Thinking Clearly about Violence

Author(s): Allan Bäck

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 117, No. 1/2, Selected Papers from the American Philosophical Association,
Pacific Division, 2003 Meeting (Jan., 2004), pp. 219-230
Published by: Springer
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 ALLAN BACK

THINKINGCLEARLYABOUT VIOLENCE

There is a lot of rhetoricand commotion about "violence",even in

the scientificcommunityitself. We heardaily aboutviolent military
conflicts, violations of human rights, domestic violence, violence in
the media and in sports,and emotionaland verbalviolence. In 1972
58%of Americanmales thoughtthatburninga draftcardor holding
a sit-in is violent.1 UNESCO commissioned twenty scientists to
make a platform statement,the "Seville Statement on Violence"
(November, 1989), to condemn the notion that humanbeings have
a biological, genetically determinedbasis for violence and aggres-
sion. Moreover,social scientists have been debatinghow to define
'violence' for practical reasons. Particularlyin doing empirical
research,it becomes a practicalissue to have a clear definitionof
'violence': is the incidence of domestic violence, of violence in
school, of aggressivedisplays in troopsof chimpanzeeson the rise?
How to tell, if we have no criteriafor what constitutes violent or
aggressive behavior?It is ironic that a large literaturehas arisen
recently in and across various social sciences on the meaning of
'aggression' and 'violence' independentlyof much referenceto or
involvementby philosophers.2
It is ironic since the analysis of the conception of violence
and its connections to related conceptions seems to fall squarely
in the provenance of philosophy. Moreover, the current lack of
philosophersbecomes even more puzzling given the considerable
philosophicalintereston this topic duringthe sixties and seventies
- incited by the civil rightsmovementand the VietnamWar.3
In any case, I shall proceed. I propose here to define 'violence'.
In doing so, I shall distinguish 'forcefulness', 'aggression' and
'violence'. Because the currentusage, both in ordinarylanguage
and in the various academic fields, is not consistent, my defini-
tions, although descriptive, will also be somewhat stipulativeand
precising.

a Philosophical Studies 117: 219-230, 2004.

O 2004 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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220 ALLAN BACK

'Violence' in its original sense connotes 'force'. We speak of a

strong wind as a "violent"wind; a strong passion as a "violent"
passion. Yet someone "violent" in this way need not be bad.
Moreover,certainly the thing that is "violent"in this sense need
not be morallyblameworthynor even be a moralagent. In contrast,
'violent', in many of its currentuses and connotations,does have
such moraldimensions.4Let me thencall this basic, amoralsense, of
an agent using force while doing somethingwith more force, effort,
or effect thanusual 'forceful'. Inanimateas well as animateobjects
can act "forcefully"in this sense.
This basic conceptionof forcefulnessagrees with the concept of
force in physics. FollowingFeynman,RubinGoteskydefines 'force'
as that "whichis capableof producingor does producea change in
motion, in shape, in quality,or in all of these aspects."'Power' then
will be "the amount or degree of force in operation",and 'force-
fulness' the "extensiveand radicalchanges within a short interval
of time producedby given forces in the qualities or structuresof
anything".5 Note that forcefulness is defined by the effects upon
the recipients of the force, and not by an intrinsiccharacterof the
action. A small event can producerapid,radicalchange. A butterfly
flappingits wings can cause a thunderstorm;6 a twitch of a fingeron
a triggeror buttoncan kill. So then an act is forceful in termsof the
effects thatit has - not in termsof its own rapidity,effort,quantityof
force exertedetc. I also leave it open whetheracts of omission can
be forceful,as they can cause radicalchange.Forinstance,failing to
close the floodgatescan drownmany;not having safety inspections
can cause manyto fall ill. In this way we shall not decide, by the fiat
of definition,whethercertaininstitutionalpolicies towardsworkers
or towardsthe poor are not "violent",since they are not "forceful".7
In line with its root sense of 'approach' or 'attack', aggres-
sion is a particularconception of forcefulness where the force
is directed towards a particularobject.8 Thus, we do not often
speak of an "aggressive"storm, as the storm does not pick out its
targets. This selective attentionon the part of the agent suggests
purposive behavior and an intentionalaspect. Aggression appears
to be intentionalforceful action. Although inanimateobjects may
act "forcefully",only animateagents, humanor animal,capable of
goal-directedbehavior,can act "aggressively"in this sense.

