DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No.

127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective
officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-
oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby
the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onp e o p l e ’ s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n o n l y b e i m p l e m e n t e d b y l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such law has been passed; (2)
The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for
Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
S e c . 2 , A r t X V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t s e l f e x e c u t o r y , t h u s , w i t h o u t i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation
the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress
does not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on
theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatw h a t h a s b e e n d e l e g a t e d , c a n n o t b e d e l e g a t e d ( p o t e s t a s d e l e g a t a n o n d e l e g a r i p o t e s t ) . T h e del
egation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations
to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e t e r m l i m i t s w a s h e l d t o b e t h a t o f
a r e v i s i o n , a s i t w o u l d a f f e c t o t h e r provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the
constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A
revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not
the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn,
and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes
a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Imbong vs Ochoa
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern
a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection
of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing
a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices
that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The
RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
“primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the
IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices
will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials
have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-
abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is
moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow
religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment
Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be
required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of
parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with
the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right
and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory
RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a
“public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to
“private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs
and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a
need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH
service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss
these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
 legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective
to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without
the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in
so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the
petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches
the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and
laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent
GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

EN BANC

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. G.R. No. 143855

ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT
ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,*
*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,* and
SERENO,** JJ.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON. MAR
ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and Industry), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA
(Secretary of National Economic and Development Authority), GOV.
RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON.
LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission),
Respondents. Promulgated:

September 21, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The Facts and the Case

On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the
retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:
 Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino citizens
US$2,500,000.00 and corporations wholly owned by
Filipino citizens.
Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but less than For the first two years of R.A.
US$7,500,000.00 8762s effectivity, foreign
ownership is allowed up to 60%.
After the two-year period, 100%
foreign equity shall be allowed.
Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by
foreigners. Foreign investments for
establishing a store in Categories B
and C shall not be less than the
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
US$830,000.00.
Category D US$250,000.00 per store of foreign May be wholly owned by
enterprises specializing in high-end foreigners.
or luxury products

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T. Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim, Orlando
Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio Apostol,Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime Jacob, Apolinario
Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all members
of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:

First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the
national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.

Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien
dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.

Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-
employment, and bring about more unemployment.

Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government
as a condition for the release of certain loans.

Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities
and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:

First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A.
8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of Congress since they
made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.

Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as members of Congress,
they represent the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the subject law violates the
rights of those vendors.

Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not specify
how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to
reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so
dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit
Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino
citizens.

The Issues Presented

 Simplified, the case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and

2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

The Courts Ruling

One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so. [1] Legal standing
or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing
refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that
law.[2] To put it another way, he must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains of.[3]

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts
damages on them, either as taxpayers[4] or as legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since the rule on
standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case the public
interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.[6]

Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as follows:

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

xxxx

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:

Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when
the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

xxxx

Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles
and state policies, are not self-executing.Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. [8]

In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of
the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies
and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and
speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.[9]

In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does
not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. [10] The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike
a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can
determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open
certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA
has not opposed such policy.

The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of the
State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without due process
of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts the retail business to Filipino
citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to substantive due process of
law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power. [11] The State had an interest in preventing
alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.

Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to
property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in
question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates
the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court
is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners
have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign
participation in that business. Thus

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals
from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage
in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside
their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling,
restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small and
medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

Francisco vs House of Representatives

Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with
the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G.
BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.

Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.

Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on
November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution
No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the
respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be
null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.

As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be
served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem proper
to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order,
and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts
sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the
first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel,
resist petitioner's action.

For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that
with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court
had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in
the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la
Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in
their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel,
all interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding
motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and
some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the
records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been
undertaken in this case.

The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of
the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said
resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as
follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,
to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the
people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in
Resolution No 2.

After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its
preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal
to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .

CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18

BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:

Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and
write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election.

Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.

Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.

Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its
unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings
or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.

By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention
implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:

September 28, 1971

The Commission on Elections Manila

Thru the Chairman

Gentlemen:

Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(see above)
 Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional
Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:

Sincerely,

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President

On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on
condition that:

(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and
tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;

(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of said
ballots and election forms; and

(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be
distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the
elections on November 8, 1971.

What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the above
proposal:

The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the
Resolution.

This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then transmitted
them to the Commission on Elections.

