MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
On
FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and
his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is
about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and
to enjoin the petition of the President's decision
to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
RULING: Yes! According to Section 1, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." The phrase, however, does not
define what is meant by executive power
although the same article tackles on exercises
of certain powers by the President such
as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment (Section
19),treaty making power (Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary
power(Section 22), informing power (Section
23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the
President, it cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO
FACTS: It began in October 2000 when
allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by
the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and
corruption against Estrada were made and
were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when
11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate
President Pimentel resigned after casting his
vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th
President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed
petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable
controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
 3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from
suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING: 1. Political questions- "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I
EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
The cases at bar pose legal and not political
questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art
II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to
resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is
deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.

exercise of people SC declared that the resignation of President

power of freedom of Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by
speech and freedom of his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press
exercise of the people assemblyto petition the release containing his final statement:
power of government for redress
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the
revolution which of grievances which
respondent as President;
overthrew the whole only affected the office
government. of the President. 2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the
extra
intra constitutional and healing process (he did not say that he was
constitutional and the
the resignation of the leaving due to any kind of disability and that he
legitimacy of the new
sitting President that it was going to reassume the Presidency as soon
government that
caused and the as the disability disappears);
resulted from it
cannot be the subject succession of the Vice
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for
President as President
of judicial review the opportunity to serve them as President
are subject to judicial
(without doubt referring to the past
review.
opportunity);
presented a political
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any
question; involves legal questions.
future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act
of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No.
176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic
of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T.
Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate
passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment
Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected
his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial
power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts
of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair
trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury
system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also
said that Estrada did not present enough
evidence to show that the publicity given the
trial has influenced the judge so as to render
the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court
said that the cases against Estrada were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with
justice and less with prosecution.
Soliven vs. Makasiar
Facts: Soliven broadcasted the statement that
President Aquino hid under her bed during a
coup d' etat. The President sued for libel.
Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because
the President was immune from suit.
Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when
the RTC issued a warrant of arrest without
personally examining the complainant and
the witnesses to determine probable cause.
Held: No
Ratio: In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the
judge isn't required to examine the complainant
and the witnesses.
He shall only personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and
issue a warrant of arrest on the basis thereof.
Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and required the
submission of
supportingaffidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Otherwise, judges would be burdened with
preliminary investigation instead of hearing
cases.
Brillantes vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June
15, 2004
Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system (AES) for
the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections. It also mandated
the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment,
devices and materials; and to adopt new
electoral forms and printing materials. On
October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its
Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization
program for the 2004 elections consisting of
three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I –
Computerized system of registration and voters
validation or the so-called "biometrics" system
of registration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized
voting and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III –
Electronic transmission of results. It resolved to
conduct biddings for the three phases.
Problems were encountered as to the
enforcement of phase I and II, leaving Phase III
imposable. The COMELEC issues Resolution No.
6712 regarding the said phase which leads to
this petition. Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose De
Venecia, Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez-
Tan, Franklin M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan,
Norberto M. Gonzales, Honesto M. Isleta and
Jose A. Bernas, filed with this Court their
Motion to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention. In their petition-in-intervention,
movants-petitioners urge the Court to declare
as null and void the assailed resolution and
permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC
from implementing the same.
Issue: 1. Whether the petitioner and the
petitioners-intervenors have standing to sue;
2. Assuming that they have standing, whether
the issues they raise are political in nature over
which the Court has no jurisdiction;
3. Assuming the issues are not political,
whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:
(a) for preempting the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of
the 1987 Constitution to canvass the votes for
the election of President and Vice-President;
(b) for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the
1987 Constitution that "no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law;"
(c) for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173, 8436
and 7166 which authorize only the citizens’ arm
to use an election return for an "unofficial"
count;
(d) for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, requiring not less than thirty (30)
days notice of the use of new technological and
electronic devices; and,
(e) for lack of constitutional or statutory basis;
and,
4. Whether the implementation of Resolution
No. 6712 would cause trending, confusion and
chaos.
Held: 1. The Petitioners And Petitioners-In-
Intervention Possess The Locus Standi To
Maintain The Present Action
2. The Issue Raised By The Petition Is Justiciable
3. The Respondent COMELEC Committed Grave
Abuse Of Discretion Amounting To Lack Or
Excess Of Jurisdiction In Issuing Resolution No.
