U.S.

Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory

Author(s): Michael J. Butler
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 226-248
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U.S. Military Intervention
in Crisis, 1945-1994
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY OF JUST WAR THEORY

MICHAELJ. BUTLER
Departmentof Political Science
Universityof Connecticut

One compellingaspectof U.S. foreignpolicy duringthe cold warwas the propensityof policy makersto
seek harmonybetweenthe pursuitof securityobjectivesand a statedAmericanbelief in enduringvalues of
peace andjustice. One need look no furtherthancampaignmonikerssuch as "OperationJust Cause"and
"OperationRestoreHope"or declarationsof the existence of an "axisof evil" for morerecentanecdotalevi-
dence of the moraljustificationsfor U.S. militaryactions.The questionof whetherthis "rhetoricof justice,"
which has been pressed into service as a public rationalefor U.S. militaryintervention,might consist of
more than mere rhetoricis addressed.The historicallygrounded,yet timely, theory of the "just war"is
appliedto a set of U.S. militaryinterventiondecisions to assess conditionsin which considerationsof justice
may have drivenU.S. decisions to employ militaryforce in internationalcrisis.

Keywords: just war theory;militaryintervention;internationalethics; internationalcrisis behavior;U.S.

foreign policy

Few subjectsreceive moreattentionor invite morecontroversythanthe studyof war

and its causes, import, and justifications. Military philosophy dating at least to the
worksof SunTzu has characterizedwaras a definitiveexperiencein internationalrela-
tions and an inherentlypolitical act. Since Karlvon Clausewitz,lthe problemof pre-
ventingor limitingthis most violent andvolatile of policy instrumentshas emergedas
a principaldilemma for internationalrelations scholarship.Clausewitzrefers to war

1. Some would also include Clausewitz;Phillips (1984) for one implies that Clausewitzunderstood
warin the Kantiansense, thatis, bothas an idealized,abstractedconceptandas an empiricalreality.By this
reading,the formerunderstandingexplains Clausewitz'spronouncementson the need to wage war abso-
lutely; the latterexplains his pragmaticdiscussion of war's limits.

AUTHOR'S NOTE:The data set used herein is a modified version of Michael Brecherand Jonathan
Wilkenfeld's InternationalCrisis Behavior (ICB) data set and is availableonline at http://www.yale.edu/
unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. Special thanksare due to MarkA. Boyer, Melissa J. Butler,and Natalie B. Floreafor
criticalinsight at variousstages of the developmentof this analysis.Errorsor oversightsremainentirelythe
provinceof the author.
JOURNAL OFCONFLICT Vol.47 No.2, April2003226-248
RESOLUTION,
DOI:10.1177/0022002702251031
? 2003SagePublications

226
 Butler/U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN CRISIS,1945-1994 227

(in an oft-cited phrase) as "policy carriedout by other means" (quoted in Phillips

1984). StanleyHoffman(1984) has remarkedthatmilitaryinterventionis "practically
the same thing as internationalpolitics, from the beginning of time to the present."
Although studies of war and conflict in a general sense have retainedtheirrelevance,
researchon military interventionas a particulartype of conflict has acceleratedin
recent years, in large partdue to the changing natureof conflict since the end of the
cold war (see Haass 1999; Huth 1998; Yoon 1997; Kegley and Hermann1997, 1996;
Crocker1996;Betts 1996;Mandelbaum1994;Levite,Jentleson,andBerman1992).
The mainresultof this renewedfocus on interventiongenerallyandU.S. interven-
tion specifically is the reemergenceof the traditionof "justwar"or thejust wartheory
(JWT).In the 19thandmost of the 20th century,JWTwas primarilya concernfor theo-
logians andlegal theorists;the formergiven its historicalroots in the religiousinstruc-
tion of AugustineandAquinas;the latterbecauseof disagreementoverthe efficacy of
the theoryin relationto a supranationalauthorityand internationallaw. Recent philo-
sophical interestin the theory (particularlyin the United States) was rekindledby the
insularityof the Vietnam-erawar-makingdecision structureand popular and aca-
demic perceptionsthat applicationsof militaryforce in that conflict were made in a
deliberativevoid (O'Brien 1979). This interestwas furtherintensified in the United
States by a flurryof normativedeliberationsover the means and ends of moder war
after the decline of detente in the 1970s and the massive buildup of American and
Soviet nuclearstockpilesthatfollowed. The returnof JWTto the publicconsciousness
in the aftermathof Vietnamandin the face of looming nuclearcatastropheis clearly a
reflectionof the realitythatat the core of JWTrestsan informedinquiryinto the moral
legitimacy of the state and state behavior(NationalConferenceof Catholic Bishops
[NCCB] 1994).
Even a cursoryreviewof U.S. militaryinterventionsin the pasthalf-century(orlon-
ger) revealsa distinctpatternof public moralizingin the service of Americanmilitary
engagementsevidentthroughoutU.S. officialdom.Explorationsof the historicalphe-
nomenon of Americanexceptionalism (Payne 1995; Lepgold and McKeown 1995)
documentin exquisitedetail the trulypeculiaraspect of Americaninterventions.This
peculiaritylies not in the frequencyor level of violence employedbutin the propensity
of U.S. policy makersto seek harmonybetween pragmaticapplicationsof military
might and America's statedbelief in peace and stability.This has been done through
the employment of what is essentially a justice-based rhetoric.For telling (if anec-
dotal) evidence of the Americanproclivity for moraljustificationsboth in planning
and prosecutingmilitaryactions, one can point to recentcampaignmonikerssuch as
"OperationRestore Freedom"(Afghanistanand possibly beyond), "OperationJust
Cause"(Panama),and "OperationRestore Hope" (Somalia) or to even more recent
allegoricalflourishesproclaimingthe existence of an "axisof evil" in the world.More
rigorous assessments of this phenomenon, for instance, in the case of "Operation
Desert Storm,"have demonstratedthe extensive efforts on the partof U.S. decision
leaders to use justice considerationsas legitimatingforces in garneringsupportfor
military engagements, in many cases successfully (Russett and Starr 1992; Gallup
Organization1991).
228 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

The questionraised,posed directly,is this: Is the "rhetoricof justice"thatappears

so serviceable as a public rationalefor U.S. militaryinterventionactually a driving
force in U.S. decisions to intervenemilitarily?Does it trulyserveas a guidingprinciple
for decisions to employ the "militaryoption"?This articleexplores these questions,
using a modifiedsubsetof MichaelBrecherandJonathanWilkenfeld's(2000) Interna-
tional CrisisBehavior(ICB) dataset to systematicallyassess U.S. crisis behavioras a
third-partyinterventionistactor during the cold war and immediate post-cold war
period(1945-1994). Specifically,U.S. crisis behavioris analyzedto addressthe ques-
tion of whetherdecisions by the United Statesto intervenewith militaryforce during
thatperiodreflectthe threemajordecision rulesof thejus ad bellum,the JWT'sfunda-
mental law regulatingan actor's recourseto armedcoercive action. The intent is to
enhanceconventionalunderstandingaboutwhetherthe United States has, in a sense,
been compelledto intervenewith militaryforceby the presenceof distinctfactorsin an
internationalcrisis thatapproximatethe maintenets of JWT,therebyreflectinga U.S.
decision-makingrationalerooted in the theory of the just war.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

