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Belyca Corp.

vs Calleja

Facts:
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, filed a petition for direct certification as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered and existing
corporation, employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers.

Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others, (1) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who
authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6
withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination
and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working; and (2) that the statutory requirement for holding a
certification election has not been complied with by the union.

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his order dated August 18, 1986.

Issue:
Whether or not the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit, asking for a certification election had
been strictly complied with.

Ruling:
Yes. It is undisputed that petitioner Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro Division) employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-file
employees and workers. It is significant to note that 124 employees out of such number have expressed their written consent to the certification
election; much more than the required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111.

More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted.
In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been reached, even the employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking place after
the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition. Also, until a decision, final in character, has been issued declaring the
strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification election.

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FACTS:
In the instant case, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
the rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of petitioner BELYCA Corporation engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the planting of
agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables. Private respondents in their petition allege the following:

(1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing
legitimate labor unions;
(2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to
the filing of the petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative in the
proposed bargaining unit;
(3) that more than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or one hundred
thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written
consent and authorization to the filing of the petition; and
(4) that in response to petitioner union's two letters to the proprietor/General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986 and
May 8, 1986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer
has locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union president, vice-
president and three other active members of the local unions for which an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union against
respondent employer.

Belyca, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper the following:

(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and
casual and regular employees;
(2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition: (a) 14 were no longer working
as of June 3, 1986; (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986; (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union; (d) 5 were retrenched on June
23, 1986; (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination and destruction of property and; (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or
stopped working;
(3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement
for those who have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and
(4) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union. The petitioner contends that
the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and
cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.
ISSUE:
WON the proposed bargaining unit by Belyca is an appropriate bargaining unit.

HELD:
No. According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited
to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. Among the factors
considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103[1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity
and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees".

Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two
separate bargaining units should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and permanent employees and another
consisting of casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent employees. But
more importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is community and mutuality of interest.

It is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from those
performed by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of
pay, including the categories of their positions and employment status. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns
cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest

DISPOSITIVE:
Calleja won. Petition Dismissed.

DOCTRINE:
Factors to consider to determine an appropriate bargaining unit:
(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and working
conditions;
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees".

International Alliance of Teacher vs Quisumbing

FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents
of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management
personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws
and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of
all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates
“to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity
to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

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FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of
instruction, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home
leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-
hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.

ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed a discrimination thus a violation of Equal Protection Clause.

HELD:
Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination. The Constitution directs the State to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all.”
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall “ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.”

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of
lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. The foregoing provisions
impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
“international character” notwithstanding. In this case, employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored
in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corp. vs Sec. of Labor

Facts:
On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election
among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (SLECC) and its Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in
the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.

On 10 October 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union]
reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting
its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No.
RO400-0110-CC-004.
On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition for direct certification. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that
more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members.

On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the
exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them.
SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office
No. IV on 9 January 2002.

In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to [SLECC’S] Motion to Dismiss.

In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification on the ground of contract
bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct
certification. This was reversed by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by
SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization
at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct when
she held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC with Samahang
Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association’s (SLECCWA) petition
for direct certification.

Issue:
Can the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition?

Ruling:
No. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
It may be recalled that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union’s initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization
representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA,
limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor
organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized
establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers
Union filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary
recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and
cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for certification election.

We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election. In petitions for
certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s decision. The exception to this
rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us

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Facts:
On 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP) instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees
of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (THE CORPORATION) and its Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE
Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.

On August 2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.

Later CLUP in its local chapter under THECORPORATION reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association (herein THEUNION), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation.

On the same date, THE UNION or THE UNION filed the instant petition for certification election. It claimed that no certification election has been held
among them within the last 12months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered covering the same employees,
namely Samahang Manggawa sa SLEC [SMSLEC], it has not been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of [THE CORPORATION’s] employees.

On November 2001, THE CORPORATION or THECORPORATION filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized
SMSLEC as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced
between them. THECORPORATION argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
The CBA between SMSLEC and the corporation was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE.

In the meantime, on December 2001, the union filed its Opposition to THE CORPORATION’S Motion to Dismiss questioning the validity of the
voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [THECORPORATION] and their consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA. According to [THE UNION], the
voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [THE CORPORATION] violated the requirements for voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of another labor
organization in the same bargaining unit. It pointed out that the time of the voluntary recognition on 20 July2001, appellant’s registration which
covers the same group of employees covered by Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial, was existing and has neither been cancelled
or abandoned.

The Med-Arbiter’s Ruling


Med-Arbiter Bactin dismissed THE UNION’s petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC and the CBA between THE CORPORATION and SMSLEC bars the filing of THE UNION’s petition for direct certification. THE UNION raised the
matter to the Secretary.

The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and Employment


The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by THE CORPORATION with SMSLEC could not bar THE
UNION’s petition. THE UNION constituted a registered labor organization at the time of THE CORPORATION’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. THE
CORPORATION then filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court


The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary

Issue:
Whether THE CORPORATION’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor organization was in existence in the bargaining
unit.

Held:
The petition has no merit.

Legitimate Labor Organization

Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as "any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose
of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations.6 Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.

Bargaining Unit

The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit.

A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."

The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.

**The UNION’S initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However,
the union subsequently re-registered as THEUNION, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of THE CORPORATION. THE CORPORATION cannot
ignore the union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of THE CORPORATION’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. THECORPORATION and
SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-THECORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining
unit.

The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances The union having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for THE CORPORATION is to file a
petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of CLUP-THE CORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately commence
voluntary recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.
UP vs Ferrer-Calleja

FACTS:
• The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a petition for certification election with the BLR.
o It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 members—more than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel of four
UP campuses (Diliman, Manila, Los Baños, and Visayas).
o UP did not object to the petition.
• Another labor union, the All UP Workers’ Union (All UP) filed a motion for intervention.
o It alleged that its membership covers both academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file employees in
one union.
o It assented to the holding of the certification election provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined.
o It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should
not be deemed part of the organizational unit.
• UP’s General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unions—one for the non-academic/administrative, and one for the academic
personnel.
• BLR Director Calleja: The appropriate organizational unit should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees.
o No evidence to justify the grouping of non-academic personnel separate from academic personnel.
o The Director quoted the pertinent provisions of EO 180 and its IRRs:

Section 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise
require.