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 THINKINGCLEARLYABOUT VIOLENCE 221

Moreover, 'aggression' has the connotation of seeking to do

something for the sake of the aggressor at the expense of the one
being attacked. I suggest that we exclude this connotation from
the definition of 'aggression' in order to avoid making every act
of aggression be morally wrong by the fiat of definition.It might
be that aggression is generally wrong. For an aggressiveact, when
successful, typically causes its recipient harm. Yet, this should
requireargumentand may have exceptions, so many say. Moreover,
social scientistsgenerallywish to avoid makingmoraljudgmentsor
acknowledge a moral dimension to their subject matter.9(Accord-
ingly, it is common for them to speak of 'aggression' more than
of 'violence'.) In philosophy there is no need to avoid this moral
dimension. However, even if all aggressive acts be bad morally,
such a moraljudgment ought not to follow merely in virtue of its
definition.Hence, aggressionshouldbe definedin a morallyneutral
way.10
However, many social scientists are not satisfied even with this
amoral definition of 'aggression'. They want also to avoid having
to determine or refer to the intentions of the agent. Indeed, as
many insist, how are human ethologists to know the intentionsof
a fish, a goose, a rat, a bonobo? Ratherthan guess, they tend to
define 'aggression'behaviorally,withoutreferenceto the intentions
or goals of the agent animal.11
Accordingly, many follow E.O. Wilson, who defines 'aggres-
sion' as "a physical threator threatof action by one individualthat
reduces the freedom or genetic fitness of another." 12 This follows
the major O.E.D. definition, "the exercise of physical force ...
tending to cause bodily injury,or forcibly interferingwith personal
freedom".By 'freedom',Wilson means 'freedomof movementand
action [of an animal],to use its abilities and develop its capacities'.
By 'genetic fitness', Wilson means 'the ability of the individualto
survive and to reproduceits own kind, by contributingto the gene
flow'.13
It would be charitable to understandWilson's conception of
'action' broadly, so as to include not only direct acts but also at
least some omissions, or failures to act. One memberof a species,
say, a mother, may withhold food from another,say, her young,
until the young individual acts in a certain way. Now she is not

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222 ALLAN BACK

acting directly. But, as the young animal depends on the parent

to survive, and withholding food threatensboth the freedom and
the genetic fitness of the young individual, it might very well be
that the mother is "threatening"the young individual and acting
aggressively throughan omission instead of an action. Once again,
I do not thinkthatit shouldbe settled,by definition,whetherin fact
a failure to act is an act of omission or simply the absence of an
action.14 Recall my claim thatthe forcefulnessof the action should
be measuredby its effects and not by its intrinsiccharacter.
Many have made other objections and emendmentsto Wilson's
definition.First, some object that it would not count as aggressive
failed attempts at aggression.15We can rectify that by talking
instead of the type of action of which the act in question is an
instance. The individualact would be aggressive if that type of act
of which it is an instance tends to reduce, or is intendedto reduce,
the freedomor genetic fitness of an individual.
Others object that aggression lies on a continuum ending at
completely non-violentbehaviors.The difficultylies in there being
actions at all points of the continuum that are used to resolve
successfully problemsbetween membersof the same species.16So
aggression seems neither wrong nor clearly demarcated.We can
handlethese problemsby insisting thataggressiveacts be 'forceful'
as defined above and by insisting also that an aggressive act is
not necessarily a destructiveor a morally bad act.17 Rather,take
'aggression'to have no moraldimensionsby definition. f

This insistence would also allay the fears, mentionedabove, of

those who do not want to call the behaviorof parentstowardstheir
young "aggressive".We can admitthatthis behavioris aggressive,in
thatthe freedomof the young is indeedbeing restrained,often physi-
cally, by the parent.Still, it is in the young animal'sbest interest,in
terms of surviving,to be, e.g., pulled away from a cliff or from an
electricalreceptacle.18
Although we may eliminate the notions of moral evil and
destructivenessfrom the conceptionof aggression,still it does seem
hopeless, despite the hope of some social scientists,to eliminatethe
notion of intentionfrom it.19Often the element of intentionsneaks
in by speakingof a 'threat'or of 'the behaviorof one animaltowards
another'.Yet 'behaviortowards'and 'threat'indicatean intentional

