Page 1 of 50
Department of Health vs. Sy Chi Siong, Inc., GR No. 85289,
February 20, 1989
No case found.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and City Fiscal NESTORIO M.
PLACER and Assistant City Fiscal ERNESTO M. BROCOY of
Butuan City, petitioners,
vs.
CITY JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA of Butuan City
and ROGELIM YEE, respondents.
The city fiscal and an assistant fiscal of Butuan City filed in the city
court on September 15, 1980 an information charging Rogelim Yee
with serious slander by deed. It was alleged therein that in the
afternoon of July 14, 1980 Yee with the deliberate intent of bringing
one Ofelia V. Torralba, a fourth year student, into discredit, disrepute
and contempt, willfully attacked and assaulted her and inflicted a
contusion in her left cheek in the presence of her visitors, teachers and
classmates to her great embarrassment and inconvenience.
The fiscal certified that he conducted the corresponding preliminary
investigation and that there was probable cause or reasonable ground
to believe that serious slander by deed was committed by Yee. He
recommended bail in the amount of P600.
Respondent judge, instead of issuing a warrant of arrest conducted
an ex parte preliminary examination by scanning the record to
determine once more the existence of probable cause and he concluded
that the offense committed was either slight slander by deed
committed in the heat of anger or slight physical injuries, a light
felony. Because the information was filed sixty-four days after the
offense was committed, respondent judge dismissed the case sua
sponte on the ground of prescription. The dismissal order was issued
on September 17, 1980 or two days after the filing of the information.
Respondent judge denied the fiscal's motion for reconsideration.
The city fiscal and his assistant filed in this Court the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus wherein they assailed the order of
dismissal on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Fiscal’s petition cannot be entertained because as a
rule, certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal.
Issue
Whether or not, a trial judge should not hold another preliminary
examination to determine probable cause in case the fiscal has filed
information and certified that he has conducted the requisite
preliminary investigation.
Held
The fiscal is also authorized to determine probable cause not only by
the Bill of Rights but also by the law or rule empowering him to
conduct preliminary investigation. His determination of probable
cause is a sufficient justification for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Generally, the Court of First Instance does not conduct any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or to confirm
the fiscal's determination thereof for that would be a time-wasting
ritual or a duplicitous proceeding.
We hold that, as a rule, a trial judge should not hold another
preliminary examination to determine probable cause in case the fiscal
has filed an information and certified that he has conducted the
requisite preliminary investigation. That certification means that there
is a prima facie case against the accused and that the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is justified.
This case illustrates the mischief or prejudice arising from the act of
the city judge in duplicating the preliminary examination held by the
fiscal.
What respondent judge actually did was not to verify whether the
fiscal's determination of probable cause was correct but to find out
whether the criminal liability of the accused was already extinguished,

which is a different matter. Extinction of criminal liability
presupposes not merely probable cause but the guilt of the accused.
Although in the instant case we find that the city court erred in
dismissing the case on its own motion on the controversial ground of
prescription, nevertheless, the petition has to be dismissed because no
appeal was seasonably made from the dismissal order and certiorari
and mandamus are not substitutes for an appeal that had lapsed.
City Fiscal NESTORIO M. PLACER VS HON. JUDGE
VILLANUEVA City Judge of Butuan
During the period from March 30 to April 14, 1982, petitioners, The
City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of
Butuan the criminal cases 1220, 12210 to 12222.
Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 12220, 12221 and 12222, were certified
to by the respective investigating Fiscals (3rd Assistant Fiscal
Felixberto Guiritan and 2nd Assistant Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy).
They conducted preliminary examination to the witnesses and
complainant base on their sworn statement and other evidence. The
fiscals believe there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that herein accused is probably
guilty.
Respondent judge issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the hearing
of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of
issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing,
respondent issued the questioned orders dated April 13, 15, 16 and 19,
1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of
the information to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration, contending
that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the
existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/
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investigation, and that their findings as to the existence constitute
sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.
Respondent's firm refusal to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest
for want of affidavits of the witnesses.
He refused to issue the warrants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418,
12419, 12420 and 12422, and instead ordered the records thereof
remanded to the City Fiscal "for further preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation," for on the bases of said affidavits, respondent found
no prima facie case against the accused.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the
supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation.
Held
There is no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's
certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, but does such certification bind the
judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in the
negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function;
it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing
magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the
preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating
officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed
it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing , a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the
information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the

fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
a probable cause. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had
been attached to the information filed in his sala, respondent found the
informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause.
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applicable to the
following, to wit:
I. B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violation of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental laws;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or
a fine of One Thousand Pesos [1,000.00], or both irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom; Provided, however, that in offenses involving
damage to property through reckless negligence, this Rule shall
govern where the imposable fine does not exceed Ten Thousand Pesos
[10,000.00].
In said cases, the filing of the affidavits of witnesses with the court is
mandatory. Section 9, par. 2 of said Rule prescribes that "the
complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are
defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files.
From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found the
charges patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue the
warrants of arrest and try the accused would only expose the latter to
unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already
pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases,
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the respondent judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of
the charge if, from the information and the affidavits attached thereto,
he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit.
City Mayor, Atty. Isaac C. Tolentino et al vs Hon. Onofre Villaluz,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court
et al
On or about January 25, 1973, private respondent Fiscal Mojica filed
a complaint against petitioners Bayot, Parra and Castillo before the
Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, presided by respondent Judge,
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their
alleged refusal to pay his salary as City Fiscal of Tagaytay City since
June, 1969.
After conducting a preliminary examination and investigation of the
complaint, respondent Judge on January 29, 1973, issued in open court
a resolution: (a) ruling that under existing law, the City Fiscal was
entitled to receive the salaries from the City under Section 3 of the
Decentralization Act; (b) holding that there exists a prima facie case
against petitioners Bayot, Parra and Castillo; (c) ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them; (d) directing the respondent Fiscal
to file the necessary information within 48 hours; and (e) ordering
respondent Fiscal to "conduct the preliminary examination and
investigation in this case to determine the criminal liability of all the
members of said City Council and thereafter to file the corresponding
information in the court of competent jurisdiction, if the evidence so
warrants.
Respondent Fiscal Santos summoned all the members of the City
Council for preliminary investigation after which respondent
Esperidion Manalastas filed another complaint and this time, the
complaint also included then incumbent City Mayor, Atty. Isaac C.
Tolentino and City Councilors Alfredo Ner and Efren Mendiola.
Respondent Judge set the case for preliminary investigation for April
5, 1973 and April 12, 1973. On April 5, 1973, an "Urgent Motion to

