Solante v.
COA that “if either party should attempt to annul or alter any of the stipulations of this deed or
G.R. No. 207348, 19 August 2014
FACTS:
The City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz Inc. entered into a Contract of Reclamation with land-
sharing agreement to be undertaken by the latter. The project was estimated to be
completed within six (6) years as stipulated in the contract. The parties executed an MOA
wherein all improvements by the F.F. Cruz on the City’s portion of the land shall belong
to the latter after project completion. The project was not completed within 6 years.
Thereafter, the DPWH contracted with F.F. Cruz to demolish improvements on the City’s
parcel of land for a road-widening project. Petitioner Solante, prepared disbursement
vouchers in favor of F.F. Cruz as payment for the demolished improvements. COA
disallowed the disbursement, stating that the failure of FF. Cruz to finish the project within
6 years means the project is deemed completed and that the City now owns the rights to
the demolished improvements, hence, F.F. Cruz cannot collect payments from the
demolition of the same.
ISSUE:
WON F.F. Cruz owned the improvements demolished.
RULING:
Yes. F.F. Cruz owned said properties and can collect the payments for their demolition.
SC ruled that a mere estimate of a period of project completion does not fall under the
definition of a fixed period or day certain as defined in law. Art. 1193 of the Civil Code
provides that: “Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed, shall be
demandable only when that day comes; Obligations with a resolutory period take effect
at once, but terminate upon arrival of the day certain; A day certain is understood to be
that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when; If the uncertainty
consists in whether the day will come or not, the obligation is conditional, and it shall be
regulated by the rules of the preceding Section.”
The lapse of the estimated 6-year period did not deem the project completed much less
bring about the fulfillment of the condition stipulated in the MOA (on the shift of ownership
over the demolished properties). As it were, the Mandaue-F.F.Cruz MOA states that the
structures built by F .F. Cruz on the property of the city will belong to the latter only upon
the completion of the project. Clearly, the completion of the project is a suspensive
condition that has yet to be fulfilled. Until the condition arises, ownership of the structures
properly pertains to F.F. Cruz. Petition is granted.
Ponce de Leon v. Syjuco
G.R. No. L-3316, 31 October 1951
FACTS:
Plaintiff obtained from defendant Syjuco two loans in 1944. One is for P200,000 obtained
on May 5, 1944, and another for P16,000 obtained on July 31, 1944. These two loans
appear in two promissory notes signed by the plaintiff which were couched in practically
the same terms and conditions and were secured by two deeds of mortgage covering the
same parcels of land. In said promissory notes it was expressly agreed upon that plaintiff
shall pay the loans “within one year from May 5, 1948, . . . peso for peso in the coin or
currency of the Government of the Philippines that, at the time of payment above fixed it
is the legal tender for public and private debts, with interests at the rate of 6% per annum,
payable in advance for the first year, and semi-annually in advance during the succeeding
years”, and that, the period above set forth having been established for the mutual benefit
of the debtor and creditor, the former binds himself to pay, and the latter not to demand
the payment of, the loans except within the period above mentioned. And as corollary to
having the above stipulations, it was likewise agreed upon in the two deeds of mortgage
of the note which it secures, or do anything which has for its purpose or effect an alteration
or annulment of any of said stipulations, he binds himself to indemnify the other for the
losses and damages, which the parties hereby liquidate and fix the amount of P200,000”.
The facts show that, on November 15, 1944, or thereabouts, contrary to the stipulation
above mentioned, plaintiff offered to pay to the defendant not only the principal sum due
on the two promissory notes but also all the interests which said principal sum may earn
up to the dates of maturity of the two notes, and as the defendant refused to accept the
payment so tendered, plaintiff deposited the money with the clerk of court and brought
this action to compel the defendant to accept it to relieve himself of further liability.
ISSUE:
Is the consignation made by the plaintiff valid in the light of the law and the stipulations
agreed upon in the two promissory notes signed by the plaintiff?
