BOOK I

SELF-DEFENSE
Requisites of the justifying circumstance of self-defense:
(1) unlawful aggression
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression
attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel.

Q: A, B, C, and D were strolling at the park. Subsequently, A and B went

down the stairs of the park. B was walking ahead of A for about 6 meters.
When the former looked back, he saw A being ganged up by the group of
X. W, Y and Z held both the hands of A, while X stabbed the latter at the
back portion. A died as a result. W,X,Y, and Z were charged with
murder. X claimed self-defense. While admitting that he stabbed A at
the back portion of the latter’s body, he further alleged that he was lying
on the ground while A was on top and at the same time choking him. A
was not armed with any weapon.
Is X’s claim of self-defense tenable?
A: NO. To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance, it must be proved with
certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained
where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also
doubtful. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his conviction, shall
of necessity follow on the basis of his admission of the killing.
Here, the claim of X that he stabbed A at the back portion of the latter's body while
the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it
is improbable and contrary to the physical evidence because how could X stab A’s
back when the former was lying on the ground while the latter was on top and at the
same time choking him, unless A just simply let his back (lumbar area) be stabbed
without any resistance or struggle on his part which is impossible under any state of
circumstances. The fact that the A was not armed all the more negates self-defense.
(People v. Suyum et al., G.R. No. 137518, 6 March 2002 as cited by People v. Erwin
Lalog, G.R. No. 196753, 21 April 2014, J. Del Castillo).

SELF-DEFENSE
Q: One evening, AA and BB were inside BB’s house when X suddenly
started throwing rocks at BB’s house. Eventually, X stopped and

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 retreated to his own house; then Y, X’s live-in partner, went out and
started shouting at AA and BB. When Y also eventually stopped, AA,
unarmed, approached X’s house and asked X to come out so they could
talk. As soon as the gate was opened, both X and Y continuously hacked
AA until the latter died.

Thereafter, X and Y were charged as conspirators in the crime of

murder. The autopsy found a total of 12 hack-wounds in AA’s head and
in several parts of his body. X invoked self-defense, asserting that AA
initiated the altercation by throwing rocks at X’s house; that when X
went outside to confront AA, AA tried to hack X with a bolo; after which,
X retrieved his samurai sword and parried with AA, resulting to AA’s
death.

Assuming X’s version is true, may X’s plea of self-defense validly

exonerate him from the crime charged?

A: No. For self-defense to be valid, the unlawful aggression of “the victim MUST put
the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in ACTUAL
PERIL. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression.” Instead, the multiple and fatal injuries of AA tend to reveal that it was
X and Y who were truly the aggressors.

As to the second element of self-defense, the means employed by X is grossly

disproportionate to AA’s alleged unlawful aggression. A plea of self-defense is
belied by the “NATURE, NUMBER, AND LOCATION OF THE WOUNDS”
inflicted on the victim "since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a
determined effort to kill and not just to defend." The wounds sustained by
AA tend to show X’s intent to kill him and not merely to prevent or repel an attack
from him. (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, 24 July 2013], J. Del Castillo)

***
APPLICABILITY OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
TO SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Q: X was convicted for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA No. 7610,
a special penal law. Under said law, the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on those who
commit acts of lasciviousness with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. The lower court sentenced X to suffer
the indeterminate imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
Is the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable in this case?

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A: YES. “Notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special law, the petitioner in this
case may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor in
its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the lower
court correctly imposed the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum” (Resolme v. People, G.R. No. 197458, 11
November 2015).

***
MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Q: One afternoon, X arrived at Y’s house. He then asked Z, wife of Y, where
the latter was. Z replied to X by asking why he was looking for Y, his
uncle of old age. Instead of replying to her query, X barged into their
house and proceeded to Y's room. Seeing that appellant was carrying a
bladed weapon, Z shouted to Perfecto to close the door to his room.
While Y was attempting to close the door to his room, X grabbed his neck
and immediately stabbed him at the right chest while uttering the words
"I will kill you." Z tried to stop X from stabbing her husband but he
pushed her away and stabbed her instead at the right wrist and
forehead. After the incident, X surrendered to the Barangay
Councilman AA, who then brought the former to the police station.

Assuming X is liable for murder, what modifying circumstances can be

appreciated in this case?
A: The following modifying circumstances can be appreciated in this case: the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the generic aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the age of victim. Moreover, a mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender can be appreciated in favor of the accused.
TREACHERY -- The fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to
close his room does not rule out the presence of treachery. It has been ruled that
while a victim may have been warned of possible danger to his person, [there is
treachery nonetheless when] the attack was executed in such a manner as to make
it impossible for the victim to retaliate. It must also be noted that the victim was
already old and that his reflexes could have been worn down by age so he could not
have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward off the attack.
DWELLING -- Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim
was killed inside his house. The offense of Murder may be committed without the
necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. The victim was
killed not merely in his house but in his own room. X could have killed him

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 elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at the victim's home; thus the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated against the accused.
DISREGARD OF RESPECT DUE TO AGE -- X knew fully well that the victim
was already old because he is his uncle. The accused perpetrated the act against his
ageing uncle knowing that by himself, said victim's physical condition due to old age
would not allow him to sufficiently defend himself anymore.

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER – The mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender, however, should appreciated in favor of the X. Thus, applying the
provision of paragraph 4, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender offsets one generic aggravating circumstance,
thus leaving one more generic aggravating circumstance. (People v. Soriano y
Narag, G.R. No. 216063, 5 June 2017, J. Del Castillo).