Quash/Dismiss" the information was filed but respondent Judge
denied the same in his resolution of May 15, 1973.
Petitioners assail respondent Judge's giving due course to the two
complaints and proceeding with the preliminary investigation thereof
as in violation of law and the constitutional rights of the accused to
due process which allegedly constitute a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue
Whether or not, Criminal Circuit Courts did not have the authority to
conduct preliminary investigations.
Held
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because they
cannot try and decide all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction
of the Courts of First Instance as courts of general jurisdiction. They
can only take cognizance of cases expressly specified in Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 5179, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 126.
Nevertheless, they have the same powers and functions as those
conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to
effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction.
But while we sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to
conduct preliminary examination, pursuant to our constitutional
power of administrative supervision over all courts, as a matter of
policy, we enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal
Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases
filed before their courts. The primary purpose of the creation of the
Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First
Instance, as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load of the Courts
of First Instance as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal cases
involving serious offenses specified in Section 1 of Republic Act
5179, as amended. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore, should not
encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints, which they should refer to the
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municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who in turn can utilize the
assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary
examination and investigation.
It is clear from the records that the payment of the salaries of
respondent fiscals had been authorized by the Auditor General
pursuant to an opinion of the Secretary of Justice. Moreover, as
gleaned from the resolution dated January 29, 1973, respondent Judge
found that the payment of salaries of respondent fiscals find
justification under Section 3 of the Decentralization Act in relation to
Section 25 of the said act. Thus, respondent Judge in the exercise of
his discretion, after considering the evidence presented at the
preliminary investigation and concluding that the petitioners acted in
bad faith in refusing to pay respondent fiscals' salaries properly
ordered the filing of the information.
Petition dismissed.
CRUZ VS. GATAN
FACTS:
Serafin Cruz was arrested along Kennon Road at a police checkpoint
in Baguio City for being a member of a subversive organization as
ordered by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos in line with the Martial Law. He
was brought to Pampanga where he was held for custodial
investigation by Gen. Romeo Gatan. A Petition for Habeas Corpus
was made on his behalf claiming that he was being held
incommunicado, he was being held in custody without court order and
he is not a member of a subversive organization. Cruz, however, opted
to stay under the protective custody of the Philippine Constabulary.
ISSUE:
Was the arrest justifiable?
DECISION:

The arrest and continued detention was justifiable under General
Order No. 2-A, as amended, the President of the Philippines, pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, ordered the
Secretary of National Defense "to arrest or cause the arrest and take
into custody and to hold them until otherwise ordered released by me
or by my duly designated representative: 1. Such persons as may have
committed crimes and offenses in furtherance or on the occasion of or
incident to or in connection with the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion.
OLAES VS. PEOPLE (155 SCRA 486)
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz, charged for violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act, challenged in the SC the admission by
respondent Judge (Alicia Santos) of evidence seized by virtue of an
allegedly invalid search warrant and of an extra-judicial confession
taken from them without the assistance of counsel.
2. Petitioners likewise claim that the Search Warrant issued by
respondent Judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the
specific offense they are supposed to have committed.
3. According to the, there is no valid finding of probable cause as a
justification for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the
Bill of Rights.
4. The caption of the Search Warrant states that is was in connection
with “Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.”
5. The petitioners also faulted the admission of the extra-judicial
confessions with they had given without the assistance or advice of
counsel and cited Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution providing that “any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
Page 5 of 50
6. In the separate sworn statement take from Olaes and Cruz on
September 24, 1982, it appears that both petitioners were, before being
examined, specifically informed of their right to the assistance of
counsel, which would be provided them by the investigating office at
their request.
7. Asked if they understood, they said “Opo” and affixed their
signatures opposite their answer.
8. A statement entitled “Pagpapatunay” or Verification, in which they
stated inter alia that they did not need the assistance of counsel,
followed this.
ISSUE:
Was the search warrant validly issued?
Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible in evidence?
HELD:
The SC has examined the Search Warrant issued in the instant case
and find it does not come under the strictures of the Stonehill
doctrine. In the case cited, there was a bare reference to the laws in
general, without any specification of the particular sections thereof
that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of
prohibitions contained in such codifications. There is no similar
ambiguity in the instant case.
***Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The
Search Warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of
the particularity of the descriptions to be made of the “place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
Even so, their investigation did not conform to the requirements laid
down in People vs. Galit (HAHAHA),where the SC declared:

“At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the Warrant of Arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent that to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be use against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, or relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone if possible – or
by letter or messenger . It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory , in whole or in par, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
ENRILE VS SALAZAR
FACTS:
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The
warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose
from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino.
There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime
charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal.
Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention
and alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent.
He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark
case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot
be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the
proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple
rebellion – which is bailable.
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Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against him. He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour
and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the
warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was
impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous
record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the
constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest
after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not
been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez
ruling should be abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause
in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted
that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to
abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver
crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President
Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to
her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez
doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal
Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can
only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law
(which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But
as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with
 Page 7 of 50

murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he
charged with rebellion – which is bailable. claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest.
He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not
took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time
admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized
the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution
and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary
investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows ISSUE:
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge
Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period HELD:
within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that
he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III
duty has been regularly performed. sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court,
provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the
FACTS: person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom
looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the
holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable
just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects
attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be
were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found
stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on
with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion
unexplained suspicion. Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-
had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were
appellant is acquitted.
turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. Information
was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession
of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the
articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he vs. LUISITO GO y KO alias KING LOUIE, accused-appellant.
 Page 8 of 50

FACTS: of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked accused-
appellant for his drivers license and the registration papers of the
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, SPO1
vehicle, but he was unable to produce them.When accused-appellant
Mauro Piamonte and SPO3 Candido Liquido, members of the
opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that the
Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, went to the
same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw
police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an
pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the
intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a
car. They asked accused-appellant why he had these items, but he did
regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent Ronnie
not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk
Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw accused-appellant
the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido
Luisito Go, also known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo Disco
replied that they should talk at the police headquarters. Accused-
House with two women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked
appellant took out an attach case from the car and opened it. There
in accused-appellants waist. Together, the three policemen proceeded
were two black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant opened the first
to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred meters away from
bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in
the outpost.
cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the
The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police
owner that they were conducting an Operation Bakal, whereby they
station. When they arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attach
search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in
case together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The
and told a waiter to accompany them. They went up to the second floor
investigator found eight cellophane bags containing granules
of the disco.The waiter turned on the lights, and the police officers saw
suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attach case
accused-appellant and his lady companions seated at a table. They
was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass
identified themselves and asked accused-appellant to stand up. When
tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspaper
the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1
Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but accused-appellant was
unable to produce any. Instead, accused-appellant brought out the
HELD:
drivers license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte
confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist
Serial Number 006784, with a magazine containing ten (10) rounds of when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was
live ammunition. Accused-appellant was invited to the police precinct conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show
for questioning. any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or
thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence
On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to
of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a
bring his car, which was parked outside. The police officers
situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
accompanied accused-appellant to his car, a Honda Civic with license
plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be
noticed a Philippine National Police identification card hanging from lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
the rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant if he was a member used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
 Page 9 of 50

warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search

incidental to the lawful arrest.[10] The subsequent discovery in his car
of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later
identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal
possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been
made during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall
within the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence
obtained in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be
used for any purposes in any proceeding.[11] Hence, not being fruits of
the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the
crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can
be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that
drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in
evidence.
 Page 10 of 50

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of
5 OCT 1989] expression of then petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign
right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive
initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force
said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used
of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall."
various student organizations.
Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ
case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco
confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a
Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of
confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or
a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
an obscenity seizure is in order and that;
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to
issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set
obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on
for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was
the judge’s sound discretion;
valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
Page 11 of 50
Page 12 of 50

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and PANLILIO v.
SOLUTA et al . 482 SCRA 660 (2006)
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for Finance of
petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (Silahis), with his personal
secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a security guard entered the union
office located at the hotel basement. The same is with the permission
of union officer Henry Babay. Babay was apprised about the suspected
illegal activities. During the search they discovered marijuana
flowering tops in the union office. An Information indicting the union
officers was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted the
accused on the ground that the marijuana tops are inadmissible as
evidence. Soluta and his fellow union officers including the union
thereafter filed before the RTC a complaint against Silahis, Panlilio
and those who cooperated for malicious prosecution and violation of
their constitutional right against illegal search. The RTC granted such
petition. It ruled that Silahis and Panlilio are jointly and severally
liable to pay for damages in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis and Panlilio
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On appeal, the CA affirmed
the lower court‘s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated the constitutional right of
Soluta et al.
HELD:
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one‘s person,
house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures,
occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community
and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether
constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. The Code
Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers
but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even
Page 13 of 50
necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which
is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is
a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. In the present
case, as priorly stated, Silahis and Panlilio had, by their own claim,
already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly
undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of
the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, Silahis,
Panlilio and their companions barged into and searched the union
office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain
one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay. The course taken by
Silahis and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the
exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law.
Silahis and Panlilio‘s violation of individual Soluta et al.‘s
constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the
basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. As
for Silahis et al.‘s contention that property rights justified the search
of the union office, the same does not lie. For Soluta et al., being the
lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of
validity of the search and seizure. Neither does Silahis et al.‘s claim
that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office
lie. Babay‘s account of why Silahis and company went to the union
office – to consider Panlilio‘s suggestion to settle the mauling incident
is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even
asked if they were armed with a search warrant. While it is doctrinal
that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by
implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing
evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver
thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists;
(b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the
waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The
evidence shows otherwise, however.
Page 14 of 50

People of the Philippines vs. Andre Marti
G.R. No. 81561, January 18 1991
Facts:
The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang
Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with them four gift
wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress,
Anita Reyes (not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if
he could examine and expect the packages however appellant refused,
assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer insisted. Before
delivery of appellant’s box to the bureau of Customs and or bureau of
Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita, following
standard procedure opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting
laboratory examination sample he extracted from the cellophane.
Therefore, job and three NBI agents and a photographer went to the
Reyes’ office at Ermita. Job brought out the box in which appellants’
packages were places and in the presence of the NBI agents, open the
top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane
wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves are found
inside the cellophane.
Issue:
Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ruling:
Page 15 of 50
The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job who made
search and inspection of the said packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Job
as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau
of Custom or Post. If the search is made upon the request of law
enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured first if it to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made in the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of the police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individual as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may
only invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by
the exercise by the sovereign authority.
People vs. Sangki Ara
The Facts
Three Information’s charged accused-appellants Sangki Ara, Mike
Talib, and Jordan Musa, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and
consciously traded, transported and delivered 26.6563 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, which is a dangerous
drug, with the aggravating circumstance of trading, transporting and
delivering said 26.6563 grams of shabu within 100 meters from [the]
school St. Peters College of Toril, Davao City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and
consciously had in his possession and control one (1) plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, weighing 0.3559 gram,
which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Page 16 of 50
above-mentioned accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,
unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control five (5)
big plastic sachet[s] of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
weighing 14.2936 grams, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a not guilty
plea.
Version of the Prosecution
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero, PO2 Ronald Lao, SPO1
Bienvenido Furog, PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., SPO4 Rodrigo Mallorca,
and PO2 Jacy Jay Francia.
In the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (CI)
came to the Heinous Crime Investigation Section (HCIS) of the Davao
City Police Department and reported that three (3) suspected drug
pushers had contacted him for a deal involving six (6) plastic sachets
of shabu. He was instructed to go that same morning to St. Peters
College at Toril, Davao City and look for an orange Nissan Sentra car.
Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buy-
bust team composed of SPO3 Reynaldo Capute, SPO4 Mario

Galendez, SPO3 Antonio Balolong, SPO2 Arturo Lascaos, SPO2 Jim
Tan, SPO1 Rizalino Aquino, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO2 Vivencio
Jumawan, Jr., PO2 Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., who
would act as poseur-buyer.
The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited
by the gate. At around 8:45 a.m., an orange Nissan Sentra bearing plate
number UGR 510 stopped in front of them. The two men approached
the vehicle and the CI talked briefly with an old man in the front
seat. PO1 Ayao was then told to get in the back seat as accused-
appellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old man, later identified as
accused-appellant SPO3 Ara, asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money
and the latter replied in the positive. Ara took out several sachets with
crystalline granules from his pocket and handed them to PO1 Ayao,
who thereupon gave the pre-arranged signal of opening the car door.
The driver of the car, later identified as accused-appellant Jordan
Musa, tried to drive away but PO1 Ayao was able to switch off the car
engine in time. The back-up team appeared and SPO1 Furog held on
to Musa while PO2 Lao restrained Talib. PO1 Ayao then asked Ara to
get out of the vehicle.
Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance: six (6) big sachets, weighing 26.6563 grams, from Ara by
PO1 Ayao; five (5) big sachets, weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa
by SPO1 Furog; and a small sachet, weighing 0.3559 gram, from Talib
by PO2 Lao.
The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the seized items
indorsed to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination. Forensic Chemist Austero, who conducted the
examination, found that the confiscated sachets all tested positive
for shabu.
Page 17 of 50
Version of the Defense
The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said that he had
been a member of the PNP for 32 years, with a spotless record. On
December 20, 2002, SPO3 Ara was in Cotabato City, at the house of
his daughter Marilyn, wife of his co-accused Musa. He was set to go
that day to the Ombudsmans Davao City office for some paperwork in
preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He recounted expecting
at least PhP 1.6 million in retirement benefits. Early that morning, past
three oclock, he and Musa headed for Davao City on board the latters
car. As he was feeling weak, Ara slept in the back seat.
Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see another man, Mike
Talib, in the front seat of the car when he woke up. Musa explained
that Talib had hitched a ride on a bridge they had passed.
When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so
they stopped. Ara did not know that they were near St. Peters College
since he was not familiar with the area. Talib alighted from the car and
Ara transferred to the front seat. While Talib was getting into the back
seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere, pointed his .45 caliber pistol at
Ara even if he was not doing anything, and ordered him to get off the
vehicle. He saw that guns were also pointed at his companions. As the
group were being arrested, he told PO1 Ayao that he was also a police
officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that
the shabu taken from him was planted. He asserted that the only time
he saw shabu was on television.
Issue:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to
Evidence

2. Whether the trial court failed to consider that the criminal
information did not allege conspiracy among the accused
3. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the intercept
operation was valid
Rulings:
The RTC pronounced accused-appellants guilty of the crimes charged.
In its Decision dated March 1, 2003, the trial court held that the
prosecution was able to establish the quantum of proof showing the
guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It further ruled
that the intercept operation conducted by the buy-bust team was valid.
The ruling of SC is What are mainly raised in this appeal are (1)
whether the buy-bust conducted was valid; (2) whether the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs were sufficiently
established; and (3) whether the chain of custody over the shabu was
unbroken.
Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest
without probable cause and the violation of their constitutional rights.
They claim that the buy-bust team had more than a month to apply for
an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-
bust operation has long been held as a legitimate method of catching
offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed as an effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an offense.[15] We
Page 18 of 50
have ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long
period of planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot
be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such
operation.[16] It is unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to
first secure a warrant of arrest given that the objective of the operation
was to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact,
one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to
arrest accused-appellants. Probable cause, in warrantless searches,
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no
hard and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable cause, for
its determination varies according to the facts of each
case.[17] Probable cause was provided by information gathered from
the CI and from accused-appellants themselves when they instructed
PO1 Ayao to enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal
sale of shabu inside accused-appellants vehicle was afterwards clearly
established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers
were justified in making the arrests as accused-appellants had just
committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao.[18] Talib and
Musa were also frisked for contraband as it may be logically inferred
that they were also part of Aras drug activities inside the vehicle. This
inference was further strengthened by Musas attempt to drive the
vehicle away and elude arrest.
Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress or
Exclude Evidence. We need not reiterate that the evidence was not
excluded since the buy-bust operation was shown to be a legitimate
form of entrapment. The pieces of evidence thus seized therein were
admissible. As the appellate court noted, it was within legal bounds
and no anomaly was found in the conduct of the buy-bust operation.

