States and Performances: Aristotle's Test

Author(s): Daniel W. Graham

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 119 (Apr., 1980), pp. 117-130
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 117

STATES AND PERFORMANCES: ARISTOTLE'S TEST

BY DANIEL W. GRAHAM

In Metaphysics0 6 Aristotleproposesa divisionof actionsintoevepyetoc

(actualizations)and XLv~aTL (movements).He divides actions into these
two classesin accordancewitha linguistictest: is a descriptionofthe action
in the perfecttense true at the same time as a descriptionin the present
tense? This test has been plausiblyrecast as an entailmentrelation:1does
the presenttense descriptionentail the perfect? I shall call Aristotle's
criterionso construedhis completenesstest.No commentators on the passage
since Ryle have been able both to accept the test at face value, namelyas
a grammaticaltest, and to accept Aristotle'sresultingclassification.This
I showin ? I. I arguein ? II thatthefailureto appreciatetheeepy?ta-xivtos
distinctionis based on a doubleerror.In the firstplace, Aristotle'sexamples
have been misclassified;in the second, the Greek perfecthas been mis-
translated.When Aristotle'stest is understood,his distinction-a different
one fromthat generallyattributedto him-can be vindicated. I meet
objectionsand providea point forAristotle'stheoryin ? III.
I
Here is the passage whichI shall discuss:
Since no actionwhichhas a limitis an end, but onlya meansto the
end, as, e.g., the processof thinning;and sincethe partsof the body
themselves,when one is thinningthem,are in motionin the sense
that they are not alreadythat whichit is the object of the motion
to makethem,thisprocessis not an action,or at least not a complete
one, sinceit is not an end; it is the [act] whichincludesthe end that
is an action. E.g., at the same timewe see and have seen,understand
and have understood,thinkand have thought;but we cannotat the
same timelearnand have learnt,or becomehealthyand be healthy.
We are livingwell and have lived well,we are happy and have been
happy, at the same time; otherwisethe [action]would have had to
cease at some time,like the thinning-process; but it has not ceased
at the presentmoment:we both are livingand have lived.
Now ofthese[actions]we shouldcall the one typemotions[xtLVatL]
and the otheractualizations[pvepyetoa] (Metaphysics0 6, 1048b18-28,
tr. Tredennick).
There are two modernschemesof classification whichowe theirinspira-
tionin partto theabove passage. Thesetwoschemes,proposedindependently
by Zeno Vendler(1967,ch. 4) and AnthonyKenny(1963,ch. 3), respectively,
1F. R. Pickering (1977) argues that Aristotle's test is a test of completeness,but not
a "tense test" using entailments. But it is no argument to say, as Pickering does (pp.
40-42), that because Aristotle's test has an application, thereforeit is not a grammatical
test.

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118 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

followingGilbertRyle's lead (1949, ch. 5; cf. 1954:102-104),have been the

basis of much subsequentworkin the area and have powerfully influenced
the way in which Aristotle'spassage has been understoodand criticized.
Vendlerproposeda fourfolddivisionof actions into activities,accomplish-
ments,achievements, and states,while Kenny divided actionsinto activities,
performances, and states. Kennygivesa numberof testsby whichthe verbs
expressing these actions can be distinguished.For instance,performance
verbshave the characteristic that a sentenceof the form'A is cping'entails
'A has not pd';e.g., 'I am buildingmy house' entails 'I have not built my
house'. With activityverbs,on the otherhand, 'A is (ping'entails 'A has
pd';2e.g., 'I am livingin Rome' entails 'I have lived in Rome'. It will be
noticedthat this test is modelledon Aristotle'scompletenesstest. State
verbs3differby not having a true progressive,as with the verb 'know'.
They take the simplepresent,whichis not used iteratively4 as with other
types. Vendler's scheme goes farther in distinguishingbetween what we
may consider to be two of
types performance verbs.5 The two sentences
'He wrotethe letterin two hours'and 'He reachedthe summitin two hours'
both express performances, but in the formersentencethe subject was
writing the letter for the fulltwo hourswhilein the latterthe subject was
approaching the summit for two hoursand actuallyreachedit only at the
last moment. The formertype of action is called an accomplishment, the
latteran achievement.
These classifications offeredby Vendlerand Kenny have proved to be
extremely valuable for philosophicalanalysis in various fieldsof inquiry.
Nevertheless,recentcriticismhas broughtto lightcertainshortcomings of
Vendlerand Kenny's approach.6 One correction in particularwill be useful
2TimothyC. Potts (1965:66-7) argues that as Kenny has set up the two tests, they
do not determinejointly exhaustive classes. (The objection is repeated by C. O. Evans,
1967:305. Cf. also Ackrill, 1965:123.) The latter test should be the contradictory of
the former,i.e., 'A is (ing' does not entail 'A has not (d'. Potts is rightto point to the
desirability of having jointly exhaustive criteria, but Kenny is closer to Aristotle in
his formulationof the tests: forAristotleseems to be assertingmore than the consistency
of expressions of the form'A is ning'and 'A has 4d' for vipyeLoct. Kenny's interpreta-
tion is supported by Aristotle's remark at N.E. 1174a 14-15 that seeing is complete at
any time. In fact, it is clear from the order of presentation in 0 6 that Aristotle con-
siders the test for &vepyetLocentral and that for XLVCa6tl to be ancillary. A plausible
defence of Kenny's interpretationof Aristotle's tests is that for performances 'A is
ping' does not entail that 'A has dd'; but furthermore,because performancesare com-
plete only over the whole interval (N.E. 1174a 27-9), in all cases 'A is (ing' entails
'A has not dd'for XtLvaeKL.Thus, for metaphysical reasons, the classes picked out by
the criteriaare jointly exhaustive.
8Kenny calls them "static" verbs; linguisticians tend to call them "stative" verbs.
Both terms have certain misleading connotations for the philosopher.
4Kenny speaks of a "frequentative" use in this connection, but frequencyis more
properly a term applying to distribution of events per time period, e.g., 'She goes to
the store twice a month', whereas a mere iterative sense is sufficientto mark a verb as
not a state verb. See Mourelatos (1978:426, 434 n. 45).
SAlthoughsome of Kenny's tests exclude achievements, there are good reasons for
a more comprehensive category for both achievements and accomplishments. See
Mourelatos (1978:422-23).
"E.g., Mourelatos (1978); Potts (1965); Evans (1967); David R. Dowty (1972:27-29).

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 STATES AND PERFORMANCES 119

for the presentstudy. A. P. D. Mourelatoshas suggestedthat it is mis-

leadingto speak ofverbtypes,sincethe class intowhicha verbfallsis subject
to systematicvariationaccordingto circumstances ofits use.7 For instance,
Vendlergives 'know' as a state verb. However,in the sentence'And then
suddenlyI knew!' the verb representsan achievement. The past tense
(perfectiveaspect) and the adverb in this case transform the forceof the
verb. The transformation is the resultof a phenomenonknownto linguisti-
cians as verbaspect. What may be consideredas aspectual operatorsallow
one to describean action in different ways. The simplepresent(in its "re-
portiveuse"), for instance, describes an action as complete,whilethe pro-
gressive describes it as incomplete. Mourelatos points out that because o
the contribution ofaspectualmarkersto verbmeaning,it is moreinformative
to speak of verbpredications than verbtypes.I shall speak in termsofprima
facie verb types for convenience, but only to label verbs satisfyingthe
appropriateKenny-Vendler conditions. This will allow us to speak, for
example, of the verb phrase in 'He is buildinghis house' as occurringin an
predication-since
activity building one's houseis an activityuntilthe house
is completed-althoughthe verb phrase is of a prima facie performance
type. Diagram 1 showsthe classification of verb typesI shall assume.

MODIFIED KENNY-VENDLER TYPOLOGY

(ACTION)

STATE
love
understand
perceive

ACTIVITY PERFORMANCE
run
enjoy
live in Rome
push a cart
_______________ -~
ACCOMPLISHMENT ACHIEVEMENT
run a mile reachthe summit
draw a circle findsomething
win a race
1
DIAGRAM

Given these moderndistinctionsas a background,we are in a position

to ask how Aristotle'sschemecompareswiththoseof Kenny and Vendler.
7Mourelatos(1978:419, 421). Potts firstglimpsed the importance of aspect (without
using that term) in its relation to the completeness test.

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120 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

There have been two plausibleproposals8made forcorrelatingthe Aristo-

telianschemeswithmodernclassifications.J. L. Ackrillhas suggestedthat
Aristotle'sdistinction and xLvjCLaSis congruentwiththe Vendler
of evepyesLo
distinctionbetweenactivitiesand accomplishments(1965:135). Anthony
Kenny,forhis part,suggestedthat the distinctionwas essentiallya division
betweenactivitiesand stateson the one hand,and performances on the other
(1963:173 n. 2). What is common to both these theories is that v6pyeLCxL
include activities. The inclusionof activitiesin the class of evepyezCxis
generallyaccepted by Aristotlescholars,and influencesthe interpretation
of otheraspectsof Aristotle'sphilosophy,such as his theoryof the good life
in the NicomacheanEthics. It is thisinclusionof activitieswhichI wishto
call in question. In particular,I shall challengethe assumptionmade by
Kenny and almost all othercommentators that Kenny's test foractivities
and performances is Aristotle'scompleteness test.
Problemswith consideringactivitiesas evepyeocLwere recognizedearly
in the post-Ryleanliteratureon the Zv?py?LCa-xLvr7C, distinction.Ackrill
(1965:131-35)noticedthat forAristotle'walk' was a paradigmxivlarC but
whichAckrilltranslatedas 'enjoy', was a paradigmevepyeac.Yet
e5CeaOL,
both of theseverbspass Kenny's test foractivities:9if one is walking,then
one has walked;if one is enjoying,thenone has enjoyed. Ackrilldiscerned
Aristotle'sreasonfor classifying'walk' as a xiv7m6,:as Aristotlesays, "the
whenceand the whitherconstitutethe form". In otherwords,walkingis
alwayswalkingsomewhere in particular,and to walksomewhere in particular
is an accomplishment.If I am walkingto the store,it does not followthat
I have walked to the store. 'Walk' is an incompletepredicate,and only
whenit is filledout can we test the predicate. But, Ackrillobjects, why
cannot we say the same of 'enjoy'? If I am enjoyingthe symphonyand
onlyhear the firsthalf,it does not followthat I have enjoyedthe (whole)
symphony.This questionof Ackrill'sis an importantone. In termsof the
problemof accountingfor Aristotle'sclassification, it suggeststhat there
may not be any test whichwill singleout activitiesas evepyeLaL,but rather
that,on completionofeach ofthepredicatesin question,all "activityverbs"
will be classed as accomplishment verbs. Ackrillraised this problemas a
criticismofAristotle.I shall considerthe problemas a challengeto Ackrill's
interpretation.At least his strategyis clear: he accepts the test to under-
mine the Aristotelianclasses. Thus also Potts (1965: 78-79): "The answer
. is not . . . that the criteria are wrong, but that Aristotle's list of ex-
amples under each category. . . are mixturesof different
logical types".

8I exclude an unworkable proposal offeredby Ryle for considering&vipyeuat as con-

sisting of what in Vendler's terms are achievements and considering xviat?; as activ-
ities ("processes") and states (1954:102-104). Kenny's tests are decisive in showingthat
e.g. 'see', one of Ryle's paradigm achievements, can appear in state predications. See
also Ackrill's (1965) criticismsof Ryle.
9Ackrilldoes not referto Kenny, but his point is easily interpretedin accordance
with Kenny's formulation.

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 STATES AND PERFORMANCES 121

Pickering(1977: 43) takes a similarview: Aristotleshould have "admitted

at least one furtherclass of action". On this accountAristotleis confused
about what verbsbelongin what categories.
The otherextremeis to accept the Aristotelianclassification and reject
his completenesstest. This is the routethat P. S. Mamo takes (1970: 27):
"the solutionto the problemis to acknowledgethe failureof the tense cri-
terion". J. P. Kostman (1974: 25) likewiseconcludes: "Ackrill'sproblem
shows that the tense tests are inadequate as they stand".
A thirdpossibilityis to save both the Aristotelianclassification and the
completeness test. Terry Penner (1970)10attemps to retain both by dis-
placing the test: it is not a grammatical test but a criterionof identity
which bringsout the difference in "logical form" between evepyazLand
xLv'6a?l. The test is ellipticalfor an elaborateand uniquelyAristotelian
criterionof identity.The detailsof Aristotle'sidentityconditionsare to be
foundin the Physics and the NicomacheanEthics,withoutwhich details
the intentof the test cannotbe understood.
The firsttwotheoriesareprimafacieunsatisfactory becausetheyattribute
to Aristotlean incoherentview. The thirdhas the advantage of charity.
But it shareswiththe secondviewan unwillingness to take thetestseriously
at face value-as a viable grammaticaltest. In fact,all threeviewsconcede
the incompatibility of the classificationsand the grammaticaldata. Yet
this concessionproves to be an embarrassment in the light of historical
evidence. Aristotlewas notthefirstto recognizepresent/perfect entailments.
He seemsto have learnedthe distinction froma certainsophisticalargument
which he attemptsto refute.l In refutingthe argumentneitherhe nor
presumablyany ofhis contemporaries thoughtto challengethegrammatical-
ity of the distinction. In an age sensitiveto verbalnuances,it is inexplicable
that no one discoveredthe counter-examples whichhave been so patentto
modernscholars. Moreover,it is evidentfromthe earlycitationsthat Aris-
totle occupied himselfwith the distinctionover a long period of time, at
firsttaking an experimentalattitudeto the entailments.These historical
considerationscount against the plausibilityof the firsttwo views,which
make Aristotlea victimof counter-examples.They also cast doubt on the
thirdview,accordingto whichAristotle'sdistinctionis an appendage of a
well-worked-out ontologyof action. If the test is viable only in connection
withAristotle'sontology,whydoes he take it overfroman alienprototype-
indeed,how could such a prototypeever have arisen outside Aristotelian
philosophy?Anotherlook at the grammaticalbasis ofthe completeness test
is in order.
1?Penner seeks to avoid Kenny-Vendler linguistic tests in favour of Aristotelian
ontological types. Nevertheless, because of the identity conditions he ascribes to
ivepyeaocand xLtvaeLC, it is clear that on his interpretation ivipye?at correspond to
activities (see p. 419) and xLcaeLq to accomplishments (p. 417).
"1De Sophisticis Elenchis 178a 9-19; forother early treatmentssee Topics 146b 13-19,
De Sensu 446b 2-4.