TREACHERY
Q: One afternoon, B rushed towards X and stabbed X twice – one on the
chest and another on the abdomen. B was facing X when he stabbed him.
X fell to the ground while B quickly ran away from the scene. X died
thereafter. B was then charged with murder qualified by treachery. B
claimed that the qualifying circumstance of treachery should not be
appreciated as he was in front of X when he stabbed the latter.
Is B’s argument tenable?
A: NO. The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator
attack his victim from behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the
attack or avoid it. In this case, B’s sudden attack on X amply demonstrates that
treachery was employed in the commission of the crime. The deliberate swiftness of
the attack significantly diminished the risk to himself that may be caused by the
retaliation of the victim. It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo
when he thrust the knife to his torso. In any event, "even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it," as in this case.
"The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." (People v. Amora, G.R. No.
190322, 26 November 2014, J. Del Castillo).

TREACHERY; CONSPIRACY; EFFECTS ON CRIME AND

PENALTY

Q: One afternoon, while AA was walking towards home, X suddenly struck

the back of AA’s head with a wooden pole. Thereafter, X’s unidentified

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 companions held AA’s arms, while X stabbed AA several times. BB and
CC both witnessed the incident and immediately fled the scene. X was
thereafter charged with murder. Post-mortem findings also established
that X died due to several stab wounds. Treachery and conspiracy were
alleged in the Information and were both duly proven during trial.

How does the presence of treachery affect the penalty to be imposed?

A: Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution thereof

which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Treachery in the present case is a QUALIFYING, not a generic aggravating

circumstance. Its presence served to CHARACTERIZE THE KILLING AS
MURDER. Since treachery qualified the commission of the crime to murder, this
circumstance could no longer be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating
circumstance warranting the increase of penalty to its maximum.

Q: Assume that conspiracy was duly proven. Does the presence of

conspiracy increase the penalty imposed to its maximum?

A: NO. Conspiracy is neither a qualifying circumstance nor a generic

aggravating circumstance that would to warrant the imposition of the penalty
for murder in its maximum period. (People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, [February
5, 2014], 726 PHIL 289-297)

LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG

Q: Buenamer and Lambada boarded a PUV and robbed the passengers with
threats. When Buenamer and Lambada were attempting to alight the
moving PUV, one of the passengers tried to get retrieve his personal
property. In the scuffle, the passenger was punched by Buenamer,
causing the passenger to fall off the PUV. The passenger was ran over by
the rear tire of the PUV and died.
A: Moreover, the mitigating circumstance of lack to intent to commit so grave a wrong
cannot be invoked by Buenamer. This mitigating circumstance addresses the
intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender executed or
commits the criminal act. The intention must comport with the weapon used by the
offender and the mode of attack adopted vis-à-vis the injuries sustained by the
victim. In this case, the force used by Buenamer was enough to make the nurse lose
his grip on the handle bar, fall off the jeepney, and be run over by the vehicle’s rear
tire which caused injuries leading to his death. Thus, Buenamer must be accountable
for all the natural and logical consequences of his act and must be deemed to have
incurred criminal liability although his act might be different from which he
intended. (People v. Buenamer, G.R. No. 206227, 31 August 2016, J. Del Castillo)

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MINORITY OF ACCUSED; DEATH OF ACCUSED PENDING
FINAL JUDGMENT

Q: AA, BB, CC, DD and EE, as conspirators, were convicted before the SC
for the crime of murder. Neither generic aggravating nor ordinary
mitigating circumstances were appreciated in court. In their Motion for
Reconsideration, they asserted that the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority should have been appreciated in favor of AA,
since he was only 16 years old at the time of the incident. AA’s minority
was only raised during the MR and was not proven in trial due to the
belated presentation of his birth certificate as evidence. Meanwhile,
pending resolution of the MR, the Court was informed that BB had
already died.

How does AA’s minority affect the imposable penalty?

A: Under Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18
years, the PENALTY NEXT LOWER THAN THAT PRESCRIBED by law shall
be imposed on the accused BUT ALWAYS IN THE PROPER PERIOD. The
rationale of the law is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have
acted with less discernment.

Prescribed: reclusion perpetua to death

Modifying circumstances: no generic aggravating, no ordinary mitigating,
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
Applying ISL:
a. MINIMUM: prision mayor in its medium period
b. MAXIMUM: reclusion temporal in its medium period

Q: Does the fact that AA’s minority was not proven during trial and was
only raised during the MR affect AA’s entitlement to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority?

A: NO. The privileged mitigating circumstance of MINORITY IS APPRECIABLE

REGARDLESS of the fact that his minority was not proved during trial
because his birth certificate was belatedly presented for consideration,
since to rule accordingly will NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE RIGHTS of the
state, the victim and his heirs.

Q: How does BB’s death during the pendency of the case affect BB’s
criminal and civil liabilities?

A: Pursuant to Article 89(1) of the RPC, upon the accused’s DEATH PENDING
APPEAL of his conviction, the CRIMINAL ACTION IS EXTINGUISHED
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; likewise, CIVIL
ACTION EX DELICTO IS IPSO FACTO EXTINGUISHED, grounded as it is
on the criminal. The judgment of conviction must be set aside insofar as BB is

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 concerned. (People v. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751 (Resolution), [January 7, 2013], J.
Del Castillo)

***
BOOK II

RAPE; SWEETHEART THEORY

Q: X was charged with the crime of rape against AAA. During trial, "AAA"
testified that X was the husband of her grandmother, and they lived in
one house. She alleged that X started raping her when she was 13 yrs old.
The last rape, according to her, happened when she was 16 yrs old,
where she got pregnant. X admitted that sexual intercourse happened
between him and AAA and that he is the father of the latter’s child.
However, he argued that he did not rape AAA as they had a relationship
when the latter was 14 yrs old. X claims that such sexual congress was
consensual because AAA was his girlfriend.
Is the “sweetheart theory”, as claimed by X, a viable defense in this case?
A: NO. "The 'sweetheart theory' hardly deserves any attention when an accused does
not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show
that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts (People v. Banig, G.R. No. 177137,
23 August 2012).”
In this case, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by X was self-serving and
uncorroborated, as there was no evidence such as love letters, pictures, gifts, etc.
that was offered to show the existence of such relationship.
In the case of People v. Banig, the Court denied appellant's bare testimony that he
and "AAA" are lovers who agreed to get married is insufficient for the defense of
"sweetheart theory" to prosper. Moreover, even if it were true that they were
sweethearts, mere assertion of a romantic relationship would not necessarily
exclude the use of force or intimidation in sexual intercourse. In People v. Cias, this
Court held that "[a] love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the
unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.”
(People v. Bunagan, G.R. No. 196786, 23 July 2014, J. Del Castillo).

