Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018

Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

18. Perez vs. Pumar, 2 Phil. 682 (EDWARD)

VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-1299 November 16, 1903

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Vicente Filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint against the defendant
herein to determine the amount due to the plaintiff, at the customary rate of compensation
for interpreting in these island, for rendering services in the tabacalera company.

In the complaint it was alleged that the defendant rendered the services of the plaintiff to
act as interpreter between former and the military authorities; not just for the latter but
also between the defendant and the colonel commanding the local garrison and with various
officer residing in the area, to the end that such services might be punctually rendered, the
agent, Pomar, assured him that the Tabacalera Company always generously repaid services
rendered it, and that he therefore did not trouble himself about his inability to devote the
necessary amount of time to his business, the defendant going so far as to make him
flattering promises of employment with the company, which he did not accept; that these
statements were made in the absence of witnesses and that therefore his only proof as to
the same was Mr. Pomar’s word as a gentleman;

The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on September 25, 1902 asking for the
dismissal of the complaint with the cost to the plaintiff, the defendant denied the allegation
and stated that it is wholly untrue, the defendant also stated that the plaintiff acted as
interpreter of his own free will, without being requested to do so by the defendant and
without any offer of payment or compensation; that therefore there existed no legal relation
whatever between the company and the plaintiff, and the defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Contract is formed between Perez and Pomar and payment must be
given?
YES!

HELD:
The judgment is rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar the payment to the plaintiff of the
sum of 200 Mexican pesos, from which will be deducted the sum of 50 pesos is made as to
the costs of this instance.

RULINGS:
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists the moment that one or more
persons consent to be bound, with respect to another or others, to deliver something or to
render some service. Article 1255 provides that the contracting parties may establish such
covenants, terms, and conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals or public policy. Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact
remains that Perez rendered to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he
did this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, having accepted the benefit
of the service, to pay a just compensation therefor, by virtue of the innominate contract of
facio ut des implicitly established.

1
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

It must be also considered that there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the
services This gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make
compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render services as interpreter, on
the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts.
1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code). The supreme court of Spain in its decision of
February 12, 1889, holds, among other things, “that not only is there an express and tacit
consent which produces real contract but there is also a presumptive consent which is the
basis of quasi contracts, this giving rise to the multiple juridical relations which result in
obligations for the delivery of a thing or the rendition of a service.

19. Republic vs. de los Angeles, G. R. No. L-26112 (ERICA)

20. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542 (EVAN)

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: C.S. Gilchrrist

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: E.A. Cuddy, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano Zaldarriaga

DOCTRINE:
Knowledge of the identity of the injured party is not necessary to be liable for a tortious act.

FACTS:
Cuddy is the owner of a cinematographic film “Zigomar.” He leased it under a rental
contract to the plaintiff Gilchrist, the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo, for a
specified period of time or for a number of days beginning May 26.

In violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over the same film
under another rental contract, to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga. The arrangement
between Cuddy and the appellants Espejo and Zaldarriaga for the exhibition of the film by
the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks would
include and extend beyond May 26.
Gilchrist filed for injunction.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI - produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in
question in their theater during the period specified in the contract of Cuddy with Gilchrist

ISSUE:
Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though
they do not know the identity of Gilchrist- YES

RULING:
Yes. Espejo argues that at the time of contracting their lease of the film with Cuddy, they
had no knowledge about the identity of Gilchrist being the original renter of the film in the
original contract. Although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made,
know the identity of the plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the
existence of a contract in favor of someone In the case at bar the only motive for the
interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to
make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire;
but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and
causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable
to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such liability

2
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee
(Gilchrist) of the film.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages
to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done.
There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a
tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact,
the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in
order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.

One who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be
restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better
right.