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 THINKINGCLEARLYABOUT VIOLENCE 223

component.A clumsy animalthat causes anotheranimalto fall out

of a tree would hardly be acting aggressively - although acting
forcefully - even if the fallen one has lost both freedom of action
and genetic fitness, by breakinga leg. We can say, again metaphor-
ically, that a clumsy action, like a flood, can 'threaten'the life of
an animal. Yet to say that one animal threatensanother suggests
something intentional.Reports of animal behaviorcommonly talk
this way, of goals and motives. We may as well admitthe intention-
ality. Again, let me repeatthatI do not mean to requirea deliberate,
self-conscious intentionality.Ratherintentionalityhereconcernsthe
basic, minimal sort, in conformity with which an animal moves
towardsa food source or away from a threat"intentionally".20
We may thendefine 'aggression'as 'a forcefulaction,done inten-
tionally by an agent, of a type of action that tends, or intends, to
reduce both the freedom or the genetic fitness of those affected by
that action'.
In short, aggression is forcefulness plus intention and injury.
I define 'injury' as 'reducing the freedom or (inclusive 'or') the
genetic fitness of those affected'. For, if I am injured,my present
or future survivalbecomes less likely, and my present and future
ability to act is lessened. Pain typically functions as a symptomor
an indicationto a sentientanimalthatits freedomor genetic fitness
is being reducedor has a threatof being reduced.21 Also, I assume
here that the subjective feeling of pain (the quale) is intrinsically
bad:ceteris paribus, pain ought not to be felt. Accordingly,I define
'harm'as 'injuryor pain'.
So far, in defining 'forcefulness' and 'aggression', I have
includedno moralcomponent.It is certainlypossible also to define
'violence' amorallytoo. For, as we have noted, there is no person
morally to blame for a "violent"storm or a "violent"sneeze. Still,
we do need a sense of 'violence' thatcarriesmoralweight to address
current issues and usage. Moreover, in many contexts, as noted
above, 'violence' has negative connotations.For to call something
'violent' is often to give at least a prima facie reason why it is
morallywrong.
However,being morally wrong differs from being in the moral
sphere. So as not to beg any questions, it would be prudent to
have two different conceptions of violence, a basic one having a

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224 ALLAN BACK

componentof moral responsibilityand a pejorativeone having that

component as well as carryingthe negative connotationof being
wrong. After developingthese definitions,we shall be in a position
to see why even the formerdefinitionimplies a primafacie moral
wrong.
In contrastto aggression,I shall thus take 'violence' in the basic
sense to signify a certain sort of aggression, namely an aggressive
activity to which moraljudgments,of being good or bad, apply.In
manymoralandlegal theories,suchjudgmentsrequire,amongother
things, considering the conscious volitions of the moral agent(s).
According to such views, if you are awareof what you are doing,
will to do so, and could do otherwise,you are morallyresponsible
for those acts.22You might, then, be able to do somethingwithout
being morally responsible,if you did not will the act, or were not
aware of what you are doing, or were in a mental state of extreme
duressor emotion.At any rate,I shall supposeherethatnormalcases
of humanintentionalaction are subjectto moraljudgmentand are
chosen.
Accordingly, an action is violent in this basic sense when it
is aggressive and is chosen. Violence, then, contains a moral
componentassociatedwith choosing to engage in actions thatharm
anotherperson and attemptingto force that person to act as you
want.23To get violence in the pejorativesense, we need to add the
conditionthat the choice made is a morallywrong one. Thatis, the
agent ought not to make thatchoice.24
We sometimestalkof "emotionalviolence"or "mentalviolence",
where, via propagandaor emotional outbursts, you may force
anotherto your views. Audi emphasizes this point and insists on
the recognitionof these types of "violence".25RobertNozick even
goes so far as to call rationalphilosophicalargumentscoercive, or
"violent"in this sense.26 So long as it is admittedthat emotional
and verbal outburstscause harm, the definitions, of 'violence' in
both senses, can apply. Still, not automatically:we must provide
justificationson a case-by-case basis.
To sum up, I am proposingthe following:
* An act is violent in the basic sense iff (1) the attemptedactionis
aggressive (2) the agent is morallyresponsiblefor that attempt
to cause harm(pain or injury)to the patient