RAPE; SWEETHEART THEORY; LACK OF RESISTANCE

Q: AA, then 13 years old, was walking home from the barrio church after a
midnight mass on Christmas eve. Suddenly, X approached her from
behind and poked a knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts. X
pulled AAA into a nearby empty house where, constantly threatening
AAA with a knife, X succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
After pleading that X let her go, AAA was allowed to go home upon a
threat that X would kill her if she reports the incident to her parents.
The matter was reported to the police and criminal charges for rape

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 were filed against X. In his defense, X asserted (a) that he and AAA were
lovers; and (c) that there was no evidence of resistance from AAA,
therefore she consented to the act.

Does a sweetheart defense negate the crime of rape?

A: NO. Even if it were true that X and AAA were sweethearts, this fact does not
necessarily negate rape. "Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from
a fiancée and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a
license for lust.”

Q: May AAA’s alleged lack of resistance be equated to her consent?

A: NO. When INTIMIDATION is exercised upon the rape victim, the failure
of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape inasmuch the victim only
submits herself to the rapist's assault because of fear for life and physical safety.
Well-settled is the rule that where the victim is threatened with bodily injury, as
when X was armed with a knife in this case, such constitutes intimidation sufficient
to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist. (People v.
Dumadag y Romio, G.R. No. 176740, [June 22, 2011], 667 PHIL 664-680)

RAPE; HYMENAL LACERATIONS NOT AN ELEMENT

Q: In three separate occasions, by employing threats and violence, X

successfully had sexual intercourse with his own daughter, AAA, then 13
years old. Three counts of qualified rape were charged against X. During
trial, AAA positively identified X and categorically narrated how X
perpetrated the crimes. In turn, X denied all charges asserting in main
that there were no external lacerations, swelling, or hematoma found on
AAA’s genitalia.

Does the absence of lacerations in AAA’s vagina negate the crime of

rape?

A: It bears emphasis that HYMENAL LACERATION IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF

RAPE. Otherwise stated, the presence of lacerations in the victim's vagina
is not necessary to prove rape. It is not necessary to show that the victim had a
reddening of the external genitalia or sustained a hematoma on other parts of her
body to sustain the possibility of a rape charge. (People v. Panes y Magsanop, G.R.
No. 215730, September 11, 2017, J. Del Castillo)

QUALIFIED RAPE
Q: X was charged with qualified rape for allegedly having carnal knowledge
with AAA. X pulled AAA inside the room, removed her shoes and panty,
told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina

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 without her consent. The genital examination of "AAA" revealed old
hymenal lacerations. Her psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she
was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12-year
old child. Is X guilty of qualified rape?
A: YES. For the charge of rape to prosper, it must be proven that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, OR when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, OR when she was under 12 years of
age OR was demented. From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is
committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering
from mental retardation.
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition
of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial
assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one
who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the
carnal act already constitutes rape, without requiring proof that the accused used
force and intimidation in committing the act. Only the facts of sexual congress
between the accused and the victim and the latter's mental retardation need to be
proved. (People v. Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, 2 September 2013).

QUALIFIED RAPE; EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO ALLEGE IN THE

INFORMATION THE FACT OF MENTAL RETARDATION
Q: X was charged with the crime of rape for allegedly having carnal
knowledge of "AAA", a 12-year old mentally retarded person. The trial
court found X guilty of simple rape only and did not consider "AAA's"
mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the
Information failed to allege that appellant knew of "AAA's" mental
disability at the time of the commission of the crime.
Was the trial court correct in not considering AAA’s mental retardation
as a qualifying circumstance?
A: YES. By itself, the mere fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental
retardate is not sufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance of mental
retardation. Knowledge by the offender of such mental disability at the time of the
commission of the rape should be specifically alleged in the information and
adequately proved by the prosecution. (People v. Limio, as cited in People v.
Obogne).

STATUTORY RAPE; ESSENTIAL IN PROVING RAPE

Q: Mr. X was charged with two counts of rape. Both informations alleged
that: in two occasions, Mr. X, by means of threats and intimidation, had
sexual intercourse with Ms. A, who was then 11 years old. Mr. X pleaded
not guilty, and denied the occurrence of both instances of rape. On the

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 other hand, Ms. A positively identified Mr. X. She also categorically
narrated in court that on the first occasion, Mr. X threatened to hurt her
if she told anyone; while on the second occasion, Mr. X pointed an “ice
pick” at her. These details of threat and force were, however, nowhere
found in Ms. A’s sworn affidavit. Furthermore, during trial, Ms. A’s birth
certificate established that she was already 13 years old at the time of
both occasions of rape, not 11.

May Mr. X be convicted of statutory rape?

A: NO. The elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age….” In this case, although
the Informations alleged that Ms. A was 11 years of age when the rape incidents
transpired, she was ACTUALLY 13 years of age when the rape incidents transpired
on both occasions, as shown by her birth certificate.

Q: Does the variance between Ms. A’s affidavit and declarations in open
court affect prosecution’s evidence in sustaining Mr. X’s conviction?

