Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State
Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285),
and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power
which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from
the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred
to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during
the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although
the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of
international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized,
by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a
corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign
subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on
which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of
sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de factotherein and its power to promulgate
rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy
territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim
and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory
occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance
may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent
allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or
sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for
and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own
legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them
aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign
is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would
necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one
hand, ipso factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other
hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of
his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the
protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because
the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military
occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as
they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country,
flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and
disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear
relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because
they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that,
while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by
him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible
for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said
Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by
their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new
ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare
76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and
the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which,
though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be
considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a
positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving
the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action
is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the
inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally
by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the
former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a
traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the
laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally
recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all
of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders
in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of
depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by
them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against
said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States,
exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the
United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935,
a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the
Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section
1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12,
1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a
government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty
is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All
citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the
people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the
United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed
against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may
have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United
States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the
change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for
Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";
 This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be
stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs.
Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a
separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there
is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may
actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.

As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-
preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency
arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its
enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they
should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to
the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be
enforced under the theory of suspension.

Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is
advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during
the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which
was also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.

"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of
which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.

"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.

Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on
him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political
relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright),
492, 501.

By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he
receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and
temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and
becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled
in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence.
Carlisle vs.United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the
King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both
expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within
the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are
under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently
founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an
implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean
himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by
being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own
misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by
residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in
lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be
inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation
might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians
within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for
they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words
and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)

Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or
subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him
who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives;
that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the
right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.

Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that which arises
by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that arising through some circumstance or act
other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from
residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance — that
arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of
allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S.,
p.885.)

Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives.
15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).

"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his
state — the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political
person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who
operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters or
enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its
 sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International
Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).

The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character.
This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in
the case of Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of
the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations,
one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed.,
p.6.)

Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection
which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign,
correlative with the protection received.

It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege

(ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and
qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.

xxx xxx xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and

temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by
some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary
and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall.
[U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the
revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities
above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides
somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible
that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their
minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules
whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est
moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and
in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece,
and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may
be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation,
with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government
stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If
sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine
democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very
life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation
between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our
people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a
people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her
husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising
his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his
protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed
with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to
enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for
her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?

Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is

unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante)
that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of
independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the
United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not
change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional
philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United
States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such
act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the
principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the
Filipino people.

The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of
independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been
sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same
Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption
of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic federal
constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all
mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the
sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.

Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress.
Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to
the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when
there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme
Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power,
authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason
which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory of
suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the
Japanese occupation.

Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and
later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should
have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those
renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them
were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.

"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the
Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the
country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did
not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or
civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.

Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the
Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the
citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable.
Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is
dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the
social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be
dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens
are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty,
is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the
physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue,
irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal
protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the
Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet
government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in
several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept
petitioner's theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot
imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people,
without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones
that could claim obedience from our citizens.

Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the
enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept
that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by
its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is
based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity,
understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our own
people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes
repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt,
spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people
and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside
from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the
morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and
officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further
slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change
human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking
man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology
remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on
hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be legally
recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and
ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.

One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of
invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice
immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the
covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-
hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium
of the invaders.

Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since
September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the
People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between
December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments
have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese
occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time
the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose
the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not
have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which
the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of
our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of suspended
allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason
cases at any cost.

Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted
principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that
the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that
the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories,
urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally
accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions
of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the
theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There
is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted
reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory,
the offspring devours its parent.

Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?

There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even
since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our
laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of
December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by
Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16,
1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in
effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President
"to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative,"
(section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give
emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that
Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and
occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the
necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for
treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed
without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal
technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing
the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having
betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due
process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as
such during the critical period of test.

