Lukas Wiehler

2018690090
Winter Semester 2018
Boğaziçi University

The main issues and debates relating to

Exclusive Economic Zones
Mid Term Paper

Pols 330
Political Geography
Department of Political Sciences and International Relations

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The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a juridical concept of international law which regulates the
primary rights to natural resources of the sea and the seabeds close to a coastal state and the
navigation and overflight rights of foreign states in this territory. This essay will outline the main
features, issues and debates related to the EEZ regime. First, the historical developments that led to
the emergence of the regime and its codification into the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) will be laid out. Subsequently, it will be elaborate on the regime’s main features
and its mechanisms to resolve disputes between states. Finally, by drawing on the example of the
East Chinese Sea it will be argued that even though the EEZ regime and its mechanisms for conflict
settlement have been institutionalised in the UNCLOS, it often remains difficult to resolve
contradicting claims on resources and its economic exploitation.

Disputes over sovereignty, maritime authority and the resources of the seas existed ever since
humans were capable to navigate on water, extract resources from the sea and protect the waters
close to their territories1. As one of the first legal concepts on the sovereignty of the seas,
Bynershoek developed the notion that “the power of the land properly ends where the force of arms
ends”2. This idea gradually developed into a customary law that coastal states had sovereignty over
a territory three miles into the sea from the coast, which at that time equalled the maximum firing
range of a canon¹.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, states like Spain and Portugal challenged the three mile
rule and pushed for more expansive jurisdictions over the seas3. Meanwhile, traditional maritime
powers like Great Britain aimed to establish an international agreement in the Hague in 1930 that
would legally fixate the 3 miles rule. As this agreement failed, many states began to expand their
sovereignty claims beyond three miles¹. After the second world war, technological advancements
that enabled deep water offshore drilling resulted in new claims and conflicts over sovereignty,
economic exploitation and navigation rights on the sea. In 1945 Truman declared sea territories far
beyond 3 miles from the US coasts to secure oil extraction operations³. In reaction, Chile, Ecuador
and Peru declared full jurisdiction over 200 nm wide sea territories in 1952¹.

1Nemeth, Stephen C., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Elizabeth A. Nyman, and Paul R. Hensel. “Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime
Conflicts through UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones.” International Interactions 40, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 711–36.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.897233.

2 The Limits of International Law. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
3Pratt, Martin, and Clive Schofield, eds. “Jane’s Exclusive Economic Zones”, 2nd
edition. (2000) Surrey: Jane’s Information Group Limited.
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The new maritime territorial claims that were now expressed by a growing number of coastal states
had a clear theme. They were not motivated by pure territorial expansionism nor merely aimed at
consolidating national security but were mainly driven by the economic interest to utilise the natural
resources of the sea and the seabed4 . Accordingly, coastal states gradually developed the notion that
full territorial control of the high seas is not only in contradiction to the traditional concept of the
freedom of the seas, but also an inefficient, expensive and unnecessary means to guarantee the
exclusive exploitation of resources of the sea5. Consequently, a group of Asian and African states
developed the concept of ‘exclusive economic zones’ for the first time in 1971⁴.

This notion of limited sovereignty rights over living and non living resources in an extensive
territory and full territorial sovereignty in a small strip of a few nautical miles was established in
other international treaties and found many supporters6 . Finally, after two unsuccessful attempts to
regulate the sovereignty over the sea in 1958 and 1960, a broadly supported treaty (the UNCLOS)
that enshrined exclusive economic zones was successfully set up in 1982 by the UN Conference of
on the Law of the Sea⁶.

The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas limits full territorial jurisdiction of a coastal
state to an area of 12 nm from the base line of the coast. It further constitutes the contiguous zone,
an area beyond the 12 nm line till the 24 nm line, where laws of four defined areas (customs,
taxation, immigration and pollution) can be enforced7 . In territorial waters and in the contiguous
zone foreign vessels have merely the right of innocent passage. Finally, an exclusive economic zone
can be established by the contracting coastal states until maximally 200 nm from the base line. In
this area, the coastal state has the exclusive right to exploit natural resources of the sea and the
seabed⁷. However, foreign vessels enjoy the full rights to navigate and foreign states are further
permitted to lay underwater pipes and cables. The exclusive economy zone may be added up by the
continental shelf until a maximum of 350 nm, in accordance with the natural prolongation principle,

4Galdorisi, Goerge V., and Alan G. Kaufman. “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and
Defusing Conflict.” SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS CENTER SAN DIEGO CA, March 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/
docs/citations/ADA457969.
5O’Rourke, Ronald. “China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests-Background and Issues for
Congress [July 19, 2018],” July 19, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=.

6Nemeth, Stephen C., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Elizabeth A. Nyman, and Paul R. Hensel. “Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime
Conflicts through UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones.” International Interactions 40, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 711–36.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.897233.
7Nelson Dolliver “Exclusive Economic Zone” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008) http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/
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if the continental shelf (as defined by UNCLOS) expands beyond the 200 nm line8. On the
continental shelf territory, states only have exclusive rights to the resources of seabed but not to the
sea9. While the 200 nm of exclusive economic zones regulation was codified by the UNCLAS, it
already existed in international customary law before the agreement. Therefore, several states which
are not contracting partners have established exclusive economic zones outside the the context of
the convention⁹.