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 122 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

II
I shall faceAckrill'sobjectionby examiningthe list of exampleswhich
Aristotlegivesat 1048b18-35:

(IIPAEI2)

ENEPrEIA KINHEI2
see
opaov reduce
Loavacvevv
cppovevbe wise becomehealthy
uyLc00eaOL
voeZvunderstand learn
ZcavvO&avev
be happy
?u8aoxLioveZv 3ocaSeiv walk
itv live well
e5 build a house
otxoSotpeZv
(a8C0oaLbe pleased) move
xLVeZv

It is crucialhere to attend not only to the sense of the verbs but to the
verbtypesin question. The firstevepyeacverb,opav,variesin an interesting
way fromall the xivmarc verbs. Its English equivalent,the verb 'see', is
prima facie, as Kenny noticed,a state verb. This featureneitherAckrill
nor Pennerobserved. But the featureis important.When we employthe
verb 'see' in Englishin an activitypredication,we are commonlynottalking
about visionat all. The sentence'I am seeingabout an importantmatter'
and 'I am seeinga lot of her' do not treat primarilyof visual perception.
Furthermore, if a sentencelike 'I am seeingthe ball' means anything,it
mustmean 'I am lookingat the ball'. Greekmakeseven moresubtledistinc-
tionsbetweenseeingand "visual gestures"-activitiesassociatedwithseeing
-than does English. (See Bruno Snell, 1960: 1-5.) And in general,all
verbs of perceptionare primafacie state verbs12as can be recognizedby
theirpreference forthe simplepresent,used non-iteratively: 'I hear a loud
noise', 'I smell a skunk'. Likewise, verbs of intellectualperceptionare
commonly used in statepredications:'I understandyou', 'I findthisdifficult',
'I thinkhe is wrong'.
Now both cppoveZv and voezvare verbs of intellectualperception.Both
have at some time been translatedby 'think',whichused absolutelytakes
an activitypredicationand passes Kenny's test for activities. But the
equivalencebetween'think'in its guise as an activityverb and the Greek
verbsis a questionableone. voeivis, in bothits Homericorigins13 and in its
predominant classical usages,l4a verb of intellectual
perception.v67atqis

12Cf.Aristotle's recognitionthat all verbs of perception pass the completeness test,

De Sensu 446b 2-3.
13See Kurt von Fritz (1943:90); Snell (1960:13). Von Fritz documents the progress
of the verb toward being a verb of thinkingin the above article and in von Fritz (1945)
and (1946). His study indicates that the element of insight continues to be prominent.
14voev is not a common verb in classical times, but Plato uses it frequentlyand
predominantlyin prima facie state senses. See S. Fridericus Astius (1836, 8.v. vo06).

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 STATES AND PERFORMANCES 123

immediateinsight,15 not a process of cogitationor calculation. The verb

cppoveZv differsin applyingmoreto a kindof thoughtwhichleads to action
(von Fritz, 1943: 229-30), and of course it comes to stand for practical
reasoning in Aristotle. Virtuallyall of theusages of cppoveiv outsideAristotle
are instancesof a state verb,wherethe verb has such equivalencesas 'be
wise', 'mean', 'intend','be so-and-sodisposed'. This suggeststhat Aristotle
may have conceivedthe verbas a state verbeven in his new sense. The fact
is that the verbsgivenin the list of evepyesoc have been translatedby virtu-
ally all translators without regard to the verb typesor predicationtypesin
question. Translators often give 'see' and 'understand' as renderingsof
6opv and voeLv, respectively,and then go on to translate the present-
tensed occurrencesas 'is seeing' and 'is understanding'.But such readings
are torturedeven in English. In Greek,whereno distinctprogressivetense
exists,the readercould be expectedto understandthe present-tensed occur-
rencesof these evepyeLoverbsin the usual way-as state-predications.For
thereare no signsor indicationsin the Greekthatthe verbsshouldbe under-
stood in any exceptionalway.
Aristotle'stwo final examples, eU8aaLioveZvand e5 4Yv,have perfectly
good state senses. The formercan be renderedby 'be happy' or 'be success-
ful'.16 The translation'be flourishing' has recentlyenjoyedpopularity,but
the main reason forchoosingan activity-verb type is just the assumption
that is herein question,namelythat 'evepyeloc are activities.Both the pedi-
greeof eusaiovsLv (fromthe adjective u8aiLcov) and parallelslike sTuxZLV
(from Tukxu)g), suggestthat the verbis a stateverb. Finally,
'be fortunate',
e?5 qv can reasonablybe considereda state-verbphrase. For although
Kenny offers'live in Rome' as an activity,it escapes him that the same
phraseis oftenused in state predications.One can say both 'I am livingin
Rome' and 'I live in Rome', the latterbeinga state predication.And it is
plausible that Aristotlemeans e5 ~tv to representa state, in agreement
with the other ev6pyesaverbs. Thus Aristotle'slist of e&vpy?eaL in the
in
passage question can be consistently construed as a listof states. Further-
more,the verb 86eaocL,the paradigmev&pyaoc fromthe Ethicswhichwas
consideredabove, can be renderedby 'be pleased', commonlyused in state
attributions,ratherthan 'enjoy', which commonlyrepresentsan activity.
In fact,the grammarof 'enjoy' and that of Ms0eaO(in classical usage) are
utterlydifferent, the formerbeing transitivewhile the lattertakes dative
constructions, in a manneranalogousto 'be pleased by'.17Moresignificantly,
15Cf.Nicomachean Ethics VI 6. Pure v67atLCis not to be confusedwithpractical v67aCT
(a kind of "thinking out") which has an end (De An. 407a 23-24); for pure v67aL; of.
ibid. b 32-33.
16Sentencesof the form 'N is A', where A stands for an adjective, do not ipso facto
represent states, but the predicates mentioned pass other tests for states. See George
Lakoff (1966).
17Penner(1970:403) wrongly ascribes to s8eaOaL a direct object complement. The
construction ~saO-aL +accusative (+participle) is strictly poetic; see H. W. Smyth
(1966, ? 1595b). The verb otherwisetakes only internal accusatives- (LSJ 8.V. 801o0aL).