G.R. Nos. L-5367 & L-5368

PADILLA, J.:
Cayetano Mangahas and Mariano de los Santos Mangahas (Cases Nos. 742 and 744 of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan) were charged with treason. With their consent both defendants were tried
jointly. After trial they were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, the accessories of the law, and each to pay a fine of
P10,000 and the costs. Both have appealed.
At about 11 o'clock in the morning of 13 December 1944 (Saturday), Jose Perez, a runner of the
guerrillas operating around Victory Hill in Norzagaray, province of Bulacan, appeared at the house of
Martin de la Merced, commanding office of the guerrillas, and informed him that about 30 armed
Makapilis raided Lawang, a section of the town of Norzagaray, and apprehended several guerrilla
members. Upon hearing the report Martin went down, joined other guerrillas, ran toward the bushes
outside the town to escape from Makapilis. While his wife Enriqueta was looking around the house a
second runner by the name of Julian Payumo came and informed her that the house of Captain
Basilio Leonardo had already been raided, and not long after a third runner by the name of Lucio
Ocampo came and told her that the Makapilis were in front of the municipal building. She left her
house and went to another across the street from where she could see what they were going to do in
her house. The Makapilis, among whom were Cayetano Mangahas, Mariano de los Santos
Mangahas and Francisco Castillo, arrived, surrounded the house, some of them went up; and took
and brought to the garrison of the Makapilis near the municipal building foodstuff intended for the
guerrillas at Victory Hill, consisting of 5 sacks of rice, 2 cans of salted beef, a basketful of camote and
another of tomatoes, a small bag of salt and a half sack of sardines, salmon and corned beef.
Enriqueta B. de la Merced and Engracia de la Cruz testified to the foregoing overt acts.
On 30 December 1944 five persons, among whom were the two defendants, came to the house of
Moises Legaspi at Norzagaray, apprehended and brought him to the garrison of the Makapilis. Three
days after his arrest, or on 2 January, his wife Purita Ramos, together with her children the eldest of
whom was Matias Legaspi, 11 years old, went to the garrison of the Makapilis and there saw her
husband, but since then he has not returned and has not been seen.
Purita Ramos and Matias Legaspi testified to the foregoing overt acts.
The foregoing evidence supports counts Nos. 2 and 3 of the information against Cayetano Mangahas
and counts Nos. 3 and 4 of the information against Mariano de los Santos Mangahas.
In the morning of 29 December 1944 a group of armed Makapilis, among whom were the two
defendants, took and carried away rice, shoes, helmet, clothes and anything they could get hold of in
the house of Primo S. Cruz at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and at the same time apprehended him and,
together with other persons whose hands were tied, was brought to the San Jose garrison where
Japanese soldiers were stationed and since then he has not returned and has not been seen. A
similar tragedy befell Artemio Nicolas who on 30 December 1944 was taken from his house in
Norzagaray by the defendants, was tied up and brought to the poblacion and then to the San Jose
garrison and since then he has not returned and has not been seen again.
By their own admission the defendants are Filipino citizen.
The arrest of Primo S. Cruz and Artemio Nicolas, who as alleged in the information was shot to death
by the Japanese while attempting to escape at the time when the Americans began bombing, cannot
be deemed sufficient to constitute treason for lack of two witnesses, because the arrest of Primo S.
Cruz is established only by the testimony of his widow Maria S. Cruz and that of Artemio Nicolas only
by the testimony of his widow Virginia Boluran. Nevertheless, it is a proof of adherence to the enemy.
There is no merit in the argument that because there is no evidence to show that the defendants
acted as informers or that they were responsible for the arrest of Moises Legaspi (counts No. 2
against Cayetano Mangahas and No. 3 against Mariano de los Santos Mangahas), the evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction for treason. There is no doubt that the two defendants were
present when they arrested Moises Legaspi at his house on 30 December 1944. A mere denial by
Cayetano Mangahas that he was with those who arrested Moises Legaspi is not sufficient to outweigh
the testimony of Purita Ramos and Matias Legaspi who pointed to the appellants as among the five
Makapilis who apprehended Moises Legaspi.
On the day his father was taken by the Makapilis from his house Matias Legaspi was eleven years old
and was 16 years old when he testified and being then a fifth grade student his senses could perceive
and transmit those perceptions to others. The trial court gave him credence. After reading the
transcript of his testimony a disregard thereof would be unwarranted.
The claim that there is no proof of adherence to the enemy is without merit. The acts of arresting
guerrillas, commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work, drilling in the plaza, going around the town
carrying firearms, and the fact that before the outbreak of the war they were members of the Ganap
Party and in the latter period of the Japanese occupation of the Makapili organization, are more than
sufficient proofs of adherence to the enemy.
Cayetano Mangahas testifies that he and his brother Mariano de los Santos Mangahas were arrested
by the Japanese on 25 December 1944 for they were suspected also of being guerrillas; and upon
that it is argued that they could not have been among the group of 30 Makapilis that raided the house
of Martin de la Merced on 13 December 1944. The uncorroborated testimony of Cayetano Mangahas
cannot prevail over the testimony of Enriqueta B. de la Merced and Engracia de la Cruz who on that
occasion saw the defendants among the raiders.
In People vs. Predilla, G. R. No. L-4407, 25 March 1952, we said:
In some cases lack of instruction was taken into account to mitigate treason;[1] in others it was not[2] In
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-2236. 16 May 1951, lack of instruction was not taken into consideration to
mitigate treason, but as it appeared that the defendants had not taken part in the killing of the victims
the minimum period of the penalty provided by law was not disturbed. The evidence does not show
that the appellant took part in the killing of the victims.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.Paras, C. J., Pablo,
Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.

C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.

REYES, J.:

We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the
People's Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said
court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with murder robbery and rape."

The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended contains the
following counts:

1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in
the city of Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called
Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully well that the
aims and purposes of said organization are among other to extend every aid and cooperation
with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of America and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of said
enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the enemy
with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to them did go out on numerous
patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and other elements and other
elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.

2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3,
1945, and the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Forces with
treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance
and fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines did then
and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police
otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T. Yushida, performing the
function and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said
military police and did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said
enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did in
company with other member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend
guerrilla as they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise
commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the
cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.

3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the
Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did
give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored
constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the Japanese Army
Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called mopping up
operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance
against said enemy and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.

4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and November
1944 in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese
Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then
and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the a construction of air raid
shelters for the protection of Japanese soldier against allied air raids and did help in the
acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation against the
expected landing of America forces.

5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu
Philippines the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to the said
enemy in company with Japanese Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other
Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest
maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to disclose the
whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to
confess his guerrilla activities.

6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese
forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in company
with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military Police and other enemy spices and
informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and
arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia strike him on the face and head
with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion
that he was a guerrilla.

7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu,

Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy in his capacity as chief undercover man
for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with Japanese soldier and Santiago
Bernaba another Japanese spy did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter taking said
Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did investigate said
Numeriano Bellesa about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms
in gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano
Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation.

8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable intent to give as he
did give aid he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief
undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District and in
company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese Military Police did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did investigate the
latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer
of the guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did
torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter by the arms so that his body dangled down
striking his stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his head and finally striking
his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.

9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines
and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy
the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces with treasonable intent to give as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer
and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with other
informers said Military Police, did then and there apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and
accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as to the
whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division Cebu
Area Command and when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's
whereabouts herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the arms
strike her on the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and
otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.

10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial Japanese Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort said enemy in company with five
Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the
Kempei-Tai and his capacity Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one
Juan Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike
said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said
Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said
person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have
not been heard of ever since then.

11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile
designs of said enemy.

12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn company with Japanese soldier, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that
the latter was a guerrilla.

13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did and
comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and
arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the Japanese Military Police and
thereat herein accused did question and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts
by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their
whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing,
severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter
addressed to her aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese
Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said headquarters in
compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever since.

14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to
the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable to give as
he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man,
informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu District and in company with
Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question the latter as the
whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said
investigation, the accused did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs
and an iron pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to divulge
said guerrilla whereabouts.

15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines
and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give,
as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man,
informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company
with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese informers and spies, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Marciano Alejandro,
Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and
wounding said Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with guerrillas.

16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to
the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer and
spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot
and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's guerrilla activities and resistance to
said enemy.