1. Perez vs. Pumar, 2 Phil. 682 (MARK) SUPRA

2. Republic vs. de los Angeles, G. R. No. L-26112 (MUSTANG)

This case is an annulment of titles proceeding commenced by the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) before the CFI of Batangas against Ayala y Cia, Alfonso Zobel, Antonio Dizon,
Lucia Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Adelaida Reyes, Consolacion D. Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, and
Zenaida Dizon. The Republic alleged that the various titles of the defendants (private
respondents herein) illegally included portions of the territorial waters and lands of the
public domain when they caused the survey and preparation of a composite plan of
Hacienda Calatagan that increased its original area from 9,652.583 hectares (the land area
covered by TCT No. 722) to 12,000 hectares. Other than the annulment of titles, the
Republic also sought the recovery of possession of areas for which fishpond permits were
already issued. One Miguel Tolentino (Tolentino) and 22 other fish pond permitees
intervened in the case.
The CFI of Batangas (Judge Damaso S. Tengco) rendered its decision (CFI Decision) whose
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit
24) of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision
titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Catalagan over
the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which,
including the lots in T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363 and 182), are hereby
reverted to public dominion.

SC further ruled, however, that "there being no showing that defendants Dizons are
not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the
property until . . . reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land" and
that, accordingly, they "cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by
other parties on account of their" (Dizon's) "possession of the property."
Soon after SC decision had become final, the records of the case were returned to the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, which, on motion of the Republic and the Intervenors,
ordered, the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution.

3
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

However, respondents seek to justify the orders complained of upon the ground that the
dispositive part of SC decision is rather vague and requires a clarification, because:
. . . Since defendants Dizons were held not liable for the alleged damages, it follows that the
joint and several character of the obligation imposed by this Honorable Court was
extinguished, because the other defendants herein will no longer be able to claim from
defendants Dizons the share which corresponds to the latter (2nd par., Art. 1217, Civil
Code).
This contention is absolutely devoid of merit. To begin with, Art. 1217 of our Civil Code,
cited by respondents, refers to the effect of payment by one of the solidary debtors. No
such payment having been made in the case at bar, said Article is clearly inapplicable
thereto. The only provision which respondents might have had in mind (on the assumption
that their reference to Art. 1217 was due merely to a misprint) is Art. 1215 of said code,
reading:
. . . Novation compensation, confusion or remission of the debt made by any of the solidary
creditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.
The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well
Issue: WON Dizon should be included to pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory
damages? (NO)
Contention is absolutely devoid of merit. To begin with, Art. 1217 of our Civil Code,
cited by respondents, refers to the effect of payment by one of the solidary
debtors. No such payment having been made in the case at bar, said Article is clearly
inapplicable thereto. The only provision which respondents might have had in mind (on the
assumption that their reference to Art. 1217 was due merely to a misprint) is Art. 1215 of
said code, reading:

. . . Novation compensation, confusion or remission of the debt made by any of the solidary
creditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.

The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects
the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding
to them.

Neither is this Article in point. The aforementioned decision of this Court cannot be
regarded as remitting a solidary obligation of the Dizons, because, as possessors
in good faith, they were and are entitled by law to retain the property in question,
until the indemnity due to them is paid. In other words, they were never under
obligation to pay damages to Tolentino either jointly or solidarily, and, hence,
there was no solidary obligation on their part that could have been remitted. The
decision of the Court of First Instance holding all of the defendants herein jointly and
solidarity liable for the payment of said damages, did not create a solidary obligation. It was
no more than an attempt to declare the existence of said obligation, which attempt — not
the solidary obligation — was frustrated by our decision establishing that such obligation did
not and does not exist.

4
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

In this connection, it should be noted that the dispositive part of the decision of the lower
court, which was the object of the appeal in G.R. No. L-20950, provided:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(c) Ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino
compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of lot 360 from March
11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;

This decision was affirmed by us, except as regards subdivision (c) thereof, which should be
deemed modified so as to read, in effect, as follows:

(c) Ordering all the defendants, except the Dizons, to jointly and severally pay intervenor
Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of lot
360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;

and, except also, insofar as the Dizons have — pursuant to the decision, as amended — the
right of retention therein stated.