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124 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

the aorist (perfectiveform)of sae0oaLmeans 'getpleased' (Penner, 1970:

437), i.e., it representsan ingressioninto a state (a kind of achievement),
as Aristotlerecognizesin N.E. 1173a 34-b4. This semanticrelationshipof
aoristto presentholdsonlyforstate verbs.18
Thus farwe have seenno need to treatany exampleof an evepystaas an
activity. Whyhave theybeen interpreted as activities?Obviouslythe main
reason forthis is that activityverbs pass Aristotle'scompletenesstest as
translatedinto English. Indeed, Aristotle'stest provides the model for
Kenny's criteriato distinguishbetweenactivitiesand performances, so that
Aristotle'stest is assumed to be identicalwith Kenny's. I wish now to
arguethat if Aristotle'stest wereproperlytranslated,activityverbswould
not pass the test. The rootof the problemof translationis that it has been
assumedthat the Greekperfectin the completenesstest could be rendered
adequatelyby an Englishperfect.But that thereis a difficulty in rendering
the Greek perfecttense into English has long been recognized. For the
Englishand Greekperfectshave different functions.Englishhas fourdis-
tinct uses for the perfect(Comrie,1976: 56-61); Greek, in the classical
period,only two (Wackernagel,1904; cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, 1950: 263).
The two uses of the Greekperfectcorrespondto a singlerecognizeduse of
the Englishperfect.19This use is called,forEnglish,the perfect of resultor
resultativeperfect.
The conditionsfor employingthe perfectof result are: (1) the action
expressedby the verb occurredin the past; (2) as a resultof thisthereis at
the time of utterancea continuingstate. Two examplesof the resultative
perfectare (a) 'Bill has gone to America';(b) 'Bill has built the house'. In
(b) the continuingstate is the existenceof the house referredto by the
grammaticalobject of the sentence,i.e., a state of the object. In (a) the
continuingstate is Bill's beingin America,a state ofthe subject. These two
examples correspondto two historicallydistinguishableuses of the Greek
perfect.20In generalno problemsarise in translatingperfectsof type (b)
18Cf.Mourelatos' 'I know' vs. 'And then suddenly I knew!'. 'Understand'/'under-
stood', 'perceive'/'perceived','see'/'saw' can exemplifythe state-achievementopposition.
In other languages this relation can be even more striking. The preterite of Spanish
sabe 'he knows' is supo 'he found out', of conoce 'he is acquainted with' is conocid 'he
met'. For a treatmentof state verbs in Greek, see Lyons (1963:114). Lyons calls them
"event-state" verbs (i.e., "achievement-state" verbs). See also his treatment of the
Greek perfect,pp. 111-19. Some correctionsare needed, however. Lyons' use of the
term 'perfective' for the Greek perfect is potentially misleading, and his treatment of
the aorist is open to question. See Bernard Comrie (1976), esp. chs. 1 and 3, fora more
thorough treatment of aspect; see pp. 11-12 for a discussion of terminology.
19Englishgrammar does not distinguishbetween a resultant state of the object and
state of the subject. In the past, however, English once made a similar (though not
identical) distinction to the Greek, e.g., 'I have built' but 'I am come'. French and
German retain such a distinction. See Otto Jesperson (1931:29-20; for examples, pp.
32-46).
20Forthe historical development, see J. Wackernagel (1904), and especially P. Chan-
traine (1927), the definitivestudy. Perfectsof the type exemplifiedby (b) are chrono-
logically much later than those like (a), and derivative. Those like (b) are called perfects
of results; those like (a), state [stative]perfects. The terminologyis confusing because

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 STATES AND PERFORMANCES 125

fromGreekto English: a Greekperfectcan normallybe replacedwith an

Englishperfect.But thecase is otherwise withperfectsoftype(a).21Consider
the followingexamples: (i) 'I have already walked today'; (ii) 'I have seen
John'. In neitherof these examplesis any enduringstate impliedwhich
resultsfromthe past action. Condition(1) is fulfilled, but not condition
(2). The perfectin such cases servesto record an experienceofthe subject,
and is called an experientialperfect. Greek has no experientialperfect,but
ratherexpressessuch situationsby means of the aorist(simplepast) tense.22
This observationallowsus to see a linguistic
reasonforAristotle'swhence-
and-whither stipulation on verbs of motion. For a phraselike 'have walked'
can be rehabilitatedas a perfectof resultby the additionof a destination
(i.e., a whither).For example, 'I have walked to school' can in suitable
contextshave the resultativesense 'I am at school'. But the same is not
true of 'see'. (Cf. Reichenbach,1947: 292.) Yet translationsof Aristotle's
completenesstest invariablyprovideEnglishperfectswhichare understood
(and meant to be understood) as experiential perfects: ". . . at the same
time we are seeing and have seen . . . are thinking and have thought"
(Ross). Ross's perfectscannot be a correcttranslationof Aristotle's. In
fact,perfectsof opav and vozsvoftenoccur in contextswherethey mean,
respectively,'know as a result of seeing', 'know as a result of insight'.23
Both perfectsstress,as the correspondingEnglishperfectscannot,an actual
consequent state. Perfects of the other v6py?sl verbs are rare or are Aristo-
but similartranslationsmust be constructedforthem.
telian neologisms,24

