FERDINAND MARCOS vs.

RAUL MANGLAPUS
FACTS: February 1986, Ferdinad Marcos was deposed from Presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and forced into exile. On August 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the
February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. The
armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements in the military establishment and
among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to
Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. However, Mrs. Aquino firmly decided to bar the return of the Marcoses
considering the dire consequences to the nation for their return.

ISSUE: WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

HELD: YES, the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning which has
been recognized by the member of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the HR
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines “as a genuine unselfish gesture for true
national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for
human rights under the Constitution and our laws.” The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the Constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative
to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

IT STILL DEPENDS ON THE PRESIDENT WHETHER IT MUST BE GRANTED OR DENIED. The

President determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still
nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.

JOSEPH ESTRADA vs. GLORIA ARROYO

FACTS: In 1998 national elections, Estrada was elected the President while Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
From the beginning of the term, Estrada was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded
his popularity. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender and the first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power to Arroyo started. After taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers and duties of the Presidency. Arroyo appointed member of her cabinet as well as ambassadors and
special envoys. Estrada filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
prayed for judgment “confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring Arroyo to have taken her oath
as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
constitution.

ISSUE: WON Estrada is a President on leave while Arroyo is only an Acting President.

HELD: NO, instead, he resigned as the President of the Philippines. The intent to resign is clear when he said
“ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “Ayoko na” are the words of resignation. Also, it was confirmed by his
leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement,
 1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President of the Republic
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of Presidency, for the sake of peace and order to
begin the healing process of our nation
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country
5. And called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity

ULPIANO SARMIENTO III vs. SALVADOR MISON

FACTS: The petitioners seek to enjoin Mison from performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague as Secretary of DBM, from effecting disbursements in
payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments. It is based on the ground that Mison’s appointment as the
Commissioner is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE: WON the Commissioner of Customs is subject to the confirmation of COA

HELD: NO. The position of Commission of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head0 is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where consent of the COA is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately
excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent/confirmation of COA.
Therefore, the President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Mison without
submitting his nomination to the COA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

ARTURO DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

FACTS: After the compulsory retirement of former CJ Reynato Puno, the position of CJ was left vacant. The
JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application and recommendation upon the request of Cong. Matias
Defensor (ex officio member of JBC). They automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the 5
most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court. Others either applied or were nominated.

The JBC has yet to take position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing authority (Sec 4(1) Art
VIII and Sec 15 Art VII of the Constitution; and Sec 261 (g) Art XXII of the OEC). The OSG contends that the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of CJ Puno upon his retirement because under Sec 15 Art VII of
the constitution does not apply to appointments in the SC.

Issue: WON the President can appoint the successor of a Chief Justice

HELD: YES, and that the prohibition under Sec 15, Art VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments in the Judiciary. The filling up of vacancies in important positions,
if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for
the appointment and appointee’s qualification may undoubtedly be permitted. If the framers of the constitution
intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of CJ, theny they should have expressly stated in the
Constitution.
 MA. J. ANGELINA MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO BENIPAYO
FACTS: The Comelec En Banc appointed Matibag as “Acting Director IV” of the EID which was renewed by
then Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a “temporary” capacity. President Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as Comelec Chairman for a term of 7 years and submitted to the COA the ad interim appointments for
confirmations. However, COA did not act on said appointments. President Arroyo renewed again the ad
interim appointments. The Congress adjourned before the COA could act on their appointments. President
Arroyo renewed again said appointments and submitted such for the COA’s confirmation. Benipayo wanted for
the reassignment of Matibag to the law department which was subsequently objected by Commissioner Sadain.
Matibag reminding heads of government offices that “transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the
election period” but it was denied by Benipayo. Matibag filed an administrative and criminal complaint against
Benipayo alleging that her reassignment violated Sec 261 (h) of the OEC and other pertinent laws, rules and
regulations.

During the pendency of the case before the law dept, Matibag filed a petition questioning the
appointment of benipayo as Chairman of the Comelec. She claimed that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of Comelec, as well as on the prohibitions
on temporary appointments and reappointments of its chairman and members.

ISSUE: WON the ad interim appointment of Benipayo issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Sec 1 (2) Art. IX-C of the Constitution

HELD: NO. An ad interim appointment means permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess and not a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked
at any time. It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the president once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the COA or until the next adjournment of Congress. Thus, the appointee can at once
assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office.

FRANKLIN DRILON vs. ALFREDO LIM

FACTS: The Secretary of Justice declared Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and that certain provisions are contrary to
law and public policy. The RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding that the procedural requirements had been observed. It also declared Sec 187 of the
Loc. Gov. Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Sec of Justice of the power of control
over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of
the specific provision therein conferring on the President only the power of supervision over local
governments.

ISSUE: WON there was a delegation of control power to the local government

HELD: There was none. Sec Drilon was performing his function in accordance with the law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the LGC. It was only an act of mere supervision and not of control. An officer in control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
 undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO ZAMORA

FACTS: The President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Sec of National Defense, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, Chief of PNP, and the Sec of DILG were tasked to execute and implement the said order. The
President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines. Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. And that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.

The IBP filed a petition to annul LOI and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional. However, the OSG defended the constitutionality of the act of President
deploying the Marines and does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the calling of the AFP to assist PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the Civilian Supremacy
Clause

HELD: NO. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe
the civilian character of the PNP. The calling of marines constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marine in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed and limited under the provisions of LOI. Also, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it
amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of the law enforcement.