It may not be amiss to add that it is the ministerial duty of respondent Judge to order the
issuance of the writ of execution of the aforementioned decision, as modified by this Court,
even if said respondent entertained the doubts pointed out in the orders complained of.

Petitioners seek to recover from respondents herein, as moral, actual and exemplary
damages, the sum of P80,000, for having been deprived of the use and possession of the
portions of the territorial waters above referred to, and P100,000, "for (respondents')
having unduly prolonged this litigation" by resorting to technical devices "to prevent the
enforcement of the final decision against them." These claims cannot be upheld: the first,
for P80,000, because the damages resulting from said deprivation of use and possession
have already been adjudicated in the decision in question; and the second, for P100,000,
because the undue delay was mainly due to the action of the lower court. Besides, an action
for certiorari and mandamus, before this Court, is not a proceeding suitable for the
determination of the latter damages.

3. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542 (SUPRA / SKIP)

CHAPTER II - NEGLIGENCE
pp 27-50 - Read the discussion very carefully

Statutory basis and requisites

NCC Art. 1157 (SIGRID)

1. Sagrado Orden de Precadores vs. Nacoco, 91 Phil. 503 (SIGRID)

2. Navales vs. Rios, 8 Phil. 508 (YANA)

5
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

DOCTRINE: When there exists no proof that a contract was entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter performed any illegal act or omission, or
other acts or omissions in which any kind of fault or negligence occurred from any of which
an obligation to indemnify the plaintiff could have arisen, a claim for damages can not be
sustained under any consideration, there being no right of action.

FACTS: In 1904, Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu against Eulogia
Rias and Maximo Requiroso, claiming that they should pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos as
damages. He alleged that the said defendants, without due cause, ordered the pulling down
and destruction of his house erected in Daanbuangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu, which
was built of wood with a nipa roof, and worth 1,000 pesos, which amount he expended in its
construction. He further alleged that he had not obtained any reimbursement from the
defendants, and that by reason of their refusal he had been prejudiced to the extent of 200
pesos.

The defendants denied all the allegations and asked that judgment be entered dismissing
the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. The destructed was from the virtue of the
decision of the justice in the action instituted by the said Eulogia Rias against the owner of
the house, Vicente Navales. The deputy sheriff who carried the judgment into execution was
obliged to destroy the said house and remove it from the land, according to the usual
procedure in the action for ejectment.

CFI: Declare that the decision entered by the justice of the peace of Naga, and the order
given by virtue thereof were illegal, as well as the action of the deputy sheriff Luciano
Bacayo, that the defendants were thereby liable for the damages caused to the plaintiff,
'which amounted to 500 pesos, and that the defendants were sentenced to pay the said
sum to the plaintiff, with costs.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled for damages -- NO.

HELD: No. The judgment rendered by the justice of peace for the ejectment of the house of
Navales, not having been appealed from, had become final. There was no reason why it
should not be enforced when it had already become final and acquired by the nature of res
judicata.

When the illegality of the judgment rendered by the justice of peace and the acts performed
by the sheriff in compliance therewith has not been proven, it is presumed that the official
duty has been regularly performed.

No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and
the defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or omissions or incurred in any
kind of fault or negligence, from any of which an obligation might have arisen on the part of
the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason, the claim for indemnity, on
account of acts performed by the sheriff while enforcing a judgment, cannot under any
consideration be sustained. Therefore, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the
judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint for damages filed
by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed
without special ruling as to costs. So ordered.

Art. 2176 (APPLE)

Requisites

6
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

Elements of quasi-delict as follows:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff;
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

3. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 19 Phil 8 (APPLE)

FACTS:
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of
the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical
drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained
employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at
a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence,
taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

On September 30, 1905, David together with Manuel Claparols, crossed the footbridge to
the Isla del Provisor to visit Murphy, one of the employees of Manila Light, who promised to
make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. (YAAAS! genius tlga silang dalawang bata for
their age 15 and 12). After finding out that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, they spent
some time wandering around the company’s premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal,
they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. They found some 20-30 brass
fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They are intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After
some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys
picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them
home; on their way home, they stumble upon Jessie Adrian, 9yrs old and went to the home
of Manuel.