There is, therefore, no basis for the assertion that the trial courts order
denying said motion was biased and committed with grave abuse of
discretion.
PEOPLE V. PEÑAFLORIDA G.R. No. 175604 : April 10,
2008Petitioners:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent:
SALVADOR PEÑAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO
Ponente:
TINGA, J.
Facts:
On or about the 7th day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at
Barangay Huyonhuyon,Municipality of Tigaon, Province of
Camarines Sur, Salvador Peñaflorida, with intent to sell, possess and
to deliver with the use of a bicycle, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody, one bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried
marijuana leaves (Indian Hemp) without the necessary license, permit
or authority to sell, administer, deliver, giveaway to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a
competent officer as required by law. On 26 October 1998, the
trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.6425, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No.
7659.Appellant admitted that he was about to convey from one place
to another the package, which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy
Page 19 of 50
Gonzales. The appellant, however, denies any knowledge that
the package in his possession contained marijuana.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, control and custody of dried marijuana leaves.
Held:
The trial court rejected the contention of the appellant, noting that it
was impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the
package because "marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable
aroma which would have alarmed him."The appellate court went on
to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the crime under
R.A. No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal
authority. Intent, motive or knowledge thereof is not necessary.
Appellant, in the main, asserts that he did not freely and consciously
possess marijuana. In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there
can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused
knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that
animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession
or control of such article.
Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof
and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact
exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not
intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor
to explain absence of animus possidendi.Knowledge refers to a mental
state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of
an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to
other evidence is necessary.

Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-
to-case basis.
Moreno vs. Ago Chi
Facts:
In the month of May, 1904, a complaint was presented against the
defendant charging him with the crime of assassination. He was
arrested and tried for said crime in the court of First Instance in the
city of Manila. The plaintiff and appellant was appointed by the court
to defend the defendant de oficio during the progress of the trial. The
defendant at the close of the trial was found guilty of the crime charged
and was sentenced with the penalty of death. From that sentence the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. That court, after a
consideration of the case, on the 30th day of April, 1906, modified the
finding of the lower court and sentenced the defendant to be
imprisoned for a period of twenty; years of reclusion temporal. 1 The
defendant was represented in the Supreme Court by another lawyer.
On the 30th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff presented a petition in
the Court of First Instance setting up that his services in defending the
defendant de oficio in said court were reasonably worth the sum of
P600, and prayed the court to make an order directing the clerk to turn
over to him (the plaintiff and appellant), of the money which had been
taken from the defendant, the sum of P600. No action was taken upon
this petition of the plaintiff and appellant until the 3d day of January,
1907, when the plaintiff and appellant filed with the Court of First
Instance a copy of an execution which had been issued by Jose M.
Quintero, justice of the peace of Manila, from which copy of the writ
of execution it appears that said justice had rendered a judgment
against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, on the 27th day of
December, 1906, for the sum of P550 and costs. At the time of this
Page 20 of 50
judgment by the justice of the peace it is to be supposed, at least, that
the defendant was in Bilibid Prison, serving the sentence of the
Supreme Court, and the record does not disclose whether or not he
was present during the trial or had received any notice of the action
pending against him in said court of the justice of the peace.
On the same day (the 3d day of January, 1907) the plaintiff and
appellant presented another petition to the Court of First Instance,
praying that the court order the clerk to pay to him, out of the money
in his hands, the sum of P559.24, to apply on said judgment obtained
before the justice of the peace. On the 4th day of January, 1907, the
judge of the said Court of First Instance fixed the 5th day of January
for the hearing on the said petition and ordered that the defendant be
brought into court for the purpose of being heard upon said motion.
The record discloses that the defendant was brought into court on the
day fixed for the hearing and then and there stated to the court that he
was willing that a portion of the money originally taken from him by
the officer making the arrest might be applied upon the execution, but
that he wished some of it reserved for his own use.
After hearing the respective parties, the judge of the lower court
ordered that the clerk pay to the plaintiff and appellant, out of said
money, the sum of P50 and further ordered that the balance should be
retained by the clerk for the benefit of the defendant.
From this order of the lower court the plaintiff appealed.
Issue:
Rulings:
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any
money or property found upon his person which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might

furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of
escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause;
but there is very serious doubt whether an officer making an arrest has
the right to take from the defendant any property found upon his
person, unless for some of the reasons just mentioned
Unless some of these special reasons exist the officer should not
deprive the defendant of the possession of his property. To deprive the
defendant of his money or property under other circumstances than
those mentioned above is to deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means
of defense. But what becomes of the property of the person arrested
when the officer making the arrest has taken possession of the same
and after the termination of the trial it appears conclusively that such
property was in no way connected with the commission of the offense
for which the defendant was arrested? If the property was in no way
connected with the commission of the offense, at the termination of
the trial it is the duty of the court to order the officer in possession of
the same to return it to the defendant. The custody of the officer of
such property in no way deprives the defendant of his right therein and
such custody should be considered as the custody of the defendant
under these circumstances.
But the question arises, May third persons, creditors for example of
the defendant, obtain a lien or claim upon such property while it is in
the possession of such officer? We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
third persons, creditors, etc., cannot acquire any claim or lien upon
such property while thus in the hands of the officer, which they might
not acquire had the property remained in the custody of the defendant
himself. To hold otherwise would lead to unlawful and forcible
searches of the person under cover of criminal process as an aid to
civil actions for the collection of debts. When it is fully shown that the
property so taken was in no way connected with the crime charged,
the court should not permit any advantage to be taken of the defendant,
by reason of the fact that he had been deprived of his property by the
officer and against his will.
It is therefore, the duty of the judge, under facts such as existed in this
Page 21 of 50
case, at the close of the trial to order such property returned to the
defendant.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby reversed and it is
hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court with
direction that an order be issued returning to the defendant the money
or property which was taken from his person at the time of his arrest.
So ordered.
PEOPLE VS.ANG CHUN KIT
FACTS:
ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of
a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating in Metro Manila,
was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he
sold to an undercover agent for P400,000.00 a kilo of
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu. His car
also yielded more of the regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex
box. The accused refuted the charges. However, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, found appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as "Romy Ang"
guilty of selling shabu in violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425,
as amended, sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him to
pay a fine of P30, 000.00. Hence this appeal. The accused maintains
his innocence and faults the trial court in not holding that the crime
could not have been committed under the circumstances narrated by
the arresting officers and that the alleged buy-bust operation was a
frame-up and the evidence merely planted. He argues that the
prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
since every piece of evidence presented against him is tainted with
constitutional infirmities.

ISSUE:
WON conviction of Ang Chun Kit was proper?
HELD:
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said
in People v. Morico that “when an arrested person signs a Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit the
commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating
circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the
accuser’s is booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an
arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary
detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial
statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction."But
as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's
conformity to the questioned documents has not been a factor in his
conviction since his guilt has
beenadequately established by the detailed and unshaken testimonies
of the officer’s whoapprehended him. Hence even disregarding
the questioned documents we still find the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The alleged inconsistencies do
not detract from the established fact that the accused was caught in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation since the arresting
agents were able to give an otherwise clear and convincing account
of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused. And, in every
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs what is material and
indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug
took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding accused-
appellant Ang ChunKit
alsoknown as "Romy Ang" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling
methamphetaminehydrochloride in violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A.
Page 22 of 50
6425, as amended, sentencing him to life imprisonment and ordering
him to pay a fine of P30, 000.00 is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE VS LUA CHU
G.R. No. 34917September 7, 1931
Facts:
Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng were convicted of the illegal importation
of opium. On November, 1929, Tieng wrote to his correspondent in
Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. Tieng went to Juan
Samson's house and told him that the opium shipment consisted of
3,000 tins for P2 at in, and that opium is in the vessel Kolambugan,
awaiting shipment direct to Cebu. When the vessel arrived, Tieng was
told that he must pay over the Php6000 before the opium be taken out.
The next day, Samson informed of what had taken place to Colonel
Francisco, who then instructed the Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss
the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Samson also went to
the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the same, and asked for a
stenographer to note his conversation with Tieng that night and in the
presence of Captain Buenconsejo. On December 17, 1929,
Buenconsejo, Fernando, and the stenographer went to Samson's house
and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood.
Samson asked Tieng where the opium was, and the latter answered
that it was in the cases numbered 11 to18
a total of 3,252 tins. Tieng returned later that night with Lua Chu, who
said he was not the sole owner of the opium. Samson then interrogated
Chu on when the former was going to get the opium, on whether Chu
had brought the money, on how he had come to bring in the opium;
Chu would answer them, and whileBuenconsejo listened in. As Tieng