PANFILO LACSON vs. HERNANDO PEREZ

FACTS: President Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly weapons” assaulting and attempting to break into Malacanang,
issues Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a State of Rebellion in the NCR. She likewise
directed the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were effected.

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. The
Secretary of Justice denied that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection
with the “rebellion,” but what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement and military agencies
to implement Proclamation No. 38.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid exercise of military power

GR 147780 – The writ of habeas corpus is not called for since its purpose is to relieve the petitioners from
unlawful restraint
GR 147781 – Petitioner Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a
warrant and that the authorities in fact categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a
warrant

GR 147799 - The declaration of a “state of rebellion” is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers
because Sec 18 Art VII of the Constitution expressly provides that the President may call out such
armed forces when necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion

GR 147810 – LDP is not a real party in interest. LDP is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters
are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.

B/GEN FRANCISCO GUDANI vs. LT./GEN. GENEROSO SENGA

FACTS: The Senate invited Gudani and Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing
of the “Hello Garci” tapes. President Arroyo issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen Senga issued memorandum, prohibiting Gudani, Balutan et al. from
appearing before the Senate committee without Presidential approval. However, the 2 appeared before
the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the 2 were relieved of
their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the “Chain of Command.” Senga
ordered them to be subjected to Court Martial proceedings for wilfully violating an order of a superior
officer.

ISSUE: WON President may prevent a member of the AFP from testifying before a legislative inquiry

HELD: YES. The President as Commander-in-Chief has absolute authority over persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces. Significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected in the military.
Preventing military officers from testifying before Congress springs from Executive power as the
Commander-in-Chief, not executive privilege.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO ERMITA

FACTS: The Senate prompted to conduct a public hearing to investigate the alleged anomalies in the
overpricing in the National Rail Project. The investigating Senate Committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before as resource persons. Ermita submitted
that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. President Arroyo issued EO 464 prohibiting Department heads, senior
officials of executive departments who are covered in executive privilege. The department head and
military officers who were invited by the Committee invoked EO 464 to except themselves.

ISSUE: WON department heads may exempt themselves from the inquiries in aid of legislation

HELD: NO. The only way for the department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by mere fact that they are department heads. It is only the President
which may be exempted from this power (except impeachment). The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Sec 1, limited as it is only to question hour is valid in its face. Under Sec 22
Art VI of the Constitution, the appearance for the dept heads is discretionary on their part. Congress is
 not bound in such instances to respect the refusal the refusal of the dept head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently mad, either by the President or Exec Sec.

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN vs. RONALDO PUNO

FACTS: The day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, President Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946 placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the city of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
She also issued administrative order transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. But due to some issues raised, she amended her order by “delegating” instead of
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM to DILG.

The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy and the
Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative
supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace
them. And that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, most especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes invalid exercise of President’s
emergency powers.

However, the OSG insisted that such proclamation does not deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to
restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her “calling out”
power as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18 (1) of Art VII of the Constitution. Also, she merely
delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Sec who was her alter ego through
admin orders which is said to be necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.

ISSUE: WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City

HELD: NO. Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers. The President did not proclaim
a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant
to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a Congressional authority to exercise the same. She called out
the AFP to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

SALVACION MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR.

FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto and three other accused, of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify
the government. While the appeal is pending, President Marcos extended absolute pardon to Monsanto
which she accepted. By reason of pardon, she wrote the Calbuyog City Treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The Finance
Ministry ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without necessity of a new appointment not
earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. However, when the letter of the petitioner
 was referred to the Office of the President through Deputy Executive Sec Factoran, it was reversed and
held that she is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of absolute pardon granted her but
must secure an appointment to her former position.

ISSUE: WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment

HELD: NO. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the RPC for estafa through falsification of public documents. When her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, thus particular disability was likewise removed. Hence,
petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction.
The pardon granted to her has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.

RODOLFO LLAMAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS

FACTS: Rodolfo Llamas was the incumbent Vice-Governor of Tarlac and by virtue of the decision of the
Office of the President, he assumed the governorship because Mariano Ocampo III was suspended from
office for a period of 90 days. Oscar Orbos was impleaded for the issuance, by authority of President,
the assailed resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Ocampo was charged with alleged
violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and other appropriate laws.

Llamas contended that Ocampo, in his capacity as Tarlac Governor, entered into and executed a Loan
Agreement with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation Inc. (LTFI), a non-stock and non-profit organization
headed by Ocampo himself and controlled by his brother-in-law. Also, the said Loan Agreement was
never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board. However, Ocampo contended that the funds
were intended to generate livelihood projects among residents of Tarlac and he resigned from the said
foundation in order to forestall any suspicion. But the Sec. of DILG held in favour of Llamas.

Ocampo issued an administrative order which signified his intention to reassume the governorship
without any notification made to Llamas. Llamas alleged that the executive clemency cannot apply to
him and it was the “product of hocus-pocus strategy” because there was allegedly no real petition for the
grant of executive clemency filed by Ocampo.

ISSUE: WON the President has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases

HELD: YES. If the President can grant reprieves, commutation and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which
are less serious than criminal offenses. In fact, there are number of laws impliedly or expressly
recognize or support the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases.

DENR vs. DENR EMPLOYEES

FACTS: Gaddi issued a memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The employees thereof filed a petition for nullity of orders
with prayer for preliminary injunction. The RTC issued TRO enjoining the petitioner from
implementing the assailed memorandum.
ISSUE: WON DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize DENR

HELD: YES. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Sec, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.