FIRST DIVISION
other evidence in support of the petition.
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and
HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29
November 2000 of the Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders3 issued by Branch
48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-
88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera
("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity
testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"),
represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a
petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing
to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent
presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified,
Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she
taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA
analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the
Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular
Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr.
Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that
the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.4
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not
gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s
motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and
Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and
the relevant individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and
respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a
laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of the Order, and to submit the results thereof within a
period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further
reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of
IT IS SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000
Order. He asserted that "under the present circumstances, the DNA test
[he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen…, unconstitutional."
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.6
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He
asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February 2000
and 8 June 2000 "in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
Petitioner further contended that there is "no appeal nor any [other]
plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA
paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support his
objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim
vs. Court of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without
considering the limitations on, and conditions precedent for
the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious
constraints affecting the reliability of the test as admitted by
private respondent’s "expert" witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public
respondent relying on scientific findings and conclusions unfit
for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and
scientific treatises.
4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing
petitioner [is] compelled to take will be inconclusive,
irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite
specimen from the petitioner, unconstitutional.7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying
the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The
appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial
court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for
an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination
because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the
appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible
adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of
the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and ordered dismissed, and the
challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.8
1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied
in its Resolution dated 23 May 2001.9
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool
in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the
conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our
judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test
results in a paternity suit.10
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion when it authorized the trial court "to embark in [sic] a new
procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of legislation to
ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as made
clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the presence of technical and legal
constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation." 11 Petitioner maintains
that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.12
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it
appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the
facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code
and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as
citizenship,13 support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.14
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual
relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative
proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative
father.15
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The
putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the
mother, because of either physical absence or impotency.16 The putative
father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other
men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate.17 The child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under the
strict standards provided by law.18
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may
be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial
technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness
is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could
quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological
father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of
fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four
aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie case
when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological father.
Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she
offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied
ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent
is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s
denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side,
to show how much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests.
We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us
determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation
are allowed in this jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant
sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.—The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.—The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy,
in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
2
This Court’s rulings further specify what incriminating acts are
acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case
petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father.
Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father. 21 A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence.22 Letters to the mother vowing to be a
good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the
child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation.23 However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father’s operation, or a marriage contract where the
putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing.24 Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism25 nor family
pictures26 are sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of
paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in
science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not
be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity,
although inconclusive on paternity.27
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the result of the blood grouping test
showed that the putative father was a "possible father" of the child.
Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the possibility of
paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and
circumstances other than the results of the blood grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child, the mother, and the putative
father agreed to submit themselves to a blood grouping test. The
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") conducted the test, which
indicated that the child could not have been the possible offspring of
the mother and the putative father. We held that the result of the blood
grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative
father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked
whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic
make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of
the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA
profile can determine his identity.30
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological
sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed
to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom
the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except
for identical twins.31 We quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the
rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and
DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in
the human body, the DNA of an individual’s blood is the very DNA in his
or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal
swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T(thymine). The order in
which the four bases appear in an individual’s DNA determines his or
her physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These
are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a
particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code.
Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that
differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas
analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA
typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or
extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several
ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are:
the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot
blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were
admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994;
mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most
recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based
STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by
most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating
or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize
enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate
places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error
rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are
determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to
identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the
crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount
of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or
fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations
between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two
genetic types called "allele", one inherited from each parent. In [a]
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the
DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which
half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half
must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the
man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as
the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.32 (Emphasis in the original)
Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case
of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,33 it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v.
Court of Appeals34 that more than a passing mention was given to DNA
analysis. In Tijing,we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent
who abducted petitioners’ youngest son. Testimonial and documentary
evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish parentage.
However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
3
analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all
concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence.
This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary
attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we
stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile
from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the
accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape
with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.37
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA
evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of
the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue
of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on
jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of
Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar, a match existed
between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA
profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court,
following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant
because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence,
showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-
petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father
of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court
ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-
petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child does not preclude
the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and
respondent refer to two United States cases to support their respective
positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v.
U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v. U.S.,
the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction to
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Frye’s
counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic
blood pressure deception test42 made on defendant. The state Supreme
Court affirmed Frye’s conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made."
The Fryestandard of general acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was
charged with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and blood
samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for DNA testing
to a government facility and a private facility. The prosecution
introduced the private testing facility’s results over Schwartz’s
objection. One of the issues brought before the state Supreme Court
included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding.
The state Supreme Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained
general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that
admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the
laboratory’s compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and
the availability of their testing data and results.44
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further
modified the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubertwas a product liability
case where both the trial and appellate courts denied the admissibility
of an expert’s testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of
"general acceptance." The United States Supreme Court ruled that in
federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded
the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402
provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general
acceptance does not mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure
that the testimony’s reasoning or method is scientifically valid and is
relevant to the issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1)
whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation;
and (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the
scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further
modified the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702
in 2000 and which now reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
4
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these
American cases. Obviously, neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor
the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.47 At best,
American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions.
Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is
not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. 48 Evidence is
relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which
governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in
evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA
analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue."50
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our
decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is
admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for
admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into
the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be
cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate
our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.51]
We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in
paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these
variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing
next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the
DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If
the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.52
It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the
putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child
and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish
paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an
American jurisdiction,53 trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a
minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a
putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database,
such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for
W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never
equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when
the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis
compared to those conducted between the putative father and child
alone.54
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%,
the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Petitioner asserts
that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right
against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial
evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the
respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in
this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence
taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme
Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As
such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus
from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance
emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts
of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of
the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an
order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was
allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a
woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction
on "testimonial compulsion."56
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim
his or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation
is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology,
such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by
the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We
also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued
by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-
98-88759. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
5
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia,"
her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to
"Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this
Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to
be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best
interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child
since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree
No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same
is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby
freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for
record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she
is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is
only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial
is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
"Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy;
and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle
name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with
her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does
not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized
by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees
agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will
be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which
a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is
that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be
his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an
6
adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a
widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though
he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son.
Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the
use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name
or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the
Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved
the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use
by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s
surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he
would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if
he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname
of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied
that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that
the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of
the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the
present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of
the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then
cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is
Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty.
Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified
to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname
of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an
initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this
for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed
Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so
that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
7
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested
by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where
they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is
also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter
on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall
bear the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can
use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right
and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by
the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is
geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights
and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use
of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code
and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San
Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie
is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them
"Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence,
to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will
not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that
it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful
or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid
an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be
entered in the decree of adoption. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146737 December 10, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN
"JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria
Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN,
MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate
estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR.,petitioners,
vs.
JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy
of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil
Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the one
entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.
8
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the September
13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which
affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The
September 13 order of the trial court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr.,
respondent, as the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.1 died intestate on December 11, 1990,
respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal
properties which include undetermined savings, current and time
deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of
real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,
Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and
(c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly
published,2 thereby giving notice to all persons who may have
opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose
Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla,
claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy
Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the
deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C.
Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by
prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased)
also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier
oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated
January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C.
Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between
herein respondent and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the
intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as
Exhibit "D")3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound
volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo
City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is
Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated
therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To
prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented
Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the
alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit
"C")4 showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims,
shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members
of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General,
Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",5 indicating that the birth of
respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the
same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They
observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on
October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957,
however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded
on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8"
appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth.
This scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners
presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He
testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa
(then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said
Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the
bound volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs
of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on
September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby
GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late
Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his
filing of a bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) to be approved by this Court.
"SO ORDERED."6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision
affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September 13, 1996.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however,
denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents —
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal7 does not apply when there appears in the record of
the case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which
have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been
misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the
case.8 Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances
that would have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons
preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration,
thus:
9
 "Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve,
it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select." (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
"Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor.9 Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.10In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court held that in the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of
the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of
administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural
son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the
estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established
that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children,
is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment."12 (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased,
presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the
deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the trial
court made the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original
having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of
the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed
the open and continuous status of an acknowledged natural
child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was
summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture
of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with petitioner
and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the
trial that the standard signatures presented by oppositors
were not in public document and may also be called
questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth
No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or
primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious
characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of
live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was testified to
and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office of the Local Civil
Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and requisitioned
forms. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958 revised
form and that she said their office usually paste the pages of
the bound volume if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the
authenticity and genuineness of the signatures of Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious
circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the
explanation of Rosita Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register),
the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines
are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births
cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely
access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate
one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more,
has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in
Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested
parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit
"D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court
should have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of
Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City.
10
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of
respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38
years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio
G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth
record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January,
1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing
records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil
Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to
be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we
find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded
in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be
used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered
that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form
and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."13
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not
satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could
have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised
in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume
that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years
thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The
back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo
is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn
like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is
a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb
because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all
other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other
certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as
the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The
space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On
the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the
alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer
had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not
a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the
volume, she explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your
employees would only paste a document like this
Certificate of Live Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves
just to replace the record. Sometimes we just have
it pasted in the record when the leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound
volume to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so
we have to paste them."14(Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital
document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the
anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually
highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit
"8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been
given more faith and credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to
send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them
for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus:
"Duties of Local Civil Registrar. — Local civil registrars shall (a)
file registrable certificates and documents presented to them
for entry; (b) compile the same monthly and prepare and
send any information required of them by the Civil-Registrar;
(c) issue certified transcripts or copies of any document
registered upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the
binding, properly classified, of all certificates or documents
registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar-
General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the
entries made during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index
the same to facilitate search and identification in case any
information is required; and (g) administer oaths, free of
charge, for civil register purposes"15 (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the
Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in
form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the
instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is
not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the
suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should
have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his
mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C.
Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not
appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar16 that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of
the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth
certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but
also, the statement of any information or circumstances by
which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of
an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person
and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)
11
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated
in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals17 where this Court said that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its
preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of
recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.18 Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case,
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of
the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has
all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in
that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of
Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the
glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits
"D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in
the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the
Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of
the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of
filiation,19 lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would
encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it
in claiming the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late
Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters
of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity
and as judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and
LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted
by his mother as his natural guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled "Antonio J.
Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her
individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes
Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees", reversing the
August 10, 1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition
filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of
Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age,
assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against
the herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said
Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his
alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived
together as husband and wife and as a result of which, he was born on
September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father and
mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his
birth, both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each
other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued living
together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and
introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the family of
his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his
father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married
herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage,
two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and
Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated from his
mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own
child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him,
petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949,
instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate
proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as
Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings,
petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this
reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father
adjudicated and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate
proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left
properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of
his father, he is entitles to at least P18,000.00; and that he had
absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and
came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand
from the petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he
prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural
child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to
him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00
as attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2)
that the cause of action is also barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid,
pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition on
October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).
On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98).
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint
(Ibid, pp. 98-102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to
Defendants' counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10, 1964, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104-
123). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the
complaint without pronouncement as to the costs. The
counterclaim is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to
respondent Court, and in a Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968
(Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:
12
 Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set
aside and another rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto,
Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C.
Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth
(1/5) of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering
the defendants to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his
one-fifth (1/5) share in said estate, subject to the usufructuary
rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto
pursuant to Articles 834 of the Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo,
p. 77). Hence, the instant petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give
due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 91).
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE
OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE
OF ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN
NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH
OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
V persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND
OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE
SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN
THEIR TESTIMONIES AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED
PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.