The literatureon U.S. militaryinterventionduringthe cold war era has generally

characterizedU.S. decision making and interestsas consistent with at least one of
three broadconceptualframeworks:hegemonic power, structuralrealism, and ideo-
logical conflict. Although these particularframeworksare far from all-inclusive-
numerousothercategoriesfor thinkingaboutmilitaryinterventionsabound,ranging
fromthe economic imperativesof the world-systemsperspectiveto the organizational
machinations and inertia of a bureaucraticpolitics framework(and all points in
between)2-Stanley Hoffman(1984), among others,has definitivelyarguedthatthey
serve a particularexplanatoryfunction for thinking about interventionsduring the
bipolarperiod.3Before progressingto an explanationof these competing interpreta-
tions of the U.S. interventiondecision-makingparadigm,however,a brief conceptual
housecleaningis in order.JamesN. Rosenau(1969) was among the firstto raise con-
cerns aboutthe inherentambiguityof the concept of "intervention."He attributesthe
deficiency of "scholarlywritingson the problemof intervention... [in developing]
systematicknowledgeon conditionsunderwhich interventionarybehavioris initiated,
sustained, and abandoned"(p. 149) largely to deficiencies in conceptualization.
KegleyandHermann(1997, 1996) haveextendedRosenau'sconcernsoverconceptual
imprecisionto competinginterpretationsof militaryinterventionas well, noting that

2. Gelb andBetts (1979) offer nine such framingcategoriesin theirtreatmentof the U.S. involvement
in Vietnam.
3. Conceptually,Hoffman's(1984) notionof (regional)hegemonicpowercould be considereda sub-
set of structuralrealism, but nonetheless, his discussion distinctly lays out these three frameworksas
benchmarksfor thinkingabout interventionsince the Second WorldWar.
 Butler/ U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN CRISIS,1945-1994 229

the same conflict behaviorcan be classified militaryintervention,otherintervention,

or noninterventionbased on differingindices.
One ascendantdefinition, which Kegley and Hermann(1997, 1996) employ, is
advancedby HerbertTillema (1989). Tillema's original definition of militaryinter-
vention pertainedto instances of "battlesinvolving regularforeign militaryforces"
generallyresultingin fewer thanone thousandfatalities(p. 419); in subsequentanaly-
ses, he expands the criteriato include military operationsundertakenopenly by a
state's regularmilitaryforces within a specific foreign land in such a mannerto risk
immediatecombat.Tillemais clearlypursuinga narrowconceptualization,excluding
less blatant forms of internationalinterferencesuch as covert operations, military
alerts,shows of force, deploymentof units not immediatelypreparedfor combat,and
incursionsacross internationalbordersthat do not involve occupationof territoryas
out of bounds in thinkingaboutmilitaryintervention.
Forthe purposesof a generalinquiryinto factorsthatmayjustify militaryinterven-
tion, such an exclusive definitionis not entirelyuseful andmay actuallybe counterpro-
ductive.In analyzingU.S. decision makingin historicalcases of intervention,greater
insight is neededinto the decision to rule out or committo the use of a militaryoption.
The spawningand testing of generalizationsis not directly served by a concern over
pickingandchoosing which militarystrategiesor instrumentsapply;in reality,the dis-
tinction of relevance is "militaryforce" versus "something else." In response to
Rosenau's (1969) concerns,then, it should be clarifiedthatin all referencesto "mili-
taryintervention"in this research,the referencepoint is not simply to the deployment
of conventionalforces to the battlefieldor the use of air or navalpower in the combat
zone, norto a distinctnumberof battledeathsor troopcommitments.Rather,a broader
interpretationof the term is used, encompassingnot only these standardelements of
militaryactionbutalso whatBrecherandWilkenfeld(2000) referto as "indirect"mili-
taryaction.Such actioncan anddoes includecrisis behaviorsuch as the deploymentof
conventionalforces to countriesneighboringthe conflict, majortransfersin armsand
militaryhardwareto one or morepartiesinvolvedin the conflict, the dispatchof mili-
taryadvisorsto one or morepartiesinvolvedin the conflict, the introductionof exten-
sive covert operationsin one or more countriesinvolved in the conflict, and so forth.
The UnitedStatesneed not be directlyinvolvedin the fightingbutmust,at a minimum,
be directlyinvolved in alteringthe context of thatfighting throughthe applicationof
militaryinfluence. "Militaryintervention"henceforthshould be understoodto con-
strue any deliberateintroductionor applicationof militaryweaponry,personnel,or
intelligence intendedto alterthe dynamics of a conflict.
A secondconceptrequiringclarityis thatof "third-party intervention."Brecherand
Wilkenfeld(1989) cite OranYoung:

anyactiontakenbyanactorthatis nota directpartytothecrisis,thatis designedtoreduce

or removeone or moreof theproblemsof thebargaining relationship andthereforeto
facilitatethetermination
of thecrisisitself.(P. 185)

The conceptualizationof third-partyinterventionhere encompasses the first partof

this definition("anyactiontakenby an actorthatis not a directpartyto an international
230 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

crisis")butby necessityrejectsthe second.Intentto resolve a crisis is one of the funda-

mentalelements to be tested in assessing whetheran interventionis just. It is neither
implausible nor improbableto think that third-partyinterventionmay be directed
againstterminationof the crisis, particularlyif the thirdpartyis a unilateralactor;this
would run decisively counterto JWT.4Finally, third-partyinterventioncan include
diplomatic,economic, and political activity as well as militaryaction.
The specificationof these fundamentalconcepts allows for a turnto the aforemen-
tioned "explanatoryframeworks"-hegemonic power, structuralrealism, and ideo-
logical conflict-that have guidedinterpretationsof U.S. interventionin the cold war
era and immediatepost-cold war period (hereaftermergedand referredto jointly as
"thecold warera").5Forproponentsof the hegemonyviewpointsuch as Luard(1988)
and Petersen (1976), U.S. conflict behaviordivergedfrom internationalnorms that
dictated noninterferencein sovereign affairs both more frequently and more pro-
foundly when the setting of the crisis was within its hemisphericzone of influence,
namely,the countriesof LatinAmerica.Structuralrealisminterpretsinterventionsas
driven predominantlyby the stabilizing functions they serve in securing polarity
arrangementswithin the internationalsystem (Waltz 1979; Linklater 1995). Thus,
U.S. militaryinterventioncan be best understoodin this sense by the role it plays in the
stabilityof securityalliancesor blocs thatarethe key to stabilityin anupdatedbalance-
of-powersystem underloose bipolarity(Kaplan1957). Proponentsof ideological fac-
torsas a rationalefor U.S. militaryintervention(Katz 1991;Huntington1987) contend
thatU.S. militaryinterventionhas been drivenlargelyby the zealous desire to spread
liberaldemocracyacross the globe-most especially where the evils of communism
were in dangerof takingroot, citing the bold pronouncementsof the Truman,Eisen-
hower, and Reagandoctrinesas empiricalexamples.
All three frameworks-hegemonic power, structuralrealism, and ideological
conflict-operate under the assumptionthat some concept of the national interest
drivesU.S. decisionsto militarilyintervenein a crisis (althoughtheirinterpretationsof
thatnationalinterestdiverge).All threealso assume some variationof a unitaryratio-
nal actor model as it applies to nation-statesin the sense that preferencesrelatedto
their particularconceptualizationof national interest can be identified, ordered,
selected, and decisively acted upon. Finally, and most important,all three locate the
primarydecision criteriafor whetherthe United Statesdecidedto intervenelargelyin
system-level factors-be they regional power, alliance maintenance,or ideological
competition(with Soviet communism)ratherthan in actor-leveldecision making.In
doing so, these frameworksdo not accountfor the agency of individualdecision mak-
ers and the decision-makingcollective withinthe countrycontemplatingintervention
(in this case, the United States). Decisions aboutmilitaryinterventionunderstoodin
these frameworksarelargelydecidedfor a countryby system-levelvariables,which in
4. Young'spresuppositionof a thirdparty'sinterestin facilitatingcrisis abatementis in itself a testi-
mony to the implicithold of just wartheory(JWT)on scholarsof conflict intervention(as cited in Brecher
and Wilkenfeld 1989).
5. I include what I am calling the "immediatepost-cold war era"-1989 to 1994-to lend a bit of
temporalconservatismto the analysis in recognitionof the fact thatshifts in perceptionsamongU.S. policy
makers(suchas a shiftfromthe dominantcold warparadigm)almostinevitablylag behindactualevents.
 Butler/U.S. MILITARY IN CRISIS,1945-1994
INTERVENTION 231