The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the
plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal
above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).

RECESS RESOLUTION

In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored by
Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to
November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies
of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum,
respectively).

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION

On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming
the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation
of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation.

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971,
hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions
are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV
of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each
and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors
posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the
Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its
power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at
such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two
poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is
a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned
by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent
has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the
jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.

Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec,
21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein
involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the
full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.

There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of
the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that
very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but
comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P.
Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."

It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a
political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in
favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification
— satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851,
March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are
under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth,
we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the
House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4)
cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the
inherent powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art.
11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1,
Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members
of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the
people, when performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature
of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1),
Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition
and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are
seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its
existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been
called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new
government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a
bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely
without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current
convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent
assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:

ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS

SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.

True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any
department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the
convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by
the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on
constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence
of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal
operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or
control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members
can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal
protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor,
for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property without just
compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special
session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between private
individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.

It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of
the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among those
not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not?
It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional
question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of government established by
our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning,
experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.

We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion
written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:

... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in
any living Constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution,
the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development
there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries. In our case,
this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our
Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions
is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the
less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must
be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In the last
and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election
of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted
on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has
the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution
of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended
by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion
of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very
nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our
own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to
refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject
to constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even
if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies
of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding
the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted
the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In
some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as
a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to
assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that
courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts
have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
 constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy,
who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be
thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework?
To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted
facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly." .

As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply
only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts between
and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body,
like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the
other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents
and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected
directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the
present Constitution..

Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without
saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the
Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon
principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the
existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.

II

The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to
eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's
Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and
resolution of the Convention?

At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real
issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional extension
of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal,
and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to
the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he
can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most
laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of
whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the
constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said
resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture
of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact,
still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and,
indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended
section or on other portions of the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be
understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental
issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There
should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part
so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.

Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute
necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the
rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect
of the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure
brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant
search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and
governmental institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the
underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the
national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses
of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the
youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what
they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done
to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these
perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives
of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds
other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to
give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper
parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.

During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being
convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any obstruction
or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to
supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws
life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in
principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted
by the present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may
propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority.
Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in
which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in
which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not
necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost
importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed
mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set
down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional
crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that
constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is
founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the
government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.

In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a
joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We
reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing
Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the
provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that
the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our
founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country
and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people
for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly,
any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived
and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already
observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This
is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see
to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more
importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least,
as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and
hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with
them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the
delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful
and omnipotent as their original counterparts.

Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of the
amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and
brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments
to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said
power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not
perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even
of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as
time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is
calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more
appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic
Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by
the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment
now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a
constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit
as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides
that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of
Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.

(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated,
amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the
Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument,
if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as
the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies
and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any
part which is out of tune with its other parts..

A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is
approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them,
more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very
least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits
and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that
is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to
the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the
questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant
qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to
enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed
amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to
eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is
there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of
judgment can he render on the proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution
the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote
would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying
types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in
that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and
aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the
context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV
a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the
rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are
stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the
language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".

III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court
want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court
has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or
not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that
in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been
called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same
violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We
are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from
but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention
of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on
November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby
declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional
Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —

I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be
sure achieves the result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the premises
postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature of
this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the
fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also
considered and ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.

REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:

We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we
do not express our individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue here because it
is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.

We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension which, although they would seem to be
superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless appear
to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.

Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the
people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed amendment in
question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election
is not the proper election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections 1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on Elections, 2 expounded his view, with which we essentially
agree, on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment. This is what he said:

... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
 "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to
inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and
effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens
cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the
Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .

The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the following words:

I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be submitted
and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is to be diverted by other
extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the Constitution, aware of
the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted upon an election wherein the
people could devote undivided attention to the subject. 4

True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?,"
would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple may turn out
not to be so simple after all.

A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered
at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or
15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In
this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the
past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional
Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having
this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future
political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved,
does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he
be required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If
I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .

The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which are
not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the answers cannot be
had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.

Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the
meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to deliberate
thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits
and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot
thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed amendment.

Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not been met.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies the
topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to
its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if not indeed required by
the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is
indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express
recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any
objection to the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the
more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according
to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.

I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the
answer of intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the one
hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral
argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all
parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted
by this Court, should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one
American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a
constitutional convention are dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the
fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It
has to look to the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature.
Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal. 1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.

It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute
sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides. 2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high
import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to
yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of
the people. It is to be admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v. Fredericks, 3 a
Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our
Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed constituent,
limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either
case to popular approval.

The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the
Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the
Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call
to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A
contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be
looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme
within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the appropriate
principle that should govern the relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under American law is
that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. The convention was
sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in decisions,
viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A
third and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body independent of the
legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its constituent power.
This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions." 4

2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any
limitation on the power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: "The Congress in
joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification."

Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus
as to the former, two constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein provided, and a
constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the
Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would
have the people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever
amendments it seeks to introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me
that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention are agencies
for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other. No justification for
such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.

Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary legislation before the convention could be enabled
to have its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive branches that could,
whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote,
but if such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable constitutional
provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions
on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better
policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as
vested in a constitutional convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable
interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time
inevitably brings in its wake.

From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the power of the
convention. That would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of appraising the legitimate scope
of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such
grave and awesome responsibility.

3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment shall be valid when
submitted and thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to the proposed
submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that therefore the petition must
be sustained as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments proposed be submitted for ratification. That
is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in
the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force
in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from the mosaic of
significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not
commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are
aimed. Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.

It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was contemplated in
this article. I do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to consult the wishes of
the people by the proposed submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of
course that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a
view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From
its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention
ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not silently silent
but silently vocal. What I deem the more important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his
source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their
sovereign powers by the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent
with the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit respondent
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the Commission on
Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge of all laws
relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution. 5 It is not
precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in
this case, to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied
that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the
legitimate discharge of its functions. 6

The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no
alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises, the conclusion
arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —

I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be
sure achieves the result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the premises
postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature of
this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the
fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also
considered and ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.

REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:

We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we
do not express our individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue here because it
is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension which, although they would seem to be
superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless appear
to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.

Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the
people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed amendment in
question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election
is not the proper election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections 1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on Elections, 2 expounded his view, with which we essentially
agree, on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment. This is what he said:

... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
"submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to
inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and
effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens
cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the
Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .

The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the following words:

I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be submitted
and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is to be diverted by other
extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the Constitution, aware of
the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted upon an election wherein the
people could devote undivided attention to the subject. 4

True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?,"
would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple may turn out
not to be so simple after all.

A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered
at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or
15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In
this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the
past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional
Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having
this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future
political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved,
does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he
be required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If
I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .

The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which are
not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the answers cannot be
had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.

Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the
meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to deliberate
thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits
and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot
thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not been met.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies the
topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to
its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if not indeed required by
the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is
indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express
recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any
objection to the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the
more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according
to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.

I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the
answer of intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the one
hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral
argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all
parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted
by this Court, should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one
American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a
constitutional convention are dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the
fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It
has to look to the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature.
Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal. 1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.

It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute
sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides. 2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high
import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to
yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of
the people. It is to be admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v. Fredericks, 3 a
Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our
Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed constituent,
limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either
case to popular approval.

The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the
Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the
Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call
to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A
contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be
looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme
within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the appropriate
principle that should govern the relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under American law is
that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. The convention was
sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in decisions,
viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A
third and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body independent of the
legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its constituent power.
This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions." 4

2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any
limitation on the power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: "The Congress in
joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification."

Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus
as to the former, two constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein provided, and a
constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the
Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would
have the people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever
amendments it seeks to introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me
that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention are agencies
for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other. No justification for
such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.

Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary legislation before the convention could be enabled
to have its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive branches that could,
whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote,
but if such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable constitutional
provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions
on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better
policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as
vested in a constitutional convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable
interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time
inevitably brings in its wake.

From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the power of the
convention. That would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of appraising the legitimate scope
of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such
grave and awesome responsibility.

3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment shall be valid when
submitted and thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to the proposed
submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that therefore the petition must
be sustained as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments proposed be submitted for ratification. That
is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in
the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force
in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from the mosaic of
significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not
commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are
aimed. Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.

