ONG VS.

REPUBLIC

FACTS: On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and
as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and
Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title[4] over Lot 15911. They alleged
that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive
property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and
Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty
(30) years. After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of
the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12,
1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; and that the subject lot is part of
the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and
his brothers. The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of
the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic)
been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of
the instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
Decision In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that
the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been
in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12,
1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

ISSUE:

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as

RULING:
amended, provides
 SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of

title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[8] These requisites involve
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
[9]
After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. The Report[10]dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of
Lands stated that the subject lot is within the alienable and disposable zone as
classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such
on November 21, 1927.[11] This finding is, likewise, embodied in the
Report[12] dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO) and the blue print Copy[13] of the plan covering the subject lot. However,
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Even if we were to tack petitioners claim of ownership over the subject lot to
that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia
Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[20]

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from
spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers
actually occupied the subject lot. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed to establish
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required
by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must
show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and
occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.[24]

CANETE VS. GENUINO ICE COMPANY

FACTS: Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
N-140441;[3] 14399;[4] RT-94384 (292245);[5] RT-94794 (292246);[6] and
292247.[7] Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued
under mysterious circumstances, considering that the holders thereof including
their predecessors-in-interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession
of the property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under
the Friar Lands Act.[8] Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 614 from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or
were derived. Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest; but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second Amended
Complaint[10] which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the
original complaint, TCT Nos. 274095 and 274096;[11] 274097 and 274098;[12] and
274099.[13] The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action,
as well as the remedy sought to be obtained, thus:

4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are among those

who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in concept of
owners of unregistered parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat,
Quezon City, Metro Manila,

5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land

known as Piedad Estate, which property is intended for distribution among
the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.

6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or derived from Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which
transfer certificates of title are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void,

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property

in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws.[14]

Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint

On January 3, 2001,[16] the trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari and dismissed
petitioners Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUE:

RULING: We deny the petition.

The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired
on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the
British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine
Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26,
1904.[18]. After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of
the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was
subdivided originally into 874 lots.
The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public
domain and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens system
following the procedure for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act
496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public
domain.[20]

One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-
in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation
from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were
bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress
of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from
certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only
actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government
were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of
the settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the
lands. [21]

First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the other subject titles are
derivatives is null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and
other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the
Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.
Second, found that as early as the period prior to the Second World
War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of. Third, the Piedad
Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land registration, which means
that all lots therein are titled. Fourth, one who acquires land under the Friar Lands
Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to
purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which means that
petitioners claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the
subject property is really of no moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-
interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands were acquired by
the Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though they were in
occupation of the same before the government acquired the land; yet, no period of
time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.

MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land

registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
(RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State.[4] Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine

Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I
affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of
the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
 Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which
stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan; this Court
hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to
the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the
property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of
the period of possession.

ISSUE: 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
RULING: It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they
presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there
is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for
the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

REPUBLIC VS. ABRILE

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

SUSI VS. RAZON

FACTS:

ISSUE:
RULING: