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Adcock Frank Ezra. The Development of Ancient Greek Diplomacy. In: L'antiquité classique, Tome 17, fasc. 1, 1948.
Miscellanea Philologica Historica et archaelogia in honorem Hvberti Van De Weerd. pp. 1-12 ;
doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/antiq.1948.2822
https://www.persee.fr/doc/antiq_0770-2817_1948_num_17_1_2822
by F. E. Adcock
(1) F. Schachermeyer, Mitt. d. altorient. Ges. IV, 1929, 180 sqq ; V. Koro-
§ec, Hett. Staatsverträge, in Leipz. rechtswiss. Stud. 60, 1931. See review by
P. Koschaker, in Z. d. Sav. St. rom. Abt. LU, 1932, p. 506 ff.
¿ F. Ε. ADCOCK
ceased to be needed when the war was over, it remains rash to say
that an alliance of this kind might not readily be continued as an
alliance in a more political sense. It has often been urged that the
fact that early treaties are for limited periods (*) reflects an
to live at peace indefinitely, but it also does mean that
states are prepared to remain in a constant relation one to another
long after any particular war is over.
So far as diplomacy is a form of persuasion there must be
to which it can appeal. The natural appeal, at first, is to
religion, partly because it supplies a sanction independent of material
force, partly because religion passes beyond the bounds of the several
city-states. The ruce of God which sheltered the common festivals
of the Greeks was largely the pattern for the truce that interrupted
or terminated their wars. The religious sanction that protects the
single suppliant may be invoked to assist the plea of a state that
turns to another for help. The methods of diplomacy in its earliest
phase may take a religious formulation. One servant of such a
diplomacy was the oracle. During the sixth century Delphi was
probably the scene of an underground struggle between the
influence of Thessaly working through the Amphictiony and the
influence of Sparta. It has long been observed how Delphic oracles
furthered policy, and how they were used to make the voice of the
god echo round the whispering gallery of Greece (2).
By the fifth century the degree of sophistication of the several
Greek states is reflected in their diplomacy. It seems a reasonable
assumption that the speeches which Thucydides puts into the mouth
of Corinthian envoys at Athens and at Sparta in 433 and 432 B.C.
reflect, and are meant to reflect, the character of Corinthian
at that time, a mixture of directness and subtlety, an
of commercial interests and a kind of cynicism, the belief
that everything can be the object of a bargain. In the speech against
the Corcyraeans at Athens there is the veiled offer to give to Athens
a free hand with her subject-allies if Athens will give Corinth a free
(1) This rule is not without exceptions. If 13. D. Mehitt's restorations of the
Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini (I. G. I2 51 and 52) are accepted
(see Class. Quart. XL, 1946, p. 85 ff.), these alliances were defined as
though this did not preclude their renewal in identical terms within a
decade or two.
(2) The evidence is conveniently collected by H. W. Parke, History of the
Delphic Oracle, 1939.
4 F. Ε. ADCOCK
hand with her recalcitrant colony (*) ; in the speech at Sparta there
is the veiled threat to desert the Lacedaemonian interest if Sparta
will not help her allies (2). So long as Corinth was an important
factor in Greek interstate politics, so long are these the
of her diplomacy.
Athenian diplomacy is harder to envisage. The inscriptions and
the treaties preserved in literary texts usually show the result,
rather than the character, of Athenian diplomatic activity. A
weakness of Athenian negotiations was the fact that the changing
moods of the demos, played upon by partly irresponsible persuasion,
might cross its purposes. From the envoys who, in the last decade
of the sixth century, were sent to ask help from Persia and took on
themselves to make submission to the Great King and then on their
return fell into great disgrace (3),to the recriminations of the envoys
who went to King Philip in 346 it is only too often the same story.
To Philip the shifts of Athenian diplomacy made it almost too
unstable to afford a steady target for his skill. The mockery in the
Acharnians, the anxieties of Andocides, reflect the low regard of the
demos for those who attempted to speak for Athens. The decree
which was the prospectus of the Second Athenian Confederacy was,
it may be, an attempt to convince the Greek world that Athenian
policy might be stable ; but the attempt did not wholly justify itself.
On the other hand the network of relations which held together
the Confederacy of Delos, and then the Athenian Empire, in the
fifth century was woven by many envoys for half a century after
Aristides. The recently reconstructed decree about coinage (4), the
Methone decrees (5), and even the drastic τάξις φόρου reflect an
awareness that diplomacy had a rôle to play in Athens' attitude
to the Cities. It is possible that Athenian episkopoi and phrourarchs
worked unobtrusively to maintain the influence of pro-Athenians,
especially democratic politicians, in the Cities. The goodwill of
the demos throughout the Empire (e) was very possibly earned,
and not wholly due to a disinterested ideology. But the generosity
that marks the decree for the Samians (7) at the thirteenth rather
than the eleventh hour of the Peloponnesian war was too isolated
a phenomenon. The truth seems to be that Athens had to make
high demands but was not skilful at devising ways of making her
demands compensated by concessions and mitigated by considerate-
ness. And her policy afforded too little scope for diplomacy or her
diplomacy fell short of serving her policy to the best advantage
or doing justice to the cleverness of the cleverest among the Greeks.