VII
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN
DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE
HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.
I.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was
filed on September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years after the enactment of
R.A. No. 1401 — creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the
questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall beyond the
jurisdictional pale of the Court of First Instance of Manila and instead
Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection
to lack of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over the
subject matter of the present action had not been raised either in the
said court or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for
resolution for the first time on appeal, they contend that a party may
object to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal
since lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter cannot be
waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised
in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of
Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had
voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot
later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine
National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986];
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
have been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356 [1986]).
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No.
9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order
of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant
case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish his
rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment
(Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that he
had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged
natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and
settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are
binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the
13
subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally
bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The
court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be
entered therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled
further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and
that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure
relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of
which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court
or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs.
Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres 45
Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly
provides:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall
prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made.
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself
on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired
on November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8,
1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the
agreement of partition among the petitioners, as approved by the
intestate court, is already barred by prescription.
That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an
alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or
fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in
this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil
Code as follows:
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that
there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons
interested; ...
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided
in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code)
should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of
partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the
case at bar, it is evident that the action to rescind the Agreement of
Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had
already prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at
bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does
not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never
recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or
impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the
case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects
of prescription on the plea of minority under the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs
against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have
parents, guardians or other legal representatives:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea
Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls
squarely under the above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased
Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the
presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the
latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of
majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this
case, prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et
al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such
case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years
after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged
father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and
partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence,
prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for
recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription,
for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery
of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the
partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings,
otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not
possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded
having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not
apply and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, tills action would
still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which
provide that the action must be brought within four and five years,
respectively, from the time the right of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its
findings clearly and unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto, Jr.
is guilty of laches as follows:
About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's
marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to
protect the interests of her child, Antonio, although she was
already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of Antonio's
infidelity and the hallowness of his promises.
It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio
Alberto's not denying that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was
the case. If this was so, however, how can we explain her inaction
even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until
September 8, 1960, when she filed this action, Andrea kept silent,
took no action to have her child recognized as the son of the
alleged father. Her laches, as well as the inherent improbabilities
in her testimony rendered it unworthy of belief.
... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his
long delay in bringing this action. 'Undue delay in the separate
enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack of merit in
this claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights
14
 most strongly when they are threatened or invaded.
(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp.
108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
[1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan,
129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr.
vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800 [1984];
Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]).
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for
the surprising delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar
except perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased
Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the
latter died in 1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to
elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to
assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped
receiving support after Alberto, Sr.'s death.
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such
delay is prejudicial to them. Private respondents could have filed the
action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the
deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16
years when the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and
possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too
old to give coherent testimony.
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:
The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be
favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate
occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and even where the
recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the
solution of a case may be hopelessly lost. These considerations
constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine long familiar in equity
jurisprudence to the effect that laches or unreasonable delay on
the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only
persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the
circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non
dormientibus equites subvenit (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil.
435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227 [1961]).
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto,
Jr. at the time of his supposed father's death. But such explanation as
discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under Article
1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of the
prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians or legal
representatives.
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant
and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act
(Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)." The law does not encourage
laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a
party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he... must show that
he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yateo, August
28,1958; 104 PMI. 378).
V.
Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court
review and reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a
general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The
established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1)
when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in
making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6)
when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the
trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239
[1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan,
147 SCRA 593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to the rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate
Court are contrary to those of the trial court.
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the
complainants is of the view that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is
sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her entire
case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim
being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing
action, her testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo
and Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto
and who have no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the
controversy. They testified that during the period Andrea Jongco
claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the deceased in fact
lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence except for his
brief stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No. 44164; Record on
appeal, pp. 111-112).
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco
has had five children (aside from her son Antonio) with four different
men. The assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at least four
different men without being married to any of them. Thus, the trial
court aptly ruled that his propensity to promiscuous relationship with
different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any
particular person is the father of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).
Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio,
the father, since the latter was a child and then of Antonio, the alleged
son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea Jongco
and Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found by the
trial court to be inherently improbable, inconsistent with human
experience and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of
Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more
credence to the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta
and declared that their testimonies have sufficiently established the fact
that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and
Andrea Jongco which finds further proof in the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs.
GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman,
24 SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs.
Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a birth certificate not signed by the
alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not
competent evidence of paternity.
15
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony,
the Court of Appeals pointed out her serious inconsistency on material
points such as her claim that she was married to the deceased in 1941
and her later admission in the answer that they were married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first
marriage was a secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the
second was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of marriage
certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as
an impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that all
pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal were destroyed
during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did
plan to marry secretly at that time, they could have chosen a city or
municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the
place of the supposed marriage so that petitioners could have an
apparent good reason for the non-presentation of the marriage
certificate.
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural.
Besides petitioners' reasons for the choice of that place, the celebration
of the marriage was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one of the
sponsors thereof.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should
not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial
court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case
(People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs. Grefiel, 125
SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People
vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 (1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis
Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479
[1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the
contending parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the
reversal of the findings of the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last
two assignments of errors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33659 June 14, 1990
VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA.
FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO, petitioners,
vs.
FELICEDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some pleadings.
Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza, all
surnamed Baluyot, then minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, Norma Urbana which seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled
"Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria U. Baluyut, et
al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this court for review
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (now
Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention filed by
petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased
Enrique Baluyut,' filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition for intervention. The
petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the
illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said
deceased and petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano;
that petitioners were conceived and born at the time when Norma
Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already
married to Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his
lifetime by direct overt acts of said deceased having supported and
maintained them. The petitioners also alleged that they were
deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18,
Record on Appeal).
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of
his estate, opposed the petition for intervention (p. 20, Record on
Appeal). On May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal), the trial court
issued an order allowing the petitioners to intervene.
