Hegel, Theology, and Contradiction: A Contradiction?

Abstract:
As widely noted, Hegel’s dialectic is often misunderstood, simplistically, under the
rubric of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This is often the cause of his isolation from
theological engagement. However, Hegel can be of use to theology precisely on
account of his articulation of dialectic in navigating the problem of contradiction. I
will begin with a short account of a variety of theological critics of Hegel’s method in
Kierkegaard, G. K. Chesterton and Karl Barth. It will be shown that there is far more
potential dialogue between these dialectical thinkers and Hegel than has been seen. I
then engage with the particularities of Hegel’s notions of ‘contradiction’ and
‘sublation’ to show how – rather than cancelling the notion of paradox or dialectic
(which holds such an important place in the theological tradition) – Hegel’s account
of contradiction upholds the necessary tension inherent in opposing polarities. It is
on these grounds that Hegel might be considered as a more fruitful dialogue partner
for theology, and in particular, dialectical theology.

‘Hegel’ and ‘Theology’ might be seen as two isolated polarities in which there can be no

synthesis. It is true that Hegel has never quite found his place in theology. Often caricatured,

little read, and – except when it suits us – often forgotten. Indeed, it is very easy to forget that

Hegel (at least in his own mind) had explicitly Christian concerns which punctuated his

philosophy:

Hegel was not a pagan like Shakespeare and Goethe but a philosopher who
considered himself Christian and tried to do from a Protestant point of view
what Aquinas had attempted six hundred years earlier: he sought to fashion a
synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christianity. 1

Of all the supposed ‘myths’ surrounding Hegel’s philosophy, it is his dialectic that has been

the cause of most discussion, disagreement and dismissal: ‘When one looks up the entry for

“Hegel” in a standard reference work, it is not unlikely that one will find something like the

following characterization: “the triadic process from thesis through antithesis to synthesis ...

proves to be essential to Hegel’s philosophy.”’2 It is for this reason that Hegel is often

discharged from service at the office of the theologian. This easily categorised method in

1Walter Kaufman, ‘The Hegel Myth and Its Method’ in From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry,
Religion, and Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), pp. 88-119 [88].

2Jon Stewart, ‘Introduction’ in Jon Stewart (ed.) The Hegel Myths and Legends (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1996), p. 1.

1
relation to the problem of contradiction seems too (for want of a better phrase) easy to be a

theologically useful concept. How could the God of the transcendentally mystifying

hypostatic union be a hybrid synthesis, or as Žižek has said, a God who ‘falls into his own

creation’?3 The contention of this article, however, is that Hegel can be of use to theology

precisely on account of his articulation of dialectic in navigating the problem of

contradiction. I will begin with a short account of a variety of theological critics of Hegel’s

method, before engaging with the particularities of Hegel’s notions of ‘contradiction’ and

‘sublation’.

I. Hegel’s Theological Critics

For all his influence in both philosophy and theology, Hegel has never been short of

critics from the theological sphere. Many of these stem from a wide variety of backgrounds

and differing schools of thought. There are so many critics, of course, that it is only possible

to account for a mere handful of divergent voices in opposition to Hegelian dialectic.

i. Kierkegaard

Søren Kierkegaard was one such trenchant objector to Hegel’s ‘system’. This system,

for Kierkegaard, not only failed to take into account the importance of existence (as is well

noted), but it cannot account for Christ as the ‘absolute paradox’ and ‘sign of contradiction’

which cannot be apprehended.4 its attempts to over-rationalise the contradictory: ‘The

Hegelian philosophy assumes there is no justified concealment, no justified

incommensurability.’5 Kierkegaard’s understanding of the mystery and inaccessibility of

ontological paradox could have no place in Hegel’s system. The ‘system’, for Kierkegaard,

3Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Fear of Four Words’ in Slavoj Žižek and John Millbank, The Monstrosity of Christ:
Paradox or Dialectic? (London: The MIT Press, 2009) p. 50.

4Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Vol. 1, trans. Howard V.
Hong & Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 82, 126-7. References to Christ as
‘paradox’ and ‘contradiction’ occur with incessant frequency throughout Kierkegaard's ‘second authorship’ as
well as much of the pseudonymous works.

5Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 98.

2
neutered all sense of oppositional tension: ‘Hegelian philosophy has cancelled the principle

of contradiction.’6 Kierkegaard thus saw his own work as almost entirely antithetical to the

Hegelian project. He also, like many, criticized Hegel’s obfuscating style:

I for my part have devoted considerable time to understanding the Hegelian

philosophy, believe also that I have more or less understood it, am rash
enough to believe that at those points where, despite the trouble taken, I
cannot understand it, the reason is that Hegel himself hasn’t been altogether
clear.7

Such criticisms have certainly played their part in the interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic. This

is also noted by Gustav E. Mueller, who comments on Hegel’s ‘peculiar’ and ‘excessively

abstract’ style as contributing to the simplistic characterisations of his dialectic.8

Fundamentally, however, Kierkegaard's recurring critique of Hegel centres on the supposed

denial of the paradoxical transcendence of Christ, to which, it seemed, Hegel had given no

account.

ii. Chesterton

Kierkegaard was not alone in his criticisms of both Hegel’s articulation and his

supposed rationalisations of contradiction. The Catholic apologist, philosopher and author, G.

K. Chesterton, often sought to expose what he saw as the inherent, unchecked irrationalism at

the heart of Hegel’s notion of becoming (a key element in Hegel’s dialectic, as will be seen).

He felt that this logical escapism led more ‘sympathetic’ readers of modern philosophy

astray. Reflecting on the thoughts of one commentator, who – having declared similarities

between the philosophical concerns of Hegel and Aquinas – states that there are also

‘remarkable differences’, Chesterton writes: ‘Let the man in the street be forgiven, if he adds

that the “remarkable difference” seems to him to be that St. Thomas was sane and Hegel was

6Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 304.

7Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 34-35.

8Gustav E. Mueller, ‘The Hegel Legend of “Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis”’ in The Hegel Myths and Legends, p.
301.

3
mad.’9 It has been noted, however, that Chesterton’s limited, at-most cursory reading of

Hegel, obscured his view.10 In fact, it could even be said that their systems of dialectical

thought had a distinct similarity, particularly in the sense of their observations of the reality

of nature as forming the foundations of thinking itself. Lauer has said: ‘the “dialectical”

method of Hegel and the “paradoxical” method of Chesterton have more than a little in

common – they both saw that reality itself dictated the method.’11 This overarching principle

is clearly visible throughout Hegel’s system, even in introductory comments: ‘the need to

unite the method with the content, the form with the principle.’12 Chesterton’s notion of

paradox as the heart of true Christian theology often stems from his observations on the ways

in which the world appears as apparently contradictory in its various polarities, to which

theologically-grounded notions of paradox provide the only appropriate hermeneutic. Much

like Kierkegaard, however, this is not merely a natural theology, but is located in the

incarnation of Christ.13

iii. Barth

Karl Barth has a complex relationship to Hegel’s thought. Although he was often

critical of Hegel from a theological perspective (as though Hegel had belonged primarily to

9G. K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas (Teddington: The Echo Library, 2007), p. 71. He adds: ‘The moron
refuses to admit that Hegel can both exist and not exist; or that it can be possible to understand Hegel, if there is
no Hegel to understand.’ Also, ‘...there seems to be a twist, in saying that contraries are not incompatible; or that
a thing can “be” intelligible and not as yet “be” at all. Against all this the philosophy of St. Thomas stands
founded on the universal common conviction that eggs are eggs. The Hegelian may say that an egg is really a
hen, because it is a part of an endless process of Becoming.’ Chesterton, Aquinas, p. 71.

