LAGON v.
CA latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Ton
R. No. 119107; March 18, 2005
CTS:
vate respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for
s and damages against petitioner Jose Lagon before the
gional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat. In the complaint,
vate respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered
o a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi
ngelen Guiabar over three parcels of land in Sultan
darat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the provisions
eed upon was for private respondent to put up
mmercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new
ants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer
the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai
nina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease
tract ended but since the construction of the commercial
ldings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was
gedly renewed.
en Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started
mitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her
ate. But when the administrator advised him to stop
ecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
structed, he discovered that petitioner, representing
self as the new owner of the property, had been collecting
tals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating
leasehold rights over
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that
induced the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to h
contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to
off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfer
with private respondents leasehold rights as there was
lease contract covering the property when he purchased
that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no cla
or encumbrances on the subject lots. Petitioner claimed t
before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjam
Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contr
between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verif
the parties indeed renewed the lease contract after it expi
in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo showed him f
copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsign
Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to
unwarranted, petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed
the payment of actual and moral damages. The court a q
found for private respondent. Petitioner appealed
judgment to the Court of Appeals. The appellate co
modified the assailed judgment of the trial court as to
amount of damag
UE: WON the purchase by petitioner of the subject contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization there
perty, during the supposed existence of private however, only proved its due execution and delivery but
pondents lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, the veracity of its conte
stituted tortuous interference for which petitioner should
held liable for damages. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petition
counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid a
LD: No subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presen
icle 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third in court appeared to be incontestable proof that priv
son who induces another to violate his contract shall be respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renew
ble for damages to the other contracting party. The tort their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome
ognized in that provision is known as interference with clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized docum
tractual relations. The interference is penalized because it continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that g
ates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the rise to its execution and delive
nefits that should result therefrom
KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE THIRD PERSON
e Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRA
wn the elements of tortuous interference with contractual Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essen
ations: element to state a cause of action for tortious interference
existence of a valid contract; defendant in such a case cannot be made liable
knowledge on the part of the third person of the interfering with a contract he is unaware of. While it is
stence of the contract and necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless
interference of the third person without legal aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inqu
tification or excuse will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relati
and rights of the parties in the contr
EXISTENCE OF A VALID CONTRACT
prove this, private respondent presented in court a In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of
arized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Se

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

wise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease
tract.
er a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention
petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own personal
estigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious
umstance that would have made a cautious man probe
eper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the
perty. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no
ication of the leasehold interest of private respondent.
n the registry of property had no record of the same
NTERFERENCE OF THE THIRD PERSON W/O LEGAL
STIFICATION
sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant
st have acted with malice or must have been driven by
ely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other
rds, his act of interference cannot be justified.
e records do not support the allegation of private
pondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina
pi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers to
uations where a person causes another to choose one
urse of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.
e records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai
nina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influe
their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer
evidence to support his cla
In short, even assuming that private respondent was able
prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Se
the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad fa
on the part of petitioner in purchasing the prope
Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was ne
established.
In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference
be justified at all if the interferer acts for the sole purpose
furthering a personal financial interest, but without malice
bad faith. As the Court explained
x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with
business relations of another exists where the actors motiv
to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where
actors motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to t
some authorities believe that it is not necessary that
interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights
invaded, and that an individual acts under an econo
interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such t
wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he act
self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting o
financial position should not be made to depend on
comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter w
t of the others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct injured person alone since the law affords no remedy
in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful damages resulting from an act which does not amount
tives. legal injury or wrong. Indeed, lack of malice in the cond
complained of precludes recovery of damages.
e foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar.
our view, petitioners purchase of the subject property was
rely an advancement of his financial or economic interests,
ent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives.
he very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared
t a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is
pelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a
ncial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a
son an officious interferer liable for damages as long as
re is no malice or bad faith involved.

sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to

d petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present,
itioner cannot be made to answer for private respondents
ses.

s case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage

hout injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right
le damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the
ry. In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
held there that there can be damage without injury where
loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
that instance, the consequences must be borne by the

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style
CG Express Liner," petitioner, vs . MORTIMER F.
RDERO, respondent. [G.R. No. 164703. May 4, 2010.]
CTS:
metime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of
mana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the
iness of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After
tacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all
r the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
stralian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the
naging Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
ween June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents
pointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA
amaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. As
h exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to
spective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger
amaran known as the SEACAT 25.
er negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson,
yers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG
press Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero
s able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT
as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated
gust 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed
pbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) highspeed
amaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per
eement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43%
the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisba
Australia, and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go a
his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of
building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses
airfare, food, hotel accommodations, transportation a
entertainment during these trips. He also spent for lo
distance telephone calls to communicate regularly w
Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was deal
directly with Robinson when he was informed by Den
Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing fo
second catamaran engine from their company which provid
the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cord
that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of
second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where
was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landi
to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be fou
while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cord
immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robins
only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there
Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT
Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given
Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cord
believe there would be no further sale between AFFA a
ACG Express Liner.
 a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero
ormed Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson
ated his exclusive distributorship and demanded that they
pect the same, without prejudice to legal action against
and Robinson should they fail to heed the same.
dero's lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law
m, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent
uations and misrepresentations committed by Go in
nivance with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in breach
Cordero's exclusive distributorship appointment.
ving been apprised of Cordero's demand letter, Thyne &
cartney, the lawyer of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to
CRA law firm asserting that the appointment of Cordero as
FA's distributor was for the purpose of one (1) transaction
y, that is, the purchase of a high-speed catamaran vessel
ACG Express Liner in August 1997. The letter further
ed that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship,
terms of which were contained in a draft agreement which
dero allegedly failed to return to AFFA within a reasonable
e, and which offer is already being revoked by AFFA.
to the response of Go, Landicho and Tecson to his
mand letter, Cordero testified before the trial court that on
same day, Landicho, acting on behalf of Go, talked to him
r the telephone and offered to amicably settle their
pute. Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to
nor his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to purchase
vessels for ACG Express Liner through him for the next
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
three (3) years. In an effort to amicably settle the mat
Landicho, acting in behalf of Go, set up a meeting w
Cordero on June 29, 1998 between 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p
at the Mactan Island Resort Hotel lobby. On said da
however, only Landicho and Tecson came and no reason w
given for Go's absence. Tecson and Landicho proposed t
they will convince Go to pay him US$1,500,000.00 on
condition that they will get a cut of 20%. And so it was agre
between him, Landicho and Tecson that the latter would g
him a weekly status report and that the matter will be sett
in three (3) to four (4) weeks and neither party will file
action against each other until a final report on the propo
settlement. No such report was made by either Tecson
Landicho who, it turned out, had no intention to do so a
were just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due
arrive from Australia. Cordero then filed a complaint with
Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT
from Australia based on misdeclaration and undervaluati
Consequently, an Alert Order was issued by Acting B
Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel which in fact arriv
on July 17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson h
conspired to undervalue the vessel by around US$500,000.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No.
35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landi
liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspir
together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad fa
and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of
e commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the
e of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and
paid commission for the sale of the second vessel in the
ount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and
mplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing
penses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications
s and entertainment, on account of AFFA's untimely
cellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement.
dero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
mages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
binson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
sdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of
on, asserting that there was no act committed in violation
he distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by
trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise
clared in default for failure to le his answer within the
iod granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their
tion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action
s likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999.
bsequently, they led their Answer denying that they have
thing to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero's
hority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the
trary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
mmunicating with Go in connection with the purchase of
rst vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in
king progress status reports and airing the client's
evances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to
documents needed for shipment of the vessel to
Philippines. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price fo
Wartsila ship engine for AFFA's other on-going ves
construction, this was merely requested by Robinson
which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go w
buying a second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson h
no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had
document to show any such shipbuilding contract. As to
supposed meeting to settle their dispute, this was due to
malicious demand of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000
otherwise he will expose in the media the alleg
undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any ca
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission
the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum
agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the terminat
of his authority by AFFA's lawyers on June 26, 1998.
The trial court confirmed that said defendants misled the t
court in moving for continuance during the pre-t
conference held on December 10, 1999, purportedly to
abroad for the holiday season when in truth a Hold-Depart
Order had been issued against them. Accordingly, plain
Cordero was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Cordero's testimony regarding his transaction with defenda
Go, Landicho and Tecson, and the latter's offer of settleme
was corroborated by his counsel who also took the witn
stand. Further, documentary evidence including photogra
 en of the June 29, 1998 meeting with Landicho, Tecson
d Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-la's Mactan Island Resort,
otographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his
mily, Robinson and Landicho, and also various documents,
mmunications, vouchers and bank transmittals were
sented to prove that: (1) Cordero was properly authorized
d actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as exclusive
ributor in the Philippines; (2) Cordero spent considerable
ms of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and ACG
press Liner; and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero
commissions from each scheduled payment made by Go
the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA pursuant to
pbuilding Contract No. 7825.
e trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
ainst defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe
dicho, and Vincent Tecson.
, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new
l, claiming that they have been unduly prejudiced by the
gligence of their counsel who was allegedly unaware that
pre-trial conference on January 28, 2000 did not push
ough for the reason that Cordero was then allowed to
sent his evidence ex-parte, as he had assumed that the
d ex-parte hearing was being conducted only against
binson who was earlier declared in default. In its Order
ed July 28, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for new
l.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
On August 18, 2000, the trial court denied the motion
reconsideration and on August 21, 2000, the writ of execut
pending appeal was issued. Meanwhile, the notice of app
was denied for failure to pay the appellate court docket
within the prescribed period. Defendants filed a motion
reconsideration and to transmit the case records to the CA.
On September 29, 2000, the CA issued a tempor
restraining order at the instance of defendants in the certio
case they filed with said court docketed as CAG. R. SP N
60354 questioning the execution orders issued by the t
court.
On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and sett
aside the trial court's orders of execution pending app
Cordero appealed the said judgment in a petition for rev
filed with this Court which was eventually denied under
Decision dated September 17, 2002.
On March 16, 2004, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 691
affirmed the trial court (1) in allowing Cordero to present
evidence ex-parte after the unjustified failure of appella
(Go, Tecson and Landicho) to appear at the pre-t
conference despite due notice; (2) in nding that it w
Cordero and not Pamana who was appointed by AFFA as
exclusive distributor in the Philippines of its SEACAT 25 a
other fast ferry vessels, which is not limited to the sale of o
(1) such catamaran to Go on August 7, 1997; and (3) in find
that Cordero is entitled to a commission per vessel sold
FA through his efforts in the amount equivalent to 22.43%
the price of each vessel or US$328,742.00, and with
ments of US$297,219.91 having been made to Cordero,
re remained a balance of US$31,522.09 still due to him.
e CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is
itled to damages for the breach of his exclusive
ributorship agreement with AFFA. However, it held that
dero is entitled only to commission for the sale of the first
amaran obtained through his efforts with the remaining
paid sum of US$31,522.09 or P1,355,449.90 (on the basis
US$1.00 = P43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum from
time of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully
d. As to the P800,000.00 representing expenses incurred
Cordero for transportation, phone bills, entertainment,
d and lodging, the CA declared there was no basis for
h award, the same being the logical and necessary
sequences of the exclusive distributorship agreement
ch are normal in the field of sales and distribution, and the
penditures having redounded to the bene t of the
ributor (Cordero).
pellants were held solidarily liable pursuant to the
visions of Article 1207 in relation to Articles 19, 20, 21 and
of the New Civil Code. The CA further ruled that no error
s committed by the trial court in denying their motion for
w trial, which said court found to be pro forma and did not
e any substantial matter as to warrant the conduct of
other trial.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
The CA denied the motions for reconsideration respectiv
led by the appellants and appellee, and affirmed
Decision dated March 16, 2004 with the sole modification t
the legal interest of 6% per annum shall start to run from Ju
24, 1998 until the finality of the decision, and the rate of 1
interest per annum shall apply once the decision becom
final and executory until the judgment has been satisfied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality
sue the respondents for breach of contract
(2) Whether the respondents may be held liable for dama
to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of
exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFF
HELD:
(1)
First, on the issue of whether the case had been filled by
real party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of
Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one (1) to
bene ted or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the pa
entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes of this provis
are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by pers
without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require t
the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one
prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and
to discourage litigation and keep it within certain boun
suant to sound public policy. A case is dismissible for lack
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
l party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a
se of action.
agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not
mana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the
ippines as shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997
ued by Tony Robinson. 33 Petitioner Go mentions the
owing documents also signed by respondent Robinson
ch state that "Pamana Marketing Corporation represented
Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero" was actually the exclusive
ributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 1997; 34 (2) certification
ed 5 August 1997; 35 and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997
dressed to petitioner Cordero concerning "commissions to
paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation." 36 Such
parent inconsistency in naming AFFA's exclusive distributor
the Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and
poses, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who
ne made decisions in the performance of the exclusive
ributorship, as with other clients to whom he had similarly
ered AFFA's fast ferry vessels.
e stipulated commissions from each progress payments
de by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero.
pondents Landicho and Tecson were only too aware of
dero's authority as the person who was appointed and
ed as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be gleaned
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies
bank transmittals every time Go remits payment to Robins
who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to the b
account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission.
Petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitio
Cordero's lack of personality to sue on behalf of Pamana, a
did so only before the CA when they contended that i
Pamana and not Cordero, who was appointed and acted
exclusive distributor for AFFA.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overrul
Robinson's objection over the improper resort to summons
publication upon a foreign national like him and in an act
in personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a spe
appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdict
over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plain
upon the ling of the complaint, while jurisdiction over
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through
service of summons upon them in the manner required by
or through their voluntary appearance in court and th
submission to its authority. A party who makes a spe
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said co
based on the ground of invalid service of summons is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
Court.
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss led
Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the l
of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had ear
d a Motion for Time to le an appropriate responsive
ading even beyond the time provided in the summons by
blication. 44 Such motion did not state that it was a
ditional appearance entered to question the regularity of
service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the
sdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by
blication issued by the court and praying for additional
e to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson
ing acknowledged the summons by publication and also
ing invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure
rmative relief in his motion for additional time, he
ectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court's jurisdiction.
is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before
Court.
Breach of Exclusive Distributorship, Contractual
erference and Respondents' Liability for Damages
agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not
mana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the
ippines as shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997
ued by Tony Robinson. 33 Petitioner Go mentions the
owing documents also signed by respondent Robinson
ch state that "Pamana Marketing Corporation represented
Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero" was actually the exclusive
ributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 1997; 34 (2) certification
ed 5 August 1997; 35 and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997
dressed to petitioner Cordero concerning "commissions to
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
be paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation." Such appar
inconsistency in naming AFFA's exclusive distributor in
Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and purpos
Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone ma
decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorsh
as with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFF
fast ferry vessels.
The stipulated commissions from each progress payme
made by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Corde
Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too aware
Cordero's authority as the person who was appointed a
acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be glean
from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies
bank transmittals every time Go remits payment to Robins
who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to the b
account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission.
Petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitio
Cordero's lack of personality to sue on behalf of Pamana, a
did so only before the CA when they contended that i
Pamana and not Cordero, who was appointed and acted
exclusive distributor for AFFA.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overrul
Robinson's objection over the improper resort to summons
publication upon a foreign national like him and in an act
in personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a spe
appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdict
over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plain
on the ling of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
endants in a civil case is acquired either through the
vice of summons upon them in the manner required by law
through their voluntary appearance in court and their
mission to its authority. A party who makes a special
pearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court
ed on the ground of invalid service of summons is not
emed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
urt.
his case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss led by
binson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack
"personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier
d a Motion for Time to le an appropriate responsive
ading even beyond the time provided in the summons by
blication. 44 Such motion did not state that it was a
ditional appearance entered to question the regularity of
service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the
sdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by
blication issued by the court and praying for additional
e to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson
ing acknowledged the summons by publication and also
ing invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure
rmative relief in his motion for additional time, he
ectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court's jurisdiction.
is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before
Court.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(2) Breach of Exclusive Distributorship, Contract
Interference and Respondents' Liability for Damages
In Yu v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the right
perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to re
the profits resulting from such performance are propriet
rights which a party may protect. Thus, injunction is
appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference w
contracts by strangers to such contracts where the le
remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable
that case, the former dealer of the same goods purchased
merchandise from the manufacturer in England through
trading firm in West Germany and sold these in
Philippines. We held that the rights granted to the petitio
under the exclusive distributorship agreement may not
diminished nor rendered illusory by the expedient act
utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods
which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at
expense of the sole authorized distributor.
In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cord
was not paid the balance of his commission by respond
Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and respond
Landicho directly dealt with respondent Robinson in Brisba
and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as
exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, Cordero w
no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA
Brisbane. In other words, Cordero had clearly been cut
m the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25
ch was sold through his efforts. When Cordero complained
Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts
judicial to his rights and demanded that they respect his
lusive distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers led by
dicho and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it
promising to pay a certain amount and to purchase high-
ed catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was
paid anything and worse, AFFA through its lawyer in
stralia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting
t his services were engaged for only one (1) transaction,
t is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.
find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero,
re was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents
ually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA.
this circumstance will not absolve respondents from
ility for invading Cordero's rights under the exclusive
ributorship. Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in
passing Cordero as they completed the remaining
ments to AFFA without advising him and furnishing him
h copies of the bank transmittals as they previously did,
d directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding
angements for the arrival of the rst SEACAT 25 in Manila
d negotiations for the purchase of the second vessel
suant to the Memorandum of Agreement which Cordero
ned in behalf of AFFA. As a result of respondents'
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid
balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel a
his exclusive distributorship revoked by AFFA.
Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate cou
erred in holding them solidarily liable for Cordero's unp
commission, which is the sole obligation of the princ
AFFA. It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in the le
dated August 5, 1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook
pay commission payments to Pamana on a stagge
progress payment plan in the form of percentage of
commission per payment. AFFA explicitly committed tha
will, "upon receipt of progress payments, pay to Pamana th
full commission by telegraphic transfer to an acco
nominated by Pamana within one to two days of [AF
receiving such payments." Petitioner Go further maintains t
he had not in any way violated or caused the termination
the exclusive distributorship agreement between Cordero a
AFFA; he had also paid in full the first and only vessel
purchased from AFFA.
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued
breach of contract because only parties can bre
contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a th
person not for breach but for inducing another to com
such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
tract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
ty.
e elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid
tract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
stence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third
son is without legal justification.
e presence of the first and second elements is not
puted. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting
t Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the
ippines, respondents were clearly aware of the contract
ween Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact,
dence on record showed that respondents initially dealt
h and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of
FA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that
acity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract
. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun
Court of Appeals 53 is instructive, to wit:
duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of
enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may
tain to a situation where a third person induces a party to
ege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
case before us, petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing ask
DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a re
petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latt
property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by
appellate court, the three elements of tort interference abo
mentioned are present in the instant case. x x x
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there w
no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impu
behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rat
than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malici
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financi
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it can
be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping B
prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to
enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Thou
petitioner took interest in the property of respond
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record impu
deliberate wrongful motives or malice in him. x x x
Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does
relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering i
contracts and causing breach of existing ones.”
Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response
duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifia
m. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. 55 In the case of lower purchase price (US$1,150,000.00) and facsim
on v. Court of Appeals , 56 we held that to sustain a case transmission of AFFA to Go confirming the transaction.
tortious interference, the defendant must have acted with We find these allegations unconvincing and a m
ice or must have been driven by purely impure reasons to afterthought as these were the very same averme
re the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference contained in the Position Paper for the Importer da
not be justified. We further explained that the word October 9, 1998, which was submitted by Go on behalf
duce" refers to situations where a person causes another ACG Express Liner in connection with the complaint-affid
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or filed by Cordero before the BOC-SGS Appeals Commit
midation. relative to the shipment valuation of the first SEACAT
purchased from AFFA. 60 It appears that the purpor
heir Answer, respondents denied having anything to do second contract superseding the original Shipbuild
h the unpaid balance of the commission due to Cordero Contract No. 7825 and stating a lower price
d the eventual termination of his exclusive distributorship US$1,150,000.00 (not US$1,465,512.00) was only presen
AFFA. They gave a different version of the events that before the BOC to show that the vessel imported into
nspired following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No. Philippines was not undervalued by almost US$500,000.
25. According to them, several builder-competitors still Cordero vehemently denied there was such modification
ered the picture after the said contract for the purchase of the contract and accused respondents of resorting to falsif
e (1) SEACAT 25 was sent to Brisbane in July 1997 for documents, including the facsimile transmission of AF
hentication, adding that the contract was to be effective on supposedly confirming the said sale for only US$1,150,000.
gust 7, 1997, the time when their funds was to become The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson a
ilable. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it AFFA to enter into another contract directly with ACG Expr
compete with the prices of other builders, and upon Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted
tual agreement, AFFA agreed to give them a discounted AFFA's breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full
ce. This led to the signing of another contract superseding commission due to Cordero and unceremonious terminat
first one (1), still to be dated 07 August 1997. Attached to of Cordero's appointment as exclusive distributor. Follow
answer were photocopies of the second contract stating a our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra) , such
may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a pro