A: No. Variance in details does not automatically prejudice the credibility of the
testimony. What is important is that the victim's declarations, both in her sworn
statement and her narration in court, are consistent on basic matters
constituting the ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME and the POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION of the culprit. (People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 196970, 2 April
2014, J. Del Castillo)

***
LIBEL; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Q: Dr. X is a Plant Manager of Cagayan Valley Herbal Processing Plant
(HPP), an alternative health care agency attached to the DOH. She
attended a seminar, conducted by XYZ Consulting Corp. During the
seminar, Dr. X had a misunderstanding with one of the resource
speakers. A month later, Dr. X received a Memorandum signed by Dr. A,
the Director General of the agency, addressed to all the plant managers
and staff and was distributed to the different plants all over the country.
The memorandum states that Dr. X needs to undergo psychological and
psychiatric treatment to prevent deterioration of her mental and
emotional stability as recommended by XYZ Consulting Corp. Dr. X filed
a libel case against Dr. A.
In his defense, Dr. A. invokes the privileged communication rule. Can
this rule be appreciated in this case?
A: NO. Before a statement would come within the ambit of a privileged communication
under par. 1 of Article 354, it must be established that: "1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication, or at

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 least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one
to whom it is made; 2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and 3) the statements in the communication are made
in good faith and without malice."
Here, the statement is not privileged beacuse Dr. A addressed the memorandum not
only to the Plant Manager but also to the staff of HPP. The staff of HPP were not Dr.
A's superiors vested with the power of supervision over Dr. X. Neither were they the
parties to whom the information should be given for they have no authority to
inquire into the veracity of the charges. The communication was addressed to all the
staff of PITAHC who obviously do not have the power to furnish the protection
sought. The irresponsible act of furnishing the staff a copy of the memorandum is
enough circumstance which militates against Dr. A's pretension of good faith and
performance of a moral and social duty. (Lagaya Tamondong v. People, G.R. No.
176251, 25 July 2012, J. Del Castillo).

LIBEL; FAIR COMMENT

Q: Dionisio put up billboards on the fence of Cadiz Hotel and at Gustillo
Boulevard in Cadiz City with the words “CADIZ FOREVER _______
NEVER”. Later on, Dionisio filled in the blank in the billboards making
it appear as “CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER”.
The mayor of Cadiz City, who was nicknamed “Bading”, he saw the
billboards, he felt that he was being maligned and dishonored filed a
case against Dioniso..
Dionisio admitted to having put up the billboards because he is aware of
the happenings in their city and that he will never love Bading and Sagay
and that the billboards are a wake-up call for Cadiz City. However, he
insisted that there was no intention of maligning the Mayor. Moreover,
Dionisio contends that the phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER” is not libelous and that it is fair commentary on matters
of public interest and thus privileged. Is Dionisio correct?
A: YES. Dionisio is correct and the his conviction for libel should be reversed. The
words used in an alleged defamatory statement must be construed in its entirety and
taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would be naturally understood by
persons reading them unless it appears they were used and understood in another
sense.
Here, the phrase merely is a mere epithet or personal reaction of Dionisio to the
mayor’s performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and
besmirch his reputation and dignity nor deprive him of public confidence.
Furthermore, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even if he does not

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 prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends
as it is a fair comment. A policy of a public official may be attached, rightly or
wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity can invent. Public
officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official
acts. (Aberasturi v. People, G.R. No. 172203, 14 February 2011)

***
ESTAFA VIS-À-VIS COMPROMISE
Q: Reynaldo and Adrandea were authorized by MBTC to extend credit
accommodation to clients. They allowed Universal, one of its clients, to
make withdrawals against uncleared check deposits more than what
was allowed by the bank’s policies and without prior approval of MBTC’s
head office.
Reynaldo and Adrandea were subsequently charged with the crime of
estafa. However, MBTC and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement. Reynaldo and Adrandea now argues that their criminal
liability has been extinguished by novation evidenced the Debt
Settlement Agreement entered into by MBTC and Universal.
Can novation be a mode of extinguishing the criminal liability for estafa?
A: No. The criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of a
contract. A compromise or settlement entered into after the commission of the crime
only affects the civil liability of the offender and not the criminal liability.
Furthermore, Reynaldo and Adrandea are not parties to the Debt Settlement
Agreement as such they cannot take refuge from it in order to bar trial for the crime
they committed. They cannot rely on a subsequent agreement when the offense has
already been committed. Moreover, the main reason for the estafa case is because of
the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them as
officers of the bank. Hence, novation cannot be a mode of extinguishing the criminal
liability for estafa. (Metrobank v. Reynadlo and Adrandea, G.R. No. 164538, 9
August 2010.)
"Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability under the penal laws of
the country. Only the State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused.
Novation is relevant only to determine if the parties have meanwhile altered the
nature of the obligation prior to the commencement of the criminal prosecution in
order to prevent the incipient criminal liability of the accused." (Degaños v.
People, G.R. No. 162826, [October 14, 2013], 719 PHIL 487-501.)

ESTAFA; PRESUMPTION OF MISAPPROPRIATION

Q: X, as a corporate officer, was entrusted with the possession of several
properties of Corp. A to be used for its business. Later on, X was divested
of his authority to possess Corp. A’s properties. In an audit and

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 inventory, it was discovered that several of these properties were
missing and unaccounted for. Upon demand, X was not able to produce
the demanded properties.
Thus, X was charged with estafa. X claims that he did not acquire
juridical possession of the things allegedly misappropriated because his
relation to Corp. A’s properties was only by virtue of his official
functions as a corporate officer. It is Corp. A who enjoys juridical
possession, not him. Is X guilty of estafa?
A: YES. The following are the essential elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1 (b) of the RPC:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Here, Corp. A’s properties were received by X in trust. He received them for a
particular purpose for the business of Corp. A. And when Corp. A. made a demand
for their return, X deliberately ignored the same. X was given absolute option on
how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, X acquired not
only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment.
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The "failure to account upon demand, for
funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. X’s
failure to account for the properties upon demand already constitutes circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioner's own
personal use. (D’Aigle v. People, G.R. No. 174181, 27 June 2012, J. Del Castillo).

