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Music Criticism and Musical Meaning

Author(s): Patricia Herzog


Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 299-
312
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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PATRICIA HERZOG

Music Criticism and Musical Meaning

In "The Authorityof Music Criticism"Edward aim not simply by telling us what, in an imper-
Cone observes that the objective musical score, sonal, objective sense, music means, but by tell-
while ultimately the source of all musical per- ing us why music is meaningful-indeed, very
ception, is by no means what determines that meaningful-to us. Theory and analysis alone
perception. "[I]t is the perceived composition fail to provide an interpretivevocabulary rich
that is the object of critical and interpretive enough to do the critic'sjob. They do not gener-
thought. The interesting 'facts' about such a ate the categories that tell us why music mat-
work are not those that are simply true, but ters. And from a critical standpoint,why music
those that are relevantto our perceptions.Thus mattersis essential to what music means. Musi-
historical data may be correct, analyses may be cal meaning as the critic sees it will not neces-
textually demonstrable;but our opinion as to sarily line up with musical meaning in the eyes
the applicabilityof the data, of the significance of the art historian, theorist, or analyst. And
of the analysis, depends on our perception of this is as it should be. Different disciplines are
the composition."' Importantly,for Cone, the defined by different categories of analysis and
perceptionthat gives music criticism its author- understanding,and salient or relevant features
ity must be deeply felt. For interpretationto of musical meaning will shift depending on
carry conviction it must be based on intense which of these perspectives one adopts. In or-
appreciation-indeed, on love.2 Similarly, in der for criticism to have point, the meaning we
Contemplating Music Joseph Kerman argues criticize must be antecedentlydeterminedto be
that autonomousstructureis only one of many relevantto intereststhat are specifically critical.
factors that determinemusical meaning. Others, The groundingof musical meaning by aesthetic
equally important,are economic, social, histor- value renders music critically interpretable.
ical, intellectual, and psychological factors, as The view that musical meaning is grounded
well as those that account for music's expres- in aesthetic value is opposed to the more usual
sive power, for its capacity to speak to us in view of musical meaning as something separate
deeply moving terms. Reducing musical mean- from and antecedentto that value. It rejects the
ing to autonomousstructure-leaving aside for claim that musical understandingprecedes, ei-
the moment the question of whether there is ther logically or psychologically, music appre-
such a thing as autonomous structure-is like ciation. According to the usual view, musical
studying an organism by removing it from its understandingis necessary,if not sufficient, for
ecological niche. It is deprivingthe work of the music appreciation: in order to appreciate a
very context that gives it artistic import.3 work we must first understandit. Thus, for ex-
What I take Cone and Kermanto be saying is ample, Malcolm Budd in Music and the Emo-
that musical meaning, conceived as autono- tions: "Atheoryof musicalunderstandingshould
mous structureonly, or in abstractionfrom hu- lie at the heart of a theory of musical value....
man interests and values, cannot possibly pro- For the musical value of a work is a function of
vide the foundation for music criticism. The the experience the listener has when he under-
aim of music criticism is the articulationof aes- stands the work he hears: the listener can be
thetic value. And the music critic serves this aware in his experience of the value of the mu-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53:3 Summer 1995

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300 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

sic as music only if he hears the music with critically relevant features. Only if criticism
understanding."4In my view, however, it is were to constitute the identity of a work would
only in connecting to a work evaluatively that our circle be a vicious one-only, that is, if it
we may be said to discern its meaning. To the were impossible to specify what we were talk-
extent that our evaluative terms have not got ing about independentlyof our evaluation. But
hold of a work, we have failed to understandit. this is clearly not the case. Artworks,including
The fact is that music yields a variety of mean- musical artworks,can be specified by reference
ings, depending on the interests with which we to propertiesthat are completely irrelevantfrom
approachit. Historical,acoustic, and analytical an aesthetic point of view. To refer to Beetho-
understandingdo not demandthe same involve- ven's Fourth Piano Concerto or to the C-sharp
ment on the partof the listener as does aesthetic Minor String Quartetis to say nothing, as yet,
understanding-indeed, they do not demand a about the aesthetic value of these works. We
listener at all! The historical significance of a can identify them perfectly well by the physical
work can be assessed by someone who has markingsof Beethoven's scores or by reference
never heard it, acoustical propertiescan be de- to particular sound structuresin performance.
tected mechanically,and, as any studentof mu- Thus, the critical grounding of musical mean-
sic theory knows, structuraland stylistic fea- ing in aesthetic concepts does not place us in a
tures-a great number of them, at any rate- logically untenable situation.
can be analyzed just by looking at the score. In what follows I argue that the theorists of
Aesthetic meaning, by contrast,exists in an in- autonomousmusical meaning who have domi-
tentional space createdby the criticalor evalua- nated the discussion of musical aesthetics in the
tive interests of the listener. Harmony,rhythm, last 150 years have not provided an adequate
melody, tonality, modulation, cadence (tension basis for music criticism. Music criticism is un-
and resolution), counterpoint, phrasing, voic- derdeterminedby what autonomytheoristshave
ing, intonation, expression, instrumentation, traditionallyregardedas the "facts" of musical
etc., whether in composition or performance, meaning. Accordingly, the scope of musical
are relevantto aesthetic understandingbecause meaning must be enlarged to accommodatethe
they give music aesthetic value. A person who demandsof music criticism. By groundingmu-
detected these features but for whom they did sical meaning in music criticism I aim not only
not matter, to whose appreciation of music to enlarge our view of whatever "facts" of mu-
these features made no contribution,could not sical meaning there might be, but to restore
be said, in the relevant sense, to have grasped credibility and vitality to the time-honored
music's meaning.5 practice of music criticismas the articulationof
If it is true that critical interests necessarily human interests and values. I take as represen-
have a share in determining musical meaning, tative of the autonomytheory of musical mean-
then musical meaning is relevantto music criti- ing EduardHanslick and PeterKivy, the former
cism only when interpretationhas alreadybeen being the originator of formalist musical aes-
informedby evaluation.What, then, determines thetics and the latter its latest and most well-
evaluation?The answer obviously leads us in a informed exponent. In support of the heteron-
circle-though not, I think, a vicious one. Crit- omy theory of musical meaning I cite, as above,
icism depends on the musical meaning it shapes the musicologists Edward Cone and Joseph
no less than musical meaning depends on criti- Kerman.My calling these theories "autonomy"
cism. Nevertheless, the requirementthat mean- and "heteronomy,"respectively,is not intended
ing be relevant to criticism need not determine to reflect how they are seen by their authors.
the outcome of a particularcriticism. If emo- Nor is it my aim to arriveat a precise definition
tional expressiveness were deemed relevant to of the autonomy/heteronomydistinction. In-
the value of a particular work, its presence deed, my own view of the relationbetween mu-
would figure in the criticism of that work; but sic criticism and musical meaning leads me to
not in a way that we could necessarily predict. want to abandonthe distinctionaltogether.Nev-
To say that expressiveness counts is not to say ertheless, the autonomy/heteronomydistinction
that it counts for or against a particularwork or is so entrenched in the discourse of musical
just how it figures in the totality of the work's aesthetics that for practicalpurposesthere is no