Sec. 1, Rule IV. For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational unit may refer to:

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d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

o General intent of the EO is not to “fragmentize” the employer unit, as can be gleaned from the definition of the term “accredited employees’
organization,” which refers to:

“x x x a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an
organizational unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such as x x x state colleges and universities.”

o She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching.
• At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term “rank-and-file.” It claimed that there were some teaching and non-teaching
employees whose functions were in fact managerial and policy-determining.
• It sought the exclusion of high-level employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 180:

SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly
confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government employees;

• It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:


o Those with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher;
o Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18 or higher.
• The University claims that these employees perform supervisory functions and are vested with effective recommendatory powers. As to the
professors, UP notes that these academic staff are members of the University Council, a policy-making body.
• ONAPUP did not oppose UP’s classification. All UP remained firm in its stance to unite all the rank-and-file employees under a single organizational
unit.
• BLR Director Calleja (Second Order): Declared that the professors are rank-and-file employees.
o Sec. 1, Rule I, IRRs of EO 180:

High Level Employee — is one whose functions are normally considered policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly
confidential in nature. A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as:

1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;

2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or

3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees.

o A careful perusal of the University Code shows that the policy- making powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely,
prescribing courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student admission and graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of
Regents the conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over students.
o On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition of high level employees refers to labor-related policies like hiring, firing,
discipline, labor standards and benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.
o MR filed by UP was denied.

ISSUES + RULING:
1. Are the professors, associate professors and assistant professors high-level employees? NO.

• The matter was correctly resolved by respondent Director.


• The College Academic Personnel Committee, through which the academic personnel purportedly perform their supervisory functions, is actually
tasked to:
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation of policies, rules, standards or general guidelines as formulated by the
University Academic Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with regard to recruitment, selection, performance evaluation, tenure, staff
development, and promotion of the faculty and other academic personnel of the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available funds for promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the members of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters covered by this
Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions made by the Department Chairman and/or the DAPC (Department Academic
Personnel Committee).
• On the other hand, the University Academic Personnel Board performs the following functions:
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of the CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the selection, compensation, and promotion of members of the academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on academic promotions and on other matters affecting faculty status and welfare.
• It is clear that the high-level employees are those who comprise the UAPB. These would refer to the deans, assistants for academic affairs, and the
chief of personnel. They formulate rules, polices and standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff.
• The functions of the DAPC and UAPB are merely recommendatory.
• Ultimately, the power to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees rests with the Board of Regents.
• It is also clear that ALL academic personnel cannot be considered high-level employees, because not all of them are members of the DAPC/UAPB.
They must be appointed or elected.
• Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the status of high-level employees.
o The actions of such council are always subject to the approval of the Board of Regents.
o In addition, the policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those governing the relationship
between the University and its students, and not the University as an employer and the professors as employees. It is thus evident that no
conflict of interest results in the professors being members of the University Council and being classified as rank-and-file employees.

2. Should the academic employees comprise a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the non-academic employees of UP? YES.

• Bargaining unit – a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
• Labor laws do not provide criteria for determining the proper collective bargaining unit.
• Sec. 12 of RA 875 merely required an “appropriate bargaining unit.” This was retained in the Labor Code.
• Thus, the Court turned to American jurisprudence for guidance.
o Rothenberg:
1. Will of the employees (Globe doctrine);
2. Affinity and unit of employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions;
3. Prior collective bargaining history; and
4. Employment status, such as temporary, seasonal, and probationary employees.
o 10th Annual Report of the NLRB:
1. History, extent and type of organization of employees;
2. History of their collective bargaining;
3. History, extent and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same industry;
4. The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the employees;
5. The desires of the employees;
6. The eligibility of the employees for membership in the union/s involved; and
7. The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the employer’s organization, management and operation.
o BASIC TEST: “A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working
conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.”
• Test applied: “community or mutuality of interests” test.
• In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized into two general classes:
o First—non-academic—janitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics,
plumbers; and
o Second—academic—full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, research, extension and professorial staff.
• It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common with the University clerks and other non-academic employees as regards
responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
• On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working
conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining.

DISPOSITION:
Order affirmed.

San Miguel Corp. vs Laguesma (FULL)

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays that the Resolution dated March 19, 1991 and the Order dated April 12, 1991 of public respondent
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma declaring respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Magnolia sales personnel
in northern Luzon be set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union (respondent union for brevity) filed with the Department of Labor a petition for
certification election among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.

Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union. It claimed
that its bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for each sales office.

The petition was heard on November 9, 1990 with petitioner being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla
withdrew petitioner's opposition to a certification election and agreed to consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At
the pre-election conference, the parties agreed inter alia, on the date, time and place of the consent election. Respondent union won the election
held on November 24, 1990. In an Order dated December 3, 1990, 2 Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J. Galang certified respondent union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.

Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It claimed that Atty. Batalla was only authorized to agree to the holding of certification elections subject
to the following conditions: (1) there would only be one general election; (2) in this general election, the individual sales offices shall still comprise
separate bargaining units.

In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991, public respondent, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, denied SMC's appeal and affirmed the Order of the
Med- Arbiter.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner claims that:

THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE IGNORED AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDED PETITIONER'S VALID AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS WHY THE ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH BY PETITIONER'S COUNSEL BE CORRECTED,
AND INSTEAD RULED:

A
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS "THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT FOR ALL THE REGULAR SALES OFFICES OF MAGNOLIA DAIRY
PRODUCTS, NORTH LUZON SALES AREA", COMPLETELY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED BARGAINING HISTORY OF PETITIONER SMC.

B
THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE "AGREEMENT" ENTERED INTO AT THE HEARING ON 9 NOVEMBER 1990, IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE ESTABLISHED FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE APPLICABLE LAW ON THE MATTER.

We find no merit in the petition.

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not respondent union represents an appropriate bargaining unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner is
bound by its lawyer's act of agreeing to consider the sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area as one bargaining unit.

Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned Orders, public respondent disregarded its collective bargaining history which is to have a separate
bargaining unit for each sales office. It insists that its prior collective bargaining history is the most persuasive criterion in determining the
appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.

There is no merit in the contention.

A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor
conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.

Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent
must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they perform.

In the case at bench, respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the various Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is
similarity of employment status for only the regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They have the same duties and
responsibilities and substantially similar compensation and working conditions. The commonality of interest among he sales personnel in the north
Luzon sales area cannot be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election held on November 24, 1990, the employees concerned accepted respondent
union as their exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to be one.

Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of Magnolia should constitute only one bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position
is the meager number of sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the bargaining unit sought to be represented
by respondent union in the entire north Luzon sales area consists only of approximately fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not be for the best
interest of these employees if they would further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength in number" is the very rationale underlying the
formation of a labor union.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that Atty. Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for Atty. Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi City.
Atty. Batalla was allegedly unfamiliar with the collective bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner claims it should not be bound by the
mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.

We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, the collective bargaining history of a company is not decisive of what should comprise the collective
bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that this mistake was the direct result of the negligence
of petitioner's lawyers. It will be noted that Atty. Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers, Attys. Jacinto de la Rosa, Jr. and George C.
Nograles. There is nothing in the records to show that these two (2) counsels were likewise unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the hearing,
petitioner's counsels chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such case, the lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC's labor
case should have adequately and sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters involved in the case and the specific limits of
his authority. Unfortunately, this was not done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner. As held by this Court in the case of Villa
Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz:

. . . As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for.

In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each of the sales offices in northern Luzon should be considered as a separate bargaining unit for
negotiations would be more expeditious. Petitioner obviously chooses to follow the path of least resistance. It is not, however, the convenience of
the employer that constitutes the determinative factor in forming an appropriate bargaining unit. Equally, if not more important, is the interest of
the employees. In choosing and crafting an appropriate bargaining unit, extreme care should be taken to prevent an employer from having any undue
advantage over the employees' bargaining representative. Our workers are weak enough and it is not our social policy to further debilitate their
bargaining representative.

In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to public respondents certification of respondent union as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular Magnolia sales personnel of the north Luzon sales area.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Resolution and Order of public respondent are hereby AFFIRMED in toto, there being no showing
of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.

Indophil Textile Mills Workers Unions vs Calica

Parties
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment and the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of Indophil Textile Mills, Incorporated. Respondent Teodorico P.
Calica is impleaded in his official capacity as the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor
and Employment, while private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and export of yarns of various
counts and kinds and of materials of kindred character and has its plants at Barrio Lambakin. Marilao, Bulacan.

FACTS:
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO and private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. executed a collective bargaining agreement.
Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corporation was formed and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Subsequently, Acrylic applied
for registration with the Board of Investments for incentives under the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code. The application was approved on a preferred
non-pioneer status.

Acrylic became operational and hired workers according to its own criteria and standards. The workers of Acrylic unionized and a duly certified
collective bargaining agreement was executed.

A year after the workers of Acrylic have been unionized and a CBA executed, the petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO claimed that
the plant facilities built and set up by Acrylic should be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of private respondent Indophil Textile
Mills, Inc. pursuant to Section 1(c), Article I of the CBA, to wit,.

c) This Agreement shall apply to the Company's plant facilities and installations and to any extension and expansion thereat. (Rollo, p.4)

In other words, it is the petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO's contention that Acrylic is part of the Indophil bargaining unit.
The petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO's contention was opposed by private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. which submits
that it is a juridical entity separate and distinct from Acrylic.

The existing impasse led the petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO and private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. to enter into
a submission agreement.

The parties jointly requested the public respondent Teodorico P. Calica to act as voluntary arbitrator in the resolution of the pending labor dispute
pertaining to the proper interpretation of the CBA provision.

Decision of Voluntary Arbitrator Teodorico P. Calica


Wherefore, an award is made to the effect that the proper interpretation and application of Sec. l, (c), Art. I, of the 1987 CBA do (sic) not extend to
the employees of Acrylic as an extension or expansion of Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.

The public respondent Teodorico P. Calica through the Solicitor General argues that the Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corporation is not an alter
ego or an adjunct or business conduit of private respondent because it has a separate legitimate business purpose. In addition, the Solicitor General
alleges that the primary purpose of private respondent is to engage in the business of manufacturing yarns of various counts and kinds and textiles.
On the other hand, the primary purpose of Indophil Acrylic is to manufacture, buy, sell at wholesale basis, barter, import, export and otherwise deal
in yarns of various counts and kinds. Hence, unlike private respondent, Indophil Acrylic cannot manufacture textiles while private respondent cannot
buy or import yarns.

Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO's contention


Petitioner notes that the foregoing evidence sufficiently establish that Acrylic is but an extension or expansion of private respondent, to wit:
(a) the two corporations have their physical plants, offices and facilities situated in the same compound, at Barrio Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan;
(b) many of private respondent's own machineries, such as dyeing machines, reeling, boiler, Kamitsus among others, were transferred to and
are now installed and being used in the Acrylic plant;
(c) the services of a number of units, departments or sections of private respondent are provided to Acrylic; and
(d) the employees of private respondent are the same persons manning and servicing the units of Acrylic. (see Rollo, pp. 12-13)

Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.'s contention


Private respondent insists that the existence of a bonafide business relationship between Acrylic and private respondent is not a proof of being a
single corporate entity because the services which are supposedly provided by it to Acrylic are auxiliary services or activities which are not really
essential in the actual production of Acrylic. It also pointed out that the essential services are discharged exclusively by Acrylic personnel under the
control and supervision of Acrylic managers and supervisors.

In sum, petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO insists that the public respondent Teodorico P. Calica committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in erroneously interpreting the CBA provision and in failing to disregard the corporate entity
of Acrylic.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT ARBITRATOR TEODORICO P. CALICA ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 1(c), ART I OF THE CBA BETWEEN PETITIONER
UNION AND RESPONDENT COMPANY

HELD:
No. Time and again, We stress that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators are to be given the highest respect and a certain measure of finality, but
this is not a hard and fast rule, it does not preclude judicial review thereof where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due
process, denial of substantial justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law were brought to our attention.

