavours
of this Congress to restore a good understanding with our parent state, & may involve us in the
horrors of a civil war.”275 Also in that letter, the Congress informed General Gage that the people
of Massachusetts “have appointed us the guardians of their rights and liberties, and we are under
the deepest concern, that…your excellency should proceed in a manner that bears so hostile an
appearance….”276
The First Continental Congress was the start of the American Revolution because the
people of Massachusetts appointed the Congress as the guardian of the rights of the people of
Massachusetts, indicating a shift in sovereignty. The Massachusetts leaders asked the First
Continental Congress to judge the legality of their actions and their provincial government. The
Massachusetts leaders instilled an authority in the First Continental Congress that they would
never have given Parliament. While the Congress rejected a motion to allow Massachusetts to
reconvene its government under the colony’s original charter, the fact that the Congress
considered the question—the fact that Massachusetts subjected itself to the will of that
Congress—is a substantial illustration of the idea that the colonists no longer believed Parliament
to be sovereign, and instead formed a revolutionary government of their own.
The formation of the Continental Association, which enforced the non-importation, -
exportation, and –consumption agreements the delegates had set forth, also proves the First
274
275
276
97
Continental Congress was the start of the American Revolution because it formally sanctioned
the committees of correspondence that had formed over the summer in protest to the Coercive
Acts, specified their duties, and imposed its own control over these local forces. The Association
assumed the policymaking decision that local leaders had been making. In addition, it
encouraged local initiative among those leaders, for the purposes of enhancing participation and
morale, as well as allowing for unforeseen emergencies.277
These examples prove that the First Continental Congress was a sovereign body. The
First Continental Congress made policy when they passed the Declarations and Resolves, which
included the non-importation, -consumption, and –exportation agreements, which were ratified
in September of 1774. It also enforced that policy when it passed the Continental Association,
which ensured that the colonies that ratified the Association followed its decrees. When the First
Congress adjourned in October, the Association governed in its wake; however, the Association
used the power given it by the First Congress. The First Congress was still sovereign even in
adjournment.
Another important point, albeit a bit different, is the escalation of anger against King
George III. The New York Journal called the king the “‘darling of America’” and stated that the
colonists still had “‘entire confidence in his Majesty, who is ever attentive to the complaints of
his subjects, and is ever ready to relieve their distress.’”278 By 1772, however, it started to
become apparent that King George III was not as misled by his advisors as previously thought.
In a letter to the editors of the Boston Gazette, Samuel Adams, writing as Valerius Poplicola,
stated that “the Grievances of this Continent have no doubt ‘reached the Royal Ear;’ I wish I
277
Rakove, Beginnings, 29, 51.
278
As quoted in Meier, Resistance, 210.
98
could see reason to say they had touch’d the Royal Heart. No—They remain altogether
unredress’d…the Complaints of three Millions of loyal Subjects have no yet penetrated the
Royal Breast, to make it even to pity.”279 When King George III gave his assent to the
Intolerable Acts in 1774, and more specifically the Quebec Act, an often-reprinted article argued
that the king had broken the one formal tie that bound him to his people, stating that the king
“‘must be guilty of perjury; for it is, in express terms, contrary to his coronation oath,’ in which
he had promised to maintain ‘the protestant reformed religion established by law’ in England and
all her dominions.”280 Some still maintained allegiance to King George, but they often added
conditions that removed the commitment from the pledge itself. People in the town of Mansfield,
Connecticut stated that they would be faithful subjects of the Crown, “‘as long as the Crown
maintains inviolate the stipulated Rights of the People.’”281
The people of Massachusetts were falling into a state in which the legal institutions of the
colony were no longer able to work as they were supposed to. Although the Massachusetts
legislature was called to convene in Salem, General Gage had found that it would not be as
simple as that. The people of Massachusetts, it was clear, would not acknowledge the authority
of an assembly that was appointed by the Crown. Courts closed because many judges either
refused their commissions or placed themselves under Gage’s protection if they accepted those
commissions.282
Samuel Adams as “Valerius Poplicola,” in Harry A. Cushing, ed. The Writings of Samuel Adams, volume II (New
279
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904), 206-207.