6712
The assailed Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28,
2004 issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc is hereby declared NULL
AND VOID.
LOPEZ VS. SENATE
Cong. Ruy Elias C. Lopez v. Senate of the Philippi
nes, House of Representatives, et al, (G.R. No.
163556, June 8, 2004)where the
Supreme Court, voting 14-0, ruled:“ Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution expressly
empowersCongress “to promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of thecertificates.”In Arroyo
v. de Venecia (277 SCRA 268, August 14,1997),
the Court ruled that it had no power to review
the internalproceedings of Congress, unless
there is a clear violation of
theConstitution. Likewise, Santiago v. Guingona,
(298 SCRA 756,November 18, 1998) held that
the Court – under the doctrine
of separation of powers –
has “no authority to interfere” in the“exclusive
realm” of a co-equal branch, absent a showing
of graveabuse of discretion. The Court has no
authority to restrict or
limitthe exercise of congressional prerogatives g
ranted by theConstitution. The creation of the
Joint Committee does not constitutegrave
abuse and cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner andthe other members of Congress
of their congressional prerogatives,because
under the very Rules under attack, the decisions
and finalreport of the said Committee shall be
subject to the approval of the joint session of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately.”
Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito
"Erap" Estrada and Comelec, G.R. No. 191988,
August 31, 2010
THE FACTS: Private respondent Joseph “Erap”
Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the general
elections held on May 11, 1998. He was
however ousted [“resigned” according to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs.
Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from
office and was not able to finish his term. He
sought the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty.
Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacy
and filed a petition for the latter’s
disqualification, which was however denied by
the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by
the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under
the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition
would not stay the execution of the judgment,
final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is
sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did
not even pray for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Hence, private respondent was able
to participate as a candidate for the position of
President in the May 10, 2010 elections where
he garnered the second highest number of
votes.
ISSUE: What is the proper interpretation of the
following provision of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution: “[t]he President shall not be
eligible for any re-election?”
THE RULING: [The petition was DENIED DUE
COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme
Court.]
Private respondent was not elected President
the second time he ran [in the May 2010
elections]. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase “any
reelection” will be premised on a person’s
second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists. There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in
this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein. As such, one of the essential requisites
for the exercise of the power of judicial review,
the existence of an actual case or controversy,
is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to
the thing in issue in the case before it. In other
words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable.
An action is considered “moot” when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence,
one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed
prior to the proclamation of a President who
has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010
elections, the same is no longer true today.
Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his
“reelection” will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose.
DOROMA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor
FACTS:
 Quintin S. Doromal, a former
Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),
Sec. 3(h), in connection with his
shareholdings and position as president
and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation
(DITC) which submitted bids to supply
P61 million worth of electronic,
electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (or DECS) and the National
Manpower and Youth Council (or
NMYC).
 An information was then filed by the
“Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the
said violation and a preliminary
investigation was conducted.
 The petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition questioning
 the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to
file the information without the
approval of the Ombudsman.
 The Supreme Court held that the
incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution
and who is supposed to retain powers
and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without
authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
Subsequently annulling the information
filed by the “Tanodbayan”.
 A new information, duly approved by
the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the
Doromal, a public officer, being then a
Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the
Doromal International Trading
Corporation, a family corporation of
which he is the President, and which
company participated in the biddings
conducted by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower & Youth Council,
which act or participation is prohibited
by law and the constitution.
 The petitioner filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground that it
was invalid since there had been no
preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him.
 The motion was denied by
Sandiganbayan claiming that another
preliminary investigation is unnecessary
because both old and new informations
involve the same subject matter.
ISSUES: Whether or not the act of Doromal
would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is
necessary even if both informations involve the
same subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be
effected as invalid due to the absence of
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to
the third issue. Petition was granted by the
Supreme Court.
RATIO:
 (1) The presence of a signed document
bearing the signature of Doromal as
part of the application to bid shows that
he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act is
absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of
Article VII of the Constitution" because
"the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at
least an indirect interest."
 Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "the
President, Vice-President, the members
of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants shall not... during (their)
tenure, ...directly or indirectly...
participate in any business.
 (2) The right of the accused to a
preliminary investigation is "a
substantial one." Its denial over his
 opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that
it subjects the accused to the loss of
life, liberty, or property without due
process of law" provided by the
Constitution.