ESTAFA BY MISAPPROPRIATION AND CONVERSION;

MEANING

The essential elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) are as follows:
(1) That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of the receipt thereof;
(3) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

13
Q: X, as authorized by Good Co., borrowed Php4 million from AA, secured
by a mortgage over Good Co.’s lot. The corresponding owner’s duplicate
TCT was consequently placed in AA’s custody. Months later, X and AA
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby X borrowed
from AA the TCT previously given, and X in turn issued 11 postdated
checks as payment of the previous Php4 million loan. As per MOA, X will
use the TCT to acquire a Php30 million loan from PAG-IBIG, upon the
release of which X will fund the postdated checks issued to AA. Two
years later, AA filed a criminal case for estafa against X contending that
despite the PAG-IBIG loan having already been released and despite
several demands from AA, X never funded the checks nor returned the
TCT so borrowed; and that X, therefore, misappropriated and converted
the TCT borrowed or the PAG-IBIG loan proceeds released. During trial,
X was able to establish that the PAG-IBIG loan proceeds were used to
meet other Good Co. commitments, and that all the transactions entered
into were on behalf of and authorized by Good Co.

May X be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(1)(b) of the RPC, for

misappropriation and conversion of the TCT or PAG-IBIG loan
proceeds?

A: No. Firstly, the TCT and PAG-IBIG loan proceeds are owned by Good Co. Secondly,
as proven in court, all acts of X were in his capacity as a duly authorized officer of
Good Co.; thus, his acts were Good Co.’s acts.

Misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition of

ANOTHER’S PROPERTY AS IF IT WERE HIS OWN OR DEVOTING IT TO
A PURPOSE NOT AGREED UPON. It connotes disposition of one's property
WITHOUT ANY RIGHT. As earlier stated, the TCT and loan proceeds belong to
and are owned by Good Co. Therefore, Good Co. (through X), could not very well
have misappropriated or converted its own properties.

It then also follows that since Good Co. owns the TCT and the loan proceeds, IF
there was any misappropriation or conversion of the TCT or loan proceeds at all, the
aggrieved party should then be Good Co., and certainly not AA. Thus, for AA’s
uncollected debt, AA’s REMEDY IS NOT A CRIMINAL ACTION, BUT A
CIVIL ACTION against X. (Coson v. People, G.R. No. 218830, September 14,
2017, J. Del Castillo)

COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF

PUBLIC DOCUMENT

Elements of Falsification of a public document, Article 172:

(1) That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who took
advantage of his official position;
(2) That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in article 171 of the
RPC;

14
(3) That the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.

Elements of estafa, Article 315 (2)(a):

(1) The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions;
(2) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
(3) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which
induced the offended party to part with his money or property;
(4) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Q: AA was induced into handing to X her owner’s duplicate TCT of her lot,
after X falsely represented himself as having connections with the Land
Registration Authority and therefore can help AA in subdividing lot.
Thereafter, despite several demands from AA, X never returned the TCT
and never secured any subdivision plan. Later, without the knowledge
of AA, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM), bearing AA’s signature,
was executed in favor of a certain mortgagee MM. To this end, AA
asserted that it was X who likewise executed the REM by forging her
signature. The mortgagee MM, however, was not presented to
corroborate this allegation; and other than AA’s testimony, no evidence
to X’s supposed participation in REM was submitted in court.

May X be validly convicted of the complex crime of estafa through

falsification of a public document?

A: NO, X may only be convicted of estafa. For a complex crime of estafa through
falsification of a public document to prosper, ALL ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE
CRIMES of estafa and falsification of a public document MUST EXIST. In
this case, it was duly established that due to X’s false representations, AA was
induced to part with the owner's copy of her TCT. X, however, never complied with
his obligations. Furthermore, his failure to return the TCT despite formal demands
is evidence of his deceit. All elements of estafa are thus met.

However, not all the elements of the crime of falsification of a public document are
present. While it was also established that AA’s lot — covered by the TCT she handed
to X — was eventually mortgaged to MM without the knowledge and consent of AA,
there was no evidence showing that X had any participation in the
execution of the REM. Accordingly, X may be convicted of estafa, but not of the
complex crime charged. (Ansaldo v. People, G.R. No. 159381, 26 March 2010], J.
Del Castillo)

15
ESTAFA AND LARGE-SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

Q: A, B, C, D, and E (complainants) met X and Y to apply for overseas

employment. The latter represented themselves to have a tie-up with
some Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as
conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. X and Y also
promised to could facilitate their employment as direct hires and
assured their departure within three weeks. However, after the
complainants paid the required fees, X and Y failed to secure any
overseas employment for them. X and Y likewise failed to return the
complainants' money. Thus, X and Y were charged with large scale
illegal recruitment and estafa. It was revealed that X and Y neither have
a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Is X and Y guilty of large scale illegal recruitment?
A: YES. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1)
the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6
of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three
or more persons individually or as a group. These elements are obtaining in this
case. First, X and Y have undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised the
complainants employment in Japan for a fee. Second, it was revealed that appellants
neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Lastly, it was established that there were five complainants.
Q: X and Y argued that they should not be held liable as there was no proof
that they received money from the complainants. Is this argument
tenable?
A: NO. Money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that
the definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law includes the phrase "whether
for profit or not."
Q: Can X and Y be also held liable for estafa for the same acts committed?
A: YES. A person convicted for illegal recruitment may, for the same acts, be separately
convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The
elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation." All these elements are likewise present
in this case. Therefore, X and Y can be held liable for estafa separately from illegal
recruitment. (People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 198012, 22 April 2015, J. Del Castillo)

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

Q: Through the conduct of a buy-bust operation, the police buy-bust team
apprehended X for the sale of 2 sachets of white crystalline substance.
They then proceeded to search the premises. They found a large quantity

16
 of the same substance inside the bag that contained the two sachets of
white crystalline substance sold to the poseur-buyer. X did not offer any
explanation why he is in custody of said substance. Neither did he
present any authorization to possess the same. X was subsequently
charged with illegal possession and sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. However, after the examination, the drug actually
confiscated was revealed to be ephedrine, a regulated drug which is a
precursor of methamphetamine. Both drugs have the same chemical
formula except for the presence of a single atom of oxygen which when
removed by means of chemical reaction changes ephedrine to
methamphetamine. X was subsequently convicted with illegal
possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Is X guilty of illegal possession of a dangerous drug?
A: YES. Based on the facts, it is showed that (1) the X was in possession of an item or
an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (3) the appellant was freely and consciously aware of being
in possession of the drug. "Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession — the onus probandi
is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi."
With the burden of evidence shifted to X, it was his duty to explain his innocence on
the regulated drug seized from his person. However, he did not offer any excuse or
explanation regarding his possession thereof. (People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, 15
January 2010, J. Del Castillo).

