790027
research-article2018
EMR0010.1177/1754073918790027Emotion ReviewHess Why Are Schadenfreude and Gluckschmerz Not Happiness or Anger
Comment
Why Are Schadenfreude and Gluckschmerz Not
Happiness or Anger? Or Are They?
Ursula Hess
Department of Psychology, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Germany
Abstract
This comment on Smith and van Dijk’s discussion of the antecedents and
consequences of schadenfreude and gluckschmerz considers these emotions
in an appraisal framework and discusses the usefulness of naming emotions
that do not come with ready-made labels in many languages.
Keywords
emotion, goal, jealousy, motivation
Smith and van Dijk (XXXX) discuss the antecedents and conse-
quences of two emotions, schadenfreude and the more recently
coined gluckschmerz. Both terms are presented as compound
nouns from the German that combine a term for a negative event
(schaden = damage) with a positive emotion (freude = joy) or
a positive event (glück = good luck) with a negative affect
(schmerz = pain). In German, the latter would actually combine
into “Glücksschmerz.” The article outlines the psychological
antecedents and consequences of positive emotional reactions
to negative elicitors and vice versa negative emotional reactions
to positive elicitors. Notably, the events are positive and nega-
tive for others. That is, both emotions are defined through their
shared object—the fortune of others—and their positivity and
negativity is not intrinsic (like the positivity of chocolates) but
rather defined through their goal conduciveness for the emoter.
By definition, then, the emotions of the observer do not match
the emotions of the observed person, and the authors discuss the
process underlying this mismatch and the wider consequences
that follow.
The authors (Smith & van Dijk, XXXX) emphasize balance
theory and an “appraisal of deservingness” and then link both
emotions to appraisal theory and evolutionary theory. The
authors specifically emphasize the appraisal of “deserving-
ness.” The antecedents of both schadenfreude and gluck-
schmerz are events that are seen as (un)deserved. This is not
really much different than the more commonly referred to
appraisal of justice or fairness. The authors distinguish this
Corresponding author: Ursula Hess, Department of Psychology, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Rudower Chaussee 18, Berlin, 12489, Germany. Email: ursula.hess@hu-berlin.de
Emotion Review
Vol. 10, No. 4 (October 2018) 1­–2
© The Author(s) 2018
ISSN 1754-0739
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073918790027
DOI: 10.1177/1754073918790027
journals.sagepub.com/home/er
antecedent from one where good fortune falls to a disliked out-
group, leading to gluckschmerz, but this also could be sub-
sumed under the heading of deservingness or fairness.
In most versions of appraisal theory (Ellsworth & Scherer,
2003), organisms appraise events according to a more or less
common list of dimensions. One important dimension is pleas-
antness, which also is very relevant to dimensional theories
(Russell, 2003). Yet, pleasantness can be considered an intrin-
sic property of an event (Scherer, 1987) or it can be conflated
with goal conduciveness—the question of whether this event
is congruent with my current goals. Early theoretical thinking
focused on the pleasantness and goal conduciveness for the
emoter, not for another person. In the case of schadenfreude
and gluckschmerz, the event is presumed to be (un)pleasant for
someone else. It becomes pleasant or unpleasant to the emoter
only through its goal conduciveness for them, which in turn is
closely linked to perceptions of fairness. Thus, in some ways,
one could subsume schadenfreude under the heading of a goal-
conducive event that is considered fair and, hence, an instance
of happiness. Gluckschmerz could be a goal-obstructive event
that is considered unfair and, hence, a likely instance of anger.
Yet, the authors (Smith & van Dijk, XXXX) clearly do not
think so.
When considering the process in detail, it becomes obvious
that both emotions are not actually elicited by the appraisal of
an event. Rather, they are elicited by an appraisal of the pre-
sumed appraisal of the event by the protagonist. Or in other
words, by an appraisal of the social appraisal (Fischer &
Manstead, 2008; Hareli & Hess, 2010) of an event as seen by
the person who experiences it. That is, observers first have to
appraise an event from the perspective of a person who, for
example, slips on a banana peel, and then they appraise the out-
come with regard to their own goals. When the person who slips
is an old lady, the emotion would likely be pity or empathic
distress, but when it is an arrogant twit or a member of a disliked
group, the emotion would be schadenfreude. This, then, links
both emotions strongly with empathy. In some ways, one could
say that schadenfreude and glucksckmerz are empathy gone
2  Emotion Review Vol. 10 No. 4
wrong. We understand the other and their plight or fortune, but
we consider them undeserving of our pity or vicarious happi-
ness and the converse emotion results. Interestingly, this sug-
gests that we need a minimum of perspective taking, of the
ability to understand others, to feel these emotions.
Yet, are schadenfreude and gluckschmerz distinct emotions
different from happiness and anger? And if so, what would that
mean? Appraisal theory (Scherer, 1987) can describe many
thousands of emotions but these are, in the end, quantitative dif-
ferences that regroup into a much smaller number of qualita-
tively different families of states. Not all of them are labeled
and, in fact, schadenfreude as a separate emotion label is found
only in a few languages and the label gluckschmerz had to be
created from scratch. Yet, as the authors (Smith & van Dijk,
XXXX) outline, when thinking about intergroup behaviors,
these labels come in very useful. When talking about the world,
labels are required, and this applies also to our emotional world.
Yet, should we label every shade of happiness? Every grade of
anger? Should social concerns decide which emotion we label?
This article on old and new emotion words (Smith & van
Dijk, XXXX) raises important questions about the aims of theo-
ries of emotion and the power and limits of language in this
context. On the one hand, language is for communication and
has to adapt to the objects that need to be named. Ancient Rome
had no Latin word for cell phone, but the Vatican has (telepho-
nium portabile). Hence, when we talk about emotions in our
social world, labels such as schadenfreude and gluckschmerz
seem handy, yet it is notable that most languages do not actually
feature these labels. Given the authors’ (XXXX) arguments, this
is deserving of thought. That the emoter does not like to
acknowledge these emotions cannot be the only reason as few
emoters are willing to acknowledge envy, yet the word exists in
many languages. On the other hand, with regard to emotion
theory, the aim is to describe underlying processes, not surface
events. From that perspective, happiness and anger as labels
may suffice. Yet, on the third hand, it is time to expand beyond
“basic emotions” and to study in more detail, and maybe also
label, the many hitherto nameless members of the emotion fam-
ilies, and gluckschmerz is a good start.
ORCID iD
Ursula Hess https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6793-7282
References
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Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2008). Social functions of emotion.
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emotions (3rd ed., pp. 456–468). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
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