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 iness interest rather than in wrongful motives. The
endant circumstances, however, demonstrated that
pondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial
erest to bene t themselves at the expense of Cordero.
pondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero
d worked hard to close the deal for them to purchase from
FA two (2) SEACAT 25, closely monitored the progress of
lding the first vessel sold, attended to their concerns and
nt no measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go,
dicho and Go's family members. But what is appalling is
fact that even as Go, Landicho and Tecson secretly
gotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel,
dicho and Tecson continued to demand and receive from
dero their "commission" or "cut" from Cordero's earned
mmission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25.
dero was practically excluded from the transaction when
, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased
mmunicating with him, without giving him any explanation.
ile there was nothing objectionable in negotiating for a
er price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25, which is
prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement, Go,
binson, Tecson and Landicho clearly connived not only in
uring that Cordero would have no participation in the
tract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but also that
dero would not be paid the balance of his commission
m the sale of the first SEACAT 25. This, despite their
wledge that it was commission already earned by and due
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
to Cordero. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly ru
that the actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landi
were without legal justification and intended solely
prejudice Cordero.
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual mat
As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. 63 We
no compelling reason to reverse the ndings of the RTC a
the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in u
disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclus
distributorship agreement. The failure of Robinson, G
Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and go
faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-spe
catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as
duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed
Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyo
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As we have expounded in another case: Elsewhere,
explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner wh
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 a
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is there
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsib
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standa
which must be observed not only in the exercise of on
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. Th
ndards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his
e and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis,
essarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
ments are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
judicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an
on for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the
il Code.
itioner Go's argument that he, Landicho and Tecson
not be held liable solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral
d exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees awarded
Cordero since no law or contract provided for solidary
igation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit.
nformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the
ponsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the
asi-delict is solidary.
e rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with
tractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the
ount for which the party who was inducted to break the
tract can be held liable. 68 Respondents Go, Landicho
d Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the
ance of petitioner Cordero's commission from the sale of
rst SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its
o equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in
ation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with
erest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until
same is fully paid.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages m
be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 69 On
other hand, the requirements of an award of exemp
damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example
addition to compensatory damages, and only after
claimant's right to them has been established; (2) that t
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determinat
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages t
may be awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act must
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudule
oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemp
damages is thus in order. However, we find the sums award
by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as reduc
by the CA, still excessive under the circumstances.
Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxie
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, so
humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly caused. Althou
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must someh
be proportional to and in approximation of the suffer
inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and w
never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of
defendant. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining w
would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damag
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar fa
al courts are given discretion in determining the amount,
h the limitation that it "should not be palpably and
ndalously excessive." Indeed, it must be commensurate to
loss or injury suffered.
believe that the amounts of P300,000.00 and P200,000.00
moral and exemplary damages, respectively, would be
icient and reasonable. Because exemplary damages are
arded, attorney's fees may also be awarded in consonance
h Article 2208 (1). We affirm the appellate court's award of
orney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(3) INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENC
(Deceased) vs. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
G.R. No. 201787; September 25, 2013
Facts: On 1 March 1946, Hospicio De San Jose (HDSJ) lea
a parcel of land in Pasay to Inocencio. The lease contract w
effective for a period of 1 year, and was renewed for 1-y
periods several times. The last written contract was execu
on 31 May 1951.
German constructed two buildings on the parcel of land wh
he subleased. He also designated his son Ramon
administer the said property. German passed away in 19
Evidence-on-record shows that Ramon did not notify HDSJ
German’s death. After German’s passing, Ramon collec
the rentals from the sublessees, and paid the rentals to HD
and the taxes on the property. On 1 March 2001, HDS
property administrator notified Ramon that HDSJ
terminating the lease contract effective 31 March 2001.
Ramon then sent a letter suggesting that the lease contr
be renegotiated for the welfare of the sublessees occupy
the parcel of land.But HDSJ notified Ramon that the le
contract shall not be renewed because Ramon has continu
subleased the subject premises to about 20 families
addition to a commercial establishment) without
 wledge and consent of HDSJ. Thereafter, HDSJ refused to
ept Ramon’s tender of payment of rentals.
SJ also entered into lease contracts with several lessees.
SJ filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against Ramon
d his sublessees. Ramon claimed that HDSJ interfered with
contractual relations between him and his sublessees. The
TC of Pasay ruled in favour of HDSJ which was affirmed by
RTC of Pasay and the CA.
ue:
ether or not there was tortious interference on the part of
SJ.
d:
. HDSJ did not commit tortious interference. The Civil
de states: Art. 1314. Any third person who induces
other to violate his contract shall be liable for damages
the other contracting party. Tortious interference has the
owing elements: 1. Existence of a valid contract; 2.
owledge on the part of the third person of the existence of
contract; and 3. Interference of the third person without
al justification or excuse. The facts of the instant case show
t there were valid sublease contracts which were known to
SJ. In So Ping Bun v. CA, we held that there was no
ious interference if the intrusion was impelled by purely
nomic motives.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
In So Ping Bun, we explained that:
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justif
where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of further
his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, a
general rule, justification for interfering with the busin
relations of another exists where the actor’s motive is
benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his s
motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, so
authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interfer
interest outweighs that of the party whose rights are invad
and that an individual acts under an economic interest tha
substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful a
malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protecti
Moreover, justification for protecting one’s financial posit
should not be made to depend on a comparison of
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others
is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a pro
business interest rather than in wrongful motives.
The evidence shows that HDSJ entered into agreements w
Ramon’s former sublessees for purely economic reaso
HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from the subless
upon termination of the lease contract. It does not app
that HDSJ was motivated by spite or ill will towards
Inocencios. The Inocencios claim ownership over
buildings since these are separate and distinct from the la
on which they are erected. Thus, as owners, they have a ri
ease the buildings to third persons, even after termination
the lease contract with HDSJ. To bolster their claim of
nership, the Inocencios presented the following evidence:
the building permit; (2) the receipt for the payment of the
mit fee; (3) the Tax Declarations; and (4) the proof of
ment of insurance. They also claimed that when they
ered into lease contracts with tenants for the lease of
tions of the said buildings, these contracts were
ependent contracts of lease over their own building and
sub-leases of the parcel of land which they leased from
pondent. It is Respondent’s inaccurate characterization of
leasing by the Inocencios of portions of their own building
t has obfuscated the legal issues in this case and partially
to the incorrect decisions of the courts a quo.
do not agree. In Duellome v. Gotico and Caleon v. Agus
velopment Corporation, we held that the lease of a
lding includes the lease of the lot and consequently, the
tals of the building include the rentals of the lot. As
rectly pointed out by HDSJ in its Comment:
x When the Inocencios leased the buildings to third
ties, they also "leased" to the third parties the plot of land
which the buildings stood — either by implied transfer of
lease covering the plot of the land, or by sublease. Either
y, the Inocencios themselves must have a valid lease
tract with HDSJ over the land. However, when the lease
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
contract with HDSJ ended on 31 March 2001, Ramon lost
status as lessee of the land, and therefore, had no authority
transfer the lease or sublease the land. x x x.
However, we find that the CA erred in not applying Art
1678 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, use
improvements which are suitable to the use for which
lease is intended, without altering the form or substa
of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination
the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of
improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove
improvements, even though the principal thing may suf
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any m
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not
entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to
principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain th
by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
The foregoing provision applies if the improvements were:
introduced in good faith; (2) useful; and (3) suitable to the
for which the lease is intended, without altering the form a
substance.
 only upon the lapse of that period does the possess
find that the aforementioned requisites are satisfied in this become unlawful."
e. The buildings were constructed before German’s
mise, during the subsistence of a valid contract of lease. It HDSJ’s last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it fi
es not appear that HDSJ prohibited German from the complaint for unlawful detainer on 28 June 2005. Th
structing the buildings. Thus, HDSJ should have the complaint was filed within the period provided under
mbursed German (or his estate) half of the value of the Rules of Court.
provements as of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to reimburse
Inocencios, then the latter should be allowed to demolish WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. T
buildings. Decision dated 12 January 2012 of the Court of Appeals
CA-G.R. SP No. 117009 is AFFIRMED with modification. T
also find that the action for unlawful detainer was not case is hereby REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Cour
red by prescription. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Pasay, Branch 48, for determination of the value or
urt provides that actions for unlawful detainer must be filed improvements to be paid to the lnocencios, if Hospicio
thin one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or San Jose desires to keep the improvements. Otherwise,
hholding of possession." In interpreting the foregoing Inocencios shall be allowed to demolish the buildings at th
vision, this Court, in Republic v. Sunvar Realty expense.
velopment Corporation, held that:

e one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not

nted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31
cember 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to
ate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year
iod in an action for unlawful detainer. "Such one year
iod should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last
mand on defendant to vacate the real property, because

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Roberto Reyes
R. No. 154259; February 28, 2005
CTS:
The cause of action before the trial court was one for
mages brought under the human relations provisions of the
w Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto
es, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay
aya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of
tel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr.
leta Filart, who then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited
to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in
ebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr.
sakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for
for which she replied: "of course." Mr. Reyes then went
with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits
ch was the latter’s present for the celebrant. At the
nthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant
er which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a
ple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes
d-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
barrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby
, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive
retary thereof. In a loud voice and within the presence and
ring of the other guests who were making a queue at the
fet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.
Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, comple
ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. N
long after, while he was still recovering from the traum
experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked h
to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he w
escorted out of the party by the policeman.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked
Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignomini
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that
was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty
years. One of her functions included organizing the birth
party of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruo
The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party,
Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitati
accordingly. The guest list was limited to approximately s
(60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some ho
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invit
At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar coun
ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep
party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller,
"captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Re
who was not invited. Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Re
with the group of Dr. Filart. As Dr. Filart was engaged
conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not w
nterrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart,
Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite
Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes
eave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however,
ered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who
d that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. When Ms. Lim
ned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain
ung whom she later approached. Believing that Captain
ung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested
m him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain
ung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
ted. Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr.
es by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself
there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.
wever, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the
d, she decided to wait. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner
d started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam
yo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung
ede lang po umalis na kayo."She then turned around
sting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave,
to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big
ne, and even threatened to dump food on her.
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint
ore the lower court, also gave her version of the story to
effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to ca
the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he w
likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse
to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse,
reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not prop
dressed and was not invited. All the while, she thought t
Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at
bar talking to Col. Batung. Then there was a commotion a
she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes. She w
embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that
invited him.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed
complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the pa
The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assum
the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvit
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
trial court. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that
actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inqu
into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridic
and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Fi
first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes
private: The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action wh
are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of considerat
of one person, which calls not only protection of hum
dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of
Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becom
 le for damages, especially if said acts were attended by
ice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
gment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
pose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
ong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest
ll-will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
UES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
applying the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria
considering that by its own findings, Amay Bisaya was
a gate-crasher
2. Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the
party where he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code
LING:
Issue No. 1
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a
son assents is not esteemed in law as injury" ) refers to self-
cted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
overy of damages by one who has knowingly and
untarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
gligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however,
doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of be
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and
of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat h
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule a
shame.
On Issue No. 2
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-
hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s form
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who w
clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) and who could not
disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, be
an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of
party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest
it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of
presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction
keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of
"gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order no
call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and
the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her form
boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of
Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability
follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his cl
friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, up
whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim lou
and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and
ning a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr.
es, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very
se. Close enough for him to kiss.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of
Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and
me, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a
y close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
us, the lower court was correct in observing that –
nsidering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when
request for the latter to leave the party was made such
t they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to
heard by him only and there could have been no intention
her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s
ction to the request that must have made the other guests
are of what transpired between them. . . Had plaintiff
ply left the party as requested, there was no need for the
ice to take him out.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes
leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
de liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of
employee. Article 19, known to contain what is commo
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a pana
for all human hurts and social grievances. When "a righ
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the no
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to anothe
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongd
must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore
to set certain standards which must be observed not only
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
one’s duties. These standards are the following: act w
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and go
faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Art
19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Artic
20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to dama
arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes
leave.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2)
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure
common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that
the act complained of must be intentional.
 As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr.
es has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
ainst him. These two people did not know each other
sonally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
es had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s
ged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim,
ng "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and
judice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her
ociates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked

Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
der the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our
primatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s
of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying
m Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
se of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
sideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
man dignity but respect of such dignity." Without proof of
ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs.
rt cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because
did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that
s. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty
y of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
not amount to bad faith.

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 University of the East vs. Romeo Jader appeared as one of the candidates. However, at the foot
R. No. 132344; February 17, 2000 the list of the names of the candidates there appea
however the following annotati
CTS:
meo Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon th
84 - 1988. In the 1st semester of his last year (School year candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as sta
87-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Departm
ctice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. of Education, Culture and Spo
enrolled for the 2nd semester as 4th year law student and
February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of Jader attended the graduation and also provided blow-out
incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega his family and friends (all with picture eviden
ch was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
ment of the required fee. He took the examination on He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination.
rch 28, 1988 but Professor Ortega gave him a grade of five took a leave of absence without pay from his job from A
20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-
review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of
iberation came and Jader’s name appeared in the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able
ntative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of take the bar examinati
helor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988)
h the following annotation: Consequently, Jader sued UE for damages alleging that
suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxie
DER ROMEO A. besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepl
nights when he was not able to take the 1988
. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87- examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He pray
C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unreali
income, attorney's fees, and costs of s
o, in the invitation for graduation, the name of the jader

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent
believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor
Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative
of graduating students.
C: favored Jader (₱35,470 and ₱5,000 as atty. Fees)
: favored Jader (in addition ₱50,000, as moral damages)
UE:
ON UE can be held liable for damages to Jader.
ON the proximate and immediate cause of damages
urred by the Jader arose out of his own negligence in
verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
moval exam.
LD:
held that UE’s petition lacks of merit.
en a student is enrolled in any educational or learning
itution, a contract of education is entered into between
d institution and the student. The professors, teachers or
ructors hired by the school are considered merely as
ents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
mmitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties
the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to
al with the former's agents, such as the professors with
pect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
prevents either professors or students from sharing with e
other such information. It is the contractual obligation of
school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice a
information to each and every student as to whether he or
had already complied with all the requirements for
conferment of a degree or whether they would be includ
among those who will graduate. Although commencem
exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not
ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educatio
institution's way of announcing to the whole world that
students included in the list of those who will be conferre
degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied
the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly info
the student of any problem involving the latter's grades a
performance and also most importantly, of the procedures
remedying the sam
UE, in belatedly informing Jader of the result of the remo
examination, particularly at a time when he had alre
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said
have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19
the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even thou
the forms and technicalities of the law, together with
 ence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
nsaction unconscientious.
e college dean is the senior officer responsible for the
eration of an academic program, enforcement of rules and
ulations, and the supervision of faculty and student
vices. He must see to it that his own professors and
chers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
versity, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The
gligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of
school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
dent's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is
act of the school, being his employer.
nsidering further, that the institution of learning involved
ein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it
uld have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
cifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in
cles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
d in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
ryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
gligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
er for the same.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
provide specifically in statutory law. In civilized society, m
must be able to assume that others will do them no intend
injury — that others will commit no internal aggressions up
them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will
so with due care which the ordinary understanding and mo
sense of the community exacts and that those with whom t
deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. T
ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable relia
under conditions of civilized society. Schools and profess
cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent
them, for without the latter, the former are usele
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the stude
of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inqu
from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to
rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affec
by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. W
of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coup
with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calcula
to produce them would make the erring party liab
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the esse
in the performance of its obligation to inform responden
his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will
 pare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
mediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It
ed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its
dent's grades at any time because a student has to comply
h certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
mission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's
ility arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of
result of an examination and in misleading the latter into
ieving that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.
rth quoting is the reason of the Dean in allowing Jader to
included in the list of candidates for graduation:
an Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was
wed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for
duation in the hope that the latter would still be able to
medy the situation in the remaining few days before
duation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain
w plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to
mplete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did
exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing
de in Practice Court I.
itioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify
own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
ormation to respondent. When one of two innocent parties
st suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity
damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even wh
the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one's a
can make him liable for damages for injury caused there
with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liab
A person should be protected only when he acts in
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts w
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts w
negligence or abu
Award of Moral Damages (Not Corre
However, while UE was guilty of negligence and thus liable
Jader for the latter's actual damages, moral damages sho
not have been awarded. SC do not agree with the Cour
Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma a
pain when he was informed that he could not graduate a
will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the v
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whet
he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible
the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respond
should have been responsible enough to ensure that all
affairs, specifically those pertaining to his acade
achievement, are in order. If respondent was inde
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this up
himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requireme
including his school records, before preparing himself for
bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations d
only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; (6) ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petition
re are also prerequisites of documentation and submission vs.
equirements which the prospective examinee must meet. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATIO
NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDU
RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JU
and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR.,Responden
G.R. No. 184315 November 28, 2011
PERALTA,
FACTS:
in the last quarter of 1993, several allegedly defamat
articles against petitioner were published in The Ma
Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation. Consequen
petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, under th
separate causes of action, nam

(1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal

Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Ju
Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Di
all members of the editorial staff and writers of The Ma
Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishi

(2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiu

Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; a

(3) for attorney’s fees and costs against all the responde

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

C: rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner on the board, "officer," "principal owner," of the Ma
vember 8, 2002. Chronicle Publishing Corporation under Articles 19 and 20
: rendered a Decision4 affirming in toto the decision of the the Civil Cod
C on March 18, 2008
: CA rendered an Amended Decision6 reversing the earlier Ruling:
cision on August 28, 2008 YES. It was substantially established that he was the Chairm
Petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court of Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation when the sub
ch rendered a Decision partially granting the petition (GR articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr. even admitted this fac
. 184315. November 25, 2009). his Reply and Comment on Request for Admissi
pondents later filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
uary 15, 2010, which the Court denied in the Resolution The cause of action of petitioner based on "abuse of righ
ed March 3, 2010. or Article 19, in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Co
anwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for warrants the award of damag
ve to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with
ached Supplemental Motion, both dated March 17, 2010. The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19
the Civil Code provid
April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution9 resolving to Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
all the Resolution dated March 3, 2010; grant Coyiuto, Jr.’s the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyo
tion for leave to file supplemental motion for his due, and observe honesty and good fa
onsideration. This provision of law sets standards which must be observ
in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance
te: supplemental MR wherein Coyiuto, Jr. raises new its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his d
tter. and observe honesty and good faith.

ue: In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court

N Coyiuto, Jr. was liable in his personal capacity for "abuse Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays dow
ight" (second cause of action) allegedly, as "chairman" of rule of conduct for the government of human relations and

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
cle 20 or Article 21 would be proper."
cle 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law,
fully or negligently causes damage to another shall
emnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general
ctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
vide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
nner which does not conform to the standards set forth in
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal
ong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
ponsible.20 Thus, if the provision does not provide a
medy for its violation, an action for damages under either
cle 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
the present case, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed
used his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which
to the publication of the libelous articles in the said
wspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article
in relation to Article 20.
nsequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded
ral damages to petitioner. Such damages may be awarded
en the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s anguish.21
ther, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument, although
itioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
20 of the Civil Code, still such violations directly resulted
the publication of the libelous articles in the newspap
which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the recovery
moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.
However, despite the foregoing, the damages awarded
petitioner appear to be too excessive and warrants a seco
hard look by the Court. The Court, finds the award of mo
damages in the first and second cause of action in the amo
of ₱2,000,000.00 and ₱25,000,000.00, respectively, to be
excessive and holds that an award of ₱1,000,000.00 a
₱10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages are m
reasonable. The award of exemplary damages in the first a
second cause of action in the amount of ₱500,000.00 a
₱10,000,000.00, respectively, is reduced to ₱200,000.00 a
₱1,000,000.00, respectively. The award of attorney’s fees a
costs is reduced from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱200,000.
Separate Opinion: Velasco, Jr.
I concur with the well-written Resolution of Mr. Jus
Diosdado M. Peralta finding respondents liable for damag
attorney's fees and legal costs. I beg to differ, however, w
respect to the proposed reduction of the damages award
in Our November 25, 2009 Decisi
The facts and circumstances of the case have not chang
since November 25, 2009. There were no supervening eve
t occurred since then. To say that the damages awarded to
itioner were not excessive on November 25, 2009 and
n say that they are excessive now defies logic. The
endment of the November 25, 2009 Decision would open
court to speculation and even intrigue, more so
sidering that the January 15, 2010 Motion for
onsideration of respondent was first denied on March 3,
10 and later the denial was recalled on April 21, 2010.
e tortfeasor is responsible for all the actual consequences
sonably to be anticipated from the publication, even
ugh they are not proved specifically, and in determining
compensation the law looks to the consequences that
y logically be expected to result therefrom. In awarding
mages, many factors are taken into consideration, including
nature of the imputation made; the circumstances
rounding the publication of the defamatory words, the
ent of the publication, although, in an action against a
wspaper, this is not the sole factor to be considered; the
antum of mental anguish traceable thereto; the plaintiff's
utation; and the general status and position of the parties.
. December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the Janu
er a review of the evidence extant on record, the Court
cluded that the spiteful and patently untruthful nature of
contents of the subject articles, the timing and frequency
he attacks, the fact that said articles were published close
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
to the stockholders' meeting of Oriental Petroleum, and
fact that respondent Coyiuto deliberately utilized
newspaper to wage war against his business rival (petitio
herein), taken together, undoubtedly justify the dama
awarded petition
Respondent Coyiuto clearly abused his right when he to
undue advantage of his position as owner and Chairman
the Board of Chronicle Publishing and used The Ma
Chronicle to launch a personal vendetta against the petitio
who was his rival in the insurance business. As this Court ru
in its November 25, 2009 Decision, Coyiuto did not o
cause the publication of articles that would paint petitione
a bad light, worse, Coyiuto was even portrayed as
underdog and petitioner the greedy capita
As earlier explained, as correctly found by the trial court, e
the timing of the publication of these subject articles is hig
suspicious inasmuch as the subject libelous articles came
in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper owned and under
control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around November
stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation. From this,
logical to conclude that the publication of the sub
defamatory articles defaming the good name and reputat
of [petitioner] is but a part of [a] grand scheme to creat
negative image of [petitioner] so as to negatively aff
titioner's] credibility to the public, more particularly, to the Even the parties' financial condition has been accepted
n stockholders of Oriental Corporation. Worth noting also bear relevance in the determination of the damages to
the fact that the subject articles did not only portray awarded the aggrieved party in an action for libel
titioner] in a bad light. Curiously, in these articles, defamation.
pondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner], was
trayed as the underdog, the "David" and [petitioner] as Clearly, a lesser amount of damages, while acceptable
"Goliath" in their battle for control over Oriental individuals of average means, would, at best, be a slap on
poration. This does not escape the Court's attention." wrist for Coyiuto, and will have no deterring effect agains
cision dated November 25, 2009, pp. 24-25) similar violation. 10 The financial worth of Coyiuto
therefore, relevant in determining the amount of mo
yiuto is, therefore, liable for the prejudice suffered by damages to be awarded to the plain
itioner under the abuse-of-rights doctrine for having
sed the publication of the subject articles in the
wspaper which he owns and controls.

pondent Coyiuto owns and controls a publishing company

ronicle Publishing), is a known steep rival of petitioner in
insurance industry and was, at the time in question,
tling with the latter to gain control over Oriental
roleum. In the latest Forbes magazine, 8 Coyiuto placed as
19th richest in the Philippines with a net worth of US$400
ion, while petitioner ranked 21st with a net worth of
$370 million. There can be no doubt that both petitioner
hengco and respondent Coyiuto are high net with
inessmen.