RULING:
Negative. In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must first comply with
certain requirements prescribed by law. The debtor must show (1) that there was a debt
due; (2) that the consignation of the obligation had been made bacause the creditor to
whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent for
incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount
due (Art. 1176, Civil Code); (3) that previous notice of the consignation has been given
to the person interested in the performance of the obligation (Art. 1177, Civil Code); (4)
that the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court (Art 1178, Civil Code); and
(5) that after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof
(Art. 1178, Civil Code). In the instant case, while it is admitted a debt existed, that the
consignation was made because of the refusal of the creditor to accept it, and the filing
of the complaint to compel its acceptance on the part of the creditor can be considered
sufficient notice of the consignation to the creditor, nevertheless, it appears that at least
two of the above requirements have not been complied with. Thus, it appears that plaintiff,
before making the consignation with the clerk of the court, failed to give previous notice
thereof to the person interested in the performance of the obligation. It also appears that
the obligation was not yet due and demandable when the money was consigned,
because, as already stated, by the very express provisions of the document evidencing
the same, the obligation was to be paid within one year after May 5, 1948, and the
consignation was made before this period matured. The failure of these two requirements
is enough ground to render the consignation ineffective. And it cannot be contended that
plaintiff is justified in accelerating the payment of the obligation because he was willing
to pay the interests due up to the date of its maturity, because, under the law, in a
monetary obligation contracted with a period, the presumption is that the same is deemed
constituted in favor of both the creditor and the debtor unless from its tenor or from other
circumstances it appears that the period has been established for the benefit of either
one of them (Art. 1127, Civil Code). Here no such exception or circumstance exists.
Buce v. CA
G.R. No. 136913, 12 May 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Buce leased a 56 square meter of land located at Quirino Avenue,
Pandacan, Manila. The lease was for a period of 15 years to commence on June 1, 1979
and subject to renewal for another 10 years, under the same terms and conditions.
Respondent Jose Tiongco, demanded a gradual increase in the rent for Php 1,000 on
1991. On December 1991, respondent wrote petitioner informing the increase of rent
pursuant to the Rent Control Law, effective on January 1992. However, petitioner
tendered checks dated October 1991 to January 1993 for only Php 400 payable to
respondent as administrator which the latter refused to accept. Petitioner filed a complaint
for specific performance which the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Appellate court
reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the period of lease is to renew the contract be given to the lessor.
RULING:
Yes. In the given case of contract of lease, it is given to the lessor. As a general rule
under Article 1196 of the Civil Code, the period of the lease contract is deemed to have
been set for the benefit of both parties. Renewal of the contract may be had only upon
their mutual agreement or at the will of both of them. In the given case, “this lease shall
be for a period of fifteen years effective June 1, 1979, subject to renewal for another ten
(10) years, under the same terms and conditions” does not mean an autmoctic extension
of the contract. The fact that the lessee was allowed to introduce improvements on the
property is not indicative of the intention of the lessors to automatically extend the
contract. However, in the given case, Tionco were not amenable to a renewal, they
cannot be compelled to execute a new contract when the old contract terminated on 1
June 1994. It is the owner-lessors prerogative to terminate the lease at its expiration. The
fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and
uncontrolled choice of the lessee and completely depriving the owner of any say in the
matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists
between the lessor and the lessee since the life of the contract would be dictated solely
by the lessee.
Araneta v. Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co.
G.R. No. L-22558, 31 May 1967
FACTS:
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. through Gregorio Araneta, Inc. sold a portion of their land to
Philippine Sugar Estates Development with a condition that the buyer will build a church
in the said land while the seller will construct a street within the property. The buyer had
already finished building the church while the seller had failed to do the construction of
the street in Northeast side because a certain person was occupying its middle portion
and refused to vacate.
Now the buyer filed a case in court contending that the seller must evict the person
occupying the property and finish the construction. The seller now contends that the case
was premature because it is without definite period. The lower court then gave a two year
period to seller to evict the squatter and to construct the street.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties agreed that the petitioner should have reasonable time to
perform its part of the bargain
RULING:
If the contract so provided, then there was a period fixed, a “reasonable time;” and all that
the court should have done was to determine if that reasonable time had already elapsed
when suit was filed if it had passed, then the court should declare that petitioner had
breached the contract, as averred in the complaint, and fix the resulting damages. On the
other hand, if the reasonable time had not yet elapsed, the court perforce was bound to
dismiss the action for being premature.
Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step process. The Court must first determine
that “the obligation does not fix a period but from the nature and the circumstances it can
be inferred that a period was intended”. The Court must then proceed to the second step,
and decide what period was “probably contemplated by the parties” So the Court cannot
fix a period merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable, but must set the
time that the parties are shown to have intended.
In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that the contract shows that the parties were
fully aware that the land described therein was occupied by squatters. As the parties must
have known that they could not take the law into their own hands, but must resort to legal
processes in evicting the squatters, they must have realized that the duration of the suits
to be brought would not be under their control nor could the same be determined in
advance. The conclusion is thus forced that the parties must have intended to defer the
performance of the obligations under the contract until the squatters were duly evicted,
as contended by the petitioner Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
Arco Pulp and Paper Co, v. Lim
G.R. No. 206806, 25 June 2014
FACTS:
Lim works in the business of supplying scrap papers, cartons, and other raw materials,
under the name Quality Paper and Plastic Products, Enterprises, to factories engaged in
the paper mill business. Lim delivered scrap papers to Arco Pulp and Paper Company,
Inc. The parties allegedly agreed that Arco Pulp and Paper would either pay Dan T. Lim
the value of the raw materials or deliver to him their finished products of equivalent value.
Arco Pulp and Paper and a certain Eric Sy executed a memorandum of agreement where
Arco Pulp and Paper bound themselves to deliver their finished products to Megapack
Container Corporation, owned by Eric Sy. The liability of Arco Pulp was now transferred
to Megapack in paying Lim. Dan T. Lim sent a letter to Arco Pulp and Paper demanding
payment but no payment was made to him. Now Lim filed a case against Arco Pulp. The
Arco Pulp now contends that their agreement was novated because of the MOA agreed
upon Sy and Arco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation between the parties was an alternative obligation
RULING:
Yes. The rule on alternative obligations is governed by Article 1199 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Article 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely
perform one of them.
The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other undertaking.
In an alternative obligation, there is more than one object, and the fulfillment of one is
sufficient, determined by the choice of the debtor who generally has the right of election.”
The right of election is extinguished when the party who may exercise that option
categorically and unequivocally makes his or her choice known.
Inchausti v. Yulo
G.R. No. L-7721, 25 March 1914
FACTS:
This suit is brought for the recovery of a certain sum of money, the balance of a current
account opened by the firm of Inchausti & Company with Teodor Yulo and after his death
continued by Gregorio Yulo as principal representative of his children. On Aug.12, 1909,
Gregorio Yulo, in representation of his 3 siblings, executed a notarial instrument, ratifying
all the contents of the prior document of Jan.26, 1908, severally and joint acknowledged
their indebtedness for P253,445.42, 10 % per annum, 5 installments. Plaintiff brought an
action againsta Gregorio for the payment of the said balance due. But on May 12, 1911,
3 siblings executed another instrument in recognition of the debt, reduced to P225,000,
interest reduced to 6% per annum, installments increased to 8.
They obligated themselves to pay but failed to pay right at the first instalment. An action
was brought against Gregorio Yulo. However, another notarial instrument was executed
by the Yulos inrecognition of the debt and the obligation of payment, and then asking
plaintiff to include in the filed suit Pedro Yulo, and in that case, they’d procure all means
for the judgment to be in favour of the plaintiff. However, the court ruled in favour of
Gregorio instead. Court reversed the judgment and held that plaintiff cansue Gregorio
Yulo alone since the Yulos obligated themselves in solidum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract constitute novation.
RULING:
The contract of May 12, 1911 does not constitute a novation of the former one of Aug.12,
1909, with respect to the other debtors who executed this contract. First, “in order that an
obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes it, it is necessary that it
should be so expressly declared or that the old and the new be incompatible in all
points(art. 1292). It is always necessary to state that it is the intentionof the contracting
parties to extinguish the former obligation by the new one.” The obligation to pay a sum
of money is not novated in a new instrument wherein the old is ratified, by changing only
the term of payment and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one.