10He makes known his inadequate acquaintance with academic philosophy proper at numerous points. See
Chesterton, Aquinas, p. 70. That is not to say, however, that Chesterton was not well-acquainted with the
essence of Hegel’s dialectical system, since he makes constant reference to it in attempting to bring its
conceptual language to the realm of ‘common sense’.

11Quentin Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio (New York: Fordham University Press,
2004), p. 48.

12G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International,
1991), p. 67.

13See G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1995), pp. 81-103.

4
the school of philosophy), he includes him in his significant theological survey, Protestant

Theology in the Nineteenth Century [1947] (a volume that did not include, for example,

Kierkegaard). He even admitted to being ‘fond of doing a bit of Hegeling’ from time to

time.14 Nonetheless, Barth was critical of what he interpreted as Hegel’s method of

‘synthesis’ (Aufheben) as limiting the freedom of the dialectic, and, in a sense, playing the

role of God.15 But even beyond problems with Hegel’s method, it is aspects of his theology

which Barth sees as most problematic:

Hegel speaks forcefully of God. But when he describes Him as the process of
absolute spirit, which exists eternally in itself, eternally proceeds from itself,
and existing in itself and outside itself is eternally the same, this is indeed a
forceful and profound description of the movement of nature and spirit which
proceeds from ourselves and returns to ourselves. But it is not a description of
God, whose movement is infinitely more than our self-movement even when
the latter is hypostatised.16

For Barth, Hegel had committed the great theological error of dissolving the creator-creature

distinction, in which God collapses into the finite system itself. Despite his criticisms, many

of Barth’s own dialectical emphases – and many of his philosophical categories – are in some

way borrowed from Hegel’s articulation of dialectic.17 Beintker has noted that Barth’s

dialectic in Romans I is in fact ‘very close to the massive movement of thought which is

Hegelian philosophy.’18 Ward has also added that Barth’s interpretation of Hegel was often

beholden to an inadequate rendering of his method into the simplistic thesis-antithesis-

synthesis mode.19 In I/2, § 17, Barth states: ‘according to Hegel…both Christian and natural

14Cited in Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth (London: SCM Press, 1976), p. 387.

15Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1, Part 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), p. 176.

16Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 2, Part 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), p. 270.

17See Jay Wesley Richards, ‘Dealing with Barth’s Doctrine of God’ in The Untamed God: A Philosophical
Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity, and Immutability (Illinois: IVP, 2003), p. 131.

18Beintker, Die Dialektik, p. 113.

19Graham Ward, ‘Barth, Hegel, and the Possibility for Christian Apologetics’ in M. Higton and J. C.
McDowell (eds.), Conversing with Barth (Farnham: Ashgate, 2004), p. 53.

5
religion are only a dispensable prototype of the absolute awareness of philosophy purified by

the idea.’20 This indicates that religion is merely one ‘synthesis’ which contributes as a

stepping stone to progressive syntheses in the system. In terms of dialectic, this appears to

collapse contradiction into a simple resolution of polarities. It is possible that Barth’s own

view of Hegel’s dialectical method may not have been entirely comprehensive; and we may

even find grounds for certain correlations between them.

II. Re-assessing Hegel’s dialectic

In agreement with Barth, incorporating Hegel theologically clearly has its problems.

And yet, it is important that we understand his easily-convoluted dialectic on its own terms.

Multifarious interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic is commonplace: ‘Each writer sees in Hegel a

version of his own image. To be sure, there are those who contrast their own position with

Hegel’s so that they can then offer a more trenchant criticism.’21 In any case, in the modern

era, it is almost impossible to speak of dialectic at all without reference to him. Whether

rejected or partly appropriated, Hegel’s is undoubtedly the most influential philosophical

dialectic of the last two hundred years. His Science of Logic, in which we see the most

relevant implications for a dialectic of contradiction, is an unavoidable text in the discussion;

as Houlgate has remarked, it ‘should be counted together with Kant’s Critique of Pure

Reason as one of the two greatest works of modern philosophy.’22 It is his section on

‘Contradiction’ (Widersprechen) which will be our primary focus, since this is the most

starkly resonant aspect relating to a theological engagement with opposing polarities.

