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LABOR 2 - PART 5

Allied Free Workers Union vs Compania Maritima

FACTS
This is a consolidation of 3 cases involving both parties

Respondent Compania Maritima (MARITIMA), a local corp. engaged in shipping entered into a contract for lease of services with petitioner Allied
Free Workers’ Union (AFWU), a duly registered legitimate labor union. In the contract, it was stipulated that AFWU will do and perform all the work
of stevedoring and arrastre services of all vessels or boats of MARITIMA in Iligan City; that the contract is good and valid for 1 month starting Aug.12,
1952, but may be renewed by agreement of the parties with the reservation that MARITIMA has the right to revoke said contract even before the
expiration of the term, if and when AFWU fails to render good service.

Towards the end of 1953, MARITIMA complained to AFWU of unsatisfactory and inefficient service. To remedy the situation, MARITIMA was forced
to hire extra laborers from among “stand-by” workers not affiliated to any union.

On July 1954, AFWU sent a written proposal to MARITIMA for a CBA, but the latter did not reply. Thereafter, AFWU instituted an action in the CIR
praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit composed of all the laborers doing arrastre and stevedoring work for MARITIMA,
to which action MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of EREE relationship. On Aug.1954, MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the contract
because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter which had adversely affected its business. The termination was to take effect as of Sept.1,
1954. MARITIMA then contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring Union for the arrastre and stevedoring work. The latter agreed to perform the work
subject to the same terms and conditions of the contract with AFWU. The new agreement was to be carried out on Sept.1, 1954.

On Aug.26, 1954, AFWU charged MARITIMA of unfair labor practices (ULPs) before the CIR. MARITIMA answered, again denying the ER-EE relationship
between the parties. On Sept.9, 1954, MARITIMA filed an action to rescind the contract, enjoin AFWU members from doing arrastre and stevedoring
work in connection with its vessels, and for recovery of damages against AFWU and its officers. The CFI ordered the rescission of the contract and
permanently enjoined AFWU members from performing work in connection with MARITIMA’s vessels.

AFWU was later able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the maintenance of the status quo prior to Jan.6, 1961. Thus, after Jan.18,
1961, AFWU laborers were again back doing the same work as before.

On Nov.4, 1963, after almost 10 years, the CFI finally rendered its decision: In pursuance of the provisions of Sec.12 of R.A. 875 and the Rules of this
court on certification election, the Honorable Secretary of Labor or any of his authorized representative is hereby requested to conduct certification
election among all the workers and/or stevedores working in the wharf of Iligan City who are performing stevedoring and arrastre service aboard
Compania Maritima vessels docking at Iligan City port in order to determine their representative for collective bargaining with the employer, whether
these desire to be represented by the petitioner Allied Free Workers Union or neither; and upon termination of the said election, the result thereof
shall forthwith be submitted to this court for further consideration. From this ruling, both parties appealed, AFWU claiming that it should be declared
outright as the majority union while MARITIMA contends that said court could not even have correctly ordered a certification election considering
that there was an absence of ER-EE relationship between it and said laborers.

ISSUE
WON the order of a certification election by the CIR was proper. (WON there was an ER-EE relationship between AFWU and MARITIMA)

HELD
NO. Before a certification election can be held, there must exist an ER-EE relationship between the ER and the petitioner union. Ratio The duty to
bargain collectively exists only between the “employer” and its “employees.” Where there is no duty to bargain collectively, it is not proper to hold
certification elections in connection therewith. Reasoning In its findings, the CIR observed that after the rescission, the AFWU laborers continued
working in accordance with the “cabo system,” which was the prevailing custom in the place. Under this system, the union was an independent
contractor. The CIR also made a finding that prior to the contract between MARITIMA and AFWU, the former had an oral arrastre and stevedoring
agreement with another union, the Iligan Laborers Union (ILU), which agreement was also based on the “cabo” system. After unsatisfactory service,
MARITIMA cancelled this oral contract and entered into a new contract with AFWU, the terms and conditions of which were similar to the oral
contract with ILU. The written contract between AFWU and MARITIMA was signed under the assurance by AFWU that the same arrangement
previously had with the former union regarding performance and execution of arrastre and stevedoring contract be followed in accordance with the
custom of such kind of work in Iligan. Thus, petitioner union operated as a labor contractor under the so-called “cabo” system.

From these findings, Insofar as the working agreement was concerned, there was no real difference between the contract and the prior oral
agreement. Both were based on the “cabo” system. Hence, since the parties observed the “cabo” system after the rescission of the contract, and
since the characteristics of said system show that the contracting union was an independent contractor, it is reasonable to assume that AFWU
continued being an independent contractor of MARITIMA. And, being an independent contractor, it could not qualify as an “employee”. With more
reason would this be true with respect to the laborers. Moreover, there is no evidence at all regarding the characteristics of the working arrangement
between AFWU and MARITIMA after the termination of the CONTRACT. All we have to go on is the court a quo’s finding that the “cabo” system was
observed-a system that negatives employment relationship.
Since the only function of a certification election is to determine, with judicial sanction, which union shall be the official representative or spokesman
of the “employees” will be, there being no ER-EE relationship between the parties disputants, it follows that there is neither a duty to bargain
collectively. Thus, the order for certification election in question cannot be sustained.

