Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Meaning of Rehabilitation
In January 2004, Republic Act No. 8799 (RA 8799), otherwise known as
the Securities Regulation Code, amended Section 5 of PD 902-A, and
transferred to the Regional Trial Courts the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) over petitions of corporations, partnerships or
associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases
where the corporation, partnership or association possesses property to cover
all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the
management of a rehabilitation receiver or a management committee.
In New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City,
the Court enumerated the basic procedure in corporate rehabilitation cases.
The Court held:
Suspension/Stay Order
Under Section 6, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules, if the court finds the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, it shall issue, not later than five
(5) days from the filing of the petition, an Order with the following pertinent
effects:
(d) prohibiting the debtor from making any payment of its liabilities
outstanding as at the date of filing of the petition;
The stay order shall be effective from the date of its issuance until the
dismissal of the petition or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings.
Under the Interim Rules, the petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation
plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of 180 days from the date of the
initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it
appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for
approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed 18 months from the
date of filing of the petition.
Exns:
Under the Interim Rules, the only pertinent reference to creditor security
is found in Section 12, Rule 4 on relief from, modification or termination of stay
order. Said provision states that the creditor is regarded as lacking adequate
protection if it can be shown that:
(a) the debtor fails or refuses to honor a pre-existing agreement with the
creditor to keep the property insured;
Upon a showing that the creditor is lacking in protection, the court shall
order the rehabilitation receiver to take steps to ensure that the property is
insured or maintained or to make payment or provide replacement security
such that the obligation is fully secured. If such arrangements are not feasible,
the court may allow the secured creditor to enforce its claim against the debtor.
Nonetheless, the court may deny the creditor the foregoing remedies if allowing
so would prevent the continuation of the debtor as a going concern or
otherwise prevent the approval and implementation of a rehabilitation plan.
The commitment embodied in the pari passu principle only goes so far as
to ensure that the assets of the distressed corporation are held in trust for the
equal benefit of all creditors. It does not espouse absolute equality in all
aspects of debt restructuring.
Case 1: Express Investment III vs. Bayan Telecom (687 SCRA 50 2012)
Facts
On various dates between the years 1995 and 2001, Bayantel entered
into several credit agreements with different financial institutions with a
security of mortgages and Omnibus Agreement (Assignment Agreement of
certain properties).
Due to the failure of Bayantel to settle its obligation, the Bank of New
York filed a petition for the corporate rehabilitation of Bayantel upon the
instructions of the Informal Steering Committee. Bayantel submitted a
rehabilitation plan to the court. The RTC issued a stay order and upholding the
pari passu treatment for the rehabilitation of Bayantel.
Issue:
Ruling
First Issue: Yes, the principle of equality in equity has been cited as the
basis for placing secured and unsecured creditors in equal footing or in pari
passu with each other during rehabilitation. In legal parlance, pari passu is
used especially of creditors who, in marshaling assets, are entitled to receive
out of the same fund without any precedence over each other.
Section 24(d), Rule 4 of the Interim Rules states that contracts and other
arrangements between the debtor and its creditors shall be interpreted as
continuing to apply, this holds true only to the extent that they do not conflict
with the provisions of the plan. Here, the stipulation in the Assignment
Agreement to the effect that respondent Bayantel shall pay petitioners in full
and ahead of other creditors out of its cash flow during rehabilitation directly
impinges on the provision of the approved Rehabilitation Plan that “[t]he
creditors of Bayantel, whether secured or unsecured, should be treated equally
and on the same footing or pari passu until the rehabilitation proceedings is
terminated in accordance with the Interim Rules.”
Case 2: Umale vs. ASB Realty Corp. 652 SCRA 215 2011
Facts
This case involves a parcel of land owned by Amethyst a company that is, in
turn, wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty Corporation (ASB Realty). Amethyst
Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor
of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearls outstanding
capital stock from ASB Realty. ASB and Umale entered into a contract of lease to the
same property. However, upon the expiration of the contract, and upon demand of
ASB to pay and vacate the premise, Umale, left the demand unheeded and even
constructed a commercial building thereon. This prompted ASB to file a unlawful
detainer case.
On the other hand, Umale challenged ASB Realtys personality to recover the
subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a rehabilitation receiver had
been duly appointed. Under Section 14(s), Rule 4 of the Administrative
Memorandum No. 00-8-10SC, otherwise known as the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), it is the rehabilitation receiver that has the
power to take possession, control and custody of the debtors assets. Since ASB
Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that
should sue to recover possession of the same.
Issue:
WON a corporation placed under receivership has no cause of action in
an unlawful detainer case
Ruling
There is no denying that ASB Realty, as the owner of the leased premises, is the real
party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Indeed, PD 902-A, as amended, provides that the receiver shall have the
powers enumerated under Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. But Rule 59 is a rule of
general application. It applies to different kinds of receivers rehabilitation receivers,
receivers of entities under management, ordinary receivers, receivers in liquidation
and for different kinds of situations. While the SEC has the discretion to authorize
the rehabilitation receiver, as the case may warrant, to exercise the powers in Rule
59, the SECs exercise of such discretion cannot simply be assumed. There is no
allegation whatsoever in this case that the SEC gave ASB Realtys rehabilitation
receiver the exclusive right to sue.
Facts
Wonder Book and eight (8) other corporations, collectively known as the
Limtong Group of Companies (LGC), filed a joint petition for rehabilitation with
the RTC. Thereafter, a stay order was issued.
Equitable PCI Bank (EPCI Bank), one of the creditors of LGC, filed an
opposition raising, among others, the impropriety of nine (9) corporations with
separate and distinct personalities seeking joint rehabilitation under one
proceeding. However, the petition for rehabilitation was approved. On appeal,
the decision was reversed, denying the petition of LGC for rehabilitation.
Issue:
WON the rehabilitation plan is feasible and the opposition entered
by the creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities is unreasonable.
Ruling
Facts
The Labor Arbiter held that the order of the SEC suspending all actions
for claims against petitioners does not cover the claims of private respondents
in the labor cases because said claims and the concomitant liability of
petitioners still had to be determined, thus carrying no dissipation of the assets
of petitioners.
Issue
WON the proceeding in labor for employees claim will be suspended
by virtue of suspension order issued by the SEC.
Ruling
Case 5: Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega (360 SCRA 33)
2001
Facts
The Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of
the Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans Bank
Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto
V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits
with said court.
After years, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for
the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Despite the legislative
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued
with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that
respondents were set to order the payment and release of employee benefits
upon motion of another lawyer, while petitioners’ claims have been frozen to
their prejudice.
Issue
Ruling
Case 6: Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency Inc. vs. First Dominion
Prime Holdings 678 SCRA 168 (2012)
Facts
The Rehabilitation court issued a stay order. After its publication, the
rehabilitation plan was approved. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money and Damages against Clearwater and/or Atty. Jacob in his
capacity as appointed Receiver before the Metropolitan Trial Court to recover
the same amount.
Issue
WON the petitioner’s action to enforce the payment of the unpaid
security services is covered by the Amended Rehabilitation Plan such
that petitioner can no longer institute a separate action to collect the
same.
Ruling
YES. An essential function of corporate rehabilitation is the mechanism
of suspension of all actions and claims against the distressed corporation upon
the due appointment of a management committee or rehabilitation
receiver. Section 6(c) of PD 902-A mandates that upon appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, all actions for
claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management
or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board, or body shall be
suspended. The actions to be suspended cover all claims against a distressed
corporation whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage,
labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of pecuniary nature.
Jurisprudence is settled that the suspension of proceedings referred to in the
law uniformly applies to "all actions for claims" filed against the corporation,
partnership or association under management or receivership, without
distinction, except only those expenses incurred in the ordinary course of
business. The stay order is effective on all creditors of the corporation without
distinction, whether secured or unsecured.
Facts
Maynilad was put in rehabilitation, the bank which provides for the
irrevocable letters of credit seek the rehabilitation court to enjoin any action
against it. The Rehabilitation Court by virtue of suspension order, suspended
any action that MWSS may have against the foreign banks. MWSS opposed the
suspension claiming that the said suspension is not applicable in the case at
hand.
Issue
Ruling
NO. Sec. 6 (b) of Rule 4 of the Interim Rules does not enjoin the
enforcement of all claims against guarantors and sureties, but only those
claims against guarantors and sureties who are not solidarily liable with
the debtor. Respondent Maynilads claim that the banks are not solidarily
liable with the debtor does not find support in jurisprudence.
We held in Feati Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals[ that the
concept of guarantee vis--vis the concept of an irrevocable letter of credit are
inconsistent with each other. The guarantee theory destroys the independence
of the banks responsibility from the contract upon which it was opened and the
nature of both contracts is mutually in conflict with each other. In contracts of
guarantee, the guarantors obligation is merely collateral and it arises only
upon the default of the person primarily liable. On the other hand, in an
irrevocable letter of credit, the bank undertakes a primary obligation. We have
also defined a letter of credit as an engagement by a bank or other person
made at the request of a customer that the issuer shall honor drafts or other
demands of payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit.
Letters of credit were developed for the purpose of insuring to a seller
payment of a definite amount upon the presentation of documentsand is thus a
commitment by the issuer that the party in whose favor it is issued and who
can collect upon it will have his credit against the applicant of the letter, duly
paid in the amount specified in the letter. They are in effect absolute
undertakings to pay the money advanced or the amount for which credit is
given on the faith of the instrument. They are primary obligations and not
accessory contracts and while they are security arrangements, they are not
converted thereby into contracts of guaranty. What distinguishes letters of
credit from other accessory contracts, is the engagement of the issuing bank to
pay the seller once the draft and other required shipping documents are
presented to it. They are definite undertakings to pay at sight once the
documents stipulated therein are presented.
Letters of Credits have long been and are still governed by the provisions of
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits of the
International Chamber of Commerce. In the 1993 Revision it provides in Art. 2
that the expressions Documentary Credit(s) and Standby Letter(s) of Credit
mean any arrangement, however made or described, whereby a bank acting at
the request and on instructions of a customer or on its own behalf is to make
payment against stipulated document(s) and Art. 9 thereof defines the liability
of the issuing banks on an irrevocable letter of credit as a definite undertaking
of the issuing bank, provided that the stipulated documents are presented to
the nominated bank or the issuing bank and the terms and conditions of the
Credit are complied with, to pay at sight if the Credit provides for sight
payment.
The prohibition under Sec 6 (b) of Rule 4 of the Interim Rules does not
apply to herein petitioner as the prohibition is on the enforcement of claims
against guarantors or sureties of the debtors whose obligations are not solidary
with the debtor. The participating banks obligation are solidary with
respondent Maynilad in that it is a primary, direct, definite and an absolute
undertaking to pay and is not conditioned on the prior exhaustion of the
debtors assets. These are the same characteristics of a surety or solidary
obligor.
Being solidary, the claims against them can be pursued separately from
and independently of the rehabilitation case, as held in Traders Royal Bank v.
Court of Appeals]and reiterated in Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, where we said that property of the surety cannot be taken into
custody by the rehabilitation receiver (SEC) and said surety can be sued
separately to enforce his liability as surety for the debts or obligations of the
debtor. The debts or obligations for which a surety may be liable include future
debts, an amount which may not be known at the time the surety is given.
Facts
Issue
WON the approval by the SEC of the rehabilitation plan and the
appointment of the receiver caused the suspension of the HLURB
proceedings with respect to a rescission of contract.
Ruling
It is well to note that even the execution of final judgments may be held
in abeyance when a corporation is under rehabilitation. Hence, there is more
reason in the instant case for the HLURB arbiter to order the suspension of the
proceedings as the motion to suspend was filed soon after the institution of the
complaint. By allowing the proceedings to proceed, the HLURB arbiter
unwittingly gave undue preference to Sobrejuanite over the other creditors and
claimants of ASBDC, which is precisely the vice sought to be prevented by
Section 6(c) of PD 902-A.
Facts
Ruling
Facts
Issue
Ruling
While there may be merit in petitioners contention that the action for
ejectment filed with the MeTC should have been suspended on the ground that
the SEC has already created a management committee under P.D. No. 902-A,
considering the peculiar circumstances of the case and in the higher interest of
substantial justice, we do not find any cogent reason or useful purpose to
nullify all the proceedings taken in the courts below and order the suspension
of the complaint for ejectment at this stage of the proceedings.
As to petitioner’s contention that the MeTC was ousted of its jurisdiction
when the SEC created the management committee, settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is conferred by the Constitution and by the laws in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. Under the amendatory
provisions of Republic Act 7691, which is the law in force at the time Dela Cruz
filed the ejectment case, it is clearly provided that Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The fact
that a management committee had already been created by the SEC does not
divest the first level courts of their exclusive jurisdiction. Under P.D. No. 902-A,
the existence of an executive committee merely suspends the proceedings in
civil actions.
The avowed objective of suspending all actions against a distressed
corporation when a management committee or rehabilitation receiver is
appointed, as enunciated by this Court in Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. vs. NLRC
and in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, is to enable such management committee or rehabilitation receiver to
effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial
interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the distressed
company. However, this purpose can no longer be effectively met in the present
case as the proceedings herein have already been pending for almost ten years
and have already reached this Court. The management committee has been
unduly burdened enough, its time and resources wasted by the proceedings
that took place before the RTC and the appellate court. Hence, to decree the
annulment of the previous proceedings in the lower courts will only result in
further delay. The greater interest of justice demands that we now dispose of
the issues raised in the present petition.
Furthermore, we agree with the pronouncement of the CA in its assailed
decision that nothing in the order of the SEC creating the management
committee nor in the language of P.D. No. 902-A, provides that only the
chairman of the Committee is authorized to receive summons. We likewise
agree with the CA that even if the SEC or the Committee has adopted a rule to
the effect that only the chairman of the latter may receive summons, such rule
cannot amend or alter the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court,
pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, which allows officers
of a corporation to receive summons on its behalf.
Case 11: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. ASB Holdings Inc.
Facts
Issue:
Ruling
No. We are not convinced that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan
impairs petitioner bank’s lien over the mortgaged properties. Section 6 [c] of
P.D. No. 902-A provides that "upon appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for
claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management
or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended."
Facts
A suspension order was issued, and Mr. Cruz was appointed as Receiver.
However, despite the opposition of BPI in its comment as to the rehabilitation
plan of the petitioner, the court approved the same. In the present case, the
RTC hastily approved the rehabilitation plan in the same order giving due
course to the petition. The RTC confined the initial hearing to the issue of
jurisdiction and failed to address other more important matters relating to the
petition and comment. The RTC also failed to refer for evaluation the
rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation receiver. Thus, the rehabilitation
receiver was unable to submit his recommendations and make modifications or
revisions to the rehabilitation plan as necessary. Moreover, the RTC denied the
rehabilitation receiver's motion to issue an order directing petitioners and their
creditors to attend a meeting.
Issue
Ruling
The rehabilitation plan shall include (a) the desired business targets or goals
and the duration and coverage of the rehabilitation; (b) the terms and
conditions of such rehabilitation which shall include the manner of its
implementation, giving due regard to the interests of secured creditors; (c) the
material financial commitments to support the rehabilitation plan; (d) the
means for the execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include
conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the
debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest; (e) a
liquidation analysis that estimates the proportion of the claims that the
creditors and shareholders would receive if the debtor's properties were
liquidated; and (f) such other relevant information to enable a reasonable
investor to make an informed decision on the feasibility of the rehabilitation
plan.
The Court notes that petitioners failed to include a liquidation analysis in
their rehabilitation plan.