ELEMENTS OF SALE/ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

DANGEROUS DRUGS; CORPUS DELICTI OF DANGEROUS
DRUGS CASES

Q: X was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. During
trial, prosecution witnesses positively identified X, and categorically
recounted to open court the buy-bust operation during which X sold to
a poseur-buyer police officer 1 sachet of shabu for Php300, and during
which 19 more sachets of shabu were seized from X’s pockets upon his
apprehension. Prosecution also presented as evidence the Php300
marked money used and all 20 sachets of shabu seized from the
operation, as well as sufficiently proved in court the preservation of its
identity and integrity, in conformance with the chain of custody rule.

May X be held criminally liable for illegal sale of drugs?

A: YES. The following elements for illegal sale of dangerous drugs were sufficiently
proved in court: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What
is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the PROOF that

17
 the transaction or SALE ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE, coupled with the
presentation in court of the CORPUS DELICTI or the ILLICIT DRUG in
evidence.

Q: May X be held criminally liable for illegal possession of drugs?

A: YES, he may be held criminally liable for illegal possession for the 19 other sachets.
The following elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs were
sufficiently proved in court: (1) X was shown to have been in possession of 19
sachets of shabu, a prohibited drug; (2) his possession was not authorized by law;
and (3) that he freely and consciously possessed the said illegal drug. Likewise, the
19 sachets DRUGS SEIZED, which constitute the CORPUS DELICTI OF THE
CRIME, were presented in court. (People v. Opiana y Tanael, G.R. No. 200797,
January 12, 2015)

CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

Q: In a buy-bust operation, X was arrested for selling 1 sachet of shabu to
poseur-buyer police officer AA. Incidental to the arrest, AA also seized 2
more sachets of shabu from X’s pockets. Consequently, X was charged
with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, and was convicted for
both charges. X appealed the decision contending that prosecution
failed to prove the identity of the drugs supposedly seized since,
contrary to chain of custody rule: (1) the sachets were not marked
immediately after seizure, but instead changed hands several times
from the seizing officer to a desk officer then to an investigator before it
was finally marked; (2) the sachets were not marked in his presence; (3)
neither inventory nor photographs thereof were taken; and finally (4)
prosecution failed to sufficiently explain the gaps in the chain. X, thus,
asserts that prosecution ultimately failed to overcome the presumption
of innocence he enjoys.

Does failure of police officers to comply strictly with the chain of custody
rule justify acquittal of an accused?

A: No. Generally, the FAILURE of police officers to comply STRICTLY with the
chain of custody rule is NOT FATAL. It will NOT RENDER AN ARREST
ILLEGAL and will NOT RENDER ITEMS SEIZED INADMISSIBLE. “What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.” Therefore, IF NO APPARENT IRREGULARITY is
sufficiently shown to have attended the chain of custody of the shabu, and its
INTEGRITY and probative value is proved to have been PRESERVED,
then identity of the drugs seized will still have been established. (People
v. Baturi, G.R. No. 189812, 1 September 2014, J. Del Castillo)

Q: Assuming X’s contention are true, was his conviction correct?

18
A: No. In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the the
DANGEROUS DRUG SEIZED from the accused constitutes the CORPUS
DELICTI of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the INTEGRITY
and IDENTITY of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved.

“The CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE requires testimony about EVERY LINK IN

THE CHAIN, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence. The MARKING of the seized drug, which is the FIRST LINK of the
chain, serves to separate the marked evidence from all other evidence,
OBVIATING SWITCHING, “PLANTING,” OR CONTAMINATION of
evidence. In this case the drugs seized were only marked after it changed hands
twice, and worse, were done not in the presence of of X. Furthermore, the required
inventory and photographs of the seized drugs were not taken — another break in
the chain. Thus, prosecution failed to (1) establish an unbroken chain of custody of
the seized drugs, and (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime. X should be acquitted.
(People v. Ismael y Radang, G.R. No. 208093, [February 20, 2017])

PLEA-BARGAINING ARRANGEMENTS IN DANGEROUS

DRUGS CASES

Q: Estipona was accused for violation of Possession of Dangerous Drugs

(Sec. 11, Art. 2 of R.A. No. 9165). He initially entered a plea of ‘not guilty’
but later withdrew said plea and entered a plea of guilty for violation of
Possession of Equipment for Dangerous Drugs under Sec. 12, Art. 2 of
R.A. No. 9165 which had a penalty of rehabilitation for a first time
offender and the minimal quantity of dangerous drugs in his possession.
However, such plea was denied as Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165 prohibits plea
bargaining. Estipona assailed Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165 as unconstitutional,
as it is against the intent of the law and violates that rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court. Is Estipona’s contention correct?
A: Yes. The prohibition of plea bargaining under Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165 is contrary to the
Supreme Court’s rule-making authority. The right to plea bargain has been
enshrined in the rules of procedure and has been encouraged because it can benefit
the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. Unless the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases has been made part of the rules of
procedure then it remains invalid as the right to plea bargain remains a right which
is a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy or redress for a disregard or infraction of them. (Estipona y.
Asuela v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
***PLEASE SEE ANNEX “A” FOR THE TABLE OF ALLOWABLE PLEA-
BARGAINING ARRANGEMENTS IN DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES

19
 ***
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
Q: Three armed men aboard a motorcycle arrived at a gasoline station. Two
robbed the cashier, while the driver stayed on the motorcycle. Inside the
office, one of the men pulled a knife while the other, armed with a gun,
shot the cashier. They returned to their companion and sped away on
their motorcycle from the scene of the crime.
Subsequently, an eyewitness to the crime positively identified Rodel as
one of the three robbers when presented in the police lineup. Rodel was
subsequently charged and found guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide. However, Rodel insists that the Court grievously erred in
convicting him of robbery with homicide. Is Rodel correct?
A: NO. Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason
or on occasion of the robbery. The elements of robbery with homicide are as follows:
(1) there is taking of personal property of another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. In this case, it was clear that the genuine intention of Rodel and his two
other companions was to rob the gasoline station. The killing of the cashier was
merely incidental to the robbery. (Crisostomo v. People, G.R. No. 171526, 1
September 2010, J. Del Castillo.)

SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

Q: Buenamer and Lambada boarded a PUV and robbed the passengers with
threats. When Buenamer and Lambada were attempting to alight the
moving PUV, one of the passengers tried to get retrieve his personal
property. In the scuffle, the passenger was punched by Buenamer,
causing the passenger to fall off the PUV. The passenger was ran over by
the rear tire of the PUV and died.
In court, Buenamer was found guilty of robbery with homicide while
Lambada was guilty of simple robbery. Dissatisfied with the lower
courts’ decision, Buenamer appealed his case, arguing that prosecution
was unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Is Buenamer
correct?
A: No. Buenamer is incorrect and the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish
the elements of robbery with homicide, to wit: (1) the taking of personal property of
another is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animo lucrandi (intent to
gain); and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide was
committed. It was clear that the primary objective of the malefactors Buenamer and
Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi. (People v. Buenamer, G.R. No.
206227, 31 August 2016, J. Del Castillo)

20
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
Q: X, along with three others boarded a public utility jeepney.
Subsequently, they announced a “hold-up”. One passenger, B, refused
to give his cellphone, hence, X kicked him. As a result. B fell of the
jeepney whereupon X shot him twice. Thereafter, X and his three
companions ran away with their loot. B died due to his gunshot wounds.
X was charged with special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Is X guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide?
A: YES. The elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are: "(1)
the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (4) on the occasion or by reason
of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
The robbery is the [main] purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human
life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery."
In this case, the fatal shooting of B was merely incidental, resulting by reason of or
on the occasion of the robbery. Appellant therefore committed the crime of robbery
with homicide as charged in the Information. (People v. Gamba, G.R. No. 215332,
24 July 2017, J. Del Castillo).

***
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
Q: Vehicles purchased by a congressman were turned over to the
Municipality of Bunawan, where Mayor Bustillo was the local chief
executive. Thereafter, the vehicles were transferred to the San Francisco
Water District (SFWD) through a resolution by the Sangguniang
Bayan. However, later on, the transfer was held null and void, for being
violative of the LGC. Consequently, Mayor Bustillo and other municipal
officials were sued for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
While the case was pending in the Sandiganbayan, SFWD executed a
deed of donation effecting the transfer of the vehicles back to the
Municipality of Bunawan as the purpose therefor had already been
accomplished.
The Sandiganbyanan convicted Mayor Bustillo and other municipal
officials of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 finding that they conspired
to effect the transfer of vehicles in the name of the Municipality of
Binawan to SFWD to the prejudice of the said municipality. Was the
conviction of Mayor Bustillo and other municipal officials correct?

21
A: No. The conviction of Mayor Bustillo and the other municipal officials of violating
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is incorrect.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that the said public officers
commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in
relation to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party,
whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to such parties; and (5) that the
public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Here, only the first element was proven. There was no showing that the transfer of
the vehicles to SFWD was motivated by bad faith. In fact, the transfer was made to
SFWD for the implementation of the waterworks projects which was also the main
reason why the vehicles were purchased to begin with. The vehicles were donated to
SFWD not because it was given any preference, unwarranted benefits, or undue
advantage but in recognition of its technical expertise. Hence, the conviction of
Mayor Bustillo and other municipal officials for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is
incorrect. (Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010, J. Del Castillo)

***
THEFT
Q: Mr. Puzon is a dealer of beer products of SMC. In one transaction with
SMC, he issued two postdated checks equivalent to the amount of stocks
bought on credit in compliance with the business practice of SMC. Upon
payment of the credit, the postdated checks will be returned to SMC.
One day, Mr. Puzon took possession of the checks from SMC’s staff
without consent from SMC. SMC sent demand letters to Mr. Puzon for
the return of the checks which went ignored. SMC then proceeded to file
a complaint for theft against Mr. Puzon. Is Mr. Puzon liable for theft?
A: NO. The crime of theft was not committed. For there to be crime of theft, among
other elements, the thing taken belongs to another. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, once there has been delivery, the person to whom the instrument
is delivered gets the title to the instrument completely and irrevocably. Delivery
means that the party delivering must have done so with the purpose of giving effect
to such instrument.
Here, SMC failed to establish that the check was given in payment of Mr. Puzon’s
obligation. There was no provisional receipt or official receipt issued for the amount
of the check. Moreover, the checks were not accepted as payment but rather in
accordance with SMC’s long-standing policy of requiring its dealers to issue
postdated checks to cover its receivables. The checks were merely intended to cover
the transaction in the meantime while Mr. Puzon pays for it in some other means
other than check. Title to the check did not transfer to SMC but remained with Mr.

22
 Puzon as such the second element of theft was not established. Hence, the crime of
theft was not committed by Mr. Puzon as he could not have stolen something that
belongs to himself. (San Miguel Corporation v. Puzon, G.R. No. 167567, 22
September 2010, J. Del Castillo.)