A contrast in almost every way is the diplomacy of Sparta.
From the close of the sixth century Sparta both needed and used
diplomacy in the service of a shrewd, and, in the main, consistent
foreign policy. Beneath a cloak of Laconic bluntness and
propriety Sparten diplomacy was crafty,tortuous and selfish.
We may think the Spartans dull ; the Greek believed them to be
wily, once the respect for their internal institutions was forgotten.
The peculiar position of Sparta, holding her helots like a wolf by the
ears, the fact that her army was a highly tempered weapon that
must not rust but must not be risked too often, and that she had
not the man-power for Imperial greatness, dictated her policy. A
great defeat would be fatal, a great victory might be dangerous.
Her policy born of her needs and her character, imposed great
tasks on her diplomacy which, like her warfare, was more
than that of the Greek states of the day. Her embassies were
led by men long trained in negotiation like Lichas, Dercyllidas
and Antalcidas. Her very character was made the instrument of her
diplomacy. The kings and ephors were masters at using the scruples
of their own people and others. Sacrifices proved of good or evil
omen as the interests of the State demanded ; her responsibilities
as Hegemon of the Peloponnesian League were at times relieved
by the failure of the diabateria that governed the crossing of her
frontiers. Even the works of Nature were pressed into their service.
For example in the winter of 413-41 an earthquake was neatly
exploited to prevent Sparta from being forced into action in Asia
Minor which might hinder a modus vivendi with Persia (1). In
other states diplomacy had by then been secularized : Sparta knew
how to make the best of both worlds. Spartan secrecy was
yet the Lacedaemonians knew how to use publicity. In the
(1) Thucgd.Ylll, 6. 5. It is just possible that the earthquakes early in 426 B.C.
(Id, III, 89, 1) may have served the ends of those who wished to arrange a
peace with Athens (Arist. Ach. 647-53).
D F. Ε. ADCOC.K
(1) Camb. Anc. Hist. VII, pp. 119, 165 : See also C· B. Welles, Royal
in the Hellenistic Period, p. xxxvm.
(2) ¥. Schkoetek, De regum Hellenisticomm epistulis in lapidibus servatis
quaesiiones selector. 1932.
(3) 11. 63-4.
(4) 11. 65-6.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANCIENT GREEK DIPLOMACY 9
cities. The usual method is for the city to pass a decree which in
effect states what they want to make valid and then to send it in
the hand of ambassadors, whose task is to justify it. But of true
negotiation there is little trace. It is exceptional that the royal
rescripts give any hint that the ambassadors went beyond the
contents of the decrees which they brought with them.
On the other hand there exists a diplomacy of the older kind
between the several Greek states that are not under the immediate
shadow of the great monarchies. Rhodes was the protector and
patron of this diplomacy, and we can see states making agreement
with her or under her aegis in the old manner. The great increase
of arbitration which was so marked by the third century, though
it has the air of pleadings before a judge, involved a great deal of
what was really diplomacy. Sometimes it is one'or other claiment
seeking to secure the ear of the judge, sometimes it is the judge
making capital out of his award, sometimes it is the linking together
of a diplomatic request with an offer to arbitrate as in the case of the
offer of Magnesia to arbitrate between Cnossos and Gortyn, an
offer which is associated with the request to restore certain exiles.
If the decrees of Cnossos and of Gortyn are read side by side (*)
it will be seen how these small states were masters of the courteous
diplomatic refusal.
Into this Greek world, so full of developed diplomacy and delicate
gradations of relationship, entered the Romans, often hesitant,
sometimes violent, generally conscientious and legalistic. The
commissions of Senators who went abroad to make plain the wishes
of the Republic or to judge between states that hastened to lay
their cause before them, must have puzzled the Greek diplomatists.
The courtly professional ambassadors of Kings, the small men
from small states, the leaders of parties momentarily in the
the philosophers with their eloquence, their subtle political
as well as ethical speculation, found these senators often strangely
deaf. Now and then the Hellenistic powers score a diplomatic
as when Antiochus the Great revealed his secret arrangement
with Egypt, but behind the Romans stood the last argument, the
legions. And beneath a kind of obtuseness which masked their
statecraft, there was discovered a notable instinct for turning the
(1) See discussion in Welles, op. cit. p. 66 ff. and cf tlje able diagramme
ot Polyperchon, Diodor. XVITI, 56.
(2) S.G.D.I. 5153-4.
10 F. Ε. ADCOCK
(1) Cf. Otto, op. cit. p. 117 for a discussion of this incident.
(2) Wilckens arguments <S. B. Preuss. Akad. Phil. Hist. Kl. 1932, XIV).
for the secrecy of the document and its publication in 96 B. C. (or less probably
η 75 Β. C.) have been effectively answered, in particular, by E. Bickermann
in Gnomon VIII, 1932, p. 424 ff.
(3) See WiLcKiiN in V. W. s. v. Aristonikos (14) col. 962.
12 F. Ε. ADCOCK