1
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO,
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3
a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1)
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and
cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives
from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring
the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2)
that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was
partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned;
but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and
things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of
the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a)
those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
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herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If
these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or
any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States
(C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the
corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs.
United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof,
are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the
nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon
the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
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herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under
the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining
to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in
line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be
allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against
the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach
and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned
Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
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In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to
be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen
years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used
against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule
the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court
held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion
of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion
of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential
part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
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Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to
the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the
illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this
Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of
Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under
the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession
of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the
alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the
approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to
said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions
said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned
affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein
expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary
to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be,
as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences
of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine
(29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
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It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the
following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in
this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in
violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said
search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,
should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are
expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made are
expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said
residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily
demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three
residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains
from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such
other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the
immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time,
the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three
residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly
and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures
made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind,
cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of
the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the
said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were
illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity
or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or
seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the
pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal
standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers
and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
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Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost
verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the
many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially
the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of
an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a)
ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership
and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises
searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives
"standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that,
excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some
of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation,
"the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants
were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned
by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants
directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply
of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were
actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under
the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a
motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored
in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk
neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12,
1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful
searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature
and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel
room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases
which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of
differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment
have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S.,
87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72
S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
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Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and
documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and
suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be
recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts;
Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had
paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army
& Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary
interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently
gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the
nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to
maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the
unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We
are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into
the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31,
carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures
ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion
to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate
records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is
to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home
during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own
or the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and
seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized
article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted.
(Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place
searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the
protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335
U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree
he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official
view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs.
Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones
was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was
enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search
occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole
stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
 9
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra.
The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and
second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in
the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation'
premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should
not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and
seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant
did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a
substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683,
(10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk
in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself)
used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and
Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs.
United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage
and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government
contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers
were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the
subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal
rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable
search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of
compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them.
Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed
against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell,
242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with
an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in
turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business
papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell
was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own
the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for
the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones
vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F.
2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out
that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were
directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in
the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant
described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
 10

