STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION STATE OF GEORGIA TAMARA GORDON, Appellant, CASE NO.: 2019-06 v DECISION GRIFFIN-SPALDING COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. 3 This is an appeal by Tamara Gordon (“Appellant”) from the decision of the Griffin- Spalding County Board of Education (“Local Board”) to terminate her employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year for willful neglect of duties and other good and sufficient cause. For the following reasons, the decision of the Local Board is hereby REVERSED. 1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ‘The Appellant executed an employment contract with the Griffin-Spalding County Board of Education for the 2017-2018 school year. She worked as a social studies teacher at Griffin High School On February 23, 2018, Darrell Evans, the principal at Griffin High School, was notified that the Appellant was resigning from her position and that her last day at the school would be March 2, 2018. Mr. Evans sent the Appellant's notice to the human resources department. Ms. Dobbins, Executive Director of Human Resources for Griffin-Spalding County Schools (District”), notified the Appellant that she must meet certain criteria before the school superintendent would recommend that the Local Board release her from her employment contract. These criteria included the Appellant showing extenuating circumstances for leaving her position and the school finding a suitable replacement. The Appellant’s extenuating circumstance was that she received @ promotion within the field of education. The new position would provide the Appellant with an inerease in salary and a signing bonus if she reported to the new position by a certain date, The Appellant and Ms, Dobbins exchanged several communications regarding information that Ms. Dobbins needed regarding the Appellant’s new position. Ms. Dobbins notified the Appellant that she would seek a replacement for the Appellant, but that the Appellant still had to report to work at Griffin High School in the interim. The Appellant did not retum to work after March 2, 2018, even though the school had not yet found a replacement for her position. "The Local Board terminated the Appellant's employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year for willful neglect of duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(3) and for other good and sufficient cause (violation of Standard 9 of the Code of Ethies for Educators, which prohibits a resignation that equates toa breach of contract). The Local Board also directed the superintendent to notify the Professional Standards Commission regarding the Appellant's possible ethical violations.Il. | PROCEDURAL HISTORY By letter of March 22, 2018, the Griffin-Spalding County Superintendent of Schools notified the Appellant that her contract of employment had been recommended for termination for willful neglect of duties and other good and sufficient cause (abandonment of contract in violation of the Code of Ethies for Educators) as provided by O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(3) and (8). Moreover, the superintendent intended to report the Appellant to the Professional Standards Commission for her ethical violation. The letter gave notice that the hearing as to the charges was scheduled for April 3, 2018 at 5 p.m. In an emailed letter of April 3, 2018, the Appellant's attorney notified the superintendent and the Local Board of the legal and factual reasons why the termination proceedings should not go forward, including the constitutional implications and the legal liability and expenses that the school district may incur. Additionally, there was one sentence in the letter near the end of page 3 where the attomney stated that the Appellant and she were unavailable to attend the hearing on April 3. ‘Thereafter, in the early afternoon of April 3, the attorneys for the Appellant and the District began an email exchange that spanned over approximately a 3-hour period. None on the email communications addressed the unavailability of the Appellant and her attorney to attend the hearing or a request for continuance. A termination hearing took place on April 3, 2018 before the Local Board. Neither the Appellant nor her attorney was present at the hearing. The Local Board terminated the Appellant’ employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year for willful neglect of duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(3) and for other good and sufficient cause (violation of Standard 9 of the Code of Ethies for Educators, which prohibits a resignation that equates to a breach of contract). The Local Board also directed the superintendent to notify the Professional Standards Commission about the Appellant’s possible ethical violations. The Appellant appealed the decision of the Local Board to the State Board of Education (State Board”). mH. |UMERATIONS OF ERROR The Local Board erred in affirming the superintendent's recommendation to terminate the Appellant’s contract on the basis that it violated the Appellant's due process rights. IV. DECISION In reviewing this appeal, this Board must apply the “any evidence rule.” Thus, if there is any evidence to support the Local Board's decision, this Board must affirm it. See Ransum v. Chattooga County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 783, 242 S.B.2d 374 (1978). See also, Chattooga County Bd. of Educ. v. Searles, 302 Ga. App. 731, 691 S.E.2d 629 (2010). This Board will not substitute its judgment for that of the Local Board unless there is clear evidence that the Local Board’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Dukes-Walton v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 336 Ga. App. 175, 784 S.E.2d 37 (2016); King v. Worth County Bd. of Educ., 324 Ga. App. 208, 749 S.E.2d 791 (2013). 2A. The Appellant failed to make a request fora continuance to the Local Board. The termination hearing was scheduled for April 3, 2018 at 5 p.m. On that date, the Appellant’s attorney emailed a 4-page letter to the school superintendent and the Local Board. The letter raised legal and factual arguments as to why the District should not proceed with a termination hearing against the Appellant. On page 3 of the letter at the end of the third full paragraph, the letter read, “Finally, it would be a due process violation as this letter also serves as notice that neither myself nor Ms. Gordon are available to participate in such a hearing this short notice.” Subsequently, that same afternoon, the attorneys for the Appellant and the District engaged in email communications that spanned a 3-hour time frame. The topics of the emails included the propriety of the Appellant's attorney communicating directly with the superintendent and the merits of the termination proceedings against the Appellant. Neither the Appellant and her attomey’s unavailability to attend the hearing nor a request for continuance was raised in the emails by either party. The District's attorney indicated in one of his emails that the termination hearing was going forward that day at 5 p.m., however, his email was not written in response to a request for continuance or the Appellant and her attorney’s unavailability to attend. The hearing went forward as scheduled. “The denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the Local Board, and absent a showing of clear abuse, it is not grounds for reversal.” Tonya Craft v. Chickamauga City Bd. of Educ., Case No. 2009-12 (Ga, SBE, Jan. 2009). See also, Talmadge v. Elson Props., 279 Ga. 268, 612 S.E.2d 780 (2005); Haygood v. Tilley, 295 Ga. App. 90, 670 S.E.2d 800 (2008). In the case at issue, the Appellant did not clearly state a request for a continuance. There was one sentence that was inconspicuously placed on page 3 of a 4-page document. To the extent that the Appellant's intention was to request a continuance in her April 3 letter, that request was not made clear. Moreover, the attomeys for the parties engaged in an email exchange that same afternoon, The Appellant’s attorney never reiterated her or her client's unavailability to attend the hearing. She did not inquire about rescheduling the hearing, nor did she request a continuance. Based on a review of the record, and specifically the written communications between the altomeys on the day of the hearing, itis clear that the attomeys were focused more on a contentious exchange regarding the merits of the underlying proceeding and ethical considerations relative to attorney communications with the opposing party. The lone sentence regarding the Appellant and her attorney's unavailability to attend the hearing was lost in the fray. The Appellant contends that Local Board made it clear that it intended to go forward with the hearing as scheduled, and therefore, it would have been futile to request a continuance. The State Board does not find this, argument persuasive, ‘The record shows that the focus of the communications between the parties ‘was not the need for a continuance. That issue was not prominent in the Appellant's April 3 letter and was not subsequently addressed when the Appellant’s attorney had multiple opportunities to do so. While the decision to grant or deny a request for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the Local Board, the State Board finds that the Appellant made no request for a continuance. ‘There appeared to be a miscommunication between the parties. It was, however, the Appellant's responsibility to clearly convey a request for continuance if she wanted one. ‘The Appellant failed in this regard