Barth was not alone in having understood Hegel’s dialectic in the simplistic aphorism

of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’. This has been a common misconception, as though his

20Barth, Dogmatics, I/2, p. 291.

21John Burbidge, ‘Is Hegel a Christian?’ in David Kolb (ed.) New Perspectives on Hegel’s Philosophy of
Religion (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 94.

22Stephen Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Logic’ in Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and
Nineteenth Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 134.

6
dialectic were nothing more than the arbitrary resolution of conflicting ideas into new

categories. This was not the language Hegel himself used. Though some trace the origins of

the summative category, ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ to Fichte, it was made more prominent

in Hegel interpretation by Karl Popper.23 Forster has said that, due to such simplifications,

Hegel is often grossly misunderstood by much of the secondary literature on his writings.24

He also notes, contrary to many of the harsher critics of the renowned maxim (who reject it

entirely as being indicative of Hegel’s dialectic) that it does in fact have a place: It is not that

‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ is fundamentally ‘wrong’, but rather that it is too vague to fully

explain Hegel’s concerns.25 In order to situate the significance of Hegel for a theological

dialectic, it will first be necessary to negotiate more precisely what these concerns were, and

whether or not they may be of value for the contemplation of contradiction. This must

necessarily begin with the term that is often erroneously understood to mean ‘synthesis’:

sublation.

III. Sublation

The category of ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung) is key for understanding Hegel’s dialectic.

This is the term by which his entire system is generally judged. If the word is interpreted

simplistically, then the Hegelian dialectic is often dispensed with as arbitrary and artificial. In

such a reading, the process of Aufhebung destroys any possibility for a residual tension

between the polarities, creating a concrete resolution, which then becomes a new ‘thesis’ in

the dialectic. This misunderstanding views Aufhebung as a kind of intermingling synthesis – a

totally new, hybrid category which dissolves the two polarities into one.

23K. R. Popper, ‘What is Dialectic?’ in Mind, 49 (1940).

24Michael Forster, ‘Hegel’s dialectical method’ in Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to
Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 130.

25Forster, ‘Hegel’s dialectical method’, p. 131.

7
 But sublation in fact has a double meaning: ‘partly to annihilate, partly to preserve.’26

Hegel saw contradictions not in isolation, as though dichotomies existed without reference to

further dichotomies and standpoints, but as part of a wider whole, and thus constantly in

motion: ‘the truth of the one and the many...is to be grasped and expressed only as a

becoming, as a process, a repulsion and attraction – not as being, which in a proposition has

the character of a stable unity.’27 It is this connectedness to the overarching system of reality

that shows how Aufhebung is intended not as an artificial process of diluting the polarities

from some imaginary objective standpoint, but as an observation of actual reality. This reality

exists in a state of permanent ‘becoming’ as the process of sublation continues ad infinitum.

The system of absolute reality (that is, absolute sublation) is fully realised not by a

philosopher, but is realised within ‘God’ (Geist) Himself, who is ‘the sum total of all

realities’.28 In the ‘finite’ realm, then, there is only continual contradiction and sublation. Yet

it is not that the philosopher assesses that a sublation ought to take place to resolve the

contradictions, but rather that it must be recognised that sublation has already taken place and

continues to do so, in a state of constant connectedness and movement. Reality dictates

thinking-about-reality: this is Hegel’s concern and his grounding for the recognition of

sublation.

The notion that sublation is somehow a static concept, then, is untenable. In all

engagements with contradiction, Hegel is seeking to emphasise that concepts or categories

cannot be seen in isolation except in their individual moments of interaction.29 These

‘moments’ occur when an aspect of a concept (which is itself only a ‘moment’ of

26Justus Hartnack, An Introduction to Hegel’s Logic, trans. Lars-Aagaard-Morgenen (Indianapolis and

Cambridge: Hacket Publishing Company, 1998), p. 5.

27Hegel, Logic, p. 172.

28Hegel, Logic, p. 442.

29See Hegel, Logic, p. 431.

8
particularity within a concept)30 is faced by its limitations and is engaged by its opposite. The

moments themselves are all part of the greater system, of which there are many other

moments of contradiction and sublation. It is not the purpose of this section to discuss

whether or not the entire system itself has theological warrant, but merely to understand and

apply Hegel’s understanding of opposing polarities at their moments of contradiction.31

IV. Contradiction

Hegel’s notion of contradictory oppositions is, as has been mentioned, far more

complicated than is generally perceived. In the already-quoted section on ‘Contradiction’ he

sets out by stating that, in a moment of opposition, there is a positive and a negative pole.

These antitheses are distinctly independent: ‘Each has an indifferent self-subsistence of its

own’.32 Yet simultaneously, each polarity contains an inherent correlation to what it is not: ‘it

has within itself the relation to its other moment; it is thus the whole, self-contained

opposition.’33 In effect, then, Hegel conceives of the polarities as having a relatedness from

which they cannot escape. Yet this relatedness is also the very thing that separates them from

their opposite; they are connected by the fact of their difference, which thus further

emphasises both their separation and their inseparability. This is a concept that may well be

seen as an ontological paradox. But for Hegel, the simultaneous relatedness and

30An example of such a particularity might be the ‘zestiness’ of an orange, which will face a different limitation
to, say, the ‘roundedness’ of an orange; and still again, the orange itself will face a different opposition when
juxtaposed with an apple or something entirely different, like a person, or an idea. It is the nature of the ultimate
connectedness of the system that sees these oppositions and ‘moments’ as particularities within a greater whole,
not as isolated binaries which are summative of ultimate reality in and of themselves.

31Garrett Green retranslates Barth’s term ‘Abolition’ as ‘sublimation’ based on the assumption that Barth was
using the Hegelian term Aufhebung. ‘Sublimation’ is intended to connote – not a total victory of one polarity
with the annihilation of the other (abolition) – but a taking-up of one into the other (sublimation). ‘To sublimate
something – i.e., to make it sublime – suggests that it will become both higher and better as a result.’ Garrett
Green, ‘Introduction: Karl Barth as Theorist of Religion’ in Karl Barth, On Religion: The Revelation of God as
the Sublimation of Religion, trans. Garrett Green (London T & T Clark, 2007), p. ix.

32Hegel, Logic, p. 431.

33Hegel, Logic, p. 431.

9
distinctiveness of oppositions is demonstrably true, and thus, not paradoxical. If it were not

demonstrable, it could be called an apparent and therefore resolvable contradiction; but Hegel

sees it as a necessary contradiction. It is his system which seeks to demonstrate how this is

possible.

However, it is almost impossible to avoid the connotations of ‘paradox’ as he

develops his conception of contradiction. There is a definite sense in his formulation that

both polarities are fully themselves and fully not themselves at the same time. Each polarity

maintains its self-subsistence, and yet it is not totally free to be itself. In its very act of being

itself, the polarity points to – and in some sense, becomes – its opposite: ‘[The] positive and

negative...are themselves the positing of themselves, and in this positing each is the sublating

of itself and the positing of its opposite.’34 Here one sees a further nuance in the use of

sublation, as it seems that each polarity is itself already a sublation. Hence there is no such

thing in Hegel as a ‘thesis’ or an ‘antithesis’ disconnected from a ‘synthesis’. There is, rather,

a continual unity between them, since the very moment they posit themselves, they cannot

help but make reference to – and thus posit – their opposite. Hegel refers to this continual

process of ontological unity as the ‘ceaseless vanishing of the opposites’.35 He declares that,

unless it is understood that all polarities (or ‘notions’) really do exist in such a unity, notions

of dialectic are null and void: ‘without this knowledge, not a single step can really be taken in

philosophy.’36 For Hegel, it is not that there is an indeterminable fusion between all

oppositions, but rather that it must be taken seriously that the very act of an opposition being

itself is impossible in total isolation.