 Since the first information was
annulled, the preliminary investigation
conducted at that time shall also be
considered as void. Due to that fact, a
new preliminary investigation must be
conducted.
 (3) The absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they
impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective; but, if
there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants,
before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence,
the court, instead of dismissing the
information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to
conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.
 WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
The Sandiganbayan shall immediately
remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the
Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation and shall hold
in abeyance the proceedings before it
pending the result of such investigation.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed
this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO
284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office
or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member
of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7;
and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that
the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those
cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their
office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate
and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered
as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and
the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13,
Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
thatCabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec
13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided
in the 1987 Constitution itself.
De Castro vs JBC
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the
controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering
that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18,
2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly
stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in
Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for
the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of
the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments
to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e. that every
part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16,
if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.
Power of the Judiciary: De Castro vs. JBC (G.R.
No. 191002, April 20, 2010)
Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on
the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The
said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council
to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the
short list of nominees and submit it to the
incumbent President. Movants argue that the
disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec.
15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the
ban on midnight appointments to cover the
members of the Judiciary, and they contended
that the principle of stare decisis is controlling,
and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying
or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to
the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec.
15, Article VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend
to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec.
15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of
Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records
of the Constitutional Commission did not
concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art.
VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on
nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend
to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its
March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the
prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the term of the
outgoing president does not apply to vacancies
in the Supreme Court.
Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.
Fact:
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority. He was designated as general
Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board.
In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary
of Tourism, a memorandum stating that his
designation is invalid because it was not her,
the President, who appointed him as what is
required by PD No. 564. As such, he will remain
in the position until the President appoints a
person to serve in a permanent capacity.
Held:
Appointment and designation are distinct from
each other. The former is defined as the
selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed,
the appointment results in security of tenure.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official and is legislative
in nature. The implication is that he shall hold
office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority.
Sarmiento vs Mison
FACTS: Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Carague as the Secretary of the Department of
Budget, without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional
by reason of its not having been confirmed by
CoA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING: Yes. The President acted within her
constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting
his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He
is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the
salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and
bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers with the consent and
confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by
law;
3rd those whom the President may be
authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers
are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the
present bone of contention. By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. The
1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III, petitioner, vs. REUBEN
S. LISTA
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments, made by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, of public respondents to
different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard
and their subsequent assumption of office
without confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments under the 1987 Constitution.
The petition impleads Hon. Emilia T. Boncodin
in her capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM). Petitioner,
Elpidio G. Soriano, filed the instant petition as
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and as a taxpayer.
Public respondents were promoted to different
ranks in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on
different dates as follows:
Reuben S. Lista Vice Admiral, Philippine Coast
Guard
Domingo T. Estera Rear Admiral, Philippine
Coast Guard
Miguel C. Tabares Commodore, Philippine Coast
Guard
Arthur N. Gosingan Commodore, Philippine
Coast Guard
Efren L. Taduran Naval Captain, Philippine Coast
Guard
Cesar A. Sarile Naval Captain, Philippine Coast
Guard
Danilo M. Vilda Naval Captain, Philippine Coast
Guard
Elpidio B. Padama Commodore, Philippine Coast
Guard
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-
submission of their names to the Commission
on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of
the said respondent officers of the PCG had
assumed their duties and functions. According
to petitioner, their respective appointments are
illegal and unconstitutional for failure to
undergo the confirmation process in the
CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from
discharging their duties and functions as such
officers of the PCG.
In the same vein, petitioner opines that there is
no legal basis for the DBM to allow the
disbursement of the salaries and emoluments
of respondent officers of the PCG. Accordingly,
he prays that respondent Secretary Boncodin
be ordered to desist from allowing such
disbursements until the confirmation of their
respective appointments by the CA.
At the outset, the Court finds petitioner to be
without any legal personality to file the instant
petition. We have ruled that a private citizen is
allowed to raise constitutional questions only if
he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government,
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.[1] In the case at bar,
petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate that
he has personally suffered actual or threatened
injury. It should be emphasized that a party
bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality
of an act or statute must show not only that the
law or act is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.[2]
The instant petition cannot even be classified as
a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no
interest as such and this case does not involve
the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner has the legal
personality to question the subject
appointments, the petition will nevertheless
fail. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the PCG used to be administered and
maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine
Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was
subsequently placed under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense (DND)
pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it
was integrated into the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of
the Philippine Navy under Section 54 of Chapter
8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as
amended.