It should be emphasized that in rendering the subject arbitral award, the voluntary arbitrator Teodorico Calica, a professor of the U.P. Asian Labor
Education Center, now the Institute for Industrial Relations, found that the existing law and jurisprudence on the matter, supported the private
respondent's contentions. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, public respondent cited facts and the law upon which he based the award. Hence, public
respondent Teodorico P. Calica did not abuse his discretion.
Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, when valid grounds therefore exist, the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from its members or stockholders may be disregarded. In such cases, the corporation will be considered as
a mere association of persons. The members or stockholders of the corporation will be considered as the corporation, that is liability will attach
directly to the officers and stockholders. The doctrine applies when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business
conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality,
agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.

In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade
the application of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent Company. While we do not discount the possibility of the similarities of
the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic, neither are we inclined to apply the doctrine invoked by petitioner in granting the relief sought.
The fact that the businesses of private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. and Acrylic are related, that some of the employees of the private
respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. are the same persons manning and providing for auxilliary services to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical
plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound, it is our considered opinion that these facts are not sufficient to justify the piercing
of the corporate veil of Acrylic.

Hence, the Acrylic not being an extension or expansion of private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc., the rank-and-file employees working at
Acrylic should not be recognized as part of, and/or within the scope of the petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO, as the bargaining
representative of private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.

San Miguel Corp. Employees Union vs Confessor

FACTS:
On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees Union — PTGWO entered into a CBA with private respondent San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989.

This CBA provided, among others, that:

ARTICLE XIV

DURATION OF AGREEMENT

Sec. 1. This Agreement which shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective successors-in-interest, shall become effective and shall
remain in force and effect until June 30, 1992.

Sec. 2. In accordance with Article 253-A of the Labor Code as amended, the term of this Agreement insofar as the representation aspect is concerned,
shall be for five (5) years from July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. Hence, the freedom period for purposes of such representation shall be sixty (60) days
prior to June 30, 1994.

Sec. 3. Sixty (60) days prior to June 30, 1992 either party may initiate negotiations of all provisions of this Agreement, except insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned. If no agreement is reached in such negotiations, this Agreement shall nevertheless remain in force up to the time
a subsequent agreement is reached by the parties.

Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations:
Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained in force and effect.

After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms of the CBA and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations started
sometime in July, 1992 with the two parties submitting their respective proposals and counterproposals.

During the negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations:
Magnolia and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years or until June 30, 1994.

SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the
bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of the Labor Code.

Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock on September 29,
1990.

(Notice of strike…Secretary assumed jurisdiction)

Secretary’s decision: the CBA shall be effective for the period of 3 years from June 30, 1992; and that such CBA shall cover only the employees of
SMC and not of Magnolia and SMFI.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective for three years of for only two years; and
2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the employees of the Magnolia and SMFI.

HELD:
We agree with the Secretary of Labor.

Pertinent to the first issue is Art. 253-A of the Labor Code as amended which reads:

Art. 253-A. Terms of a CBA. — Any CBA that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of 5
years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term
of the CBA. All other provisions of the CBA shall be renegotiated not later than 3 years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions
of the CBA entered into within 6 months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such CBA, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity
thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the CBA, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

The “representation aspect” refers to the identity and majority status of the union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the appropriate bargaining unit concerned. “All other provisions” simply refers to the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-economic provisions,
except representation.

The law is clear and definite on the duration of the CBA insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, but is quite ambiguous with the terms of
the other provisions of the CBA. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that the Court must ascertain the legislative intent for the purpose
of giving effect to any statute.

**Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace and stability by having both management and labor work harmoniously
together without any disturbance. Thus, no outside union can enter the establishment within 5 years and challenge the status of the incumbent
union as the exclusive bargaining agent. Likewise, the terms and conditions of employment (economic and non-economic) can not be questioned by
the employers or employees during the period of effectivity of the CBA. The CBA is a contract between the parties and the parties must respect the
terms and conditions of the agreement. Notably, the framers of the law did not give a fixed term as to the effectivity of the terms and conditions of
employment. It can be gleaned from their discussions that it was left to the parties to fix the period.

The issue as to the term of the non-representation provisions of the CBA need not belaboured. The parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a
renegotiated contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with the said 5-year term, and said agreement is ratified by
majority of the members in the bargaining unit, the subject contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting parties.

Thus, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in ruling that the effectivity of the renegotiated terms of the
CBA shall be for 3 years.

II. Undeniably, the transformation of the companies was a management prerogative and business judgment which the courts can not look into unless
it is contrary to law, public policy or morals. Neither can we impute any bad faith on the part of SMC so as to justify the application of the doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil.18 Ever mindful of the employees’ interests, management has assured the concerned employees that they will be
absorbed by the new corporations without loss of tenure and retaining their present pay and benefits according to the existing CBAs. 19 They were
advised that upon the expiration of the CBAs, new agreements will be negotiated between the management of the new corporations and the
bargaining representatives of the employees concerned.

Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical personalities. Thus, they can not belong to a single
bargaining unit.

Moreover, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be
represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by
the type of work they performed. 22 Considering the spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their respective and distinctive concerns in
terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment. Interests of employees in the different companies perforce
differ. The nature of their products and scales of business may require different skills which must necessarily be commensurated by different
compensation packages. The different companies may have different volumes of work and different working conditions. For such reason, the
employees of the different companies see the need to group themselves together and organize themselves into distinctive and different groups. It
would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different companies where the employees can bargain separately according to their
needs and according to their own working conditions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


Phil. Scouts Veterans vs Torres

Facts:
On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union, PGA Brotherhood Association – Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as “the
Union ” filed a petition for Direct Certification/Certification Election among the rank and file employees of Philippine Scout Veterans Security and
Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations Agency, Inc. (GVM). and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These
three agencies were collectively referred to by private respondent Union as the “PGA Security Agency,” which is actually the first letters of the
corporate names of the agencies.

On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the management of PSVSIA, GVM, ASDA (PGA Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue, Quezon City.