It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was contemplated in
this article. I do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to consult the wishes of
the people by the proposed submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of
course that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a
view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From
its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention
ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not silently silent
but silently vocal. What I deem the more important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his
source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their
sovereign powers by the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent
with the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit respondent
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the Commission on
Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge of all laws
relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution. 5 It is not
precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in
this case, to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied
that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the
legitimate discharge of its functions. 6

The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no
alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises, the conclusion
arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

Footnotes
1 Under Section 36, Rule 138 as amended, no one may appear as amicus curiae unless invited or allowed, by the
Court.

REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:

1 L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 816-817.

2 L-28224, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 816-817.

3 Per Justice J.B.L. Reyes, concurred by Justices Arsenio P. Dizon, Calixto O. Zaldivar, Fred Ruiz Castro and
Eugenio Angeles.

4 21 SCRA 821.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874) cited in Malcolm and Laurel. Cases in Constitutional Law, pp. 1, 4-5 (1936).
It was therein stated: "In a governmental and proper sense, law is the highest act of a people's sovereignty while
their government and Constitution remain unchanged. It is the supreme will of the people expressed in the forms
and by the authority of their Constitution. It is their own appointed mode through which they govern themselves,
and by which they bind themselves. So long as their frame of government is unchanged in its grant of all
legislative power, these laws are supreme over all subjects unforbidden by the instrument itself. The calling of a
convention, and regulating its action by law, is not forbidden in the Constitution. It is a conceded manner,
through which the people may exercise the rights reserved in the bill of rights. ... The right of the people to
restrain their delegates by law cannot be denied, unless the power to call a convention by law, and the right of
self protection be also denied."

2 According to Sec. 1 of Art. II: "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." .

3 11 So. 472. The following excerpt appears in the opinion: "We have spoken of the constitutional convention as
a sovereign body, and that characterization perfectly defines the correct view, in our opinion, of the real nature
of that august assembly. It is the highest legislative body known to freemen in a representative government. It is
supreme in its sphere. It wields the powers of sovereignty, specially delegated to it, for the purpose and the
occasion, by the whole electoral body, for the good of the whole commonwealth. The sole limitation upon its
powers is that no change in the form of government shall be done or attempted. The spirit of republicanism must
breathe through every part of the framework, but the particular fashioning of the parts of this framework is
confided to the wisdom the faithfulness, and the patriotism of this great convocation, representing the people in
their sovereignty." The Sproule decision was cited with approval four years later by the Mississippi Supreme
Court anew in Dickson v. State, 20 So. 841. A 1908 decision of the Southern State of Oklahoma, State v. Scales,
97 P. 584, admitted the controversial character of the Sproule dictum.

4 Orfield on The Amending of the Federal Constitution, 45-46 (1942).

5 According to Sec. 2 of Article X of the Constitution: "The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive
charge of its enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred upon it by law." Cf. Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958).

6 "According to Sec. 14 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act (1970):"Administration and Technical
Assistance. -- All government entities, agencies and instrumentalities, including the Senate and House of
Representatives, shall place at the disposal of the Convention such personnel premises, and furniture thereof as
can, in their judgment be spared without detriment to public service, without cost, refund or additional pay."
Landmark Case: RH BILL CASE -- Imbong vs Ochoa et.al. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 ( Digested Case)
This a Landmark Case not only citing the validity of the RH Bill but also the classic scenario where of the Catholic
Church vs the Government. It is no secret that the Catholic Church plays political power in the Philippines for many
years. This displays ow the separation of the State and the Church paves it way.

Digested Case: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 205003, 205138, 204988,
205043, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, 207563)

FACTS:
Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Bill.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement
of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals,
and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious
objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product
is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.
3.
a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.
6. NO.
7. NO.
8. NO.
B. NO.
C. NO.
* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using
the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under
RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription
of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from
a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective”.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However,
the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or
the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose
basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to
do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures
under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of
religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail
over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal
protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she
is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious
objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-
quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective.
The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA
4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by
the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who
attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family
life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing
the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case
of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin
shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether
to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by
the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH
Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate
it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government
RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they
do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included
in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not mandatory.
Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may
be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power
to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.