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Herzog Music Criticism and Musical Meaning 301

getting around it. Thus, I shall continue to indeed, it is extraordinarilydifficult, on Hans-


employ the distinction in this paper,along with lick's view, to say anything else.7
the correlativedistinction between musical and Initially, Hanslick compares the musically
extramusicalcontent. beautiful to a purely abstractdesign, like a ka-
leidoscope or an arabesque.8No sooner does he
II say this, however, than the analogy is impor-
tantly qualified. Although purely formal, the
In philosophical circles the debate about musi- musically beautiful differs from the kaleido-
cal meaning has often centered on the question scope or arabesquein thatits form is not "empty."
of emotion. Music moves us, and it is often Whereas the kaleidoscope and arabesque are
thought to do this through its capacity to ex- pleasing but vacuous, the mere forms of empty
press the emotions we ordinarilyfeel: sadness, space, the musically beautiful has what Hans-
joy, anger, hope, etc. Music has been variously lick calls "ideal substance."9Although lacking
thought to cause the listener to feel these emo- in subject matter(the musically beautiful is not
tions, to express them in a way that the listener about anything) and extramusicalcontent (its
apprehends but does not feel, to express the content is its form), the musically beautiful is
formal or dynamic properties of emotion-its the depiction in rationally coherent tones of
intensity,pace, ebb, and flow-or to mimic the "the mind giving shapeto itself from within."10
humanconcomitantsof emotion, such as bodily Its form is pure, we might say, but not mere.
gesture and vocal contour.But the emphasis on The thoughts and ideas expressed by the musi-
whether or not, to what extent, and just how cally beautiful are not empty because they re-
music expresses emotion can be easily mis- late to an ideal content. And in distinguishing
placed. While music moves us, and indeed at the genuine from the empty-those thoughts
times moves us greatly, it is not at all clear that that refer to an ideal content from those that do
what moves us about the music are the emo- not-the trainedlistener may be said to discern
tions it either causes or contains. How relevant the truth.11
is the expression of emotion to the critical as- In keeping with his claim thatthe form of the
sessment of a work? Does our appreciationof musicallybeautifulis specificallymusical,Hans-
music requirethat it express emotion in any or lick emphasizes that the language of music is
all cases? Only if music moves by virtue of its not verbalizable. Music does not start out as
emotive content will an account of musical concepts which the composer then transforms
meaning in terms of that content provide the into tones. Rather,it is tones themselves that are
basis for music criticism. the starting point for musical composition.12
In VomMusikalisch-Schonen(On the Musi- "An inner singing, not a mere inner feeling,
cally Beautiful) EduardHanslick famously de- induces the musically gifted personto construct
nies that music moves by virtue of its emotive a musical artwork."113 Although the musically
content. To begin with, music can represent beautiful is the creation of a thinking and feel-
only the dynamic properties of emotion, never ing mind,14we cannot say anything in words or
the specific emotions themselves. These latter feel anything in our hearts either about this
involve definite thoughts (e.g., sadness about mind or aboutthe productsof its creativeimag-
something or other; fear directedtowardsome- ination. Because the language of music is ut-
one or something) which music in itself is pow- terly untranslatable,we can give only intuitive
erless to convey. Moreover,even in the dynamic assent to those compositions in which the musi-
sense the value of music is independent of its cal elements have been successfully combined
emotive content. The musically beautiful is into meaningful,organic wholes-an assent re-
specifically musical in character.Its value con- siding "instinctively in every cultivated ear"15
sists in the autonomous,"self-subsistent"beauty and deriving from an act of pure, imaginative
of tonally moving forms (tOnendbewegte For- contemplation.16
men)-the "primordial stuff" (melody, har- That we cannot say anything aboutthe value
mony, rhythm, and timbre) out of which music of music, save assentto it, is a strangestatement,
is composed.6 However,to say this is not to say to say the least, coming from one of the foremost
much, as Hanslick himself acknowledges.And, music critics of the nineteenthcentury.Someone

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302 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

who truly believed what Hanslick says about tion of the melody shows furtherthe correspon-
musical meaning could never have written the dence of the large and the small arches: The
way Hanslick did about Beethoven, Schubert, C-majortriadof the first four bars corresponds
and Brahms, to name just a few of the com- to the four-twochord in the fifth and sixth bars,
posers whose music he greatly admired.In giv- then to the six-five chord in the seventh and
ing expression to his own musical sensibility,to eighth. This reciprocalcorrespondencebetween
an understandingand appreciationof the great- melody, rhythm,and harmonyproducesa sym-
est music of his time, Hanslick employs de- metricalyet richly varied structurewhich main-
scriptive resources extending far beyond the tains still richerlights and shadowsby means of
scope of what he regards as appropriatein On the timbres of the various instrumentsand the
the Musically Beautiful. His criticism describes fluctuations in intensity."20
music in terms of emotions and their objects Whereas this interpretationis not apt to mis-
and gives music a content, a concrete about- lead the listener into attributingto Beethoven's
ness, that defies even the most liberal inter- music any aestheticallyuntowardmeaning,Hans-
pretationof his theory of musical meaning. The lick readily admitsthat it "makesa skeleton out
first movement of Schubert's "Unfinished" of a flourishing organism ... and is apt to de-
Symphonyis "amelodic streamso crystal clear, stroy all beauty."121 As a means of giving ex-
despite its force and genius, that one can see pression to the musically beautiful such "aes-
every pebble on the bottom, the same bright, thetically correct"language is a disaster.What,
life-giving sunshine." The second movement then, is a critic to do? Hanslick's answer is
gives us a "few odd hints here and there of tricky.He says that we may apply metaphorical
complaint or irritation... interwoven in a can- language to music provided we do not take the
tilena otherwise full of heartiness and quiet ascription seriously. Thus, it would seem that
happiness."117 The first movement of Brahms's interpretations of musical meaning in non-
SymphonyNo. 1 holds even the musically unin- literal or extramusical terms are theoretically
formed by its "fervent emotional expression" dispensable. Yet, in the same breath, Hanslick
and "Faustian conflicts,"18 more specifically, tells us that as a matter of practice such lan-
by the "darkFaustianstruggle ... of a suffering, guage cannot be dispensed with. "Quiterightly
abnormallyagitated individual."19 we describea musical theme as majestic, grace-
Contrast this with Hanslick's description of ful, tender, dull, hackneyed, but all these ex-
Beethoven's Prometheus Overture in On the pressions describe the musical characterof the
MusicallyBeautiful: "The tones of the first bar, passage. To characterize this musical expres-
following a descent of a fourth, sprinklequickly siveness of a motive, we often choose terms
and softly upward,repeatingexactly in the sec- from the vocabularyof our emotionallife: arro-
ond [bar]. The third and fourth bars carry the gant, peevish, tender,spirited,yearning.We can
same upward motion further. The drops pro- also take our descriptionsfrom other realms of
pelled upward by the fountain come rippling appearance, however, and speak of fragrant,
down so they may in the next four bars carry vernal,hazy, chilly music. Feelings are thus, for
out the same figures and the same configura- the descriptionof musical characteristics,only
tion. So there takes shape before the mind's ear one source among others which offer similari-
of the listener a melodic symmetry finally be- ties. We may use such epithets to describe mu-
tween the first four bars as a single grand arch sic (indeed we cannot do withoutthem [my em-
and the corresponding arch of the following phasis]), provided we never lose sight of the
four bars. The rhythmically pronounced bass fact that we are using them only figuratively
marksthe beginning of the first three bars with and take care not to say such things as 'This
a single beat, of the fourth [bar] with two beats, music portrays arrogance,' etc."22
and it is the same with the following four bars. Hanslick's disclaimer that the language of
Here, then, is a difference between the fourth music criticism is figurativeleaves us in a phil-
bar and the first three: The first four are by osophical quandary.How are we to understand
repetition symmetrical with the second four the critic'sattemptto articulateaestheticvalue if
bars, so the ear is delighted by a touch of equi- the language indispensableto music criticismis
librium between new and old. The harmoniza- dispensable from the point of view of musical