17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu,
Philippines, particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, thee Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, as member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer
and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonable join and take part in the general mopping up operation conducted by the Japanese
Army under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to
Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting
said enemy.

18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering
to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer and
spy under the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with the
member of said Japanese Military Police under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the
Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest,
maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls
naked, raping them, and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said
Martin Francisco:

2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch

P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring

on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.

19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, acting as an informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers of
the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct
and carry out a raid for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and as a result of which,
Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was captured.

20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by
the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract confession of the latter's connection
with guerrillas.
 21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in
company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise
known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up the hands of
said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as
consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.

22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as did give and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer, spy and undercover man of the
Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously arrest
at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and "John Doe" her husband, on suspicion that said
persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita
Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused
did torture them by hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.

23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of
Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to
the said enemy.

By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the information.
But he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court erred:

1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1) voluntary
surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC
in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission; on and (3) the facts
that the accused helped and saved the lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of
the Japanese;

2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the
strength of the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him;

3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and

unnecessary cruelty;

4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with
murder, rape and robbery;

5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.

Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have
been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The
killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses
but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being
merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January
29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only.

Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his
admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he
was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be invoked (People vs. Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 166;
People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)

The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen
have not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as mitigating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.

There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he would not
be sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied by both
the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying appellant' motions for
reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in connection with the
decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on the merit of the same."

There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature,
inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty."
(People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in the information show that appellant in
committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to
captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting them to
death, and as appears in count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in
arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and then abusing her
together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint and
deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary
cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this said in the case of People vs.
Racaza, supra.

But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to
the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human
treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties
are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately
augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of
article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is
beyond doubt guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs.

For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are adsorbed in
treason characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and other accompanying
crimes should be taken in to consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal
responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule
treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are
denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be
adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to
which the culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and
injuries that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code
just penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution.
 Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the
case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment with
the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in
furtherance of the law's aims.

The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to
exceed P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and
unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since five member of this
court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.

Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of
treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this
instance de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-365 January 21, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO RACAZA, defendant-appellant.

Pedro C. Mendiola for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

Antonio Racaza was charged with treason on 14 counts and tried din the City of Cebu before the First
Division of the People's Court. The information is as follows:

That during the period comprised between January , 1944 and February, 1945, more
specifically on or about the dates and periods herein below mentioned, in the municipalities
hereinafter stated all within the Provincial of Cebu and Bohol, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Court, said accused not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the
United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said duty of
allegiance did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably adhere to the
Empire of Japan with which the United States and the Philippines were then at war, giving said
enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces in the Philippines, aid and/or
comfort in the following manner, to wit:

"1. That on or about May 8, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give aid and comport fort to the enemy said accused did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably acting as a Japanese spy lead, guided and
accompany a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers, which
apprehended Custodio Abella; that the Filipino undercovers, which apprehended Custodio
Abella; that the aforementioned accused did question Abella as to the hiding place of Captain
Ibañez, G-2 of guerrilla forces; that during the investigation, the herein accused hit Custodio
Abella several times with a revolver and did threaten to kill him if he did not give the desired
information; and while Abella's hands were tied behind his back, the herein accused did knock
him down and choke him, while another companion did jump up and down several times on
Abella's stomach; that said Antonio Abella was finally taken and detained at the
Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters for fifteen days:

"2. That sometime during the month of August, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province
of Cebu, the accused therein acting as a Japanese spy and undercover with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comport to the enemy did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol composed of two
Japanese soldiers and twelve Filipino undercovers which apprehended one Florencio Perez as
a guerrilla suspect; that over his pistol to the accused as and upon denying of having any
pistol, said accused and his companions did hang him with a rope and while he was thus
suspended in mid air, the herein accused and his companions hit Florencio Perez on the head
hand in other parts of the body with the butts of the revolvers and with their fists; that the
accused then took Florencio Perez outside the house and threatened to shoot him on the back
of his head unless he told where his pistol was;

"3. That on or about December 2, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe. Province of Cebu, the
aforesaid accused acting as a Japanese spy for the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany three Japanese soldiers to the house of Pablo Seno;
that upon arrival at the said house, the herein accused and his companions did apprehend the
said house, the herein accused and his companions did apprehend Pablo Seno and his
daughter Anunsacion Seno for alleged guerrilla activities and connections and did ransack and
take away many objects therein; that said Pablo Seno and Anunsacion Seno after having been
tied and tortured by the accused and his companions were imprisoned at the Japanese
Kempei Tai Headquarters and since then nothing more was heard of them nor are their
whereabouts known;

"4. That on or about December 2, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu, for
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, the aforesaid
accused acting as a Japanese spy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonable lead and guide a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the
house of one Rufino Seno for being a guerrilla suspect; that said Rufino Seno was tied, beaten
and tortured and brought to and detained at the Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters at Cebu
City and since then nothing more was heard of him nor are his whereabouts known;

"5. That on or about the first day of July, 1944, in the municipality of Clarin, Province of Bohol,
Philippines, said accused, acting as Japanese spy and with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, them and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead and guided a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers for the enemy which apprehended Leonilo Mercado and Jovito C. Soria for
alleged guerrilla activities; that Leonilo Mercado was brought to the municipal jail of Clarin, and
detained up to July 12, 1944 when his wife visited him; and since then Leonilo Mercado was
not seen again nor heard from, nor are his whereabouts known;

"6. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the City of Cebu, the herein accused who was a
Japanese spy, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead and guide a
patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the house of Silvina Caballon; that
upon arrival at said house, the herein a accused and his companions did ask Silvina about the
whereabouts of her brother who was a guerrilla and to surrender the latter's revolver; that upon
receiving an unsatisfactory reply, said accused forcibly undress her, choke and beat her; that
the aforesaid accused then took her to another house where through force, violence and
intimidation he attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, but which criminal purpose the
accused did not realize on account of reasons independent of his own will;