Disposition
Appealed decision of the CIR is AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the charge of ULP, but REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered the holding of
a certification election. The petition for certification election should be DISMISSED.

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants, Allied Industries Manila Pavilion Chapter vs Sec. of Labor

FACTS:
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the
Hotel) with the following results:

EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS’ LIST = 353


TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
HIMPHLU = 169
NO UNION = 1
SPOILED = 3
SEGREGATED = 22

In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila
Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter to decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied. 11
votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court
of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the
election. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a
probationary employee, was counted.

Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, especially those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those
cast by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.

Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary
employees should have been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. And petitioner averred that respondent
HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would
push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the
majority which would then become 169.

Secretary affirmed the decision of the med-arbiter. In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent
was proper.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote
(2) Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.

HELD:
I. On the first issue, the Court rules in the affirmative.

The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a
certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja holds:

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote.
This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the “labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining.”
Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in
the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining
representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election.
The law refers to “all” the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the “bargaining unit.”
(Emphasis supplied)

For purposes of this section (Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003), any employee, whether employed for a definite period
or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite employers
may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-
organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.

A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.

II. As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in the negative.

It is well-settled that under the so-called “double majority rule,” for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must
have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.

Presiding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees
should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union
obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in
the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.

HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE
and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so
they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.

It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required
majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material.

To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority
representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who
between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they
want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held
to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees.

PETITION GRANTED.

NOTES:
A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the 2 highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with 3
or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the 3 or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast;
provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least 50% of the number of votes cast.

Warren Manufacturing Workers Union vs BLR

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for a preliminary injunction and/or the issuance of a restraining order seeking to set aside: (1)
Order of the Med-Arbiter dated August 18,1986 and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor dismissing
the appeals of Warren Manufacturing Corporation and herein petitioner.

This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry between the petitioner and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and
Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985.

Facts:
This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry between the petitioner and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and
Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985.

On June 13, 1985, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election, alleging compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

On July 7, 1985, respondent thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that there exist a C.BA between the respondent and
the Warren Mfg. Union which took effect upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to expire on July 31, 1986.

While the petition was under hearing, PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work Agreement was signed on July
25, 1985, stipulating, among others, as follows:

To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg- Corp. parties have agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file
on August 25, 1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by MOLE. …
It is cleanly understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its
expiry date on July 31, 1986.

On 12 August 1985, an Order was issued by this Office, directing that a consent election be held among the rank and file workers of the company.

On August 25, 1985, said consent election was held, and yielded the following results:

PACIWU—————————-94

WMWU—————————-193

Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU filed an Election Protest.

In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike was again filed by the union this time with the Valenzuela branch office of this Ministry, and after conciliation,
the parties finally agreed.On the basis of a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election Protest filed by the PACIWU was ordered
dismissed.

On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification election followed by the filing of a petition for the same purposes by the Samahan ng
Manggagawa sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were
both opposed by Warren Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the one-year no
certification election law and the existence of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent, therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification
election be dismissed.

As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, ordered on August 8, ‘t 986 the holding of a
certification election within twenty 20) days from receipt to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of
the Warren se Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned choices.

Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which
dismissed the same for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing Workers Union, with the company itself opting not to appeal.

The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of November 3, 1986 without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to
comment and issued the temporary, restraining order prayed for .

Issues:
A. The holding of a certification election at the bargaining unit is patently premature and illegal.
B. The petition filed by private respondents do not have the statutory 30% support requirement.
C. Petitioner was denied administrative due process when excluded from med-arbitration proceedings.

Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.

A.
Petitioner’s contention is anchored on the following grounds:

Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code provides, among others:

… however no certification election may be held within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the declaration of a final certification
result.

and

Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides:

No certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any CBA existing between the employer and a legitimate labor
organization.

Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no certification election rule and the principle of the Contract Bar Rule.

This contention is untenable.


The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August 25, 1985 at the Company’s premises and which became the root of this
controversy, was a consent election and not a certification election (Emphasis supplied). As correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent
election is an agreed one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective
bargaining unit while a certification election is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a separate and distinct process and has nothing
to do with the import and effect of a certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof
to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to choose their sole and exclusive
bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom period. In fact the Med-Arbiter in the Return to Work Agreement signed
by the parties emphasized the following:

To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg. Corp., parties have agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file
on August 25, 1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by the Ministry of Labor and Employment …..

It is clearly understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its
expiry date on July 31, 1986. (Rollo, pp. 46, 48-49).

It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of determining which labor union should be the
bargaining representative in the negotiation for a collective contract, there being an existing CBA yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to determine
which labor union shag administer the said existing contract.

Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor Code apply:

ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a CBA.—When there is a CBA, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
neither party shall terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties
to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.

Corollary to the above, Article 257 of the New Labor Code expressly states that No certification election issue shall be entertained if a collective
agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of this Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization
except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified CBA.” (Rollo, pp. 83-84)

Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied Workers Association v. the Director of the Bureau of labor Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781)
“there should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election at the proper time. that is, within 60 days prior to
the expiration of the three year period …

Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not adversely affect the petition for
certification election filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly provides:

Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.—There representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective agreement
submitted before or during the last sixty days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.

As aforestated, the existing CBA was due to expire on July 31, 1 986. The Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number of employees signified their
consent to the filing of the petition and 107 employees authorized intervenor to file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he found that the
petition and intervention were supported by more than 30% of the members of the bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of the
Labor Code makes it mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v.
Noriel, et al., 134 SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]),
this Court was even more specific when it stated “No administrative agency can ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The language used
is one of command. Once it has been verified that the petition for certification election has the support of at least 30% of the employees in the
bargaining unit, it must be granted, the specific word used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under the circumstances, “mandatory”…”

The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter that the petition and intervention filed in the case at bar were supported by 30% of the members
of the workers is clear and definite.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.

Algire vs De Mesa

FACTS
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU) filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for the holding of an election of union
officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). This was done through De Mesa.

DOLE’s med-arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing that such an election be held.
In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the 3 Section 3, Rule V, Implementing Rules and Regulations, election by secret ballot be conducted
on November 16, 1990 between Catalino Algire, et al. (petitioner) and Regalado de Mesa, et al. (respondents) under the supervision of DOLE through
its duly appointed representation officer.

In filling out the ballots, instructions were given to mark choices with either a check mark or an ‘X’ mark. There should also be no other markings on
the ballot.

De Mesa and Algire both got 133 votes each. Total votes cast were 272. 6 were declared as spoiled ballots.

Algire filed a petition, alleging that one of the ballots which had two check marks was erroneously declared to be a spoiled ballot. The checks
supposedly made it clear as to the choice made by the voter.

The med-arbiter (De la Cruz) issued an order in Algire’s favor and certified the latter’s group to be the unions validly elected officers.

De Mesa appealed to the DOLE secretary which was granted. Another order for a new election of officers was made by the Med-Arbiter and another
pre-election conference was scheduled.

Algire’s group filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit.

Algire, et. al. contend that a representation officer (referring to a person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in
accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from
the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence.

ISSUE
WON the act of the DOLE secretary in denying Algire’s motion was in excess of its authority since the case is an intra-union activity

HELD
NO. Ratio The certification election was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers
in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification
election.

Reasoning
What is at question in this case was a consent election, not a certification election.

If indeed petitioner’s group had any opposition to the representation officer’s ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so
seasonably during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot’s validity shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity
arising from said election.

Disposition
Petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Premex vs Sec. of Labor

FACTS:
On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of respondentPermex Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereafter
referred to as Permex Producer). The results ofthe elections were as follows:

National Federation of Labor (NFL) – 235, No Union – 466, Spoiled Ballots – 18, Marked Ballots – 9, Challenged Ballots – 7

However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment onMarch 11, 1991.

The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-
Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union(SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of employees at the Permex Producer.

On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it.

The CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991,
it was certified by the DOLE On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter
in an order on August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the
Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification election to be
conducted among the rank and file employees at the Permex Producer

ISSUE:
WON the order of the Public Respondent of the conduct of certification election valid.

HELD:
Yes, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.

Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working
force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company. But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally
important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself

The Contract Bar Rule is not applicable in this case. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the
management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the
stipulated original period. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees
had not been established yet.

DISPOSITIVE:
Decision and order by Sec. of Labor affirmed.

DOCTRINE:
The purpose of the Contract Bar rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent
modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

Oriental Tin Can Labor Union vs Sec. of Labor

FACTS
Company entered into CBA with OTCLU (Oriental Tin Can Labor Union). -248 rank and file workers FFW to file a petition for certification election.
However, this petition was repudiated by waiver of 115 signatories who ratified the new CBA.

OTCWU-FFW filed petition for certification election, accompanied by “authentic signatures” of 25% of employees.

OTCLU filed motion for dismissal of the petition for certification election. It said the petition was not endorsed by at least 25% as some of the
employees allegedly withdrew their support.

Company filed comment alleging that the new CBA was already ratified.

OTCWU-FFW filed a reply, alleging that the employer has no legal personality to oppose petition for certification election.

-DOLE issued certificate of registration of the CBA. It showed that the CBA between the OTCLU and the company has the force and effect of law.

OTCWU-FFW officers walked out of their jobs. The union filed notice of strike with NCMB, grounded on alleged dismissal of union members/officers.
Company directed the officers to return to work. None of them did.

Med-arbiter dismissed petition for certification election.

OTCWU-FFW appealed to Sec of Labor. Pending appeal, they staged a strike. They prevented free ingress and egress of non-striking employees, and
vehicles. NLRC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Labor Usec. issued resolution granting the appeal and setting aside the order of Med-arbiter.

After denial of their MFR, the company and OTCLU filed petitions for certiorari before SC.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the employer can challenge petitions for certification election
2. WON the DOLE correctly granted the petition for certification election
3. WON it is proper to dismiss a petition for certification election because a new CBA has already been ratified.
4. WON the 25% support requirement has been met in this case

HELD
1. NO. Certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge the same.

The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation activities is when it has to file the petition for certification
election because there is no existing CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of Labor Code. After filing
the petition, the role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Company’s interference in the certification election below by actively
opposing the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish a company union.
2. YES. Since question of right of representation as between competing labor organizations in a bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, law
governs the choice of a collective bargaining representative which shall be the duly certified agent of the employees concerned. An official
certification becomes necessary where the bargaining agent fails to present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority authorization and where
the employer demands it, or when the employer honestly doubts the majority representation of several contending bargaining groups. IArticle 255
of the Labor Code allows the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit to designate or select the labor organization
which shall be their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.

The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going through the process set out by law for the conduct of a
certification election applies only when representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously chosen by a majority of the
employees as their bargaining representative, but a question of representation arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit
aspiring to be the employees’ representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the supervision of the proper government
authority.

3. NO. Petition for certification election was filed 28 days before expiration of existing CBA, well within 60-day period provided for.

Filing of petition for certification election during 60-day freedom period gives rise to a representation case that must be resolved even though a new
CBA has been entered into within that period. This is clearly provided for in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is obvious. A petition for certification election is not necessary where the employees are
one in their choice of a representative in the bargaining process. Moreover, said provision manifests the intent of the legislative authority to allow,
if not encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to hold a certification election during the freedom period.

4. YES. The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in determining the true will of the workers instead of frustrating
the same.

All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the holding of a certification election should, therefore, be resolved by going through
such procedure. It is judicially settled that a certification election is the most effective and expeditious means of determining which labor organization
can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Colgate Palmolive Phils. Vs Ople

FACTS
The respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal
to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union
members from joining the union.

After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code.

Respondent Minister rendered a decision finding no merit in the Union’s Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioner as
regards the alleged refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage
unionism and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in
petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first offenders.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by respondent

ISSUE
WON respondent Minister exceeded his power when he certified respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company’s salesmen
since the case is not a representation proceeding as described under the Labor Code and the Union did not pray for certification but merely for a
finding of unfair labor practice imputed to petitioner-company.

HELD
YES. The procedure for a representation case is outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the Labor Code, in relation to the provisions on cancellation of a Union
registration under Arts. 239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in ascertaining majority representation.

The requirements under the law, specifically Secs. 2, 5, and 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code are all calculated to ensure
that the certified bargaining representative is the true choice of the employees against all contenders. The Constitutional mandate that the State
shall “assure the rights of the workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work,” should
be achieved under a system of law such as the aforementioned provisions of the pertinent statutes.

When an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its
meaning as the law itself is disregarded.

When respondent Minister directly certified the Union, he in fact disregarded this procedure and its legal requirements. There was therefore failure
to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation.
Contrary to the respondent Minister’s observation, the holding of a certification election at the proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as
there was a compelling legal reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the object of litigation in a pending
cancellation case filed by certain “concerned salesmen,” who also claim majority status.

Even in a case where a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct
certification.

More so, when the records of the suit show that the required proof was not presented in an appropriate proceeding and that the basis of the direct
certification was the Union’s mere allegation in its position paper that it has 87 out of 117 regular salesmen.

Respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving assertion of the respondent Union that it enjoyed the support of the majority of the salesmen,
without subjecting such assertion to the test of competing claims. As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved
in rendering the assailed orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the law for representation cases.

Disposition
Order REVERSED and SET ASIDE

George and Peter Lines vs Associated Labor Union

FACTS
George and Peter Lines, Inc. (petitioner) is involved in shipping, while Associated Labor Unions (ALU, respondent) is a legitimate labor organization.

July 16, 1878: a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by ALU praying that it be certified as the SOLE and EXCLUSIVE bargaining representative of
all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation, there being no labor union.

Petitioner opposed the petition stating that the Union does not represent the majority of the employees concerned, and that more than 80% of the
licensed/ unlicensed crew of its vessels claim they are not members of any union.

August 25, 1978: Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
alleging that 80% of the employees denied their membership. Corporation moved that a certification election should be called.

Bureau of Labor Relations Director, upon examination of the documents, opined that there existed a doubt regarding the majority of status of
respondent ALU because of the withdrawal of the members, and directed a certification election.

Upon a motion for reconsideration by ALU, the BLR Director reconsidered its Resolution and directly certified ALU as sole bargaining agent.

ISSUE
1. WON employees of the corporation are entitled to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative with petitioner thru a certification
election;
2. WON petitioner is entitled to file petition for certification election.

