Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 98149 September 26, 1994

JOSE V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.

Orlando B. Braga for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner suffered physical injuries, requiring two (2) major operations, when he fell from, and then was dragged along the
asphalted road by, a passenger bus operated by private respondent transportation company. The incident occurred when
the bus driver bolted forward at high speed while petitioner was still clinging on the bus door's handle bar that caused the
latter to lose his grip and balance. The refusal of private respondent to settled petitioner's claim for damages constrained
petitioner to file, on 26 June 1985, a complaint for damages against private respondent.

After the reception of evidence, the trial court, on 11 December 1989, rendered its decision, the dispositive portion reading
thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing defendant De Dios Marikina Transportation Co.,
Inc.'s counterclaim for lack of merit and ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff Jose V. Del Rosario: (a)
the sum of P76,944.41, as actual and compensatory damages; (b) the sum of P15,000.00, as moral and
exemplary damages; and (c) the sum of P33,641.50, as attorney's fees, a s well as to pay the costs of
suit; and, as regards the third-party complaint herein, ordering third-party defendant First Quezon City
Insurance Co., Inc. to indemnify third-party plaintiff
De Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc. in the sum of P12,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from date of filing of the third-party complaint on August 20, 1985, until full payment thereof. Further,
there being no satisfactory warrant, therefor, the Court hereby dismisses the rest of the claims in the
complaint and third-party complaint herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

On appeal to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of fact of the trial court, as well as the grant to petitioner
of damages, but it reduced the award for attorney's fees from P33,641.50 to P5,000.00. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration questioning the reduction of attorney's fees was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition raising
this sole issue.

We see merit in the petition.

There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems it just and equitable, allow the recovery by the prevailing party
of attorneys fees. 1 In determining the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of cases 2 has provided
various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate thusly:

a) the quantity and character of the services rendered;

b) the labor, time and trouble involved;

 c) the nature and importance of the litigation;

d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;

e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;

f) the responsibility imposed on counsel;

g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service;

h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;

i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services;

j) the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment client;

k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a
higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and

1) the results secured.

In this instance, the complaint for damages was instituted by petitioner in June 1985, following the refusal of private
respondent to settle petitioner's claim, and the decision thereon was promulgated by the court a quo only in December
1989 or about four years and six months later. Several pleadings were filed and no less than twenty appearances were
made by petitioner's counsel, not counting the various other pleadings ultimately filed with the Court of Appeals and now
before this Court. Given the nature of the case, the amount of damages involved, and the evident effort exerted by
petitioner's counsel, the trial court's award of attorney's fees for P33,641.50 would appear to us to be just and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
REINSTATING the trial court's award of attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4078. July 14, 2003]

WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan, complainant
alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainants building in Quezon City for
his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainants retained
lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainants cases. Hence, the start
of the legal relationship between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from
complainant which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to
complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He
likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the
subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the document of sale of the
car was issued in complainants name and financed through City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to
borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned
commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondents arrears with the car
financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to
complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as
respondents account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainants repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case
against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:
xxxxxxxxx

4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of deficiency
taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases pending in court;

xxxxxxxxx
Complainant denied respondents charges and claimed that respondents allegation is libelous and not privilege as it
was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph 12 of respondents Answer, thus:

12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January 30, 1993, defendant Essex L.
Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but the latter said that
he will only do so after the termination of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, x x x where he (complainant) wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe
money to the members of the review committee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of the
resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or, in the event that the said petition for
review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned at the above-
mentioned Court, and even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant Essex L. Silapan
all refused to do not only because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also because the complainant confided
to him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime that was charged of in the above-mentioned
case. (emphasis supplied)

Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed
to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying
also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained[1] that it was complainant who offered him an office
space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case[2] filed
against complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices
to complainant and his revelation of complainants desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal
case. He claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit
complainants credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he
is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of
his honor and reputation.
Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration
and only as a formal requirement so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title
over the mortgaged property to complainant.
Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as
some kind of acknowledgment that he already received in advance a portion of his attorneys fees from the complainant for
the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for
complainant.
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romeros loan which he allegedly helped
facilitate. He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorneys fees, the latter being his client. He used this
amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car,
he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted
that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling
as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged
that he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding
the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases pending between the
parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein. For this
reason, it is not for us to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be determined by
the trial court where his case is pending.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by
imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in
connection with a pending case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted
to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation
to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.
CANON 19

Case: VALERIANA U. DALISAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., respondent. (A.C. No. 5655.
January 23, 2006)

FACTS:

Valeriana U. Dalisay engaged

respondent’s services as counsel in CivilCase No. 00-044. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys
fees,respondent never rendered legal services. As a result, she terminated theattorney-client relationship and demanded
the return of her money, butrespondent refused.