"7. On or about the 24th day of August, 1944, in the Mandawe, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
said accused acting as Japanese spy, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
lead, guide and accompany a patrol of fifteen Filipino pro-Japanese undercovers and two
Japanese soldiers in search of guerrillas, guerrilla suspect and their supporters, and did
apprehended Patricio Suico, Leonardo Ouano and Eduardo Ouano from their homes and did
bring them to the Japanese Navy Kempei Tai Headquarters in Cebu City where they were
questioned on the whereabouts of Sulpicio Ouano, brother of Leonardo Ouano and a guerrilla
suspect, and Patricio Suico was questioned and blamed for not taking proper steps against the
guerrillas as barrio lieutenant; that the accused therein and his companions did bring the
aforesaid three persons back to Leonardo's house at Banilad where they again tied, hung
tortured on account of which Patricio became unconscious; that while said Patricio Suico was
thus unconscious, the accused and his companions did build a fire under the sled where
Patricio Suico was, on account of which said Patricio was burned and died; that while being
detained in Cebu City, Leonardo and Eduardo Ouano managed to escape and fled to the
mountains;

"8. Sometimes during the month of December, 1944, in the municipality of Lahug, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, the accused herein acting as Japanese spy with four other Filipino
undercovers for the Japanese Army, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comport to the enemy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
capture Pedro Lavares and Luis Hallares and did detain, tie and torture them at the Kempei
Tai Headquarters for alleged guerrilla activities; that said accused and his aforesaid
companions did detain likewise in said Kempei Tai Headquarters Bonifacio Suico and Aniceto
Taranza and did torture them by giving them fist blows tying them with ropes, hitting them with
bamboo poles and wooden pestles to force them to tell the real connections of Major Alejandro
Fortuna with the guerrillas that due to said punishment and torture, Bonifacio Suico died; that
after torturing Aniceto Taranza, said accused and his companions did bring him to the river
bank near by and did kill him with a saber;

"9. On or about July 28, 1944, in the Mabaling, City of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting
as Japanese spy with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid comfort to the
enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the Japanese Army and
did capture Vicente Abadiano, Nazario Abadiano, Tereso Sanchez, Fidencio Delgado and
some twenty Filipinos whose names cannot now be stated all suspected of being guerrillas
and of having allegedly taken part in the ambush of Japanese soldiers on board a truck while
passing at the boundary of Mambaling on July 25, 1944; that all the persons above-named and
twenty mountains near Ponta Princesa and after having been questioned and tortured, twelve
of them including Nazario Abadiano and Tereso Sanchez were shot by the herein accused and
his companions, all of whom died except Tereso Sanchez who is now an invalid due to
wounds he received;
"10. On or about July 21, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said
accused acting as Japanese spy with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably in
company with three Filipino undercovers like the accused and two Japanese soldiers, capture
Jose Roda for being the brother of Apolonio Roda alleged G-2 operative for the guerrilla who
could not be found, Claros Numeran for being related with Santiago Numeran a guerrilla
suspect whom accused and his companions were looking for, and Marciano Alejandrino a
guerrilla suspect, and did maltreat and torture said Jose Roda, Claros Numeran and Marciano
Alejandrino and later did bring them to a secluded spot at Mambaling and shoot them to death;
that due to the fact that the wounds of Jose Roda were not serious, he survived;

"11. On or about November 17, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as Japanese spy, for the purpose of giving and with the intent
to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably guide, lead and accompany a patrol composed of ten Filipino undercovers for the
Japanese Army and two Japanese soldiers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas,
guerrilla suspects and their relatives and the herein accused and his companions did catch
Hipolito Cabahug, Dioniso del Castillo, Victorino del Castillo and Demetrio Congson and did
whip and torture the last three persons for being allegedly messengers for the guerrillas; that
said accused and his companions finally did kill Dionisio del Castillo and Victorino del Castillo
by inflicting fatal wounds on theirs necks with swords;

"12. Sometimes in January, 1945, in Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu Province, said accused who was
a Japanese spy, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the Japanese
to Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas; that the herein accused
and his companions did catch one Hospicio Singson from his house, tie him with a rope, hang
and torture him urging him to till about reports and papers from the mountains (guerrilla
reports) and questioning him about money contributions to guerrillas; that thereafter said
Hospicio Singson was carried by accused and his companions to the local Japanese garrison
and since then he was not seen again nor heard from, nor are his whereabouts known;

"13. On or about the 5th day of January, 1945, in the municipality of Cebu Province of Cebu,
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy the
aforesaid accused acting as Japanese spy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead a group a Filipinos who were enemy undercovers to the house of Susana
Singson; that upon arrival at the said house, said accused and his companions did catch
Hospicio Singson, brother of Susana Singson and who was a guerrilla suspect; that the herein
accused and his companions tied and tortured Hospicio Singson and brought him to the
Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters in the City of Cebu and that from that date Hospicio
Singson was not seen again nor heard from, nor are his whereabouts known;

"14. That on or about January 25, 1945, in Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said
accused who was a Japanese spy, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead
and accompany five other Filipino undercovers and did arrest Anacleta Eben, that the herein
accused and his companions did take Anacleta to the Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters
where she was questioned on the whereabouts and activities of her daughter who was a
member of the Women's Auxiliary Service (Guerrilla); that during the questioning Anacleta
Eben was tied, hung, boxed, beaten and beaten and tortures, and while said accused was
questioning her, he did choke and threaten to kill her with a gun.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of all the counts and sentenced him to death ands to pay a
fine of P20,000 and costs, It said that "the prosecution substantiated the overt acts specified in counts
Nos. 2,3,4,5,6,7,9,11,12, and 13 by two competent witnesses, and the through the confession of the
defendant in open Court."

The trial was not conducted in strict accordance with law and the rules of practice and procedure,
giving rise to confusions, misunderstanding, and non-presentation of evidence on some charges. The
court below itself was led into serious errors.

After several witnesses for the prosecution had given testimony, defendants counsel informed the
court that his client, upon the latter's insistence, was willing "to enter a plea of guilty and ask whatever
consideration or mercy the court will give him." Upon being asked whether or not he ratified the
statement of his counsel, the defendant answered yes. He also answered yes to the question whether
he was aware of the consequences of a plea of guilty (t. s. n., pp. 50-51). However, when the
information was read over again, the accused said that he admitted some of the charges but not all (t.
s. n., pp. 51-52). Specifically, he said he pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, an 14 and not guilty to
counts 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 (t. s. n., pp. 54-55).