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 THINKINGCLEARLYABOUT VIOLENCE 225

* An act is violent in the pejorativesense iff (1) the attempted

action is aggressive (2) the agent is morally responsible for
thatattemptto cause harm(painor injury)to the patient(3) the
agent ought not to will to inflict that harm,and (4) the patient
should not want to suffer that harm. (I.e., the action unjustly
violates the rights of the victim, where 'rights' signifies the
morallyideal set of entitlementsthatthe recipientof the action
(typically a person) ought to have.)
As manymoraltheoristsagree,a personmay be generouswithout
doing generousacts at times.27So too, a person may not be violent
and still do violent acts. Again, a violent personmay do non-violent
acts. To accountfor this difference,I define 'a violent person' as 'a
personwho does violent acts regularlyfor theirown sake', or, more
precisely:
* A person is violent iff (1) she does a violent action or wills it
"for its own sake"or "in itself" and (2) she knows what she is
doing, or wantingto do. (An act is done for its own sake if the
agent would want to do it even if, ceteris paribus, there were
anotherway to act thatcauses less pain or injuryto the patient
or victim, and the agent would not choose that alternative.The
"wanting"here signifies a strong commitmentto action, and
not merely wishful thinking.)
* A personhas a violent characteriff she is violent regularly.
Some problemsarise with what 'ought' means in these definitions.
Oftentimes,we make a choice that we consider,given the alterna-
tives availableto us, to be the best one. Yet, we may not think that
the action is the best one possible. In more traditionalterminology,
we do not chose the act withoutqualification,but only relativeto a
particularcontext, in a respect.28
Whatdoes it meanthenfor the personto will a violent action"for
its own sake"?The idea is that she would want to act violently even
if there were some other way of reachingher goal. She would not
be violent in the pejorativesense even if deliberatelychoosing to do
a act violent in the basic sense, if, were there anotherway of acting
so as to reachthe intendedresult,withoutinflictingharm,she would
not have chosen to act thus.
In this way a surgeon who orders chemotherapyfor a patient
while knowing full well that that patient will suffer a lot of pain

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226 ALLAN BACK

can be said not to act violently in the pejorativesense. Again, take

a teacher who gives a student a low grade. She knows that, most
likely, she will be causing the studentto feel anguishat a low grade.
Yet she may intend only to be reportingto the studentand others
how well the studenthas performed.
In these two cases, it might be said that no right not to have
suffered pain unjustly has been violated.29For the patient or the
studenthas willingly enteredinto a situationwhere they know that
pain or injuryis possible. Still, if there were a less painful way for
the surgeonor teacherto reachher goal, it would be morallywrong
for her not to use it. A right not to suffer pain unjustly requires
that the agent causing the harm not have another way available,
of achieving the same end while casing less harm,ceteris paribus.
Rather,the agent is justified in causing pain or injury,not merely
if this were the result of helping the patient,but also if there were
no otherway currentlyavailableto her to reachher goal. The 'other
way' has to be availableto the agent, not to people centurieslateror
miles away.30
Thus a personis morallyresponsiblefor deliberatelychoosing to
inflict pain. She then is committinga violent act, in the basic sense.
Whether or not the act is violent in the pejorativesense may be
distinguishedby counterfactuals.If the agent would have chosen an
availableway that would not harmbut still have the same benefits,
then the act is not violent in the pejorativesense. If she would not
have preferredotherwise,then the pain is intentional,andher action
is violent in the pejorativesense. For in the latter case she wishes
to inflict pain, while in the former case she does not. The third
conditionin the definitionapplies.This makesa doctornormallynot
violent in the pejorativesense when she causes the patientto suffer
while undergoingchemotherapy.Likewise for the teacherwhen she
causes a studentto feel anguishat a low grade.3'Yet, if therewere a
less painful alternative,the agent would have a primafacie obliga-
tion to learn about and to acquireproficiencyin it. In this way, the
definition leaves it open that certain institutionalizedpractices are
violent in the pejorativesense and bad wholesale.
On account of a person doing an act violent in the basic sense
having this primafacie obligation to seek out less painful alterna-
tives, acts violent even in the basic sense areprimafacie wrong.That