and of themselves are susceptibleto highly unpredictabledegrees of variationdue to

their exposure to a variety of extenuating systemic circumstances. Although
inarguablysystemic constraintsplayed some role in U.S. involvementin crisis during
the cold war, from a retrospectiveposition, systemic factors would seem to provide
only a partial explanation. Furthermore,all three frameworksare inadequatefor
explainingcurrentand futurecrises given thatthey arepredicatedon a cold warbipo-
laritythat no longer exists.
This examination advances and tests for the applicability of a fourth possible
explanatoryframeworkfor U.S. militaryinterventionismin the period since World
WarII, namely,thejus adbellumlaw of the JWT.Becausethejus adbellum law is fun-
damentallya precautionaryprinciplethatallows the use of force only as a last resort
andonly to a degreeproportionateto thatwhich is neededto bringaboutpeace, it theo-
retically contains a greaterconcern for individualand small-groupdeliberationthan
other, more structurallybound approaches.Accordingly, it addresses what Gacek
(1994) calls the "conceptualtension"between the logic of the ends andmeans of war,
providinga robusttool for evaluatingthejustice of first strikes,interveningon behalf
of nationalliberationmovements,counterintervention,andthe rightto intervenewith
force in scenariosthat shock the humanconscience (Bull 1979).

ORIGINS AND PRECEPTS OF JUST WAR THEORY

The originsof a recognizabletheoryof thejust wararecommonlytracedto Augus-

tine's notionof "theTwo Cities,"in whichjustice can be gainedin the temporalsphere
only throughthe measuredethical conductof statecraft(see Phillips 1984). Although
thisjustice is imperfectandincompleteatbest-nothing morecould be expectedin the
fallen, earthlyrealm-it is worthpursuingbecause, as Augustinepoints out, "we can
makeuse of the peace of Babylon,"if for nothingelse thanto steel ourselvesin the pur-
suit of the City of God (Augustine 1963). Specifically,Augustineoffers a formulafor
the restorationof peace thatincludes the commonly cited themes of a just war as one
limitedby its purpose,authority,andconduct.Warproperlyconductedmustbe led by
rulersof nations (who by virtueof theirposition are obliged to maintainpeace) who
prosecutewar to revenge wrongs and undo injustices but never in the spirit of ven-
geance (Augustine 1963).
Following on Augustinianthought, Thomas Aquinas offered a restatementand
degreeof clarificationthatjustifies his frequentassociationwith the theory.In PartII,
Question40, "Of War,"in the SummaTheologica(Aquinas 1952), he specified three
clear and irrefutableconditions for a just war:legitimate authoritymust be received
fromthe sovereign;ajust cause for the attackmustbe present;and a rightfulintention
should guide the proceedings,so thatthe advancementof good is the sole purposeof
going to war.In statingthese generalpreceptsof thejust war,Aquinasis clearly seek-
ing to explorethe possibilitiesof his distinctionbetweenhumanandnaturallaw on one
hand and eternallaw on the other.Although war in and of itself reflects humanity's
fallen condition, a war prosecutedjustly is consistent with Aquinas's proclamation
thathumansshould strivethroughthe use of reason and humanintelligence to disci-
232 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

pline human law (laws enacted by governments) to the stricturesof natural law
(humanity'sbest attemptat replicatingeternallaw in the temporalsphere).
Just war's antecedentscan be located long before the writings of Augustine or
Aquinason the subject;for example,Platoextensivelydiscusses the rulesof warin The
Republic(Plato 1974), and Hebrewteachingsappearin the Old Testamentcalling for
limits to destructionand violence in the conquestof Canaan(Deut. 2), grieving over
violence and offering appealsto the God, who can bringwarto an end anddestroyits
implementsin the Psalms (Ps. 46, 120), andcondemningatrocitiesin war(Amos 1-2).
Nonetheless, it is these two classical theologians and the common theme that binds
them-that humanity,thoughfallen, is nonethelessworthpreservingthroughhuman-
kind'sbest attemptsto establishandmaintainpeace andorderaccordingto the dictates
of the divine and eternallaw-that serve to frameJWT in the modernmindset.
The theoryof thejust warthatemergedfromthis traditionandwas refinedandclar-
ified throughoutthe centuriesis actuallyof two parts,a deliberationover the initiation
of war (jus ad bellum)and a set of questionsover properconductin war(jus in bello),
the formerof which is the focus of this research.6Thejus ad bellumlaw is an attemptto
set cautiouslimitationson the initiationof militaryactionto ensurethatit retainsajust
character(Phillips 1984). As Johnson(1999, 27) economicallystates,it is "howtojus-
tify a resort to war,"whereas O'Brien (1979) calls it simply a war-decision law.
Althoughcriticshave chargedJWTwith being purposefullyunderspecified(pointing
to cases of historicalmisapplicationby religious authoritiesto justify militarycam-
paigns as evidence of its selectivity), the law as formulatedis crucial for addressing
Kantianconcernsover the pursuitof liberalgoals throughilliberalactions.7
The five mainprinciplesdelineatingajust warin accordancewith thejus ad bellum
test are

1. presenceof justcause,
2. presenceof competentauthority to act,
3. rightintentionin action,
4. reasonablehopeof success,and
5. overallproportionalityof good(inendsdesired).8

Possessing just cause is the first and arguablymost importantcondition of jus ad

bellum,becauseits presenceis wholly fundamentalto furtherdeliberationoverthe use
of force. Johnson(1999) states thatthe first threeprinciplesare predominantboth in
the developmentof the theoryandin its historicalapplication;this is borneout in con-
sultingotherscholarshipon the subject(see especially O'Brien 1979;Phillips 1984).