After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered
declaring the intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the
forced heirs of deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering administratrix
Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support to Norma
Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor children. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:
1) FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix
to pay P150.00 as monthly support out of the
Estate of Enrique Baluyut to Norma Urbano
guardian ad litem for the three minor children,
Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza Baluyut.
2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said
children are forced heirs of the late Enrique
Baluyut.
3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights
in said Estate of Enrique Baluyut under the
provisions of the New Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record
on Appeal).
On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from
the trial court's decision. On February 22, 1966, the intervenors filed
their Objection to Appeal and Motion for Execution. The latter motion
was based on the pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29,
1953, that an order granting support pendente lite is final and
executory.
On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal)
declaring that it considers intervenors' motion for execution as a motion
for reconsideration and amended the decision to the effect that it
granted the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly
16
support pendente lite in the amount of P150.00 payable every first day
of the month to their guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.
On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-
41, Rollo) reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
reversed and the intervenors' petition in
intervention is hereby declared dismissed, without
costs. The order granting alimony pendente lite to
the intervenors is hereby set aside. (p. 41, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals'
decision was denied on May 24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari filed on June 19, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On
July 1, 1971, We required the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo).
Respondents, on the other hand, filed their brief on October 28, 1971
(p. 85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was considered
submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).
On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation" praying
for the reinstatement of the order of the trial court to grant the
petitioners monthly support during the pendency of the case. The said
order for monthly support granted by the trial court in its decision of
May 4, 1966 was terminated in the early part of 1971 (p. 90, Rollo).
When asked to comment on the manifestation and motion of
petitioners, respondents opposed said motion in view of respondent
Court of appeals' finding that petitioners were not the recognized
spurious children of deceased Baluyut (p. 113, Rollo).
On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for
continuation of their monthly support pendente lite effective June 1975
until further orders (p. 141, Rollo). After an exchange of pleadings by the
parties regarding the order of this court on the matter of the
continuation of petitioners' support pendente lite, and after a motion
filed by petitioners to cite administratrix for contempt, private
respondents filed a manifestation on January 6,1978, informing this
Court that: 1) the former administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was
substituted by one of her daughters, Milagros B. Villar, as Special
Administratrix; and that 2) they have complied with the September 13,
1977 resolution of the court requiring them to show cause why they
should not be dealt with as in contempt for failing to obey the order to
pay petitioners a monthly support pendente lite. Private respondents
also manifested their compliance by depositing with the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 1, a Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank check in the amount of P4,350.00 representing the
required support until October, 1977. Another PCIB check in the amount
of P300.00 representing support pendente lite for November and
December, 1977 was also deposited with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).
On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad
litem and private respondent Administratrix Milagros B. Villar, both
parties assisted by their respective counsel, filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss the petition in view of petitioners 'filing of a "Petition for
Withdrawal of Intervention" with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of Enrique Baluyut.
The petition for withdrawal was based on a waiver by petitioners of any
right or interest they may have on the estate of the deceased in
consideration of the financial assistance granted them by the
administratrix of the estate (p. 371, Rollo). The petition for withdrawal
of intervention was approved by the intestate court on February 14,
1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant
petition was noted by this court on April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).
The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial
assistance extended to petitioners by the administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the nature of a
compromise settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo).
Considering, however, that the issue involved in this case is whether or
not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed
Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious children of the deceased,
Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition
cannot be granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status
of persons and of future support cannot be the subject of a compromise
(pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code). (See Advincula v.
Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).
The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by respondent
Court of Appeals:
... the testimony of Norma Urbana supported by
that of Liberata Vasquez on the one hand as against
that of the administratrix who declared that she
and her late husband were always together and
that of Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma had
a suitor named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads us to
give credence to the proof of the intervenors
specifically the testimony of Norma that the
intervenors are in fact her illegitimate children with
the late Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).
However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M.
Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary right in the
estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established by an
illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to
successional rights under Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not the
fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by the putative
parent. This has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court since
the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et
al., 102 Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v.
Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held:
An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to
support and successional rights from his putative or
presumed parents must prove his filiation to them.
Filiation may be established by the voluntary or
compulsory recognition of the illegitimate
(spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary when
"made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing." It is compulsory when by court action the
child brings about his recognition. ...
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that by their motion to dismiss the
appellees are deemed to have admitted that the
appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural
child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an
admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit
from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to
allege that her putative father had acknowledged
and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment
is essential and is the basis other right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment the action becomes one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought after
the death of the putative father.
17
This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 121 Phil. 261, where this Court held that:
... the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to
support and successional rights from his parents,
must prove his filiation and this may be done by
means of voluntary or compulsory recognition of
the relationship. For this purpose, the provisions
concerning natural children are held applicable. ...
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil
Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by the putative parent made in
the record of birth, a statement before the court of record, or in any
authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory
recognition under Article 283 of the same law.
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M.
Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the
petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his
spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the
name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no
authentic writing presented nor any statement in a court of record
which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased.
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the
cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child as his, namely:
a) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when the
child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; c) when the child was
conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father; d) when the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of
Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged
possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate
spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when their
mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the petitioners were still
minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for
compulsory recognition was correctly filed by petitioners' guardian ad
litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed out by
respondent appellate court, since the recognition sought in the case is
compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree
with respondent appellate court that the evidence presented by
petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the
success of their action for compulsory recognition. Respondent court
held:
The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her
witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of
recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma
was kept by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his
mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a
house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this
Lacuna was not even presented to testify in
support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that
Baluyut rented his house for Norma. And,
according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited
Norma some twice a week in the house where she
kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the
hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger
children of Norma. But, according to Liberata
herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid the
hospital bills but he gave the money for the
payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he
requested her to pay the money to the hospital.
This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his Identity
as the father of the children of Norma, an act which
is inconsistent with recognizing such children as his
own.