The Supreme Court in its Decision, found respondentguilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him from
thepractice of law for a period of six months.

Upon learning of the Court’s decision, respondent verified the status ofCivil Case No. 00-044. He learned of the
trialcourt’s Decision holding that thetax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records. Thereupon,
respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainantalleging that complainant offered tampered evidence.
The respondent then fileda motion for reconsideration for the Supreme Court Decision and argued thatcomplainant did not
engage his services as counsel, and that complainantoffered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him
to filefalsification cases against her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted.

HELD:

The respondent’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

The Courtexplained that once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-clientrelationship is established.
Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsifieddocumentary evidence, it will not be sufficient to exonerate the
respondent.Consistent with the mandate of Canon 19 that a lawyer shall represent hisclient with zeal and only within the
bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the sameCanon specifically provides that a lawyer who has received information that
hisclients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon aperson or tribunal, shall promptly call upon
the client to rectify the same, andfailing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordancewith the
Rules of Court.As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead ofinaction, he should have confronted
complainant and asked her to rectify herfraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminatehis
relationship with her.
THIRD DIVISION

VALERIANA U. DALISAY, A.C. No. 5655

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Promulgated:

Respondent.
April 22, 2005

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The instant case stemmed from a verified letter-complaint dated February 21, 2002 filed with this Court by Valeriana U.
Dalisay against Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr. for demanding and receiving exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take
any action on her case.

In her complaint, Dalisay alleged that she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a
media personality. So she engaged his services as her counsel in Civil Case No. 00-44, wherein she is the defendant,
pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal. After consulting with respondent, she handed to him all
the pertinent documents. In turn, respondent demanded P25,000.00 as acceptance fee which she paid. Then
respondent asked her to pay P8,000.00 as filing fee. She paid the amount although she knew that Civil Case No. 00-44
was already filed with the court.

After a month, complainant approached respondent to followup her case. Respondent demanded additional acceptance
fee, or a total of P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay in cash. Respondent also
asked her to pay him P3,000.00 as appearance fee.

Complainant raised an additional amount and paid respondent the total sum of P48,000.00. Adding to this
amount P8,000.00 filing fee, her total payment was P56,000.00.

Complainant further alleged that notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service for her in
Civil Case No. 00-044. As a result, she terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her
money and documents. However, he refused to do so.

In his comment, respondent denied complainants charge. He claimed that Atty. Oliver Lozano referred her to him to
defend her in Civil Case No. 00-044. He explained to her that she is not covered by the free legal services being rendered
by his office. Thus, she would be treated as a regular client. Accordingly, his acceptance fee would be One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos. In addition, she would be charged for any pleading and paper filed with the court, plus
an appearance fee of P3,000.00.
A few days later, Atty. Lozano called respondent and asked him to reduce his acceptance fee. He then agreed and asked
only P25,000.00 for which complainant was very grateful.

Respondent denied demanding P8,000.00 as filing fee in Civil Case No. 00-044. He clarified that such fee was intended
for another case he would file for complainant, aside from Civil Case No. 00-044.

Respondent also alleged that he asked complainant to bring her son-in-law to his office for a conference and to submit
to him the necessary documents to enable him to prepare the filing of the complaints in order to protect her rights over
the subject property. But complainant did not heed his advice. Instead, she returned to his office and told him that she
was no longer interested in retaining his services. She then demanded a refund of the amounts she paid.

According to respondent, he rendered legal services to complainant by way of legal advice and opinions on all her
problems and those of her family. Consequently, he had every right to collect attorneys fees from her. He prayed that
the instant complaint be dismissed.

On September 18, 2002, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

In her Report and Recommendation dated January 13, 2004, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline made the following findings -

It is evident that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant as reflected in the duly signed official receipts of
respondents law office, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged
conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office, as his legal services.

In view thereof, when complainant decided to withdrew respondents services as her counsel due to inaction; it is quite
fair and incumbent upon the respondent to return whatever amount the complainant had already paid in the amount
of P56,000.00 and the latter to compensate respondent for reasonable consultation fees due him which was not
included in their retained agreement.

and recommended as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against Atty. Melanio Batas
Mauricio, Jr., be dismissed and the respondent be required to refund the amount of Fifty Six Thousand Pesos
(P56,000.00) to the complainant within two (2) months from receipt hereof, with the advice to be more discreet and
cautious in dealing with clients relative to assessment and receipt of required fees in the future, specially those assisted
by him through referral and accommodation; otherwise severe penalty will be imposed.