The prosecution then resumed the presentation of evidence and called witnesses to substantiate the
charges to which a plea of not guilty was entered. But after three new witnesses, had taken the stand,
and while the third of them was testifying, counsel for the accused reiterated "his petition at he
instance of the accused himself", that the latter be allowed to changed his plea of not guilty to that of
guilty to all the 14 counts. Informed of his attorney's statement, the defendant said "I am pleading
guilty. I accept my guilt" (t. s. n., pp. 71-73).

As counsel insisted on putting his client on the stand, the prosecution went ahead with its witnesses
who testified on counts 6, 9, 12 and 13. Then it rested and the accused testified on his own behalf.

According to defense counsel the purpose of the defendant's testimony was not to deny his guilt for
the crime of treason; it was, he added, to "clarify certain points which he (accused) denied when he
was informed again of the contents of the information filed against him."

After having been sworn the defendant again said that some of the charges filed against him were not
true; that in some of those cases there were other persons responsible for the commission of the
crime, 9, he said who were tortured because of their refusal to give information, be taken to Isisaki
and Muraki, after which they were marched off to Lensa by Japanese soldiers. There were about 20
prisoners, he said. Upon arriving at Lensa they were shot by Muraki and Isisaka in the presence of
Captain Suriyama. He admitted having gone with these people and seen Isisaka and Muraka shoot
the prisoners with luggers. He said about 700 civilians were herded on that particular date and that it
was among these 700 that 20 were executed.

In answer to a question of Judge Saguin if he wanted to make any statement regarding counts 3 and
4, to which he had pleaded guilty, the defendants answered in the affirmative. He said that when they
apprehended Pablo Seno and Anunciacion Seno, he and Pedro Labares stood guard under the
house while the Japanese went up. When the Japanese came down they brought the Senos. From
there they returned to the Normal School where prisoners were confined. That was, he said, all he
could say.

As to Del Castillo (count 11), he said he was not the one who killed him but two Japanese by the
names of Isituca and Pujisaki; that it was Pedro Labares and not he who reported Del Castillo to the
Japanese; that he accompanied Labares because the Japanese ordered him to do so. He said that
his sole connection with the Japanese was as a driver of Watanabi. He said that after he was
captured as a guerrilla he was told that he should drive their car or else he would be killed (t.s.n., pp.
98-102).

Regarding count 2, he said it was Japanese accompanied by some Filipinos, one of whom was
Antonio Tancingco, who arrested Florencio Perez. Reminded that he had pleaded guilty to this count,
the accused after the session, he had been struck in the head and that when he came back to court
he was still confused. Nevertheless, he said having guilt he wanted to abide by his plea fully realizing
its consequences, now that his mind was already clear. (T. s. n., pp. 102-104).

In answer to a direct question of Judge Borromeo, the accused answered in the affirmative the
question whether he admitted the facts and pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 4,7, 12, 13 and 14 (t. s. n.,
p. 104). But when these last counts were read over again and he was told to plea after each count
was read, he pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 3, and not guilty to counts 4, 7, 12, 13 and 14 (t.s.n., p.
105).

With specific reference to count 7, he said: "When we apprehended Suico and Ouano, they were
brought to the pier before Yusidati, a sergeant of the Japanese Military Police here. At night time,
Ouano, his nephew and Patricio were taken by four Japanese by the names of Muraki, Isisaki,
Pujisaki and Koydi and other members of the Japanese Military Police. We started from the pier
about 9:00 o'clock of that evening and they took a truck and proceeded to Mandawe. Upon reaching
Mandawe, right in the house of Leonardo Ouano, there they were investigated by Muraki. In the
affidavit, it says that Patricio Suico was burned and that is not true. The truth is that, during that night,
those three were brought back here to the pier, and from that time on Ouano and Suico were never
heard by me any more." He admitted that he took part in the apprehension of these persons but said
that he was ordered to do so by Watanabi (t. s. n., pp. 106-107).

With respect to count No. 12, he said that those who took part in the apprehension of Hospicio
Singson was Maximo Bati alias Pacho (t. s. n., p. 108).

With regard to count 13, he said he had nothing to say and renewed his plea of guilty to this charge (t.
s. n., pp. 108-109).

As to the counts which the defendant denied or qualified, his plea does not posses the requirement of
a plea and should have been rejected and the parties directed to introduce their evidence. A plea of
guilty must be unconditional save to explain mitigating circumstances. The defendant's responsibility
on these counts therefore have to be gauged by the prosecution's evidence and defendant's
admissions.

From the defendant's changing attitude, changing pleas and statements, only counts 2, 3, and 13
survive the test of having been confessed in open court. The prosecution's evidence and defendant's
testimony substitute counts 4, 6, 9 and 11. On count 7, only one witness testified; on the rest none
whatever.

Count 4. Maximina Basubas, 46 years old, testified that on December 2, 1944, the accused
apprehended her son Rufino Seno for being a guerrilla; that Rufino Seno was tied, beaten, tortured,
and taken to and detained at the Japanese Kempei Tai headquarters in Cebu City; that since then he
heard nothing more of him; that with the accused were other Filipinos and Japanese.

Jose Cui, 24 years old, testified that on December 2, 1944, Antonio Racaza "raided our place".
Racaza was accompanied by other persons, Japanese and Filipinos; that he (witness) was arrested
with four others, among them Apolonio Ceniza and Rufino Seno. They were taken to the U.P.
Building in the city of Cebu, near which he was punished personally by Antonio Racaza, hung by the
hands tied at his back and whipped with a golf club (witness showed the scar). He said that he was
accused of being a guerrilla; that Rufino Seno was brought with him and others in the afternoon of
December 3 to the Kempei Tai; that a Japanese took Rufino Seno out and he had not seen Rufino
since.