6. Althoughthe intentof this studydirectsthe analysisto the questionsofjus ad bellum,the impactof

jus in bello on the prosecutionof moder warandthe evolutionof internationallegal conventionsgoverning
its conduct should not be overlooked.
7. Although thejus ad bellum has almost certainlybeen misused over its long history,this hardly
negates the viability of the law as a precautionaryframeworkfor moralchoices about war.
8. Two otherimportantjustwarcriteriaexist; however,discrimination(limitingharmto civilians and
noncombatants)andproportionalityof means(force used in combat)are mainlyjus in bello principlesand,
hence, are outside the boundsof this discussion.
 Butler/U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN CRISIS,1945-1994 233

The most common criteriadefining the rightto resortto force for the primaryjust
warprincipleof just cause are (a) defense of the innocentagainstwrongfulattack;(b)
reclamationof persons,property,or otherthingsof valuethatwere wronglytaken;and
(c) punishmentof fundamentally"evil"acts againsthumanity.In the case of compe-
tent authority,the lone criterionis thatmilitaryactionmustbe clearly sanctionedby a
duly authorizedrepresentativeof some sovereignpolitical authority.9Right intention
has two definitions,each with associatedcriteria;in its negativeconnotation,it refers
to militaryaction markedby the absenceof (a) territorialacquisition;(b) intimidation
or coercion;or (c) cruelty,hate,or vengeance.In its positive connotation,it consists of
militaryaction possessing eitherpeacekeepingor justice-buildingefforts.

RECENT APPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF JUST WAR THEORY

Possibly the definitivetreatmentof JWTduringthe cold war era was the NCCB's
(1983) pastoralletter The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,
which simultaneouslyelucidatedboththe principlesandpremisesof thejust wartradi-
tion within the RomanCatholicChurchand the currencyof its applicationto moder
methodsof war,especially (butnot exclusively) of the nuclearvariety.Throughoutthe
text,the mainconcernof TheChallengeof Peace is the expositionof whatit statesto be
transcendentanduniversalmoralprinciplesconcerningwarandpeace thatemphasize
the intrinsicdignityandvalueof all humanlife andthe extensiveapplicabilityof codes
providingfor the ethical conductof warfare(i.e., thejust warprinciples)for civil and
religiousleadersalike in protectingthatdignityandvalue.The letteraffirmsthe appli-
cabilityof JWTfor modernity,contendingthatthe objectsas well as the methodsof its
precautionremainvalid sources of concernregardlessof evolutionarydevelopments
in war making or the internationalsystem. Moreover,the letter exhorts those con-
cernedwith curbingthe savageryof warto "lookat the worldas it is, not simply as we
would want it to be" (p. 22). In this, the letter'sauthorscontend,thejust wartradition
offers its practitionersnot only a set of principlesto objectively examine and guide
theirown decisions andconductin the prosecutionof warbutalso providesthem with
the necessaryspace for the objectiveexaminationof the conductof otherinvolvedpar-
ties and of the context and dynamics of the situation itself. Although one's moral
agency is restrictedin terms of goal selection-one's inalienable obligation is to
defend peace againstaggression at every turn-it is unleashedwith respectto moral
deliberationoverthe appropriatemeansfor attainingthis goal-means thatclearlycan
takethe shapeof ajust warif the appropriateconditionsfor embarkingon such a cam-
paign entail.
In concertwith the NCCB pastoralletter,JWThas been appliedto the questionsof
moder warfareand statecraftin works by O'Brien, Johnson,and Phillips as well as
PaulRamsey(1968) andMichaelWalzer(1977). Althougheach of these explorations
in JWTis markedby particulardifferencesof opinion over implementationquestions

9. Heateddebateover whetherthis sovereignpoliticalauthoritycan be foundin a nonstateactor(that

is, an intergovernmentalorganization[IGO] or a regional governmentalorganization[RGO]) exists; for
analyticalpurposesdescribedbelow, I will assume that it can.
234 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

(which,for the most part,areoutsidethe scope of this study),'?all sharethe notionthat

JWTis a synthesisof bothidealistandrealistconceptionsof the utilityof war,confirm-
ing thathistoricalandpresent-dayrealitiesdisplayevidence of JWTin statecraft,mili-
tary strategy,and internationallaw."
The key point at which JWT divergesfrom the threecustomaryanalyticalframe-
works noted previously is in its distinctivelyactor-orientedapproach.By testing for
the applicationof thejus ad bellum decision rule and its three main principles-just
cause, competentauthority,and right intention-in U.S. interventionin the cold war
era, what is soughtis the advancementof a contextuallysensitive means of assessing
how the United Stateshas conceived of the acceptablecosts andproperends of inter-
vention,especially in the face of perceivedinjustice.Insteadof analyzingintervention
cases basedon theiradherenceto a hegemonic,structuralrealist,or ideological ortho-
doxy, the particularandpeculiardynamicsof each interventioncan be examinedtheo-
retically on their own merits, openly acknowledgingas Johnson (1999, 2) does that
"themoralquestionsposed by war change by war and by form of war."

RESEARCH DESIGN

STUDY OBJECTIVES

This researchsystematicallytests for the presenceof just warthinkingin U.S. inter-

ventionpolicy by measuringa set of conditionalvariablesin a crisis approximatingthe
threemain precepts-just cause, competentauthority,and rightintention-of thejus
ad bellumlaw of just wartheory.Thesejust warvariablesassess whetherand to what
extent-by theirpresenceor absence-U.S. decisions to intervenewith some measure
of militaryforce were impactedby just war considerations.These variablesare also
contrastedwith a set of control variablesrepresentingthe three explanatoryframe-
worksoutlinedabove(regionalhegemony,structuralrealism,andideologicalconflict)
to test the impactof these frameworksagainstthe impactofjus ad bellum.The three
hypothesesbelow addressthe influence of variouselements of JWT and contending
frameworkson U.S. cold war era interventions.

Hypothesis 1: The probability of the United States employing military force in a cold war era
interventionwill increaseif oneormoreof thethreemajorprinciples
ofjus ad bellumis
evidentin a crisis.

This hypothesis arises directly from the assumption,explained above, that JWT,in
general,andthejus ad bellumlaw,in particular,providefor greateragency in decision
makingaboutintervention.As stated,it presupposestwo interestingphenomenaabout
10. These questionsof implementationconcern,particularly,preemptivefirst strikes,involvementin
wars of nationalliberationor secessionist movements,and the role of nonstatebodies in prosecutinga just
war.
11. Walzer(1977) providesdetailedcase studies throughouthistoryup to and includingpresent-day
conflicts to illustrateJWT in practice.
 Butler /U.S. MILITARY IN CRISIS,1945-1994
INTERVENTION 235

U.S. decision making duringthe cold war era. The first is that U.S. decision makers
were stronglyinclined if not predisposedto select the militaryoption when interven-
ing as a third party.If, as shown above, the jus ad bellum decision rules provide a
greaterrole bothfor agency in decision makingandfor finerdistinctionson ethicaland
political grounds,andyet the probabilityof interventionstill increases,it may reason-
ably be inferredthat U.S. interventionpolicy, in a sense, favoredthe militaryoption.
The second is that U.S. decision making about interventionwith militaryforce was
stronglyinfluencedby considerationsofjustice-either the promotionof justice or the
correctionof injustice. If militaryinterventionhas a higher probabilityof being the
policy instrumentof choice whenjust warvariablesarepresent,at the least one can in-
fer thatjustice was a key componentof cold war era decision makingaboutinterven-
tion. (One might also infer thatU.S. decision makersbelieved thatinjusticedeserved
to be correctedwith force, or thatthey felt thatinjusticewas a compellingrationaledo-
mestically,althoughneitherof these far-reachinginferencesis testablein the models
presentedbelow.)

2: Theprobability
Hyphothesis of theUnitedStatesemployingmilitaryforcein a coldwar
is mostaffectedby theevidenceof thejustcauseprinciplesof jus ad
eraintervention
bellumin a crisis.