both types represent states and both types involve a result. For some suggested cor-
rectionsto Chantraine,see K. L. McKay (1965). McKay would give even more emphasis
to the state perfect.
21Standardexamples of difficultiesare given in Smyth (1956, ? 1946); and R. Kfihner
and B. Gerth (1904:148) point out a similar difficultywith respect to German. See also
Comrie (1976:57).
22Kiihner-Gerth(1904:147). E.g., EL5 AiAouq i58 n6noToaO'*xou;-KOal
ca ye.
'Have you ever been to Delphi before?-Twice in fact' (Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.2.24).
Note that the resultative perfect logically precludes repeatable, and hence countable,
occurrences, and conversely. 'Bill has gone to America threetimes' no longer entails
that Bill is in America. A handful of examples of adverbs of cardinal count with a
perfect occur. They are discussed by Chantraine as rhetorical usages (1927:165, 179).
23E.g., Plato, Rep. 6, 493c: TrE.icopaxq ?eL'),'Te &X(c,p uvaoct6 ?iat, 'neither
knowing [sc. for himself] nor able to explain to another'; Aristophanes, Birds, 1572-3:
a' pyo o6pcaxaTavcov oapapoTarov Oecv, 'I know you are the most uncouth of all
the gods'; Plato, Laws 5, 737e: 86E . . . TOaoov
uO avra &v8pa vooOso5vTOur vevo7x6vat,
'every lawmaker must know at least this much'. A more dramatic, although later,
illustrationof the forceof 6cdpaxaoccurs in the New Testament, John 1:33-34. (McKay,
1965, argues contra Chantraine that the Greek perfectretains its force down to New
Testament times.) John the Baptist tells his disciples concerningthe Christ,xayC oux
MjetvocT6v. But he saw the Spirit descend upon Jesus: xay' &ocpaxa, xocate?oapT'5pxoc
6
6?L o50r6q ialV uO(V OG
T Oeo5. The parallel with the pluperfect of *eet8v (j8eLv) is
instructive. The sense is 'and now I am an eye-witness'.
24The perfects of ?u?6aatovetvand Qv appear to have been coined by Aristotle. In
classical times PepLcoxewvserved as a suppletive perfect for Qtv. This perfect can
have a sense similar to the one I have used in translating9}xev. See Chantraine (1927:
163). The perfectof 4poveZvis rare. It appears firstin Empedocles fr. 103, where it
is a state perfect, meaning 'have sense, intelligence'. (Although rCep6vwqxehas been

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126 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

The semanticpropertiesof the Greekperfectdemanda retranslation of the

completeness test as it to
applies evepyeoc verbs. When this demand is met,
Aristotle'sentailmentssucceedunproblematically:
I see X -+ I know(by visual acquaintance)X
I am wise-- I have wisdom
I understandX -+ I have understanding of X
I am happy-+ I have happiness
(I am pleased by X -+ I have pleasurein X).25
The presentinterpretation vindicatesall of Aristotle'sentailmentsand
accommodatesall his examples. In orderto arriveat this interpretation I
have invokedacceptable,and only acceptable,uses of the Greekperfect.I
have attemptedto give an explanationwhich succeeds whereothersfail,
to make sense of what Aristotleactually says about the e&vpytoc-xmvqyt
distinction.What he says is justifiableon the groundsthat his distinction
is reallya divisionof actionsinto states and non-states.
III
Some objectionshave been raised to my interpretation.26 These can be
met. (1) The objectionhas been raisedthat accordingto my accountof the
Greekperfect,the presentand perfectpredicationsare not trueat the same
time (&oa), as Aristotlesays theyare. For I say that the perfectdescribes
a presentstate whichresultsfroma past action,i.e., a previousstretchof
the state. Thus a periodof the state is necessarybeforethe perfectcan be
predicated. I replythat this is incorrect:the past action whichis relevant
to the perfectof the state verb is not an instantor stretchof that state
itself,but ratherthe eventthat beginsthe state,whichis always a Vendler
achievement. Considerthe verb *et8aev,which is earlierin its semantic
developmentthan 6opv,but parallel. The perfectoT8a,'I know',expresses
the resultof a past act of spottingsomething, representedby edov, 'I saw,
spotted'.27Knowing is not the result of a previousstretchof knowing,or
even seeingin the state use. Similarly,for seaO0a the past action (event)
is not a being pleased, but a gettingpleased ('aOvocL), an achievement
representedby the aorist of the verb. The state of being pleased and the
resultantstate (i.e., that representedby the perfect)whichI call 'having
pleasure' are reallythe same state-and hence beginwiththe same event.
(Cf.Lyons, 1963: 114. Thus 'I am pleased by the symphony'entails'I am
in the state resultingfromgettingpleased by [hearing]the symphony'.)
The only difference betweenpresentand perfectpredicationsis that the
nresentnredicationdoes not regardthe initialevent;the perfectdoes.
restored to the text of our passage by Bonitz, his emendation is generally accepted.)
From the list of xtwvatLverbs, Aristotle appears to have made up the perfects for
?yL&tEaOoa and P3aremv.
2"It has been pointed out that ?eaOat does not have a perfect form. (See Owen,
1972:150.) But the point is really irrelevant since Aristotle seems to have made up
several of the perfectswhich he used in Q 6. See preceding note.
26I am indebted to James Forresterfor these objections.
7?Cf.Xenophanes fr. 34 for a manifestationof this perfect-aoristopposition.