280
281
282
99
The leaders of the resistance in Massachusetts had already set up alternative bodies, with
the purpose of eluding the legal government that General Gage controlled. With the addition of
the Continental Association passed by the First Continental Congress, the colonies had set up a
governing body that had the ability to take power away from the legal, royal government through
a network of committees and conventions.283 Indeed, Gage had managed to give the Association
in Massachusetts an opportunity to take over and expel traditional authority when he dissolved
the Massachusetts legislature in early October 1774. The representatives from the Massachusetts
legislature then met in Cambridge, thus causing Massachusetts to have something resembling a
revolutionary government that did not answer to the Crown, but to the people of Massachusetts.
When this extra-legal Provincial Congress reconvened in November, with the Continental
Association to consider, members thought it was inadequate, and decided instead to strengthen it
by banning the sales of all imported goods.284
Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Charleston all set up meetings to choose
committees to enforce the Association in those cities. Establishment of those committees was not
limited only to those cities. In Virginia, every county in the colony had a committee.285
Virginia, like Massachusetts, had a stricter version of the Continental Association in
place. The committee elected in Virginia required all merchants and planters to agree to the
Association. Merchants who had prohibited goods usually managed to avoid their destruction by
asking the committees to sell those goods themselves, although there were some instances of tea
being thrown into Virginian rivers. The committees would then set a maximum price, or
sometimes inspect merchants’ accounts for exploitation. Those who violated the Association
283
Rakove, Revolutionaries, 65.
284
285
100
found their names in the paper and themselves called enemies of the country; in addition,
members of the community shunned those merchants, in both trade and society. As a result, by
the end of 1774, the Association was in full effect, and, as the royal governor of Virginia noted,
the local committees constituted the government of Virginia.286
Traditional Alternative Moments of Revolution
While critical for revolution, the First Continental Congress required additional support
to be successful. The events that followed the First Continental Congress are evidence of this
support. They are not, as traditionally taught, the moment of revolution.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1774, General Gage, the commander-in-chief of the
British Army in North America and the new Governor of Massachusetts after Thomas
Hutchinson, sent letters to Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, informing
members there of the situation in the colonies. On July 27, 1774, Gage informed Dartmouth of
the widespread opposition to the Intolerable Acts, stating that “‘if the Opposers of Government
may be called only a Faction in this Province [as Gage himself and Lord Dartmouth had called
them] they are at least a very numerous and powerfull Faction.’” In a later letter from September
2nd, Gage informed Dartmouth that “‘the Flames of Sedition had spread [so] universally
throughout the Country,’” and a letter dated September 12th told Dartmouth that “‘The Country
People are exercizing in Arms in this Province, Connecticut and Rhode Island, and getting
Magazines of Arms and Ammunition…People are resorting to this Town for Protection…and
Sedition flows copiously from the Pulpits.’”287
286
287
As quoted in Knollenberg, Growth, 200-203.
101
Upon receiving Gage’s letters, Dartmouth met with Lord North and decided to send
warships with marines on them to Boston, and King George issued a proclamation forbidding the
export of munitions from Great Britain. The king also sent a note to Lord North stating that
“‘blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this Country or independent.”’ Lord North
also spoke something similar in a letter to ex-Governor Thomas Hutchinson, stating that
Massachusetts “‘was in Rebellion and must be subdued.’”288
Lexington and Concord
The story of the first shots at Lexington and Concord is traditionally taught as the start of
the American Revolution. In fact, a book by William Hallahan called The Day the American
Revolution Began stated that “historically, it [the American Revolution] began after dawn on
Wednesday, April 19, 1775, in Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts.”289 However, while the
events at Lexington and Concord were important during the American Revolution because they
were the start of the shooting war, those events were not the start of the American Revolution
itself.
In January of 1775, Lord Dartmouth sent General Gage a letter at the request of the
British ministry, allowing for a “‘vigorous Exertion of that Force.’”290 In addition, Dartmouth
ordered Gage to arrest the leaders of the rebellion, if possible. That letter did not arrive in the
colonies until April. Shortly thereafter, Gage put into operation a plan for Boston that had been
prepared for some time.291
288
As quoted in Knollenberg, Growth, 204-205.
289
William Hallihan. The Day the American Revolution Began: 19 April 1775 (New York: HarperCollins, 2000),
xiii.
290
Ferling, Leap, 124.
291
Ferling, Leap, 128.
102
On April 18, 1775, Gage’s troops moved toward Concord, a town eighteen miles north of
Boston. Gage chose Concord for two reasons. First, Concord was very close to Boston, and Gage
hoped that his troops could complete their assignment and escape to the relative safety of Boston
before the colonists could respond. The colonists were training upwards of two to three times a
week, preparing for war, drilling, marching, loading and firing their muskets, and learning how
to give and take orders. At least a third of these men, Gage believed, were being trained as
“minutemen,” the forces that would be ready to respond within a minute upon an alarm
sounding, with an armful of shot and two weeks of provisions. The element of surprise would be
extremely important, as these minutemen would descend upon Concord as soon as the alarm
sounded. In addition, Gage chose Concord because his intelligence network informed him that
John Hancock and Samuel Adams were there, thus allowing him to fulfill the second half of his
job—arresting the leaders of the rebellion.292
What Gage did not know was that the colonists, too, had a spy network, and were quite
aware of what Gage’s plans were for that night. As a result, two riders—Paul Revere and Joseph
Dawes—were sent out on two different paths from Boston to warn the militia at Concord and the