This hypothesis is intendedto addresswhetherU.S. militaryinterventionin the cold

warera,if influencedbyjust warconsiderationsat all, was most stronglyinfluencedby
thejust cause principle.Froma purelyspeculativestandpoint,thejust cause principle
and its majordefining criteria-defense againstwrongfulattack,reclamationof per-
sons or propertywrongfullytaken, and punishmentof inherentlyevil deeds-would
appearto have greater and more immediate resonance within U.S. foreign policy
decision-makingcircles. Also testedhere is the implicitassumptionthatthe othertwo
principles-the presenceof competentauthorityandan assuredlyrightintention-are
of less importanceto decision makerscontemplatingmilitaryintervention.In a sense,
hypothesis2 reflects an attemptto measurenot only the explanatory"fit"of thejus ad
bellumbutto identify which componentof thatlaw is the most compelling in U.S. de-
cisions to militarilyintervenein a cold war era crisis.

Hypothesis3: The impactof the principlesofjus ad bellumon the probabilityof the United
Statesto employmilitaryforcein a coldwareraintervention is notsignificantly
affected
by regionalhegemony,structural realist,or ideologicalconflictconsiderations.

This hypothesis encompasses the possible influences of three other explanatory

frameworkson the strengthof jus ad belluminfluences on U.S. militaryintervention
decisions. First, it assertsthatjus ad bellumprinciples,should they apply,arejust as
likely to apply in the traditionalzones of U.S. dominance as in other regions. This
hypothesis should not be construedas an assertionthat U.S. policy was devoid of an
interestin retaininghegemonicinfluencein thatregion.Instead,it simply statesthatin
cases of U.S. interventionin whichjustice considerations(as reflectedin thejust war
variables)were strong,the likelihood of the United Statesto employ militaryforce in
thatconflict was neitherpositively nor negatively affected by geographicproximity;
236 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

that is, the justice componentstandson its own as a compelling rationale.Second, it

contendsthatU.S. decisions to militarilyintervenein a cold wareracrisis in which the
just war variableswere prominentwere not profoundlyshapedby the presence of a
strongU.S. political or militaryally as a crisis actor.This hypothesispresumesthatif
U.S. military interventionwere motivatedby a desire to promotejustice or correct
injustice, said motivationswould reflect a pure or absolute conception of justice or
injustice,withoutregardforwho was being transgressedagainst.Finally,this hypothe-
sis directlyconfrontsthe conventionalwisdomthatconflict with the Soviet Union over
its perceivedtotalitarianismwas anoverridingfactorin U.S. decision makingconcern-
ing third-partymilitary intervention. What the ideological conflict model really
assertsis thatU.S. militaryinterventionwas motivatedby a desireto check the spread
of "theevil empire"butoperatedonly in cases in which the Soviet Union itself was not
directly engaged in militarycombat.l2The most importantoutcome in this respect,
shouldthis hypothesisbe supportedin the analysis,is thatjustice considerationsalone
were seen as a sufficientlycompelling rationaleto supportU.S. militaryintervention
duringthecold warera,regardlessof whethersome ideologicalgainwithrespectto the
Soviet Union could be reaped.13
Whereashypotheses1 and2 test for the presenceofjus ad bellumprinciplesin gen-
eral and one principlein particular(respectively),whathypothesis3 attemptsis a test
of the strengthof thejus ad bellumlaw in variouscontexts-namely, the geographic,
structural,and ideological contextsof the dominantexplanatoryframeworksfor U.S.
military intervention.Although the structureof these three hypotheses betrays an
approachthat is admittedlybiased againstthe priorthreeframeworks(in that it tests
only the influenceof these frameworkson interventionsin which somejust war crite-
rion has also alreadybeen shown), this bias is entirelyconsistentwith the goal of this
researchto test the strengthof JWTas a fourthalternativeexplanatoryframework.For
the purposesof this inquiry,the criticalpointis whetherandhow the otherframeworks
interactwith JWT as embodied in thejus ad bellum principles,not how compelling
they mightbe on theirown or how JWTinteractswith them. Althoughthese would be
interestingquestionsfor a separateanalysis,theydivergefromthe generalrationalefor
incorporatingthe three alternativeframeworksin this research,namely, to examine
whether the partialand systemically driven explanationthese frameworksprovide
directly negates any explanatorypower found in the more actor-orientedJWT.14

12. This was because of an obvious reluctanceto provokea directshowdownthatcould lead to full-
scale, possibly nuclear,war.
13. It shouldbe stressedagainthatthis analysisdoes not allow testingfor the inversescenario;thatis, I
cannotaddressthe significantquestionof whetherideologically motivatedinterventionswere impactedone
way or anotherbyjustice considerationsin anyof the modelsI provide.Althoughleavingthis questionunan-
swered does not limit this analysis of JWT (as it pertainsto the strengthof ideologically orientedexplana-
tions), it remainsanalyticallyimportantnonetheless.
14. For similarreasons,the nullificationof any or all of the hypotheseswould proveas valid andvalu-
able as supportingthem.Findingthatthejus ad bellumlaw has not been importantin cold warmilitaryinter-
ventions;or thatjust cause is the least importantof the threeprinciples;or thatjustice considerationsarenot
resilientin the face of geographic,alliance,or ideological factorswouldbe at least as serviceablein general-
izing about the political and ethical deliberationsof decision makersconcerning militaryinterventionas
"proving"them.
 Butler/U.S.MILITARYINTERVENTIONIN 1945-1994 237
CRISIS,

METHODOLOGY

In this research,three distinctbut interrelatedanalyses are conducted:

Stagela: ananalysisof thepresence,absence,andrelativestrengthof thethreemainpre-

ceptsof thejusadbellumlaw,thatis,justcause,competent andrightintention.
authority,
StageIb: ananalysisof theabsolutestrengthof thejus ad bellumlawaloneto statistically
explainthelikelihoodwithwhichtheUnitedStatesembarked ontheuseof militaryforce
in aninternationalcrisis.
Stage2: ananalysisof thestrengthof thejusadbellumlawto statisticallyexplainthelikeli-
hoodwithwhichtheUnitedStatesembarked on theuse of militaryforcein aninterna-
of thethreeotherexplanatory
tionalcrisison introduction frameworks advancedabove
(regionalhegemony,structural realism,andideologicalconflict).

To conductthese analyses in a coherentfashion, a binomiallogistic regressionmodel

is employed, based on existing and modified variablesfrom the InternationalCrisis
Behavior(system level) (ICB-1) data set compiled by Michael Brecherand Jonathan
Wilkenfeld(2000). One hundredseventy-onecases of U.S. intervention(rangingfrom
diplomaticstatementsto deploymentof U.S. groundforces) were selected for inclu-
sion in the analysis. Cases in which the United States was not involvedat all were ex-
cluded, as the focus of this analysis is the selection of the militaryoption when inter-
vening. Case selections were basedon the following criteria,consistentwith the focus
of this studyon U.S. interventionsin the cold warera (1945-1994) andthe concept of
third-partyinterventionas defined above:15

1. anyU.S. involvement ormilitary),

(lowlevel,covert/semimilitary,
2. intervention directthreat(onlyverbalandeco-
targetstatemustbe subjectto significant
nomicthreatswereexcluded),and
3. crisisdidnotfeaturetheUnitedStatesasinitialdirectcrisisactor(therebyexcludingthe
KoreanConflict,the VietnamWar,and"hot"cold warcases suchas standoffsover
Berlin,theBayof Pigs,andtheCubanMissileCrisis).