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 STATES AND PERFORMANCES 127

Now thereis a dangerof misunderstanding the way in whichthe perfect

regards the past action. Because a prior event has somethingto do with
the truthof a Greekperfectpredication,it is sometimesinferredthat the
perfectrefersto that event. This inferencewould make the perfecta past
tense withtruthconditionsutterlydifferent fromthe present. I rejectthe
inference.Hans Reichenbach(1947: 287-98) makes a distinctionwhichwill
helpto resolvethedispute. He identifies threeelementsofa speechsituation:
a speechpoint,a reference point(orinterval),and an eventpoint(orinterval).
For a statementlike 'I have builtthe house' the eventpointis priorto the
speech point,i.e., the house-building took place priorto my talkingabout
it; but the reference intervalextends to the speechpoint,i.e., I am talking
about a presentstate of things. By contrast,forthe past-tensesentence'I
built the house' the referencepoint coincideswith the event point,which
is again priorto the speech point. I suggestthat to treat the perfectas a
past tense (or to claimthat I so treatit) is to confuseeventpointand refer-
ence point. The relevantevent point is indeed priorto the presentstate,
but the perfectpredicationdoes not refertothat event;or ifit does,it refers
to it differently fromthe way it refersto the state. Both the presentof
state verbs and the perfectreferto a presentstate; but the perfectrefers
to it as the consequenceof a past event,the eventwhichbeginsthe state.
Consequently,a sentenceemployingthe perfectpredicationis true at any
momentwhenthe corresponding sentencein the presentis true.
(2) It has been objectedthat myaccountis too narrowbecause it cannot
account for the activityof enjoying,which ought to be an ev6pytoc.To
carryforce,this objection must be ontological,not linguistic. (For it is
trivialthat Aristotle'sclassificationdoes not accountforEnglishlinguistic
categories.) In otherwords, enjoyingis an activityand Aristotle'sclassifica-
tion mustbe able to accountforit. To this I replythat thereis no reason
forAristotleto posit an activityof enjoyingwhichis parallel to the state
of pleasureand adds nothingto it. Accordingto Aristotle'stheory,I claim,
thereis no such thingas an activityof enjoying. Unless the objectioncan
be accompaniedby an argumentforrecognizingsuch an activity,it is not
a tellingobjection.
(3) It has been objected that I read too much into Aristotle'stest.
Aristotlewas concernedin the test only to illustratethe propertyof com-
pleteness,not to expound a theoryof the Greekperfect.I replythat it is
no part of my thesisthat Aristotlewas theorizingabout the Greekperfect.
The theoryof the Greekperfectis the presupposition of the completeness
test,not the conclusion.The transformation rulesof Greekwereintuitively
obvious to Aristotle,as Englishrules are to us. It is we who must attend
to the theoryofthe Greekperfectin orderto reconstruct a distinction
which
was quite obviousto Aristotle'scontemporaries.For we are programmed by
our own languageto misunderstand that distinction.
A questionmay be raised as to whethermy theorycan accountforall

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 128 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

that Aristotlesays about vApy?tac and XLVTae?L,since I have focusedmy

attentionon the singlepassage in whichAristotleproposesthe completeness
test. I claimthatit can. Thereare two importantcharacteristics ofevepyeoct
that I have not discusseddirectly.(1) Aristotlesays that 'quickly'/'slowly'
predicatesare not applicableto paradigmevepystaverbs(N.E. 1173a 31-b4).
Adverbsof rate of changecannotbe attachedto state verbs. For a state is
an unchangingcondition:it makes no sense to say that one is in a state
quicklyor slowly-that I am pleased quickly/slowly or that I see quickly/
are
slowly. (2) &vkpy?ta complete any at moment (N.E. 1174a 14-b14).
For instanceseeing "is not lackingin anythingwhich comingto be later
will completeits form" (a 15-16). It is characteristicof states that their
objects are not goals. If I see John,Johnis not the goal of my seeingas a
house is the goal of my buildingor Thebesis the goal of my walking. John
does not come to be whenI see him as the house comesto be or I cometo
be at Thebes. I claim,then,that my interpretation accountsforthe pro-
perties of bVepyeLot.
One seriousproblemremains. What philosophicalreasoncould Aristotle
have forpromotingstates to the firstrank among rpiLet?? There are a
numberof reasonswhyAristotlevalues states. I shall be able to give only
one, that havingto do withthe finalcause and the relatednotionof Te?Xo.
Considerthe followingdialogue:
Q. What are you doing?
A. Standingin the marketplace.
Q. Why are you standingin the marketplace?
A. To look at the statue.
Q. Why are you lookingat the statue?
A. To see it.
Now imagineaskinganotherwhyquestion:'Why do you see it?'. The ques-
tion makes no sense; or ratherit is not the rightquestion. If someonesays
'I see because. . .', he can onlyfillout the sentencewithan explanationof
how it is possible to see, or what mechanismswe employin seeing. The
sentencecannot give a reason (finalcause) for seeing.28But it is not a
peculiarityabout seeing that it has no reason-this featureis a general
characteristicof states. Linguisticianshave remarkedthe inabilityof verbs
whichare predicatedas statesto be modifiedbyfor-the-sake-of expressions.29
28Mamo recognized this feature (1970:28-31), but he did not connect it with state
verbs. For an early Aristotelian account of the chain of why questions, see Posterior
Analytics 85b 28-34. There his chain stops at "not doing wrong". In Met. 994a 8-10,
a chain ends with "happiness".
29Lakoff(1966:11): cf. Kenny (1963:184). Some achievement predications exhibit
this trait also. E.g., 'Why did you reach the summit?' cannot be given an answer in
terms of purposes. Nevertheless, as Vendler saw (1967:105-6, 111-13), there is a close
connection between some achievements and states. Some of Aristotle's ivepyeLa verbs
from0 6 can clearly have an achievement sense when predicated in the aorist: iam(tvw)
Ec8ov, v6a7Ca,'suddenly I saw, understood'. Because of considerations like these,
Dowty maintains that verbs used in achievement predications have the inherentseman-
tic property of "stativity" (1972:48-49). Surely this characterization is too sweeping,
for, e.g., 'hit' is not inherentlya state verb. But note that one can ask 'Why did you