was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay;
Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two
men. After the two to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the
fiscal, Buenconsejo and Samson went to Chu's home to search it and
arrest him, and took him to the Constabulary headquarters, and then
went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked. Contention of
the accused: The accused principal defense was that they were induced
by Samson to import the opium in question Contention of the state:
The state contends that the defendants do not deny their participation
in the act in question. Samson denied his connection with the offense
for purposes of gain; further contending that he smoothed the way for
the introduction of the prohibited drug, but he did not do so to help
them carry their plan to a successful issue, rather to assure the seizure
of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
Issue:
Whether or not the Samson instigated the accused to import opium?
Decision:
Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein accused to import
the opium in question,
but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs
, Natividad; not to gain the Php2000intended for him out of the
transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is
certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which
should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the
culprits, for this isnot a case where an innocent person is induced to
commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to
catch a criminal. The mere fact that the Samson pretended to agree a
plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the
customhouse; in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium
Page 23 of 50
and the arrest of its importers is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the latter. Decision against the accused is affirmed.
People vs Figueroa
Facts:
Arturo Figueroa was charged with lllegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.
On November 10 1989, at around seven o'clock in the morning,
Captain Lodivino Rosario, the Executive Officer of the 215th PC
Company, and his men arrived at the residence of accused Arturo
Figueroa at Barangay San Juan, San Francisco Subdivision, General
Trias, Cavite, to serve a warrant for his arrest issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, in Criminal Case No. 411 and
Criminal Case No. 412 (for the crime of Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions and for Violation of Section 16, Art. III, Republic Act
6425). While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn
around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala.
Suspecting thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting
officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to
acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber
pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box
containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted,
Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted
by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the
seized items.
Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted
by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the
seized items.
 Page 24 of 50

The accused questioned the admissibility in evidence of the firearm

and rounds of ammunition which, he claims, were discovered and
taken during a warrantless search.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.

Held:
Yes. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's
lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control.
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.
 Page 25 of 50

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano

Facts:
Mila Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by
the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Mila had been wanted as a
high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of
August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched
and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served
at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house
of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of
subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the
search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
Held:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
 Page 26 of 50

People vs. Mariacos Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a
warrantless search is valid. These are:
Facts:
xxx
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2
Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. PO2 of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc
xxx
found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the
other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but
no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted
together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice
who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized
a few moments later that the said bags were already being carried away
by two (2) women. He caught up with the women but one of the
women got away. He was able to arrest the other who was later
identified as Belen Mariacos. The bags were opened and three (3)
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped
in a newspaper, were recovered.
Issue: WON the warrantless search conducted was valid.
Held:
Yes. The search was conducted in a moving vehicle. A search of a
moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus,
under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search
warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded
on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have
been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.

Espano vs CA
Facts:
Pat. Romeo Pagilagan other police officers Western Police
District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane
tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he
replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his
residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he
was charged with possession of prohibited drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
Held:
Yes. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x.
Petitioners arrest falls rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a
buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the
area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw
petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer
left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana.
His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of
Page 27 of 50
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the
crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner’s
residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner’s house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
Carroll vs US
Facts:
An undercover officer attempted to buy alcohol, during Prohibition,
from Carroll. That transaction was never completed. Months later, the
same officer recognized Carroll and his vehicle as it was traveling
along a Michigan highway. The officer pursued Carroll, pulled him
over, and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle. Inside,
officers found sixty-nine quarts of whiskey. The United States
convicted Carroll of violating the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth
Amendment. Carroll appealed, citing the warrantless search of the
automobile as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Issue: Whether or not the search is valid.
Held: Yes.
The court upheld warrantless searches of automobiles when probable
cause existed for such a search – i.e. reasonable belief that the
automobile to be searched contains evidence of a crime. The court
noted the differences between automobiles and fixed structures such
as buildings. Automobiles are mobile by nature and can be hidden or
moved out of the jurisdiction before a warrant could be procured. As
such there are times when requiring a warrant to search a vehicle may
be impracticable. As applied in this case, the court affirmed Carroll’s
conviction, holding that the officer had probable cause to search his
vehicle.
That became known as the Carroll doctrine: a vehicle could be
searched without a search warrant if there was probable cause to
believe that evidence is present in the vehicle, coupled with exigent
circumstances to believe that the vehicle could be removed from the
area before a warrant could be obtained.
G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
LO HO WING
In July 1987, the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) received a tip and created “OPLAN
SHARON 887” to bust an organized group/syndicate engaged in the
importation of illegal drugs. As part of the operations, Reynaldo Tia
(Tia) was a “deep penetration agent” for the purpose of infiltrating the
syndicate in which accused Peter Lo (alias Lo Ho Wing) and Antonio
Lim (alias Lim Cheng Huat) were part of.
Lim hired Tia to be his travelling companion for his business trips in
China. Lim traveled with Lo, in lieu of Lim, to China on October 4,
1987. As a “deep penetration agent”, Tia reported to Capt. Palmera
Page 28 of 50
(officer-in-charge of the Oplan) that they were to return to the
Philippines on October 6, 1987 as indicated in the plane ticket.
While in Chine, Lo purchased six tin cans of tea. Upon landing on
NAIA (then MIA), the contents of the can were not closely examined
by the customs, and Lo and Tia were cleared. Lim met the pair at the
arrival area.
Meanwhile, Capt. Palmera and other operatives spotted their arrival
and embarkation to two taxi cabs (one for the Lo and Tia and another
carrying Lim). The operatives stopped the cab carrying Lo and Tia –
from their red luggage, they discovered a tin can of tea containing a
paper tea bag which in turn contains some crystalline white powder
(shabu). A total of six tin cans were found from the luggage and
nothing else. Likewise, Lim was eventually apprehended and brought
to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
During interrogation, 56 tea bags tested positive as methamphetamine.
Hence, the accused were charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. It should be noted, however, that Tia was discharged as a
state witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was legal
HELD:
Yes. The rule that a search and seizure must be supported by a valid
warrant is not absolute and a search of a moving vehicle is an
exception thereto.
Although the operatives were informed two days in advance from the
arrived of the accused, it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
What is important is there was probable cause based on the
intelligence reports by Tia to conduct a probable cause.
G.R.No. 91107 June 19, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional
command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to
set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused (Malmstedt, a Swedish
National) was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the
bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist.
And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the
same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to
get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after
the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection
the stuff toy contained also hashish. During the arraignment, accused
entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects.
Issue:
Whether or not Malmstedt’s constitutional right to unreasonable
search and seizure has been violated?
Page 29 of 50
Held:
No. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused
and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon
his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.
There are exceptions to the constitutional right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
–– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of
accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime when one of the officers noticed a
bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to
present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed
to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide
his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has

nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. Hence, expediency can be
validly invoked.
G.R. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of
Forest Development. The Special Actions and Investigation Division
of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner,
essentially violating the provisions of the Forestry Code of the
Philippines.
Page 30 of 50
On April 1, 1990, A team of foresters and policemen were organized
and sent to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team
members saw the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber, coming out from the lumberyard. Since the driver could not
produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the
DENR compound. The team, however, was not able to gain entry into
the lumberyard because of the refusal of the owner.
Two days later, the team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue
thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
On April 4, 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's
lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure the remaining
stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source
and origin.
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles
requesting an extension of fifteen days to produce the required
documents covering the seized articles because some of them,
particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the
Province of Quirino. Robles denied the petition on the ground that the
documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the
lumber or forest products placed under seizure.
Subsequently, the DENR Secretary Factoran issued an order
confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as
those found in their lumberyard and suspending the petitioner’s
lumber permit.
 Page 31 of 50

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure on petitioner’s truck

was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of
the power vested upon a forest officer or employee. the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.