Count 6. Silvana Cabello, 22 years old, single, testified that in August 1944, Antonio Racaza and
others came to their house looking for somebody — her brother who was a soldier. Among the men
who came she recognized only the accused. In her house the accused and others undressed her.
She prayed to God and pleaded that she be not undressed. They succeeded in their purpose
however and her naked body was exposed. They pushed her mother when the latter was not able to
produce any arm. From that place they took her to Buakaw where they went up a house apparently in
search of something. when they did not find anything they moved to another house. In the latter
house they caught a man, took him behind a tree and there killed him. Then a soldier, Teofilo
Navarro, who had killed that person, approached her and said, "Well, how do you like to come along
with me behind the cassava trees?" She refused and then they proceeded to the provincial road with
her; she was crying. At Basac, near a big house owned by Filemon Rago, Antonio Racaza told her,
"Come along with me." Once in that place he hugged her and kissed her and told her to take off her
panties. Then she said her devotion to the Virgin Mary praying that she might be delivered from her
aggressors. Luckily, the accused did not succeed. Afterward one companion of the accused, Jose
Abascas, slammed her against a coconut tree and embraced her. Later, a truck passed by and she
was told to get on. Then Racaza approached the Japanese and later she was released.

Raymunda Sabillano, 42 years old, testified that on August 19, 1944, Antonio Racaza came to her
house at night (it was Saturday) looking for her son who was a guerrilla soldiers. He had many
companions among whom were two Japanese. They were armed but Racaza was not. As she was
not so, they undressed her daughter, Silvina Cabellon, and Antonio Racaza told witness to step out.
when she heard her daughter cry out she tried to get inside but they blocked her way. Afterward they
left her daughter dress up again and took her away. About 3 o'clock in the morning the girl returned.
Her house is in Pardo, Cebu City.

Count 9. Hilario Cabañezas, 56 years old, testified that on the 29th of July, 1944, her house was
surrounded and she and the inhabitants of the house were apprehended and taken to a place near
the Normal School in Basac. Those who arrested them were, among others, Antonio Racaza,
Carding and Loloy. These three tied them and she pleaded for mercy. From her house she could see
may people tortured in the Basac school building. There must have been around 1,000 people there.

Pastor Abadiano, 45 years old, testified that on the 29th of July, 1944 the accused and his several
companions with Japanese came up to hi house and maltreated him, trampling on his body. When he
could not endure the punishment any longer they asked him where his nephew Inocencio was.
Inocencio was a guerrilla soldier. Among those who were tortured and killed were Sario Abadiano,
Tomas Bacalla, Quirico Abellanosa and Lope Bacon. The witness was allowed to go when they found
the brother of Inocencio. Vicente Abadiano was one of those who survived the torture.

Tereso Sanchez, 25 years old, testified that he knew Antonio Racaza. On July 29, 1944, he was
arrested by Filipino spies. About 1,000 were apprehended and taken to the school building in Basac.
They were taken there to be screened building in Basac. They were taken there to be screened for
guerrillas. Among those who tortured civilians was Antonio Racaza. He saw Jose de la Cerna.
Antonio Racaza was armed with a revolver. After he was tortured he was taken to the mountain of
Lensa. With him were about 24; all of them were tied. When they arrived at the mountain, the
Japanese and their Filipino cohorts told them to sit down . The prisoners were taken by the Japanese
to another place where they were shot. The witness was shot by Filemon Delgado and was hit in the
neck, the bullet coming out his left eye. He was left for dead and that was how he lived to tell the
story. Before he was shot, Nazario Abadiano was shot by Antonio Racaza and killed immediately.

Vicente Abadiano, 19 years old, testified that he was apprehended on July 29 and brought to a place
where his bother Nazario was killed. His brother was apprehended on July 29 and brought up where
he was killed by Antonio Racaza. He actually saw Racaza shoot his brother; it was in Lensa, in the
mountain. His brother had his back on Racaza when Racaza shot him in the buttock. He saw Tereso
Sanchez as one of the victims in that massacre. He also witnessed the mass torture in the school
building before the victims were marched up to the mountains.

Jose de la Cerna, 34 years old, testified that on July 29, he was one of the people arrested in Basac
and concentrated in the school building. Those who made the arrests were Japanese and Filipino
undercovers. Among these were Antonio Racaza, Antonio Tancinco, Roberto Bautista alias Eriberto
Ocampo, Filemon Delgado, Margarito Campos and Jesus Campos. Antonio Racaza was one of those
who beat him (witness) with an iron bar, kicked him, boxed him and inserted a galvanized iron tube
into his throat through which sand was poured. He was choked and was unconscious for several
minutes. When he came to, they questioned him as to the whereabouts of his brother who was with
Governor Abellanosa. Then he was hung from two to five o'clock in the afternoon. The cause of the
massacre and mass torture in Basac was that about three or four days before July 29, the guerrillas
attacked a train loaded with naval officers on Mambaling bridge in Dulho, Cebu.

Count 11, Hipolito Cabahug, 18 years old, widow, testified that her husband was captured by Racaza
and his companions on November 16, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu. On
that date Antonio Racaza came up to her house leaving his companions below. He threatened the
people in the house with his sword, told them not to move, and asked the witness whether her
husband was a soldier. Because her answers were not satisfactory, he arrested her and her husband
and Antonio Racaza hung her husband. While her husband was hanging in mid-air they beat him with
a big bat. Then they lowered her husband and Racaza hung her instead. While she was dangling in
the air they stepped on her husband's prostrate body trying to force him to admit that he was a
guerrilla. They put o his neck a piece of lumber and stepped a man sat astride her husband's
abdomen. Afterward they hung her husband again. After he was released this time he was taken
across a creek; that was the last she saw of him. The cadaver was found by her father-in-law
Gregorio Del Castillo. Her brother-in-law, Victorino del Castillo, was taken the next morning and
brought to the same place. They also hung Victorino and beat him while hanging. He died before his
body was brought down.