surrounding countryside of the danger they were imminently facing.293
The British regiment reached Lexington first, and there met the men of the Lexington
Provincial Company, commanded by Captain John Parker. Major John Pitcairn, the leader of the
British forces, ordered the men to disperse, telling them to “‘lay down your arms, you damned
292
Ferling, Leap, 128.
293
Ferling, Leap, 129.
103
rebels.’”294 Parker, wanting no part in leading his group of vastly outnumbered militiamen to
slaughter, ordered his men to step aside. 295
No one knows who fired that first shot that rang out in the early hours of dawn that
morning. Nobody knows if it was a frightened militiaman on the American side, or an
overzealous British Redcoat, but a shot rang out. Witnesses on both sides claimed the other side
fired first; regardless, an unknown British officer subsequently gave the order to fire. At the end
of the skirmish, eight militiamen were dead, and ten were wounded. Several British officers,
realizing that colonial riders sent an alert along the countryside, went to Lieutenant Colonel
Francis Smith, who was in charge of the operation as a whole, to ask him to call off the march to
Concord, which he refused to do. Smith stated that he would follow orders, although he asked for
reinforcements from Boston. Realizing that there was no point to marching quietly anymore,
Major Pitcairn ordered the men to march, setting off with fifes and drums playing.296
The British troops set forth to Concord for their target. The Redcoats had no resistance in
their march from Lexington to Concord. After searching for the arms and ammunition they knew
the colonists stored there, the British destroyed what little they found in the way of militia
supplies. In the meantime, the American militias gathered at Concord, to the tune of five hundred
armed men by eleven that morning. As the British were relaxed and scattered that morning, the
militiamen caught them unaware. A British regular fired a shot, which caused other regulars to
fire at the militiamen. Once the militiamen were given the order to return fire, twelve regulars
were wounded, with three being wounded fatally. In the first volley of shots fired by the
294
295
Ferling, Leap, 132.
296
Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 276; Ferling, Leap, 133.
104
militiamen, four British officers were wounded, and three were killed. The British troops, now
outnumbered, retreated in a hurry.297
The British retreat was not smoothly done; the British soldiers, tired after a long day’s
march from Boston to Lexington and then to Concord, were so disorganized that their leaders
threatened them with death in order to get them to pull themselves together and organize
themselves into a defensive position. While the British suffered during their engagement with the
colonists, they suffered more on their march back to Boston. The British troops formed a
column, upon which the Americans hiding in the woods fired. Although the fight started with
guns, it ended with a melee between the British and American troops. Only a large detachment
with cannon covering their retreat saved the British troops from further suffering.298
The events at Lexington and Concord included the first shots, which indicated the start of
open hostilities between the colonies and the mother country. That being said, the British
marched up to Concord with the purpose of taking arms and munitions from the colonists, who
viewed this as provocation for a fight. Since it is entirely unclear as to who fired the first shot at
Lexington Green on April 19, this thesis argues that the colonists were simply shooting back at
people who were shooting at them. It would be irresponsible to assume that the colonists would
not fight back after being shot at, no matter that nobody knows who fired that first shot. The
colonists felt they were in danger; thus, they fought back. On its own, fighting back does not
define revolution. The initiation of the shooting war was simply the first implementation of the
American Revolution itself.
297
Ferling, Leap, 134; Hibbert, Redcoats, 33.
298
Hibbert, Redcoats, 33; Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 278.
105
The Second Continental Congress
At the end of the First Continental Congress in October 1774, the delegates agreed that
“it will be necessary that a congress should be held on the 10th of May next, unless the Redress
of grievances, which we have desired, be obtained before that time.”299 With the events at
Lexington and Concord still fresh in their minds, in May of 1775, the Second Continental
Congress met in Philadelphia.
As soon as the delegates convened, they received letters from Massachusetts about the
events at Lexington and Concord. Shortly thereafter, the Congress received a letter from Joseph
Warren, the president of the Provincial Congress in Massachusetts, which stated that
We beg leave to suggest, that a power full Army, on the side of America, hath been
consider'd, by this Congress, as the only mean left to stem the rapid Progress of a
tyrannical Ministry. Without a force, superior to our Enemies, we must reasonably expect
to become the Victims of their relentless fury: With such a force, we may still have hopes
of seeing an immediate End put to the inhuman Ravages of mercenary Troops in
America.300
The delegates needed to decide whether the colonies would organize themselves as a union, so as
to be able to fight as one. The Congress decided to “resolve itself into a committee of the whole,
to take into consideration the state of America…that the Letter from the pro: Congress of
Massachusetts bay be referred to that committee,”301 in order to keep from making a decision on
it right away.
This question of whether to organize the colonies into one fighting force was only part of
the deeper question about separation from England. While the moderates in the Second
299
Letters of the Delegates of Congress, 1:233.
300
301
106
Continental Congress, including John Dickinson of Letters from a Farmer, favored
reconciliation with constitutional rights, there were also those whose objective was complete
separation from Great Britain. As a result, the fear felt by the delegates—mainly the fear of being
a new nation vulnerable to invasion by countries such as France and Spain—caused these
delegates to keep quiet about their aims, so that the possibility France or Spain seizing the
colonies was never mentioned openly in those first days of the Congress.302
Following the letter from Joseph Warren, the Congress received one from the New York
Committee of 100 asking about an appropriate response to the expectation of British troops in
the city.303 The answer Congress gave New York was “that if the troops, [which] are expected
should arrive, the [said] Colony act on the defensive.”304
Two days later, Congress received word that troops from Connecticut and Vermont
seized Fort Ticonderoga, a fortress of strategic importance between Lake Champlain and Lake
George, on the main route between Canada and the upper Hudson Valley in New York. A group
of men from Connecticut, led by the wealthy merchant turned captain, Benedict Arnold of New
Haven, made plans to attack the fort to acquire the heavy cannon needed in Boston. At the same
time, a lead miner and farmer from Vermont named Ethan Allen was planning a similar raid with
men from Vermont. After Arnold confronted Allen, demanding that he (Arnold) lead the raid,
the two men decided to combine their forces and cooperate in the raid. The combined forces of
302
303
Jensen, Founding, 605-606; Journals of the Continental Congress, 2:49.
304
107
men from Connecticut and Vermont captured both cannon and other military stores that would
be invaluable in a fight with the British army.305
Having told New York only to act defensively, Congress was embarrassed when news of
the raid reached them. While the supplies acquired by the raiders were necessary to the fight, the
raid itself was not a defensive action. In addition, neither Benedict Arnold nor Ethan Allen
informed New York officials about it, which led to domestic implications. There was a reward
for the capture of Ethan Allen in New York, and there were conflicting land claims among the
colonies themselves over the land captured in the raid. Furthermore, the offensive action of the
capture of Fort Ticonderoga went against what Congress had ordered of New York.306
On May 30, 1775, a letter arrived from England to the Congress. The Journals of the
Continental Congress states that Gray Cooper, the Under-Secretary of the Treasury, had written
the letter at the request of Lord North. Within the Journals, the letter began “that it is earnestly
hoped by all the real friends of the Americans….”307 In it was a reconciliation resolution, which
offered terms that were “honourable for Great Britain and safe for the colonies.”308 The letter
also stated that “these terms will remove every grievance relative to taxation, and be the basis of
a compact between the colonies, and the mother country…[and] that the people in America
ought, on every consideration to be satisfied with them.”309 The letter went on to say that if the
Americans did not agree to the resolution, no other appeasements could be made.
305
Hibbert, Redcoats, 40; Jensen, Founding, 606.
306
Middlekauff, Glorious Cause, 286; Jensen, Founding, 607.
307
308
309
108
The letter from England used the term “compact” in regards to the colonies, which
implied that both parties were of equal status. The fact that the British used that word in this
reconciliation implies that the British viewed the colonies at a higher status than they viewed
some of the other colonies throughout the Empire. Regardless, the Congress voted to have the
letter “lie on the table;”310 that is, to let the issue go without discussing it.
Throughout the months of May and June, the Second Continental Congress raised and
funded a Continental Army to fight against the British. They appointed George Washington as
the General of the Army. The Congress appointed a committee to secure supplies for the
military, and borrowed money for purchasing gunpowder.311
The Second Congress did not diminish the authority of the First Congress. While it could
be argued that the Second Continental Congress was the start of the revolution for this point
alone, it would be inaccurate to say so. Surpassing the authority of the First Congress does not
make the Second any more revolutionary than the First; if anything, it shows that the delegates to
the Congress saw that the model from the First Congress worked well, and they expanded upon
it. Indeed, most of the delegates to the Second Congress had been at the first, so the Second
Congress was simply an extension of the First.
Due to the pressure from the more moderate delegates in Congress, Congress sent a
second petition directly to King George III. Within this “Olive Branch Petition,” written by
Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, the colonists informed the king of their desire to restore
310
311
109
harmony with England and asked the king to prevent further hostile action until a reconciliation
could be reached, stating
we solemnly assure your Majesty, that we not only most ardently desire the former
harmony between her and these colonies may be restored, but that a concord may be
established between them upon so firm a basis as to perpetuate its blessings,
uninterrupted by any future dissensions, to succeeding generations in both countries.312
The king, however, refused all statements sent by the Congress, and when the petition arrived at
Parliament in mid-August, members decided that, since the Congress was not a legal body, and
thus not recognized by Parliament, they would ignore the petition. In addition, by August of
1775, the king had already proclaimed the American colonies to be in a state of rebellion,
claiming that the colonists had forgotten “the Allegiance which they owe to the Power that has
protected and sustained them.”313 He also stated that they “have at length proceeded to an open
and avowed Rebellion, by arraying themselves in hostile Manner to withstand the Execution of
the Law, and traitorously preparing, ordering, and levying War against Us.”314 As such, King
George stated that “all Our Officers Civil and Military are obliged to exert their utmost
Endeavors to suppress such Rebellion, and to bring the Traitors to Justice.”315 With the Olive
Branch Petition turned away by the British government, the moderates were defeated in favor of
the radicals, who proclaimed excitement at the idea that they could now put forth the ideas they
supported.316
312
“To Suppress ‘Rebellion and Sedition’: Royal Proclamation of Rebellion (August 23, 1775)” in Colonies to
313
Nation, 259.
314
“Royal Proclamation of Rebellion” in Colonies to Nation, 259.
315
“Royal Proclamation of Rebellion” in Colonies to Nation, 259-260.
316
Ferling, Leap, 149.
110
Shortly after the king’s proclamation in August of 1775, news came of a bill introduced
by Lord North that ceased all commerce with the colonies for the duration of the war, and
allowed for the seizure of cargo on American ships. North believed this was a concession,
considering that the commissioners would be able to exempt any colony that returned its
obedience to the Crown from this policy. This caused John Hancock to remark that the British
policy of “making all our Vessells lawful Prize don’t look like a Reconciliation.”317 It was in this
environment of agitation that Thomas Paine published his pamphlet Common Sense.