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 THINKINGCLEARLYABOUT VIOLENCE 227

is, all else being equal, we ought not to choose them. Yet it does not
follow, despite popularrhetoricto the contrary,that a violent act is
necessarilya bad act.
What then? Are all types of passive resistance, all strategies
of non-violence violent in the basic sense and hence prima facie
wrong? Yes.32 Lest my admission be taken as a reductio ad
absurdum- as well as a blasphemouscondemnationof those like
Gandhiand M.L. King Jr.- let me point out thatthis is the position
of, e.g., Gandhi. He himself admittedthat his political activity in
India was not ahimsa (non-violence):

I have admittedmy mistake. I thoughtour struggle was based on non-violence,

whereas it was in reality no more than passive resistancewhich is essentially a
weapon of the weak. It leads naturallyto armedresistancewheneverpossible.33

To marchup to soldiersweaponlessin protest,to sit in or in frontof

a business, and to go into a restaurantwith the expectationof being
thrownout do indeed limit of the freedom of action of those whom
you have targeted.34Perhapsthey do indeed deserveit! Perhaps,but
the case must be made, that more normaland peaceful methods of
negotiationcannot succeed.

NOTES

1 Science, Vol. 23 (June, 1972), pp. 1300-1303, as cited in the O.E.D.

2 On recent materialin the social sciences, cf. James Silverbergand J. Patrick
Gray,"Violenceand Peacefulnessas BehavioralPotentialitiesof Primates",in J.
Silverbergand J. Gray(eds.), Aggressionand Peacefulnessin Humansand Other
Primates,(Oxford, 1992), pp. 3ff. On the lack of recentmaterialin philosophy,cf.
Steven Lee, "Is PovertyViolence?",in D. Curtinand R. Litke (eds.), Institutional
Violence(Amsterdam,1999), p. 11, n. 1.
3 Indeed, another irony lies in the lack of discussions on the conception of
violence in political theory at that time. Cf. HannahArendt, On Violence(New
York, 1970), pp. 8, 40, who bewails the lack of discussion in political science on
'violence', 'strength','authority','power', 'violence'.
4 Kai Nielson, "On Justifying Violence", Inquiry 24 (1981), p. 24, claims, in
oppositionto the O.E.D., that 'violence' has a negativeconnotationso thatwhen it
is used it "becomes[primafacie?] immoralby definition."RobertPaulWolff, "On
Violence",Journalof Philosophy 66 (1969), p. 606: "Strictlyspeaking,violence
is the illegitimateor unauthorizeduse of force to effect decisions againstthe will
of others."