QUALIFIED THEFT
Q: Remedios was hired by Rebecca as her legal secretary, in order to help
her facilitate the transfer of titles of her clients. In view of Remedios’
job, amounts of money were entrusted to her by Rebecca. One day,
Remedios absconded, leaving all her work unfinished, and taking with
her the amounts of money entrusted to her. Remedios was sued for
qualified theft. As her defense, Remedios pointed out that Rebecca
failed to prove that she actually received the amounts intended for
processing the documents. This warrants her acquittal, according to
her.
Is Remedios correct?
A: NO. She is not correct. Theft becomes qualified when it is committed with grave
abuse of confidence. Here, pieces of circumstantial evidence presented constitute an
unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that Remedios took the sums of money
entrusted to her by Rebecca. The nature of Remedios’ work as secretary and liaison,
the trust reposed in her by Rebecca to handle the money received from clients, and
that Remedios did not specifically deny that she made the fake receipts and that she
suddenly disappeared are circumstances that when taken together are sufficient to
prove that she indeed took the money and that her failure to properly and correctly
account for the money constitutes appropriation with intent to gain clearly shows
that the crime of theft has been committed. Due to the nature of the relationship
between Remedios and Rebecca, the theft becomes qualified because there has been
grave abuse of confidence.
Since Rebecca relied on Remedios when it came to the affairs of her law office, a high
degree of trust and confidence was created and because of such relationship,
Remedios was able to create the fake receipts and appropriated the sums of money
for herself. Thus, Remedios was correctly held by the lower courts to be liable for
qualified theft. (People v. Tanchangco y Pineda, G.R. No. 177761, 18 April 2012, J.
Del Castillo)

***
PERJURY
Q: In a verified petition for Involuntary Dissolution, Eriberto alleged that
Elizabeth prepared a fictitious Secretary’s Certificate which states that a
Board of Directors resolved to exchange a parcel of land owned by

23
 Eriberto’s minor son, Gilberto, for shares of stock evidenced by a Deed
of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct which was alleged to be void.
Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that no board
meeting was held and that Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of
Usufruct was a fictitious instrument, Cesar filed a complaint of perjury
against Eriberto and presented evidence including the minutes of the
meeting which Eriberto himself signed.
Eriberto asserted that the meeting did not actually take place and that
the minutes were only brought by Cesar and Elizabeth to his house for
signing but there was no actual meeting. As for the Deed of Exchange,
Eriberto explained that it was fictitious and simulated as MFI never
issued stock certificates in favor of his son, who was not a stockholder
of MFI, and thus there is lack of consideration.
Should case of perjury against Eriberto prosper?
A: NO. For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law;
(2) it must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement
contains a deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with
regard a material matter. Here, all except one are proved, because the element of
deliberate falsehood is absent.
It must be proven without a doubt that the meeting, in fact, took place. Reliance on
the minutes of the meeting signed by Eriberto himself which is inconsistent with his
statement that the meeting did not actually materialize cannot be used to prove
deliberate falsehood.
Mere contradiction or inconsistency between two statements merely means that one
of them is false. It does not tell which of the two statements is actually false.
Conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by merely showing inconsistent or
contradictory statements even if both statements are sworn. It must be proven which
of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence
other than the contradictory statement. Hence, the case of perjury against Eriberto
will not prosper. (Masangkay v. People, G.R. No. 164443, 18 June 2010, J. Del
Castillo)

ILLEGAL TRADING UNDER B.P. 33

Q: A complaint was filed against Antonio, the general manager, and several
other members of the board of directors of ACCS Company for illegal
trading of petroleum products and for underfilling LPG cylinders under
Sec. 2(a) and (c) of B.P. 33, as amended, respectively.
The members of the board of directors protest their being impleaded in
the case because under B.P. 33, as amended, only the president, general
manager, managing partner, or such other officer charged with the
management of business affairs are to be held liable. They argued that

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 under the articles of incorporation, they were merely incorporating
stockholders and nothing more. Are the members of the board correct?
A: YES. With the election or designation of Antonio as general manager of ACCS, the
daily business operations of the corporation were vested in his hands and ceased to
be the responsibility of the other members of the board of directors. Under Sec. 4,
Par. 3, of B.P. 33 as amended, only officers who are charged with the management
of the business affairs could be held liable.
Here, the members of the board of directors were not proven to have been charged
with the management of business affairs. Even the articles of incorporation of ACCS
do not show that the members of the board of directors were directly involved in the
daily operations of the corporation as such they cannot be considered as officers
charged with the management of the business affairs of the corporation and thus
should not be held criminally liable.
Q: Upon review, the Department of Justice found probable cause against
Antonio only for the charge of illegal trading. The DOJ held that the
offense of illegal trading by means of unauthorized refilling is not
distinct from the offense of underfilling since these two offenses involve
the very same act of refilling.
Is the DOJ correct in holding that illegal trading under Sec. 2(a) and
underfilling of Sec. 2(c) under B.P. 33 as amended, are not distinct from
each other?
A: NO. The DOJ is not correct. The acts penalized by the provisions are essentially
different. Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products is committed by
refilling LPG cylinders without authority from the Bureau of Energy Utilization or
refilling of another company’s cylinder without written authorization. However,
underfilling refers to the sale, transfer, delivery, or filling of petroleum products of
a quantity that is actually below the quantity indicated or registered on the metering
device of a container.
While refilling is common to both acts, it cannot be said to constitute illegal trading
through unauthorized refilling or underfilling without additional requisites. In order
to constitute as illegal trading through unauthorized refilling, refilling must be
paired with the lack of authority to refill from the concerned government agency or
company owning the LPG cylinder refilled. In order to constitute underfilling,
refilling of the LPG cylinder must have been made below the authorized limits in the
sale of petroleum products. (Federated LPG Dealers Association v. Del Rosario,
G.R. No. 202639, 9 November 2016, J. Del Castillo)

***
GOOD LUCK, INVICTUS!

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