Gregorio del Castillo 50 years old, testified that this sons are dead because they were arrested by
Antonio Racaza at their place It was November 16, about 9 o'clock in the evening. Hipolita Cabahug
is his daughter-in-law living with him. He was present when his sons were arrested. Hipolita was told
to come along. He found the next day the bodies of his son in a creek. One of them was naked with
several wounds and the neck was almost severed from the body. Rope was still tied around his
hands.

To sum up, we find the defendants guilty of counts 2, 3 and 13 by the defendant's plea of guilty, and
of counts 4, 6, 9, and 11 by the testimony of two or more eye-witnesses to the overt acts. These
admitted and proven charges, in the opinion of the majority of the court, lead to the same result
reached by the trial court.

The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength,
treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are, by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not be
taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is, in many
cases, as in this, a long, continued process requiring, for the successful consummation of the traitor's
purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning.

So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in
superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements, which was
Racaza's purpose in collaborating with the enemy, the use of a large force and equipment was
necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute, superior
force, and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue
its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their
foes only on even terms according to the romantic traditions of chivalry.

But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the
commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of
prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and
the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of
deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main Criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and
21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned, of which the appellant is
beyond doubt guilty, fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.

For the very reason that premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed in
treason characterized by killing, the killings themselves and other accompanying crimes should be
taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of
the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule, treason, the highest crime known to
law, would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. to avoid such
incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the
Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to which the culprit has exposed his country and his
people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of
the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the
crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is
inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the
punishment with the enormity of the offense my be summoned to the service of justice and
consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims.

The judgment appealed from is correct in this result and the same should be affirmed with costs.
However, as four justices dissent from the imposition of the death penalty, the appealed sentence is
modified and reduced toreclusion perpetua and legal accessories, a fine of P20,000 and costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the
People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.

Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1,
2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the
trial court found as follows:

"As regards count No. 1 —

Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended
and commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using
them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel
Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami
Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.

It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it
sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on
June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in
the house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor
Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the
accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that
she did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and
succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to
Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her
with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her;
that on the following night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped;
that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out
from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.

"As regards count No. 2 —

Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some
Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in
Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet
Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select those first
who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of threat, force and
intimidation, the above mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese
Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a
life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta
Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once more their
testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that the
allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.

"As regards count No. 4 —

 Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S.
Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused
and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr.
Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his
companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first
their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente
Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the
way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited
house; that she resisted with all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail;
that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas
who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his
companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out
of the house; that the accused threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she
was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused
carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia
Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered
her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on
arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I
did not call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against the
Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said Governor Hontañosas then, said:
"Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the
Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called
Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another Japanese
living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she
could, but of no avail.

In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay,
all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 5 —

Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered
Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee taken
as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain
Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the
aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel
abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of
Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the
unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a
secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence had
carnal knowledge with her against her will.

Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get her on the
pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before
Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the
accused; they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted
into a room and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her hair and
her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against her will by
Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap officer, was taken by
Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in
 raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following
day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by
the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.

Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following: That on
June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to be
witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran;
that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the office of
the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and told her that they were
turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness)
that after the Japanese had raped her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited
house; that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on the pretext that the
Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the
accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her house ultimately, they related to her
(mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they would have preferred death rather
than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had
raped her.

The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the res
gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the
information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt that
they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume and
admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The Court is fully convinced
that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the testimonies of these
two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 6 —

Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion apprehended
Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial
hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in
honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran
market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely
reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend
another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a
selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral
purposes.

Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: That on June 29,
1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a revolver and
took them on a car to the office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely reprimanded
by the latter for not attending the dance held on June and receptions was to select from among
them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for immoral purposes that she and
her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to said hospital;
that on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into
her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused, not satisfied, went up
into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling
her that it was only her pretext that she was sick.

The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda.
Said testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it is contended that
the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the
opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been,
and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on
its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the
Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).

If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company
kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and
drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the
same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and
attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.

In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the
nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts
between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon
their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance
is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement
indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.

As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to
render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to
an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to
assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money
to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country enhance
his strength and by same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason.
(See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)

Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more
than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly
and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts
herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army
or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay
and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the manner
above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.

Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
 Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense
(treason) charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused
for any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence.

All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.

Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17,
Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in requires
that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the
information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of
the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded
an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In
facts under the general law of criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that designated in
the complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or
described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the
trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)

The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are not
charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count
No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must
suffer.

We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal,
with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to
pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty
years.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote. Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty
he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and
6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and
6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4
as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.

Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail.
Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino
undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the
American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled
and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the
Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the
next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American and
the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.

These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the
American was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito
Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.

This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each
other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300;
Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)

The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General
agrees with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense
committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."

Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,

Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers
to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their
hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his
hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured
by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent back to the
Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;

2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,

Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police,
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the,
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group
of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that
the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said
Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face
and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters;
that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his brother was detained and
thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
 3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of
some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact
apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with
a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to
death;

7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other
Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil
Soco for guerrilla activities.

The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there
must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other
does not make treason.

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense
under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for
smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in
a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate
crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical
injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes
instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are
charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded separately under their general
denomination.

However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the
usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under
the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case,
augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is

true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated
while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.

In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's
failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the
attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious
reasons."

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all
the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right
to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law
has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36
Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not
sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement
of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect
the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said
Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the
record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if
Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was
enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights
of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts
1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other
particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.

J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee.

HILADO, J.:

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high
crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an
indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision,
and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan,
Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing
the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this
plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered
the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or
seventy, the residents thus assembled included men, women and children — mostly women (Exhibits
A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).

The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women — the prosecution star
witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently,
the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103,
t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing,
among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina,
Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia
(pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).

Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to
death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13,
31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative,
but he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of
guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).

Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he had
been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed to
kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew nothing of the
matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children
would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22,
t.s.n.).

The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses — Clarita
Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a
complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely
testifying against appellant — such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed,
appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the
People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's
Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the following to say:

The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple
barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or
revenge or by any desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward and
frank in their testimony and did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court.
They could not have been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they
know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro, the
painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of
January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were involved in the
whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the massacre committed by the accused and his
Japanese masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting
moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a trustworthy mental
picture of the unusual event they could not help but witness.
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and convincing
that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample
corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred
residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant
himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one made on August
28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit
A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).