The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps, until they opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches,
and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion
followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.

Jessie – got a slight cut in the neck

Manuel – had his hand burned and wounded
David –was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured
his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.

7
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to
children, they are liable for damages due to the company’s negligence.

Arguments of Taylor’s counsel:

· From the records, it appears, that months before the accident, during the construction
of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the
boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were
found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly
caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort
William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have
been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem
to have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish
heap.
· No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or
prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt
disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel’s brief, “it is undoubtedly true that
children in their play sometimes crossed the footbridge to the islands;” and, we may add,
roamed about at will on the enclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the
place where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid
these children from visiting the defendant company’s premises, although it must be
assumed that the company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not
infrequently did so.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages –No.

RULING:
The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps,
which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor.
However, the causal connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries
sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor, which led to the
explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to
explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.

Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able
to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge
the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a
match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can
there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous.

8
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding
to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

The doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this
court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra),
wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated,"
on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty"
(decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated
in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain
"define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and
we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such
cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of
proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the
acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.

It is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion,
the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the
contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover."

4. Gregorio vs. CA, G.R. No. 1979799, Sept. 11, 2009 (EDWARD)
5. Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco, G.R. No. 160795, June
27,2008 (ERICA)
6. American Express vs. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, October 14, 2005 (EVAN)
FACTS:
· American Express International (AEI) was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to
purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers.
· Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An
extension charge card, was likewise issued to respondent in the name of Noel Cordero which he also
signed.
· On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his family went on a three-day holiday trip to
Hong Kong. The group went to the Watson’s Chemist Shop. While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies
and handed his American Express extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases.
· Susan Chong, the store manager, upon verification of the card with AEI, informed respondent
that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a
pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda
had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.
· According to AEI there was a prior incident on November 01, 1991, where someone tried to use a
credit card with the same number as the respondents’ card. Hence the card was placed in the Inspect
Airwarn Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the company and the
cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is
placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the
true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved.
Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.

9
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

· Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. He
prayed for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of
the humiliation he suffered. According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to
that of respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the
“confiscation and cutting of respondent’s extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for
which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
· RTC: In favor of respondent spouses. Proximate cause of the injury is the inexcusable failure of
defendant bank to inform plaintiff regarding the November 1, 1991 despite the sufficient time.
· CA: Affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the public humiliation allegedly suffered by Cordero
to AEI – YES
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable to Cordero for moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees - YES

RATIO:
· In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply
· To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent
· The Court ruled that there was no tort amounting to breach of contract in this case. Petitioner can
revoke respondent’s card without notice according to the membership agreement.
· Also, the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to
petitioner’s representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent
himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the card.
· Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If at
all, the cause of respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s
representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that,
therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

7. Peter Paul Patrick Lucas vs. Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuano, G.R. No. 178762,
April 21 2009 (MARK)

DOCTRINE(S): In a medical negligence suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree
of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a
proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.There is breach of
duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending
physician when the patient is injured in body or in health constitutes the actionable malpractice.