The obligation being solidary, the remission of any part of the debt made by a creditor in
favor of one or more of the solidary debtors necessarily benefits the others, and therefore
there can be no doubt that, in accordance with the provision of Art. 1215, 1222, the
defendant has the right to enjoy the benefits of the partial remission. At present judgment
can be rendered only as to P112,500.
Quiombing v. CA
G.R. No. 93010, 30 August 1990
FACTS:
On August 30, 1983, Nicencio Tan Quiombing and Dante Biscocho, as the First Party,
jointly and severally bound themselves in a “Construction and Service Agreement” to
construct a house for private respondents Francisco and Manuelita Saligo, as the Second
Party, for the contract price of P137,940.00, which the latter agreed to pay. On October
10, 1984, Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a second written agreement
under which the latter acknowledged the completion of the house and undertook to pay
the balance of the contract price in the manner prescribed in the said second agreement.
On November 19, 1984, Manuelita Saligo signed a promissory note for P125,363.50
representing the amount still due from her and her husband, payable on or before
December 31, 1984, to Nicencio Tan Quiombing.
On October 9, 1986, Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount, plus
charges and interests, which the private respondents had acknowledged and promised
to pay but had not, despite repeated demands. Instead of filing an answer, the defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on February 4, 1987, contending that Biscocho was an
indispensable party and therefore should have been included as a co-plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Biscocho is an indispensable party in the case.
RULING:
Article 1212 of the Civil Code provides:
Each one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to the others, but not
anything which may be prejudice to the latter. Suing for the recovery of the contract price
is certainly a useful act that Quiombing could do by himself alone.
A joint obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable only for a proportionate part
of the debt, and each creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit. A
solidary obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each
creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. Hence, in the former, each creditor
can recover only his share of the obligation, and each debtor can be made to pay only
his part; whereas, in the latter, each creditor may enforce the entire obligation, and each
debtor may be obliged to pay it in full.
The essence of active solidarity consists in the authority of each creditor to claim and
enforce the rights of all, with the resulting obligation of paying every one what belongs to
him; there is no merger, much less a renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation.
The question of who should sue the private respondents was a personal issue between
Quiombing and Biscocho in which the spouses Saligo had no right to interfere. It did not
matter who as between them filed the complaint because the private respondents were
liable to either of the two as a solidary creditor for the full amount of the debt. Full
satisfaction of a judgment obtained against them by Quiombing would discharge their
obligation to Biscocho, and vice versa; hence, it was not necessary for both Quiombing
and Biscocho to file the complaint. Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when
Quiombing was competent to sue by himself alone, would be a useless formality.
Parenthetically, it must be observed that the complaint having been filed by the petitioner,
whatever amount is awarded against the debtor must be paid exclusively to him, pursuant
to Article 1214. This provision states that “the debtor may pay any of the solidary
creditors; but if any demand, judicial or extrajudicial, has been made by any one of them,
payment should be made to him.
If Quiombing eventually collects the amount due from the solidary debtors, Biscocho may
later claim his share thereof, but that decision is for him alone to make. It will affect only
the petitioner as the other solidary creditor and not the private respondents, who have
absolutely nothing to do with this matter. As far as they are concerned, payment of the
judgment debt to the complainant will be considered payment to the other solidary
creditor even if the latter was not a party to the suit.
Although he signed the original Construction and Service Agreement, Biscocho need not
be included as a co-plaintiff in the complaint filed by the petitioner against the private
respondents. Quiombing as solidary creditor can by himself alone enforce payment of the
construction costs by the private respondents and as a solidary debtor may by himself
alone be held liable for any possible breach of contract that may be proved by the private
respondents. In either case, the participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary, much
less indispensable.
Inciong v. CA
G.R. No. 96405, 26 June 1996
FACTS:
In February 1983, Rene Naybe took out a loan from Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBC) in the amount of P50k. For that he executed a promissory note in the same
amount. Naybe was able to convince Baldomero Inciong, Jr. and Gregorio Pantanosas
to co-sign with him as co-makers. The promissory note went due and it was left unpaid.