In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the
Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's
Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was
therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are
of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese
Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of
Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is
absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63, providing:

. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign

country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

xxx xxx xxx

(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy,
or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted.

There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before
he was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against
the Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of
allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched
deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without
necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely
and resolutely aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the
Chinese constitution and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War
the "National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the
side of the Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission — although the
war ended before this could be done — they surely did not have to take an oath to support the
constitution or laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for
they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.

Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or
air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the
Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air
Corps.

Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said
constitution ordains:

"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis
supplied.).

This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a period of
stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off
his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the
patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under
the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly
proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him even when
his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission
in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or
Air Corps.

It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact
of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances
of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
protect him from punishment.

But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment
of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never
prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself;
nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the
obligation of the criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)

696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take
up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does
not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian
Edition by Borchard.)

As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper to
separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed
men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the
same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing
that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the employment of more than three
armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of
a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the
aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant
acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability,
because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan as a member
of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code
compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal
order. The construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the
destruction of this Republic.

The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under
pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.
Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering
military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this
is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually
acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more
cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it — were the very ones who saved
the little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses
against him on the day of reckoning.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of
treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of
"armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A
majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty,
convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of
each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due
to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the
applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be
inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity
of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's
decision, and the costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.

Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.

TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the
accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.

The information charged:

That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines
by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to
the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did
then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the
said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:

That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist
and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts
and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm
and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts
and engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine
Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija,
and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945.
Contrary to Law.

The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the
accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property.
The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two
witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had
their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili
military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a
Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and
with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan,
Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused
and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand,
later surrendered to the Americans."

Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason
imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and
seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is
only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by
them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is
corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at
least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.

We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in
the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the
organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the
obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed
blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;"
"to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the
Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by
the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one
witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)

At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except
for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed
himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though
an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and
comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals
of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced,
his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men
such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of
it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army.

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness
requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-
witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull
from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.

Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:

In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same
overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another
witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been
intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so
succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering
the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting
them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional
provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the
same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:

Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must
be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.

Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the
same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible
to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .."
(Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United
States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down
this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is
that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused
actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant
charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the
possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism,
we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy
purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more
witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the
defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of
the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are
familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other
testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the
needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully
realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections.
(Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional
Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative
change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal
Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the
celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this
Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than
modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure
of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of
innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason
rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced
in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an
enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of
prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension,
the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to
have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American
forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

76 Phil 415

BENGZON, J.:

The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter
Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth
Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a political prisoner. Such detention, he
claims, is illegal, because he has not been charged before, nor convicted by, the judge of a
competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act No. 682, as he owes allegiance
neither to the United States nor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Solicitor-General, for the respondent, admits the detention, for active collaboration with the
Japanese, doubts the allegation of citizenship, and maintains that, conceding arguendo petitioner's
alien age, he may be charged for espionage, a crime against national security wherein allegiance is
immaterial, and may, therefore, be held in custody under Commonwealth Act No. 682.
As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject. The commitment order No.
291 issued by the United States Army authorities describes him as such. But it does not follow that he
is entitled to liberty now. He is included among those contemplated by section 19 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682, which reads partly:
"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the
Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government,
the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things
as the Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting
said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as
speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, * * *. And, provided,
further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the
aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing 1 of the corresponding information with the
People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the formal
delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government."
His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the above provisions. As stated
by the Solicitor-General, he might be prosecuted for espionage, (Commonwealth Act No. 616) a
crime not conditioned by the citizenship of .the offender, and considered as an offense against
national security.
The contentions advanced during the oral argument, challenging the validity of said section 19,
Commonwealth. Act No. 682, upon constitutional grounds must be over ruled, in view of our decision
in Laurel vs. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante), copy of which will be furnished to petitioner by the
clerk of this court. The petition is denied, with costs.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also
raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment
was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to
the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in
the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
 ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation
not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical

injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and
in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions
of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of
crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order
of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice
they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by
 the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened
practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette,
Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14,
1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution
of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to
Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned
for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers
of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards"
are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United
States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only
public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to
the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering,
therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present,
which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible
nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as
to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant
Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at
such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District.
The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a
one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-
appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge
Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.

In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder said to have been committed according to the information as follows:
 That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the
above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with
firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating
together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of
violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat
wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de
Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas,
boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist
watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the
total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the
occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims
were at their mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns
at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de
Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore
and hid himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said victim,
Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)

An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam
Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.

WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of
them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of
Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme
poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so
called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id,
p. 130.)

In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public
Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979,
Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman
received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets
and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were
received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits
for themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor
returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by
Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his
companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that
caused the death of his companions.

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were
also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of
Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought
with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at
2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in
the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).

The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide
Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On
July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their
goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at
Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry
the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept
at the house of Siyoh.

On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a
place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47,
tsn).

The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by
Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh
were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the
group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was
selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with
two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After
selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared
to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at
the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de
Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from
their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their
pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved
towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other pumpboat who
were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he
saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close
to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and
his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn).
Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress.
Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody
undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked
 Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into
the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram
fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove
where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of
Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a
fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first
aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela,
Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).

On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de
Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took
from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get
back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).

Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)

As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who
should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and
Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court
which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified
assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following
claims of the appellants are not convincing:

1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on
any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at
sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.

2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be
members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily
Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to
an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the
army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes
this observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the
lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against
them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the
defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate
or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The
point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report
was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of
helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of
the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman,
acted consistently with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and
Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed
them shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram.
The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the
killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the
accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this

case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly
conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two
(2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was
chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors
to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk
Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two
armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de
Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and
undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested. These
concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the
same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The
convergence of the will of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta,
25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The
incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the
number of victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.)
The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that
the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is
affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall
be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the
deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, C.J., took no part.

Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.