Common Sense
Thomas Paine published his pamphlet Common Sense in January of 1776. Paine’s
pamphlet not only attacked George III himself, but the entire idea of the monarchy, and actually
advocated independence, saying that “the authority of Great Britain over this continent, is a form
of government, which sooner or later must have an end.”318 Paine argued that the monarchy was
“an absurdity,”319 because all men are equal at creation and therefore “no one by birth could
have a right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all others forever;”320 therefore,
the distinction between kings and subjects was a false one. In addition, Paine argued that the
distance between the colonies and England made governing the colonies from England unwieldy.
A petition sent to Parliament would not receive a response for over a year. Even if Britain were
the "mother country" of America, that made her actions all the more horrendous, for no mother
317
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 3:244.
318
Thomas Paine. “Common Sense” in Scott Liell, 46 Pages: Thomas Paine, Common Sense, and the Turning Point
to Independence (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2003), 174.
319
Paine in Liell, 46 Pages, 166.
320
Paine in Liell, 46 Pages , 164.
111
would harm her children so brutally.321 Paine concluded that “reconciliation is a fallacious
dream.”322
Paine’s pamphlet exploded in the colonies. Colonists purchased over 250,000 copies of
Common Sense in 1776, and countless others read Common Sense in their local newspapers. In
the Continental Army, entire regiments of soldiers heard it read aloud to them.323 As a result, the
idea of independence spread rapidly throughout the colonies.
The delegates to the Second Congress were aware of the impression that Common Sense
had on the people of Philadelphia. As visitors in the city, the delegates spent a majority of their
time in public places, such as taverns. The delegates witnessed how Common Sense renewed the
conviction of those who favored independence already, how it convinced those who were unsure
toward the cause of independence, and how it even “‘turned Tories into Whigs’” in some cases.
It was apparent that the publication of Common Sense brought the issue of independence into the
public conversation. The issue now was how to change the position of the Congress. The actions
of the delegates were dictated by the instructions their constituents in their home colonies gave
them. Many of the delegates were given instructions at the end of 1775 to oppose independence;
however, the widespread success of Common Sense helped sway the decision of the Congress to
vote in favor of independence.324
What Paine wrote had already been talked about in the months following Lexington. The
nine months following Lexington had shown the hostility of the king and Parliament, and made
321
Paine in Liell, 46 Pages, 171-172.
322
Paine in Liell, 46 Pages, 177.
323
Ferling, Leap, 151.
324
Liell, 46 Pages, 101-102.
112
the idea of reconciliation untenable. In Common Sense, Paine pointed out to the colonists that
there was no return to the days before the first reforms in 1763; the only available path for the
colonists, Paine argued, was independence from Great Britain.325
While Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was a very appropriate moment for revolution to
start, Paine had written something that, in part, had been in the minds of a small group of men for
some time before Common Sense was published. While the pamphlet was revolutionary, and
while Thomas Paine himself was revolutionary, Common Sense was more a tool used to open the
eyes of people who had not publically announced their wish for separation from England.
Common Sense helped the public to figure out on which side of the argument they stood. It
swayed public opinion to the side of separation from England, but it only made it easier for the
radical leaders to discuss it publically. Common Sense was an amazingly well written document
that gave the radical leaders that final nudge to articulate an argument supporting separation from
Great Britain.
Independence
American independence, like the shots fired at Lexington and Concord, was another
implementation of revolution in the colonies.
By early spring of 1776, the colonies were starting to work together toward the common
goal of independence, although they stopped short of proposing that Congress unite the colonies
as one country under a central government. South Carolina gave its delegates permission to join
with others in Congress to protect and defend America, while the delegation from Georgia
received instructions that allowed them to vote for independence, if it came to that. The
Provincial Congress of North Carolina gave its delegates the authority to vote for independence
325
113
as well, as did Rhode Island, which went the extra step of declaring its own independence in
May of that year.326
Although Paine’s Common Sense made the idea of independence politically possible,
meeting two other mandatory conditions before independence could be declared was essential.
The first condition was that independence needed to be morally justifiable. By spring of 1776,
this condition was met, as news that King George hired German mercenaries arrived in the
colonies. It was obvious now that the colonies did not owe allegiance anymore to King George;
after all, their “sovereign” was no longer protecting them, but attacking them with foreign
mercenaries. The second condition was that independence had to be strategically necessary; the
only way to get foreign aid in a fight against England was to formally declare independence. 327
To this end, in June of 1776, Congress made its plans for independence, stating
that the committee, to prepare the declaration, consist of five members…Mr. [Thomas]
Jefferson, Mr. J[ohn] Adams, Mr. [Benjamin] Franklin, Mr. [Roger] Sherman, and Mr.
R[obert] R. Livingston…that a committee be appointed to prepare and digest the form of
a confederation to be entered into between these colonies…that a committee be appointed
to prepare a plan of treaties to be proposed to foreign powers.328
In May 1776, Congress declared “that it be recommended to the respective assemblies
and conventions of the United Colonies…to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of
the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in
particular, and America in general.”329 To that end, Congress declared “that a committee of three
be appointed to prepare a preamble to the foregoing resolution [and] the members chosen, Mr.
326
327
328
329
114
J[ohn] Adams, Mr. [Edward] Rutledge, and Mr. R[ichard] H[enry] Lee.”330 Their preamble read,
“it appears absolutely irreconcilable to reason and good Conscience, for the people of these