If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of
the intervenors who were born at the Ortanez
hospital, there was no need for him to ask Liberata
to pay the hospital bill of Norma for the delivery of
her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily
done this himself. There is not even evidence
showing that he visited Norma at the hospital when
she delivered there. Coupled with the circumstance
that Enrique tried to hide his being the father of
the intervenors, there is absence of positive and
convincing proof that Enrique treated the
intervenors as his children in all relations in society
and in life. Far from treating them in society as his
children, he was hiding Norma and the intervenors
from society and visited them only once in a while
evidently only to satisfy his sexual urge with Norma
but with no genuine desire to have and treat the
intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous
possession of the status of recognized illegitimate
(not natural) children. There is not even any proof
that he had brought out these intervenors to show
them publicly as his children. With the single
exception of Liberata Vasquez, not a single
neighbor of Norma in the rather populous area of
Project 4, Quezon City, was produced to testify on
any act of Enrique to show his genuine desire to
treat the intervenors as his very own in his actual
relations. The foregoing deficiencies in the
intervenors' proof is fatal to their case.
In order to prove the
continuous possession of the
status of a natural child, the
acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal, not only the
conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as
such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously' (Igar, et al.
vs. Vda. de Balingkit, CA, 60
O.G. 7792; Onos, et al. vs. Vda.
de Onos, CA-G.R. No. 24646-R,
July 22, 1964).
The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the
intervenors do not help their case for these are not
evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased
Enrique Baluyut because, firstly, they were
admitted in evidence by the lower court merely as
part of the of the witnesses who referred to them
in the course of said witnesses' testimony and
hence, they are not evidence of the facts stated in
them. Secondly, they are merely evidence of the
fact that gave rise to their execution, that is, the
fact of birth and nothing else, much leas of
recognition as they are not signed by Enrique
Baluyut.
18
 In an action for compulsory acknowledgment
under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code,
a birth certificate which, on its face, was not
signed by the supposed natural father is
incompetent evidence on paternity, being in
violation of oration 5 of Act 3753 and Article
280 of the Civil Code' (Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950; Crisolo va. Macadaong,
No. L-7017, April 19, 1964; Bernabe, etc. vs.
Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).
If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the
presumed father as required by section 5 of Act
No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are
incompetent evidence even to prove paternity
alone, with more reason are birth certificates
incompetent evidence to prove recognized
filiation. (pp. 36-39, Rollo)
Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application
of law regarding compulsory recognition as first laid down in
the Javellana v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said case
was in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into
the present provisions of the New Civil Code governing paternity and
recognition.
Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in
the Javellana case. That the case was the forerunner of the liberal view
that has found its way into our statute books, is true. But, the rule of
liberality enunciated therein applied only to case involving voluntary
recognition specifically in a public document and not to cases of
compulsory recognition. Thus,
Upon the second point, whether a voluntary
acknowledgment may be done incidentally in a
public document, a distinction must be made
between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1)
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former,
recognition may be incidental, but in the latter, it
must be direct and express.
In actions to compel the alleged father to
acknowledge his natural child, based upon
recognition in an indubitable writing, article 135,
par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the father
must expressly recognize his paternity. This
provision has been strictly construed by Spanish
and Philippine jurisprudence against the alleged
natural child. Thus, in the Sentence of July 5,1906,
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held in an action to
compel acknowledgment under article 135, that a
mere allusion, more or leas clear, by the alleged
father to his supposed child, if there is no express
recognition of his paternity, is not sufficient. In the
Sentence of April 8,1915, that same Tribunal
declared that there should be an indubitable
documentary proof or uninterrupted on of the
status of a natural child, excluding deductions and
conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule
has been adhered to in several decisions by this
court. Thus, in Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil.,
746, an action was filed to compel recognition of a
natural child, based in part on a letter of defendant
telling the mother of his affection toward her and
asking her to take care of the child. This court held
that the letter did not expressly recognize the child,
under article 135. In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5
Phil. 1, the alleged father wrote the child a letter
advising him how to conduct himself. This court
held that the letter did not contain an-express
recognition under article 135.
But while in actions to compel recognition the
foregoing principle is true with respect to
indubitable writings according to article 135, par. 1
of the Civil Code, however, in cases of voluntary
acknowledgment in a public document under
article 131, the law is more liberal and permits an
incidental recognition. ... (Javellana, et al. v.
Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393)
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 63680 March 23, 1990
JACOBA T. PATERNO, TOMAS T. PATERNO, and MARIA LUCIA
PATERNO, petitioners,
vs.
BEATRIZ PATERNO, BERNARDO PATERNO and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Cruz, Cases, Cabaltera & Associates for petitioners. Bausa, Ampil, Suarez,
Paredes & Bausa for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, now defunct,
there was filed by Feliza Orihuela, as guardian ad litem of her children,
Beatriz Paterno and Bernardo Paterno, a complaint 1 praying that the
latter be declared illegitimate (adulterous) children of, and consequently
entitled to inherit from, the deceased Jose P. Paterno. According to
Feliza, Beatriz and Bernardo had been begotten of her illicit liaison with
Jose P. Paterno, a married man, and should thus be counted among the
latter's compulsory heirs in accordance with Article 887 2 of the Civil
Code. Feliza prayed in her complaint for: (1) the invalidation of the
extrajudicial partition of Jose Paterno's estate executed by his Widow,
Jacoba T. Paterno, and his legitimate children, Luis T. Paterno, Vicente T.
Paterno, Tomas T. Paterno, Susana T. Paterno and Maria Lucia T.
Paterno, said partition having deprived the minor plaintiffs of their
legitimes; (2) the extension to Beatriz and Bernardo of support; and (3)
the payment to them of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney's fees. 3
The answer with counterclaim filed for the widow and her children
aforenamed inter alia asserted as affirmative defense that the "plaintiffs
are guilty of laches as they should have exercised their right of action, if
any, against the deceased Dr. Jose P. Paterno during his lifetime in order
to give the latter an opportunity to admit or deny the same, death
having sealed his lips." 4
It appears that "upon defendants" filing their answer, the Honorable N.