This lattercriteriondeservesfullerexplanation.In treatingthis studyas an analysisof

U.S. third-partymilitaryinterventions,it was necessary to include only those crises
thatwere not a directandimmediatethreatto U.S. existence or nationalsecurityand/or
were not precipitatedby U.S. action.16

15. This case selection criteriaadmittedlyexposes the researchto a potentialcase selection problem;
namely,if internationallegal or moralimperativesare, in fact, active in the cases selected, it could be those
factorsthatdictatethe U.S. involvement(or noninvolvement)and, by extension, the U.S. militaryinvolve-
ment (or nonmilitaryinvolvement).This can be overcome by recalling that the actualdependentvariable
being considered here is whetherthe United States used militaryforce in any cases in which it became
involved(an agency question),not whatexternalconsiderationsmay have precipitatedU.S. involvementin
the first place or a particulartype of U.S. involvement(a structurequestion).
16. To illustrate,U.S. involvement in Laos prior to full-scale U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia
(PathetLao Offensive, case 180), or in Cambodiaafter disengagementfrom that theatre(Mayaguez,case
259), were acceptedundermy criteria,but intrawarcrises occurringduringthatfull-scale involvement(Tet
Offensive,case 225) were rejected.Intrawar,protractedcrises (such as the series of Arab-Israeliconflicts in
the Middle East) were fully eligible for inclusion,providedthe United Statesplayed some third-partyinter-
ventionistrole andtherewas a significantthreatto one or moretargetstates.The eligibility of all cases of cri-
sis includedin this analysis was determinedin a multistageprocess based initially on the empiricalcharac-
terizationsby Brecherand Wilkenfeld (2000) included within the InternationalConflict Behavior (ICB)
238 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

The dependentvariablethroughoutthe analysisis y = the level of militarycommit-

ment by the United States in a crisis intervention.A dichotomousscale was used to
measurethe level of militaryforce utilizedby the UnitedStatesas a thirdpartyin a cri-
sis intervention,with the resultingdependentvariablemilitary,for which 0 = no mili-
taryinterventionand 1 = militaryintervention.These classificationsare based on the
ICB values for U.S. involvement(USINV); 0, or the nonmilitaryvalue, consists of a
recodingof ICB value2 (low-level U.S. activity),whereas1, or the militaryvalue,con-
sists of collapsingICB values3 (U.S. covertor semimilitaryactivity)and4 (U.S. direct
militaryactivity) in accordancewith my earlier,necessarilybroaddefinitionof mili-
tary interventiongearedtowardelucidatingthe decision to rule out or commit to the
use of militaryforce.17Given the analyticalfocus on drawinga dichotomousdistinc-
tion betweenthe use or nonuseof militaryforce in interventioncases (thatis, some or
any militaryforce contrastedwith none at all), this researchemploys a binomiallogis-
tic (probabilistic)regressionmodel.
To test for the strengthof the jus ad bellum law of JWT in U.S. decision making
aboutmilitaryinterventionin cases in which the UnitedStatesdid carryout some form
of interventionin all three stages of my analysis, a numberof independentvariables
approximatingseveralof the main tenets of JWTwere identified.A small numberof
these independentvariableswere new introductionsinto the ICB dataset; manywere
createdas compositesof existing ICB variables;in some cases, currentlyexisting ICB
variableswere utilized directly.'8The utility of these just war variableslies in their
ability to allow inferences to be drawn(from their presence or absence and relative
strength)aboutthe applicationof the threeprinciplesof thejus ad bellumandthejust
war model in U.S. militaryinterventiondecision makingin empiricalcases. For pur-
poses of clarification,the termtargetstate is used to referto the countryin which the
United States intervened(not necessarily on behalf of); the term triggering state or
triggeringentityrefersto the generallyacceptedinitiatorof the crisis (as basedon ICB
coding and case summaries);and the term crisis actor, in accord with Brecherand
Wilkenfeld's (2000) definition, refers to states feeling all three elements of crisis
(threatto basic values,finite time for decisions, andan increasein warlikelihood).For
ease of interpretation,the variablesarelisted andexplainedunderthe threemainprin-
ciples of thejus ad bellumlaw in an appendixto this article,as is a listing of the cases
includedin this analysis(these appendicesareavailableon theJournalof ConflictRes-
olution Web site at http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdta.htm). They are also repre-
sented here in Figures 1 and 2, graphicaldepictionsof the analyticalapproach.

data set and then corroboratedusing crisis summariesprovided by Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) and
Tillema (1991).
17. Cases with an ICB value of 1 (U.S. not active) were droppedfromthis analysispermy earliercase
selection criteria.
18. To controlfor potentialbias in coding the five new independentvariablesintroducedin this analy-
sis, an independentcoderwas utilized.The intercodercorrelationresultsfor all five variableswas .872. With
one exception(x 10 = targetstateauthority)intercoderreliabilitycorrelationresultswere greaterthan.9. The
correlationscore for xlO was .56, a lower figure probably best explained by the inherent subjectivity
involvedin determiningprecisely whatembodiesconveyanceof authorityto intervenein a conflict by a cri-
sis actor.The author'stendencywas towardthe conservative,coding in the affirmativeonly cases in which
directdiplomaticappealshave been documentedin the case summariesor supplementaryhistoricalmateri-
als consulted.
 STAGE la
(Component)

7
\^ * STA
(Exp

|*

Figure 1: Stage 1-Component and Explanatory Power of Jus ad Bellum Law

Figure 2: Stage 2-Explanatory Power of Jus ad Bellum Law with Controls Induced
 Butler/ U.S. MILITARY IN CRISIS,1945-1994
INTERVENTION 241

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A two-tieredmodel was used in this analysis, correspondingto the multiplestages

of analysisoutlinedin the hypothesesabove. An initiallogit model was used to assess
thepredictivepowerof each of the threejusad bellumprecepts(addressinghypotheses
1 and 2); introducingall independentvariablesalso allowed for the evaluationof the
generalexplanatorystrengthof thejus ad bellumlaw (also addressinghypothesis1). In
a second meta-model, control variablesreflecting the main competing frameworks
(regionalhegemony,structuralrealism,ideological conflict) were introducedas well
to gauge their effects on the explanatorypower of thejust war variables(addressing
hypothesis3). To check for multicollinearity,a seriesof bivariatecorrelationswas cal-
culated for the independentvariables, including the controls, with no evidence of
multicollinearityusing r = .7 as a benchmark.
The resultsof the logistic regressionanalysis testingthe relativeand total strength
of thejus ad bellumpreceptsin explainingU.S. militaryinterventiondecisions arepre-
sentedin Table1. It wouldappearthatthe tier 1 model approximatingthe mainjust war
criteriahangs closely with empiricalcases of U.S. interventionsin the cold war era.
The just cause variablesof power discrepancybetween triggerand target,U.S. prop-
erty or personsseized, andcivil authoritarian/military regimecrisis actorareall statis-
of or
tically significantat a fairly robustlevel .05 greater.'9The involvementof a civil
authoritarian/military regime in the crisis was the most statisticallysignificantof all
just cause variablesin the tier 1 model, with the existence of a moderateto high power
imbalancebetween the crisis actortriggeringthe crisis andthe targetstatealso highly
significant. Assessing the associated coefficients of the statistically significantjust
cause variablesshows an increasein the probableodds of a U.S. militaryintervention
associatedwith an increasein anyof these variables.The most dramaticincreasein the
probableodds of militaryinterventionassociated with any just cause variableis the
seizureof Americanpropertyor persons.As the resultsof this analysis show, the pre-
dicted odds of a U.S. militaryinterventionoccurringare increasedby an astounding
factor of 27 in the event that U.S. persons or propertyare seized in a crisis. The just
cause variablewith the next greatestimpactis thatindicatingthe involvementof a pro-
foundly nondemocraticregime as a crisis actor,a factor that increases the odds of a
U.S. militarycommitmentby a factorof roughly 5 (5.14).
Among the competentauthorityvariables,the authorizationof a targetstate(target
state authority)as well as thatof a global organization(global organizationauthority)
were each moderatelysignificant(atthe .1 level), althoughglobal organizationauthor-
ity is associatedwith a negativeimpacton the estimatedodds of U.S. militaryinterven-
tion. In a reaffirmingboost to sovereigntyas an internationallegal principle,the odds
of the UnitedStatesmilitarilyinterveningin an ongoing crisis areimprovedby a factor
of nearly 2 (1.99) if an authorizationto intervenein the crisis is made by the target
state. Along the right intentiondimension of the analysis, U.S. pace of abatement-