colonies now to take the oaths and affirmations necessary for the support of any government
under the crown of Great Britain.”331 The following month, on June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee
put forth a resolution calling for an official vote on independence, stating “that these United
Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from
all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State
of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.”332 After a vigorous debate, Congress
decided that “the question of independence was postponed until the first July, in order to give the
assemblies of the middle colonies an opportunity to take off their restrictions and let their
delegates unite in the measure. In the interim will go on plans for confederation and foreign
alliance.”333 The interim plans also included the commission charged with writing the document,
including the primary author, Thomas Jefferson.
Using arguments from Virginia’s first state constitution and its Declaration of Rights,
both written in June of 1776, Jefferson wrote the first draft of the Declaration of Independence in
only a few days. After making some stylistic changes, the document was ready on June 28, 1776.
With the exception of New York, whose delegates had prior instructions to work "for the
preservation and re-establishment of American rights and priviledges, and for the restoration of
harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies,"334 the delegates from each colony voted on
330
331
332
333
334
Journals of the Continental Congress, 2:15-16.
115
the issue of independence. On July 1, 1776, Pennsylvania and South Carolina’s delegations voted
against independence, with the two present delegates from Delaware split on the issue. The
delegates from New York explained that, while they were in favor in independence, due to the
aforementioned instructions, they could not vote for it.335 The following day, the third delegate
from joined the majority decision, and the delegates from South Carolina and Pennsylvania also
changed their votes. The Congress declared independence on July 2, 1776, and two days later, on
July 4, 1776, the delegates to the Second Continental Congress signed the Declaration of
Independence.336
Lee’s resolution and the Declaration of Independence are two parts of the same event;
historians write of them, along with the shots fired at Lexington and Concord, as the start of the
American Revolution. However, Lee’s resolution and the Declaration came well after the shift in
sovereignty from Parliament to the American Congress. The Declaration of Independence was a
public statement to the rest of the world. In fact, the Declaration was not even addressed to
England, nor did the Second Congress expect any response from England; rather it was
proclaimed, left to other governments to respond as they would, with the hopes that foreign
nations would aid the colonies.337 In addition, the American people had already been fighting the
British for well over a year by the time the Declaration of Independence was even proposed,
much less signed.
The Declaration of Independence came fifteen months after the first shots fired at
Lexington and Concord because, in 1775, those who were in favor of separation were not talking
about it openly, as public opinion leaned toward reconciliation, not separation. That is not to say
335
336
337
116
that there were not those who wished for separation; only that those who wished for it did not
speak openly about it in 1775. Even within the radical faction, there were those who favored
reconciliation on American terms over independence. By 1776, however, public opinion, thanks
to Thomas Paine, moved toward favoring independence. The Declaration of Independence was
simply another implementation to revolution; the Declaration of Independence was another step
in the replacement of the British government in the colonies.
In the end, the beginning to the American Revolution, then, was the passage of the
Suffolk Resolves and the formation of the Continental Association during the First Continental
Congress in 1774. It was the first point in which the colonies came together to form a united
government, regardless of whether they called it that. The Association had branches in every
colony, and had the ability (and the obligation) to punish those who did not follow the rules set
forth by the First Continental Congress. While there were congresses that had come before, such
as the Stamp Act Congress, and other boycotts of British goods, the First Continental Congress
was the first time all the colonies had come together as one, and the Association was the first
time the boycott of British goods could be enforced by a central body. The boycotts during the
Stamp Act crisis and the Townshend Act crisis were enforced locally and sporadically; there
were no consistent punishments in place for merchants who did not follow the boycott, and no
central body to enforce those rules. The Continental Association, as its name implies, was a
central body, and it enforced its rules to the fullest extent possible.
Although independence was declared in 1776, it took another eight years for the war with
England to end, and eleven years for the British colonies to transform into the United States of
America.
117
CHAPTER SIX: END OF A REVOLUTION
The moment at which the American Revolution began occurred at the First Continental
Congress in Philadelphia in 1774. Fifty-six men got together and ratified the Suffolk Resolves,
which said that Parliament should not be obeyed because it had no power to govern the colonies.
They implemented a boycott against all British goods, and they formed the Continental
Association—a central governing body—to make sure the colonies abided by the rules. When
the members of the First Continental Congress decided that their current system of government
under Parliament was not working, when they chose to repudiate Parliament’s power in
exchange for the power of the Continental Association, that is when the American Revolution
truly began. Everything that came after the First Continental Congress, from the Second
Continental Congress to the Declaration of Independence to the ratification of the Constitution,
was another implementation of the American Revolution itself.
Generations of Americans grew up thinking that the American Revolution started with
the shots fired at Lexington and Concord, or with the signing of the Declaration of
Independence. Even today, schools teach the idea that the American Revolution and the shooting
War for Independence are the same event. These two events may overlap, but they are not the
118
same. There is a difference between the American Revolution and independence. The War for