Almeda-Lopez started reception of plaintiffs 'evidence. However, on
January 11, 1964, prior to a scheduled continuation of the hearing, the
19
Honorable Judge C. Juliano Agrava who x x (succeeded Judge Almeda-
Lopez) required the parties to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On April 4, 1964, and after both parties
had submitted their respective memoranda, the court finally ordered
the dismissal of the case, for the reason that where an illegitimate child
seeks to participate in the estate of the deceased putative father, the
action becomes essentially one for recovery of plaintiffs' supposed share
in the estate and the question of paternity becomes merely an incident
thereto. As the main issue falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts, the incidental question of paternity should also be resolved
therein, if the splitting of causes of action is to be avoided. ...." 5
The plaintiffs perfected an appeal to this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. L-23060. The appeal resulted in the reversal of the challenged
order. In a decision rendered on June 30, 1967, this Court set aside "the
order of dismissal appealed from, insofar as it affects the issue of
paternity," and returned the case "to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for determination of that particular issue." Said the
Court: 6
... The issue to be determined ... is which of
plaintiffs' claim (filiation or participation [in the
decedent's estate]) constitutes the main cause and
which is merely an incident thereto.
xx
... Clearly before the claim to participate in the
estate may be prosecuted, plaintiffs' right to
succeed must first be established. Differently
stated, plaintiffs' main action is that for recognition
of their status as illegitimate children of the
deceased, upon which the right to share in the
hereditary estate of the putative father would rest.
(This matter is without doubt within the jurisdiction
of the JDRC.) ...
In granting to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court 'such incidental powers generally possessed
by the court of first instance,' the law x x (however)
could not have intended to confer on this special
tribunal jurisdiction over all subject matter
cognizable by the ordinary court of first instance.
The term 'incidental powers' must refer to the
authority to issue such orders or writs and take
such measures as might be necessary to carry out
the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. (Hence, the matter of the
participation in the estate of the decedent is not
within its competence; it is within the jurisdiction
of the court of first instance.)
The above conclusion will not constitute a violation of the rule against
splitting of cause of action. The prohibition provided in the Rules of
Court is against the institution of more than one suit for a single cause
of action, (Sec. 3, Rule 2 ...). But, as alleged in the complaint, the bases
for plaintiffs' various claims would not be the same. By the creation of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, with its exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving paternity and acknowledgment, recognition of
children and recovery of hereditary shares can no longer be properly
joined as cause of action, since each lies within the jurisdiction of a
different tribunal.
The case having been thereafter remanded to and tried by the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC), that Court rendered judgment on
April 14, 1970 dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription,
its view being that the action for compulsory recognition should have
been commenced within the lifetime of the alleged father, and on the
ground that plaintiffs had failed to present "clear, strong and
convincing" evidence of their filiation. 7Dismissed as well was the
defendants' counterclaim. The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, 8where basically, they imputed to the JDRC two (2)
errors, 9 to wit:
1) holding that they (plaintiffs) had lost whatever
right of action they might otherwise have had,
when they failed to file the corresponding action
during the lifetime of their putative parent, Jose P.
Paterno; and
2) ruling that plaintiffs' evidence was in part
incompetent and in any event did not constitute
"clear, strong and convincing proof' of plaintiffs'
filiation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the JDRC. In a decision
promulgated on August 16, 1982, 10 said Court, after an extensive
review of the evidence adduced by the parties before the JDRC —
observing in this connection that as against the plaintiffs'(illegitimate
children's) "witnesses and documentary evidence, Mrs. Jacoba Paterno,
widow of the decedent, stood alone to deny the claim of the plaintiffs-
appellants" — reached the following conclusions:
It is true there appear to be certain inconsistencies
in plaintiffs' evidence as pointed out by the trial
court, but in the final analysis, these
inconsistencies are only minor matters winch, to
Our mind, instead strengthened the entire
plaintiffs' evidence. Had these witnesses been very
elaborate, thorough and precise, We would have
entertain(ed) some doubts. In fact, the evidence is
so convincing, clear, positive that We noted that,
after trial and assessment of the evidence, the trial
court was constrained, perhaps, in consonance
with its conscience, to admit that 'in evaluating
plaintiffs' evidence ... the court cannot definitely
state that their (plaintiffs') claim is false. 'The trial
court was convinced that plaintiffs-appellants
Beatriz and Bernardo and Virginia are the children
of Dr. Jose P. Paterno, but being of the opinion that
spurious children's right of action to compel
recognition as such is lost forever upon the demise
of the putative father, found against the plaintiffs.
We hold, after going over the records, that there
are sufficient evidence, clear and convincing,
establishing the filiation of plaintiffs appellants
Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno as spurious children
of Dr.Jose P. Paterno; that Jose P. Paterno died
when they were still minors and the present action
for the establishment of their filiation to Dr. Jose P.
Paterno was filed before they reach(ed) the age of
majority and within the period of limitation, within
which cases of this nature should be instituted to
establish paternity and filiation. 11
WHEREFORE, finding the Court a quo in error, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
another one entered, declaring plaintiffs-appellants
Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno illegitimate(spurious)
children of Dr. Jose P. Paterno, deceased, begotten
out of wedlock with Felisa Orihuela (who is herein
appointed guardian ad litem) conceived and born
20
 when the deceased was cohabiting with the latter,
(and) having enjoyed and continued possessing the
status as children of the deceased Dr. Jose P.
Paterno.
We are not in a position to pass on, much less,
grant the other prayers of the appellants contained
in their brief except as to costs, inasmuch as the
directive of Our Supreme Court in the case
of Paterno,et al. vs. Paterno, et al., L-32060, June
30, 1964, 20 SCRA 585, returning this case to the
court of origin, specifically states:
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from,
insofar as it affects the issue of paternity is hereby
set aside, and the case returned to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for determination of that
particular issue.