G.R. L-23996 March 15, 1974
PEDRO PACIS
vs
MANUEL PAMARAN
Respondent Ricardo Santos brought into this country a Mercury
automobile, model 1957. It was without the payment of customs duty
and taxes, its former owner Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. On
June 25, 1964, Santos paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.
On July 22, 1964, Pacis received a letter stating that the Land
Transportation Commission reported that said automobile was a "hot
car." Although Pacis ascertained that the amount of P311.00 was
already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on said car
should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, he
instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and
detention. Hence, the automobile was taken while it was parked by
virtue of the said warrant. It was then brought to the General Affairs
Administration compound.
On August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel,
wrote to the petitioner asking that such warrant of seizure and
detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and the car
released on his contention that the issuance of the warrant was
unauthorized. He likewise threatened to proceed against the petitioner
for violation of Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code and for
damages. Pacis denied the request for the release of the car and averred
he had authority under the law to issue such warrant.
On September 15, 1964, Santos filed a criminal complaint for
usurpation of judicial functions. In response Pacis filed a writ of
prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pacis had the authority to issue such warrant
of seizure and detention
HELD:
Yes. the SC held that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
Page 32 of 50
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws.
Pacis, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, had the
requisite authority by virtue of Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs
Code for the issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and detention
for the automobile owned by Santos. What was done by Pacis was
strictly in accordance with settled principles of law. The issuance of
the warrant of seizure and detention was. His liability for any alleged
usurpation of judicial function is non-existent.
Furthermore, SC reiterated the landmark case of Boyd v. United States
it which it held that the seizure of goods concealed to avoid the duties
on them is not embraced within the prohibition of this constitutional
guarantee of unreasonable search and seizure.
Ultimately, the writ of prohibition prayed for was granted and
respondent Manuel R. Pamaran, now a criminal circuit court judge,
was restrained from acting thereon except to dismiss the complaint
filed by Santos.
G.R. L-27360 February 28, 1968
RICARDO PAPA
vs
REMEDIOS MAGO
Two trucks, allegedly containing misdeclared and undervalued
shipment of personal effects, left gate No. 1 of the customs at about
4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966. Elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting
of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions
of the Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of
the Bureau of Customs. It was later dicoveredthat the estimated duties,
taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00.
Remedios Mago, was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased

them from the San Fernando, Pampanga and hiring the trucks owned
by Valentin Lanopa to transport the goods from said place to her
residence at Sampaloc, Manila.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the
two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an ex parte motion to
release the goods, on the basis that (1) the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant
issued by a competent court, (2) that the Commission of Customs no
longer had control and supervision over the goods petitioners could no
longer go after the goods in question after it had left the customs
premises and (3) even assuming that the goods have been misdeclared
and undervalued, they were not subject to seizure under Section 2531
of the Tariff and Customs Code because Mago had bought them from
another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally;
Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that
the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view
of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case and the same
be left to the Collector of Customs. Judge Jarencio issued an order
releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground
that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector
of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending
termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed
the present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Jarencio had acted with jurisdiction in
releasing the goods in question.
Page 33 of 50
No. It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among
others,
(1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles,
and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under
the tariff and customs laws;
(2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the
customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As
long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods
remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is
deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. It
is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods
subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report
of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and
other charges had not been paid in full.
Even if the goods had been brought out of the customs area, the Bureau
of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same. Nevertheless, when
said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle by members of the
Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their
Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs. Thus, the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods, to the exclusion of the regular
courts. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon

the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported
articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid
or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise
jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The SC granted the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
petitioners and declared null and void the order of respondent Judge
Jarencio, for having been issued without jurisdiction.
RICHARD HIZON, et al., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CHARGE: Illegal Fishing with the use of Obnoxious or Poisonous
Substance
RTC Decision: Convited
CA Decision: Affirmed RTC decision
SC Decision: RTC and CA decisions set aside; PETITIONERS are
ACQUITTED
FACTS: Hizon et. al, are crew members and fishermen of F/B
Robinson owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., a
domestic corporation. They gathered fish or fishery aquatic products
in the coastal waters of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less
one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally caught thru the
use of sodium cyanide.
Hizon, et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for
supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance (sodium
Page 34 of 50
cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami"
led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et
al were present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task
Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples
of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the
fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the
information against Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples
yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
The RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to
imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this
decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question
the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the
warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of
petitioners.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not fish samples seized by the NBI in the
F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in evidence.
YES.
(2) Whether or not et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use
of poisonous substances. NO.
HELD: As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule
is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizure without
search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement
of a search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of
fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections
33 and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt
for possession of explosives or poisonous substances. However, this

presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to
present evidence to rebut this presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous
substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish
specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the
boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious
substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the
possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the
circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the
infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the
same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal
fishing expedition. "Muro ami", as what was reported the fishermen
were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make
the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the
net." This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred
fishermen to execute. What the apprehending officers instead
discovered were twenty eight fishermen in their sampans fishing by
hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would
have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the
boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish
specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that
petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON
B. QUE, accused-appellant.
Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705 as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) 277.
Two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of
the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received information
Page 35 of 50
that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass
through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the
Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity
of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. They followed the truck
and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao,
Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified Que as the
owner of the truck and the cargo.
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut
slabs. When interviewed, Que told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn
lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.
SPO1 Corpuz asked Que for the Cargos supporting documents,
specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport
agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5)
certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. Que failed to present any of these documents. All he could show
was a certification from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally
acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate
transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs
and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides
of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber. When the CENRO
personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they
counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with
a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total
assessed value of P93,232.50.
Que was charged before the RTC of Laoag with violation of Section
68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277.
There were 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn
lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or

equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount
of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft.,
Que denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he
presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
DENR. The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose
timber from the forest area covered by the permit.
Que objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence
against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search
and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found Que guilty. It also ordered the confiscation of the
seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck
ISSUES: Whether or not:
1. There are no existing forest laws and regulations which required
certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest
products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and
seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.
HELD:
1. Que’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation
clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal
source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession
Page 36 of 50
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents
as malum prohibitum.
2 & 3. No. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This in no way,
however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched
The police officers had probable cause to search the truck. A member
of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received reliable
information. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, Que
admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs.
When the police officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents,
Que could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient
to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive
search of the truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted
as evidence to prove the guilt of Que.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE
VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya, testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24,
1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence
of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited

plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez’s hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya
then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police
team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the
marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour,
uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives
arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found
Valdez alone in his nipa hut. They looked around the area where
Valdez had his kaingin and saw seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants
known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos. PO2 Balut asked Valdez
if who owns the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, Valdez
admitted that they were his. He was arrested.
One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
PNP Crime Lab. in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. The
result was positive, it was marijuana. Valdez was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by trial court of cultivating marijuana plants
punishable under section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection.
Valdez contended there was unlawful search and that the court
erred in declaring the marijuana plants, as evidence despite that was
the product of an illegal search; erred in convicting the accused of
violation of section 9 (Dangerous Drugs Act), Republic Act No. 6425
despite of the inadmissibility of the evidence; and gravely erred in
imposing the supreme penalty of death upon the accused despite
failure of the court to prove that the land where the Indian Hemp were
cultivated was a public land on the assumption that Valdez planted.
Issues:
1. Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in this case
lawful?
2. Was the used evidence (seizure of marijuana plants) in the case
against Valdez admissible?
Page 37 of 50
3. Has the prosecution proved that Valdez was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?
HELD:
The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and the appellant was AQUITTED
1&2. No. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a
judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause.
Contention: For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by
the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the
marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as
each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and
were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police
Elements of the plain view doctrine:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first
located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a
warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded
the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team
was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating

object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they
could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were
not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum,
the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to
eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated
plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As
to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot,
as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence
against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It
was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have
admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.
3. No. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been
conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's
very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had sufficient
time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or
necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the
marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana
plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running
afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search
and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants,
which Valdez allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not
only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported
confession was made without the assistance of competent and
independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said
confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul
Page 38 of 50
of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal
investigation must have the services of competent and independent
counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to
appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants
relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of
Constitutional competence.
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of
drug trafficking in Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
The informant of the police directed them to the residence of a certain
“ABE” PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the
house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves
nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3
Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw
“Abe” arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he
believed to be containing shabu. At the same instance they arrested the
petitioner. However, the version of the petitioner is that, together with
her father and sister while watching television the police operatives
barrage themselves into their house and that the shabu was later
planted to the petitioner while travelling to the police station.
The trial court rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of
Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA
subsequently affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-
COVERED WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF “PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE” FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE
LAWFUL.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY
APPRAISED (SIC) OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE

INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS ARREST
AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE
PERIOD OF HIS ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION.
WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF
PLASTIC SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE
MEANING OF SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
HELD: Supreme Court ruled that at the time of petitioner’s
arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his
arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before
the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon
a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even
negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
While it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights preserves the
rights of individuals of illegal search and seizure. However, a settled
exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that
of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not
require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
Page 39 of 50
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession
of the drug.
Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of fact of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any
apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses
of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After
a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed
by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that
petitioner committed the crime charged against him
Elenita Fajardo vs People
GR no. 190889 10 January 2011
Facts: Fajardo and Valerio were charged of violation of PD 1866 for
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without
authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody
and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.]
M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with
defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite
rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and
fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search
conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operation. Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the
discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview

of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was
attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with
Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive
showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen
matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband
of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any
proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged
throwing of the receivers.
Issue: Whether or not the receivers are admissible as evidence in court
Held: Yes, the receivers are admissible as evidence in court. The
receivers were seized in plain view which is an exception to the rule
that an evidence that has been obtained through warrantless arrest and
seizure is inadmissible. Prior to the seizure, the law enforcement
officer lawfully made an intrusion and was in a position from which
he can particularly view the area. In the course of lawful intrusion, he
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating to the accused.
The evidence was also open to the eye and hand and its discovery was
inadvertent.
ELENITA C. FAJARDO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190889
January 10, 2011
FACTS:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial
Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by
Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt.
Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing
on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision,
Page 40 of 50
Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at
the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the
elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat,
they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different
directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber
pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of
petitioner
Fajardo was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and
the waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and
locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from
entering petitioners house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading
apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited
for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later,
petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the
police troops. No agreement materialized
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police
Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back
portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house
and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of
petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence.
SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega
(Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness,
recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial
number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced
serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1
Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them
in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a
barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as

witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The
team found and was able to confiscate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing
their authority to possess the confiscated firearms and the two
recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against
them.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the seized illegal firearms in plain view is
admissible as evidence.
RULING:
The honorable court ruled in the affirmative. No less than our
Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Page 41 of 50
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in
Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the
foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search
and seizure may be admissible under any of the following
circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an
officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[19] It applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer
in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.
In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two
receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within
the purview of the plain view doctrine.
The presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other
law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that
petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45
caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge.
The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and
 Page 42 of 50

Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable

ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed.
There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon
off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.
From where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw
suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio
holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the
things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense
they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently
recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to
exist: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the
accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding
license for it.
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part
of a firearm must yield these requisites:
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the
license for the firearm to which the seized part/component
corresponds.

Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968)
FACTS:
Petitioner William Harris was charged with robbery under the District
of Columbia Code. D.C.Code Ann. § 22-2901. At his trial in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner
moved to suppress an automobile registration card belonging to the
robbery victim, which the Government sought to introduce in
evidence. The trial court, after a hearing, ruled that the card was
admissible. Petitioner was convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two to seven years. On
appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the card had been. obtained
by means of an unlawful search. The Government's petition for
rehearing en banc was, however, granted, and the full Court of
Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, with two judges dissenting.
We granted certiorari to consider the problem presented under the
Fourth Amendment. 386 U.S. 1003 (1967). We affirm.
Petitioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of the robbery.
The car was traced, and petitioner was arrested as he was entering it
near his home. After a cursory search of the car, the arresting officer
took petitioner to a police station. The police decided to impound the
car as evidence, and a crane was called to tow it to the precinct. It
reached the precinct about an hour and a quarter after petitioner. At
this moment, the windows of the car were open and the door unlocked.
It had begun to rain.
A regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department requires the
officer who takes an impounded vehicle in charge to search the vehicle
thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it, and to attach to the vehicle
a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of
the impounding. Pursuant to this regulation, and without a warrant, the
arresting officer proceeded to the lot to which petitioner's car had been
towed in order to search the vehicle, to place a property tag on it, to
Page 43 of 50
roll up the windows, and to lock the doors. The officer entered on the
driver's side, searched the car, and tied a property tag on the steering
wheel. Stepping out of the car, he rolled up an open window on one of
the back doors. Proceeding to the front door on the passenger side, the
officer opened the door in order to secure the window and door. He
then saw the registration card, which lay face up on the metal stripping
over which the door closes. The officer returned to the precinct,
brought petitioner to the car, and confronted petitioner with the
registration card. Petitioner disclaimed all knowledge of the card. The
officer then seized the card and brought it into the precinct. Returning
to the car, he searched the trunk, rolled up the windows, and locked
the doors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the officer discovered the registration card by means
of an illegal search.
HELD:
We hold that he did not. The admissibility of evidence found as a result
of a search under the police regulation is not presented by this case.
The precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by the
Court of Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the card was
not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect
the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow
circumstances.
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with
the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be introduced in evidence.