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Herzog Music Criticism and Musical Meaning 303

meaning? Clearly Hanslick means to privilege the aesthetics of feeling (Empfindsamkeit)with


the use of terms that figuratively describe what the intention of "clear[ing] away the rubble of
are literallythe dynamicpropertiesof music. But obsolete prejudices and presuppositions" so
if, as Hanslick's aesthetic theory would have it, that the groundworkfor a "properaesthetics of
musical meaning is inarticulate,if it is divorced music" might be laid.23 By his own admission,
from verbalconcepts, dynamicor otherwise,the however, Hanslick's aesthetic theory never did
ascriptionof those terms could not possibly be get off the ground. "What is the musically
correct.The vocabularyof the criticwouldbe no beautiful? Obviously different times, different
more thanfa on de parler-harmless at best but peoples, and different schools have answered
more apt to mislead. Or, ceasing to carry de- the question in altogether different ways. The
scriptive weight, it would function rather as a further I went into the history of music, the
heuristic.Like the blackboardpointer,the critic's more I found abstractmusical aesthetics shim-
words would be a way of getting the listener to mering before my eyes like a mirage. It seemed
attend to something else-the music proper,of to me that a work deserving the title 'Aesthetics
which the pointer itself formed no part. This of Music' was still a long way from being
could be accomplishedin a varietyof ways-by feasible."24 Hanslick's acknowledgmentof the
singing or playing a motive, by pointing to part shifting ground of musical taste tells against
of a score, by grunting,stampingthe feet, saying the "assentresiding instinctively in every culti-
"Tryit, you'll like it," referringto parallelchord vated ear." Musical truth is not timeless and
progressions,ascendingand descendingmelodic pure, but historically grounded.And only when
lines, and so on. If the criticism were good, it musical taste is implicated in musical meaning
would succeed by whatever means in drawing does the historicalnatureof the formercease to
our attentionto the object of aesthetic contem- be a problem for the latter.
plation. Even good criticism, however, would
be entirely powerless to say anything about that
III
object or, in particular, about why that object
would be worthy of aesthetic contemplation.
If Hanslick is right about musical meaning, In Music Alone Peter Kivy provides new and
then music criticism cannot articulateaesthetic subtleargumentation for the claim thatthe mean-
value. It can tell us nothing aboutthe musically ing of pure instrumentalmusic-music with-
beautiful, the discernmentof which lies rather out text, program, or extramusicalfunction-
in an act of pure contemplation, in the "assent depends on musical content alone. Unlike
residing instinctively in every cultivated ear." Hanslick, Kivy does not deny that at least some
But is musical meaning really so inarticulate? instrumentalmusic can express emotion. Nev-
And, if so, what are we to make of Hanslick's ertheless, he maintains that the emotions at-
own criticism? What have life-giving sunshine taching to the more expressive varieties of in-
and Faustian conflicts to do with the greatness strumental music, the music of Brahms, for
of the music of Schubert and Brahms? Either example, are phenomenalpropertiesrelating to
the musically beautiful is critically mute, in nothing other than the music itself. Drawing on
which case any attemptto express it is as worth- Charles Hartshorne's analysis of sensation,
less as any other, or else something is wrong Kivy likens the expression of emotion in music
with Hanslick's theory of musical meaning. to the expressive qualities of colors.25Brahms's
Hanslick'sautonomytheory of musicalmean- First Symphony is expressive of anxiety and
ing commits him to the view that the musically melancholy the way that canary yellow is ex-
beautiful is not only inarticulatebut also invari- pressive of cheerfulness. In both cases, the
ant. Whereas the first of these commitments emotional tone of the aesthetic object is a per-
poses a problemfor Hanslick the critic, the sec- ceptual quality specific to the object itself, a
ond poses a problem for Hanslick the theorist. specifically musical or chromatic quality. On
In the introduction to his translation of Vom Kivy's view, then, aesthetic propertiesare emo-
Musikalisch-SchonenGeoffrey Payzantreminds tionally expressive as a matter of brute phe-
us that Hanslick's aim was primarilypolemical. nomenological fact. Humansjust do perceive at
On the MusicallyBeautifulwas directed against least some aesthetic featuresas emotionally ex-