FACTS: Herein petitioner, Peter Lucas, first consulted respondent, Dr. Tuaño, on a complaint of
soreness and redness on his right eye. The respondent, after a series of examinations, found

10
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

that the former was suffering from conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” and prescribed the use of the
Spersacet-C. However, after the petitioner’s condition seemed to have worsened, he sought for
the respondent’s second finding wherein the latter said that his condition had progressed to
Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. The respondent then prescribed the use
of Maxitrol, a steroid-based eye drop. The petitioner’s condition worsened over time, yet he
obediently complied with all the prescriptions and orders of the respondent.
Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from significant swelling of his right
eyeball,headaches, nausea and blindness on this right eye, he sought for the opinion of another
doctor, Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino found that the petitioner had been suffering from glaucoma and
needed to undergo laser surgery, lest he might suffer from total blindness.After reading the
literature on the use of the medicine Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the petitioners herein and Peter
Lucas’ wife, read that one of the adverse effects of prolonged use of steroid-based eye drops
could possibly be glaucoma. Peter, Fatima, and their two children instituted a civil case for
damages against herein respondent for medical malpractice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners amply proved that Dr. Tuaño failed to exercise diligence
in the performance of his duty as petitioner Peter Lucas’ physician.

RULING: NO. Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuaño under the
circumstances, the Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate the attendant facts of the
case at hand to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted
negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation. In medical negligence
cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship
between the doctor and the victim.
But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2)
breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four
(4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for
damages.As the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care as that of any
other reasonably competent physician would use in the treatment of his patient, said standard
level of care, skill and diligence must likewise be proven by expert medical testimony, because
the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
experts in the field. The same is outside the ken of the average layperson.There is breach of
duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending
physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable
malpractice. Hence, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician isinsufficient.
Rather, the negligence of the physician must be the proximate cause of the injury.

8. Garcia, Jr. vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007 (MUSTANG)

Facts:

Ranida Salvador worked as a trainee in the accounting department of Limay Bulk Handling
Terminal. As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical exam at the
Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia, a medical technologies conducted the HBs Ag
(Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and issued the test result indicating that Ranida was “HBs
Ag: Reactive.” The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the
rubber stamp signature of Bu Castro as pathologist.

11
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

When Ranida submitted the result to company physician Dr. Sto. Domingo, the latter told
her that the result indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Based on
the the doctor’s medical report, the company terminated Ranida’s employment for failing
the physical exam.

When she informed her father Ramon, he suffered a heard attack and was confined at
Bataan Doctors Hospital. During her father’s confinement, she had another HBs Ag test at
the same hospital. The result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo
but was told that the test by the CDC was more reliable because it used the Mirco-Elisa
Method.

She went back to CDC for confirmatory testing and the Anti-HBs test conducted on her had
a Negative result. She also had another test at the hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method
and the result indicated that she was non-reactive.

She submitted both results to the Executive Officer of the company who requested her to
undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be considered. The CDC
conducted another test which indicated a Negative result. The Med-Tech OIC of CDC issued
a certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining med tech Garcia
interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or negative.

The company rehired Ranida. She then filed a complaint for damages against Garcia and an
unknown pathologist of CDC. She claimed that because of the erroneous interpretation of
the results of the examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety,
trauma, sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities. In
an amended complaint, she named Castro as the pathologist.

Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the
scientific explanation for the “false positive” result of the first HBs Ag tests in a letter to the
respondents.

Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his
rubber-stamp signature.

RTC dismissed the complaint because the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and found Garcial
liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. The appellate court
exonerated Castro for lack of participation.

ISSUE: Whether Castro has been negligent in issuing the test result and thus liable for
damages

HELD
YES.

12
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of
negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.

Thus, the elements of actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4)
proximate causation.

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well
as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the
people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately
supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical
laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high
standards of performance are expected from them.

In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person
the duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to
whoever may be injured thereby.

From provisions RA 4688, otherwise known as the The Clinical Laboratory Law, it is clear
that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed
physician authorized by the Sec. of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in
methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the
supervision of the pathologist or licensed physician; and that the results of any examination
may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the
direction of the laboratory pathologist.

These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of
substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly
supervised. The public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of
clinical laboratory examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws
and regulations.

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First: CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required
by law.
Second: Garcia conducted the HBs Ag test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro.
Third: The HBs Ag test result was released to Ranida without the authorization of
defendant-appellee Castro.

