GEORGIA CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW UNDER A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

SUBMITTED TO:
MD.TOUHIDUL ISLAM
LECTURER
DEPT .OF PEACE AND CONFLICT
STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF DHAKA.

Prepared By:
HABIBUR RAHAMAN
SAHIDUZZAMAN SOHEL
FATEMA ALOM SUROVEE
SALMA SONIA
SANJIDA SHARMIN
ANAMUL HAQUE
A.M MONIRUDDIN
MAZEDUR RAHMAN
Date :03.05.2010
Sl.no Contents Page no.
1 Introduction
2 Geographical location of Georgia:
3 Georgia conflict
3.1 Background information: history of conflict:
3.2 Major conflicts in Georgia:
3.3
The conflicts of independence, 1989–1993
3.4
The south Ossetia conflict The conflicts of independence, 1989–1993
3.5
The Abkhaz conflict
3.6
The Georgian civil war
3.7
2008 south Ossetia
4 Causes of conflict:
5 Different environmental issues facing Georgia.
6 An analysis of the Russia-Georgia conflict from a geopolitical point of view
6.1 A new geopolitical balance post-conflict
7 Analysis: energy pipeline that supplies west threatened by war Georgia conflict
8 The role of the Russian federation in the Abkhazia conflict
9 United states policy toward the Abkhaz conflict
10 Role of United States in Georgia
11 Analysis: why the Russia-Georgia conflict matters to the west
12 Russia-Georgia conflict: why both sides have valid points
12.1 What is Georgia’s view?
12.2
The separatists' case?
12.3
What is the Russian position?
13 Concern of European Union
14 Role of UN in Georgia conflict:
14.1 UN role in Georgia unclear as conflict is unresolved
15 Initiatives of civil society for Georgian peace
16 Analysis of Georgian conflict under a theoretical framework
17 Recommendations
18 Concluding remarks
19 References
Figures: content Page
1 Map of Georgia
2 Map of Georgia’s conflicting areas
3 chronology of Georgian conflict
4 Major conflicts in Georgia
5 Georgia vs. South Ossetia conflict at a glance:
6 Georgia vs. Abkhazia conflict at a glance:
7 Location of Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the Russian part of North
Caucasus
8 Georgia vs. South Ossetia or Georgia vs. Russia
9 major causes of Georgian conflict
10 Different environmental issues facing Georgia
11 A section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 30 miles south Tbilisi, Georgia, under
construction in 2003.
12 USA Military Assistance in Georgia
13 military aid to Georgia
14 A Framework for Conflict Analysis CR SIPABIO
Abstract:
The autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia added to the problems of Georgia's post-
Soviet governments. By 1993, separatist movements in those regions threatened to tear the
republic into several sections. Intimations of Russian interference in the ethnic crises also
complicated Georgia's relations with its giant neighbor. The intra-state conflict of Georgia is
highly considerable in international politics because of its geo-political situations. It is the only
conflict prone area which is situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe and Western Asia . The
conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal
role in the global energy market. Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is
a key transit point for oil from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.
Currently the Georgia-South Ossetia and Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts are stalemate. The South
Ossetians and Abkhazians still desire to break away from Georgia and establish their own state,
and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep the regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as parts of the state.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the conflicts in Georgia and it covers all the issues,
contexts, actors, level of strategic interests, implications of conflicts and the outcome of these
conflicts in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Firstly, this paper pays attention on the historical background of Georgian conflicts, Changing
pattern of the conflicts at different region in different periods, major conflicts, and the causes of
these conflicts. Secondly, the paper analyses Georgian conflict under a theoretical framework.
This paper also focuses on the geopolitical situation of Georgia , responses of the United States
in Georgian conflict, role of Russia, peace initiatives by the United Nations and the concern of the
European Union. Finally, this paper ends up with offering some recommendations.

Introduction:

The collapse of the Soviet Union generated instability throughout the Caucasus and rapidly undermined the
established political structures and economic practices. Long suppressed aspirations were unleashed and, more
than any other of the newly independent states that arose from the debris of the Soviet Union, Georgia became
the location of a series of violent conflicts. The conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have proved the most
intractable of these. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are two disputed regions in the Caucasus with de facto
independence[1] as the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, respectively. The two republics
each claim to be sovereign states deserving of full international recognition and recognize each other as
independent states. Georgia and the vast majority of other countries of the world, however, reject the legitimacy
of the two republics and consider both Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be occupied territory that, de jure,
remains part of GeorgiaThe autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia added to the problems of
Georgia's post-Soviet governments. By 1993 separatist movements in those regions threatened to tear the
republic into several sections. Intimations of Russian interference in the ethnic crises also complicated Georgia's
relations with its giant neighbor.