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304 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

pressive without having to relate those features tinction between musical meaning and music
to anything else. interpretationrepresentsa significant departure
That expressive featuresof music are specifi- from Hanslick's theory of musical meaning.
cally musical seems to me wrong. However,it is For both Kivy and Hanslick, music does not
not my intention to show that the autonomy mean anything that is not specifically musical.
theory of musical meaning is logically mis- However,for Kivy, the spectrumof specifically
taken, but rather to expose its inadequacy in musical properties is much broader.Whereas
relation to the evaluative claims of music criti- Hanslick takes the expressive terms used to de-
cism. Thus, I shall assume that Kivy is right scribe musical meaning only figuratively,Kivy
that emotionally expressive qualities are phe- means them to apply literally.And this, as Kivy
nomenologically autonomous,that we need not himself acknowledges, leaves the door open to
appeal to anything outside those qualities to extramusical interpretation. Hanslick would
explain our perception of them. Sadness, tran- never have allowed that pure instrumentalmu-
quility, joy, etc., are on a par with other, non- sic could be interpretedto be about the emo-
expressive properties of music, like the chro- tions or that it could have extramusicalcontent
maticism of a baroque fugue,26 the tonality of of any other sort, whereas for Kivy, the extra-
the classical style, or for that matterHanslick's musical aboutness of such music cannot be
tonally moving forms (tones do not literally ruled out a priori, on logical grounds alone.
move from one place to another,and hence mo- Kivy has aptly been describedby Philip Al-
tion, no less than emotion, is a phenomenologi- person as an "enhancedformalist" in that he
cal property). The question, then, is how the gives "anaccountof the contentof music which
perception of any of these properties, expres- admitsnot only sensible qualities and relations,
sive or non-expressive, relates to aesthetic but also expressive, representational,and other
value. What must music mean in orderfor it to featuresthat figure into our aesthetic apprecia-
be meaningful? tion of the formal presentationof the work or
Although Kivy denies, along with Hanslick, performance."28What is essentially formalist
that pure instrumentalmusic is about anything about Kivy's view is his claim that the extra-
or that it has extramusicalcontent, he neverthe- musical interpretationof musical content is by
less allows that a broad spectrum of music's and large aesthetically irrelevant.Kivy defines
phenomenological properties are interpretable music alone as a "quasi-syntacticstructureof
in extramusicalterms. These propertiesinclude musical properties, some of which are describ-
not only dynamic aspects of emotion, but emo- able in phenomenological terms."29 And he
tions themselves, the "garden variety" emo- likens the "quasi-syntacticstructure"of music
tions of joy, sadness, and so on. Thus, Kivy to a semanticallyuninterpretedsystemof signs.30
draws an important distinction between musi- Like the operations of symbolic logic, music
cal meaning and music interpretation: what has a rule-governedstructure,a coherent,intel-
music can mean differs from what it does mean. ligible form that does not rely on what its sym-
As a matter of logical fact, absolute music can bols stand for, on what they mean. Interpreta-
be about something, it can have extramusical tion in logic is irrelevant;if a form of reasoning
content. Nevertheless, music has extramusical is valid, then it will be valid under any and
content only underappropriateconditions of in- every interpretation(given a consistent substi-
terpretation."Because a piece of music can be tution of constants for variables). In symbolic
calm and then agitated, it can be interpretedas logic it is the form of thought, not its content,
representing,perhaps,a calm and then agitated that matters. Similarly, in music it is specifi-
life or a tranquiland then stormyseascape. And cally musical properties that count, even if
because a piece of music can be melancholy those properties can be interpretedas having
and then joyful, it can be interpretedas repre- extramusicalcontent.
senting a melancholy and then joyful human Kivy devotes an entire chapterin Sound and
experience or a melancholy followed by a joy- Semblance to the question of valid interpreta-
ful event. The obvious questionto ask, of course tion. With characteristicwit he raises the spec-
is when, under what conditions, are we entitled ter of a renaissancein romanticmusic criticism.
to interpreta musical structure."27Kivy's dis- "For,it might be argued, in defending the rep-

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Herzog Music Criticism and Musical Meaning 305

resentationalpowers of music, have I not opened solve, no difficulty that it eliminates, no gap in
the door again to those infernal asses who must ourmusicalunderstandingthatit fills, no "facts"
find a story in Beethoven's piano sonatas, and aboutthe music thatit explains.In Kivy's words,
pictures in The Well-TemperedClavier, and to the autumnalinterpretation"bakes no bread"
those teachers, devoid of all musical intel- because "a more basic interpretation-that is, a
ligence, who impart 'musical appreciation' to purely musical accountof the musical events in
their young prisoners by encouraging them to the C-Minor Prelude" is available.36Like sci-
freely associate as a substitute for listening, entific explanation, good interpretationis par-
thus transformingBeethoven's Fifth into Ror- simonious; it gets us where we want to go with
schach's First?"3' Given that interpretationof the greatest economy of means.
absolute music in extramusicalterms is possi-
ble, how are we to prevent an opening of the IV
critical floodgates that would let in these kinds
of abominablemusings? Kivy's answer lies in a I will now try to show that Kivy's "problem-
particular conception of music criticism, one solving" view of musical interpretationis inad-
that likens interpretationto the activity of prob- equate, that it conceives of musical understand-
lem solving. Interpretationhas point, for Kivy, ing too narrowlyand leaves us unableto account
only if it enables us to "solve" a musical prob- fully for aestheticvalue. Ourunderstandingof a
lem. "Any interpretation,I would urge, begins musical work can increasein the absence of any
with a question, a problem, a perplexity. One sense of puzzlement or of a correspondingre-
does not 'interpret' the crystal clear, the ob- duction thereof. In orderfor a Bach fugue to be
vious, the unproblematical,and in music, we heard without a sense of puzzlement, the lis-
are drivento seek a representationalor pictorial tener need not have identified every entrance,
answer to a problem in those instances where, augmentationand diminution,inversion,stretto,
for one thing, a purely musical one will not countersubject,and so on. Yet such knowledge
suffice. ... In short, interpretationremoves the would certainly constitute an increase in musi-
perplexity which gave rise to it without leaving cal understanding.Thus, it is not always puz-
any others to resolve in its place. It satisfies."32 zlement that calls forth interpretation. Inter-
Kivy cites a cock's crow from Haydn'sThe Sea- pretation can increase understandingwithout
sons as an example of the justified ascriptionof reducing puzzlement. Perhaps Kivy means to
extramusicalcontent. Extramusicalrepresenta- be saying that it is only extramusicalinterpreta-
tion is required,in this case, in order "to make tion that puzzlementcalls forth. But why should
the theme musically comprehensible."33With- we be less puzzled by a fact whose explanation
out it, we remain unsatisfied. Our musical un- can be accounted for purely musically than by
derstandingis thwartedby the apparent"eccen- one whose explanation needs extramusicalin-
tricity" of the passage.34 terpretation?Either musical and extramusical
Kivy cites numerousinstances of interpreta- facts are on a par here or else we have two
tions that are aesthetically inapposite because species of musical understanding-one for
they do not conform to the problem-solving those works whose meaning is purely musical
model. His most extensive example is an ad hoc and the other for works, like Haydn'sThe Sea-
interpretation of Bach's Prelude in C Minor sons, which include reference to extramusical
from the first book of The Well-Tempered Cla- content. In the absence of any reason to em-
vier.In this "autumnal"interpretation,the "rus- brace this view, we must reject the postulation
tling sixteenth-notefigure, in both the rightand of two kinds of musical understanding on
left hands, that pervadesthe entire piece, repre- grounds of explanatoryparsimony:a theory of
sents the rustling of the dry autumn leaves in musical meaning that calls for more than one
the cold October wind."35 Although certain kind of musical understandingmultiplies en-
featuresof Bach's music are such that they log- tities beyond necessity.
ically could be described in autumnal terms, Kivy's autumnalmusingaboutBach'sC-Minor
any interpretationthat appealed to those terms Prelude is designed to show that only in the
would be aesthetically irrelevant. There is no exceptional case does absolute music stand in
puzzle that an autumnal interpretationwould need of extramusicalinterpretation.Where in-