PBC demanded payment from the three but still no payment was made. PBC then sue
the three but PBC later released Pantanosas from its obligations. Naybe left for Saudi
Arabia hence can’t be issued summons and the complaint against him was subsequently
dropped. Inciong was left to face the suit. He argued that that since the complaint against
Naybe was dropped, and that Pantanosas was released from his obligations, he too
should have been released.a
ISSUE:
Whether or not Inciong should be held liable.
RULING:
Yes. Inciong is considering himself as a guarantor in the promissory note. And he was
basing his argument based on Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides that
guarantors are released from their obligations if the creditors shall release their debtors.
It is to be noted however that Inciong did not sign the promissory note as a guarantor. He
signed it as a solidary co-maker.
A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor does not become a
solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference between a solidary
co-debtor and a fiador in solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the liability he assumes
to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains
all the other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa;
while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed upon him.
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three
signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be
proceeded against for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor
(PBC) to determine against whom he will enforce collection. Consequently, the dismissal
of the case against Pontanosas may not be deemed as having discharged Inciong from
liability as well. As regards Naybe, suffice it to say that the court never acquired
jurisdiction over him. Inciong, therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers,
as provided by law.
Vigilla v. Phil. College of Criminology, Inc.
G.R. No. 200094, 10 June 2013
FACTS:
The petitioners work for the Philippine College of Criminology Inc. (PCCr) as janitors,
janitress, and supervisor in its maintenance department. The petitioners were made to
understand by the respondent PCCr that they are under the Metropolitan Building
Services, Inc. (MBMSI) which is a corporation engaged in providing janitorial services.
PCCr terminated the services of MBMSI on 2009 which resulted in the dismissal of the
petitioners. An illegal dismissal complaint was then filed against PCCr by the petitioners
contending that it is their real employer and not MBMSI. Subsequently, the PCCr
submitted to the Labor Arbiter waivers, releases, and quitclaims that were executed by
the petitioners in favor to MBMSI.
The Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of the petitioner, however upon filing the
petition for review on certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the CA ruled that the
quitclaims, releases, and waivers executed by the petitioners in favor to MBMSI redounds
to the benefit of PCCr by virtue of solidary liability under Article 1217 of the New Civil
Code. The petitioners contend that under Article 106 of the Labor Code a labor-only
contractor’s liability is not solidary as it is the employer who should be directly responsible
to the supplied worker.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quitclaims, releases, and waivers executed by the petitioners in favor
to MBMSI redounds to the benefit of PCCr?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the basis of the solidary liability of the principal with
those engaged in labor-only contracting is the last paragraph of Article 106 of the Labor
Code that provides, “In such cases of labor-only contracting, the person or intermediary
shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the
workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.”
It also pointed out D.O. No. 18-A, s. 2011 section 27 providing for the effects of labor-
only contracting “where upon the finding by competent authority of labor-only contracting
shall render the principal jointly and severally liable with the contractor to the latter’s
employees, in the same manner and extent that the principal is liable to employees
directly hired by him/her, as provided in Article 106 of the Labor Code.”
Hence, the PCCr’s solidary liability was already expunged by virtue of the releases,
waivers and quitclaims executed by the petitioners in favor of MBMSI by virtue of Article
1217 of the Civil Code providing that “payment made by one of the solidary debtors
extinguishes the obligation.”
Diamond Builders v. Country Bankers
G.R. No. 171820, 13 December 2007
FACTS:
Rogelio Acidre (sole proprietor of Diamond Builders) was sued by Marceliano Borja for
breach of his obligation to construct a residential and commercial building.
Rogelio entered into a compromise agreement with Borja.
Rogelio in order to secure himself entered into surety bond with Country Bankers. Under
the Surety Bond, Rogelio and his spouse and other petitioners, in this case, signed an
indemnity agreement consenting to their joint and several liabilities to Country Bankers
should the surety bond be executed uponRogelio violates the compromise agreement.
A writ of execution was issued against Country Bankers for violation of Rogelio to the
compromise agreement.