19. Given thatthe hypothesesas formulatedare directionalin nature,in exploringthe possibility that
U.S. militaryinterventionin a crisis will increasewith the presenceof just warconditionsin thatcrisis, sig-
nificance levels are based on a one-tailed test.
242 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

TABLE 1
Impact of Major Just War Precepts on
U.S. Military Intervention Decisions, 1945-1994

Coefficient Significance Odds Ratio

Direct violent crisis trigger 0.833 .058* 2.30

Power discrepancybetween trigger/target 1.261 .008*** 3.53
Triggeringentity nonstateactor 1.271 .412 3.57
Triggeringentity state actor 0.581 .707 1.79
Territoryseized 0.797 .075* 2.22
U.S. propertyor persons seized 3.313 .012** 27.46
Gravityof threatfrom triggerto target -0.616 .283 0.54
Civil authoritarian/military regime crisis actor 1.637 .005*** 5.14
Global organizationauthoritypresent -0.974 .080* 0.38
Regional organizationauthoritypresent 1.020 .101 2.77
Targetstate authoritypresent 0.688 .099* 1.99
U.S. contributionto pace of abatement 1.284 .002*** 3.61
Formalityof outcome -0.684 .122 0.51

n= 171
PseudoR2 = .412

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

TABLE2
Impact of Major Just War Precepts on
U.S. Military Intervention Decisions (controls introduced)

Coefficient Significance Odds Ratio

Direct violent crisis trigger 1.101 .025** 3.00

Power discrepancybetween trigger/target 1.413 .009*** 4.11
Triggeringentity nonstateactor 0.867 .606 2.38
Triggeringentity state actor 0.075 .964 1.08
Territoryseized 0.819 .092* 2.27
U.S. propertyor persons seized 3.746 .008*** 42.37
Gravityof threatfrom triggerto target -1.492 .023** 0.23
Civil authoritarian/military regime crisis actor 2.270 .001*** 9.68
Global organizationauthoritypresent -1.505 .017** 0.22
Regional organizationauthoritypresent 1.698 .016** 5.46
Targetstate authoritypresent 0.888 .062** 2.43
U.S. contributionto pace of abatement 1.201 .009*** 3.32
Formalityof outcome -1.043 .033** 0.35
Geographiclocation of crisis 0.298 .684 1.35
U.S. ally involved crisis actor 0.835 .012** 2.31
USSR involved crisis actor 1.255 .013** 3.51

n= 171
Pseudo R2 = .510

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

 Butler/ U.S. MILITARY IN CRISIS,1945-1994
INTERVENTION 243

thatis, an overarchingobjectiveto deescalatethe crisis-was a statisticallysignificant

predictorof American decisions to intervene with military force at the .01 level,
increasingthe probableodds of militaryinterventionby more than 32 times.
The resultsof the tier 1 model demonstratea generalresonancefor all threeof the
jus ad bellum precepts within American decision making about the use of force in
third-partyinterventiondecisions, although, for the most part, perceptions of the
unjustnatureof the cause of the conflict in questiontrumpthe authorityand intention
elements of the decision law. Notable exceptions are cases in which authorizationis
providedby the nation-statetargetedfor aggression (essentially an appeal for assis-
tance)or cases in which the interventionis interpretedas havingthe objectiveof bring-
ing about a speedy end to an ongoing crisis. The latterexception is associated with
higher probableodds of interventionthan several of the statisticallysignificantjust
cause variables.
These findingsconfirmbothhypotheses 1 and 2, althoughfurtherclarificationis in
order.The case could be made thatthe only "hard"justice-basedconsiderationsthat
achievedsignificancein the tier 1 model were those measuringthe powerdiscrepancy
between crisis triggerandcrisis target,the involvementof an authoritarianregimein a
crisis, and the presence of authorizationfrom the crisis target state. For example,
although the variablewith the most profoundimpact on the predictedodds of U.S.
applicationof militaryforce to a crisis is (perhapsunsurprisingly)the seizureof Amer-
ican propertyor persons, there is reason to speculatethat the statisticallysignificant
role of this crisis variablemay be derived in part from traditionallyrealist (that is,
material)conceptionsof nationalinterestratherthana purelyjustice-basedrationale.
In sum, however,the presence of a distinctive,if inconsistent,strainof moralizingin
U.S. militaryinterventiondecision makingseems evidentfrom the tier 1 results.This
is particularlytruewith respectto the involvementin a crisis of a distasteful(fromthe
U.S. perspective)regimetype, to the presenceof an appealfor help (possibly survival)
from a state transgressedupon by anotherstate, and to the existence of a large power
imbalancebetween aggressorand aggressed.
Generally speaking, the results of the tier 1 model also demonstratethat an ade-
quatejustifying cause for militaryinterventionis a more robustfactorthanotherjus-
tice considerationssuch as legitimatingauthorityor rightintentionin makingdetermi-
nationsaboutan intervention,addingadditional(thoughweak) supportto hypothesis1
but strongconfirmationto hypothesis2. Only one of the variablesdepictingthe other
two main preceptsof the jus ad bellum decision rule was statisticallysignificantat a
.05 level or betterandhad a positive impacton the estimatedodds of militaryinterven-
tion (pace of abatement).Anothernotable finding was the nearly significantp value
and sizeable odds ratio (2.77) associated with regional authorizationfor American
militarydecision making,althoughthis resultmay be somewhatmisleadinggiven the
weak position of regional governmentalorganizations(RGOs) relativeto the super-
powersduringthe cold war.It is entirelyconceivablethatthe relativelyhigh loadingof
RGO authorizationto U.S. decisions to employ the militaryoption may just reflect
RGOs serving as a post hoc "rubberstamp"for Americandesires for engagementin
244 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

zones of conflict.20The high statisticalsignificanceof U.S. pace of abatementon the