13
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequence which followed after the release of
the test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and
issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission
constitutes a breach of duty.

Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply

with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service
for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was
compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper
safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing
the clinical report.

Art. 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was
incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damages
because another has violated some legal provision.

9. Air France vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966 (SIGRID)
FACTS
● On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome.
● From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that
he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was
a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
● When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

ISSUE: Whether Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles
to damages?

● Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received
from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said
respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride,
but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
● If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class
seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline.
What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an

14
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and
say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a
schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a
uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to
believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
● Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he
had no seat or, if another had a better right to the seat?
● To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad
faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts
and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the
relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment
thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

● Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.

10. Petrophil Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 122796, December 10, 2001 (YANA)

LAWS APPLIED: Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
damage done.

Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a
specific person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful
act of another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer.

FACTS: Petrophil Corporation, petitioner, entered into contract with private respondent Dr.
Amanda Ternida-Cruz, for hauling and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products
of Petrophil. The contract provided among others, that Petrophil could terminate the
contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance or
abandonment. Par 11 of the contract stipulated that the contract shall be for an indefinite
period, provided that Petrophil may terminate at any time with 30 days prior written notice.
Annexed to the contract was the Penalty Clause which contained calibrated penal sanctions
for infractions that may be committed by Dr. Cruz and/or her employees.
Petrophil through its operations manager advised Dr. Cruz that Petrophil was terminating its
contract in accordance of Par 11. Dr Cruz appealed to Petrophil but was denied.

15
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

Dr. Cruz filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40930 on the RTC Manila, seeking
Petrophil the nullity of the termination of the contract and declaring its suspension as
unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions. Other private respondents herein,
Jessie de Vera, Marcial Mulig, Antonio and Rufino Cuenca, all tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz,
also filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil Operations Manager Antonio Santos,
Pandacan Terminal Manager Crispino A. de Castro, and Pandacan Terminal Superintendent
Jaime Tamayo.
During the hearing;
● Dr Cruz claimed that the termination of her hauling contract was a retaliation against
her for allegedly sympathizing with the then striking Petrophil employees and for
informing the PNOC president of anomalies perpetrated by some of its officers and
employees.
● Driver Jessie de Vera corroborated these allegations and said that the termination of
Dr. Cruz's contract was intended to silence her. Further, he testified that before the
termination of the contract, Petrophil officials reduced their hauling trips to make life
harder for them so that they would resign from Dr: Cruz's employ, which in turn
would result in the closure of her business.
● Petitioner denied that Petrophil officials were out to starve Dr. Cruz's drivers for their
support of her. Additionally, witnesses for Petrophil testified that on April 25, 1987,
there was a strike at the Pandacan terminal and Dr. Cruz and her husband were at
the picket line. They refused to load petroleum products, resulting in the disruption
of delivery to service stations in Metro Manila and in the provinces, which in turn
resulted in loss of sales and revenues. Because of Dr. Cruz's refusal to load, the
management terminated the hauling contract.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would
entitle Dr. Cruz to damages.

HELD: Yes. The termination of contract appeared to be a retaliation or punishment for her
sympathizing to the striking employees. The petitioner did not ask her (Dr. Cruz) to explain
her actions. Even if Petrophil have the right to terminate the contract, the Petitioner could
not act purposely to injure the respondent.
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done.
Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a
consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs
and ,consequently suffered loss of income. Note that under Article 20, there is no
requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a person
suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could
be demanded from the wrongdoer.20The appellate court did not err, given the circumstances
of this case, in awarding damages to respondent-drivers.

11. Receiver for North Negros Sugar vs. Ybanez, 24 SCRA 979 (APPLE)

FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants Pedro V. Ybañez and Rosario V. Ybañez, named respondents in the
instant petition, are the brother and sister, respectively, and immediate heirs of Cesar V.
Ybañez

Cesar V. Ybañez who was one of two persons who died as a result of the collision between
the car he was riding and being driven by Gil Dominguez, and train No. 5, owned by the
North Negros Sugar Company, Inc., in the evening of August 31, 1937 in the railroad

16
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

intersection at Hacienda Santa Teresa, Manapla, Occidental Negros, while the car was on its
way from Bacolod City to Cadiz.