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306 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

terpretationin purely musical terms is entirely purely musical terms. Might not someone with
adequate, we need look no further.But is any a rich, descriptive vocabulary of extramusical
one interpretationever really adequate? What terms know more about a work than someone
of multiple or alternativeinterpretations,those who simply had a sense of what soundedright?
we seek in different performancesof the same And would not someone equipped with a mas-
work? And, when faced with different inter- tery of both musical and extramusicalterms,for
pretations, what reason is there to prefer the example, the composer-critic Robert Schu-
purely musical ones over those that employ ex- mann, be better able to understanda work than
tramusicalterms? Why is a purely musical in- someone who had a mastery of one set of terms
terpretation "more basic" than an interpreta- but not the other? Toward the end of Music
tion that incorporatesotherelements of musical Alone, Kivy states thathearingheroes and ship-
meaning? Without a theory of musical under- wrecks in Beethoven'sFifth Symphony,as does
standing,we cannot answerthese questions.We the characterof Helen Schlegel in E. M. For-
may find the autumnal interpretation of the ster's Howard'sEnd, would be to "close oneself
C-Minor Prelude superfluous, or even abomi- off from one of the most satisfying and en-
nable, but we are not entitled to conclude that grossing experiences the arts have to offer
we find it so simply because an alternativein- us."40But this works both ways. Someone who
terpretationexists or because the autumnalin- failed to see the melancholy and anxiety of
terpretation employs extramusical terms-a Brahms'sFirst Symphonyin specifically Faust-
fortiori, we are not entitled to conclude that the ian terms-that is, 'a la Hanslick, in terms of
autumnalinterpretationof Bach's C-Minor Pre- the "dark Faustian struggle ... of a suffering,
lude is inadequatebecause there exists another, abnormally agitated individual"-might like-
purely musical interpretation. wise miss something central to the aesthetic
The question of what makes one interpreta- appreciationof it.
tion better than another forms an important What, then, determineswhetherextramusical
partof MusicAlone. A majorclaim of that work descriptionis relevantto-or, indeed, required
is that the more one understands music, the for-musical understanding? More particu-
more one is in a position to appreciateit, either larly, what determines the relevance of extra-
as good music or bad.37 In arguing for this musicaldescriptionto so-called absoluteor pure
claim Kivy explicitly assumes that one under- instrumentalmusic, where there is no link, ei-
stands a musical work to the extent thatone can ther explicit or implicit, to either text, program,
give a descriptionof it in purely musical terms. title, dedication, or any other extramusical
This descriptionneed not be technically sophis- function or content? It is evident, I think, that
ticated, and it need not even be verbal-it could more is involved in understandingat least some
be a purelytonalor gesturaldescription,as when absolute music than the attributionof specifi-
one hums a tune or moves in a rhythmicway,38 cally musical properties allows. Witness the
or a simple indication that something sounds in following passage from Maynard Solomon's
or out of place.39As we have seen, Kivy's view Beethoven:
of the purely musical allows for expressive
properties as well, like the brooding melan- Thatthe meaningsof musicarenot translatable into
choly and anxiety of Brahms'sFirst Symphony. language is a philosopher'struism. Kierkegaard
What it excludes are descriptions,like the rus- wrotethatmusic"alwaysexpressedtheimmediatein
tling of dry autumnleaves or Faustianconflicts its immediacy" andthatit was therefore"impossible
or heroes and shipwrecks,thatcannotbe under- to expressthe musicalin language."AndNietzsche,
stood simply as phenomenologicalpropertiesof in TheBirthof Tragedy, noted that "language,the
music alone. But what is to preventextramusi- organandsymbolof appearance, can neversucceed
cal descriptions like these from adding to or in bringingthe innermostcore of musicto the sur-
forming a part of our musical understanding?It face.Wheneverit engagesin the imitationof music,
does not follow either that one knows all there languageremainsin purelysuperficialcontactwith
is to know abouta work or even that one knows it." Such warnings,however,have never stopped
more about a work when one's knowledge is commentators (including,I fear,this one) fromput-
limited to a description,verbal or otherwise, in ting forthunprovable speculationsas to the "mean-

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Herzog Music Criticismand Musical Meaning 307