On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single comment alleging therein that the said three security agencies have separate and distinct corporate
personalities while PGA Security Agency is not a business or corporate entity and does not possess any personality whatsoever; the petition was
unclear as to whether the rank-and-file employees mentioned therein refer to those of the three security agencies collectively and if so, the labor
union cannot seek a certification election in three separate bargaining units in one petition.

Issue:
WON petitioners can interfere with the certification election proceeding.

Held:
Except where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain
collectively, it has nothing to do with a certification election which is the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election has aptly been
described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a
certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself in a
certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union.

This Court’s disapprobation of management interference in certification elections is even more forceful in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, where
we held:

On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder.
His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference
with a purely internal affair of labor.

Golden Farms, Inc. vs Sec. of Labor

FACTS:
Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the production and marketing of bananas for export. On February 27, 1992, private
respondent Progressive Federation of Labor (PFL) filed a petition before the Med-Arbiter praying for the holding of a certification election among the
monthly paid office and technical rank-and-file employees of petitioner Golden Farms. Petitioner moved to dismiss claiming that PFL failed to show
that it organized a chapter within the petitioner establishment, that there was already an existing CBA between the rank and file employees
represented by NFL and petitioner, and that the employees represented by PFL are disqualified by the courts.

PFL countered that the monthly-paid office workers and technical employees should be allowed because they were expressly excluded from the
coverage of the CBA between Petitioner and NFL. Petitioner argued that the subject employees shoull have joined the existing CBA if they are not
managerial employees. On April 18,1991, the Med-Arbiter ordered the conduct of the certification elections. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of
Labor which the LabSec denies the appeal for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
WON the Monthly Paid rank and file employee can constitute a bargaining unit separate from the existing bargaining units of its daily-paid rank and
file employees

HELD:
Wherefore, Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Yes, the Monthly Paid office and technical rank and file employee of the petitioner enjoy constitutional rights to self organization and collective
bargaining. The duties of the monthly paid employees primarily administrative and clerical which is of different nature from daily paid employees
whose main work is the cultivation of bananas. To be sure, the monthly paid group have even been excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily
paid rank and file employees.

In the case of UP vs Ferrer-Calleja, the SC sanctioned the formation of 2 separate bargaining units within the establishment. Finally, the SC note that
it was Petitioner company that filed the motion to dismiss the petition for election violating the general rule that the employer has no standing to
question a certification election since this is the so that the employer has no standing to question a certification election since this is the sole concerns
of the workers (Bystander Rule)
San Miguel Corp. Supervisors vs Laguesma

FACTS:
Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the
SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different
plants as one bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping
together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in
nature.

The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of
origin for determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification
elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.

RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining
a union.

They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle
the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ”confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees
should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters
through employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties
may obtain advance information of the company’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations
matters.”

The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership.”

An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee’s necessary access to confidential labor relations
information.

(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San
Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are
not sacrificed.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.”

A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.
Mechanical Department Labor Union vs CIR

FACTS:
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there
were three unions in the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the "Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad
Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor Union;

That no certification election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical Department
Labor Union had submitted different labor demands upon the management for which reason a certification election was needed to determine the
proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers.

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical Department Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously
certified in two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of the PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated
two bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963; that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had been negotiated and
the contract remained to be signed; that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January 1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established
nor separated from the Mechanical Department unit;

That the "Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the
petition was to disturb the present smooth working labor management relations.

TRIAL COURT: reviewed the collective bargaining history of the Philippine National Railways and allowed the establishment of new and separate
bargaining unit in one company, even in one department of the same company the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to this Court
questioning the applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the will of the employees in determining what union
should represent them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the employees at the Caloocan Shops can desire the respondent union, "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be
separated from the Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a view to the former being recognized as a separate bargaining unit, applying the
Globe Doctrine

RULING:
Yes, the Globe Doctrine is applicable in this case.

Yes because even though Appellant Mechanical contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the
Caloocan shops do not require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company. This question is
primarily one of facts.

The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working
conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the others only
perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment
and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers.

In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two
(2) years; hence, such agreements cannot constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative (PLDT
Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the
status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the
appellant may later question whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.

Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the employer, during the pendency of the original petition in the Court of
Industrial Relations, should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops is a question that should be first passed upon by
the Industrial Court.

Filoil Refinery Corp. vs Filoil Supervisory

FACTS:
Respondent association is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor. It is composed exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of Petitioner Corporation. There exists another entirely distinct labor association composed of the corporation's rank-and-
file employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers Association (FEWA) with which petitioner executed a collective bargaining agreement. This collective
bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees, who in turn organized their own
labor association, respondent herein.
Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965 with the industrial court its petition for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent of all of petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees working at its refinery in Rosario, Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action and of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, under its claim that supervisors are not employees within the meaning of Republic Act 875, the Industrial Peace Act, and
that since they are part of management, they do not have the right to bargain collectively although they may organize an organization of their own.
CIR: denied the dismissal motion. It ruled that under the express provisions of section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act, "(I)ndividuals employed as
supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations
their own."

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:
WON the supervisors (and confidential employees) has right to self-organization?

RULING:
YES, they (both) do. Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom and policy of the Industrial Peace Act which expressly grants supervisors the
right to organize and bargain collectively, which are beyond the Court's power of review. Thus, the argument that "it is axiomatic in the law of self-
interest that an employer must give a "better deal" to those who act in his interest and in whom he has trust and confidence. These are the supervisors
and confidential employees” and that "In the United States there was a move to have a part of the supervisory group to be aligned with labor. But
the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act put an end to this move."

So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give supervisors the right to compel employers to bargain would in effect align labor and management
together against stockholders and bondholders (capital) and inexorably tilt the balance of power in favor of these hitherto confliction forces. This is
contrary to the nature and philosophy of free enterprise." This further serves to point up the validity and rationale of the Industrial Peace Act's
provision, since the supervisors and confidential employees, even though they may exercise the prerogatives of management as regards the rank
and file employees are indeed employees in relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the "stockholders and bondholders (capital)"
in petitioner's own words, and should therefore be entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect to their
terms and conditions of employment.

Petitioner's argument that the express provisions of section 3 of our Industrial Peace Act must give way to the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act
which exempts employers from the legal obligation to recognize and negotiate with supervisors is tenuous and groundless. The language of our own
statute is plain and unambiguous and admits of no other interpretation.