A criminal prosecution for double homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was instituted against Gil Dominguez, driver of the car, and Primitivo Gustilo
and Loreto Perez, operator and brakeman, respectively, of the locomotive. The offended
parties reserved their right to institute separate civil actions for damages. Primitivo Gustilo
and Loreto Perez were tried together and acquitted of the crime charged. Gil Dominguez
was also acquitted in a separate trial.

On May 15, 1940, a civil action based on culpa aquiliana was instituted in the CFI of Negros
Occidental by Pedro V. Ybañez and Rosario V. Ybañez against Primitivo Gustilo, Loreto
Perez, and their employer, North Negros Sugar Company, Inc., seeking to recover damages
for the death of the deceased.

The defendants interposed as special defense the previous acquittal of defendants Primitivo
Gustilo and Loreto Perez in the criminal case, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

TC: dismissed the case.

CA: reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

During the pendency of the case in the lower court, plaintiff Rosario V. Ybañez died, leaving
as her only heir, co-plaintiff Pedro V. Ybañez, to continue the case. On the other hand, the
North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. was dissolved and was accordingly substituted by its
receiver Dr. Claudio R. Luzurriaga. One of the defendants, Loreto Perez, also died in the
interim and the case against him was dismissed.

CFI: dismissed the case

CA: reversed the judgment of the lower court and held the North Negros Sugar Company,
Inc. liable for the death of Cesar V. Ybañez, ordering it to pay plaintiff-appellant Pedro V.
Ybañez damages

Petitioner’s contention:
· Petitioner cites paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the new Civil Code, which provides that
in case of death caused by a crime or quasi-delict, only the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Petitioner urges that in the instant
case the heirs of the deceased Cesar V. Ybañez, being his brother, Pedro V. Ybañez, and his
sister, Rosario V. Ybañez (now deceased), are not among those entitled to moral damages;
consequently, the award to them of moral damages was not authorized by law.

Respondent’s contention:
· The law applicable is in the old Civil Code, and not Article 2206 of the new Civil Code,
because the accident that caused the death happened in 1937, and the case was filed in
1940.
· The award of moral damages is authorized particularly under Articles 1902, 1903,
1103, 1104, 1106 and 1107 of the old Civil Code, and as ruled by this Court in the decisions
in Lilius vs. Manila Railroad;4 Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez;5 and Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Inc.6
Moral damages, respondent urges, should be paid to the injured person; but if the injured
person died as a consequence of the culpable act and the victim left no descendants or
ascendants, the damages must be paid — taking into consideration the principles of the
general law on damages, of the law on succession, and the fact that under the old Civil
Code no specific persons are indicated to be the only ones entitled to recover moral

17
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

damages — to the heirs or next of kin of the victim. Respondent further cites the rulings of
this Court in the cases of Bernal vs. House, et al.; Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.8; and
Manzanares vs. Moreta9, wherein the fact of heirship, as viewed from the general principle
of succession of the deceased victim, was taken into consideration in determining who
would be paid the indemnity for damages.

In reply, petitioner points out that although the cases cited by respondent show that moral
damages were awarded even before the new Civil Code took effect, in none of the cases
cited, however, were moral damages awarded to a brother or sister of the deceased, but
only to either the victim himself, the surviving spouses, the children or the parents.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the old Civil Code or of the new Civil Code applies to the case at
hand –Old Civil Code should apply.
Whether or not Pedro V. Ybañez can recover damages for the death of the deceased –No.

RULING:
As to the payment of damages
This Court said: "Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or
omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for
the damage done . . . a person is liable for damage done to another by any culpable act;
and by culpable act is meant any act which is blameworthy when judged by accepted legal
standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational
conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society.