Mrs. Jacoba T. Paterno, the widow, and her legitimate children have
appealed to this Court on certiorari. In these proceedings, they claim
that the Court of Appeals erred in —
1) holding the evidence of the enjoyment by Beatriz
and Bernardo Paterno of the status of children of
the deceased Jose Paterno, to be strong, clear and
convincing;
2) failing to take account of —
a) the suspicious nature of the alleged letter of the
decedent to Feliza, mother of Beatriz and Bernardo
(Exh. G), it being in English although Felisa was "not
adequately conversant in English;"
b) the suspect character of Beatriz's alleged
baptismal certificate in that it "does not even state
the given name" (Exh. B);
c) he lack of specific evidence of cohabitation
between the decedent and Feliza during the
periods of conception of their alleged children;
d) the "contradictory and conflicting evidence on
direct acts by petitioner vis-a-vis the status of
private respondents;"
3) failing to apply the doctrine in Clemena v.
Clemena, 24 SCRA (1968), 720, to the effect that
doubts in paternity suits are resolved against the
claimant.
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether
or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and
adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt
questions of fact. 12 Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a
party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted
by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;
whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be
accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body
of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said
proofs weight — all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not
reviewable by this Court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases
decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the
petition and therein distinctly set forth. 13 But it is questions of this type
which the petitioners have precisely submitted for resolution to this
Court. Therefore, in accordance with established rule and practice,
those issues will not be considered by this Court, the resolutions
thereon by the Court of Appeals being final. 14
It may however be noted in passing that, as recapitulated in painstaking
detail in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 15 the dovetailing and
mutually corroborative testimony of the private respondents, their
mother Felisa Orihuela, and Teresa Miranda and Anselmo Macapinlac,
the late Dr. Jose P. Pateno's retainers to whose care and company he
entrusted his illegitimate family, does indeed compel acceptance of the
fact that from their birth until Dr. Pateno's death, said respondents were
treated as, and enjoyed the status of, his children by blood.
The gist of that testimony is to the effect that Dr. Paterno had borne the
expenses of the birth and baptism of said children, who were born in
the same year (1938) within eleven months of each other; that in that
year, after the birth of the first child, Beatriz, mother and daughter had
moved from A. Luna in San Juan, Rizal, to Rubi Street in San Andres
Bukid, Manila, where the second child, Bernardo, and a third, Virginia,
who died at four, were born; that in 1940, the family moved to a house
in A. Lake Street in San Juan, Rizal purchased by Dr. Paterno; that in
both places, they had lived with and been maintained by Dr. Paterno in
the company of the Miranda and Macapinlac families; that shortly
before the outbreak of the war in December 1941, Dr. Paterno left for
Hongkong where he stayed until war's end; that in his absence, mother
and children received monthly support from Don Vicente Madrigal at
the instance of Dr. Paterno who was Madrigal's brother-in-law; that for
sometime after Liberation, they lived in the Madrigal compound in Gen.
Luna, Paco, Manila; that when Dr. Paterno thereafter returned to the
Philippines and until he again left for Hongkong, he lived with mother
and children, first in Antipolo, Rizal and later in Marilao, Bulacan; that
when Felisa decided to get married — this while Dr. Paterno was in
Hongkong on his second sojourn there — she sought and received the
forgiveness of his wife, Dona Jacoba, who even consented to act as
sponsor at her wedding; that when Dr. Paterno returned once more
from Hongkong, to be assigned to the Madrigal cement plant in
Binangonan, Rizal, he made it a point to see that Beatriz and Bernardo
went or were brought to visit him, especially during weekends, and on
these occasions, he and the children slept in his room in the same bed,
he would tell them to come or send word to him for anything they might
need, and would give them money when they left; that Beatriz, then
about thirteen or fourteen, was being sent to school in Sta. Isabel
College by Dr. Paterno, who did the same for Bernardo, who was
enrolled at the University of Santo Tomas; that these reunions
continued until he fell ill and had to keep to his house in Mendoza St.,
Quiapo, Manila, and Doña Jacoba forbade the children to see him on the
excuse that he might suffer a relapse; that on the some five occasions
that they tried to see Dr. Paterno in his residence while he lay sick, the
children were given money by Doña Jacoba upon leaving; and that after
his death and burial, Doña Jacoba gave them money for their tuition.
Hence, even if, against all applicable law and precedent, this Court were
minded to substitute its own assessment of such testimony, as
supported by the documents also presented by the private respondents,
for that of the Court of Appeals, it would reach no different conclusion.
True, certain inconsistencies may be noted in the testimony given by the
witnesses for the private respondents, but it is on the whole unanimous
and consistent as to the really crucial fact that Dr. Paterno treated and
acted towards said respondents, from their birth onward, in a manner
only a real father would and leaving little doubt that he recognized and
considered them as in truth his children. The simple denials of the
widow, petitioner Jacoba T. Paterno, do not suffice to refute such
proof.
21
The action for recognition (or to establish filiation) having been timely
filed-having been instituted after the demise of the putative parent and
before the attainment of the age of majority of the children concerned-
and the ground invoked therefor having been satisfactorily
proven, 16 the Court of Appeals committed no error in declaring and
confirming the status of the private respondents as illegitimate children
of the late Dr.Jose P. Paterno.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA
PUERTA, respondents.
Isabel de la Puerta for and in her own behalf.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent
Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of
her alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will
leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo,
Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free
portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the
will.1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by
her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the
time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its
meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of
her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate
court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After
hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed
by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal,
Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in
the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a
monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta.7 At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to
prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-
evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring
that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts
claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence presented
by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the same.8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent
court,9 which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural
child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta
in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real
parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was
the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were
legally or presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have
been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already
married at the time of her birth in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified
that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two
were living as husband and wife and had three children, including a girl
named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not
sure if the couple was legally married.10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de
la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in
1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living
with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses
away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the
relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known in the
community.11
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that she was born on
December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh.