HELD
1. YES. Ratio Employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization which it desires to join. The exercise of such right would be
rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a certification election.

Reasoning
The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.

The best forum to determine if there was indeed undue pressure exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification
election itself (in secret ballot where they can freely express their choice).

The fact that there are no competing Unions should not affect the freedom of choice (they can always choose ALU or ‘No Union’).

DISPOSITION
The Regional Office concerned of MoLE is directed to cause the holding of a certification election.

Progressive Development Corp. vs DOLE

FACTS:
1. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local
chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153.
2. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and
that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
3. Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and
list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
4. Respondent KILUSAN-TUCP submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary
requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses.
Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local union was only recently organized.
5. Petitioner PDC insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the
organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the corresponding signatures of the purported members,
and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private
respondent KILUSAN-TUCP therefore failed to substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by the rules.
6. MED-ARBITER Dela Cruz: held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of the chapter. He further
stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the
establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a certification election should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.
7. Petitioner filed an MR to the Office of the Secretary.
8. SECRETARY Laguesma: denied the MR.
9. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was correct that a labor organization such as the respondent (KILUSAN)-TUCP may not validly invest the status of
legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR and as such
local or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers and
books of accounts

RULING:
1. YES, because, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate
status.

In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent.

The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for
registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate
labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted
false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay
these apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration
(see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.

In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing
Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts.
For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.
(Emphasis supplied)

Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained
in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration
exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements
because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the case of formation
of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing
preventive measures against the commission of fraud.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.

DOCTRINE:
Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local
thereof."

Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with
the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.

Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor
organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:

1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.

The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection
to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use
the union for dubious ends.

Barbizon vs Nagkakaisang Supervisor

Facts:
Petitioner (formerly the Philippine Lingerie Corporation) filed a petition for certification election among its rank-and-file employees. As a consequence
thereof, two (2) unions sought recognition, namely: PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB (ALAB) and BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION (BUKLOD). PLW then moved for the exclusion of number of employees who were holding supervisory positions
but was denied for lack of merit.

On certification election, BUKLOD garnered the highest vote and Buklod is then certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
regular rank-and-file employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Philippine Lingerie Corporation). The CBA was then signed and took effect for
five years. While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into the Nagkakaisang Supervisors Ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc.
(NSBPI) and the Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees Ng Barbizon, Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) allegedly because they were excluded
from the coverage of the existing CBA between petitioner and BUKLOD. Two separate petitions for certification of election was filed but was
dismissed.

Issue:
WON respondent “supervisors” local union form a supervisors union when their members are incompatibly rank-and-file employees.

Held:
Yes. The exclusion of petitioner's "supervisors" from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees indiscriminately curtailed the right to these
employees to self-organization and representation for purposes of collective bargaining, a right explicitly mandated by our labor laws and "accorded
the highest consideration."

In the case at bar, BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner's "supervisor" employees since the latter
were expressly excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.

The "one union — one company" rule is not without exception. The exclusion of the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and
the CBA is indefinitely a "compelling reason" for it completely deprived them of the chance to bargain collectively with petitioner and are thus left
with no recourse but to group themselves into a separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own organization.

Reyes vs Trajano

FACTS:
Public Respondent Trajano as OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-
one members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same company, at a certification election at which two labor organizations were
contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.

The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation.
The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS).

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement
between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference that the INK members should not be allowed to vote “because they are not
members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections.”

The INK employees promptly filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it “was not fair” and the result thereof did “not reflect the true
sentiments of the majority of the employees.” TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition contending that the petitioners “do not have legal personality to
protest the results of the election,” because “they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK” which prohibits its followers, on
religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . .”

ISSUE:
W/N employees who are not part of any union may validly exercise their right to vote in a certification election
HELD:
YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the “right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for purposes of collective bargaining.” This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an
establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their
own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.

The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as
no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that
a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the
election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no
union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees — who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining
— can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may
not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive
workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective
bargaining.

The respondents’ argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they “are not constituted into a duly organized labor union” — “but
members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization” — and “hence, not one of
the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative,” is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence
requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible
intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization
or not.

Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they “did not participate in previous certification elections
in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations,” persuade acceptance. No law,
administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.

National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs Sec. of Labor

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation engaged in the metal industry.

On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent
FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region a petition for certification election.
The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank
and file employees of QCC.

Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required consent to the certification election
of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who
was also the president of petitioner, had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.

On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro.

On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack
of merit and affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE:
WON the petition for certification election was verified as required by law

HELD:
YES. First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-
SMQCC before the petition for certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De Pedro from the company is of no
moment, considering that the petition for certification election was filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.
Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the
courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid
rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but
merely investigative and non-adversarial in character. Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in the first petition were cured and corrected
in the second petition for certification election.

Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list some 36 signatures which
are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.

Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 i.e., 25%
of the total number of company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The disclaimer of 13 employees by their
respective signatures covers only their own personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not
question the same.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition dismissed

Kamada vs Ferrer-Calleja

Cruzvale, Inc. vs Laguesma

FACTS
Private respondent, Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a petition
for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner.

Petitioner filed its comment to the petition for certification election. It sought the denial of the petition, among the grounds enumerated is that the
Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company’s place of business is located at Cubao, Quezon City,
which is outside the jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has jurisdiction
over said petition.

Med-Arbiter found petitioner’s claim unmeritorious and rendered a decision in favor of respondent union.

ISSUE/S
1. WON petitioners correctly interpreted Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which states: “Where to file.
A petition for certification election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the Employer. The petition
shall be in writing and under oath.”

HELD
NO. The word “jurisdiction” as used in said provision refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which
implies the power of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought. Venue touches more the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. Reasoning Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same territorial
jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for
certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the territorial
jurisdictions of different regional offices. We assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into
consideration the fact that there are many companies with factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located.
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest
governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a choice in
favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience of the worker. Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced
by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where
the principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification
election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila. Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional
Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters have jurisdiction
should be filed in the branch office which has territorial jurisdiction over the “workplace of the complainant/petitioner” (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC
Rules defines the workplace as follows: “For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly
assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail,
assignment or travel. . . “

Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order is LIFTED.

Lopez Sugar Corp. vs Sec. of Labor

Facts
The Med-Arbiter, sustained by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, has ruled that Art. 257 is mandatory and give him no other choice than to
conduct a certification election upon the receipt of the corresponding petition.

“Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. -In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall
automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.”

National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP (“NACUSIP-TUCP”) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(“DOLE”) a petition for direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar Corporation (“LSC”). NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor
organization; that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of whom were members of the union; that no other labor organization
was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said employees; and
that there was no legal impediment either to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification election.

LSC contended it. NACUSIP-TUCP submitted Charter Certificate No. 003-89, dated 20 July 1989, of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory
Chapter.

LSC appealed to the DOLE and asseverated that the order was a patent nullity and that the Med-Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion, Sec. of
Labor denied it. Petition for certiorari was filed.

Issue
WON the certification election should push through

Held
No, because the labor organization is not legitimate. It was held in Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment:

“But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also
requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor
organization as ‘any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof.’ Rule 1, Section 1(j), Book V of the
Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as ‘any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch,
local or affiliate thereof .’ “

Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be set to impulse by the mere filing of a petition for certification
election. He is still tasked to satisfyhimself that all the conditions of the law are met, and amongthe legal requirements is that the petitioning union
must be legitimate labor organization in good standing.

The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization duly registered with the
DOLE. The legitimate status of NACUSIPTUCP might be conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the federation’s bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, shouldalso be
a legitimate labor organization in good standing.

Accordingly, in Progressive Development, we elucidated: “In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found
in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:

“‘(c ) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by laws, set of officers and books of
accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed.’ “Since the ‘procedure governing the reporting independently registered unions’ refers to the certification and attestation requirements
contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and
chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union
registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation
requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the
case of the formation a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the
policy of providing preventive measures against the commission of fraud.

“A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to theBLR:

“1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and

“2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary
or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.

“Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become legitimate labor organization.”

The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate
and nothing else.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Secretary of Labor, dated 06 March 1990, affirming that of the Med-Arbiter, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The petition for certification election is dismissed. No costs.

California Manufacturing Corp vs Laguesma

FACTS
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) was filed by the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO)

In its answer, CMC alleged that the petition for the holding of a certification election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-
five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors

FFW-CALMASUCO in its reply maintained, among others, that under the law, when there is no existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the
time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories does not apply

Med-Arbiter ordered that a certification election be conducted among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation

CMC appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which, however, affirmed the above order

CMC’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE
WON the petition for the holding of a certification election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all
its supervisors

HELD
No. CMC’s insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents.

Compliance with the said requirement need not even be established with absolute certainty

The Court has consistently ruled that “even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force asking for a certification
election had not been strictly complied with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose
of ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining agent.

The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all other instances, the discretion, according
to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for certification

Disposition
The petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. Manila, Inc. vs Laguesma

Facts
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is engaged in the construction and fabrication business and conducts its construction business in
different construction sites here and abroad while its fabrication operations are conducted by its Steel and Marine Structures Group at its Batangas
Marine and Fabrication Yard.

Atlantic has adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing fabrication capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel
structures and other heavy construction works. Said project employees are covered by the Project Worker/Reliever Employment Agreements which
indicate the specific projects to which they are assigned and the duration of their employment. Upon the expiration of their contracts/agreements,
the employment of these employees is automatically terminated unless the projects to which they are assigned have not yet been completed, in
which case, they are rehired for the remainder of the project. The positions occupied by the regular rank-and-file employees and the project
employees are basically similar in nature and are directly related to the main line of petitioner’s business.