However, on March 30, 1998, after the
aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG,
then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of
his statutory authority to reorganize the Office
of the President, issued EO 475 transferring the
PCG from the DND to the Office of the
President. He later on again transferred the PCG
from the Office of the President to the
Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no
longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of the
PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain
and higher for that matter, do not require
confirmation by the CA.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
It is clear from the foregoing provision of the
Constitution that only appointed officers from
the rank of colonel or naval captain in the
armed forces require confirmation by the CA.
The rule is that the plain, clear and
unambiguous language of the Constitution
should be construed as such and should not be
given a construction that changes its meaning.[3]
The enumeration of appointments subject to
confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The
clause officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain refers
to military officers alone. This is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions
and appointments of respondent officers are
not covered by the above-cited provision of the
Constitution, the same need not be confirmed
by the CA.[4]
Accordingly, the Court declares that no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction was committed by respondent
officers of the PCG. Their assumption to office
as well as the disbursement of their respective
salaries and other emoluments by the
respondent Secretary of the DBM are hereby
declared valid and legal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita, 472 SCRA 587
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments without the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, while
Congress is in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned,
President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of
the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the
constitutionality of the appointments, assert
that “while Congress is in session, there can be
no appointments, whether regular or acting, to
a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the
President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments
even while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the
President’s power of appointment. Sections 16
and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The
President shall exercise the power to appoint
such officials as provided for in the Constitution
and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary
Designation. — (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch, appointment to which is
vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer
regularly appointed to the office is unable to
perform his duties by reason of illness, absence
or any other cause; or (b) there exists a
vacancy[.]
Issue: WON the President can issue
appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries while Congress is in
session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an
acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may
become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is
the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have
the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary,
the President must appoint in an acting capacity
a person of her choice even while Congress is in
session.
Ad interim appointments and acting
appointments are both effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be extended
any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation
or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyo’s issuance of ad
interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic
appointment of the undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere
with the exercise of this executive power except
in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on
the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislature’s interference in the executive’s
power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive
office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
that office. Neither may Congress impose on
the President the duty to appoint any particular
person to an office
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYOG.R. No. 149036, April
2, 2002FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was
appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelec’sEID by then Comelec Chairperson
Harriet Demetriou in a temporary
capacity. OnMarch 2001, respondent Benipayo
was appointed Comelec Chairman together wit
hother commissioners in an ad interim appoint
ment. While on such ad interimappointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as
Chairman issued a Memorandumaddress
transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo
toreconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the LawDepartment. S
he cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding h
eads of government offices that "transfer and d
etail of employees are prohibited during the
election period. Benipayo denied her request
for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing CO
MELEC Resolution No. 3300 datedNovember 6,
2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of
the said Memo Circular.Petitioner appealed the
denial of her request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC
enbanc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal co
mplaint 16 with the LawDepartment 17 against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment
violated Section 261
(h)of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Res
olution No. 3258, Civil ServiceMemorandum
Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil servicelaws, rules and
regulations.During the pendency of her
complaint before the Law Department,
petitioner filed theinstant petition questioning
the appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo,Borra and Tuason,
as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively.Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violatethe constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts
to a temporaryappointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without
merit. An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment beca
use it takes effectimmediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that
it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent c
haracter.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making
it
Effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
Drilon v. Lim
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code
1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of
four oil companies and
ataxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manil
a Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s
resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional
because it vests on the Secretary the power
of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution. The Secretary argues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the
Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the
Court due to failure to submit certified true
copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: WON the lower court has
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial
courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X,
Section5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Sup
reme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judg
ments and orders of lower courts in all cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation,order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction,
lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws,
no less than on the doctrine of separation
of powers. It is alsoemphasized that every
court, including this Court, is charged with the
duty of a purpose fulhesitation before declaring
a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the
measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with
the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution.
Biraogo vs. PTC
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated
authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does
not include the power to create an entirely new
public office which was hitherto inexistent like
the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution
and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under
the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation
and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the
legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create
or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body
and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions
do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the
equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to
file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of
the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that
the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that
he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest
is “the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of
the general public. He has to show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication
of the public order and the securing of relief as
a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. There is no usurpation on
the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need
to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office
of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject
to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the
DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise
and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person
within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or
by its improper execution through the state’s
duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.
Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration
is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Guanzon vs. De villa
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the
"saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila)
were unconstitutional. They alleged that there
is no specific target house to be search and that
there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest
served. Most of the policemen are in their
civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards. The residents were rudely
rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their houses. The residents
were at the point of high-powered guns and
herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip
down to their briefs for the police to examine
their tattoo marks. The residents complained
that they're homes were ransacked, tossing
their belongings and destroying their valuables.
Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents
also reported incidents of maulings, spot-
beatings and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical
torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations. The respondents said that such
accusations were all lies. Respondents contends
that the Constitution grants to government the
power to seek and cripple subversive
movements for the maintenance of peace in the
state. The aerial target zoning were intended to
flush out subversives and criminal elements
coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they
have intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead for the actual operation and that local
and foreign media joined the operation to
witness and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive
committed consisted of violation of human
rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which
should be prohibited rather it is the procedure
used or the methods which "offend even
hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts
stated by the parties, it appears to have been
no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial
zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights
of the squatters and low income families are
fully protected. However, the remedy should
not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one
victim complaints and not one violator is
properly charged. In the circumstances of this
taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or
policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no
permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that
some abuses were committed, the court
temporary restraint the alleged violations which
are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded
to the RTC of Manila.
Gudani vs. Senga
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col.
Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci”
tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of
the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing
before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two
appeared before the Senate in spite the fact
that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, the two were relieved of their
assignments for allegedly violating the Articles
of War and the time honoured principle of the
“Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them
to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an
order of a superior officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the
authority to issue an order to the members of
the AFP preventing them from testifying before
a legislative inquiry.
RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has
constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military
officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may
be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial
orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President
may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from
testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The President’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President
to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief.
The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries
in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the President’s
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come
to pass in this petition, since petitioners
testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has
the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may
soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President,
as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers
appearing before the legislature to testify, the
Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to
comply with the final orders of the courts.
Sanlakas vs. Reyes
FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood Incident,
the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O. 4, both
declaring a “state of rebellion” and calling out
the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After hours-
long negotiations, the
Oakwood occupation ended and the president
lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state
of rebellion is constitutional
RULING: President’s Commander-in-Chief
Powers
The above provision grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of
“graduated power[s].” From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law. In the exercise of the latter two
powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an
actual invasion or rebellion, and
that public safety requires the exercise of such
power. However, as we observed in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, “[t]hese
conditions are not required in the exercise of
the calling out power. The only criterion is that
‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President
may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.’”
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion.
Note that the Constitution vests the President
not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive powers.
xxx the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad
enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power
and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency
equips the occupant with the means to address
exigencies or threats which undermine the very
existence of government or the integrity of the
State.
xxx
Thus, the President’s authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-
Chief powers. xxx
Declaration of State of Rebellion is Superfluity
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in
calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a
state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At
most, it only gives notice to the nation that such
a state exists and that the armed forces may be
called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the
declaration may wreak emotional effects upon
the perceived enemies of the State, even on the
entire nation. But this Court’s mandate is to
probe only into the legal consequences of the
declaration. This Court finds that such a
declaration is devoid of any legal significance.
For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed
not written.
Should there be any “confusion” generated by
the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the
dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the
mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason
that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these conditions. At any
rate, the presidential issuances themselves call
for the suppression of the rebellion “with due
regard to constitutional rights.” But Declaration
of State of Rebellion is not Declaration
of Martial Law; Exercise of Emergency Powers
by President does not necessarily follow
The argument that the declaration of a state of
rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the
report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is
no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or
that military authorities have taken over the
functions of civil government. There is no
allegation of curtailment of civil or political
rights. There is no indication that the President
has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In
short, there is no illustration that the President
has attempted to exercise or has
exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the
declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends
upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declarednational policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance
where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI.