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to
move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records
stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises
searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d
498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the
United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell
is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners'
family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the
case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much
closer than in Birrell.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things
which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that
the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses
and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them
as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to
corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of
which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of
the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower
courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the
suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners
likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely
corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the
warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the
narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of
the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by
them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional
proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the
return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no
matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of
the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably
show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the
petitioners.
 11
RAUL L. LAMBINO G.R. No. 174153 vs THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Promulgated: October 25, 2006
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denying due course to an initiative petition
to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino Group), with other groups[1] and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section
5(b) and (c)[2] and Section 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act (RA 6735).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article XVIII entitled
Transitory Provisions.[6] These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters
ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII
AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.[7]
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Courts ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections[8] declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.[9]
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August
2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding
precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the
parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of
the will of the sovereign people.
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (Binay Group) pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be
cited in contempt for the COMELECs verification of signatures and for
entertaining the Lambino Groups petition despite the permanent injunction in
 12
Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Groups petition as an
opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Groups petition, the Solicitor General joined
causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the
Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and
its implementing rules as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or
opposing the Lambino Groups petition. The supporting intervenors[10] uniformly
hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying
on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors[11] hold the contrary
view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors
also challenged (1) the Lambino Groups standing to file the petition; (2) the
validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino
Groups compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters
supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;[12] (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not
mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Groups compliance with the requirement in
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September
2006. After receiving the parties memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
peoples initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to the Lambino Groups petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Courts ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of
an amendment directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,
thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to
them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they
sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.
 13
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in
a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed[14] the concept of peoples
initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States[15] which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the
people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.[16]
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of
an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting,
downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not
be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case,
the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.[17] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,[18] the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of full text provisions that apply to amendments by initiative
commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can
intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition.); x x x (publication of
full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is essential for the
elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted
from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.) (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.[19]
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that
the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires
that the people must sign the petition x x x as signatories.
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people.
The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present
the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often
pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
 14
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet[20] after the oral arguments of
26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The
signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet
attached[21] to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by
intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadras opposition and the signature sheet
attached to the Lambino Groups Memorandum are the same. We reproduce
below the signature sheet in full:
PROPOSITION: DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI
AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
ANOTHER?
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My
signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Groups
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26
September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the
signature sheet is not the petition that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering
from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the
signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Groups draft petition which they
later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also
circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty.
Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006
petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February
2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentados
Verification/Certification of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal
capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities
of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached,
and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to
the present petition. However, the Official Website of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines[22] has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLES
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLES INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the
Peoples Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as
embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the
members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives
in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
 15
WHEREAS, the Peoples Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by
Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has
submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress
which militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of
Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has
unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through Peoples
Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue
the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL
THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLES
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLES INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14
January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to
prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition,
filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 support(s) the porposals
(sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through peoples
initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution. The
proposals of the Consultative Commission[24] are vastly different from the
proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30
August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all
provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory
Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and
the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the
Lambino Groups proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Groups proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution,
including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six
months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the
draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with
the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt
on the Lambino Groups claim that they circulated the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the
draft petition or to the Lambino Groups proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4
and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated
and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because
the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February
to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the
petition of 25 August 2006 inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August
2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of
the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group
did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or
circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the
Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC, thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that (w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act. [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus,
the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
 16
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have
understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Groups statement that they circulated to the people the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu
Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets
did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the
Lambino Group alleged that they circulated the petition for initiative but failed to
mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated
during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended
petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act. The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change
attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition.
The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the
petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must
be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In
the present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Groups
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from
February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the
petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino
Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed
and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the
amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group
admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed
only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with
the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print
additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how
many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the
printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Groups Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the
Lambino Group expressly admits that petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x.[25] This
admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the
Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great
majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received
with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution
with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition
to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with
the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming
ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached
petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed
the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible
for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition
before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition
before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Groups signature sheets do not contain the full text of
the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as
attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner
Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds
the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature
sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed
changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with
the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition. The signature sheet is not the petition
envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They
could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among
which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted
and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;[26]
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely
until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to
 17
call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament
will determine the expiration of their own term of office; [27]
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes,
the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions
to the Constitution.[28]
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino
Groups signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no
idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes
are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these
proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group
assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed
changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the
proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the
amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members
of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be
held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires
that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the
local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed
changes, could have easily written the word next before the phrase election of all
local government officials. This would have insured that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the
ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word next
allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own
term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to
hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even
beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament.
Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to
the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his
group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely
on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result
is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the
proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Groups initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed
the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to
make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section
4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a surplusage
and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage,
this provision invalidates the Lambino Groups initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire
proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,[29] the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes logrolling, which, if
our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very
broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendments proponents
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must
give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x
The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the
 18
proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the
requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine,[30] the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against inadvertence, stealth
and fraud in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems
that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase
the likelihood of an initiatives passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
inadvertence, stealth and fraud in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised
process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use
simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the
election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the
several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the
initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the
interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the
absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion
whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section
4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending
or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also
explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the
interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments
or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect
of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not directly proposed by
the people because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the
proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Groups amended
petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory
Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of
Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will
all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present
Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the
interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime
Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does
not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime
Minister will come only from the present members of the House of
Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The
6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that
their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could
not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010,
the interim Parliaments choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing
House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and
can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution
requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a
petition - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed,
faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even
if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full
 19
text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the
petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Groups initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of
the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third
mode is through a peoples initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to [A]ny
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article
XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to [A]mendments to this Constitution.
This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1.
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago,
this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would
only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
 20
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between amendment and revision of the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that a peoples initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people
the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States.
Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,[32] the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x
x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of laws and
amendments to the Constitution and does not purport to extend to a constitutional
revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove.
Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
the measure) now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner
should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:[33]
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may
be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments,
revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The
constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment
and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in
question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it
is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part
on the revision of the constitution drafted by the Commission for Constitutional
Revision authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the
1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's
majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed
of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored
by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present
constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be
submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be
proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1.
xxxx
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a peoples initiative can
only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed
by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:[34]
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in
the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost
invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to
adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so,
act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional
law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method
by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental
law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution,
cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitution ― that a peoples initiative may only amend, never
revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Groups initiative constitutes a revision,
then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction
described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
 21
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term amendment implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of
the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to
the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:
the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions.[36] The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.[37] Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of
its Branches.[38] A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances.[39]
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is
a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.[40] Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic
plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when
the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Groups
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from
the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,[42] an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the
Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The
issue turned on whether the initiative was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the]
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside
the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all
of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult
to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the
 22
whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were
adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next
session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission
of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos
would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain from
an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women
and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968
was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable,
accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very
quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the
initiative petition here.[43] (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present
petition. The Lambino Groups initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative
departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive
department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida
Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. In the Lambino Groups present initiative, no less than 105 provisions
of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.[44] There is no doubt that the Lambino Groups present
initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the
initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and
revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits
that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative
body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the
changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession,
or vocation out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their
Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions
expressly provide for both amendment and revision when it speaks of legislators
and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for
amendment when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent
distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the
common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words
revision and amendment pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up
with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between amendment and revision cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in
the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group
wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in
the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely
amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter
of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution
contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate
from such categorical intent and language.[45] Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration.
More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any
jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Groups position. Any theory advocating
that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does
not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in
American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v.
Keisling,[46] the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
 23
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely
provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change
to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They
assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by
reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to a formal overhauling of the constitution. They argue
that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the
original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and
radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of
citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure will refashion
the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law, the trial court correctly held
that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the
prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not
prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme
Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by
initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing
Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the
initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no
similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution. x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: It is the only
section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision
and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a
measure before the electorate. x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not
apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Groups theory which negates the
express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for
amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the
spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end
of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical
overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several
sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution
without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing
the voting age from 18 years to 15 years[47] is an amendment and not a revision.
Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from
100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.[48] Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.[49]
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or
articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of
checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples
are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where
the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II[50] of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will
have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system
of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions,
but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions
allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not
revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions states:
 24
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Groups draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that
in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government. The
effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one shall be
amended, which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty.
Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a
future amendment is a surplusage. In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the
rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in
case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the Parliamentary
system of government, and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a
unicameral parliamentary form of government.
Now, what unicameral parliamentary form of government do the Lambino Groups
proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New
Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments?
The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German,
Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral
parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they
were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the peoples initiative is not meant for revisions of
the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of
the Constitution through a peoples initiative will only result in gross absurdities in
the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Groups initiative is a
revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
limiting the scope of a peoples initiative to [A]mendments to this Constitution.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit
this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute
if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such
avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some
other grounds.[51]
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the
constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with
RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires
that the petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories. Section
5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the petition x x x as
signatories.
 25
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino,
Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado,
Petitioners. In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act together with
the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition
and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the
Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735
stating, No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; x x x. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions,
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter,
RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even
if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Groups initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing
the Lambino Groups Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Groups initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc
merely followed this Courts ruling in Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.[52] For following this Courts
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this
ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition
filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in
the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997,
and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect
and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the
Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly
specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in
unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of
the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that
comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the
rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the
total votes cast[53] − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11
February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full
expression of the peoples sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed
modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by
the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes
that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means
subverting the peoples sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one
act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect
the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or let the people decide
cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in
the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the peoples fundamental
covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily
susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the
nations stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the peoples voice. However, the
Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the
verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms. The Lambino Group thus admits that
their peoples initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda of the incumbent
President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of peoples voice or sovereign will in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution.
The Constitution, which embodies the peoples sovereign will, is the bible of this
Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to
alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
 26
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Courts raison
d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were
consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children
who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled
from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs,
to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the
Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high
school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan,
Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who
belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some
100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.
In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school
students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's
Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M.
Ganal.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and
by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony,
which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National anthem.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or
cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony
herein provided.
Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in
accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after
proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its
head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at
least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag-ceremony provided by this Act,
the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the
cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution
responsible for such failure.
The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and
private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered
at sunset. The flag-staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of
such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or
within the compound.
 27