Atlantic executed a CBA with the AG&P United Rank & File Association (“URFA”, for brevity) which is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.

Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG&P-SMSG-National Federation of Labor (“LAKAS-NFL”, for brevity) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the Med-
Arbitration Unit. Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Order for certification election.

Atlantic filed an appeal with the Department of Labor and Employment. Alleged project employees sought to be represented by private respondent
LAKAS-NFL were formally issued regular employment appointments by the Atlantic. Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied Atlantic’s appeal for lack of merit. Atlantic’s project employees at its SMSG site who were not given regular
employment appointment went on strike and completely paralyzed Atlantic’s operations in Bauan, Batangas. Strike was settled in a conciliation
conference, an Agreement was reached by the petitioner and private respondent LAKAS-NFL wherein petitioner agreed to formally regularize all the
remaining alleged project employees with at least one year of service pending the final outcome of the certification election case. Thereafter, 686
additional regular project employees were regularized effective December 1, 1990 in pursuance to said Agreement.

On December 6, 1990, Atlantic received a letter from URFA informing the former about the admission into URFA of the membership of 410 regular
project employees who were formally regularized by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990. Atlantic filed MFR alleging that the employees sought
to be represented by the private respondent LAKAS-NFL are regular employees of the petitioner and are deemed included in the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement of the regular rank-and-file employees of Atlantic. Undersecretary Laguesma denied it.

Issue
WON Laguesma was wrong in applying the CONTRACT-BAR rule and failing to consider that the bargaining unit of the alleged regular workers has
ceased to exist by virtue of the regularization of all said workers

Held
Yes, he committed grave abuse of discretion. Section 1 of Article II of petitioner’s Collective Bargaining Agreement with URFA defined appropriate
bargaining unit as follows: ARTICLE II :Sec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of
those regular rank-and-file employees of the COMPANY who have remained as such up to the date of execution of this Agreement, as well as those
who may hereafter acquire the same status. It is hereby understood and agreed that the following are not within the appropriate bargaining unit
and, therefore, this Agreement is not applicable to them, to wit:

a. Executives, division department and section heads, staff members, managerial employees, and executive secretaries;

b. Workers hired by the COMPANY as project employees as contemplated by existing laws including relievers of regular employees who are sent
abroad are not covered by this Contract. Provided, however, that regular employees who are assigned as relievers shall continue to be covered by
this Contract, and provided further that relievers who are assigned to regular positions which may become vacant shall be duly considered for such
regular positions after attaining the six months probationary period.

c. Security personnel.”

Although the aforementioned definition does not include petitioner’s regular project employees in the coverage of the existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement between petitioner and the URFA, the regularization of all the regular project employees with at least one year of service and the
subsequent membership of said employees with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to
represent are, in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in the appropriate bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining
Agreement consequently, the bargaining unit which respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist.

The Labor Code provides:

“Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or any other action
which may disturb the administration of duty registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under
Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.” Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations likewise
provides: “If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.”

Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA, which is the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular project employees with more than one
year of service, bars any other labor organization from filing a petition for certification election except within the 60-dayperiod prior to the expiration
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was designed to ensure industrial
peace between the employer and its employees during the existence of the collective bargaining agreement.

Disposition
Petition Granted When Applied

Associated Labor Union vs Calleja

FACTS
Several days before the expiration of the CBA between petitioner ALU and the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR),
private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional
Office in Tacloban city.

Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support of its petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the holding of certification elections in organized establishments is mandated only where a petition is filed questioning the majority status
of the incumbent union, and that it is only after establishing that a union has indeed a considerable support that a certification election should be
ordered

HELD
NO. Reasoning in cases of organized establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent, what is essential is whether the petition for
certification election was filed within the sixty-day freedom period. Article 256 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, provides:

ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To
have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid
votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit.

When an election which provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be
conducted between the choices receiving the two highest number of votes.

Article 256 is clear. The mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the respondent Director to
order the holding of a certification election.

Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom period? The record speaks for itself. The previous CBA entered into by petitioner ALU
was due to expire on April 1, 1987. The petition for certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well within the freedom period.

Disposition
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Pambansang Kapatiran vs Sec. of Labor

FACTS:
The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY), formed a local union known as Pambansang Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey
Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB). They ratified their Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.

On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for Certification Election alleging that there was no existing and effective CBA between FORMEY and any
union; neither was there any recognized union within the company.

FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition while Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise moved to dismiss on the ground
that there was already a duly registered CBA covering period Jan. 1, 1992 to Dec. 31, 1996, therefore the contract bar rule will apply.

KAPATIRAN opposed both motion to dismiss claiming that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was fraudulently registered with the
DOLE and that it was defective since what was certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI which as federation only served as mere agent of the local
union and without any legal personality to sign in behalf of the latter.

Med-Arbiter found that there is a valid and existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI which effectively barred the filing for petition for certification
election. KAPATIRAN appealed imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the contract bar rule. Secretary of Labor upheld the
decision of Med-Arbiter. KAPATIRAN filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for certification election was properly filed.
2. Whether or not there was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI.