A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her
mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common
law husband and wife until his death on June 14,
1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but
was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la
Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta
on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last will and
testament, she was the only child who survived him
together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta
with whom he did not beget any child; that she was
treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from
the time of her birth until his father died; that the
fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de la
Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing
movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and
D-2) and school records wherein he signed the
report cards as her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that
during the hearing of her adoption case in Special
Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at
Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically
stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his
daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that
it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who
spent for her subsistence, support and education; .
. . 12
22
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of
those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that
will justify reversal.13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said
findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of
the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural
child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial
and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were
living separately in such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate,
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and
Gloria were married at the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to
Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that:
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.—The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be
refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such
evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they
involve situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and
wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be married. In the case
before us, there was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her
husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple, thereby
rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of
Juanita Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not
continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not
explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object
when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly consorting with
Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to
say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that
she had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had
long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even renounced in open
court any claim to Vicente's estate.15
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been
destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional
proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's
filiation, we reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the
Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she
is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her
status by the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been
settled that:
The so-called spurious children or illegitimate
children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include adulterous children or
those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or
to a married man cohabiting with a woman other
than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation
must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of
the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
paternity or maternity of spurious children under
the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284
of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules
on compulsory recognition of natural children are
applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position
than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation
of natural children or the rule on voluntary and
compulsory acknowledgment for natural children
may be applied to spurious children. 16
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private
respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was
sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta
at the hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where
he categorically declared as follows:
23
 Q What relation if any do you
have with Carmelita de la
Puerta?
A She is my daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de
la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction
of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first
reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and
the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that —
In testamentary succession, the right of
representation can take place only in the following
cases: first, when the person represented dies
before the testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of succeeding the
testator; and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases,
since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law
calls the children or descendants of the person
represented to succeed by right of
representation. 18
xxx xxx xxx
The law is clear that there is representation only
when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed
him in his rights which he would have had if still
living. In the present case, however, said deceased
had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix
herein. . . . It is a fact that at the time of the death
of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He
died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And
upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the
petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or
the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other
words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not
trying to succeed to the right to the property of the
testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee
Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the
right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of
representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon
her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would
have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta
died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of
her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente,
Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992
of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate
and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court declared:
. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of
Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as
found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born
outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born, his alleged putative father and mother
were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged
father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most,
petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes.
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier
or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from
inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred
ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either.
As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the
adopted child, the latter cannot represent the
former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not
related to the deceased in that case, because the
filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted. "By
adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an
heir, but they cannot thus make one for their
kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la
Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but
24
not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and
inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the
settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga
Revuelta's Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of
Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as
special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother
of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of
his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero
in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by
his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit:
four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December
9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over
the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4
and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo
Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24,
1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13,
1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel,
her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding
Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement
of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in
the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared
her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its
order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was
rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983
(reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which
reads —
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent
with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December
1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-
appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the
declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its
order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review
with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate
succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct
descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate
children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral
relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of
the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father
Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
"legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son
and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
25
 IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-
appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore
a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988,
989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate
succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December
1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and
interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are
the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa
Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could
inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation
of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti
Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners
contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New
Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes
the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and
inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly
changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly
grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased
father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona
Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict
refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood,
but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be
an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided
for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of
the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code,
We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon.
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists,
to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation
was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so
that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate
child can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art.
992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990,
995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him
in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This
difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and
decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the
right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in
accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate
children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the
phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother"
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes
all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from
the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article
992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any
error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December
1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention
is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December
1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to
intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the
declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated
December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the
subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal.
Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already
removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide
anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has
become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent
Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a
26
quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir
of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null
and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already married to someone
else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on
February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4 The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition
with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein
respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is
overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if
they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of
[respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants
[Antonio’s] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially
approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following
Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of
Makati to cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the
father of the aforementioned minors in their respective
Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental
Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor
children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody
over the parties’ minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and
Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s]
residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening
and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons
and custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick
Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the
aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the
written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor
children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the
amount of ₱30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7(Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her
motion was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November
22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave
error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and
jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over
her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court
modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the
CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same
in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week,
and may only take the children out upon the written consent
of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of
the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the
father’s recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of
reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner
Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the
27
children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be
deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of
the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the
minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-
interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the
surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give
support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of
the minor children.12Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to
deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of
the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their
children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a
partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the
CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court
via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family
Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use
by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their
mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their
filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the
Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA
925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the
paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his
children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the
mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate
children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of
the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use
the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its
literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position
that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has
no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
"may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the
matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed
the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of
the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed
even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother
rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest
and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of
her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the
use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the
child be placed in the best possible situation considering his
circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the
choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it
would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a
person’s name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his
successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any
way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against
such change.
28
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate
court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the
Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as
her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate
his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States.
This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use
of the father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children,
citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, 21 which
states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate
of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the
child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child
shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of the
accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public
document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required
if he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be
contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the
child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be
recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private
handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded
in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to
(new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live
Birth and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration,
the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live
Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child
is hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA
9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance
cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v.
Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a
law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to
amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be
broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative
agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is
no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous. 23 What
is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to
strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the
Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of
the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by
illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s
recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art.
176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary
controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames
by which they will be known.
29
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children,
now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring
their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However,
since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial
court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to
rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of
the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is
necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24,

2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is
MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed

Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard

Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;

b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week,

and may only take the children out upon the written consent
of [Grande]:

c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of

the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and

d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch

8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the
surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General

Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and
hereby declared NULL and VOID. SO ORDERED.

30