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

Arco Paper Pulp & Santos v Lim On May 5, 2007, Dan T.Lim sent a letter to Arco Pulp a
Paper demanding payment of the amount of P7,220,968.
CTS but no payment was made to him.

m February 2007 to March 2007, Dan Lim of Quality Paper Dan T. Lim filed a complaint for collection of sum of mon
d Plastic Products Enterprises delivered scrap papers worth with prayer for attachment with the RTC on May 28, 2007
20,968.31 to Arco Pulp and Paper Company, Inc. (Arco
RTC Decision: RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Arco P
p and Paper) through its CEO and President, Candida A.
and Paper and dismissed the complaint, holding that wh
tos. The parties allegedly agreed that Arco Pulp and Paper
Arco Pulp and Paper and Eric Sy entered into
uld either pay Dan T. Lim the value of the raw materials or
memorandum of agreement, novation took place, wh
iver to him their finished products of equivalent value.
extinguished Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation to Dan T. Lim
alleged that when he delivered the raw materials, Arco
CA Decision: Reversed RTC. It ordered Arco Pulp and Pa
p and Paper issued a post-dated check in the amount of
to jointly and severally pay Dan T. Lim the amount
487,766.68 as partial payment, with the assurance that the
₱7,220,968.31 with interest at 12% per annum from the ti
ck would not bounce.8When he deposited the check on
of demand plus moral, exemplary damages and attorne
ril 18, 2007, it was dishonored for being drawn against
fees. The CA found the existence of an alternative obligati
osed account.
It also ruled that Dan T. Lim was entitled to damages a
the same day, Arco Pulp and Paper and a certain Eric Sy attorney’s fees due to the bad faith exhibited by Arco P
cuted a memorandum of agreement where Arco Pulp and Paper in not honoring its undertaking.
d Paper bound themselves to deliver their finished products
Petitioner’s argument: The execution of the memorandum
Megapack Container Corporation, owned by Eric Sy, for his
agreement constituted a novation of the original obligat
ount. According to the memorandum, the raw materials
since Eric Sy became the new debtor of respondent. T
uld be supplied by Dan T. Lim, through his company,
also argue that there is no legal basis to hold petitio
ality Paper and Plastic Products.
Candida A. Santos personally liable for the transaction t
petitioner corporation entered into with respondent. T

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

urt of Appeals, they allege, also erred in awarding moral
d exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to respondent
o did not show proof that he was entitled to damages.
pondent’s Argument: The CA was correct in ruling that
re was no proper novation in this case. He argues that the
urt of Appeals was correct in ordering the payment of
220,968.31 with damages since the debt of petitioners
mains unpaid. He also argues that the Court of Appeals was
rect in holding petitioners solidarily liable since petitioner
ndida A. Santos was "the prime mover for such outstanding
porate liability.”
UE 1
ether or not petitioners are liable for damages. — YES
LD
ition DENIED.
itioners are liable for damages
der Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
arded in case of breach of contract where the breach is due
raud or bad faith:
2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
arding moral damages if the court should find that, under
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defend
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages are not awarded as a matter of right but o
after the party claiming it proved that the breach was due
fraud or bad faith.
Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contr
has been breached. They are recoverable only if the pa
from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad faith o
wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The bre
must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, a
oppressive or abusive.
An award of moral damages would require certain conditi
to be met: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physi
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factu
established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of
Civil Code.
Here, the injury suffered by respondent is the loss
₱7,220,968.31 from his business. This has remained unp
since 2007. This injury undoubtedly was caused by petitio
Arco Pulp and Paper’s act of refusing to pay its obligations.
en the obligation became due and demandable, petitioner
o Pulp and Paper not only issued an unfunded check but
o entered into a contract with a third person in an effort to
de its liability. This proves the third requirement.
to the fourth requisite, Article 2219 of the Civil Code
vides that moral damages may be awarded in the
owing instances:
cle 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
owing and analogous cases:
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
Adultery or concubinage;
llegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
llegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in Article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
32, 34, and 35.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Breaches of contract done in bad faith, however, are
specified within this enumeration. When a party breache
contract, he or she goes against Article 19 of the C
Code. Persons who have the right to enter into contract
relations must exercise that right with honesty and go
faith. Failure to do so results in an abuse of that rig
which may become the basis of an action for damag
Article 19, however, cannot be its sole basis.
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct
human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actiona
tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required
that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleg
together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 and 21 of the Civil Code are as follows:
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custo
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage
To be actionable, Article 20 requires a violation of l
while Article 21 only concerns with lawful acts that
contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy.
 cle 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an
ry. It allows recovery should the act have been willful or
gligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and
desire to achieve the outcome which is considered by the
ntiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a
ation where the act was consciously done but without
ending the result which the plaintiff considers as injurious.
cle 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be
sed by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by law.
s article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there
s an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the
come. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve
und whether such outcome should be considered a legal
ry on the part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of
act was done in violation of the standards of care required
Article 19.
en parties act in bad faith and do not faithfully comply with
ir obligations under contract, they run the risk of violating
cle 1159 of the Civil Code:
cle 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force
law between the contracting parties and should be
mplied with in good faith.
icle 2219, therefore, is not an exhaustive list of the
tances where moral damages may be recovered since it
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
only specifies, among others, Article 21. When a pa
reneges on his or her obligations arising from contracts in b
faith, the act is not only contrary to morals, good custo
and public policy; it is also a violation of Article 11
Breaches of contract become the basis of moral damages,
only under Article 2220, but also under Articles 19 and 20
relation to Article 1159.
Moral damages, however, are not recoverable on the m
breach of the contract. Article 2220 requires that the bre
be done fraudulently or in bad faith. To recover mo
damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach m
be palpably wanton, reckless and malicious, in bad fa
oppressive, or abusive. Hence, the person claiming bad fa
must prove its existence by clear and convincing evidence
the law always presumes good faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some mo
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of kno
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partake
the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a question of intenti
which can be inferred from one’s conduct and
contemporaneous statements.Since a finding of bad faith
generally premised on the intent of the doer, it requires
examination of the circumstances in each case.
 en petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper issued a check in
tial payment of its obligation to respondent, it was
sumably with the knowledge that it was being drawn
ainst a closed account. Worse, it attempted to shift their
igations to a third person without the consent of
pondent.
itioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s actions clearly show "a
honest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
ng of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some
tive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
ud." Moral damages may, therefore, be awarded.
48
mplary damages may also be awarded. Under the Civil
de, exemplary damages are due in the following
umstances:
cle 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
ard exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
nton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
nner.
cle 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
tter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
uld be adjudicated.
cle 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
ed not be proven, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
court may consider the question of whether or not exemp
damages should be awarded.
The purpose of exemplary damages is to serve as a deterr
to future and subsequent parties from the commission o
similar offense.
The requisites for the award of exemplary damages are
follows:
(1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition
compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's righ
them has been established;
(2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, th
determination depending upon the amount of compensat
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done i
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.51
Business owners must always be forthright in their dealin
They cannot be allowed to renege on their obligatio
considering that these obligations were freely entered into
them. Exemplary damages may also be awarded in this c
to serve as a deterrent to those who use fraudulent means
evade their liabilities.
Since the award of exemplary damages is proper, attorne
fees and cost of the suit may also be recovered.
 cle 2208 of the Civil Code states: 2. the complainant must clearly and convincingly pr
such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.
cle 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
Here, petitioner Santos entered into a contract w
penses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
respondent in her capacity as the President and Ch
overed, except:
Executive Officer of Arco Pulp and Paper. She also issu
UE 2 the check in partial payment of petitioner corporatio
obligations to respondent on behalf of petitioner Arco P
ether Candida Santos is solidarily liable with petitioner and Paper. This is clear on the face of the check bearing
poration — YES. account name, "Arco Pulp & Paper, Co., Inc.” Any obligat
arising from these acts would not, ordinarily, be petitio
LD
Santos’ personal undertaking for which she would be solida
director, officer or employee of a corporation is generally liable with petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper.
held personally liable for obligations incurred by the
poration. Nevertheless, this legal fiction may be Petitioner Santos cannot be allowed to hide behind

egarded if it is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an corporate veil.

gal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
igation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse
itimate issues.
ore a director or officer of a corporation can be held
sonally liable for corporate obligations, however, the
owing requisites must concur:
1. the complainant must allege in the complaint that the
director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith; and
When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation
respondent became due and demandable, she not o
issued an unfunded check but also contracted with a th
party in an effort to shift petitioner Arco Pulp and Pap
liability. She unjustifiably refused to honor petitio
corporation’s obligations to respondent. These acts cle
amount to bad faith. In this instance, the corporate veil m
be pierced, and petitioner Santos may be held solidarily lia
with petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper.

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 GARCIA and CASTRO v. SALVADOR; G.R. No. 168512;
rch 20, 2007
ts:
nida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the
counting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc.
e Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she
derwent a medical examination at the Community
gnostic Center (CDC). Orlando Garcia who is a medical
hnologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface
igen) test and on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test
ult indicating that Ranida was HBs Ag: Reactive (i.e.
itive). The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
miner and the rubber stamp signature of Bu Castro as
hologist. Dr. Sto Domingo, the Company physician, then
mitted a report to the Company reiterating the findings of
C that Ranida is suffering from Hepatitis B. Based on such
ort, the Company terminated Ranida’s employment for
ng the physical examination.
on being informed by Ranida of her medical ailment, her
her Ramon suffered a heart attack and was brought to
aan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement,
nida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital
d the result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed
. Domingo of this development but was told that the test
ducted by CDC was more reliable because it used the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Micro-Elisa Method. Thus, Ranida went back to CDC
confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs t
conducted on her indicated a Negative result. Ranida a
underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doct
Hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method. The result indica
that she was non-reactive. Further, another similar test w
conducted, as per the request of the Company, and si
another negative finding resulted, Ranida was rehired by
Company.
Thereafter, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for dama
against petitioners Garcia and Castro, claiming that, by rea
of the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranid
examination, she lost her job and suffered serious men
anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon w
hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for failure of the responde
to present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Ga
and Castro. It held that respondents should have presen
Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted
test result issued by CDC. Likewise, respondents should h
presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of Ga
and Castro regarding the medical explanation (hi
minention sa case ano ‘yung medical explanation nila Ga
puro followed the procedure lang) behind the conflicting t
results on Ranida.

: Reversed. Found Garcia liable for damages for
gligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other
d, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the
uance of the results.
gument of Garcia before SC: maintains he is not
gligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as
tated by his training and experience; and that he did
rything within his professional competence to arrive at an
ective, impartial and impersonal result.
ue: Whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision
he trial court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages
he respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result
d:
S. For health care providers, the test of the existence of
gligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do
mething which a reasonably prudent health care provider
uld have done, or that he or she did something that a
sonably prudent health care provider would not have
ne; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if
, then he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an
onable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4)
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
proximate causation. All the elements are present in the c
at bar.
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty
comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulatio
purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health
the people by preventing the operation of substanda
improperly managed and inadequately supported clin
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance
clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impres
with public interest, as such, high standards of performa
are expected from them.
Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the
imposes upon a person the duty to do something,
omission or non-performance will render him liable
whoever may be injured thereby.
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known
The Clinical Laboratory Law, provides:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be profession
in-charge of a registered clinical laboratory unless he i
licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine a
authorized by the Secretary of Health, such authorization
be renewed annually.
 license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of
alth for the operation and maintenance of a clinical
oratory unless such laboratory is under the administration,
ection and supervision of an authorized physician, as
vided for in the preceding paragraph.
reover, Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known
The Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969 penalizes
y medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall
ctice medical technology in the Philippines without the
essary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician
horized by the Department of Health.”
m the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical
oratory must be administered, directed and supervised by
censed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like
athologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory
dicine; that the medical technologist must be under the
ervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and
t the results of any examination may be released only to
requesting physician or his authorized representative
on the direction of the laboratory pathologist.
e records show that there was no compliance with the
owing standards set by law. First, CDC is not
ministered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Medical Technologist. Castro’s infrequent visit to the clin
laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administra
supervision and control over the activities in the laborato
Supervision and control means the authority to act dire
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulat
to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify a
and decisions of subordinate officials or units. Second, Ga
conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without
supervision of defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted t
does not know, and has never known or met, the plain
patient even up to this time nor has he personally examin
any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from
plaintiff-patient otherwise his own handwritten signat
would have appeared in the result and not mer
stamped. Lastly, the disputed HBsAG test result was relea
to Ranida without the authorization of Castro.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequen
which followed after the release of the HBsAG test res
However, his failure to comply with the laws and ru
promulgated and issued for the protection of public saf
and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasona
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act
omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or (9) BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
gligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
er for the same.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

e foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award Facts
damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following th
mmits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
orporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a September 4, 1954 as the big day, but then Velez left a no
son who suffers damage because another has violated Dear Bet
me legal provision. Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it.
leaving on the Convair tod
nce, the CA’s Decision awarding (moral and exemplary) Please do not ask too many people about the reason why
mages and attorney’s fees was AFFIRMED by the Supreme That would only create a scand
urt. Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the follow

telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VE
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE
PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from ag

hence Beatriz sued for damages, but defendant continued
fail to participate in the proceedings. The latter then file
petition for relief, MNT and MR, upon which the co

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

ered the parties to appear and explore at this stage of the
ceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable
tlement, stating that should any of them fail to appear "the
ition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
mitted for resolution." Defendant failed to appear.
other chance for amicable settlement was given. This time.
wever, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances
ettling the case amicably were nil. He then filed a petition
relief from judgment, which was denied as an affidavit of
rits stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is
valid.
endant then contended that the affidavit of merits was in
unnecessary, because the judgment sought to be set
de was null and void, it having been based on evidence
duced before the clerk of court, and in support of his
otion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts
t the judgment is contrary to law, as "there is no
vision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for
ach of promise to marry.”
ue
ether the act of the defendant is punishable, despite the
that a breach of promise to marry is unactionable. YES.
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of s
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, go
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damage."
The record reveals that plaintiff and defendant alre
applied for a license to contract marriage, invitations w
printed and distributed to relatives, friends a
acquaintances, party needs were already purchased, dres
for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought and br
showers were given and gifts were already received.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to ma
As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
through all the above-described preparation and public
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably a
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defend
must be held answerable in damages in accordance w
Article 21 aforesaid.

ing As to damag
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New C

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

de, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned (10) RAFAEL PATRICIO vs HON. OSCAR LEVISTE
Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
GR No. 51832; April 26, 1989
endant contends that the same could not be adjudged
ainst him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code Facts:
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a
nton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent Petitioner Rafael Patricio, an ordained Catholic priest, a

nner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar, Ca

ove-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly where he is residing, was appointed Director General of

ed in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz.

s Court's opinion, however, is that considering the 16 May 1976 at about 10:00PM, while a benefit dance w

ticular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and on-going in connection with the celebration of the to

mplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were pos
near the gate of the public auditorium to check on
EMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent Bienven
dification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Capta
h costs. of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, w
was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the sa
gate together with his companions, struck a bottle of beer
the table causing an injury on his hand which started to ble
Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and ask
the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and bef
petitioner could respond, private respondent, with
provocation, hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. A
consequence, a commotion ensued and private respond
was brought by the policemen to the municipal building.

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

a result of the incident, a criminal complaint for "Slander
Deed was filed by petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court
Pilar, Capiz but was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint
damages was filed by petitioner. In April 1978, the court
ed in favour of petitioner, holding private respondent liable
the former for moral damages as a result of the physical
ering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by
vate respondent’s act of hitting petitioner on the face in
blic.
9 June 1978, petitioner filed a motion for execution of
gment, alleging that the 18 April 1978 decision had
come final and executory alter the lapse of thirty (30) days
m receipt thereof by private respondent, without any
tion for reconsideration or appeal having been filed.
wever, said motion was denied by the court a quo on the
und that there was a pending motion for reconsideration
d by private respondent. Petitioner filed a reply
position) to the motion for reconsideration, alleging that
filing of said motion and supplement thereto was without
ice to the adverse party and proof of service, hence, the
cision sought to be reconsidered had already become final
d unappealable. On 3 August 1979, an order 12 12 of
missal of the petitioner's complaint was issued by the trial
rt
t satisfied with said order, petitioner filed the petition at
contending that no copy of the Motion for
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Reconsideration was served upon petitioner and no proo
service as well as notice of hearing were attached to s
motion when filed with the court a quo; thus, the motion
reconsideration did not interrupt the running of the period
appeal. . Petitioner further argues that responde
admission that he slapped herein petitioner in public caus
him physical suffering and social humiliation, entitles the la
to moral damages. Actual and compensatory damages ne
not be proven before an award of moral damages can
granted, so petitioner contends.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to his claim for mo
damages
Held:
YES.
There is no question that moral damages may be recovered
cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission
caused the complainant physical suffering, mental angu
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wound
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Co
to wit: "ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense result
physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. (4)
ultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or
est; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of
amation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in
cle 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26,
28, 29, 30 32, 34, and 35
ate respondent's contention that there was no bad faith
his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the
dent was merely accidental is not tenable. It was
ablished before the court a quo that there was an existing
d between the families of both petitioner and private
pondent and that private respondent slapped the
itioner without provocation in the presence of several
sons. The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on
face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused
petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings
d social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full
ponsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of
at he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is
initely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to
latter. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to
. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any person who
ully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
trary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
mpensate the latter for the damage." The fact that no
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
actual or compensatory damage was proven before the t
court, does not adversely affect petitioner's right to reco
moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on hum
relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need
proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused
physical injury upon the complainant. It is clear from
report of the Code Commission that the reason underlying
award of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is
compensate the injured party for the moral injury cau
upon his person.
In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary
corrective damages may be imposed upon herein priv
respondent by way of example or correction for the pu
good. Exemplary damages are required by public policy
suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are
antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not
through the body politic. The amount of exemplary dama
need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entit
to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as
case may be, although such award cannot be recovered a
matter of right. In cases where exemplary damages
awarded to the injured party, attorney's fees are a
recoverable.
) Carpio v. Valmonte
No. 151866 September 9, 2004
CTS:
chelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged the services of
onora Valmonte (wedding coordinator) for their church
dding on October 10, 1996. At about 4:30 p.m Valmonte
nt to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were
eted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons
e already there including the bride, the brides parents and
atives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the official
otographers, and the fashion designer. Among those
sent was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride
o was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
er reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the room
rying with her the gifts from the principal sponsor and the
ms needed for the wedding. After going to the Maynila
taurant where the reception is to be held, she immediately
nt back to the Suite but upon entering, she noticed the
ople staring at her. It was during that moment when
itioner uttered “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan
g dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and
abas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” It was when petitioner
covered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside
comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Petitioner then
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
ordered one of the ladies to search the bag of Valmonte
searched and further called the hotel security to help in
search. The bags and personal belongings of all the peo
inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allege
bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security gu
throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived a
interviewed all persons who had access to the suite a
fingerprinted them. During all the time Valmonte was be
interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on say
the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto". Valmontes
which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched
the search yielded nothing.
Few days later, Valmonte demanded that petitioner sho
issue a formal letter of apology to be circulated to
newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smea
reputation. As the request yielded to nothing, it promp
Valmonte to file a complaint for damages before the R
Pasig. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner
ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as w
as attorneys fees. Petitioner denied having uttered words
done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during
investigation and claimed that everything that transpired a
the theft incident was purely a police matter in which she h
no participation
Ruling of the RTC: The trial court dismissed the complain
ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss
 jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage The Court ruled that Valmonte is entitled to moral damag
ults from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum but not to actual damages.
que injuria. It added that no proof was presented by
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be bo
monte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad
1. right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, a
h in pointing to her as the culprit.
2. the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff.
ing of the CA on Valmonte’s appeal: Valmonte has
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does
arly established that she was singled out by petitioner as
constitute a cause of action.
one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the
timony of Serena Manding (make up artist), corroborating In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim o
montes claim. It further ruled that Valmonte’s claim for wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully
mages is not based on the fact that she was subjected to negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse
dy search and interrogation but rather petitioners act of obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustain
blicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles
egorized petitioners utterance defamatory considering that equity but also universal moral precepts which are design
mputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
cluded that petitioners verbal assault upon Valmonte was good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides
ne with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the human conduct.
sence of many people without any solid proof except
itioners suspicion. It the ruled that Valmonte was entitled First of these fundamental precepts is the princi

an award of moral damages but not of actual damages commonly known as abuse of rights under Article
To find the existence of an abuse of right, the follow
UE: elements must be prese
(1) there is a legal right or du
ether or not Valmonte is entitled to an award of actual and
(2) which is exercised in bad fa
ral damages
(3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.
LD:

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

e is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
uld cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would
reby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person
uld be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
rcise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and
od faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
mplementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
visions of Articles 20 and 21. The foregoing rules provide
legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who
ers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of
me legal provision, or an act which though not constituting
ransgression of positive law, violates certain rudimentary
hts of the party aggrieved.
his case the Court found that petitioners verbal reproach
ainst respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that
her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind
d amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the
e, she had no right to attack respondent with her
uendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
usatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person
o went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
sence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be
mediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded
pondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to
ertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
pondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who
actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard
principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willf
caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary
morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to f
her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward responde
She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently,
had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice responde
Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Art
19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be h
accountable.
Based on the principles of Arts 19-21 and the findings of
CA, the SC sustain the findings of the trial court and
appellate court that respondents claim for actual damag
has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence dur
the trial and must therefore be denied. To be recoverab
actual damages must be duly proved with reasona
degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely
speculation, conjecture or guesswork. Valmonte, however
clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Mo
damages may be awarded whenever the defendants wrong
act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs phys
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirch
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliati
and similar injury. Though no proof of pecuniary loss
necessary in order that moral damages may
adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 circumstances obtaining in the case and assess (12) Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr. G.R. No. 179736. Ju
mages according to their discretion. Worthy of note is 26, 2013
t moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
Facts:
endant, or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the
er to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria H
ve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by led with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue Cit
son of defendants culpable action. In any case, award of Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer
ral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandat
cted. Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) aga
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners o

parcel of land situated in Barangay Basak, City of Manda
Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Developm
& Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located adjacent to the property
petitioners; 7 that respondents constructed an auto-rep
shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; tha
April 2005, Aldo led a case against petitioners for Injunct
and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TR
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125; that in that case, A
claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence withou
valid permit and that the said construction would destroy
wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners' prope
that the court, in that case, denied Aldo's application
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegatio
that, in order to get evidence to support the said ca
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set- up and instal

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
veillance cameras facing petitioners' property; that
pondents, through their employees and without the
sent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners' on-
ng construction; and that the acts of respondents violate
itioners' right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that
pondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
meras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.
heir Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that
y did not install the video surveillance cameras, nor did
y order their employees to take pictures of petitioners'
struction. They also clarified that they are not the owners
Aldo but are mere stockholders.
ing of RTC: RTC issued an Order granting the application
a TRO. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the
C denied the same.
grieved, respondents led with the CA a Petition for
tiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application
a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ing of CA: CA issued its Decision granting the Petition for
tiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
s issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners
ed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive
. The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code was not violated si
the property subject of the controversy is not used a
residence. The CA also said that since respondents are
the owners of the building, they could not have instal
video surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. Thus, they
not the proper parties.
Issue: Whether there is a violation of petitioners' right
privacy
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance o
Writ of Preliminary Injunction because responde
installation of a stationary camera directly facing petition
property and a revolving camera covering a significant port
of the same property constitutes a violation of petition
right to privacy. Petitioners cite Article 26 (1) of the C
Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private li
of others. Although the said provision pertains to the priv
of another's residence, petitioners opine that it inclu
business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino. Th
even assuming arguendo that petitioners' property is used
business, it is still covered by the said provision.
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to imple
in this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo
e and the same, and that respondents only want to hide
hind Aldo's corporate fiction. They point out that if
pondents are not the real owners of the building, where
video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had
business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by
court.
spondents' Arguments
pondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA
t petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the
perty involved is not used as a residence. Respondents
ntain that they had nothing to do with the installation of
video surveillance cameras as these were installed by
o, the registered owner of the building, as additional
urity for its building. Hence, they were wrongfully
pleaded in this case.
ing:
e Petition is meritorious.
e right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
e right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our
s. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted
ploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's
vate activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
son's ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
"to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live with
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which
public is not necessarily concerned." Simply put, the righ
privacy is "the right to be let alone."
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people's right to privacy a
protects them against the State's abuse of power. In
regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to
secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except
case of overriding social need and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in
privacy of their homes.
The right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Co
covers business offices where the public
excluded therefrom and only certain individuals
allowed to enter.
Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects
individual's right to privacy and provides a legal reme
against abuses that may be committed against him by ot
individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, persona
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and ot
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of act
for damages, prevention and other relief:
 Prying into the privacy of another's residence; xxx xxx
s provision recognizes that a man's house is his castle,
ere his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted
others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or
ering inquisitively into the residence of another without the
sent of the latter." The phrase "prying into the privacy of
other's residence," however, does not mean that only the
dence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law
pert Arturo M. Tolentino:
r Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of
other's residence." This does not mean, however, that only
residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers
o "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same
vacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
ividuals as are allowed to enter may come in. . .
us, an individual's right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the
il Code should not be confined to his house or residence
t may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the
vacy of another's residence," therefore, covers places,
ations, or even situations which an individual considers as
vate. And as long as his right is recognized by society,
er individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26
of the Civil Code only to residences.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used
determine whether there is a violation of the right
privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right
privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of priva
test. This test determines whether a person has a reasona
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has be
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depe
on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individ
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonab
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefo
limit or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation
privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's expectat
of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis sinc
depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are instal
practically everywhere for the protection and safety
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, sho
not cover places where there is reasonable expectation
privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should th
meras be used to pry into the privacy of another's residence
business o ce as it would be no different from
esdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200
he Anti-Wiretapping Law.
this case, the RTC, in granting the application for
liminary Injunction, ruled that:
er careful consideration, there is basis to grant the
plication for a temporary restraining order. The operation
[respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were
unted on their building, violated the right of privacy of
titioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The
mera does not only focus on [respondents'] property or the
f of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
ources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion
the] land of [petitioners].
ed on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why
titioner] Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the
olving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-
ing construction in his property. The monitor showed only
ortion of the roof of the factory of [Aldo]. If the purpose of
pondents] in setting up a camera at the back is to secure
building and factory premises, then the camera should
olve only towards their properties at the back.
spondents'] camera cannot be made to extend the view to
titioners'] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do that over
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
the objection of the [petitioners] would violate the right
[petitioners] as property owners. "The owner of a thing can
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights o
third person."
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasona
expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they us
as a business office or as a residence and that the installat
of video surveillance cameras directly facing petition
property or covering a signi cant portion thereof, without th
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we
then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justi ed.
need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunct
is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance
the case and should not be interfered with, unless there
grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. Here, th
is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence,
CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to
injunctive writ.
Additional issue: Whether respondents are the proper par
to this suit
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative le
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff
reason of the defendant's act or omission which h
violated the legal right of the former.
 tion 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, a
thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediati
C. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the
and eventually, led a Complaint against respondents bef
ty who stands to be bene ted or injured by the judgment
the RTC. He also admitted that as early as 1998 there
he suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
already been a dispute between his family and the Choac
erwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
family concerning the boundaries of their respec
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
properties. With these factual circumstances in mind,
erest.
believe that respondents are the proper parties to
eal party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal impleaded.
igation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separ
the defendant's act or omission which had violated the
and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it i
al right of the former."
family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy famil
uling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstand
soned that since they do not own the building, they could
their claim that they are not owners of the building, allow
have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such
the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct
soning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents
ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even tou
not the registered owners of the building does not
Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answe
omatically mean that they did not cause the installation of
all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of
video surveillance cameras.
video surveillance cameras. And when respondents moved
their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of
alled the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo wo
dence, which could be used against petitioners in another suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are remov
e. During the hearing of the application for Preliminary and transferred. Noticeably, in these instances,
nction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
alled the video surveillance cameras, he immediately

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion
t respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of
o as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view
the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper
ties to this suit.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(13) RODRIGO CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEA
G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000
Facts:
In 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nico
resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig C
in an apartment leased to them by the owner Florence "Bin
Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound. Nes
was then engaged in the business of supplying governm
agencies and private entities with office equipme
appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or cre
basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture
contributing capital on condition that after her cap
investment was returned to her, any profit earned would
divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodr
Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Floren
angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accu
him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Floren
He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan
pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat
Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa
uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latt
dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family w
 gedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom
y were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair.
e same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor
en the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her
dence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo
ktracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a
ative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over
telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her
t should something happen to his sick mother, in case the
er learned about the affair, he would kill Florence.
a result of this incident, Nestor felt
barrassment and shame to the extent that he could no
ger face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased
do business with him by not contributing capital anymore
much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses
clined as they could no longer cope with
mmitments to their clients and customers. To make matters
rse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestor’s fidelity
ulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which
em even expressed her desire to leave her husband.
nsequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding
blic apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly
ored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses
d a civil suit against him for damages.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor
accusing him publicly of being Florence's lover. He reason
out that he only desired to protect the name and reputat
of the Concepcion family.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitio
Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following issues:
(a) whether there is basis in law for the award of dama
to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and,
(b) whether there is basis to review the facts which are
weight and influence but which were overlooked a
misapplied by the respondent appellate court.
extreme
PETITIONER: The CA was without legal basis to justify
verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respond
spouses does not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of the C
Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any ot
their form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into
privacy of another’s residence or meddling with or disturb
the private life or family relation of another. Petitio
criticized the appellate court for not taking into account
fact that the trial judge who penned the decision was in
position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnes
of respondent spouses as he was not the original judge w
heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed.
 The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when
issue is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however,
factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by the
dence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court
ed. In this respect, the Court is not generally inclined to
ew the findings of fact of the CA unless its findings are
oneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting,
nted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the
dings culled by the trial court of origin.
wever, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge
o heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the
gment but merely relied on the record of the case does
render his judgment erroneous or irregular.
UE
s sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to
gender doubt as to the factual findings of the court a quo?
LING
. The fact that the case was handled by different judges
oks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence
sistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by
vate respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise,
ry time a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies
ives the service, the case cannot be decided and a new
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
trial will have to be conducted. That would be absu
inconceivable.
The testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents
unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in
afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nico
spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbo
and later on, with the accusation being repeated in
presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That
finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in
complaint as to the time of the incident bears no moment
significance since an allegation in a pleading is not eviden
it is a declaration that has to be proved by evidence
evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, s
evidence controls, not the allegation in the pleading its
although admittedly it may dent the credibility of
witnesses. But not in the instant case.
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents fai
to present as witnesses the persons they named
eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented inste
one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible witn
during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaru
testimony is not credible and should never have be
accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the
that a great distance separates Villaruel’s residence and t
of private respondents as reflected in their house numb
 formers number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St., while concomitant consideration of every plan for hum
t of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of
culture and civilization of every country, is how far it digni
ether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated. man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from be
at is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is
olas were neighbors on 14 July 1985. exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under
article, the rights of persons are amply protected, a
ere are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in damages are provided for violations of a persons dign
testimonial evidence of private respondents but these are personality, privacy and peace of mind.
of such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the
er court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are
d candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed exclusive but are merely examples and do
timony. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages theref
h on minor details and collateral matters do not affect are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity, such
substance of their testimonies. profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abus
language.
reject petitioners posture that no legal provision supports
h award, the incident complained of neither falling under Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages wh
2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, seri
her elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, mo
less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, althou
a person. incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if t
are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act
e philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for omission.
nclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in
uncertain terms that the human personality must be There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nico
lted. The sacredness of human personality is a suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wound

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

lings and social humiliation as a proximate result of
itioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
itioner said that he wanted to protect his nephews and
ces and the name of his late brother (Florence’s
band). Testifying that until that very afternoon of his
eting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had never
n him before, and was unaware of his business partnership
h Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness
nd however belie this lack of knowledge about the
iness venture for in that alleged encounter he asked
stor how the business was going, what were the collection
blems, and how was the money being spent. He even
w that the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was
ned by combining the first syllables of the name Florence
d Allem, the name of Nestor’s wife.
cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to
w the truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied
h the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He
d to confront Nestor face to face, invade the latter’s privacy
d hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife
d children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married
n - of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This
initely caused private respondent much shame and
barrassment that he could no longer show himself in his
ghborhood without feeling distraught and debased. This
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
brought dissension and distrust in his family where bef
there was none. This is why a few days after the incident,
communicated with petitioner demanding public apology a
payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that w
explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion testif
against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why
Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom
had no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages.
It also has not escaped our attention that, faced with a law
by private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a cert
Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but
Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherw
her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinc
Florence told the lawyer that it was not for her to decide a
that she could not do anything about it as she was not a pa
to the court case.
 ) GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO
LIPPINES INC., AND EMMA J. DATUIN
R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
ts:
e case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for
ation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 (Bouncing
ecks Law) by respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as
icer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department,
d upon authority of petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc.
nsio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio)
d one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing,
gedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as
ment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi
rketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint
s incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges
ainst her. Consequently, she was indicted for three (3)
nts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Case
s. 236544, 236545, and 236546, before the Metropolitan
al Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila. The MeTC issued a
rant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the
med operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction
ainst Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and
al Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday, at
und 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she was visiting her
band and their two (2) daughters at their city residence.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where
was subjected to fingerprinting and mugshots, and w
detained. She was released in the afternoon of the same
when her husband posted a bond for her temporary libe
Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion[6] for Defermen
Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could
have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even h
a checking account with the bank on which the checks w
drawn, as certified by the branch manager of the Philipp
National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that
signature was patently and radically different from
signatures appearing on the bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation w
conducted. In the course of the reinvestigation, Dat
submitted an Affidavit of Desistance dated August 18, 19
stating, among others, that Gregorio was not one of
signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecuti
Subsequently,
the assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss da
November 12, 1998 with respect to Criminal Case N
236544-46. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered
B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. On August 18, 2000, Grego
filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Dat
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Lig
Albay.
e complaint, in part, reads —
Be that as it may, incalculable damage has been in︎ icted
the plaintiff on account of the defendants' wanton, callous
d reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that
ery person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
d peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" (Art.
Civil Code of the Philippines);
That the plaintiff, being completely innocent of the
rges against her as adverted to in the preceding
agraphs, was socially humiliated, embarrassed, suffered
ysical discomfort, mental anguish, fright, and serious
iety as a proximate result of her unjustified indictment,
est and detention at the PARAC headquarters — all of
se ordeals having been exacerbated by the fact that
ntiff is a woman who comes from a respected family in
s, Albay, being the wife of an executive of the Philippine
ional Construction Corporation, the mother of two college
dents studying in Manila, a pharmacist by profession, a
inesswoman by occupation, and an incumbent Municipal
uncilor (Kagawad) of Oas, Albay, at the time of her arrest
d detention; and that she previously held the following
itions:
President, Philippine Pharmaceutical Association (Albay
apter);
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(b). Chairman of the Board, Albay Pharmaceutical Market
Cooperative (ALPHAMAC);
(c). Charter Secretary, Kiwanis Club of Oas;
(d). Chairman, Polangui Ladies Multi-Purpose Cooperat
Polangui, Albay;
(e). Vicarial Regent, Daughters of Mary Immacul
International, District IX;
(f). Chapter President and Municipal Coordinator, Al
Women Volunteers Association, Inc., Legaspi City;
(g). Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate International Vi
Clemens Circle, Oas, Albay;
(h). Secretary, Girl Scout of the Philippines District Associati
and
(i). Director, Albay Electric Cooperative (ALECO),
not to mention the undue aspersion cast upon her soc
professional and business reputation because of defenda
tortious act of accusing her of Estafa and/or issuing bounc
checks — even without a scintilla of evidence;
16. That to compound the foregoing travails and suffering
the plaintiff she had to devote and spend much of her tim
money and efforts trying to clear her tarnished name a
reputation, including traveling to and from Manila to con
h her lawyer, attend the hearings at the prosecutor's office
d at the Metropolitan Trial Court;
sio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
t the complaint, being one for damages arising from
icious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the
mate facts constituting the elements thereof were not
ged in the complaint.
UE:
ether or not the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is
ed on malicious prosecution.
LING:
. It is the position of Sansio and Datuin that the complaint
damages filed by Gregorio before the RTC was for
icious prosecution, but it failed to allege the elements
reof, such that it was aptly dismissed on appeal by the CA
the ground of lack of cause of action. In their comment,
ng Albenson Enterprise Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
y posit that Article 26 of the Civil Code, cited by Gregorio
one of the bases for her complaint, and Articles 19, 20, and
of the same Code, mentioned by the RTC as bases for
taining the complaint, are the very same provisions upon
ch malicious prosecution is grounded. And in order to
her buttress their position that Gregorio's complaint was
eed one for malicious prosecution, they even pointed out
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
the fact that Gregorio prayed for moral damages, which m
be awarded only in case of malicious prosecution or, if
case is for quasi- delict, only if physical injury res
therefrom.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action
determined by the material averments in the compla
and the character of the relief sought. Undenia
Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a compla
based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Art
26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution
every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1)
damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of
defendant or some other person to whose act he m
respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between
fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) t
there must be no pre-existing contractual relation betwe
the parties. On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Co
grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, a
other relief in cases of breach, though not necessa
constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights:
right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security;
right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse;
right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that
averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements
 cle 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Art
pears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability,
sonal security, privacy, and peace of mind were employer, arising from the act or omission of its employ
inged by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to Datuin.
ercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity
the person they should rightfully accused of tendering
ufficiently funded checks.

s fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the

rect address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
portunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
en proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the
rges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never
nd at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office
dress of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint,
egorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of
PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St.,
muning, Quezon City, while visiting her family.

e suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her

den arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
ort, and money to clear her tarnished name and
utation, considering that she had held several
norable positions in different organizations and offices
the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in
s, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no
ntractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

) St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1994
CTS
Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of
adio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil)
he issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an
ertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS".
ow that heading was the photograph of the residence of
ctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the
otograph was the following write-up:
ome is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND
S. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been
tured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-
droom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly
dequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family.
ey dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din
d dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape
en they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and
ermination, they bought a lot and built their dream house
for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly,
ving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-
ss subdivision planned for wholesome family living.”
e same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated
uary 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsay
Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. Doctor Aramil wr
a letter addressed to the Sunday Times, saying:
“This is anent to your advertisements appearing in
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the Sun
Times which boldly depicted my house at the abo
mentioned address and implying that it belonged to anot
person. I am not aware of any permission or authority on
part for the use of my house for such publicity.
This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional g
and much more the apparent distortions therein are I beli
not only transgression to my private property but a
damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have h
invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagu
medical students and friends to my house and after read
your December 15 advertisement some of them have utte
some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional a
personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein
"it looks like your house," "how much are you renting fr
the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers
belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no li
mental anguish on my part.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of
Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publicat
of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offe
 apologies. However, no rectification or apology was The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with th
blished. real house in the background, as was intended all along.”