Country bankers paid the surety bond and ask for reimbursement from petitioners.
Petitioners refused to pay. Country bankers filed a complaint about the sum of money
against petitioners.
ISSUE:
W/N Country Bankers is entitled to reimbursement?
RULING:
YES. Art. 1217 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of reimbursement from a co-debtor
(principal co-debtor in case of suretyship) in favor of one who paid the surety.
Only payments made after the obligation has prescribed or became illegal shall not entitle
a solidary debtor for reimbursement (in accordance with Art. 1218).
Alipio v. CA
G.R. No. 134100, 29 September 2000
FACTS:
(1) Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito,
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September
12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his
lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the Manuel Spouses.
(2) The sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
P50,600.00.
(3) Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido
Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.
RTC: Surviving spouse should pay. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on the
ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death
of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.
CA: Surviving spouse should pay. It is noted that all the defendants, including the
deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants
cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract
has totally extinguished their obligation.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is
owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or
(2) Whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the decedent.
RULING:
(1) Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is liable. It is clear
that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It
was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money
and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death
of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint
about the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership
can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the
proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for
this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving
spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having
jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not
even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership
property is void. the inventory of the Alipios’ conjugal property is necessary before any
claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains
to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent’s estate and not to any
other court.
(2) The obligation is joint. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the
obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e.,
the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being
considered distinct from one another. Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely
joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their
respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided
into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
Lafarge Cement Phil v. Continental Cement
G.R. No. 155173, 23 November 2004
FACTS:
In the Letter of Intent (LOI) executed by both parties, Petitioner Lafarge Cement
Philippines, Inc. on behalf of its affiliates and other qualified entities agreed to purchase
the cement business of Respondent Continental Cement Corporation. Both parties
entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement knowing that respondent has a case
pending with the Supreme Court. In anticipation of future liability, the parties allegedly
agreed to retain from the purchase price a certain amount to be deposited in an account
for payment to the complainant who sued respondent herein. Upon the finality of the
decision of the said case wherein liability was imposed to the respondent, petitioner
allegedly refused to apply the sum for payment despite repeated instructions of the
Respondent. Respondent filed a Complaint with Application for Preliminary Attachment
against petitioners.
Petitioners filed their Answer and Compulsory Counterclaims denying all the allegations
and alleged that respondent`s majority stockholder (Lim) which is also the company
president and the corporate secretary (Mariano), influences respondent to file the
baseless complaint and procured the Writ of Attachment in bad faith. Hence, petitioners
prayed that both the president and corporate secretary be held jointly and solidarily liable
with respondent. RTC dismissed petitioner`s counterclaims.
ISSUE:
May defendants in civil cases implead in their counterclaims persons who were not
parties to the original complaint?
RULING:
Counterclaims are defined in Section 6 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as any
claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. They are generally
allowed in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to facilitate the disposition of the whole
controversy in a single action, such that the defendants demand may be adjudged by a
counterclaim rather than by an independent suit. The only limitations to this principle are
(1) that the court should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim, and
(2) that it could acquire jurisdiction over third parties whose presence is essential for its
adjudication.
The general rule that a defendant cannot by a counterclaim bring into the action any claim
against persons other than the plaintiff admits of an exception under Section 14, Rule 6
which provides that when the presence of parties other than those to the original action
is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or
cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over
them can be obtained.
The foregoing procedural rules are founded on practicality and convenience. They are
meant to discourage duplicity and multiplicity of suits. This objective is negated by
insisting — as the court a quo has done — that the compulsory counterclaim for damages
be dismissed, only to have it possibly re-filed in a separate proceeding. Respondents Lim
and Mariano are real parties in interest to the compulsory counterclaim; it is imperative
that they be joined therein. Moreover, in joining Lim and Mariano in the compulsory
counterclaim, petitioners are being consistent with the solidary nature of the liability
alleged therein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The
court of origin is hereby ORDERED to take cognizance of the counterclaims pleaded in
petitioners Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims and to cause the service of summons
on Respondents Gregory T. Lim and Anthony A. Mariano.