2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be
conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the
I will be a true, Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its
premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put
away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats
shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously
give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the
command to "guard ourselves from
school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be
played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be idols — 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol
raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in
attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the hat compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the
over the heart. Those without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution
straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute protect against official control (p. 10, Rollo).
prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and
completed upon last note of the anthem.
This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.
unison the following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version), which may bring
the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools
which are intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.,
106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960).
This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:
English Version

The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
I love the Philippines. national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it
and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of
It is the land of my birth;
church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
It is the home of my people. significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute
is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official
It protects me and helps me to be, strong, happy and useful. or by a candidate for admission to the bar.

In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;

I will obey the rules of my school;

 28
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary
of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said
students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem,
Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed
upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all
educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of
public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things,
civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.
The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag
ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school
population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws,
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. (pp. 2-3).
Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:
The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act
1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the
observance of the flag salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and
profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag
stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion.
(Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150).
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28,
Title VI, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which
took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette,
Vol. 63, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative
cachet to the ruling in Gerona, thus:
5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag
ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation.
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the
above provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only
Republic Act No. 1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS.
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the
Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools,
Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr. Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso,
Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision in Gerona, issued
Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R.
No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private
Educational institutions as follows:
1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils,
students, and school employees in public schools who refuse to salute the Philippine
flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony because of some religious belief.
2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS
Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations) but
also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to inculcate patriotism and
nationalism.
3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any
manner whatever a justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not participating in
flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Philippine says:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it
and the Constitution guarantee and protect. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al.,
106 Phil. 11.)
4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance,
the Supreme Court asserts:
 29
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give
way to the latter. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)
5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the
daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in Department
Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be considered removed from the service after due
process.
6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme
Court has this to say:
If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more.
According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected not to
comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public
schools. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)
7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who
choose not to participate in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag. (pp. 147-148,
Rollo of G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis supplied).
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of
Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School,
the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect
promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the
end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of
G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887), but they refused to sign the
"Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met
with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990,
excerpts from which reveal the following:
After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents on
October 2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the
Republic of the Philippines during Flag Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated
by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this Office hereby orders the dropping from
the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah Witness pupils
from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
xxx xxx xxx
This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated
November 17, 1989 by virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21, 1955
in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and Supreme Court Decision of a case
"Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The Honorable Secretary of
Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against their
favor. (p. 149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered
the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which
is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend
public schools." (p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.
Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo Elementary
School with the information that this office is sad to order the dropping of Jeremias
Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III and IV pupils respectively from the roll since
they opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law (R.A.
1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the
regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools
(Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they
change their mind to respect and follow the Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted.
(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG
 30

District Supervisor iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the
re-admission of petitioners to their respective schools. (p. 41, Rollo.)

(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)

The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the
Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay
National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School,
Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School,
San Juan Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando,
Cebu, upon order of then Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted
some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro
Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)
and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary
restraining order be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of
the petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately
re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court
(p. 57, Rollo).

The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents in these cases.
because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division
Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor.
Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions
Witnesses.
(p. 98, Rollo) defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the
grounds that:

On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in
anti-social school children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their
right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The petitioners pray that:
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's
Witnesses that the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are
violative of their freedom of religion and worship.
c. Judgment be rendered:

3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates

i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein
respect and love of country, for which the flag stands.
petitioners from their respective schools;

4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations
ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from
in question do not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's
their classes or otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived
religious convictions.
 31
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified,
besides having scriptural basis.
7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of
Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court in Gerona
upholding the flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to
obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative
cachet by its in corporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court
believes that the time has come to re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a
flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from
school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their
teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free
exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution;
Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (J. Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show
their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings
(Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since
they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting
opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and
present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the
expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few
participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and
uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country,
admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and
all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and
was granted an exemption. (Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's
Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism,
love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106
Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the
arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of
profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through
 32
the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs,
will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the
appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to
others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But
freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . —
assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal
that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end
cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L.
ed. 1042, 1046.)
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the
exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop
agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching
of their church not to join any labor group:
. . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the
land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to
be granted unless some "compelling state interests" intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Berner,
374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.)
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185
SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free
exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions
that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how
such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of
a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan,
135 SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our
country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of
the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier.
Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and
our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that
made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and
sovereignty of our nation.
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution
to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope,
nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in
order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion
orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by
this Court is hereby made permanent.
 33
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CORTES, J.:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information,
petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the
fundamental right to information. The same remedy was resorted to in the
case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136
SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973
Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the
right in said Constitution the statutory right to information provided for in the
Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a
newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand
access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering
data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil.
383 [1948]).
The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained
recognition in the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which
states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the
citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided
amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the
phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development." The new provision reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
 34

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made
means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly
ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of
Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which that:
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11,
Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may
* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result,
proceeding such as this one.
it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915,
April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due
course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the
ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
the general "public" which possesses the right.
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the
information he seeks.

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case,
supra, when it held that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in
1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been
any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records
instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal,
relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be
corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:
enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix,
77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an
"aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be
enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. * * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it
embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and
existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought
are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. ***
In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the
(Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).
petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of
any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to
 35
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find
no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect
that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional
regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the
limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary
exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5).
Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment
on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the
Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution
and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents
to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further
enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public
disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in
Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by
what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials
concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We
found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality.
The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever
as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v.
Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing
the examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the
Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is
unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law
of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative
to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before
public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody
thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra
at 388). (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government
agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by
the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of
Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect,
examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However, the
regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage
to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the
duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees
may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection
may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)
 36
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a
municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal
docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed
against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of
the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating
Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the
subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held
that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of examining
the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to
a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the
access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access
to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec.
6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency
charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is
to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records
may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional
right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory
by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not
being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of
mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee.
3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free
flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm.
Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of
general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard
Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better perspective of the vital
issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is
not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations
as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10;
and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional
Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest,
and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having
custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case
of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern,
that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
 37
To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and
interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511
[1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the
public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of
those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in
violation of the Constitution.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of
certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions
which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at
all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions.
b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest.
For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the
species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility,
the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass
the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of
civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission
to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of
eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service
eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi.