1.

Pesigan vs Angeles

FACTS

Petitioners, carabao dealers, transported twenty-six carabaos and a calf. They were
provided a permit to transport and four certificates, despite of which, the carabaos were
confiscated by Lieutenant Zenarosa and by Doctor Miranda. The confiscation was basis on the
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended
shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos” Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to
a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery.

ISSUE

W/N the petitioners are bound by the said executive order.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of
the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to
restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are
entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines
Sur.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having
general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or
document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and
legal effect."

In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines
Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of
Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of
such an executive order.

It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the
Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now
bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
2. First lepanto ceramics vs CA

FACTS

• Board of Investments (BOI) granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramic’s application to amend
its BOI certification of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from “glazed
floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”
• Mariwasa filed a Petition for Review with respondent Court of Appeals. CA then temporarily
restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.
• Petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss Petition and Lift Restraining Order” on the ground that
respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI’s decision, as it is exclusively vested
in the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226 or “the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.”
• Petitioner argues that BP 129 and Circular 1-91 cannot be the basis of Mariwasa’s appeal to
CA because Article 82 of EO 226 provides that appeals from decisions or orders of BOI shall
be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
• Respondent Mariwasa, on the other hand, posits that the inconsistency between BP 129 and
EO226 has already been resolved by SC Circular 1-91.

ISSUE

W/N Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as
the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned.

RULING

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is hereby LIFTED.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing
appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and
quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of
procedure.
 Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it
has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly
with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

3. Smart communications vs Nat’l telecommunications

FACTS

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications

Commission (NTC) issued a Memorandum Circular promulgating rules and regulations on the
billing of telecommunications services. It then issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally
eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another
Memorandum addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed an action for
declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circulars  alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods as stated in the said memorandum circulars, that  such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Acts of the
Philippines.  Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed with the
trial court a joint motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention. 

ISSUE

W/N THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES APPLY IN THE CASE.

RULING

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

RATIO DECIDENDI

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi-legislative power.

In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi- judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the
regulatory statute administered.

4. Tatad vs Sec of DOE

FACTS

Petitioner contends that various provisions of RA No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes” are unconstitutional. Under the deregulated
environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and
other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
The petitioner alleges that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power.

RULING

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motions for Reconsideration of the public respondents and of
the intervenors as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Enrique Garcia are
DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to
the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section
15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

5. Carino vs CHR

FACTS

Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook a "mass
concerted actions" to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that were brought to the latter's attention. They had
decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after their protest rally which had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education, Hon. Casiño. Through their representatives, they
were served with an order of the Secretary to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal.
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the private
respondents herein, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. For
failure to heed the return-to-work order, the respondents were administratively charged on the
basis of the principal's report. They were preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant
to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced, allegedly without notice and consequently
for reasons completely unknown to the respondent teachers, which prompted them to file
complaint to Commission on Human Rights.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction or adjudicatory

powers over certain specific type of cases.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are
prohibited "to hear and resolve the case.”
RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

6. Kanlaon Construction vs NLRC

FACTS

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide.

Petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for
its plant employees in Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the
project and worked under the supervision of Engineers Estacio and Dulatre. When the project
neared its completion, petitioner started terminating the services of private respondents and its
other employees.
Private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional
Arbitration in Iligan City. They claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and
sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Petitioner then appealed
to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It alleged that it was denied due
process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre, who managed and supervised the construction
project, had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not the decision rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission is a
nullity, it having been issued without jurisdiction.
RULING

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the
Regional Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and
respondent Commission, they "shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all
in the interest of due process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are
not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be interpreted so as to
dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due process.20 And this right is satisfied, at
the very least, 'when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers.21 Labor
Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in dispensing with this requirement.

Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the
first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist
the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.

7. SEC vs CA

FACTS

Certificates of stock of PHILEX representing (1,400,000) shares were stolen from the
premises of FIDELITY. Later, the stolen stock certificates ended in the hands of a certain Lopez,
a messenger of New World Security Inc., an entirely different stock brokerage firm. Lopez
brought the stolen stock certificates to CUALOPING for trading and sale with the stock
exchange. After the stock exchange awarded and confirmed the sale of the stocks represented
by said certificates to different buyers, the same were delivered to FIDELITY for the cancellation
of the stocks certificates and for issuance of new certificates in the name of the new buyers.

After acquiring knowledge of the pilferage, FIDELITY conducted an investigation with

assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and found that two of its employees
were involved and signed the certificates.

After two (2) months from receipt of said stock certificates, FIDELITY rejected the
issuance of new certificates in favor of the buyers for reasons that the signatures of the owners
of the certificates were allegedly forged and thus the cancellation and new issuance thereof
cannot be effected. FIDELITY sought an opinion on the matter from SEC.
ISSUE

W/N the appellate court erred in setting aside the decision of the SEC which had (a)
ordered the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both
FIDELITY and CUALOPING.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED except the portion
thereof which sets aside the imposition by the Securities and Exchange Commission of a fine on
FIDELITY which is hereby REINSTATED.

RATIO DECIDENDI

A justiciable controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive

jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party against another who, in turn,
contests it.5 It is one instituted by and against parties having interest in the subject matter
appropriate for judicial determination predicated on a given state of facts. That controversy must
be raised by the party entitled to maintain the action. He is the person to whom the right to seek
judicial redress or relief belongs which can be enforced against the party correspondingly
charged with having been responsible for, or to have given rise to, the cause of action. A person
or entity tasked with the power to adjudicate stands neutral and impartial and acts on the basis
of the admissible representations of the contending parties.

8. FABELLA V. CA

FACTS

The then DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) Secretary

Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-
outs and strikes. Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against the teachers of the
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required the teachers to explain in writing why
they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service
laws and regulations. The DECS investigating committee rendered a decision, finding the
teachers guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.

The RTC ordered that the DISMISSAL of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary
and violative of the teacher's right to due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision, holding in the main that the teachers were denied due process in the administrative
proceedings instituted against them.
ISSUE

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in

holding in effect that private respondents were denied due process of law.

RULING

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to
show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus
AFFIRMED.

RATIO DECIDENDI

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative
charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of
RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus,
all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for
the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It
was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the  essence  of procedural due process is  embodied  in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

9. Villaflor vs CA

FACTS

Petitioner Villaflor leased to Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a 2-hectare parcel of
land together with all the improvements existing thereon, for a period of five (5) years. In an
"Agreement to Sell", Villaflor conveyed to Nasipit Lumber, two (2) parcels of land. Villaflor filed a
Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands, Manila recognizing that the land covered by the
same is of public domain and any and all rights may have with respect thereto by virtue of
continuous occupation and cultivation are hereby relinquished to the Government, but which
was rejected for having leased the property to another even before he had acquired
transmissible rights thereto.

Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a "Deed of Relinquishment of Rights"

with respondent corporation. Nasipit filed a Sales Application over the two (2) parcels of land.
The Director of Lands issued an "Order of Award" in favor of Nasipit.

Villaflor protested the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company
has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights. The Director
of Lands dismissed the protest as Villaflor offered no evidence to support his claim of non-
payment beyond his own self-serving assertions and expressions that he had not been paid
said amount. From such dismissal, Villaflor filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
considered as an Appeal to the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Ministry affirmed the said
decision, Respondent Court of Appeals likewise rendered judgment against petitioner via the
assailed Decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in adopting or relying on the factual findings of
the Bureau of Lands, especially those affirmed by the Minister (now Secretary) of Natural
Resources and the trial court.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case,
since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private
respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the
Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters.
Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand
aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
10. FACTORAN VS CA

FACTS

(2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying
4,000 board feet of narra lumber. They apprehended the truck driver and brought the truck and
its cargo to the DENR Office. There, petitioner Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and
discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber, which are in violation of
Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a
temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
Petitioner Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an
order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to
the Office of the President. Consequently, the confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck
were forfeited in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at
public auction.

ISSUE

W/N the Order of the petitioner Secretary Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is valid, making the
issuance of the order of replevin illegal.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development
and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the
DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy
which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin
suit filed by the private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court
to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.