David vs. Arroyo
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo
issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
“The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces
to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and
in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power]
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction; and
[power to take over] as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare
a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5
implementing PP1017, directing the members
of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence." David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition
of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged
“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued
that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have
factual basis, and contended that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b
the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING: The operative portion of PP 1017 may
be divided into three important provisions,
thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested
upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection
or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare
a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as
provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of
rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk
II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary
power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise
of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of
Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the
armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence. Second Provision:
The "Take Care" Power. The second provision
pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.” To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the
President’s authority to declare“a state of
national emergency” and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a
power not reposed upon it. However, knowing
that during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress
to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised
to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood
as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the “the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President
may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17,
Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President
alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he
has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types
of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President
has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII
in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it
provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
“necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
IBP vs. Zamora
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-
Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary
period only. The IBP questioned the validity of
the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE: 1. WoN the President's factual
determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military.
RULING: 1. The power of judicial review is set
forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance
are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites
are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of
the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their
duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an
“insidious incursion” of the military in the task
of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),
Article XVI of the Constitution.
Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (and
other consolidated cases)
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, heavily armed
men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family
of Maguindanao gunned down and buried
under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In
response to this carnage, President Arroyo
issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring
a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued
PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao except for identified areas of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6,
2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress
convened in joint session to review the validity
of the President’s action. But two days later, or
on December 12, 2009, before Congress could
act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial
law and restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the [privilege of the]
writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot
and academic?
RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the
consolidated petitions on the ground that they
have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in
Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and
academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal
departments of the government dictate that
the Court should be cautious in entertaining
actions that assail the constitutionality of the
acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department. The issue of constitutionality, said
the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of
the case, that the resolution of such issue is
unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of
Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two
reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus before the joint houses of Congress
could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same. xxx.
[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President
and the Congress act in tandem in exercising
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They
exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in
a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based
on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not
have.
Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is
implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated. Only when
Congress defaults in its express duty to defend
the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final
rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands
of the Court. xxx
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation
1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which
had in fact convened, could act on the
same. Consequently, the petitions in these
cases have become moot and the Court has
nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening
event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just
eight days, they have not been meaningfully
implemented. The military did not take over
the operation and control of local government
units in Maguindanao. The President did not
issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao
that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had
been reported. Those who were arrested
during the period were either released or
promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition
for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight
days. The point is that the President intended
by her action to address an uprising in a
relatively small and sparsely populated
province. In her judgment, the rebellion was
localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of
a determined and amply armed government
presence. xxx
xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the
suspension never took off. The Congress itself
adjourned without touching the matter, it
having become moot and academic.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
February 9, 1989 (G.R. No. 78239)
FACTS:
• In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused
of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount
defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
• She was given an absolute pardon by
President Marcos which she accepted.
• Petitioner requested that she be restored to
her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant, she also asked for the
backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
• Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity
of a new appointment
• The Office of the President said that that
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
and emoluments due to him during the period
of his suspension pendente lite.
• In fact, in such a situation, the former public
official must secure a reappointment before he
can reassume his former position. And a pardon
shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.
• Petitioner argued that general rules on
pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive
clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment
therefore as assistant city treasurer could not
be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
• The court viewed that is not material when
the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the
same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities and restores him
to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the
person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered
by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the
pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from
public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa
thru falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
People vs. Salle
Where the judgment of conviction is still
pending appeal and has not yet therefore
attained finality, as in the instant case,
executive clemency may not yet be granted to
the appellant.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate
as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal.
Facts: On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr.
and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the
compound crime of murder and destructive
arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and
Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal which was
accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24,
1993.
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's
counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the
voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the
motion without the assistance of counsel on his
misimpression that the motion was necessary
for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison
following the grant of a conditional pardon by
the President on December 9, 1993. She also
stated that Mengote was also granted
conditional pardon and that he immediately left
for his province without consulting her. She
prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to
withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's
motion.
After taking into consideration Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution which provides
that the President may, except in cases of
impeachment or as otherwise provided in the
Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by
final judgment, the Court required (1) the
Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-
appellants to submit their memoranda on the
issue of the enforceability of the conditional
pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for
the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform
the Court why it recommended to the President
the grant of the conditional pardon despite the
pendency of the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor
General maintains that the conditional pardon
granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable
because the judgment of conviction is not yet
final in view of the pendency in this Court of his
appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty.
La'o, submits that the conditional pardon
extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable.
Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that
although Mengote did not file a motion to
withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have
abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the
conditional pardon which resulted in the finality
of his conviction.