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 STATES AND PERFORMANCES 129

And it seems equally true that one's chain of explanationsends when one
reachesa state. One cannot (in any normalsense) give motivesforseeing,
understanding, being happy, or living well (i.e., the state). Rather, one
looks in orderto see, reducesto be slender,considersin orderto be wise,
becomes healthyto be healthy,learns in order to understand,walks in
orderto be somewhere,builds a house to have a house,and in generalacts
in orderto be happy. (Cf. Physics194b32 ff.) In this sense certainkinds
of states are finalcauses of the firstorder:one acts in orderto realize or
actualizethem,but neverhas themforthe sake of anythingelse. The per-
fectofresult,by emphasizingthe outcomeof actions,is apt forrepresenting
the attainmentof ends. Its applicationto state verbs showsthat the end
is attainedby the veryact itself. The act does not,as it were,pointbeyond
itselfto anotheract.
I have arguedthat Aristotle'sevepyeLoc as determinedby the complete-
ness test are states, and that this test is a test for state verbs. I have
attemptedto showthat myinterpretation of the completenesstest is philo-
logicallysoundand that the view I have attributedto Aristotleis supported
by good reasons. My thesis suggeststhat a re-evaluationof the relation
betweenevepyLocin the realm of r;paiX;and Ev6pyeaxin its broadermeta-
physicalsenseis needed. The recognition ofa closertie betweenthelinguistic
propertiesof state verbs and the metaphysicalvalue of ivepyeo promises
to provideanotherchapterin the Platonismof Aristotle.30

The University
of Texas at Austin
hit him?'. It appears that one can ask why questions of achievements only when the
verb is not inherentlya state verb. Dowty's proposal provides an interestingparallel
to some of Aristotle's observations. For in N.E. 1173a 34ff. (mentioned already),
Aristotle recognizes that an bv6pyELa verb predicated in the aorist can yield a x?v7aq
(in particular an achievement in our terms). This recognitionentails treating &v6pyeLa
verbs as inherentlystate verbs, i.e., as potentiallyrepresentingstates, but only actually
doing so when predicated in certain ways (as, e.g., in the present system). Aristotle
was not, however, concernedwith the grammarper se, but with the ontological relation-
ships it clarified.
One class of state verbs does admit of purpose clauses: verbs of wanting and willing.
But in utterances made with these verbs there is somethingunusual about the purpose
clause. If one asks 'Why do you want to go to Athens?', the answer 'Because . . .'
gives a reason forgoingto Athens. The verb of wanting is in a certain sense transparent
and dispensable. The complement of the verb of wanting or willing may be a state
verb, e.g., 'Why do you want to be rich?' (although even here an answer to the question
explains 'Why get rich?'). This indicates that verbs of wanting are useful in allowing
us to frame whyquestions for states as well as non-states. Aristotle seems to be aware
of such a phenomenon when he exploits the propertyof desirability(strictly,he speaks
of the "pursuable" or "choosable", 8tcoxr6v,aOper6v)in coming to a hierarchy of ends
(N.E. 1097a 26 ff.). The ends under consideration being states (having honour, having
virtue, having wealth), they can be subordinated to the state of happiness only by
means of why-do-you-want (or why-do-you-pursue) questions, i.e., by using some auxiliary
expression of desire.
3"A version of this paper was read at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American
Philosophical Association, March 24 1979. I am grateful to the following for help,
encouragement,and constructivecriticism:R. David Armstrong;James Wm. Forrester,
who presented comments at the APA meeting; E. David Francis; Diana Graham;
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos; Terry Penner; Paul Woodruff. I acknowledge a special
debt to ProfessorMourelatos, from whom I have learned a great deal on this subject.

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 130 DANIEL W. GRAHAM

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