1. TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. (obviously in the USA).
ously in the USA). Meanwhile, in 1963, Renato Tayag was
RENATO D. TAYAG vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., G.R. No. L-
23145, November 29, 1968
2. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO
FONTANILLA in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, G.R. No. 124110, April 20, 2001
3. BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1, 767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru
and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, G.R. No. 104776,
December 5, 1994
4. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION vs. HON.
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE
LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B.
FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, G.R. No. 61594,
September 28, 1990
5. HUNTINGTON vs. ATTRILL, 146 U.S. 657, December 12, 1892
6. SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA AND LIANA ZALAMEA vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND TRANSWORLD AIRLINES,
INC., G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993
7. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
8. ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
9. INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS CORPORATION (PUERTO RICO)
vs. JACK GOLDEN, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, November 19, 1964
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO
D. TAYAG vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., G.R. No. L-23145,
November 29, 1968
FACTS: In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left
behind properties here and abroad. One property she left behind
were two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of stocks of the
Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates were in the
possession of the Country Trust Company of New York (CTC-NY).
CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of the estate of Perkins
would be highly irregular if court orders would yield to the bylaws
appointed as the ancillary administrator (of the properties of
Perkins she left behind in the Philippines).
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between them
is entitled to possess the stock certificates. A case ensued and
eventually, the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the stock
certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed with the
court a petition to have said stock certificates be declared lost and to
compel BCI to issue new stock certificates in replacement thereof.
The trial court granted Tayag’s petition.
BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue
new stock certificates because the two stock certificates declared
lost are not actually lost; that the trial court as well Tayag
acknowledged that the stock certificates exists and that they are
with CTC-NY; that according to BCI’s by laws, it can only issue new
stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed certificates of
stocks, only after court of law has issued a final and executory order
as to who really owns a certificate of stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. are correct.
HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its
existence to Philippine laws. It has been given rights and privileges
under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under the law and
one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It is not immune
from judicial control because it is domiciled here in the Philippines.
BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to
the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock
cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful
court orders. Further, to allow BCI’s opposition is to render the court
order against CTC-NY a mere scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag
without any remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses
to comply with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our
local courts to create a legal fiction such that the stock certificates in
issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the hands
of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the
law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an
important part in its development.
Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue new
stock certificates in accordance with its bylaws is misplaced. It is
worth noting that CTC-NY did not appeal the order of the court – it
simply refused to turn over the stock certificates hence ownership
can be said to have been settled in favor of estate of Perkins here.
Also, assuming that there really is a conflict between BCI’s bylaws
and the court order, what should prevail is the lawful court order. It
of a corporation. Again, a corporation is not immune from judicial
orders.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO
FONTANILLA in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, G.R. No. 124110, April 20, 2001
FACTS: Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through
the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three “Visit the U.S.A.”
tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son, Mychal, to visit
the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All All
flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the
Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changed their itinerary,
paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words:
“Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but were
denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. The CA ruled
that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in
requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding
rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA,
relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of the
USA.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.
HELD: No. According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”,
the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and
interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even
though the place where the contract was made is different from
the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply
the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket
is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore,
although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United
States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in
Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however,
such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of
carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1, 767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru
and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, G.R. No. 104776,
December 5, 1994
FACTS: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by
respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal,
Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they
were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the
Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were
terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where
some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for
claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.
ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on
prescription that shall be the governing law
HELD: As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION vs. HON.
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE
LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B.
FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, G.R. No. 61594,
September 28, 1990
FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International
Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts
of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other
with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became
effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as
follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the
mutual consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA
reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving
the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the
intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE
wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the
laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have
applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by teh laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is
based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in
the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A
“borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,”
one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the
the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this
agreement.
Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants
after undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and flying
assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts
of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and
official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing
them that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses,
against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE).
PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no
evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were
habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from
abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly
warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to
discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of
both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.
Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that
private respondents had attained the status of regular employees
after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that
the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3
local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action
arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be
enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards
the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor.
years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and
casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out
without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and
entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the
case? Which court has jurisdiction?
HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment
agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the
applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the
agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected
with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine
laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties
agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also
performed here, at least partially; private respondents are
Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a
foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing
business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private
respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned
flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to
the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum
for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment
agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies
and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to
plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must
therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of
Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
Petition denied.
HUNTINGTON vs. ATTRILL, 146 U.S. 657, December 12, 1892
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA AND LIANA ZALAMEA vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND TRANSWORLD AIRLINES,
INC., G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea,
and their daughter, Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila
agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New
York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a
full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had
checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on
the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including
petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those
holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-
listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket
of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully
booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and
purchased two tickets from American Airlines. Upon their arrival in
the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on
breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower
court ruled in favor of petitioners . CA held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of
record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed
under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE; WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas
to Moral and Examplary damages.
RULING: The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing
overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn
Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of
Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. No official publication of said code was presented as
evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no
basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the
same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the
principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the
court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum
and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since
the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to
bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral
damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers
with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute,
this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of
carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he
would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the
carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where
an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to
deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would
show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of
being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages.
For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public
duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience to its
passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment.
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its
passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage
even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking.
Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared
for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another
airline.
Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of
its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither
did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners
were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that
there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It
is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of
respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that
their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification.
The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could
easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them
as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently,
respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of
petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious
disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for
moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in
similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for
exemplary damages, as well.
In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court
explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the
cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus,
instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA
tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight
from New York to Los Angeles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987.
They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the
marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was
solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City.
Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they
were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only
in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick
Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry
petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD: The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by
the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the
Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s
legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be
used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will
conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
FACTS: In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to pay $5.1 million to
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result of a
recovery suit filed by Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia for PNCC’s
failure to complete a construction project there despite due payment
from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC failed to comply with the
judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavest filed a complaint for the
enforcement of the Malaysian ruling against PNCC in the Philippines.
The case was filed with the Pasig RTC which eventually denied the
complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the foreign
judgment cannot be enforced here because of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to PNCC, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC on
the ground that PNCC’s counsel participated in all the proceedings in
the Malaysian Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should be
enforced against PNCC in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and
mistake of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest was able to present
evidence as to the validity of the proceedings that took place in
Malaysia. Asiavest presented the certified and authenticated copies
of the judgment and the order issued by the Malaysian Court. It also
presented correspondences between Asiavest’s lawyers and PNCC’s
lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCC’s allegation that the
Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCC’s
allegation of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked the
same in the Malaysian Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party
must present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the
judgment enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly
certified and authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to present the
required evidence.