We might suggest that Hegel’s conception of contradiction is so nuanced with

qualifications that it is almost entirely incompatible with what we might think of as a rational
34Hegel, Logic, p. 431-432.

35Hegel, Logic, p. 433.

36Hegel, Logic, p. 438.

10
‘contradiction’, that of two oppositions standing against one another in impossible conflict.

For Hegel, contradiction is not a negative thing, but supremely positive:

It is not, so to speak, a blemish, an imperfection or a defect in something if

contradiction can be pointed out in it. On the contrary, every determination,
every concrete thing, every Notion, is essentially a unity of distinguished and
indistinguishable moments, which, by virtue of the determinate, essential
difference, pass over into contradictory moments.37

The ‘contradictory moments’ here are the coming-together of oppositions in their own self-

subsistence. Again, the self-subsistence of each opposition is not in stark opposition, but a

kind of related opposition. It is this which lends to Hegel’s dialectic a notion of ontological

paradox, as the inaccessibly true contradiction in the order of being. In my reading of

Millbank’s formulation, this might be called a ‘both/and’ form of paradox, since it stresses

the relatedness of the oppositions. The language Hegel uses for ‘either/or’ (Žižek’s notion of

the non-relatedness of contradiction) is ‘the so-called law of the excluded middle’. This ‘law’

assumes that there can be no connection between the two oppositions. We might articulate

this by describing the concept of two trenches in a battlefield, entirely separate, but somehow

without a ‘no-man’s land’ in between. Hegel thinks the ‘excluded middle’ is a

misunderstanding of the nuance of oppositions, as though every single thing was

determinable by stark contrast; it is ‘a triviality leading nowhere.’38 His suggestion is that

there is in fact a third which is ‘indifferent’ to the opposition itself yet still containing

elements of each polarity. This would mean that the ‘middle’ is not related to the one-side-

versus-the-other, it is simply the place in between, in which it has a connectedness to both

sides without existing purely for the sake of the either/or dichotomy itself. It is evident, then,

that a key part of Hegel’s conception of contradiction is a rejection of the either/or binary

logic. This may seem obvious, but is a necessary observation in distinguishing Hegel’s

37Hegel, Logic, p. 442.

38Hegel, Logic, p. 438.

11
dialectic from a simplistic model in which the thesis counteracts the antithesis, forming a new

thesis, and so on.

Oppositions, as we have seen, have a relational unity and a relational distinctness. Yet

they can only be conceived of as ‘opposites’ in so far as they are in a particular moment of

contradiction. This is a point Hegel repeatedly returns to as he continually rejects the either/or

binary paradigm. He lists various common oppositions such as ‘father and son’, ‘above and

below’, and ‘right and left’ but notes that, though in these configurations we see them as

opposites, they are not only opposites of one another.39 They also relate, in varying degrees,

to other objects and concepts. We cannot take two concepts and isolate them into a

dichotomy without due warrant, as though that was the only way to understand them. So he

states, for example, that ‘[t]he father also has an existence of his own apart from the son-

relationship; but then he is not father but simply man’.40 Yet in rejecting the simplistic idea of

contradiction, there is simultaneous admittance that even if the father has a different existence

apart from his ‘opposition’ to the son, there is a sense in which he is still recurrently involved

in oppositions and limitations to his own self-subsistence. There is always a counterpart, of

some sort, and to some extent. We can continually observe in Hegel that being cannot be

conceived of in isolation, and that dialectic is required in order to understand any and every

concept as it relates to itself and to everything else. Without accepting the implications of his

entire system, we can certainly say this echoes the logic of ontological paradox, since Hegel

is effectively asserting that the essentiality truth contains unresolved polar tension, but is

nonetheless ‘true’.

Hegel’s positive conception of contradiction sees oppositional conflict as forming a

necessary part of all being: ‘everything is inherently contradictory’.41 As mentioned, this is

39Hegel, Logic, p. 441.