February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. HELD

uis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of
RTC
10,000. In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty
med that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty sho
ired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times. have immediately published a rectification and apology.
found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnif
published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18,
by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered men
69 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their
anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000
l house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor
P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aram
mil and an explanation of the error.
right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St.
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damag
uis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of
P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
il 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION"
Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.
space 4 by 3 inches:
CA
his will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart
which appeared in the Manila Timesissue of March 18, The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Act
69 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, a
nila Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurrin
cember 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Re
house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-
committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and
vate respondent) was mistakenly used as a background for
of the Civil Code because the questioned advertiseme
featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.
pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arca

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it ne
tretemps. made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up
just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
his appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate
urt ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, w
jectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he w
urt adopted the facts found by the trial court. Those factual renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had lea
dings are binding on this Court. it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly a
unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income a
Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to
mental anguish.
and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity
h the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not
ered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall
pect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of
other's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the
vate life or family relations of another" and "similar acts",
ough they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
duce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
ef".

e damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by

cles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219
ws moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in
cle 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the
s and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up

Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

) VINZONS-CHATO v. FORTUNE TOBACCO implementation of RMC 37-93. CTA ruled that RMC 37-9
RPORATION defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoin
R. No. 141309; June 19, 2007 petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessm
issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirm
CTS: by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
itioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It w
mmissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of
bacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the requirements for a valid administrative issuan
nufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. On June Respondent then filed before the RTC a complaint
1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA damages against petitioner in her private capac
54). Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," Respondent contended that the latter should be held lia
ope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code consider
an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional ri
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner against deprivation of property without due process of
ued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and and the right to equal protection of the la
ore" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
nd subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that:
jected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to respondent has no cause of action against her because
provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official funct
ally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that
d taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore
% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the compla
e Pesos (P5.00) per pack.” states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice
bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping w
pondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule tha
peals (CTA), which issued an injunction enjoining the is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the sam

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES


RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to
e on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely
cide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to
sent evidence.
e case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition
certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on
ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability
y arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad
h. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I
the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil
ility of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is
special law that governs the instant case. Consequently,
ice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for
mages.
itioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is
unded on her acts done in the performance of her
ctions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of
Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this
vision, liability will attach only when there is a clear
wing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further
rred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which
ws recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
hts, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while
tion 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if
complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad fa
malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for fail
to state a cause of acti
ISSUES/HELD
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her priv
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
functions of his/her office? -Y
The general rule is that a public officer is not liable
damages which a person may suffer arising from the j
performance of his official duties and within the scope
his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is
liable for damages that may have been caused to another
it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which
not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without
consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune fr
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in b
faith which, being outside the scope of his authority,
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for offi
actions.
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administra
de, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice,
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
d, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
e where the subordinate public officer’s act is
racterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus – Sec. 38.
bility of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be
lly liable for acts done in the performance of his official
ies, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
ss negligence. x x x x Section 39. Liability of Subordinate
icers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly
le for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of
duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent
s done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public
icy and good customs even if he acts under orders or
ructions of his superior.
addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
peals, that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
mages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
e not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
us, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be
dly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
urse of the performance of the functions of the office,
ere said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
gligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
constitutional right of the plaint
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Sect
38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause
action? - IN THIS CASE, complaint filed by respondent sta
a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon
Article 32 of the Civil Co
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects
places and does not omit any subject or place natur
belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term
generally understood, is one which relates to particu
persons or things of a class or to a particular portion
section of the state only. A general law and a special law
the same subject are statutes in pari materia and shou
accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possib
with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that wh
there are two acts, one of which is special and particu
and the other general which, if standing alone, wo
include the same matter and thus conflict with the spe
act, the special law must prevail since it evinces
legislative intent more clearly than that of a gene
statute and must not be taken as intended to affect
more particular and specific provisions of the earlier a
unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order
give its words any meaning at
 abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives
e circumstance that the special law is passed before or after good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely,
general act does not change the principle. Where the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by
cial law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in
alification of, the prior general act; and where the general nature of a t
is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining
exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not o
essary implication. public officers but also private individuals civilly liable
violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the C
us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Art
cle 32 of the Civil Code provides: should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise
T. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private would defeat its main purpose, which is the effec
ividual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, protection of individual rights. It suffices that there i
ates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the violation of the constitutional right of the plain
owing rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
the latter for damages: x x x x Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code,
The right against deprivation of property without due down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordin
cess of law; x x x x (8) The right to the equal protection of public officers for acts done in the performance of th
laws; x x x duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers,
presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are v
e rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean elements that will make them liable for damages. Note t
cobo of the Code Commission, as follows: while said provisions deal in particular with the liability
he very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil government officials, the subject thereof is general,
criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should "acts" done in the performance of official duties, with
malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a c
eat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective suit against the official concerned. Contrarily, Article 32 of
tection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

ticular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional righ
mages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for the plaintiff.
pairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the
NOTE: pls take note that this case has been reversed b
ecial provision that deals specifically with violation of
later EN BANC decision dates December 23, 2008 penned
nstitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable
Justice Nachura
s of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of
Administrative Code.

ile the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human

ations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a
cial and specific provision that holds a public officer liable
and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts
t may be committed by public officers. Compared thus
h Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly
als with civil liability arising from errors in the performance
duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision
ch must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to
k damages for violation of constitutional rights.

e complaint in the instant case was brought under Article

of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice
not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil
de, the failure to specifically allege the same will not
ount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below
refore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
und of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 ) MADEJA vs. HON. CARO and ARELLANO-JAPZON action may be instituted only after final judgment has be
rendered in the criminal action."
R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
Issue:
ts:
Whether or not the instant civil action may be instituted o
a Criminal Case of the CFI of Eastern Samar, Japzonis
after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal actio
used of homicide through reckless imprudence for the
ath of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The Held:
mplaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L.
No. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation
deja who reserved her right to file a separate civil action
Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. T
damages." While the criminal case is still pending, Carmen
two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:
d Dr. Japzon for damages in a Civil Case before the same
rt. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provid
gligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
endant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section the Philippines, an independent civil action entir
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
brought by the injured party during the pendency of
. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
included in the preceding section the following rules shall
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proce
observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the
independently of the criminal prosecution, and s
me offense may be instituted separately, but after the
require only a preponderance of evidence."
minal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injur
minal action. ... a civil action for damages, entirely separate and disti
from the criminal action, may be brought by the inju
cording to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

minal prosecution, and shall require only
ponderance of evidence.
ere are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code
ch are worth noting, namely:
The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted
ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses
expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution."
s conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
mmission,
e underlying purpose of the principle under consideration
o allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action
ught by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney.
not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance
d initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the
vernment for the vindication of their own private rights. It is
e that in many of the cases referred to in the provision
d, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be
membered that while the State is the complainant in the
minal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned
cause it is he who has suffered directly. He should be
mitted to demand reparation for the wrong which
culiarly affects him.
d Tolentino says:
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
a The general rule is that when a criminal action is institut
the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the crim
action, unless the offended party reserves his right to instit
it separately; and after a criminal action has be
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception
this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or phys
injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be fi
independently of the criminal action, even if there has be
no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in
article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not gi
the right to determine whether the civil action should
scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has be
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independ
of the result of the civil action."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.
not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Pe
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummat
frustrated and attempted homicide.
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fra
and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in th
ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offen
defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fra
must have been used not to impart to them any techn
aning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil act
se. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the crim
t the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in action against her.
specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the or
de, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission
dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no spe
uld have used terms in the same article-some in their
pronouncement as to costs.
neral and another in its technical sense. In other words, the
m 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily
ry, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms
d with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code
mmission recommended that the civil action for physical
ries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in
erican Law, and this recommendation must have been
epted by the Legislature when it approved the article
act as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a
l action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
ilar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
mmission states, the civil action should lie whether the
ense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
micide, or attempted homicide, or even death,"

pus vs. Paje which states that reckless imprudence or

minal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil
de is not authoritative. Of 11 justices only 9 took part in the
cision and 4 of them merely concurred in the result.

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

) PILAR JOAQUIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
LIX ANICETO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
R. No. L-18719. October 31, 1964.]
CTS:
ile Pilar Joaquin was on the sidewalk of Aviles Street,
nila, on April 27, 1960, a taxicab driven by Felix Aniceto
d owned by Ruperto Rodelas bumped her. As a result, she
ered physical injuries.
ceto was charged with serious physical injuries through
kless imprudence in the Municipal Court (now the City
urt) of Manila. He was subsequently found guilty and
tenced to imprisonment. However, no ruling was made on
civil liability to the offended party in view of the latter's
ervation to file a separate civil action for damages for the
ries suffered by her.
ceto appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
t Instance of Manila. While the criminal case was thus
nding appeal, Pilar Joaquin, the injured party, filed this
e or damages in the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
ordance with the reservation which she had earlier made.
x Aniceto and Ruperto Rodelas, driver and owner,
pectively, of the taxicab were made party defendants.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
At the trial of this case, the plaintiff blocked all attempts
Rodelas to prove that, as employer, he had exercised d
diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee,
the ground that such a defense is not available in a civil act
brought under the Penal Code to recover the subsidiary c
liability arising from the crime. The lower court sustain
plaintiff's objection. However, it dismissed the case on
ground that, in the absence of a final judgment of convict
against the driver in the criminal case, any action to enfo
the employer's subsidiary civil liability would be prematu
Such liability, the trial court added, may only be enforced
proof of the insolvency of the employee. Hence, this appea
ISSUE:
May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and
employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separ
civil action even while the criminal case against the emplo
is still pending?
HELD:
To begin with, obligation arise from law, contract, qu
contract, crime and quasi-delict. 1 According to appellant,
action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crim
With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 11
of the New Civil Code provides:
vil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some k
verned by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 7
cle 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, [1964])
liminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer can
ok, regulating damages."
be subsidiary liable.
e Revised Penal Code provides in turn that "every person
Now, it is no reason to bring such action against the emplo
minally liable for a felony is also civilly liable" and that in
on the ground that in cases of defamation, fraud and phys
ault of the persons criminally liable, employers, teachers,
injuries, Article 33 of the Civil Code authorizes a civil act
sons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry
that is "entirely separate and distinct from the crim
ll be civilly liable for felonies committed by their servants,
action," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 94; 51 O.G. 2878; Reyes
pils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge
De la Rosa, 52 O.G. 6548; Dyogi vs. Yatco, G.R. No. L-96
heir duties.
January 22, 1957).
this Court held in City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52
Can Article 33 above cited be made applicable to
. 586:
employer in a civil action for subsidiary liability? The answe
. . The Penal Code authorizes the determination of this question is undoubtedly in the negative.
sidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its applicability
What this article 33 authorizes is an action against
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
employee on his primary civil liability. It cannot apply to
demeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary c
nal Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
liability as stated above, because, such liability arises o
sdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction."
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. A
now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, action brought against him before the conviction of
following requisites must be present: (1) That an employee is premature.
ployee has committed a crime in the discharge of his
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has
ies; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability aris

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

m crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and
action for quasi delict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil
de. (See Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607;
ker vs. Panlilio, et al., 91 Phil. 1)
he chooses an action for quasi delict, be may hold an
ployer liable for the negligent act of the employee,
ject, however, to the employer's defense of exercise of the
gence of a good father of the family. (Art. 2180, Civil Code)
the other hand, should he choose to prosecute his action
der Article 100 of the Penal Code, he can hold the
ployer subsidiarily liable only upon prior conviction of the
ployee. While a separate and independent civil action for
mages may be brought against the employee under Article
of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the
ployer on the latter's subsidiary civil liability because such
ility is governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal
de, under which conviction of the employee is a condition
e qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. If the court
ng the employee's liability adjudges the employee liable,
the court trying the criminal action acquits the employee,
subsequent insolvency of the employee cannot make the
ployer subsidiarily liable to the offended party or to the
er's heirs.
HEREFORE, decision appealed from is affirmed, without
nouncement as to costs.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(19) Maria Benita A. Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108017; April 3, 1995
FACTS:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation betwe
Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at
"Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa a
result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on d
at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of
deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behal
her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action
damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein priv
respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., I
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Co
("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzue
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUA
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the compla
does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claim
that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope
his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting w
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liab
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Pe
Code.
 Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a judge also declared that the complaint was one for dama
mplaint for damages based on negligence under Article founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103
76 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those aris
itioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article from, quasi-delict.
76 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision a
ised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent
insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of neglige
ued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
but also cover acts that are intentional and volunt
sidering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the N
a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for th
ility. Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying
negligence either in the selection or supervision of th
t it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
employees. This liability is independent of the employe
endant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners
own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from
posed both motions, stating that their cause of action
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Pe
ainst the private respondents is based on their liability
Code. Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act
der Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the N
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued Civil Code, to wit:
order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fra
FEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The
and physical injuries, a civil action for damag
pondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal acti
essary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil act
mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in
shall proceed independently of the crim
oting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
formance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere
evidence.
gations of the concurring negligence of the defendants
vate respondents herein) without stating the facts showing The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has be
h negligence are mere conclusions of law. Respondent held to include consummated, frustrated and attemp

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

micide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior
viction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed
ependently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is
private respondents' argument that since the act was not
mmitted with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of
on under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code.
e civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable
acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to
asi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
zuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from
ng purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and
ld not have been part of his duties as security guard. And
ce Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts
ne within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the
vate respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
UE:
1. Whether or not Article 2176 is limited to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence
2. Whether or not Artilce 33 applies only to injuries
intentionally committed
LING:
Issue No. 1
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligen
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case
Elcano v. Hill, this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable
law" but also acts criminal in character; whet
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequen
a separate civil action against the offender in a crim
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted a
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offend
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged a
criminally, to recover damages on both scores .
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent a
which may be punishable by law.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of neglige
but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it w
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dism
petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to m
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to priv
respondents
On Issue No. 2
 No. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has (20) Almario Salta vs. Hon. De Veyra and Philipp
eady been construed to include bodily injuries causing National Ba
ath. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the G.R. No. L-37733; September 30, 19
ised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
o consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. FACTS:
hough in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no Almario T. Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned
ependent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where Manager of the Malolos' branch. As such, his duty w
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recomme
wever, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the lo
rged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he
ereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless supposed to exercise care and prudence, and with utm
prudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of
cle 33 lies. bank.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies

the PNB, Salta indiscriminately granted certain lo
mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a man
characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, a
upon securities not commensurate with the amount of
loans. This is how the PNB found Salta to have discharged
duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a c
action in the CFI of Manila and another case, to reco
losses the bank suffered. At the same time the bank caused
be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case with
Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District at
Fernando, Pampanga, for violation of the Anti-Graft a
Corrupt Practices A

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES


he criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by
defense, after the prosecution has rested, granted the
tion in a 64-page Resolution. Said Court ACQUITTED
ta.
h his acquittal in the criminal case, Salta filed Motions to
miss in each of the two civil cases, based on Section 3(c),
e I I I of the Revised Rules of Court.
in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de
yra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically
posing views, the former denying the motion, the latter
nting
nce, these consolidated petitions.
UE: WON motion to dismiss should be granted.
LD:
e motion to dismiss of Salta must be denied for the reason
t acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for
civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court
kes a finding that even civilly the accused would not be
le-there is no such a finding. Apart from this, PNB in the
l case based its case either on fraud or negligence-
dence that only requires a preponderance, unlike beyond
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal cas
Further, the filing in this case of a civil action separate fr
the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision
Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for
prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fra
one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforeci
provision. Based on the same acts for which the crim
action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud a
negligence as having given rise to the cause of action aver
in the complaints. It needs hardly any showing to demonstr
this fact, which petitioner disputes, particularly as to
sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil complai
it. Definitely, SC hold that the following allegation in
complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints
contain sufficient averment of fra
13. That there was fraud committed by the defendan
granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for
acts, which fraud is positively and easily Identifiable in
manner and scheme aforemention
That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistaka
shown when the complaint states that "the defendant
manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the b
rules and regulations, and without exercising necess
prudence, ... extended a number of credit accommodation

this allegation of negligence alone, the civil case may be
ntained as an entirely independent action from the
minal case. Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the
ised Rules of Court has no application thereto.
petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint,
ed on negligence, apart from the averment of fraud, then
the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be
ntained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.
e opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs.
endia is not only enlightening, but authoritative. Thus —
in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil
de, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
viction, would be entirety irrelevant to the civil action. This
ms to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make
se actions 'entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal
on (Articles 22, 33, 34 and 2177). Hence in these cases, I
nk Rule 107 Sec. l(d) does not apply.
significant to note that under Article 31 of the New Civil
de, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to
filed separately from the criminal action may proceed
ependently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclu
that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in
same manner to be filed separately from the criminal ca
may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the crim
case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related t
criminal case, to be filed separately and to proce
independently even during the pendency of the latter ca
the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of
criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate c
case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Art
33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mention
that they may be made the subject of a separate civil act
because of the distinct separability of their respective jurid
cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case
swindling, a specie of an offense committed by means
fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately a
proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of
result of the lat
The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New C
Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action
reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case
prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone with
intervention from a private counsel representing the inter
of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in
sent instance, the prosecution of the criminal case is left to (21) ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIM
government prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or SOLIVEN, petitione
handing of the case committed by the latter should not vs.
rk to the prejudice of the offended party whose interest COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLA
uld thus be protected by the measure contemplated by respondents
cle 33 and Article 2177 of the New Civil Code. G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999

BELLOSILLO,
erefore, acquittal in the criminal case will not be an
FACTS:
tacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal
Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven (petitioners) are among
e the Court makes a finding that even civilly, the accused
incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilST
uld not be liable-there is no such finding.
Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper
the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was
President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher a
Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular writers
The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker

Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other ha

is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant a
journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a techn
adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of
House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Pol

During the congressional hearings on the transport cr

sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House S
Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agre
to organize the First National Conference on La
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the priv

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 tor in the transport industry and government agencies
cerned in order to find ways and means to solve the
nsportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the
CLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a
g-term land transportation policy for presentation to
ngress. The conference which, according to private
pondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00
uld be funded through solicitations from various sponsors
h as government agencies, private organizations, transport
ms, and individual delegates or participants.
February 1989 -at the organizational meeting of the
CLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected
cutive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation
ers to the business community for the support of the
ference.
y - July 1989: a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal
s published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The
cles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an
ganizer of a conference" without naming or identifying
vate respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the
ference therein mentioned. The excerpts quoted talked
out a conference organizer’s solicitation of huge fees,
uthorized use of the names of President Aquino and
retary Reyes, shady deals, dubious ways, and the failure of
supposed conference.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
PR reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philipp
Star insisting that he was the "organizer" alluded to
petitioner Borjal's columns.4 In a subsequent letter to T
Philippine Star, private respondent refuted the matt
contained in petitioner Borjal's columns and ope
challenged him.
PR filed a complaint with the National Press Club (N
against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He accu
petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage
obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Bo
Associates.6 In turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinde
the challenge of private respondent not only to protect
name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was us
his column for character assassination.
Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC,
filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal a
Soliven, among others.
Assistant Prosecutor: dismissed the complaint
insufficiency of evidence which was affirmed by the DOJ a
OP
31 October 1990 - private respondent instituted aga
petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subjec
the instant case.
al Court: decided in favor of PR publication.10 Regrettably, these requisites have not be
: affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the complied with in the case at bar. The questioned artic
ount of the monetary award to P110,000.00 actual written by Borjal do not identify private respond
mages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of
orney's fees plus costs ruling that PR was sufficiently Jaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue
ntifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that priv
t PR was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely,
variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes"
anizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "s
ked inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conference
bious ways;" that petitioner's claim of privilege As a matter of fact, in his 9 June 1989 column petitioner Bo
mmunication was unavailing since the privileged character wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on La
he articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of Transportation whose principal organizers are not specifie
neral circulation. (emphasis supplied). 11Neither did the FNCLT letterhead
disclose the identity of the conference organizer since th
ue:
contained only an enumeration of names where priv
N PR was sufficiently identified? NO.
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Execu
N the disputed articles constitute privileged
Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organi
mmunications? YES
13 The printout 14 and tentative program 15 of
N malice is presumed? GR: YES
conference were devoid of any indication of Wenceslao
ing: organizer. The printout which contained an article entit
The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention priv
el suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although respondent's name, while the tentative program o
not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman a
t the offended party recognized himself as the person Executive Director," and not as organizer. No less than priv
acked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had seve
d person could identify him as the object of the libelous organizers and that he was only a part of the organizati

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

vate respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the
son spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called
columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one
erred to in the subject articles. 17 His letter to the editor
blished in the 4 June 1989 issue of The Philippine Star even
wed private respondent Wenceslao's uncertainty.
ntification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged
ended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the
bal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the
ntity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner
jal but from private respondent himself; when he supplied
information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor.
d private respondent not revealed that he was the
ganizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the
blic would have remained in blissful ignorance of his
ntity. It is therefore clear that on the element of
ntifiability alone the case falls.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely
vileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
mmunications are those which are not actionable even if
author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec.
Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member
Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
ngress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand,
alifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
imputations are not actionable unless found to have be
made without good intention justifiable motive. To this ge
belong "private communications" and "fair and true rep
without any comments or remarks." Indisputably, petitio
Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions
Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observ
by the appellate court, they are neither priv
communications nor fair and true report without
comments or remarks. However this does not necessa
mean that they are not privileged. To be sure,
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commenta
on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The r
on privileged communications had its genesis not in
nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitut
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. 19 As e
as 1918, in United States v. Cañete,20 this Court ruled t
publications which are privileged for reasons of public po
are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by
mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition
the statute punishing libels. Fair commentaries on matters
public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense
an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comm
means that while in general every discreditable imputat
publicly made is deemed false, because every man
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, a
 ry false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
en the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
son in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
y be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
material that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long
t might reasonably be inferred from the facts.21There is no
nying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of
blic interest. But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that
vate respondent, despite the position he occupied in the
CLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not
essarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a
blic comment even if he was not a public official or at least
ublic figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in
ublic issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general
erest, it cannot suddenly became less so merely because a
vate individual is involved or because in some sense the
ividual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The
blic's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on
conduct of the participant and the content, effect and
nificance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
onymity or notoriety.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(3) While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamat
words, the privileged character of a communication destr
the presumption of malice. 32 The onus of proving act
malice then lies on PR. Malice connotes ill will or spite a
speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.34 Malice is bad faith or b
motive.35 It is the essence of the crime of libel. Prima
private respondent failed to substantiate by preponder
evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire to in
unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles w
written and published without good motives or justifia
ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal to h
acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty a
prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman,
proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to
a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for th
Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name a
reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal
violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedo
Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libel
statements must be shown to have been written or publish
with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disreg
of whether they are false or not. 37 "Reckless disregard
what is false or not" means that the defendant enterta
serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, 38 or that
possesses a high degree of awareness of their proba
ity.39 The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be (22) MVRS Publications Islamic Dawah Council of the Ph
d to have been written with knowledge that these are false
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC
n reckless disregard of what is false or not. This is not to
local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religi
however that the very serious allegations of petitioner
organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R
jal assumed by private respondent to be directed against
LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID
are true. But we nevertheless find these at least to have
GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUN
en based on reasonable grounds formed after the
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
umnist conducted several personal interviews and after
damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behal
sidering the varied documentary evidence provided him
the Muslim members nationwide against MV
his sources.
PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA
AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from
article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a d
tabloid. The article reads:

"ALAM BA NINYO?

Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindan

ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hi

nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom
mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa
itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw
kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinataw
nilang Ramadan."

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement w

insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these wo

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

 ding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
blished out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the
lings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a
gion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good
rals and human relations; that on account of these libelous
rds Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines
the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim
ividual in non-Muslim countries.
C Decision: COMPLAINT DISMISSED due to the fact that
plaintiffs were not specifically identified. Hence, it is
icult for an individual Muslim member to prove that the
amatory remarks apply to him.
Decision: REVERSED RTC DECISION and found petitioner
le for damages. It opined that it was "clear from the
puted article that the defamation was directed to all
herents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred
d idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This
elous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-
pellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious
iefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit"
d that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
C.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave
he requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of
Muslims.
UE
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Whether petitioner is liable for damages — NO.
HELD
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means
offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputat
through false and malicious statements.It is the publication
anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation
another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is
invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opin
which others in the community may have, or tend to have
the plaintiff.
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting
not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatio
whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation
special damages. The fact that the language is offensive
the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot
interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individ
Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding t
particular member of a class, no member of such class
a right of action without at all impairing the equ
demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as
the press, under the Bill of Rights.In the present case, th
s no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could
be identifiable, private respondents have no individual
ses of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly
paraged. Private respondents must have a cause of action
ommon with the class to which they belong to in order for
case to prosper.
individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal,
arate and distinct in the community. There is no injury to
reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this
mmunity that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each
utation is personal in character to every person. Together,
Muslims do not have a single common reputation that
give them a common or general interest in the subject
tter of the controversy.
ip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to
Law of Libel,” discusses the inappropriateness of any
ion for tortious libel involving large groups, and
vides a succinct illustration:
ere are groupings which may be finite enough so that a
cription of the body is a description of the members. Here
problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description of
member implicit in the description of the body, or is there
ossibility that a description of the body may consist of a
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
variety of persons, those included within the charge, a
those excluded from it?
A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shyst
would obviously not be a charge that all of the lawyers w
shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point in a gr
city, such as Times Square in New York City, were shyst
would obviously not include all of the lawyers who practic
in that district; but a statement that all of the lawyers w
practiced in a particular building in that district were shyst
would be a specific charge, so that any lawyer having an of
within that building could sue.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libel
statement is considered to have no application to anyo
in particular, since one might as well defame all manki
Not only does the group as such have no action; the plain
does not establish any personal reference to himself.
present, modern societal groups are both numerous a
complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as
size of these groups increases, the chances for members
such groups to recover damages on tortious libel beco
elusive.
This principle is said to embrace two (2) important pu
policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the cou
presume that no reasonable reader would take the stateme
as so literally applying to each individual member; a
ond, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily as good as ones character and conduct warrant. The mere
eguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the that the plaintiffs feelings and sensibilities have be
ss, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting offended is not enough to create a cause of action
damental interests involved in libel cases. defamation. Defamation requires that something
communicated to a third person that may affect the opin
he instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to
others may have of the plaintiff. The unprivileg
dily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly
communication must be shown of a statement that wo
amed. The size of the group renders the reference as
tend to hurt plaintiffs reputation, to impair plaintiffs stand
eterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics,
in the community.
testants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word
uslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury
gion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the reputation, the focus of a defamation action is upon
tes, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predicta
itical and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name effect upon third persons. A statement is ordina
ch describes only a general segment of the Philippine considered defamatory if it tend[s] to expose one to pu
pulation, comprising a heterogeneous body whose hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contem
struction is not so well defined as to render it impossible ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace T
any representative identification. Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as o
that tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lo
amation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander
him in the estimation of the community or to deter th
one being, in general, written, while the other in general is
persons from associating or dealing with him.
l. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in
utation and good name. This is a relational interest since it Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary
olves the opinion others in the community may have, or the plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie case that
d to have of the plaintiff. defendant

e law of defamation protects the interest in reputation the (1) published a statement that was
erest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying ones reputation

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

defamatory
of and concerning the plaintiff.
ine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged
amatory statement, it must appear that the plaintiff is
person with reference to whom the statement was
de. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a
up or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the
ective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to
w that he was the person at whom the defamation was
ected.
ontrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to
arge class or group of persons, and there is nothing that
nts, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to
ply, to a particular member of the class or group, no
mber has a right of action for libel or slander. Where the
amatory matter had no special, personal application and
s so general that no individual damages could be
sumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous
t great vexation and oppression might grow out of the
ltiplicity of suits, no private action could be maintained.
s rule has been applied to defamatory publications
cerning groups or classes of persons engaged in a
ticular business, profession or employment, directed at
ociations or groups of association officials, and to those
ected at miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception
the size of the group and whether a statement will
interpreted to refer to every member. The more organi
and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its memb
with the same brush and the more likely a court will perm
suit from an individual even if the group includes more th
twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increas
size may be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and
resulting injury will fall
SC concluded that the statements published by petition
in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer
any particular individuals who were purportedly
subject of the alleged libelous publication. Responde
can scarcely claim to having been singled out for so
censure pointedly resulting in damages.
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is persona
nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assua
the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal atta
on his character. It has no application in the instant case si
no particular individual was identified in the disputed article
Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the arti
assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relatio
harm - which includes harm to social relationships in
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished fr
the principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries
individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction
otional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly
erted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the
mmunity, especially to their activities in propagating their
h in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in
country.
recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
plaintiff must show that:
The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless
egard of the plaintiff;
The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
There was a causal connection between the defendant's
duct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and,
The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
treme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so
rageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The
endant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff. Generally,
duct will be found to be actionable where the recitation of
facts to an average member of the community would
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or
to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or her reaction.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant men
reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliati
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, naus
mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, a
chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictio
refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or men
condition which may be generally recognized and diagno
by professionals trained to do so, including posttraum
stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression,
phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among other thin
that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe t
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; seve
of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not sim
a matter of damages.
n determining whether the tort of outrage had be
committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required
be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough langua
and to occasional acts and words that are defini
inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the ac
knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulti
or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
Verily, SC found that the conduct of petitioners was
extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional distr
 gedly suffered by respondents so severe that no
sonable person could be expected to endure it. There is
evidence on record that points to that result.
fessor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional
ction of emotional distress in this manner
ere is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary
endants are not liable for mere insult, indignity,
oyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other
umstances of aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek.
r manners, and with them our law, have not yet progressed
he point where we are able to afford a remedy in the form
ort damages for all intended mental disturbance. Liability
course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity x x x x
e plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be
dened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts
t are definitely inconsiderate and unkind x x x The plaintiff
not recover merely because of hurt feelings.
fessor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this
cinct observation, viz:
ere is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case
ere someones feelings are hurt. There must still be
edom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety
ve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow
relatively harmless steam.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot
cured by the filing of a class suit. As correctly pointed out
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations,
element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation
The rules require that courts must make sure that the pers
intervening should be sufficiently numerous to fully prot
the interests of all concerned. In the present controve
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in eff
to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in
Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well.Priv
respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers
represent such a global group; neither have they been able
demonstrate the identity of their interests with those t
seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can b
safe guaranty that those absent will be adequa
represented by those present, a class suit, given
magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing."
Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "mo
damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for
damages and its causal connection with the acts complain
of,and so it must be, as moral damages although incapa
of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a pen
but to compensate for injury sustained and actual dama
suffered.
 mplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded (23) AMARO v. SUMANGUIT; GR No. L-14986; July
laimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, 1962
uidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither
the requirements to sustain an award for either of these Facts:
mages would appear to have been adequately established Appellant Cornelio Amaro and Jose Amaro filed a suit
respondents." damages in CFI Negros Occidental against the chief of po
of the City of Silay, respondent-appellee Ambro
urts must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious
Sumanguit. Although not specifically alleged in the compla
tters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech
it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respec
hts under modern jurisprudence where "[a]ll ideas are
briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27
ated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment - even those
the Civil Code, which provide:
as that are universally condemned and run counter to
stitutional principles.” Under the right to free speech,
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
ere is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custo
nion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage
science of judges and juries but on the competition of
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss beca
er ideas.” Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate
a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
rt decision would surely create a chilling effect on the
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action
stitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejud
pression, and of the press.
to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

The complaint alleges that on October 5, 1958 appellant J

Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city governm
building of Silay; that the following day he, together with
father (Cornelio Amaro) and his witnesses, "went to the of
of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to th
complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" that in v

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES

reof they "gave up and renounced their right and interest
he prosecution of the crime;" that upon advice of the City
yor given to appellee an investigation (of said crime) was
ducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about
ile or had already filed an information for illegal discharge
irearm against the assailant; and that "having finished the
estigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief
police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work,
ering them thru his police to appear in his office when he
bsent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs
take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the
ice from any dereliction of duty in their case against the
petrator of the crime."
: dismissed complaint upon respondent’s motion on the
und that the same does not state facts sufficient to
stitute a cause of action; ruled that petitioners have
other recourse (in connection with the crime of illegal
charge of firearm supposedly committed against one of
m) by filing their complaint directly with the city attorney of
y or by lodging an administrative charge against
pondent
ue: Was the order of dismissal based on failure to state a
se of action correct (not sure if torts or civpro chos)
d:
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
NO. SC held that the facts set out constitute an actiona
dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of
Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorize
may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly plead
Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact
harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to g
them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an office
the law. The requirement under the aforesaid provision t
such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in
context of the allegation. The statement of appelle
dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of
complaint, where it
is alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of
plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in fa
of the policemen.
The complaint is, without doubt, imperfectly drafted. It suf
from vagueness and generalization. But all that the Ru
require is that there be a showing by a statement of ultim
facts, that the plaintiff his a right and that such right has be
violated by the defendant. An action should not be dismis
upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for th
are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8,
rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16. Under
new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon
ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefin
(see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such ca
1
 y ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the (24) RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA a
ntiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEG
thods of discovery provided by the Rules (Rules 18, 20, 21, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DO
and 23). Respondents.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

us, the CFI’s order was SET ASIDE and the case was
manded to the same court for further proceedings.
Facts
Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, minors, w
graduating high school students at St. Theresa's Colle
(STC), Cebu City. While changing into their swimsuits fo
beach party, they took digital pictures of themselves, wh
were uploaded by Angela Tan on her FB. STC’s compu
teacher, Mylene Escudero learned about it. Using ST
computer, her students logged in to their account to sh
her the photos of Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor a
smoking cigarettes inside a bar, wearing articles of cloth
that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. It w
also said that the accounts of Julia and others can be view
by the public.

STC found that the identified students to have depor

themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Stud
Handbook, like smoking, drinking, engaging in indecent a
wearing apparel that exposes the underwear, and posing a
uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample bo

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES 1

posure Julia and the others reported to Sr. Purisima, STC’s as the copying of information, data, and digital ima
h school principal and ICM Directress. They claimed that happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory.
ing the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused
the STC officials. Sr. Purisima also informed their parents
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition,
following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred
petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual
m joining the commencement exercises.
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of
week before graduation, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M.
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
n, filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the
the photos been uploaded without restrictions as to who m
C of Cebu City against STC, praying that defendants
view them, lost their privacy in some way.
rein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that
cluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
a’s mother also joined as an intervenor. RTC issued a Petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Sect
mporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to 19 of the Rule on Habeas Da
end the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion
reconsideration. STC, nevertheless, barred the s students
m participating in the graduation rites. Issue

ares filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation

t of Habeas Data, stating that the photos of their children the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the min

heir undergarments were taken for posterity before they involved in this case. NONE.

nged into their swimsuits and that the privacy setting of

ir children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." Ruling
ey, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
st be respected, the photos accessed belong to the girls
d, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their On Cyber Responsibi
sent and the intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well It is not only STC but a number of schools have alre

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES 1

emed it important to include digital literacy and good
er citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in
w of the risks that the children are exposed to every time
y participate in online activities. The participation of the
ents in disciplining and educating their children about
ng a good digital citizen is encouraged. STC cannot be
ted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students
be responsible in their dealings and activities in
erspace.
incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence
their online dealings and activities and must not be
gligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
manding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
mants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
ch they allege to have been violated. These are
ispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
mselves did nothing to place the matter within the
fines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
ough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they
ire to keep the information private, and to keep track of
nges in the available privacy settings, such as those of
ebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for
nging these settings and the site's layout often.
e right to informational privacy on Facebook ( discussion
out how FB works)
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users
ability to interact and to stay connected to other members
the same or different social media platform through
sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depend
on the services provided by the site. It is akin to havin
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards
"walls," the contents of which are under the control of e
and every user. A Facebook user can regulate the visib
and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his
her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’s pro
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setti
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention t
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebo
would, in context, be correct. However, it is not the case.
through the availability of said privacy tools that many O
users are said to have a subjective expectation that only th
to whom they grant access to their profile will view
information they post or upload thereto. Without
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images w
visible only to the five of them, and without their challeng
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, t
deserving scant considerati
1
 suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set
"Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be
d to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
n assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
ctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can
dly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
ce it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the
tures to Tigol. Respondents did not resort to any unlawful
ans of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given
them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
ts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
nors.
um, there can be no quibbling that the images in question,
personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
ulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
servative institution. However, the records are bereft of
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
ebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to
m or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
otographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
tected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they
e an expectation of privacy with respect to
otographs in question.
d it been proved that the access to the pictures posted
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me On
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has be
screened to limit access to a select few, through
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, fo
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particu
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large o
the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest a
palpable.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ
Habeas D
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any per
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public offi
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or informat
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
the aggrieved party. It seeks to protect a person’s right
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instan
in which such information is being collected through unlaw
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It is erroneous
the
limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforc
disappearances only.
1

pondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not
ue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
hering, collecting or storing of data or information
arding the person, family, home and correspondence of
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless,
oneous. This would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
to a very small group.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(25) JOSE JESUS DISINI, Jr. v. THE SECRETARY
JUSTICE
G.R.No.203335
FACTS:
The present case involves consolidated petitions that as
the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 (“RA 1017
otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the follow
provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as wel
provisions that would enable the government to track do
and penalize violators. These provisions are:
1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
2. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
3. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
7. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications;
8. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the
Commission of Cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
11. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
1
 Section 8 on Penalties;
Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of
mputer Data;
Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer
a;
Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
nter (CICC); and
Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
me petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related
cles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of
el.
LING OF THE COURT:
CTION 4(a)(1)
tion 4(a)(1) provides:
ction 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts
stitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
: (2) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alterati
Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity
ilability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part o
computer system without right.”
The petitioners argue that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet
strict scrutiny standard required by laws that interfere with
fundamental rights of the people.
The Court held Section 4(a)(1) to be constitutional finding
reason to apply the strict scrutiny standard since the s
section does not involve any fundamental freedom. The Co
held that the accessing the computer system of anot
without right is a universally condemned conduct. The Co
further stated that the fear of the petitioner’s that the sect
will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers is unfounded si
he does his job with prior permission of the client t
insulating him from the coverage of this section.
SECTION 4(a)(3)
Section 4(a)(3) provides:
“Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following a
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity a
availability of computer data and systems:
xxxx
and damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer da
electronic document, or electronic data message, with
right, including the introduction or transmission of viruse