Complainant is likewise ordered to pay respondent consultation fee equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the whole
amount of P56,000.00.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. [1]

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121 adopting and approving in
toto the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro.

We cannot sustain the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that this case should be dismissed.

As found by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro, respondent agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044 on behalf of
complainant for an acceptance fee of P25,000.00 which she paid. Respondent then demanded additional acceptance fee
or a total of P48,000.00, instead of P25,000.00 initially agreed upon. In addition, respondent asked for P8,000.00 which
according to him was intended as filing fee for a new case he was supposed to file.

Hence, respondent received the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant for his supposed legal services.

When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case
and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve
complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.

However, there is nothing in the records to show that respondent entered his appearance as counsel of record for
complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she
terminated his services.

As to the P8,000.00, allegedly as docket fees for other cases, paid to respondent by complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner found that there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case
considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the body of rules governing the conduct of every member
of the Bar in this jurisdiction, provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:

A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGLECT A LEGAL MATTER ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND HIS NEGLIGENCE IN CONNECTION
THEREWITH SHALL RENDER HIM LIABLE.

Also, respondents Attorneys Oath declares that respondent shall impose upon himself the sacred duty, among others,
that he will not delay any man for money or malice, and will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights.[2] An attorney is expected to exert his
best efforts and ability to protect his clients case, for his unwavering loyalty to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice. Indeed, the entrusted privilege of every lawyer to practice law carries with it his corresponding duties, not only
to his client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

In Santos vs. Lazaro,[3] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-quoted, is a basic
postulate in legal ethics. Verily, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the
courts and society.[4]

Respondent insists that he is entitled to attorneys fees since he gave legal advice and opinions to complainant on her
problems and those of her family. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services.
However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees. Canon 20 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. There is, however, no
hard and fast rule which will serve as guide in determining what is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be
determined from the facts of each case.[5] The power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character
of a lawyers fee is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the Court.[6]

It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant in her case, charging P56,000.00 is
improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainants problems and those of her family constitutes legal
service, however, the attorneys fee must be reasonable. Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant.

We cannot understand why respondent initially demanded P8,000.00 as filing fee from complainant when he very well
knew that the docket fee for Civil Case No. 00-044 had been paid. If it was intended as a docket fee for another case,
why did he not file the corresponding complaint?

By his inaction in Civil Case No.00-044, respondent violated Canons 17, 18 and 18.03, earlier cited, as well as his Oath as
an attorney. Likewise, in collecting from complainant exorbitant consulting fee, respondent violated Canon 20 of the
same Code. For all these violations, respondent should be penalized.

The facts of Sencio vs. Calvadores,[7] bear a striking similarity to the present case. Respondent lawyer Sencio did not
return the money to complainant despite demand following his failure to file the case. We found him guilty of violation
of the lawyers oath,
malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount
of P21,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of our Resolution until the return of
the amount.

In Garcia vs. Manuel,[8] we suspended respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered him to
render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant. We found him guilty of gross misconduct.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Melanio Mauricio, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of malpractice and gross misconduct
for violating Canons 17, 18, Rule 18.03 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that
any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within ten (10)
days, also from notice, the sum of P56,000.00 to complainant Valeriana U. Dalisay and submit to this Court proof of his
compliance within three (3) days thereform.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for his distribution to all courts of the land , the IBP, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondents personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
Del Rosario v CA GR 98149

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, attorney’s fees

FACTS: Del Rosario suffered physical injuries when a bus of De Dios Marikina Transportation Co. dragged him along the
road. De Dios was to pay damages. Upon appeal at the Court of Appeals, the lower court decision was affirmed in toto but
considerably reduced the attorney’s fees from P33,641.50 to P5,000.00. Del Rosario’s motion for reconsideration
questioning the reduction of attorney’s fees was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reduction of the attorney’s fees was proper
HELD: No. The Supreme Court upheld that the court may allow recovery of attorney’s fees whenever just an equitable
based on the following factors: a) the quantity and character of the services rendered; b) the labor, time and trouble
involved; c) the nature and importance of the litigation; d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by
the controversy; e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved; f) the responsibility imposed on counsel; g) the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the service; h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer; i)
the customary charges of the bar for similar services; j) the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment
client; k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a higher fee
when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and l) the results secured. The entire complaint ranged four years and six
months. Several pleadings were filed and no less than twenty appearances were made by Del Rosario’s counsel, not
counting the various other pleadings ultimately filed with the Court of Appeals and now before this Court. Given the nature
of the case, the amount of damages involved, and the evident effort exerted by petitioner’s counsel, the trial court’s award
of attorney’s fees for P33,641.50 would appear to us to be just and reasonable.