The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal questioning the confidential employees' inclusion in the supervisors bargaining unit is equally
untenable. Respondent court correctly held that since the confidential employee are very few in number and are by practice and tradition identified
with the supervisors in their role as representives of management vis-a-vis the rank and file employee such identity of interest has allowed their
inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for purposes of collective bargaining in turn as employees in relation to the company as their
employer.

No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against respondent court's allowing the inclusion of the confidential employees in the
supervisors' association for as admitted by petitioner itself, supra, the supervisors and confidential employees enjoy its trust and confidence. This
identity of interest logically calls for their inclusion in the same bargaining unit and at the same time fulfills the law's objective of insuring to them
the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, which could hardly be accomplished if the respondent association's
membership were to be broken up into five separate ineffective tiny units, as urged by petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE:
Filoil supervisors and confidential employees won

Negros Oriental Electric Corp. vs Sec. of DOLE (FULL)

Petitioner assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1999 dismissing its petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 50295 and the
order denying its Motion for Reconsideration therefrom.

The antecedents are recited by the Court of Appeals as follows:

"It appears that on December 4, 1997, some employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a local chapter of the Philippine
Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union - Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP). The private respondent-
union submitted its charter certificate and supporting documents on the same date.1âwphi1.nêt

On December 10, 1997, PACIWU-TUCP filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the NORECO 1 chapter, seeking to represent
the seventy-seven (77) rank-and-file employees of NORECO 1. PACIWU-TUCP alleged in its petition that it had created a local chapter in
NORECO 1 which had been duly reported to the DOLE Regional Office (Region VII) on December 4, 1997. It was further averred therein that
NORECO 1 is an unorganized establishment, and that there is no other labor organization presently existing at the said employer
establishment.

The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition in an order dated December 23, 1997, which stated that:

'It appears in the records of this Office that the petitioner has just applied for registration. The corresponding certificate has not
yet been issued. Accordingly, it has not yet acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization.

The instant petition, not having been filed by legitimate labor organization, the same is hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.'

PACIWU-TUCP filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order, which was treated as an appeal by the public respondent. On July 31,
1998, the public respondent rendered the assailed judgment as previously quoted. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
August 24, 1998, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated September 21, 1998."

The appellate court ruled that the Secretary of Labor properly treated PACIWU-TUCP's Motion for Reconsideration as an appeal, and held that the
said chapter is deemed to have acquired legal personality as of December 4, 1997 upon submission of the documents required under the Omnibus
Rules for the creation of a local chapter. The said court also dismissed petitioner's contention assailing the composition of the private respondent
union.

Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision was denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari which submits the following arguments in
support thereof:

"I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT THE PERIOD TO APPEAL CANNOT BE EXTENDED AND
THUS THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE MED-ARBITER, BECAUSE THE
APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN PERFECTED ON TIME;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THIS CASE CONTRARY TO THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF TOYOTA MOTOR
PHILIPPINES VS. TOYOTA MOTOER PHILIPPINES CORPORATION UNION AND THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, G.R. NO.
121084, FEBRUARY 19, 1997, BY COMPLETELY IGNORING THE TOYOTA CASE WHICH IS ON FOUR SQUARE WITH THIS CASE, WHEN THE
COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAINED THE ORDER FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS IN SPITE OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES IN
THE RANK AND FILE UNION OF THE RESPONDENT PACIWU-NACUSIP NORECO 1 CHAPTER;

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS WHEN ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE UNION ARE MEMBERS OF
THE COOPERATIVE."

The first contention was correctly resolved by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner reiterates that the Motion for Reconsideration from the Decision of
the Med-Arbiter was filed by PACIWU-NACUSIP out of time, i.e. beyond the ten (10) days allowed for filing such motion for reconsideration. The
allegation of late filing is bare, it does not even specify the material dates, nor furnish substantiation of the said allegation. The Court of Appeals
noted that the original record does not disclose the actual date of receipt by the private respondent of the order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing the
petition for certification election, and hence it "cannot conclude that the Med-Arbiter's Decision had already become final and executory pursuant
to Section 14, Rule XI Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules". Neither the present Petition or the Reply to Comment of Solicitor General for
public respondent attempts to supply the omission and we are accordingly constrained to dismiss this assigned error concerning the timeliness of
respondent's appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

In its Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals dated November 7, 1998, the allegation that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent PACIWU-NACUSIP was "filed out of time" was similarly unsubstantiated. Moreover, the issue was raised below for the first time in the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by NORECO I (Motion dated August 22, 1998), and the Secretary of labor rejected the petitioner's contention for
not having been seasonably filed; the DOLE Resolution stated categorically that:

"there being no question as to the timeliness of the filing of appellant's Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to us by the Regional
Office, the same can be treated as an appeal xxx".

We find no cogent justification to reverse the finding on the basis of the records before us.

The second argument posited by petitioner is also without merit. Petitioner invokes Article 245 of the Labor Code and the ruling in Toyota Motor
Philippines Corp. vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union which declare the ineligibility of managerial or supervisory employees to join
any labor organization consisting of rank and file employees for the reason that the concerns which involve either group "are normally disparate and
contradictory". Petitioner claims that it challenged the composition of the union at the earliest possible time after the decision of the Med-Arbiter
was set aside by the DOLE; and that the list of the names of supervisory or confidential employees was submitted with the petition for certiorari filed
in the Court of Appeals, which did not consider the same. Petitioner further argues that the failure of the Secretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals
to resolve this question constituted a denial of its right to due process.
The contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue was raised for the first time in petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Secretary of Labor dated July 13, 1998 which
set aside the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 dismissing the PACIWU-TUCP's petition for certification election. In its Resolution
dated September 21, 1998, denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Secretary of Labor categorically stated:

"On the fourth ground, in the cited case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union,
268 SCRA 573, the employer, since the beginning opposed the petition indicating the specific names of the supervisory employees and their
respective job descriptions. In the instant case, movant not only belatedly raised the issue but miserably failed to support the same. Hence,
between the belated and bare allegation of movant that "there are supervisory and confidential employees in the union" vis-à-vis the open
and repeated declaration under oath of the union members in the minutes of their organizational meeting and the ratification of their
Constitution and By-Laws that they are rank and file employees, we are inclined to give more credence to the latter. Again, in Cooperative
Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, supra, the Supreme Court held:

'the Court upholds the findings of said public respondent that no persuasive evidence has been presented to show that two of
the signatories in the petition for certification election are managerial employees who under the law are disqualified from
pursuing union activities.'