rightintentiondimension,however,is a strongindicatorof the presenceof thisjus ad
bellum precept. The finding that the presence of an overarchingU.S. interest in
deescalatingthe crisis positively impactedthe predictedodds of pursuinga military
approachseems a clearempiricalexampleof the linkageof "might"and"right"in U.S.
foreign policy decision making.
The significance and coherence of the jus ad bellum law of JWT cannot be con-
firmedwithoutanalyzingit in the light of the competingexplanatoryframeworksdis-
cussed at length above. Accordingly,the resultsof the logistic regressionanalysis of
thejus ad bellummeta-model,controllingfor the presence of variablesrepresenting
the threecompetingexplanatoryframeworks,are presentedin Table2. The most tell-
ing aspectof the introductionof these controlsis the degreeof consistencyin statistical
significancefromtheearlierstageanalysis.Witha few minorexceptions,the variables
thatachievedstatisticalsignificancein tier 1retainedandin fact increasedtheirsignifi-
cance in tier 2.
A notabledevelopmentin the tier 2 analysisis the uniformelevationof the compe-
tent authorityvariablesin statisticalsignificancewith the introductionof the control
variables,indicatingthe rise in relative importanceof the presence of legitimizing
competentauthorityfor U.S. militaryinterventiondecisions when regional,andespe-
cially alliance and ideological, considerationswere in evidence. The presence of
authorizationfromthe state-basedauthoritytargetedin the initialattackretainssignif-
icance across both models, supportingboth the notion of sovereigntyas a legitimate
sourceof authorizationfor interventionunderexisting normsof internationallaw and
the possibility that U.S. military interventiondecisions may be at least partially
informedby thejust warcriteria.The magnifiedimportanceof a third-partylegitimiz-
ing force for Americanmilitaryinterventiondecisions in the form of regionalorgani-
zationswith the controlvariablesintroducedappearsconsistentwith criticalinterpre-
tations that U.S. interferencein the political organizationand processes of regional
governingbodies duringthe cold warwas substantial.The high statisticalsignificance
of this variable,its highly positive (5.46) impacton the odds of U.S. militaryinterven-
tion occurring,and that the regionalauthorityin question in the majorityof cases in
this analysiswas the Organizationof AmericanStates (OAS) provideat least a modi-
cum of supportfor the RGOs-as-rubber-stamp thesis-although such a conclusion
would be dangerouslypreliminarywithouta more directanalysis targetingthatques-
tion specifically.
The resultshere also suggest supportfor the interpretationthatAmericaninterven-
ion decisions sought to strike a complex balance in decisions concerning military
intervention.The tier2 model indicatesthatthe UnitedStatessimultaneouslyassumed
the role of ideological warriorand "championof the free world" (as shown in the
strongsignificanceof USSR involvementand U.S. ally involvement)while also rely-
ing on a measureof multilateralismto mutethe impactandriskof directandhigh-level
20. This interpretationis partiallyconfirmedby the negative coefficient associated with the global
organizationvariable,approximatingthe notablyindependentandless captiveUnitedNationsorganization.
 Butler/ U.S. MILITARY IN CRISIS,1945-1994
INTERVENTION 245

tensionwith the Soviets. This complex balancemightbe best explainedas an embodi-

ment of the concept of Putnam's"two-level game" (1988) within the frameworkof
U.S. militaryinterventiondecision making. The prosecutionof the ideological con-
flict can be interpretedin the main as a vehicle for mobilizing domestic support,
whereasthe pursuitof competentauthoritymightbe best understoodto be the interna-
tional side of the two-level bargainingcoin.
The result that two of the three controls-U.S. ally involved actor and USSR
involved actor-were highly statisticallysignificantconfirmsin partthe utility of the
structuralrealistandideological frameworksas importantcontributionsin the studyof
U.S. militaryinterventiondecision making.Geographiclocation(as an approximation
of regionalhegemony)was, statisticallyspeaking,a nonfactor,perhapsillustratingthe
decline of regionalconsiderationsas a strongcompelling influence in Americanmili-
taryinterventionsin the post-WorldWarII era.21Inarguably,the 12jus ad bellumvari-
ables were significantlyaffected by the introductionof these threecontrol variables,
which, takentogether,provideenoughevidence to rejecthypothesis3. In fact, approx-
imating these alternativeexplanatoryframeworkswith more (and more comprehen-
sive) variableswould likely impactthe justice variablesto an even greaterextent and
should be a goal for futureresearch.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings of this research,as might be expected, signal a clear need for further
investigationof U.S. interventiondecision-makingprocessesandrationales.Hypothe-
ses relatingto therelevanceof thejus ad bellumlaw in U.S. decisions to intervenemili-
tarilyduringthe cold war era, as well as the primacyof the just cause preceptof that
law,were statisticallyconfirmed.However,the law's influenceon theprobableodds of
undertakinga militaryinterventionduring that period was dramaticallyrecast after
this main decision law of JWTwas placed in a contextualsetting.The resultwas nei-
therthe triumphof JWTin explainingU.S. interventiondecisions nor its repudiation.
The same can be said for the alternativesystemic frameworks,pervasivewithinthe lit-
erature,which were tested againstthejus ad bellumlaw and also found to be farfrom
definitivein termsof the level of explanationthey provide.Perhapsit is this muddled
resultthatis the ultimatelesson of this analysis;it serves as confirmationof the earlier
assertionthat actor-leveldeliberationsshould not be wholly ignored in constructing
interpretationsof why the United States decides to intervene with force when and
where it does.
Buildingon the findingsof this study,threebroadareasemergethatseem to provide
promisinggroundfor futureresearch.First,as has only begun to be outlinedhere, the
interactiveeffects of actor-levelethical and moral deliberationswith realist concep-
tions of an interest-basedforeignpolicy on decisions to intervenemilitarilyin an inter-
national crisis are complex and demand a much more robust treatmentthan I have

21. Althoughalmostcertainlyregionalconsiderationswould haveachievedsignificancein an analysis

of 19th-and early-20th-centuryU.S. interventions.
246 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

afforded.Many questions demandingattentionarise from the finding here thatreac-

tions to apparentinjustice in the internationalsphere by Americandecision makers
have been highly contextuallyconditioned.DeterminingwhetherAmericaninterven-
tion policy is typifiedby a cognitive overlapof universalnormsand nationalinterest,
or conversely thatjust war rhetoricis simply being used as a purposefullyopaque
shield for the pursuitof realpolitik,is a questionthatdeserves furthertreatment.
Admittedlyunderrepresented in this analysiswere the competentauthorityprecept
andthe alternative(control)frameworks.Fora moreaccurateassessmentof these fac-
tors, more and bettermeasuresmust be found to describethem. A conceptualmatter
thatrequiresattentionis the contingentnatureof the rightintentionpreceptof thejus
ad bellumin contrastto just cause andcompetentauthority.Althoughpossibly a func-
tion of the shortcomingsof the author,rightintentionwas difficultto reconcile in the
analysis because it seemed to describe the conduct of, ratherthan resortto, military
action. This is likely to be a methodologicaland conceptualproblemfor any inquiry
into militarydecision making.
The thirdareathatdemandsfurtherattentionis the relationshipof Americancon-
ceptionsof justice pertinentto decisions aboutthe use of force in a conflict with those
held by othernation-statesandorgansof regionalandglobal governance.In acknowl-
edging the existence of some degree of influence of JWT on U.S. decision making
aboutintervention,it wouldclearlybe helpfulto contrastthe threemainpreceptsofjus
ad bellumwith ethical and deliberativeframeworksaboutthe resortto, and prosecu-
tion of, warheld by otherstatesand nonstateactorswithjurisdictionalauthority.This
richertheoreticalbackgroundwouldgreatlycontributeto furtherempiricalanalysesof
unilateralU.S. interventionsandto analysesthatassess the goals, missions, successes,
andfailuresof multilateralinterventionsfor peacekeepingandhumanitarianpurposes.

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