HELD:
1. No, the petition for certification election was not properly filed. The CBA entered into between FORMEY and KAMAPI was made effectively Jan. 1,
1992 and will expire Dec. 31, 1996. The petition for certification election was filed on April 22, 1993 which was filed before the so-called 60-day
freedom period.
2. Yes, the court affirmed that there was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. Art. 253-A of the labor code provides that “no petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the DOLE
outside the 60-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such 5 year term of the CBA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15 August 1993 sustaining the order of the Med-
Arbiter dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED

National Congress of Unions in Sugar Industry vs Ferrer-Calleja

National Congress of Union vs Ferrer-Calleja


FACTS:
Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co. entered into a CBA with respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW). When the CBA expired,
it was extended for another 3 years with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment. However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In order to
obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their
positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and convened, with a representative of the Department of Labor and Employment, acting
as chairman, to resolve the issues.

Petitioner filed a “petition for direct certification or certification election” among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon. Respondent NSFW
moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed out of time and that there is a deadlocked of CBA negotiation.

Med-Arbiter denied the Motion to Dismiss and direct the conduct of a certification election among rank-and-file employees BLR set aside the order
of the Med-Arbiter and ruled in favor of respondent

ISSUE:
Whether the BLR committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:
NO. Petition Denied. The “Deadlock Bar” Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending
bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. The principal purpose is
to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the management.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified CBA — i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections.

This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the
expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during
the existence of a CBA except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to
ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by
them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

xxx

FACTS:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor organization while
private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization

Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500) workers
during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-milling season.

On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a CBA.

When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three
years with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.

However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the
parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, a Labor
Management Council was set up and convened, with a representative of the DOLE, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.

Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon.

Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition alleging that it was filed out of time.

Med-Arbiter: denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the conduct of certification election among the
rank and file workers of Dacongcogon

Director Calleja of BLR: rendered a resolution reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.

RULING:
NO. A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules implementing Executive Order
No. 111 provides that:
Sec. 6. Procedure — . . .

In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned
by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the
last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.

The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal
of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election.

xxx xxx xxx

The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed
outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar
to certification elections. It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement.
Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable.

This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the
expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The
purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any
collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

DISPOSITIVE:
Private respondent won

DOCTRINE:
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned
by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the
last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.

The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal
of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election.

This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the
expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The
purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any
collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

Progressive Development Corp vs Laguesma

FACTS:
On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union) filed a petition for certification election with the
Department of Labor (National Capital Region) in behalf of the rank and file employees of the Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut)

Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the respondent.
Union’s registration making it void and invalid: a) respondent Union’s registration was tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of
those who allegedly took part in the ratification of the respondent Union’s constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers that there were
two sets of supposed attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on June 26, 1993; that the alleged chapter
is claimed to have been supported by 318 members when in fact the persons who actually signed their names were much less; and b) while the
application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter
certification issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June 26, 1993or one (1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were
serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the charter certification and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter.

On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a Petition seeking the cancellation of the Union’s registration on the grounds of fraud and falsification, docketed
as BIR Case No. 8-21-83. Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with the Med-Arbiter requesting suspension of proceedings in the certification
election case until after the prejudicial question of the Union’s legal personality is determined in the proceedings for cancellation of registration.

However, in an Order dated September29, 1993, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah directed the holding of a certification election among petitioner’s
rank and file employees.

Appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor, Labor Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma in a Resolution dated December 29, 1993 denied the
same.
Motion for reconsideration of the public respondent’s resolution was denied.

ISSUE1:
Whether or not, after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by a labor organization, recognition by the Bureau of Labor Relations
merely becomes a ministerial function.

RULING1:
Art. 234. Requirements of registration. —Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality
and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based
on the following requirements: (a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee; (b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the
labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings; (c) The names of all its
members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate; (d) If the applicant union
has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and (e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it.

A more than cursory reading of the aforecited provisions clearly indicates that the requirements embodied therein are intended as preventive
measures against the commission of fraud. After a labor organization has filed the necessary papers and documents for registration, it becomes
mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to check if the requirements under Article 234 have been sedulously complied with. Falsification and
serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied
recognition as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor organization’s registration
could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly,
by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election.

Such requirements are a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions of workers
are engaged directly affect the public interest and should be protected.

The employer needs the assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or
misrepresentations to the Bureau.” Clearly, fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a legitimate labor organization are
contrary to the Med-Arbiter’s conclusion not merely collateral issues. The invalidity of respondent Union’s registration would negate its legal
personality to participate in certification election.

Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess all of the rights and privileges granted by law to
such organizations.

Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been seriously challenged, it would have been more prudent for the Med-Arbiter and
public respondent to have granted petitioner’s request for the suspension of proceedings in the certification election case, until the issue of the
legality of the Union’s registration shall have been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted a
grave abuse of discretion.

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