ing" of one or anotherof Beethoven's masterpieces. "joyous" and "liberating";we must imagine a
Nowhere has this tendency been more manifest than form of life with as much detail and richness as
in nineteenth-centuryinterpretationsof Beethoven's the music's astoundingbeauty calls forth. The
Seventh Symphony.Berlioz heard a "Rondedes Pay- difference,then, between Solomon's interpreta-
sans" in the first movement;Wagnercalled the sym- tion of the Seventh Symphony and Kivy's "au-
phony the "Apotheosisof the Dance"; Linz saw it as tumnal"interpretationof the C-Minor Prelude,
a second PastoralSymphony [Beethoven's program- is not that the one employs extramusicalterms,
matic Sixth Symphony], complete with village wed- whereas the other does not. Nor is it that Sol-
ding and peasant dances; Nohl visualized a Knight's omon's interpretationsolves a syntactic puzzle.
Festival and Oulibicheff the masqueradeor diversion Rather,the difference between the two sets of
of a multitude drunk with joy and wine. For A. B. remarksis simply that what Solomon says, to-
Marx it was the wedding or festival celebrationof a gether with the critics he quotes, illuminatesthe
warrior people. More recently, Bekker called it a greatness of Beethoven's music, whereas what
"bacchic orgy," and ErnestNewmann describedit as Kivy says tells us nothing whatsoeveraboutthe
"the upsurgeof a powerful dionysiac impulse, a driv- depth of our response to Bach's C-Minor Pre-
ing intoxication of the spirit." lude. Solomon's remarks are aesthetically ap-
Quaint as these interpretationsnow seem, it may posite precisely because they articulate aes-
be worthwhile to seek some underlyingcommon de- thetic value, whereas Kivy's interpretationis
nominatorin the opinions of so eminent a group of aesthetically superfluous precisely because it
critics. Clearly,a work that so powerfully symbolizes does not.
the act of transcendence, with its attendantjoyous In Music Alone Kivy specifically addresses
and liberating feelings, can be represented in lan- the listener who derives pleasure from pure in-
guage by an infinityof specific transcendentimages strumentalmusic without associating it-in the
which may tell us as much about the free associa- manner of Helen Schlegel or the critics cited
tions of their authors as about Beethoven and his and endorsed by Solomon, or even Hanslick
music. But the apparently diverse free-association himself- with anything else. The puremusical
imagery of these critics-images of masses of peo- listener does not requiredrunkenorgies, heroes
ple, of powerful rhythmic energy discharged in ac- and shipwrecks,Faustianconflicts, or any other
tion or in dance, of celebrations, weddings, and extramusical content in order to appreciate to
revelry-comprises, at bottom, variationsupon a sin- the fullest the symphonies of Beethoven and
gle image: that of the carnival or festival, which, Brahms:music alone is sufficient to groundthe
from time immemorial, has temporarily lifted the aesthetic value of these works. In assessing
burdenof perpetualsubjugationto the prevailing so- Kivy's attemptto accountfor the value of abso-
cial and naturalorder by periodically suspending all lute music in purely musical terms we may
customary privileges, norms, and imperatives.41 leave to the side any elitist claim to the effect
that pure musical listening is the province of
Clearly, the images invoked by Solomon are the musically learned. This view, which I have
extramusical. Beethoven's Symphony in A Ma- alreadyquestionedand which Kivy himself has
jor "symbolizes the act of transcendence," to sense enough not to argue for, is both logically
which not one but many linguistically repre- and historically groundless. The question be-
sentable images are adequate. Perhaps Kivy fore us is not whetherpure musical listening is
would say that what is being expressed here are better than any other form of musical listening
simply "joyous and liberating feelings"-spe- but whetherpure musical listening can account
cifically musical feelings, feelings that require for the greatnessof such works as the sympho-
no specification outside the music itself. Ac- nies of Beethoven and Brahms, Bach's Well-
cording to Solomon, however, such joyous and TemperedClavier,and so on. Does the value of
liberating feelings attend the act of transcen- these works derive solely from the music itself
dence of societal norms; they are conditioned or must we look outside the music in ordersuf-
by that act and derive their character from it. ficiently to account for it?
Hence, to grasp the character of the Seventh Like otherautonomytheorists,Kivy holds that
Symphony we must look beyond whatever in a musical meaning is independentof and priorto
specifically musical sense may be meant by musical value. If we are to appreciatemusic, we

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308 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

must first understandit. But while understand- "deeply important"in a human sense, then the
ing absolutemusic in purelymusical terms may answer is no. Musical craftsmanshipalone will
be necessary for musical appreciation,it is not not separateworks that are great in the human
sufficient.Purelymusical standards,like syntac- sense, what Kivy calls "profound"works, from
tic rightness or balance and symmetry, do not the largerbut not necessarilyinclusive category
exhaustmusicalvalue. Syntacticrightnesscan be of works that are great because they are techni-
trivial as well as profound, and balance and cally and stylistically perfect. All the fugues of
symmetrycan be perfectto the point of dullness. The Well-Tempered Clavier are technically and
The many instrumentalconcerti of Georg Philip stylistically perfect. But they are not all-or at
Telemannare formallyperfect, but few if any of least not all equally-profound. Judgmentsof
us would consider them great. And there are aesthetic value are, as a rule, finer than judg-
acknowledgedmasterpieces,like the late quar- ments arrivedat on the basis of musical consid-
tets of Beethoven, whose greatness consists at erationsalone.Wecommonlydiscriminateamong
least partly in transcendingstandardsof formal movements, sections, and specific passages of
perfection.42 musically perfect works, the very greatest of
Kivy recognizes, at the end of Music Alone, which are neither uniformly compelling nor
that aesthetic value still poses a problemfor the uniformly beautiful. Moreover,aesthetic judg-
musical purist. "I must end here on a note of ments leave room for music that is great but not
mystery and puzzlement. Those of us who cul- musically perfect. Not every composer was a
tivate a taste for the instrumentalmusic of the consummatecraftsman, and some of the great-
West seem to find certain examples of it so est music is technically flawed. A classic exam-
enormously compelling and of such enduring ple is Franz Schubert, whose symphonic and
interest that 'profound' forces itself upon us as chamberworks Charles Rosen regardedas sty-
the only (and fully) appropriateterm to de- listically "degenerate"but, nonetheless, as hav-
scribe them. Yet there seems to be no rational ing "virtues of their own that more efficiently
justification for our doing so. For even if the organizedmusic can rarelyachieve."44If Rosen
works we describe as profound have a subject is right, Schubert'smusic does not stand up to
matter, and that is debatable, the only subject Kivy's conception of craftsmanshipas the "ex-
matter they can plausibly be thought to have, ploration of musical possibilities within some
namely, musical sound itself, does not bear, at given set of stylistic parameters."45Yet no one
least on the face of it, any obvious mark of would deny that Schubert is a great composer
profundity,as do such subjectmattersas freedom and that at least some of his symphonies and
of the will or the problem of evil, love and chamberworks are profound. Since Kivy finds
marriageor crime and punishment,and so forth: profoundness a puzzle, I suggest he take his
the subjects of 'profound' literary works."43 own advice and seek an answer outside music's
Great music, like all great art, must be about quasi-syntactic-cum-expressivestructure.Might
something that matters;it must have a profound not the "fact"of musical value be the very thing
content. But for the musical puristthis content that requiresextramusicalexplanation?
must itself be musical:music alone ought to ex- In supportof the view that the profoundness
plain its own greatness.And it does not. of at least some musical works is purely musi-
The Well-Tempered Clavier,which consists of cal, Kivy cites a chorale fantasy by Bach. What
forty-eight preludesand fugues in all the major is profoundaboutthe work is a counterpointso
and minorkeys, is a workof musicalexploration perfect that it defies any description. Oddly
par excellence. It is also a great work of art. enough, however, he adduces as evidence for
Indeed, the greatnessof The Well-Tempered Cla- this view the following passage from Albert
vier consists at least partly in its being a musical Schweitzer's J. S. Bach. "He appears to have
exploration par excellence. Each prelude and passed his last days wholly in a darkenedroom.
fugue is both formallyperfect and representsthe When he felt death drawingnigh, he dictatedto
greatest perfection of the style in which Bach Altnikol [his son-in-law] a chorale fantasia on
wrote.Is this enough to accountfor the greatness the melody 'Wennwir in htchsten Ndten sind'
of the work? If by "great"is meant not simply [When we are in greatestneed], but told him to
"perfect" in a formal or stylistic sense but head it with the beginning of the hymn 'Vor