In the instant case, there is no persuasive evidence to show that there are indeed supervisory and confidential employees in appellant
union who under the law are disqualified to join the same."

The above finding was correctly upheld by the Court of Appeals, and we find no cogent basis to reverse the same. Factual issues are not a proper
subject for certiorari which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals cannot be expected to go over the list of alleged supervisory employees attached to the petition before it and to pass
judgment in the first instance on the nature of the functions of each employee on the basis of the job description pertaining to him. As appropriately
observed by the said court, the determination of such factual issues is vested in the appropriate Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment and pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from resolving such controversies. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence.

The petitioner questions the remedy suggested by the Court of Appeals i.e., to file a petition for cancellation of registration before the appropriate
Regional Office arguing that the membership of supervisory employees in the rank-and-file is not one of the grounds for cancellation of registration
under the Omnibus Rules. Whether the inclusion of the prohibited mix of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in the roster of officers and
members of the union can be cured by cancellation of registration under Article 238 et seq. of the Labor Code vis-à-vis Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules,
or by simple inclusion-exclusion proceedings in the pre-election conference, the fact remains that the determination of whether there are indeed
supervisory employees in the roster of members of the rank-and-file union has never been raised nor resolved by the appropriate fact finding body,
and the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals cannot cure the procedural lapse. It bears notice that unlike in Toyota Motor Philippines
Corp. vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor Union where the objection that "the union was composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees in violation of law" was promptly raised in the position paper to oppose the petition for certification election, and this objection was
resolved by the Med-Arbiter, this issue was belatedly raised in the case at bar and was sought to be ventilated only before the Court of Appeals in
the petition for certiorari. Time and again, this Court has ruled that factual matters are not proper subjects for certiorari.

The above observations are in point with respect to the last assigned error challenging the inclusion of members of the cooperative in the union. The
argument that NORECO I is a cooperative and most if not all of the members of the petitioning union are members of the cooperative was raised
only in the Motion for Reconsideration from the Decision of the Secretary of Labor dated July 31, 1998. The Secretary of Labor ruled that the argument
should be rejected as it was not seasonably filed. Nevertheless the DOLE resolved the question in this wise:

"On the third ground, while movant correctly cited Cooperative Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 165 SCRA 725, that "an employee
of a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining…" it failed to mention the proviso
provided by the Supreme Court in the same decision:

'However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such
employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are
enshrined in the constitution and existing laws of the country.

The questioned ruling therefore of public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja must be upheld in so far as it refers to the employees
of petitioner who are not members or co-owners of petitioner.'

Not only did movant fail to show any proof that anyone of the union members are members or co-owners of the cooperative. It also
declared that not all members of the petitioning union are members of the cooperative".

The ruling was upheld by the appellate court thus:


"The petitioner is indeed correct in stating that employees of a cooperative who are members-consumers or members-owners, are not
qualified to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining, because of the principle that an owner cannot
bargain with himself. However, the petitioner failed to mention that the Supreme Court has also declared that in so far as it involves
cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of
all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the
country.

The public respondent found that petitioner failed to show any proof that any member of the private respondent was also a member or
co-owner of the petitioner-cooperative. Hence the members of the private respondent could validly form a labor organization."

In the instant petition, NORECO 1 fails to controvert the statement of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner "failed to show any proof that any
member of the private respondent was also a member or co-owner of the petitioner cooperative." More important, the factual issue is not for the
Court of Appeals to resolve in a petition for certiorari. Finally, the instant petition ambiguously states that "NORECO1 is an electric cooperative and
all the employees of the subject union are members of the cooperative", but submitted "a certified list of employees who are members-co-owners
of the petitioner electric cooperative." Impliedly, there are rank-and-file employees of the petitioner who are not themselves members-co-owners,
or who are the ones qualified to form or join a labor organization. Again, the core issue raises a question of fact that the appellate court correctly
declined to resolve in the first instance.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

General Rubber and Footwear Corp. vs BLR

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing rubber sandals and oilier rubber products. In 1985, the Samahang Manggagawa
sa General Rubber Corporation — ANGLO was formed by the daily paid - rank and file employees as their union for collective bargaining, after the
expiration on October 15, 1985 of the collective bargaining agreement previously executed by petitioner with General Rubber Workers Union.

On July 17, 1985, the monthly — paid employees of the petitioner-corporation, after forming their own collective bargaining unit, the National
Association of Trade Unions of Monthly Paid Employees-NATU, filed a petition for direct certification with the Bureau of Labor Relations which
petition was opposed by herein petitioner.

the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election after finding that a certification election is in order in this case and observing
that it is the fairest remedy to determine whether employees of petitioner desire to have a union or not. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations
denied both the appeal and motion for reconsideration interposed by petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the Med-Arbiter. Hence, the present
petition, imputing serious errors of law and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor Relations in issuing the assailed order which
sanctioned the creation of two (2) bargaining units within petitioner-corporation.

ISSUE:
WON BLR is correct in upholding two bargaining units in Petitioner Corporation

RULING:
Yes. Although it is unusual to deal with 2 bargaining units, there is no one to blame except petitioner itself for creating the situation it is in. From the
beginning of the existence in 1963 of a bargaining limit for the employees up to the present, petitioner had sought to indiscriminately suppress the
members of the private respondent’s right to self-organization provided for by law. Petitioner, in justification of its action, maintained that the
exclusion of the members of the private respondent from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from forming their own union was agreed upon
by petitioner corporation with the previous bargaining representatives namely: the General "Rubber Workers Union PTGWO the General Workers
Union — NAFLU and the General Rubber Workers Union (independent). Such posture has no leg to stand on. It has not been shown that private
respondent was privy to this agreement. And even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions particularly private respondent-
union because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization guaranteed by the labor laws.