In many instances UNCLOS, has established rules to regulate disagreement over sovereignty and
economic usage of the seas and therefore succeeded in creating “a comprehensive and universally
accepted delineation of maritime law”10. Innovatively, UNCLOS has identified several forums in
which disputes may be settled. According to Article 287, states are obliged to choose from a
settlement of the conflict by either the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), an arbitration under Annex VII or an arbitration under Annex
VIII. If conflicting states can not agree on one forum, arbitration under Annex IV is set as the is the
default option⁸. In many cases the settling terms of the convention have been successful, because
they are mandatory for all state parties, but still allow for flexibility to choose a binding
mechanism⁹. However, even after the convention came into force in 1994, numerous disputes over
the economic use of sea territory emerged or remained11 .

An example of unsettled disputes over exclusive economic zones is the East Chinese Sea12 . In the
1960s researchers have suggested the existence of an extensive oil reservoir in the continental shelf
between Japan and China13. As some of the relevant territory of the continental shelf is within the
reach of 200 nautical miles of both China’s and Japan’s base line, both countries have expressed
overlapping claims to exclusive economic zones¹². Even-though both countries are contracting

8Nelson Dolliver “Exclusive Economic Zone” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008) http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/

9Nemeth, Stephen C., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Elizabeth A. Nyman, and Paul R. Hensel. “Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime
Conflicts through UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones.” International Interactions 40, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 711–36.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.897233.
10Boyle, Alan
E. “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction.” International & Comparative
Law Quarterly 46, no. 1 (January 1997): 37–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300060103.

11Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon C. Prins. “Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized
Interstate Disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 169–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00115.

12O’Shea, Paul. “How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea
Dispute.” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (June 1, 2015): 548–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.3.548.

O’Rourke, Ronald. “China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests-Background and Issues for
13

Congress [July 19, 2018],” July 19, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=.

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partners of UNCLOS, a solution to the dispute could not been found to date. Ideally, such disputes
between contracting partners can be settled quite formally by drawing a median line equidistant
from the base lines of the conflicting states14. However, such territorial conflicts are often restrained
by more complex issues. In case of the East Chinese Sea, conflicting territorial claims over small
islands, different interpretation of the continental shelf regulation of UNCLOS and the eventual
application of the proportionality principle (which grants coastal states with longer coasts a larger
proportion of the territory as EEZ) make a resolution more complicated15.

Based on the natural prolongation principle, China claims the rights to exploit resources of the
seabed until the end of the continental shelf. It thereby neglects a suggested median line between
Japan’s and China’s coasts to divide the exclusive economic zones¹⁴. While the natural prolongation
principle was actively applied in international jurisprudence in the 1960s, current jurisprudences of
both the ICJ and the ITLOS have shifted away from the principle in favour of the equidistance
(median line) principle or a broader consideration of relevant circumstances¹⁵. China, on the other
hand, argues that a their claim holds valid till today as it was expressed long before the shift in
jurisprudence took place¹⁴. Furthermore, with the legal application of the proportionality principle
arbitration would have to take into account the length of the coast lines and essentially allocating
the median line in China’s favour (but not as far as the natural prolongation line)¹⁴. Moreover, a
complex issue are the islands in the East Chinese Sea which are territorially claimed by South
Korea, China and Japan¹⁵. As seabed around them is believed to be the most oil rich, all states aim
to declare the a 12 nm territorial sea around them. A prolonged EEZ may be another motivation for
China, South Korea and Japan to claim sovereignty over the islands¹⁵. However, current
international jurisprudence suggests that these islands might be discounted in an eventual arbitration
and therefore not might not lead to a prolonged EEZ ¹⁴.

This essay has given an overview over the main functions and feature of the legal regime of the
exclusive economic zone. It has further pointed out the developments that have led to the
establishment of the regime under UNCLOS. Finally, by summarising the situation in the East
Chinese Sea it was exemplified that disputes over the territory and the resources of the sea remain
difficult even after the establishment of exclusive economic zones and UNCLOS.

14O’Shea, Paul. “How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea
Dispute.” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (June 1, 2015): 548–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.3.548.

O’Rourke, Ronald. “China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests-Background and Issues for
15

Congress [July 19, 2018],” July 19, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=.

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Bibliography:
Boyle, Alan E. “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and
Jurisdiction.” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 46, no. 1 (January 1997): 37–54. https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0020589300060103.

“Exclusive Economic Zone.” Accessed November 11, 2018. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/

9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1156.

Galdorisi, Goerge V., and Alan G. Kaufman. “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone:
Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict.” SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS CENTER
SAN DIEGO CA, March 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA457969.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon C. Prins. “Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in
Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 169–
83. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00115.

Nelson Dolliver “Exclusive Economic Zone” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008)
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/

Nemeth, Stephen C., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Elizabeth A. Nyman, and Paul R. Hensel. “Ruling the Sea:
Managing Maritime Conflicts through UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones.” International Interactions
40, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 711–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.897233.

O’Rourke, Ronald. “China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests-
Background and Issues for Congress [July 19, 2018],” July 19, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=.

O’Shea, Paul. “How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation
in the East China Sea Dispute.” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (June 1, 2015): 548–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.
2015.55.3.548.

Pratt, Martin, and Clive Schofield, eds. “Jane’s Exclusive Economic Zones”, 2nd
edition. (2000) Surrey: Jane’s Information Group Limited.

The Limits of International Law. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

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