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228 ALLAN BACK

Inter alia, the O.E.D. gives the following definitions:"'violence' is the exer-
cise of physical force so as to inflict damageor injuryto personsor property,"and
'to force' is "toexertphysical or psychologicalpoweror coercion uponone to act
in some determinateway."
5 Rubin Gotesky, "Social Force, Social Power, and Social Violence", in S.
Stanage (ed.), Reason and Violence (Totowa, N.J., 1974), p. 146; he calls
this "violence". Cf. RichardFeynman, The FeynmanLectureson Physics, Vol.
1 (Reading, MA, 1961), ??12.1 and 13.1. This conception amounts to what
ShermanStanage, "Violatives:Modes and Themes of Violence", in S. Stanage
(ed.), Reasonand Violence(Totowa,N.J., 1974), p. 225, calls 'power'.Cf. Hannah
Arendt, On Violence (New York, 1970), p. 40; R.G. Collingwood, The New
Leviathan(Oxford, 1942), pp. 141-142.
6 The butterflyeffect in chaos theory.
7 RonaldP. Miller, "Violence,Force, and Coercion",in J. Shaffer(ed.), Violence
(New York, 1971), pp. 31-32. Some howevertake forcefulnessto be determined
by the intrinsiccharacterof the act, like its effort or quantityof energy, and not
by its effects. E.g., RobertAudi, "Onthe Meaningand Justificationof Violence",
in J. Shaffer(ed.), Violence(New York,1971), p. 66, says thatdiscriminationand
exclusion are not violent since they are "peacefullymaintained".Miller (p. 20),
says thatneglect is not violent "sinceneglectingcannotbe done with greatforce".
8 'Is directedtowards'shouldbe understoodin the middle voice, and not (neces-
sarily) in the passive voice. That is, I am leaving it open whetheror not an act
of aggression must be committedby a moral agent, I shall claim that it must be
committedby an agenthavingintentions,in a weak sense of 'intention',according
to which all animalshave them.
9 JanesSilverbergandJ. PatrickGray,"ViolenceandPeacefulnessas Behavioral
Potentialitiesof Primates",p. 5. Cf. G. Siann,AccountingforAggression(Boston,
1985), p. 12.
10 Cf. Miller, "Violence, Force, and Coercion",p. 23; Audi, "On the Meaning
and Justificationof Violence",pp. 59, 88.
l l Cf. S. Howell and R. Willis, Societies at Peace: AnthropologicalPerspectives
(London, 1989), who favorthe etic over the emic.
12 E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge,MA, 1975), p. 577; cf. pp. 242-244.
Also cf. KonradLorenz, On Aggression (New York, 1966), p. ix, who defines
'aggression' as "the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directedagainst
members of the same species." At p. 18, however, he does use 'aggression' in
describing behavior towards another species. (In a section omitted from this
version of the paper,I discuss and reject weakening Wilson's definitionto '...
that reducesthe freedomand genetic fitness of another'.)
13 E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology, p. 585.
14 Cf. JonathanGlover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Reading, England,
1977), pp. 94-97.
15 James Silverbergand J. PatrickGray,"Violence and Peacefulness as Behav-
ioral Potentialitiesof Primates",p. 4.

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 THINKINGCLEARLYABOUT VIOLENCE 229
16 FranzDe Waal,"Aggressionas a Well-IntegratedPartof PrimateSocial Rela-
tionships:A Critiqueof the SSSV", in J. SilverbergandJ. Gray(eds.), Aggression
and Peacefulnessin Humansand OtherPrimates(Oxford, 1992), p. 39, describes
violence as one of many tactics to pursuesocial goals, but one having high costs.
So too in philosophy. Cf. Sherman Stanage, "Violatives:Modes and Themes
of Violence", in S. Stanage (ed.), Reason and Violence (Totowa, N.J., 1974),
pp. 215-219.
17 James Silverbergand J. PatrickGray,"Violenceand Peacefulness as Behav-
ioral Potentialities of Primates", p. 3, likewise define 'aggression' as "the
assertiveness (or forcefulness) indicated by one actor's initiating toward some
other(s) of an act that is higher on the violence scale than the previous act in a
given interactionsequence."This agrees with my account if by 'violence' they
mean what I have called 'forcefulness'.
18 Still, it would be betternot to restrainthe young if the same benefitscould be
gainedotherwise.Indeed,this is a commonJapanesecriticismof Americanchild-
rearingpractices!I discuss below why such practicesareprimafacie wrong.
19 Forinstance,CarolLauer,"Variabilityin the Patternsof Agonistic Behaviorin
Pre-SchoolChildren",in J. Silverbergand J. Gray(eds.), Aggressionand Peace-
fulness in Humans and Other Primates (Oxford, 1992), p. 172, complains that
aggression is difficult to observe because of its intentionalelement and because
even of the difficultyto decidingwhen freedomis restrained.Hence, she suggests,
we should use 'agonistic activity', which she defines as: "Anagonistic act is any
behavior relating to conflict situations, whether assertive or submissive."Well,
first we would have to define 'conflict' which seems intentional.For example,
one animal bumpinginto anotherclumsily has not starteda "conflict"although
the one being bumpedmightreactas if the bumpingwere a conflict.And it would
react thus because typically such acts have been goal-directedand intentional.
How thento judge whatconstitutesa "conflict"?Again, via consideringintentand
common practice.Moreover,it does sound strangeto call completely submissive
behavior "agonistic"just because it occurs in a "conflict situation".Cf. though
E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge,MA, 1975), p. 578, who defines 'agon-
istic' as any activityrelatedto fighting.
20 I.e., first-orderintentionality,andnot second-orderintentionsaboutintentions.
Cf. HarryFrankfurt,"Freedomof the Will and the Concept of a Person",in the
Importanceof WhatWeCareAbout(Cambridge,1988), pp. 12-19.
21 Cf. Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics X.4.
22 E.g., Aristotle,Nicomachean
Ethics 111.2;ImmanuelKant,Foundationsof the
Metaphysicsof Morals II, pp. 416-417.
23 Cf. Robert
Simon, Sportsand Social Values(EnglewoodCliffs, 1985), p. 38:
"Typicallyor paradigmatically... cases of violence involve the intentionaluse of
physical force designed to harma personor property."
24 This distinction amount to what Audi calls "doing violence to" a person,
versus 'violating' a person,where only the latteris "wrongby definition".Robert
Audi, "Violence, Legal Sanctions, and Law Enforcement",in S. Stanage (ed.),
Reason and Violence (Totowa, N.J., 1974), p. 32. The pejorative sense takes

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230 ALLAN BACK

the violation of persons as the most importantfeatureof 'violence', as Newton

Garver,"WhatViolence Is", in T. Rose (ed.), Violence in America (New York,
1969) (= The Nation, 24 June 1968, p. 819), pp. 6-7, wants: "Whatis funda-
mental about violence is that a person is violated ... violence in human affairs
amountsto violating persons."This definition agrees also with Ted Honderich,
Political Violence(Ithaca, 1976), p. 98: a violent act is "a use of a considerable
or destroyingforce againstpeople or things, a use of force which offends against
a norm."Also cf. HarryGirvetz,"AnAnatomyof Violence,', in S. Stanage(ed.),
Reason and Violence(Totowa,N.J., 1974), p. 184, who defines 'force or violence'
as "harmperpetratedon personsor propertyranging,in the case of persons,from
restrainingtheir freedom of movement to tortureand death, and, in the case of
property,from simple fine or damageto complete expropriationor total destruc-
tion."
25 RobertAudi, "Violence,Legal Sanctions,and Law Enforcement",p. 38; "On
the Meaningand Justificationof Violence",pp. 52, 54.
26 RobertNozick, PhilosophicalExplanations(Cambridge,MA, 1981), pp. 4-6.
So too AndrewNorman,"EpistemologicalViolence",in D. Curtinand R. Litke
(eds.), InstitutionalViolence(Amsterdam,1999), p. 252.
27 Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics 11.4;Kant,Foundationsof the Metaphysicsof
Morals I, pp. 393-394.
28 This distinction can be made also in terms of the distinction between an
antecedentversus a consequentwill.
29 JudithJarvis Thomson, "Self-Defense",Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.4
(1991), pp. 294, 303.
30 Cf. Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics 111.3on what is up to us.
31 It also prevents a person from having the casuist excuse of appeal to the
doctrineof double effect, sc., of willing only one of the consequences when she
knows full well that the other consequence will follow. Cf. Alison Maclntyre,
"Doing away with Double Effect",Ethics 11.2 (2001), pp. 222-225; 225, n. 12.
32 To be violent, such acts would also have to be forceful in the sense described
above. Still instancesthatwere successfulwould tendto be forceful,as they would
have great consequences. Cf. John Lewis, The Case Against Pacifism (London,
1939), pp. 109-1 10.
33 Quotedin ThomasMerton(ed.), Gandhion Non-Violence(New York, 1965),
p. 75.
34 To be violent, such acts would also have to be forceful in the sense described
above. Cf. JohnLewis, The Case Against Pacifism(London, 1939), pp. 109-110.

Departmentof Philosophy
KutztownUniversity
Kutztown,PA 19530
USA
E-mail: back@kutztown.edu

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