People of the Philippines vs. Damaso
G.R. No. 93516
August 12, 1992
FACTS:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary
officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of
CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan
City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano,
Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When
interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the
group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other
item.
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put
under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister
of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed
Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated
that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided
the group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the
house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the
occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of
Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the
place and requested him to point out the new house rented by
appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When
they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They
told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in
the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she
requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house,
Page 44 of 50
the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets
entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They
also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely,
Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and
Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house
to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of
the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14
rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps
of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items.
They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters
for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the
house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that
appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated
therefrom
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a search on a house without the owner’s presence is
valid.
RULING:
NO. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to
do so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that
appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There
was no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper,
that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco
has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion
into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
 Page 45 of 50

principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by

the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation
here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to
dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point.
The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime, does
not grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, the
court ruled that the respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the
raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners
were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before
making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly
processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily
forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of
a military invasion.
The accused was acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO
G.R. No. 110592; January 23, 1996
FACTS:
After close surveillance by the Narcotics Unit of Station 7 of the
Western Police District Command confirmed reports that appellant,
notoriously tagged as the Shabu Queen of Quiricada, Tondo, was
indeed illicitly peddling the prohibited drug, a crack team composed
of Pat. Ricardo Godoy, Pfc. Lamberto Gan, Pat. Renato Yumang, and
Pat. Eduardo Chiapoco launched a buy-bust operation in the afternoon
of June 28, 1991 in Quiricada Street. Pat. Godoy was the designated
poseur-buyer while the rest stealthily positioned themselves around
the area. Donning a basketball outfit as disguise and accompanied by
a confidential informant, Pat. Godoy searched for appellant and found
her in an alley beside a creek near her house on Quiricada St.
apparently preparing to launder some clothes. Pat. Godoy told
Yolanda Velasco that he wanted to buy shabu and gave her a fifty peso
marked bill. Velasco asked him to wait for a while and went inside her
house. When she returned, she reached into her pocket and gave Pat.
Godoy less than a gram of shabu wrapped in aluminum foil known in
street parlance as a deck. After the exchange and upon Pat. Godoys
pre-arranged signal, his couching teammates rushed to the scene and
immediately apprehended the appellant. When the police officers
asked appellant to open her pockets, they found five more decks of
shabu.
Yolanda was then brought to the police precinct for investigation by
Pat. Vicente Rodriguez, the officer-in-charge of the Narcotics and
Anti-hoodlum Section. The six aluminum foils containing shabu were
referred to the Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Western
Police District and tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. A booking sheet and arrest report which recorded the
incidents of the operation were prepared by Pat. Rodriguez, while a
joint affidavit of apprehension was executed by the members of the
buy-bust team.
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On her part, Yolanda Velasco claimed that on June 28, 1991, between
2:30 and 3:00 P.M., she was at home laundering clothes in her kitchen
when police officers, with their guns drawn, suddenly barged into her
house. Two officers held her and frisked her body for shabu while the
other two went upstairs, ransacked her room and even stole some
pieces of jewelry belonging to her sister and nieces. She claimed that
no shabu was found on her person nor anywhere within the premises
of her house. The police officers allegedly brought her outside and
asked her to locate a certain Minang. Unable to point to Minang whom
appellant claims she does not know, the police officers took her
instead. While at the precinct, appellant was again told to locate
Minang or think of somebody else to take her place, otherwise
appellant would be charged. The police officers also asked for grease
money. Appellant insisted that she did not know the person they were
looking for and that she was poor and could not give them any grease
money. Appellant denied selling shabu to the police officers. and
alleged that she had no idea why she was brought to the police precinct
and charged with having sold shabu. She further claimed that she had
never met the police officers before and that she has no knowledge of
any reason which might have impelled them to impute false charges
against her. In sum, the defenses of the appellant are denial and frame-
up, as she maintained that the six decks of shabu were planted
evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
Whether or not the RTC has a jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that an arrest when done lawfully either by a peace officer or
any private person may be done if the person to be arrested is actually
committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.
 Page 47 of 50

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the
of frame-up cannot be justified under the said provision. Moreover, jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal
appellant failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust team are cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.
policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when
they entrapped her.
Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty
provided for in R.A. 6425, agrees with the appellants argument that
under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in
the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component
penalty is prision correccional to be applied in its medium period, in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying
the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the
medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is arresto mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months.”
R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said
act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years.
However, R.A. 7691 shows that retroactive provisions apply only to
civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from
an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having
retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the
Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by the
new legislation.
At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial
Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged in as much as Section
39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over
the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in
force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed.
Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI
G.R. No. 112659
January 24, 1996
FACTS:
Early afternoon of May 31, 1993, accused Leangsiri was arrested at
the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He
was in the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin
hidden under the false bottom of a black suitcase. He informed the
authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to 3 people at the Las
Palmas Hotel in Manila.
Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) at the Old MIA for further investigation. The head of the
command, MAJOR ALBINO SABLAYAN, formed a team, headed
by SR. INSP. ADOLFO SAMALA, to conduct follow-up operations
in the case. The team and agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded
to the Las Palmas Hotel, where they allowed Leangsiri to check into
Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin.
At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking in,
Leangsiri received a telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri was
told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten oclock that
night.[15] He relayed the information to his escorts, NARCOM agents
SPO3 FABIAN GAPIANGAO and SPO4 ELPIDIO BALNEG.
Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned themselves inside
the washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them visual
access to the rest of the hotel room.
On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel,
Samala and other NARCOM and Bureau of Customs agents were
watching for unusual and suspicious events. From where he sat at the
hotels coffee shop, Samala noticed appellant Amidu paced around the
lobby for nearly an hour. At about ten p.m., Amidus co-appellants,
Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel.[21] As Amidu flashed
Page 48 of 50
a thumbs up sign to them, they all headed for the elevator and went up
to the fifth floor of the hotel.
They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the
bed in which he sat, opened the door, and let the three appellants in.
Leangsiri took the black suitcase and brought it to the dining area of
the room where appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents
Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed
its contents to his visitors.
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent
plastic bags which contained the heroin. After the examination,
Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to appellants.
Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the contraband when
Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.
Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg,
and the four foreigners in Room 504. Appellants Omogbolahan and
Bhola identified themselves by presenting their respective passports.
Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying in
Room 413 of the same hotel. Further questioning of appellants
revealed that Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at the Royal Palm
Hotel, also located in Manila.
Accompanied by the hotels owner and security officer, Samala
searched appellant Amidus room. Tucked within the pages of her
telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name
SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it. The paper and Amidus other
possessions were confiscated.
The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm
Hotel where appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted. The
agents coordinated with the security officers of the hotel, who stood
as witnesses when the former entered and searched said appellants
room. Their efforts yielded two black suitcases each with false
bottoms and both smaller than that confiscated from Leangsiri.[35]
 Page 49 of 50

Masking tape and an empty transparent bag were also found in the searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
room. inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by
of the doctrine.
Leangsiri. They told a different tale.
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in
Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
fateful night of March 31, 1993, they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
meet co-appellant Amidu and an American named David. When they
the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and as they made their way to Room
- whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
413 (Amidus room), they were accosted by some people who forcibly
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
brought them to Room 504. They explained that they were at the hotel
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and
to meet Amidu. Some of those who intercepted them left the room and
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
returned with Amidu. Appellants money and jewelry were taken from
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
them. Those who dispossesed them turned out to be policemen.
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain
The trial court denied the testimony of Julita Thach Camerino could view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
not be considered newly discovered, as said person was brought to the from one object to another until something incriminating at last
premises of the Court for identification during the trial of this case. emerges. (US Jurisprudence)
Besides, her testimony, summarized in the undated Affidavit
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las
submitted by the accused (appellants) on September 24, 1993, does
Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name was
not inspire confidence, considering that this witness was convicted by
obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel,
this Court for violation of the dangerous drugs law.
and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidus telephone and
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece
guilty of conspiring to transport heroin in violation of Section 4, R.A. of paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence
6425. against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not,
however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the
ISSUE: prosecutions case against appellants. The remaining evidence still
Whether or not the warrantless search is valid and whether or not the established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
confiscated illegal drugs is admissible as evidence. The decision of the RTC is affirmed.
HELD:
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt.
The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
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