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Herzog Music Criticism and Musical Meaning 309

deinen Thron tret ich alihier' [I step right here, pact on our appreciationand is not, therefore,
before your throne], that is sung to the same part of the work'smeaning.But thatBach wrote
melody. ... In the dark chamber, with the shades the work while dying and that he altered the
of death already falling round him, the master text of the chorale melody accordingly is part
made this work, that is unique even among his of the music's vital import. Focusing exclu-
creations. The contrapuntalart that it reveals is sively on the structuralproperties of the work
so perfect that no descriptioncan give any idea and ignoring its compositional context will not
of it. Each segment of the melody is treatedin a take us from the perfection of the work to its
fugue, in which the inversionof the subjectfig- profoundness.It leaves out a vital part of what
ures each time as the counter-subject.Moreover must be understoodin order to account for the
the flow of the parts is so easy that after the work's true greatness.47
second line we are no longer conscious of the Clearly,musical greatnessand the perfection
art, but are wholly enthralledby the spirit that of musical form are related. Music expresses
finds voice in these G-major harmonies. The meaning through its musical form. Musical
tumultof the worldno longerpenetratedthrough form is the vehicle of whatevermeaning music
the curtained windows. The harmonies of the possesses. Thus, we might say, music is for-
spheres were already echoing round the dying mally perfect to the degree that it succeeds in
master. So there is no sorrow in the music; the conveying meaning. Formally perfect music is
tranquilquaversmove along on the other side of completely articulate. Like the speeches of a
human passion; over the whole thing gleams great orator,its tonally moving forms drive the
the word 'Transfiguration."'46 point home convincingly, compellingly, and
Much in this passage could be cited as rele- with total conviction. Had the form of the Cho-
vant to an appreciationof Bach's music as pro- rale Fantasy been less than perfect, Bach's mu-
found. To be sure, the composer's matchless sic would not have succeededin communicating
skill as a craftsman of fugues is among them. to Schweitzer what it did. Nor would Solomon
But so, too, are the interrelatedfacts that this and his critics have responded to Beethoven's
was Bach's last work, that he wrote it while he music the way they did, had the Seventh Sym-
was dying, that the fugue is specifically a cho- phonybeen less perfectlycomposed.But the per-
rale fantasy, and that Bach decided to change fection of musicalform is not yet musical great-
the text of the chorale melody to "Vor deinen ness. For skill in communicationis one thing
Thron tret ich allhier."These facts, no less than and profoundtruthanother.Like many a skillful
the counterpointitself, are relevantto Schweit- orator,music that is consummatelycrafted can
zer's recognition of the work as a profound, seduceus with its elocutionaryforce. It can lie or
spiritual transfiguration;they are part of the put across a point that has little or no value.
work's meaning. Kivy is right, of course, that Much of Westernart music has forcefully com-
Bach's exquisite part writing can be understood mended to our attentionvisions of power, vio-
and appreciatedon its own. The fugue is a great lence, and aggression,of the triumphof unqual-
work, whether or not we relate it to anything ified good over unqualifiedevil, of "masculine"
else. But when these other considerations are strengthand "feminine"weakness, of complete
factored in, the work is greater still. closure and finality, of endless longing, heroic
To the extent that one understands a work, suffering, and total redemption.48It has given
one understands whatever there is about the us pictures of human reality-oversimplified,
work to appreciate.For it is our appreciationof exaggerated,sentimentalized,glorified, and ex-
a work that leads to the detection of its aesthet- alted-whose larger-than-life proportions not
ically relevantfeatures.This applies to musical only distortbut overshadowand devaluethe true
and extramusical factors alike. Thus, in the proportions and worth of human existence.
case where extramusicalinterpretationbears on Thus, while form must be adequateto content,
aesthetic value, the properties picked out-be so, too, must content be adequateto form. Mu-
they cock crowings, country weddings, or spiri- sical greatnessconsists in the supremelyskillful
tual transfigurations-will form a genuine part articulationof a meaning that is itself great. It is
of musical meaning. That Bach dictated the the musically perfect expression of that which
chorale fantasy to his son-in-law does not im- is of profoundhuman interest.

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310 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

V of absolute music lay in a "surplus"of extra-


musical meaning, in music's ability to penetrate
I have argued that autonomy theorists, in re- to an inner, spirit world of sublime and reli-
stricting musical meaning to a content that is gious sentiment. Even for Hanslick, we recall,
purely musical, have failed to account for aes- the musically beautiful did not exhaust itself in
thetic value. Greatmusic speaks throughmusi- being form and structure. Its form was not
cal form. But it is not musical form-at least, pleasing but empty, like the arabesque,but had
not principally-of which great music speaks. "ideal substance" reflecting "the mind giving
In a recent paper Kivy proposes that absolute shape to itself from within." In the musically
music be viewed as a purely decorative art, an beautifulone discernedthe truth.Moreover,the
art of "puresonic design," in contrastto vocal unspeakablysublime could still be describedin
music, which, on accountof its representational words. What was not specifiable in the lan-
content,may be classed as one of the fine arts.49 guage of classical aesthetics-the bourgeois
His paperends by challenging us to accountfor aesthetics of determinatefeelings and states of
the very thing that Kivy himself had been un- character (Empfindsamkeit) so despised by
able to explain in Music Alone-the value of Hanslick-was nonetheless capable of expres-
such pure, contentless music. "Whatis it about sion in the language of the poetic imagination
us, and about our world, that has made the pure as a "beautifulconfusion" of fleeting feelings
contentless art of musical design so important and impressions.
for our lives in the past one-hundred-and-fifty Thus, the question of musical meaning can-
years, but not before? What needs of ours does not be decided simply by looking to the music
it serve? And why have other peoples not felt itself. At its inception, absolute music was not
those needs, or we until so recently in our his- music alone. Only after its romantic essence
tory?"50Kivy's challenge is a good one in that had dropped out-only, that is, after a change
it leads us to examine our reasons for appreciat- had occurredin musical aesthetics-was it pos-
ing any music whatsoever as an abstract art. sible to esteem instrumentalmusic as an art of
But it is phrased in such a way as to beg the pure sonic design. Let us, therefore, rephrase
question of whether the music Kivy has in Kivy's question as follows: What is it about us
mind-so-called absolute music, epitomized and about our world that has made us esteem
by the symphonies, chamber works, and so- instrumentalmusic as an art of pure, content-
natas of the baroque, classical, and romantic less design? What is it about us and about our
periods-is in fact an art of pure, contentless world that leads to the appreciationof instru-
design. mental music as abstractart? If this is the right
As Carl Dahlhaushas shown in his definitive question, as I believe the history of musical
study, absolute music is historically rooted in aesthetics has shown it to be, then the mean-
the idea of an unspeakablesublime, in the idea ingfulness of music is deeply implicatedin mu-
that "music expresses what words are not even sical meaning. Indeed, from an aesthetic point
capableof stammering."'5' But the idea thatmu- of view, the meaning of music is its meaningful-
sic, like the absolute itself, was unspeakably ness.
indeterminatedid not give rise to musical for- EdwardCone ends "The Authorityof Music
malism. Nor did it resultin criticalsilence. "The Criticism"with the observationthatjudgments
effort to speak the unspeakable often begins of taste reveal as much aboutthe critic as about
with an admission of its own hopelessness; the works of art: "In the end, the critic himself
first sentence alreadytakes back those that fol- must be willing to stand judged. In a sense all
low.... That one nonetheless attemptedan inter- of us are revealed-or shown up-by our
pretationof the 'poetic' at all-while conscious taste."53Judging a work of art involves more
of its general insufficiency-bespeaks, on the than assessing the adequacy of the work to a
otherhand, that absolute music-understood to given conception. It involves assessing the con-
be the realizationof the idea of a 'purelypoetic' ception as well: great works of art are not just
art-did not exhaust itself in being form and perfect specimens of theirkind; theirkinds, too,
structure. ... [I]t contained a surplus in which are of great worth. John Cage's 4'33" is a per-
one sensed its nature."52The preeminentstatus fect realizationof a silent musical work. Yetit is