Independence was another implementation of revolution by the colonists.
Before the Declaration of Independence was written, Congress authorized New
Hampshire to establish a government, stating “it be recommended…to call a full and free
representation of the people, and that the representatives, if they think it necessary, establish such
a form of government as, in their judgment, will…most effectively secure peace and good order
in the province….”338 The next day, Congress authorized the same for South Carolina. By July 4,
1776, three former colonies—New Hampshire, Virginia and New Jersey—had written state
constitutions, and by the end of 1779, the rest followed. Many of these new state constitutions
included a stipulation for the sovereignty of the people, guaranteed their right to alter or abolish
the government, and provided for various liberties, including freedom of speech and religion.
The executives of these new governments were elected, either by the legislature or by the people,
but did not have much power. Additionally, three states lowered property qualifications for
voting, and four others allowed for all white male taxpayers to be allowed to vote.339
In 1776, acting on part of Richard Henry Lee’s motion for independence, the Second
Congress authorized a committee under John Dickinson to prepare a plan of confederation.
Dickinson brought forth a series of proposals that formed the basis of the Articles of
Confederation, which the Second Congress approved on November 17, 1777 and sent to the
states. The Articles of Confederation stated that “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation
338
339
Ferling, Leap, 195.
119
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”340 In addition, the Articles
formed the states into a loose union, stating that “said States…enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their
mutual and general welfare….”341 The only powers expressly delegated to the United States in
Congress assembled included “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war” and “the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin
struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective states.”342 However, those powers were
only given to Congress if “nine States assent to the same,” meaning Congress was powerless if
nine states did not agree to allow Congress to execute those powers. In addition, as article II
stated, if the Articles did not expressly give Congress the power to do something, Congress could
not do it. This included the power to tax, which Congress did not have. Congress also did not
have the power to enforce its own laws; rather, it had to rely on the states themselves to enforce
legislation, and if the states refused to enforce an act, Congress could do nothing about it.343
The transition of sovereignty from Parliament to the King to the First Continental
Congress was revolutionary. In 1763, colonists considered both Parliament and King George III
as the supreme powers in the colonies. By 1774, Parliament was no longer sovereign at all, and
King George III was a figurehead. For the revolutionaries, many of the lingering loyalties to the
Crown were irrelevant. When it came to dealings with England, the revolutionaries did not deal
with the Crown; they only dealt with Parliament. To the revolutionaries, Parliament was the
340
“Articles of Confederation : March 1, 1781, article II,” in Yale University Avalon Project.
341
“Articles of Confederation, article III” in Yale University Avalon Project.
342
“Articles of Confederation, article IX” in Yale University Avalon Project.
.
343
Gerber, Revolution, 70-71.
120
problem, not the Crown. Everything they did, everything they wrote, talked about the evils of
Parliament more than anything else because, to them, Parliament was the problem.
By 1774, the authority of rule in the colonies was given to the First Continental Congress.
That is where the American Revolution began. The colonists no longer viewed Parliament as
sovereign.
The events at Lexington and Concord could not have been the start of the American
Revolution, as previously taught, because the colonists only defended themselves against hostile
action by the British troops. Defense of one’s person and property alone does not define
revolution; in this case, it is an implementation of revolution.
The formation of the Second Continental Congress also could not have been the start of
the American Revolution, because the Second Congress simply picked up from where the First
Congress left off. Many of the delegates to the Second Congress were the same delegates that
attended the First Congress. The issues decided upon were different, but the attendants were the
same.
Likewise, Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was not the moment the American Revolution
began because Paine wrote something that, in part, had been in the minds of a small group of
men for some time before the publication of Common Sense. While the pamphlet was
revolutionary, and while Thomas Paine himself was revolutionary, Common Sense was a tool to
open the eyes of people who had not yet fully committed to the idea of full independence from
Great Britain. Common Sense helped people figure out their position in the controversy.
The Declaration of Independence, while also taught to be the point at which the
American Revolution began, also is not the start of the American Revolution. The Declaration of
Independence came after the people started believing themselves to be Americans. The
121
Declaration of Independence seemed to be more of a public statement to the rest of the world,
rather than a starting point of revolution inside the country. The people had already been fighting
the British for over a year by the time Richard Henry Lee proposed it. Breaking from the Crown,
while revolutionary, was another extension of the revolution that had already begun in 1774.
While revolution and violent rebellion are not required to go hand-in-hand, in this case, they do.
The members of the First Continental Congress knew exactly what they were doing.
They knew the Declarations and Resolves and the Continental Association were extralegal
according to Parliament. They knew that what they were proposing was seditious, but they also
knew that it was something that needed to change. The real moment of revolution began in the
moment when those men decided that their current system of government was not working, and
that they were going to throw it out. Those men who met in Philadelphia dared to have the
courage to tell Parliament and the world that they were starting a revolution. They dared to
change the world.
122
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Original Master's Thesis On The American Revolution