40Hegel, Logic, p. 441.

41Hegel, Logic, p. 439.

12
rooted in Hegel’s sense of the movement and vigour inherent in all forms of reality. A

singular polarity (a ‘simple immediate’) is merely ‘dead being’.42 All it can do is be.

Contradiction, on the other hand, is what gives reality its essential vitality: ‘it is only in so far

as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.’ 43 It is

essential, at all points in configuring Hegel’s dialectic, that we see his primary concern as the

dynamic, continuous motion of reality, not in creating static, lifeless resolutions.

Contradiction, for Hegel, is life itself.

Upon this foundation, we can see that Hegel does not see contradiction as a

conceivable entity that might be speculated upon, but rather something that is bound up with

reality itself: ‘the contradictory cannot be imagined or thought.’44 It must be seen as a by-

product of life itself, as a necessary antagonism within reality. In Hegel’s conception,

contradiction occurs because it must occur, not because it is conjured up or presupposed by

the dialectician. He refers to this act of occurrence as ‘a contingency, a kind of abnormality

and a passing paroxysm of sickness.’45 The language of ‘paroxysm’ (connoting a convulsion

or spasm) highlights the fact that contradiction itself is a kind of inappropriate (yet

necessarily appropriate) event; it cannot be domesticated by a simple act of synthesizing. We

see this language as ever-present throughout his articulations of contradiction as he moves

through his dialectical process of positing and countering his own argument. All positions

and concepts are never simply present in and of themselves; they are rather, ‘in a state of

collapse’.46

V. Evaluations
42Hegel, Logic, p. 439.

43Hegel, Logic, p. 439.

44Hegel, Logic, p. 439.

45Hegel, Logic, p. 440.

46Hegel, Logic, p. 443.

13
 We have seen that, in Hegel’s conception of dialectic, there is not an abstract sense of

tranquil resolution, but lingering and persistent tension. This is a natural element inherent

within all reality: ‘Finite things...in their indifferent multiplicity are simply this, to be

contradictory and disrupted within themselves’.47 The inner disruption of all final

formulations is, for Hegel, a precondition of thought itself. The dialectic is the way in which

Hegel navigates the existence of these conflicts without ever truly escaping them. Despite the

fact that Hegel’s dialectic forms the inner-workings of his greater system accounting for the

Whole, his notion of contradiction is related entirely to the fact that total resolution is

possible only in the Absolute. Even if Hegel’s conception of the Absolute brings ‘God’ into

the midst of the system itself (thus removing the creator-creature distinction) his dialectical

conception of contradiction might yet be incorporated within a distinctly theological

framework that is able to uphold divine transcendence. The incessant tension within the finite

realm, as seen in Hegel’s dialectic, is an aspect that will be seen to be shared by many

dialectical thinkers in the theological tradition, especially Barth, Chesterton and Kierkegaard.

Seeing Hegel in this light – and not as the proponent of simplistic triadic resolutions – will

show us how we might see his systematic dialectic as contributing to the theological

conception of dialectic as a necessary condition of human finitude. In this, total resolution of

the opposites is denied even as they come into contact through sublation. This is particularly

significant for theological engagements which focus upon the polarity nature of theological

doctrines. Bruce McCormack, in his significant book on Barth’s dialectical theology, defines

the dialectical theological method as: ‘[A] method which calls for every theological statement

to be placed over against a counter-statement, without allowing the dialectical tension

between the two to be resolved in a higher synthesis.’48 Seen alongside Hegel’s complex

47Hegel, Logic, p. 443.

48Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development
1910-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 17.

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notions of contradiction and sublation, one might begin to see Hegel’s relevance to

articulations of theological dialectic. Despite the theological faults in Hegel’s overall system,

we might yet admit along with Barth: ‘Doubtless, theology could and can learn something

from Hegel as well.’49

49Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background and History, trans. B. Cozens and
J. Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1972), p. 403.

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