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Herzog Music Criticism and Musical Meaning 311

doubtful that many of us would place it along- understandingis dependenton music appreciationafter all.
What is hearingmusic as music if it is not hearingmusic as
side a Beethoven symphony.Thus, in the end,
something to be appreciatedand enjoyed?In Michael Tan-
we cannot criticize dispassionately.Each of us ner and Malcolm Budd, "UnderstandingMusic," Proceed-
stands revealed in our judgments of taste. This ings of the Aristotelian Society, SupplementalVolume 59
is particularlytrue regardingworks we judge to (1985): 215-248.
be great. For in judging them to be great we 6. Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, trans.
Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Com-
judge them to be the kind of thing that is su- pany, 1986), pp. 28-29.
premely worthy of our interest. 7. Ibid., p. 30.
I have tried to show that the idea of absolute 8. Ibid., p. 29.
music as autonomous,as a purelyself-referential 9. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
art of tonally moving forms, does not provide 10. Ibid., p. 30.
11. Ibid.
adequate grounds for judgments of aesthetic 12. Ibid., p. 32.
value. When musical meaning is conceived in 13. Ibid., p. 47.
abstractionfrom human interests,its relation to 14. Ibid., p. 31.
critical discourse becomes problematic. The 15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., pp. 4 and 45.
aesthetic of autonomy cannot explain musical 17. EduardHanslick, Music Criticisms1846-99, ed. and
greatness precisely because musical greatness trans. Henry Pleasants (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1950),
transcendsthe perfection of musical form. Mu- p. 192.
sical greatness argues for a heteronomyof mu- 18. Ibid., p. 126.
sical meaning. Indeed, musical greatness ar- 19. Ibid., p. 211.
20. Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful,pp. 12-13.
gues for the dependenceof musical meaning on 21. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
music criticism.54 22. Ibid., p. 32.
23. Ibid., p. xiii.
PATRICIA HERZOG 24. Ibid., from Hanslick's autobiography, quoted by
Payzant.
Departmentof Philosophy 25. Peter Kivy, Music Alone (Cornell University Press,
Brandeis University 1990), pp. 182 ff.
Waltham,Massachusetts02254 26. Ibid., p. 185.
27. Ibid., p. 198.
28. Philip Alperson, "The Arts of Music," The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50 (1992): 217.
1. Edward Cone, "The Authority of Music Criticism,"
29. Ibid., p. 196.
Journal of the American Musicological Society 34 (1981):
30. Kivy, Music Alone, p. 198.
5-6.
31. PeterKivy, Soundand Semblance(CornellUniversity
2. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Press, 1984 and 1991),p. 197.
3. Joseph Kerman, ContemplatingMusic (Harvard Uni-
32. Ibid., pp. 206-207.
versity Press, 1985), p. 73.
33. Ibid., p. 200.
4. Malcolm Budd, Music and the Emotions (London:
34. Ibid.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 151.
35. Ibid., p. 203.
5. Of the first movementof Schubert'sNinth Symphony,
36. Ibid., pp. 211-212.
Michael Tanner writes: "One hasn't understood it unless
37. Kivy, Music Alone, p. 115.
one grasps at every moment the way in which the thematic
38. Ibid., pp. 117 ff.
materialis undergoingconstant transformation;if one does
39. Ibid., p. 114.
grasp that, in the fullest detail, and is exhilarated by its
40. Ibid., p. 200.
progress,then one has understoodthe movement"(p. 228, my
41. MaynardSolomon, Beethoven (New York:Schirmer
italics). I should like to cite this remark in support of the
Books, 1977), p. 212.
view that musical understandingdepends on music appre-
42. Charles Rosen, in The Classical Style (New York:
ciation, although, as the insertion of italics suggests, I am
W W Norton and Company, Inc., 1971), would disagree
not at all certain that Tannerhimself would agree with my
with this statement, since in his view the late Beethoven
interpretation.I note also, in this connection, Budd's re-
exemplifies the classical style. But see what Kerman says
markto the effect that what is necessary for the understand-
about Rosen's approach to his subject-matterin Contem-
ing of a musical work will differ dependingon what there is
plating Music, pp. 151-154.
about the work to appreciate: "what is necessary for the
43. Kivy, Music Alone, p. 217.
appreciationof one work is not always necessary for the
44. Rosen, The Classical Style, p. 455.
appreciationof any other ... work. There is no illuminating
general answer to the question 'How must someone hear 45. Kivy, Music Alone, p. 212.
46. Albert Schweitzer,J. S. Bach, quoted by Kivy, Music
[i.e., understand]a piece of music if he is to appreciateits
appealas apiece of music?'"(pp. 235-236). Trueenough.But Alone, pp. 205-206.
the force of Budd's "if" would seem to imply that musical 47. Jerrold Levinson has expressed similar concerns in

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312 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

response to Kivy's view. See "Musical Profundity Mis- 51. Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea of Absolute Music, trans.
placed," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50 Roger Lustig (University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 63.
(1992): 58-60. 52. Ibid., p. 68.
48. Feminist music criticism can be credited with bring- 53. Cone, "The Authorityof Music Criticism," p. 18.
ing much of this discussion to the fore. See, in particular, 54. I would like to thankLydia Goehr and an anonymous
Susan McClary,FeminineEndings:Music,Genderand Sex- reader for extremely valuable corrections, comments, and
uality (University of Minnesota Press, 1991). suggestions, many of which I have incorporatedinto the
49. Peter Kivy, "Is Music an Art?," The Journal of Phi- present text.
losophy 88 (1991): 553.
50. Ibid.

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