Issue: Whether or not a pardon granted to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from
a judgment of conviction by the trial court is
enforceable.
Held: Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as
follows:
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.” Where the
pardoning power is subject to the limitation
of conviction, it may be exercised at any time
after conviction even if the judgment is on
appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where
the requirement is " final conviction, " as was
mandated in the original provision of Section
14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or
"conviction by final judgment," as presently
prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be
extended before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a)
when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b)
when the accused commences to serve the
sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court,
and (d) when the accused applies for probation,
thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the
judgment of conviction is still pending appeal
and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in
the instant case, executive clemency may not
yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation
under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefor, if one is made, should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should not
be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of
the Government concerned must require proof
from the accused that he has not appealed from
his conviction or that he has withdrawn his
appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a
certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate
as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal,
and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole
before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render
those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the
accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a
basis for the release of the accused from
confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant
Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty
(30) days from notice hereof within which to
secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The
conditional pardon granted the said appellant
shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-
compliance with this Resolution, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections must exert every
possible effort to take back into his custody the
said appellant, for which purpose he may seek
the assistance of the Philippine National Police
or the National Bureau of Investigation. (People
vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote, G.R.
No. 103567, December 4, 1995)
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest
G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus
to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court to the Senate
of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant
to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l
Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and crimes of
aggression as defined by the Statute. The
Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in
UN. The provisions of the Statute however
require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a
treaty, under both domestic and international
law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the
duty of the Executive Department to transmit
the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and
the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to
the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed
by a member of the Philippine mission to the
U.N. even without the signature of the
President.
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole
organ and authorized in the external relations
and he is also the country's sole representative
with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with
respect to the country's foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states and
enter into treaties but this power is limited by
the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of
all the members of the Senate for the treaty to
be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of
foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit
of political maturity and growth.
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly
registered party-list group established to
represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the
period material to this case. Respondent
Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity
as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case
is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with “the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international
concern x x x and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious
crimes adverted to cover those considered
grave under international law, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge
d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory
countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J.
Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated
May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter),
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary
Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy
Note adverted to and put in effect the
Agreement with the US government. In esse,
the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to
and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be
brought against them in international
tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace
of the strategic security and defense
partnership between the two countries. As of
May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have
been effected by and between the US and 33
other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons”
are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military
personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory
of the other shall not, absent the express
consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means
to any international tribunal for any purpose,
unless such tribunal has been established by the
UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means
to any other entity or third country, or expelled
to a third country, for the purpose of surrender
to or transfer to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the
UN Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or
otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines
to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of
the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or
otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a
third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of
the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until
one year after the date on which one party
notifies the other of its intent to terminate the
Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement
shall continue to apply with respect to any act
occurring, or any allegation arising, before the
effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General
Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-
surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone
replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international
law; and that, under US law, the said agreement
did not require the advice and consent of the
US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave
abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional,
or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON
SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral
or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the
Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a
valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken
unaware of certain well-recognized
international doctrines, practices, and jargons––
is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article
II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation,
and amity with all nations. An exchange of
notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an
internationally accepted form of international
agreement. The United Nations Treaty
Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines
the term as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine
agreement, that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of
the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one
signed by the representative of the other.
Under the usual procedure, the accepting State
repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to,
either because of its speedy procedure, or,
sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative
approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of
notes” and “executive agreements” have been
used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that
becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements
concluded by the President “sometimes take
the form of exchange of notes and at other
times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As
former US High Commissioner to the Philippines
Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The
Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence
between this and other governments ends and
agreements – whether denominated executive
agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise
– begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition
that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral
instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent
to be bound––is a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international
written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck
down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with
allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds
from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner
would put it, “leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x
it precludes our country from delivering an
American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of
petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering
into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its
treaty obligations under the Rome Statute,
contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in
this regard that the non-surrender agreement,
as aptly described by the Solicitor General, “is
an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to
try and punish crimes under its national law. x x
x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy
and competence of the country’s judiciary to try
offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the
erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is
manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have
committed acts penalized under the Rome
Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of
the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for
the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to
bind both countries to the Rome Statute have
been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either
party of individuals to international tribunals,
like the ICC, without the consent of the other
party, which may desire to prosecute the crime
under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the
Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over
an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.