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES 1

itioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth
that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it
udes into the area of protected speech and expression,
ating a chilling and deterrent effect on these freedoms.
e Court held that Section 4(a)(3) does not suffer from
rbreadth as it does not even encroach the freedoms of
ech and expression. The Section merely punishes what
entially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully
troying without right the things that belong to others, in
case their computer data, electronic document, or
ctronic data message. Such act has no connection to
aranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other
ople’s computer systems and private documents.
ther is there a chilling or deterrent effect. There exists no
ling effect, since the section clearly describes the evil that
eeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the
e exercise of one’s rights. The Court also noted that all
nal laws have an inherent chilling effect or the fear of
sible prosecution against those who would violate the law.
CTION 4(a)(6)
tion 4(a)(6) provides:
tion 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts
stitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
: SECTION 4(b)(3)
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity a
availability of computer data and systems:
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name o
the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy t
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same
such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an exist
trademark registered with the appropriate governm
agency at the time of the domain name registratio
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a per
other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; a
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual prope
interests in it.
Petitioner claims that Section 4(a)(6) violates the eq
protection clause, such that it will cause a user using his r
name to e to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases
take the name of another in satire, parody, or any ot
literary devi
The Court held that the challenge raised by the Petitioner
baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing those w
acquire the domain name in bad faith to profit, misle
destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the sam
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
1
 tion 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts
stitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
: speech and that it only regulates specific actions such as
xx
Computer-related Offenses:
xx
Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional
uisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or
etion of identifying information belonging to another,
ether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no
mage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be
e (1) degree lower.
itioners assail Section 4(b)(3) for violating the constitutional
hts to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and
nsgressing the freedom of the press.
e Court held Section 4(b)(3) to be constitutional. According
the Court, the usual identifying information regarding a
son includes his name, his citizenship, his residence
dress, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the
me of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.
tion 4(b)(3) punishes those who acquire or use such
ntifying information without right, implicitly to cause
mage and Petitioners failed to show how it violates the
hts to privacy and correspondence as well as due process
aw.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
The Court also found that the specific conducts proscribed
Section 4(b)(3) do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms
acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identify
data of another. There is no fundamental right to acqu
another’s personal data.
Neither does Section 4(b)(3) violate the freedom of the pre
The theft of identity information must be intended for
illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminat
information made public by the user himself cannot
regarded as a form of the
SECTION 4(c)(1)
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
“Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constit
the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, cont
or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibit
of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a compu
system, for favor or consideration.”
Petitioners assail the provision on Cybersex for violating
freedom of expression. They fear that private communicati
of a sexual character between husband and wife
1
 senting adults would be regarded a crime when done “for
our” in cyberspace.
e Court upheld the validity of Section 4(c)(1). The Court
nd that the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
mmittee of Congress show that there is no intention to
nalize a private showing between two private persons.
her, the element of “engaging in a business” is necessary
constitute the illegal cybersex. The Court will not declare
tion 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction
t makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business
maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly,
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity
h the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.
CTION 4(c)(2)
tion 4(c)(2) provides:
. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xx
Content-related Offenses:
xx
Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts
ined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-
ld Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
mputer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
ll be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
public Act No. 9775.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
The above provision merely expands the scope of the A
Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to cover ident
activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecut
persons who commit child pornography using a compu
system.
SECTION 4(c)(3)
Section 4(c)(3) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constit
the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – T
transmission of commercial electronic communication with
use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or o
for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient;
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for serv
and/or administrative announcements from the sender to
existing users, subscribers or customers;
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contain
simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to re
receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-o
1
m the same source;
) The commercial electronic communication does not
posely disguise the source of the electronic message; and
The commercial electronic communication does not
posely include misleading information in any part of the
ssage in order to induce the recipients to read the
ssage.
tion 4(c)(3) punishes the transmission of unsolicited
mmercial communications also known as “spam”. The
vernment defends the provision on claims that such
olicited commercial communications wastes the storage
d network capacities of internet service providers, reduces
efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
h the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property.
nsmitting spam amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since
person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain
hout prior permission. It is likewise argued that commercial
ech enjoys less protection in law.
e Court declared Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional. The Court
nd that the Government has shown no basis for claiming
t unsolicited commercial ads reduce the efficiency of
mputers. Moreover, people have been receiving such ads
n before the advent of computers and these have never
en outlawed since people might have interest in such ads.
at is essential is that the recipient has the option of not
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
opening or reading these ads. The same is true with spa
The recipient has the option to delete or not to read them.
The prohibition of unsolicited commercial ads would den
person the right to read his emails even those which
unsolicited. While commercial speech is a separate categ
of speech that is not entitled to the same level of protect
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of express
it is nonetheless still entitled to protection. Unsolici
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
SECTION 4(c)(4) in relation to Articles 353,354, and 355
the Revised Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) reads:
“Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constit
the offense of cybercrime punishable under this A
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defin
in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amend
committed through a computer system or any other sim
means which may be devised in the future.”
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the Revi
Penal Code provisions on libel and Section 4(c)(4)
cyberlibel. They claim that the libel provision of
Cybercrime Law carries with it the requirement of “presum
1
 ice” and that this infringes on the freedom of expression.
ey likewise contend that the laws on libel should be stricken
wn as the requirement of “actual malice” established by
sprudence can easily be set aside even when the offended
ty is a public figure.
e Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4) and
Revised Penal Code provisions on libel. libel is not a
stitutionally protected speech and that the government
an obligation to protect private individuals from
amation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime
ce Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code,
eady punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
rms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for
mmitting libel.
addition, the Court reiterated that the requirement to show
tual malice” remains available where the offended party is
ublic official or a public figure. This puts in place a stricter
ndard of malice in order to convict the author of a
ement made against a public official or figure. On the
er hand, where the offended party is a private individual,
law presumes the existence of malice from the defamatory
racter of the statement. The accused must show that had a
ifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was
act true.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Neither do the libel laws violate the country’s obligati
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rig
Nothing therein enjoins the Philippines to decriminalize lib
The Covenant even states that although everyone sho
enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it spe
duties and responsibilities.
SECTION 5
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall a
constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. –A
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any
the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any per
who willfully attempts to commit any of the offen
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Section 5 is assailed for suffering from overbreadth a
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protec
expression.
The Court found Section 5 to be unconstitutional in relation
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section4(c)(3) on Unsolici
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Ch
Pornography.
The Court held that, when it comes to certain cybercrim
the idea of “aiding or abetting” becomes muddier a
1
mewhat blurred. In order to illustrate this, the Court made
of social media sites Facebook and Twitter. The Court
ed the query on whether a person who “Likes”, “Shares”
“Comments” on a defamatory post on Facebook, may be
d liable under Section 5. Similarly, for Twitter, will a person
o replies to or “retweets” a defamatory tweet be liable
der Section 5? The Court characterized such actions as
entially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little
haphazardly of their response to the original posting.
e Court then went on to state that the concept of “aiding
d abetting” when applied to cyberlibel tends to create a
ling effect since the terms “aiding or abetting” constitute a
ad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
press themselves through cyberspace posts, comments,
d other messages. The particularly complex web of
eraction on social media websites would give law enforcers
h latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce
law. This same logic applies to Section 5 in relation to
d pornography in Section 4(c)(2) and unsolicited
mmercial communication under Section 4(c)(3).
e Court likewise noted that libel is a formal crime that is
nished only when consummated. Thus, Section 5(b) does
apply therein.
the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of
ercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to
tion 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Sect
4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1)
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Compu
related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Iden
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offen
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
Moreover, Section 5(b) applies to these offenses because
not do so will allow those, who were to unsuccessfully com
these offences due to the vigilance of the offended party
evade punishment.
SECTION 6
Section 6 provides:
“Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revi
Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed
through and with the use of information and communicati
technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions
this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall
one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revi
Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case m
be.”
Section 6 was held to be valid as it merely makes
commission of existing crimes through the internet
qualifying circumstance and there is a substantial distinct
between crimes committed through the internet and th
1
mmitted through other means. The offender may evade
ntification and is able to reach more victims or cause
ater harm.
CTION 7
tion 7 provides:
. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this
shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or
cial laws.
h the exception of the crimes of online libel and online
d pornography, the Court would rather leave the
ermination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual
es.
wever, with respect to online libel, if the libellous material
ublished in print and is again posted online or vice versa,
t identical material cannot be the subject of two separate
els. The two offenses involve essentially the same elements
d are in fact one and the same offense. The same is true
h child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2)
rely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical
vities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s
inition of child pornography in fact already covers the use
“electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
er means.” Thus, charging the offender under both
tion 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
violation of the constitutional prohibition against dou
jeopardy.
SECTION 8
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crim
Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integ
and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b)
Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devic
when the crime punishable under 4(a) is committed aga
critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Ch
Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commer
Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, a
Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The fixing of penalties was held to be a legislative preroga
and those imposed by Section 8 appear to be proportion
to the evil sought to be punished. The Courts should
encroach upon the legislature’s prerogative in
determination of penalties for crimes.
SECTION 12
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — L
enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authori
to collect or record by technical or electronic means tra
data in real-time associated with specified communicati
transmitted by means of a computer system.
1
ffic data refer only to the communication’s origin,
tination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of
derlying service, but not content, nor identities.
other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will
uire a court warrant.
vice providers are required to cooperate and assist law
orcement authorities in the collection or recording of the
ove-stated information.
e court warrant required under this section shall only be
ued or granted upon written application and the
mination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there
reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes
umerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being
mmitted, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
sonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be
ained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to
solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and
that there are no other means readily available for
aining such evidence.
itioners argue that the power given to law enforcement to
ect and record data traffic in real time violate the right to
vacy.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Section 12 allows law enforcement to collect and record r
time traffic data with “due cause”. However, nothing in
law hints at the meaning of “due cause” and is akin to the
of a general warrant which is Constitutionally prohibited.
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agenc
is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that tra
data collection should not disclose identities or content da
such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing
prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in th
hands from looking into the identity of their sender or rece
and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose
citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion fr
certain bad elements in these agencies. The power is virtu
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage
“fishing expedition,”choosing whatever specif
communication they want. This evidently threatens the ri
of individuals to privacy. The grant of the power to tr
cyberspace communications in real time and determine th
sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclu
abuses.
Neither may Section 12 be characterized as a valid warrantl
search. Such warrantless search involves a situation where
officer has probable cause to believe a crime has be
committed, there is no opportunity to get a warrant, and t
unless the search is carried out the thing to be search
1
nds to be removed. These preconditions do not appear in
tion 12.
CTION 13
tion 13 provides:
c. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of
fic data and subscriber information relating
mmunication services provided by a service provider shall
preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the
e of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly
served for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the
er from law enforcement authorities requiring
servation.
w enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension
another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data
served, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used
evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service
vider of the transmittal document to the Office of the
secutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
mputer data until the termination of the case.
e service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall
p confidential the order and its compliance.”
itioners claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue
privation of property akin to a form of garnishment of
sonal property in civil forfeiture proceedings.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
The Court held Section 13 to be valid. The data that serv
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authori
are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issua
of such orders and the process of preserving data will
unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
to SECTION 14
Section 14 provides:
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcem
authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an or
requiring any person or service provider to disclose or sub
its subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours fr
receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint offici
docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosur
necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
The court held that Section 14 is valid. The power to is
subpoenas is also available to executive agencies as
adjunct of their investigatory powers. Moreover, Section
contemplates the enforcement of a duly issued court warra
There is thus no unlawful search nor seizure, nor a violation
the privacy of communications and correspondence.
1
CTION 15 storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no c
tion 15 provides: for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of appro
. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. by the court.
Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the The Court held Section 15 to be valid. It only enumerates
enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following duties of law enforcement authorities which does not p
wers and duties. any threat to the rights of the person from whom these w
hin the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct taken by virtue of a court warrant. It merely suppleme
erception, as defined in this Act, and: existing search and seizure rules.
To secure a computer system or a computer data storage
dium; SECTION 17
To make and retain a copy of those computer data Section 17 provides:
ured; Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration
To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, serv
a; providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case m
To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the be, shall immediately and completely destroy the compu
mputer data storage medium; and data subject of a preservation and examination.
To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in
accessed computer or computer and communications Section 17 is valid. It is unclear that the user has
work. demandable right to require the service provider to have t
suant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its stora
person who has knowledge about the functioning of the system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have sav
mputer system and the measures to protect and preserve them in his computer when he generated the data or receiv
computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the it. He could also request the service provider for a co
essary information, to enable the undertaking of the before it is deleted.
rch, seizure and examination.
w enforcement authorities may request for an extension of
e to complete the examination of the computer data

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES 1

CTION 19
tion 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or
ck access to computer data:
. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.—
en a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation
he provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to
trict or block access to such computer data.
itioners assail Section 19 for stifling the freedom of
pression and violating the right against unreasonable
rches and seizures.
tion 19 violates the right against unreasonable searches
d seizures and freedom of expression.
mputer data produced or written by its authors is personal
perty and is thus protected against unreasonable searches
d seizures whether it be stored in the owner’s personal
mputer or in the service provider’s systems. The DOJ’s
er is not a substitute for a judicial warrant.
e contents of computer data can also constitute as speech.
tion 19 disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to
ermine validity of restrictions on speech (i.e. dangerous
dency doctrine, balancing of interest test, clear and
sent danger rule). Section 19, however, merely requires
t the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation
any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation
any penal provision.
SECTION 20
Section 20 provid
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with
provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders fr
law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation
Presidential Decree No.1829 with imprisonment of pris
correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hund
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and ev
noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcem
authorities.
Petitioners allege that Section 20 is a bill of attainder a
makes a mere failure to comply constitutes a legisla
finding of guilt.
Section 20 is valid. since the non-compliance would
punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 18
Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offe
which are defined therein. If Congress had intended
Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it wo
not have had to make reference to any other statue
provision. There must still be a judicial determination of gu
during which, as t
1
 citor General assumes, defense and justifications for non- sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provide
mpliance may be raised. definition of cybersecurity.

CTION 24 and 26(a) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies,

tions 24 and 26(a) provide: management approaches, actions, training, best practic
c. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cy
ere is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the environment and organization and user’s assets. T
ectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as definition serves as the parameters within which CICC sho
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
der the administrative supervision of the Office of the
sident, for policy coordination among concerned agencies
d for the formulation and enforcement of the national
ersecurity plan.
. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the
owing powers and functions:
To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend
mediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
enses through a computer emergency response team.”
itioner assail the above sections for being an invalid
egation of legislative power.

tions 24 and 26(a) are valid as they meet the completeness

d sufficient standards test for a valid delegation. The
ercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan.
o, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave

T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES 1

) Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. CA
No. 130068 October 1, 1998
CTS:
June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the
gship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern
pping Company (FESC for brevity), arrived at the Port of
nila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00am.
e vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International
t, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was
ked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the
thing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned
the appellant Manila Pilots Association (MPA) to conduct
cking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth
. 4.
vino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and
ioned himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel,
tor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
ankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the
sel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
ceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm
d the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the
sel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo
rth Harbor) 1/2 mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
gine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000ft
m the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov
ayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
left anchor, with 2 shackles were dropped. However,
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the ves
did not slacken. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did
take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, w
was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel w
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the f
astern code. Before the right anchor and additional shack
could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into
apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the p
The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his
protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief P
Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. T
rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the PPA the amo
of P1,126,132.25.
PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against Far East
Shipping, Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pi
Association, before RTC Manila.
RTC: ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally
pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing act
damages and the cost of suit.
Defendants appealed to the CA and raised the follow
issues:
1
 Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory
otage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to
pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?
Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the
mage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master
vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
: affirmed RTC’s decision and found no employer-
ployee relationship existing between MPA and Capt.
vino. It held that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on
cle 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the provisions of
stoms Administrative Order No. 15-65, holding MPA, along
h its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but
itled MPA to reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such
ount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the
ount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed reserve fund.
G.R. No. 130068, which was assigned to the Second
ision of this Court, FESC argues: it asserts that since the
PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at the time of
incident, it was a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was
ommand and had complete control in the navigation and
cking of the vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the
ster for the time being in the command and navigation of a
p and his orders must be obeyed in all respects connected
h her navigation. Consequently, he was solely responsible
the damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the
ners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
not commit any act of negligence when he failed
countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because
did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In other words,
master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on
competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does
observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physic
incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot
In G.R. No. 130150, MPA as petitioner argues: that
respondent court's errors consisted in disregarding a
misinterpreting Customs Administrative Order No. 15
which limits the liability of MPA. Said pilots' associat
asseverates that it should not be held solidarily liable w
Capt. Gavino who, as held by respondent court, is onl
member, not an employee, thereof. It further argues t
there was erroneous reliance on Customs Administra
Order No. 15-65 and the constitution and by-laws of M
instead of the provisions of the Civil Code on damages wh
being a substantive law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pilot and master are liable
HELD:
Yes. In American jurisprudence that there is a presumption
fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary ob
such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty,
1
sumption does more than merely require the ship to go
ward and produce some evidence on the presumptive
tter. The moving vessel must show that it was without fault
that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the
ionary object or was the result of inevitable accident. It has
en held that such vessel must exhaust every reasonable
sibility which the circumstances admit and show that in
h, they did all that reasonable care required. In the
ence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of
t attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed
ect and makes a prima facie case of fault against the
sel. Such accidents simply do not occur in the ordinary
rse of things unless the vessel has been mismanaged in
me way.
OT
pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and
nsed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain
ers. In a broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1)
se whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or
particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation
vessels on the high seas. The pilot supersedes the master
the time being in the command and navigation of the ship,
d his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with
navigation. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a
ce where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on
ing effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does
take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely
adviser of the master, who retains command and contro
the navigation even on localities where pilotage
compulsory.
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot
Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the MPA. Upon assuming such of
as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the univers
accepted high standards of care and diligence required o
pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge
respect to navigation in the particular waters over which
license extends superior to and more to be trusted than t
of the master. A pilot should have a thorough knowledge
general and local regulations and physical conditions affect
the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he
licensed, such as a particular harbor or river. He is not held
the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must h
and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by
circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in
profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot m
exercise extraordinary care.
Prudence required that he, as pilot, should have made s
that his directions were promptly and strictly follow
Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give the command
drop the anchor on time, as pilot he should have seen t
1
 t the order was carried out, and he could have done this in
umber of ways, one of which was to inspect the bow of the
sel where the anchor mechanism was installed.
nerally, the degree of care required is graduated according
the danger a person or property attendant upon the
vity which the actor pursues or the instrumentality which
uses. The greater the danger the greater the degree of
e required.
STER
the duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's
oxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which
does not foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The
ster has the same power to displace the pilot that he has to
move any subordinate officer of the vessel, at his discretion.
master of a vessel is not Without fault in acquiescing in
duct of a pilot which involves apparent and avoidable
nger, whether such danger is to the vessel upon which the
ot is, or to another vessel, or persons or property thereon
on shore. Though a compulsory pilot might be regarded as
independent contractor, he is at all times subject to the
mate control of the ship's master. In sum, where a
mpulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being
uired to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes
t the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is
duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But
o such reasons are present, then the master is justified in
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under
circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where
master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which the mas
of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have observ
that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was goi
or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exerc
of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the mas
to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the mas
should have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel m
exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with
circumstances.
The court ruled that Capt. Kabankov's shared liability is d
mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the peril
situation should have spurred him into quick and decis
action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent or act
danger, he did not have to wait for the happenstance to oc
before countermanding or overruling the pilot. By his o
admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavin
decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided
to countermand any of the latter's orders. Inasmuch as b
lower courts found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing
agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as negligen
Capt. Gavino.
1
 TORTFEASORS
neral Rule: a pilot is personally liable for damages caused
his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel,
d to third parties for damages sustained in a collision. A
powner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the
gligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily.
eption: a pilot is responsible only for his own personal
gligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages
ximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be
thing which concurred with the fault of the pilot in
ducing the accident, the vessel master and owners are
le.
ce the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the
den of proof is upon the party claiming benefit of the
mption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that
pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on the part
he officers or crew, which might have been conducive to
damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to
e the pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liability. The
ners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for
acts of the pilot, and they must be left to recover the
ount as well as they can against him. Except insofar as their
ility is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her
ner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or
er wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel.
ere the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory one in the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
sense that the owner or master of the vessel are bound
accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the owners of
vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent act.
Compulsory pilot and the master of the vessel to
concurrently negligent: the negligence in order to rende
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. I
sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or m
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liab
because he is responsible for only one of them, it be
sufficient that the negligence of the person charged w
injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would
have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is
attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one
the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not h
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence
wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors wh
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the to
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent a
or omissions of two or more persons, although act
independently, are in combination the direct and proxim
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible
determine in what proportion each contributed to the in
and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
1
R. No. 130150
e liability of MPA for damages is not anchored on Article
80 of the New Civil Code but under the provisions of
stoms Administrative Order No. 15-65. There being no
ployer-employee relationship, clearly Article 2180 of the
il Code is inapplicable since there is no vicarious liability of
employer to speak of. The Court of Appeals properly
plied the clear and unequivocal provisions of Customs
ministrative Order No. 15-65. In doing so, it was just being
sistent with its finding of the non-existence of employer-
ployee relationship between MPA and Capt. Gavino
cludes the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
e, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 does not
egorically characterize or label MPA's liability as solidary in
ure. Nevertheless, a careful reading and proper analysis of
correlated provisions lead to the conclusion that MPA is
darity liable for the negligence of its member pilots,
hout prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from the
ot at fault.
RTINENT RULES ON PILOTAGE:
C. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service.- For entering a harbor
d anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits
hin a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at
pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every
sel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
mpulsory pilotage. x x x
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties a
responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master h
been specified by the same regulation in this wise:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. -
compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot, providing
service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage cau
to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to
negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liabilit
the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calami
provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence
prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel ev
on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand
overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot
board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to
and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence
the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of
registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice
recourse against said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pi
shall be determined by competent authority in appropri
proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances
each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilo
Association. - The duties and responsibilities of the Har
Pilot shall be as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
1
 pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel
m the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he
ves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that
responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master
glects or refuses to carry out his order.
stoms Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years
lier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
ponsibilities of pilots:
. XXXIX. - A Pilot shall be held responsible for the
ection of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof
il he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his
ponsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects
efuses to carry out his instructions.
xxxxxxx
. XLIV. - Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor
sels under their control when requested to do so by the
ster of such vessels.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
(27) UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V CHI
JOY, SAMSUN SHIPPING LTD., and INTER-ASIA MARI
TRANSPORT, INC. vs. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.
Facts:
On 25 January 1997, the cargo ship M/V "China Joy" (
Vessel) arrived at the Mariveles Grain Terminal Wh
operated by plaintiff [ATI].
According to the Berth Term Grain Bills of Lading, the Ves
carried soybean meal that had been shipped
ContiQuincyBunge L.L.C[.] (ContiQuincyBunge), an expo
of soybean meal and related products, in favor of seve
consignees in the Philippines.
Under theCharter Party Agreement over M/V "China Jo
ContiQuincyBunge represented itself as the Charterer of
Vessel, with San Miguel Foods, Inc. as Co-Charterer, a
defendant [Samsun] represented itself as the Agent of
Shipowners. Samsun is a foreign corporation not do
business in the Philippines.
On 3 February 1997[,] ATI used its Siwertell Unloader No. 2
unload the soybean meal from the Vessel's Hold No. 2. T
Siwertell Unloader is a pneumatic vacubator that u
compressed gas to vertically move heavy bulk grain fr
within the hatch of the ship in order to unload it off the ship
1
e unloading operations were suddenly halted when the
d of Unloader No. 2 hit a at low-carbon or "mild" steel
measuring around 8 to 10 inches in length, 4 inches in
th, and 1 1/4 inch in thickness that was in the middle of
mass of soybean meal. The flat steel bar lodged itself
ween the vertical screws of Unloader No. 2, causing
tions of screw numbers 2 and 3 to crack and be sheared
under the torsional load.
cording to the quotation of BMH Marine AB Sweden, the
e manufacturer of Siwertell unloaders, the replacement
t of each screw is US$12,395.00 or US$24,790.00 for the 2
ews plus freight. The labor cost to remove and re-assemble
screws is estimated at US$2,000.00.
4 February 1997, ATI sent a Note of Protest to the Master
the Vessel for the damages sustained by its unloading
uipment as a result of encountering the at steel bar among
soybean meal. However, the Vessel's Master wrote a note
the Protest stating that it is not responsible for the damage
cause the metal piece came from the cargo and not from
vessel itself.
5 March 1997, ATI sent a claim to defendant [Inter-Asia]
the amount of US$37,185.00 plus US$2,000.00 labor cost
resenting the damages sustained by its unloading
uipment.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Inter-Asia rejected ATI's claim for the alleged reason that
not the Shipowner's Agent. Inter-Asia informed ATI that
principal is Samsun. Moreover, according to Inter-Asia,
owner of the Vessel is Trans-Pacific Shipping Co., c/o La
Shipping Company. Inter-Asia, however, offered to relay A
claim to Trans-Pacific through Samsun.
As previously noted, the Charter Party Agreement sta
Samsun to be the Agent of the Shipowners, but since Sam
is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Philippines, it transacted its business through Inter-A
Hence, Inter-Asia is the Agent of the Agent of
Shipowners.
When negotiations for settlement failed, ATI led the inst
Complaint for Damages against Samsun, Inter-Asia and
"Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V 'China Joy'" on 9 Ma
1999.
In the joint Answer, Inter-Asia reiterated that it is not
Agent of the Shipowners. Defendants further averred that
soybean meal was shipped on board the M/V "China J
under a Free-In-and-Out-Stowed-and-Trimmed (FIO
Clause, which supposedly means that the Shipper/Charte
itself (ContiQuincyBunge LLC) loaded the cargo on board
Vessel, and the latter and her complement had
participation therein except to provide the use of the Vess
1
ar. Similarly, under the FIOST clause, the discharge of the
go was to be done by the consignees' designated
sonnel without any participation of the Vessel and her
mplement.
endants argued that since the metal foreign object was
nd in the middle of the cargo, it could not have come from
bottom of the hatch because the hatch had been
pected and found clean prior to loading. Defendants
her averred that neither could the metal bar have been
t of the Vessel that had broken off and fallen into the hatch
cause tests conducted on the metal piece revealed that
d metal bar was not part of the Vessel.
endants concluded that the metal bar could only have
en already co- mingled with the soybean meal upon
ding by ContiQuincyBunge at loadport, and, therefore,
endants are not liable for the damages sustained by the
oader of ATI.
ings of the RTC and CA
January 30, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision 8
missing ATI's complaint for insu ciency of evidence. The
C explained that while the damage to ATI's Siwertell
oader No. 2 was proven, "[t]he Court is at a quandary as to
o caused the piece of metal to [co-mingle] with the
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
shipment." ATI thereafter led an appeal, 10 which the
granted.
CA on res ipsa loquitur
he CA explained its ruling, viz.:
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitu
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that pr
facie negligence may be established without direct proof a
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
We find the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitu
be appropriate in the case at bar.
First. Since the cargo to be unloaded was free- ow
soybean meal in bulk, ATI correctly used a pneum
vacubator unloader to extract the soybean meal from
holds. Under normal unloading procedures of bulk grain,
not expected that a metal foreign object would be among
grain to be unloaded. . . ..
Such an accident does not occur in the ordinary course
things, unless the loading of the soybean meal at loadp
was mismanaged in some way that allowed a metal fore
object to be co-mingled with the soybean meal cargo.
Second. The damage to the vertical screws of ATI's unloa
was caused by the presence of the metal bar among
1
bean meal in Hold No. 2 of the ship: an instrumentality
hin the exclusive control of the shipowner.
. According to defendants, "the vessel and her
mplement had no participation in the loading and
charge of said bulk cargo except to provide use of the
sel's gear."
endants' argument is neither accurate nor meritorious. In
rst place, the terms of the Charter Party in this case was
Free-In-and-Out-Stowed-and- Trimmed [FIOST] but Free-
and-Spout-Trimmed-and-Free-Out [FISTFO].
xxx xxx
. [I]t appears that the FIOST clause in a Charter Party
eement speaks of who is to bear the cost or expense of
ding, spout trimming and unloading the cargo. "Free In
d Out" means that the shipowner is free from such
penses. This becomes clearer when the FIOST clause is
ulated as an adjunct to the terms of payment of the freight
e.
xxx xxx
ng a provision for the apportionment of expense (as an
lusion from the rate of freight to be paid), the
erpretation of the FIOST clause should not be extended to
an an apportionment of liability, unless speci ed in clear
d unambiguous terms.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
While there are instances where a Charter Party Agreem
clearly states that the Charterer will be liable to third par
for damages caused by its cargo (as in the case of spills
petroleum oil cargo, or of damage to third parties caused
toxic cargo), there is no such provision in this case. Therefo
liability or non-liability for such damage cannot be presum
from the FIOST clause alone, and the Charter Pa
Agreement must be closely scrutinized for the part
intention on liability.
Clause 22 of the Charter Party Agreement states:
"At loadport, the stevedores[,] although arranged
charterers, shippers, or their agents[, are] to be under
direction and control of the Master. All claims for dama
allegedly caused by stevedores [are] to be settled betwe
stevedores and Owners. Charterers shall render assistance
Owners to settle such damage in case of need."
. . . Clause 22 clearly states that loading shall be done un
the direction and control of the Master. Hence, if the me
bar that damaged ATI's unloader was inadvertently mixed i
the soybean meal during loading, by express provision of
Charter Party Agreement, the cost of the damage should
borne by the shipowner because the loading was done un
the supervision and control of the Master of the Vessel.
Hence, not only did defendants have presumed exclus
control of the Vessel during the loading of the soybean m
by reason of them being the owners or agents of the own
1
reof, they also had actual exclusive control thereof by
press stipulation in the Charter Party Agreement that the
ding of the cargo shall be under the direction and control
he Master of the Vessel.
s is as it should be, considering that the charter in this case
contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship lets
whole or part of her to a merchant or other person for the
veyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration
he payment of freight. The Supreme Court has held that if
charter is a contract of affreightment, the rights and the
ponsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer
ee from liability to third persons in respect of the ship.
rd. There is neither allegation nor evidence in the record
t ATI's negligence contributed to the damage of its
oader.
3 requisites of res ipsa loquitur being present, the
sumption or inference arises that defendants' negligence
s the proximate cause of the damage to ATI's unloader.
e burden of evidence shifted to defendants to prove
erwise. Th[e] defendants failed to do so.
xxx xxx
endants' testimonial evidence consisted of the sole
timony of the former Operations Manager of Inter-Asia,
o . . . on cross-examination, . . . admitted that he was not
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
present at the loading of the cargo and, therefore, did
actually see that the soybean meal was free of any fore
metal object.
Defendants' evidence, which heavily relies on (1) th
erroneous interpretation of the FIOST clause in the Cha
Party Agreement; (2) the Master's unsupported allegat
written on the Note of Protest that the metal bar did
come from the vessel; and (3) their witness' dubi
interpretation that the notation "loaded clean" on the Be
Terms[ ]Grain Bills of Lading means that the soybean m
had no foreign material included therein, does not presen
satisfactory answer to the question: How did the metal bar
co-mingled with the soybean meal, and what did the Mas
of the Vessel do to prevent such an occurrence? . . . .
By their failure to explain the circumstances that attended
accident, when knowledge of such circumstances is accessi
only to them, defendants failed to overcome the prima fa
presumption that the accident arose from or was caused
their negligence or want of care.
Theres ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the the
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality wh
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or
the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plain
has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to alle
1
gligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
ppening of the accident in order to establish negligence. . .
xxx xxx
e prima facie evidence of defendants' negligence, being
explained and uncontroverted, is su cient to maintain the
position a rmed. Hence, the negligence of the Master of
Vessel is conclusively presumed to be the proximate
se of the damage sustained by ATI's unloader. Moreover,
ce the Master's liability is ultimately that of the shipowner
cause he is the representative of the shipowner, the
powner and its agents are solidarily liable to pay ATI the
ount of damages actually proved.
cles 587 and 590 under Book III of the Code of Commerce
vide for the liability of the shipowner and its agents for
s of the Master or Captain, as follows:
587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the
emnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the
duct of the captain in the care of the goods which he
ded on the vessel; but he may exempt himself therefrom
abandoning the vessel with all her equipment and the
ght it may have earned during the voyage.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Art. 590. The co-owners of the vessel shall be civilly liable
the proportion of their interests in the common fund for
results of the acts of the captain referred to in Art. 587.
Anent the amount of the herein petitioners' solidary liabi
the CA found that only US$30,300.00 of ATI's claim
supported by evidence. The quotation submitted by
manufacturer of Siwertell unloaders indicated that (a)
replacement cost for the two damaged screws
US$24,790.00, (b) freight cost is US$3,510.00, and (c) la
cost in removing and re-assembling the screws
US$2,000.00.
Issues
The instant petition raises the questions of whether or not
CA erred in (a) applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a
(b) rejecting the argument that "the petitioners had
participation in the loading and discharge of the bulk ca
except to provide use of the vessel's gear."
Petitioners’ arguments
Petitioners emphasize that the foreign metal object was fou
in the middle of the cargo. Hence, it is logical to conclu
that the metal came in with the cargo and could not h
fallen off from some appurtenance of the vessel before
after loading. The petitioners likewise claim that because
the Free-In-and-Out Clause under which the cargo w
1
ried, the charterer chose who were to effect the loading,
oading and discharge of the goods, which tasks were
formed without the participation of the vessel and its
mplement. Besides, notwithstanding Clause 22 of the
arter Party Agreement, the Master of the Vessel's control is
ative and pertains merely to the maintenance of the
sel's seaworthiness, and not to acts of covert negligence
ch could have been committed without even the
rterer's own knowledge. Further, while it is true that in a
tract of affreightment, the charterer is free from liability to
d persons in respect of the ship, in the instant petition, the
ending factor which caused the damage was not the vessel,
the cargo itself, thus, the liability should instead rest upon
cargo owner, who was not even impleaded as a party to
case. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur hence nds
plication herein but in support of the petitioners' lack of
pability since they possessed neither the knowledge nor
opportunity of ascertaining the presence of the foreign
tal object lodged in the middle of the soybean meal cargo.
spondent’s arguments
contends that "the law does not distinguish between
vert' and 'evident' negligence in determining whether the
ctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies." An unusual event
urred because proper care was not observed. The event
k place in Hold No. 2 of M/V China Joy, which was within
shipowner's exclusive control. There is likewise no
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
evidence of ATI's negligence, which could have contribu
to the damage of its own unloader. Besides, ATI did
witness the loading of the soybean meal cargo into M/V Ch
Joy at the Port of New Orleans, United States of Amer
Hence, ATI cannot furnish direct evidence on whether or
the hold or hatch containing the cargo was inspected a
found clean prior to loading, and sealed thereafter.
ATI also asserts that the petitioners presented no evide
conclusively proving that the foreign metal object was inde
in the middle and not at the top or bottom of the soyb
meal cargo. Moreover, the petitioners' only witness, Alejan
Gilhang, the former Operations Manager of Inter-A
admitted that he was not present during the loading, thus,
could not have seen if the cargo was free of any foreign me
object.
ATI likewise points out that the petitioners have not explic
quoted in verbatim any provision in the Charter Pa
Agreement, which the latter invoke to vaguely argue that
loading of the cargo pertains exclusively to the charte
Therefore, the petitioners have nary a legal basis for th
assertion that the shipowner has no liability insofar as
loading operations are concerned. Besides, even if s
provision in fact exists, ATI is not privy to the Charter Pa
Agreement.
Ruling
1
e Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners are liable to
for the damage sustained by the latter's unloader.
wever, the Court nds the petitioners' liability to be based
quasi-delict and not on a contract of carriage. The Court
wise deems it proper to modify the rate of interests on the
ount of damages imposed by the CA upon the petitioners.
e Court notes that the shipowner and shipowner's agent,
msun, are all juridical entities not registered and not doing
iness in the Philippines. It was the charterer's agent, Inter-
a, a duly-registered domestic corporation, which had led
instant petition for itself and on behalf of the shipowner
d Samsun. In the course of the proceedings too, none of
parties had raised issues anent the validity of the service
ummons and the courts' acquisition of jurisdiction over the
sons of the petitioners.
e petitioners present two issues for the Court's resolution,
wit: (a) the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
he case at bar; and (b) who participated and should thus
ume liability for the loading of the soybean meal cargo.
ts Decision dated January 30, 2009, the RTC declared that
le ATI indeed sustained damages to its unloader, liability
refor cannot, however, be established with certainty.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
In the assailed decision, the CA, on the other hand, discus
in detail why and how the three requisites to the applicat
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are found to be attend
in the case at bar. First, the co-mingling of the two fore
metal objects with the soybean meal cargo and
consequent damage to ATI's unloader is an accident wh
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someon
negligence. Second, the foreign metal objects were found
the vessel's Hold No. 2, which is within the exclusive con
of the petitioners.Third, records do not show that A
negligence had in any way contributed to the damage cau
to its unloader.
The Court agrees with the CA anent ATI's entitlement to
payment of damages from the petitioners and
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However,
Court nds as misplaced the CA's application of the laws
maritime commerce and contracts of carriage for reas
discussed below.
There is no contract of carriage between the petition
and ATI.
There is no contract of carriage between ATI, on one ha
and the shipowner, Samsun, ContiQuincyBunge L.L.C., a
Inter-Asia, on the other. It likewise bears stressing that
subject of the complaint, from which the instant petit
arose, is not the damage caused to the cargo, but to
1
uipment of an arrastre operator. Further, ATI's contractual
ation is not with the petitioners, but with the consignee and
h the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).
Delgado Brothers, Inc. v. Home Insurance Company and
urt of Appeals, 26 the Court discusses the functions of an
astre operator, viz.:
der this provision, petitioner's functions as arrastre
erator are (1) to receive, handle, care for, and deliver all
rchandise imported and exported, upon or passing over
vernment-owned wharves and piers in the Port of Manila,
as well as to record or cheek all merchandise which may be
ivered to said port a t shipside, and in general[,] (3) to
nish light and water services and other incidental services in
er to undertake its arrastre service. Note that there is
hing in those functions which relate to the trade and
iness of navigation . . ., nor to the use or operation of
sels . . . . Both as to the nature of the functions and the
ce of their performance (upon wharves and piers shipside),
itioner's services are clearly not maritime. As we held in
Macondray case, they are no different from those of a
positary or warehouseman. Granting,arguendo, that
itioner's arrastre service depends on, assists, or furthers
ritime transportation . . ., it may be deemed merely
dental to its aforementioned functions as arrastre operator
d does not, thereby, make petitioner's arrastre service
ritime in character.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
"The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling
cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishm
of the consignee or shipper and the ship's tackle. Being
custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arras
operator's duty is to take good care of the goods and to t
them over to the party entitled to their possession."
"The legal relationship between an arrastre operator an
consignee is akin to that between a warehouseman and
depositor. As to both the nature of the functions and
place of their performance, an arrastre operator's services
clearly not maritime in character."
In Insurance Company of North America v. Asian Termin
Inc., the Court explained that the liabilities of the arras
operator for losses and damages are set forth in the contr
for cargo handling services it had executed with the P
Corollarily then, the rights of an arrastre operator to be p
for damages it sustains from handling cargoes do not likew
spring from contracts of carriage.
However, in the instant petition, the contending parties m
no references at all to any provisions in the contract for ca
handling services ATI had executed with the PPA.
1
 icle 2176 of the New Civil Code and the doctrine of res
a loquitur apply.
twithstanding the above, the petitioners cannot evade
ility for the damage caused to ATI's unloader in view of
cle 2176 of the New Civil Code, which pertinently
vides as follows:
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
other, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
sting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
asi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., the Court
plained that to establish a plaintiff's right to recovery for
asi-delicts, three elements must exist, to wit: (a) damages to
plaintiff; (b) negligence by act or omission of which
endant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
pond, was guilty; and (c) the connection of cause and
ect between the negligence and the damage.
gligence, on the other hand, is de ned as the failure to
erve that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
umstances justly demand, whereby another suffers injury.
he case under consideration, the parties do not dispute
facts of damage upon ATI's unloader, and of such
mage being the consequence of someone's negligence.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
However, the petitioners deny liability claiming that it was
established with reasonable certainty whose negligence h
caused the co-mingling of the metal bars with the soybe
meal cargo. The Court, on this matter, agrees with the C
disquisition that the petitioners should be held jointly a
severally liable to ATI. ATI cannot be faulted for its lack
direct access to evidence determinative as to who among
shipowner, Samsun, ContiQuincyBunge and Inter-Asia sho
assume liability. The CA had exhaustively discussed why
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. The metal bars wh
caused damage to ATI's unloader was found co-mingled w
the cargo inside Hold No. 2 of the ship, which was then wit
the exclusive control of the petitioners. Thus, the presumpt
that it was the petitioners' collective negligence, wh
caused the damage, stands. This is, however, with
prejudice to the petitioners' rights to seek reimburseme
among themselves from the party whose negligence prima
caused the damage.
1
 ) SOFIA FERNANDO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
PEALS
R. No. 92087, May 8, 1992
CTS
November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the
dao Public Market filed a requisition request with the
ef of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
ptying of the septic tank in Agdao.
invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito
arsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer,
Bascon won the bid.
November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed
purchase order. However, before such date, specifically
November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other
mpanions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto
nando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the
tic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman.
e body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
nilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he
pired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case
d learned that the five victims entered the septic tank
hout clearance from it nor with the knowledge and
nsent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed
be the ones who did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bod
and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims
"asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in
body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the
victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was d
to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide
produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.
TRIAL COURT: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case
hereby DISMISSED.
CA: WHEREFORE, in view of the facts fully established and
the liberal interpretation of what the Constitution and the
intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy,
ignorant and the indigent –– more entitled to social justice
having, in the unforgettable words of Magsaysay, "less
life," We hereby reverse and set aside the appea
judgment.
Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration
CA: The decision of this Court dated January 31, 1986
reversed and set aside and another one is hereby rende
dismissing the case.
1

UE
ether or not Davao City is guilty of negligence in the case
bar.
LING
. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe
the protection of the interests of another person that
gree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
umstances justly demand, whereby such other person
ers injury. Under the law, a person who by his omission
ses damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged
pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
gligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
ween the omission and the damage. He must prove under
cle 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's
gligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
ury.
ximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
ural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
ervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
ult would not have occurred. Proof of such relation of
se and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
in any way contribute to the negligence of the defenda
However, where the resulting injury was the product of
negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to disc
which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of
accident.
Citing Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts
the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of
the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be ma
between the accident and the injury, between the ev
itself, without which there could have been no accident, a
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent o
but contributing to his own proper hurt.
Applying all these established doctrines in the case at bar a
after a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no compell
reason to grant the petition. We affirm.
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing
clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in
accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed
laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded
the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing dan
and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutra
or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They sub
1
t the public respondent's gross negligence was the
ximate cause of the fatal incident.
do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that
public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty
septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
ntinuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market
ster about the need to clean the septic tank of the public
et in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent
mediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
vice. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder,
Feliciano Bascon.
e public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up
medial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an
disputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to
empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market
e been using the public toilet for their personal necessities
have remained unscathed.
e absence of any accident was due to the public
pondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing
cifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank.
nce, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have
ked out because the septic tank was air-tight. The only
ication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and
eded emptying was when water came out from it. Yet, even
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
when the septic tank was full, there was no report of
casualty of gas poisoning despite the presence of peo
living near it or passing on top of it or using the pu
toilet for their personal necessities.
Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilat
pipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the
government and presented witnesses to attest on this la
However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Th
witnesses were not expert witnesses.
On the other hand, Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the
government testified and demonstrated by drawings how
safety requirements like emission of gases in the construct
of both toilet and septic tank have been complied with.
stated that the ventilation pipe need not be construc
outside the building as it could also be embodied in
hollow blocks as is usually done in residential buildings. T
petitioners submitted no competent evidence to corrobor
their oral testimonies or rebut the testimony given by En
Alindada.
We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission t
warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in
toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOME
already in place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are
nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New C
1
de which would necessitate warning signs for the
tection of the public. While the construction of these
blic facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
itary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not
e of those requirements.
view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an
ident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is
ikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The
ident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on
ir own and without authority from the public respondent
ened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of
ptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
aned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should
doubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this
d of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the
. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
cautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
se of the accident.
itioners further contend that the failure of the market
ster to supervise the area where the septic tank is located
reflection of the negligence of the public respondent.
do not think so. The market master knew that work on
septic tank was still forthcoming. It must
membered that the bidding had just been conducted.
T 5 – TORTS AND DAMAGES
Although the winning bidder was already known, the award
him was still to be made by the Committee on Awards. Up
the other hand, the accident which befell the victims who
not in any way connected with the winning bidder happen
before the award could be given.
The surreptitious way in which the victims did their
without clearance from the market master or any of
security guards goes against their good faith. Even th
relatives or family members did not know of their plan
clean the septic tank.
Finally, petitioners' insistence on the applicability of Art
24 of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. Said
states:
ARTICLE 24. In all contractual, property or other relatio
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakne
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant
his protection.
We approve of the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one
the victims was invited to bid for said project, he did not
the bid, therefore, there is a total absence of contract
relations between the victims and the City Government
be Davao City that could give rise to any contractual obligati
much less, any liability on the part of Davao City."
1