However, to prevent any difficulty. and to avoid confusion to all concerned and, more importantly, to fulfill the policy of the New Labor Code as well
as to be consistent with Our ruling in the Bulletin case, the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-
paid-rank-and-file employees of petitioner so that they can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own rank-and-file union, without prejudice
to the certification election that has been ordered.

xxx

Facts:
On 15 Oct 1982, General Rubber executed a CBA with General Rubber Workers Union (Independent). Three years later [17 Jul 1985], the monthly-
paid employees formed their own collective bargaining unit [NATU] and filed a petition for direct certification with the BLR. General Rubber opposed
this. On 02 Sep 1985, the Med-Arbiter issued an order for the holding of a certification election. A month later, the CBA expired. The daily-paid rank
and file employees formed the Samahang Manggagawa sa General Rubber Corporation-ANGLO as their union for collective bargaining. BLR issued
an order that sanctioned the creation of 2 bargaining units in General Rubber.
Main arguments of General Rubber
1. There is already an existing bargaining unit, whose members are represented by the ANGLO for collective bargaining purposes, so why did
BLR order the creation of a new bargaining unit?
2. Managerial employees or those employees exercising managerial functions CANNOT legally form and join a labor organization and be
members of the new bargaining unit.
3. Supervisors, employees performing managerial, confidential and technical functions and office personnel, who are negotiated by General
Rubber to be excluded from the existing bargaining unit because they are performing vital functions to management, CANNOT form and
join a labor organization and be members of the new bargaining unit.

Other arguments by General Rubber


1. A policy is in favor of a larger unit and not the creation of smaller units in one establishment.
2. The monthly-paid-employees are excluded from the first existing bargaining unit of the daily-paid rank and file employees because in 1963,
when the employees initially started to exercise their right to self-organization, General Rubber bargained for the exclusion of the monthly-
paid employees from the existing bargaining unit because they are performing vital functions of management.
a. In view of this exclusion, General Rubber took upon itself to take care of them and directly gave them the benefits or privileges without
having to bargain for them or without the aid of the bargaining arm or force of a union.

ISSUES & HOLDING


1. WON the NATU members / monthly-paid employees are rank-and-file employees. YES
2. WON the monthly-paid employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid employees. YES

The fact that the employees perform supervisory functions (making recommendation petitions as to what managerial actions to take in disciplinary
cases) does not make them managerial employees already. It has not been clearly established how effective those recommendations are.
The proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless there are compelling reasons which would deny a certain
class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. This case does not fall squarely within the exception. The
monthlies who are rank-and-file have been historically excluded from the bargaining unit composed of daily-paid rank-and-filers. The expired CBA
provides:

Section 1. Appropriate bargaining unit. — This Agreement covers all regular employees and workers employed by the company at its factory in
Malabon, Metro Manila. The words "employee," "laborer" and "workers" when used in this Agreement shall be deemed to refer to those employees
within the bargaining unit. Employees who occupy managerial, confidential or technical positions, supervisors, contract employees, monthly-paid
employees, security as wen as office personnel are excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.

The NATU members are not managerial employees but merely considered as rank-and-file employees who have every right to self-organization or
to be heard through a duly certified collective bargaining union. Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial
employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file labor organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such
organizations.

Perhaps it is unusual for General Rubber to have to deal with two collective bargaining unions but there is no one to blame except General Rubber
itself for creating the situation it is in. From the beginning of the existence of a bargaining limit, General sought to suppress the NATU members’ right
to self-organization. General Rubber maintained that the exclusion of the NATU members from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from
forming their own union was agreed upon by General Rubber with the previous bargaining representatives. It has not been shown that NATU was
privy to this agreement. Even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions because it is a curtailment of the right to self-
organization. The monthly-paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file employees so that they
can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own rank-and-file union, without prejudice to the certification election that has been ordered.

De La Salle vs De La Salle Employees

Facts:
On 1986, Dela Salle University (UNIVERSITY) and Dela Salle University Employees Association — National Federation of Teachers and Employees
Union (UNION), which is composed of regular non-academic rank and file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement. During the
freedom period, or 60 days before the expiration of the said collective bargaining agreement, the Union initiated negotiations with the University for
a new collective bargaining agreement which, however, turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, National Capital Region.

Among the issues that remained unresolved after conciliation-mediation meetings was the scope of the bargaining unit

Labor Arbiter:
The employees of the College of St. Benilde, the College of St. Benilde has a personality separate and distinct from the University and thus, the
employees therein are outside the bargaining unit of the University's rank-and-file employees.

The University filed with the Second Division of this Court, a petition assailing the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Subsequently, on May 24,
1993, the Union also filed a petition for certiorari with the First Division. The First and Second Divisions separately resolved to require the respondents
in each petition, including the Solicitor General on behalf of the voluntary arbitrator, to file their respective Comments. 30 Upon motion by the
Solicitor General both petitions were consolidated and transferred to the Second Division.

Buenaventura C. Magsalin, the Solicitor General agreed with the voluntary arbitrator's assailed decision on all points except that involving the
employees of the College of St. Benilde. According to the Solicitor General, the employees of the College of St. Benilde should have been included in
the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of the University. The Solicitor General came to this conclusion after finding ". . . sufficient evidence
to justify the Union's proposal to consider the University and the CSB [College of St. Benilde] as only one entity because the latter is but a mere
integral part of the University,"

Issue:
Whether CSB employees may be included in the new CBA since they were not previously included in the CBA between the University and the Union

Held:
The University's arguments on the first issue fail to impress us. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the express exclusion of the computer
operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank- and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any
re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties may not only renew the
existing collective bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or amendments thereto. With regard to the alleged
confidential nature of the said employees' functions, after a careful consideration of the pleadings filed before this Court, we rule that the said
computer operators and discipline officers are not confidential employees. As carefully examined by the Solicitor General, the service record of a
computer operator reveals that his duties are basically clerical and non- confidential in nature. 52 As to the discipline officers, we agree with the
voluntary arbitrator that based on the nature of their duties, they are not confidential employees and should therefore be included in the bargaining
unit of rank-and-file employees.

The Court also affirms the findings of the voluntary arbitrator that the employees of the College of St. Benilde should be excluded from the bargaining
unit of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University, because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality
and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.