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INTRODUCTION

set up punishments for those who disobeyed the Association’s rules.2

infringed upon, so the they fought for those rights.

struggle against the might of the British Empire.”6

thoroughly Americans yet.

the colonies specifically. This is a vital relationship to understand. Sovereignty is power; a

revolution overthrows that power.

the shooting War for Independence, and should be treated as such.

or buy goods, thus crippling the colonial economy.

Townshend Acts in 1770.

England and the colonies had settled down.14

bypassing any intermediaries, thus making it extremely cheap.15

Wisconsin and, obviously, Ohio.

America,” the colonists wrote that “a non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation

appeared as a challenge to Parliament, and congressional measures, however hesitant, as outright

Chapter One: Origins

Chapter Two: Interlude

Chapter Three: Catalyst

Chapter Four: Revolution

Chapter Five: Analysis of a Revolution

Chapter Six: End of a Revolution

points were not.

Prior Historical Contributions of the American Revolution

autonomy ends and imperial reform begins.

conclusion that they would adopt the non-importation, non-exportation, non-consumption

transition from British to American.

“were actually moving, if only half consciously…away from it.” 25

what the American Revolution was to mean...”26

peaceful solution was yet possible.” 31

Ferling’s work is important to understanding the American Revolution because he

of the American Revolution was a useful addition to this topic.

of change that changed the course of future historical events.

willing to declare independence if necessary, stating

instead to hide whatever bias he maintained behind a strict synthesis of facts.

Glorious Cause: The American Revolution 1763-1789. Middlekauff is a professor emeritus at

United States Constitution by the states starting in 1787.

despotism.” Interestingly, according to Middlekauff, some of the delegates, including Joseph

Americans against Great Britain.

comprehensive conspiracy against liberty throughout the English-speaking world…lay at the

liberty, which came directly from British reform.

evidence showing the shift from colonist to American.

Knollenberg’s second book, Growth of the American Revolution 1766-1775, is

a Crown-appointed Governor and Council and an elected Assembly. Bills…were subject to

options, including Parliament’s ability to strike down an eighty-year-old Massachusetts law if

odious to the people of the colony.”58

of American blood on the nineteenth of April.”59

writing The Long Fuse.

summer when…farmers seized power from every Crown-appointed official in Massachusetts.”62

of sovereignty happened in Massachusetts; however, the transfer of sovereignty of which

American Revolution, not the point at which Raphael argued.

The book Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789: A Documentary History of the American

Boston Massacre by a town committee.65

Dickinson’s Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer and Works of John Adams.

Knollenberg argued in Origins that:

They dared to change the world.

French were their enemies.

the British Empire.

but solely to raise revenue in the colonies.74

office by the Crown.76

defendant of a trial by jury.80

which depreciated the value, leading to the Currency Act of 1751.81

taxes or buy goods, thus crippling the colonial economy.84

other Burthens upon its own people”89 followed this claim.