The word "damage" in said article, comprehending as it does all that are embraced in its
meaning, includes any and all damages that a human being may suffer in any and all the
manifestations of his life: physical or material, moral or psychological, mental or spiritual,
financial, economic, social, political, and religious.

It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of the obligation to
pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article does not limit or specify the
active subjects, much less the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa
aquiliana and the person who may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in
principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana whether a relative or not of
the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor.

It may well be said that culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, is punished both by the old Civil
Code — the previous legislation — and by the new Civil Code. But, as we have pointed out,
a less severe sanction, or penalty, for culpa aquiliana is provided for in the new Civil Code.
It follows, therefore, that Article 2206 of the new Civil Code — which provides that only the
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased caused by quasi-delict
— should be applied in the instant case. Hence, petitioner herein, who claims moral
damages for the death of his brother Cesar V. Ybañez caused by quasi-delict, is not entitled
to, and should not have been awarded, moral damages, by the Court of Appeals.

As to the payment of Attorney’s fees

The refusal of herein petitioner to pay the damages asked, although the case was finally
decided against it, cannot be said to have been caused by bad faith.

18
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

At common law, the successful party usually has no right to have the fees of his attorney,
as such, taxed against his opponent (14 L. ed. 181). The Court will not ordinarily allow
counsel fees to the successful party. Each party to the action must pay his own lawyer . . . .
Counsel fees paid in prior action have been allowed . . . (where) the conduct of the party
against whom they were allowed, so directly and certainly caused the expenditure for this
purpose, that the loss of the amount so paid was easily within such causal relations to the
defendant's wrong as to warrant the assessment of the damages in compensation for it

12. Garcia Rueda vs. Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141, Sept. 5, 1997 (EDWARD)
13. Cruz vs. CA, 282 SCRA 188 (ERICA)
14. Rakes vs. AG&P, 7 Phil. 359 (EVAN)

FACTS:
- The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant,
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near
the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which
were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails
lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to
prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were
either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were
also in front, hauling by a rope.
- At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee.
- The sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate occasion of
the accident, was due to the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the
water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. It appeared that a day before the accident the
attention of the defendant’s foreman was called by one of the laborers to the defect in the
track but the same was not repaired. Action was instituted by plaintiff to recover damages
from his employer the defendant. One of the questions was whether under the facts the
defendant was negligent or not.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable - YES

RULING:
- On the principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in
reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is
plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not
have occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.”
- The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in
fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with
carelessness: (1) First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work; and (2) Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead
of along the boards, either before or behind it.
- The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that
not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that

19
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by
the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the
starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order
being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself
in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its
primary cause.
- Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or
the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.

NOTES:
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for
injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against
the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his

employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
"Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the
negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

15. Barredo & Garcia vs. Almario, 73 Phils. 607 (MARK)

FACTS: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby
killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against
Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually
convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the
taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code
(negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been
filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: NO. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right
to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to
overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for
damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

20
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

16. FEBTC vs. CA, 240 SCRA 348 (MUSTANG)

FACTS:

Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast card issued by
petitioner FEBTC.

Clarita informed FEBTC that she lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita
submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security
procedures and policy would be torecord the lost card, along with the principal card, as a
"HotCard" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. When he presented his fareast card
to pay for the lunch, the card was not honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally,
Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.

Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of
damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies,
admitting that they have failed to inform Luis about its security policy.

Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, which rendered a
decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral damages.

HELD:
NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown
to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.

Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. The failure to
inform Luis is not considered to be so gross that it would amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliguity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in
that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill-will.

Article 21 of the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In relation to a breach
of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his
contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no
less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a
general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific

21
Pokemon / Torts and Damages August 16, 2018
Atty. Ayo 3:45-5:45 PM

provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa
contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.

The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private
respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay nominal damages sanctioned under
Article 2221 of the Civil Code

22