The basic domestic and international issues surrounding the conflicts are the South Ossetians' and Abkhazian
claim of unequal treatment under Georgian rule and subsequent demands for cultural, social, economic and
political protections as a minority group, Russia’s desire to punish Georgia for its increasingly pro-Western
political orientation, and outside concerns about the stability and accessibility of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline running partly through Georgia. However, at the conflict’s most basic level, it is a conflict over land
and territory. Georgia wants to maintain its territorial integrity and thus prevent the region of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia from seceding, while South Ossetia and Abkhazia want to establish independence.
Geographical location of Georgia:
Georgia is a sovereign state in the Caucasus region of Eurasia. Situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe and
Western Asia, it is bounded to the west by the Black Sea, to the north by Russia, to the south by Turkey and
Armenia, and to the east by Azerbaijan. Georgia covers a territory of 69,700 km² and its population is 4.385
million.

Figure 1 : Map of Georgia

Form of state: Georgia was an independent republic between 1918 and 1921, but in 1922 it was incorporated
into the Soviet Union, from which it declared its independence in April 1991. The Abkhazian and South
Ossetian autonomous territories, created in 1922, have both declared their independence from Georgia. Russia
recognized the independence of the two territories in August 2008. A new constitution was approved in Georgia
in August 1995, which reinforced the presidential-democratic form of government, providing for a strong
executive branch and a unicameral 235-seat parliament. A constitutional court met for the first time in late
1996. The constitution does not address the status of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but grants autonomous status
to Adjara, another separatist region until its reintegration in May 2004

Georgian conflict:

Figure2: Map of Georgia’s conflicting areas

Background information: history of conflict:
 Year Events

Late18th century Ossetia was incorporated into the Russian Empire and divided into northern and
southern regions

1918-1921 Georgian independence from Russian Empire

1921 Georgia was annexed by the Soviet Union

1922 South Ossetia was established as an autonomous region of the Soviet Republic of
Georgia

1989-1990 South Ossetia tried to gain independence from Georgia

April 1991 Georgia received independence

1991-1992 brutal clashes between South Ossetians and Georgians, 1,000 dead*

1992 The conflict involved a 13-month long Abkhazian war

1992 Ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia

1998 the conflict escalated once again in the Gali District in Abkhazia

2001, Around 400 Chechen fighters and 80 Georgian guerrillas appeared in the Kodori Valley
in extremely controversial conditions. The Chechen-Georgian paramilitaries advanced
as far as Sukhumi, but finally were repelled by Abkhaz and Gudauta based Russian
peacekeepers.

2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia

2004 fighting broke out in South Ossetia

2007 Georgia calls for internationalization of peacekeeping force in the region

2008 Georgia attacks Tskhinvali followed by a Russian counter-offensive.

Figure 3: chronology of Georgian conflict

Major conflicts in Georgia:

 Figure 4 : Major conflicts in Georgia
The conflicts of independence, 1989–1993
In Georgia, the easing of restrictions on expression and political organization in the late 1980s led to
spontaneous and large-scale nationalist demonstrations for greater autonomy and independence, which led to
independence in April 1991. Institutionalized legacies of Soviet nationalities policy, however, engendered bitter
ethnic tensions and political fragmentation, creating a climate of instability as non-Georgian populations
increasingly regarded Georgian aspirations as a precursor to more oppressive political control. Subsequently,
the Abkhazian ASSR and South Ossetia AO countered Georgian demands for independence with demands for
greater autonomy within the Soviet federal system. In this context, armed violence was not inevitable, but arose
due to the conjunction of two interrelated factors: the progressive militarization of politics, and the decision by
former Soviet military officers to intervene in the political rivalries. During 1991–94, two secessionist wars
were fought, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively, and in Georgia proper a civil war pitted supporters of
the first post-independence president against the actors who overthrew him.
The South Ossetian conflict

Duration The conflict began with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's and the
last conflict in 7-8 august in 2008.

Location The location of most of the fighting has been within the South Ossetian territory
itself.

Actor Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, North Ossetia

Type of Habitat The natural environment of Georgia and in particular, South Ossetia is
mountainous with a temperate climate.

Type of Conflict The conflict is civil in nature.

Level of Conflict It is an intrastate conflict and is currently at a low threat level. Between 1991 and
1992, the violence was more severe and last in 2008 conflict was high threat level.

Fatality Level of June 8, 1992 over 1,000 civilian and military deaths. During the violence in 2004,
Dispute (military and at least 22 people died. in 1991, causing thousands of casualties and creating tens
civilian fatalities) of thousands of refugees on both sides of the Georgian-Russian border.” In 2008,
Civilian casualties:South Ossetia: 162 according to Russia, 365 according to
South Ossetia.
Georgia: Georgian government says 228 civilians dead or missing.
One foreign civilian killed and 3 wounded.At least 158,000 civilians displaced.

Environment-Conflict The conflict has had a negative impact on the environment with issues of
Link and Dynamics: deforestation, soil degradation, and pollution from unmanaged hazardous waste
sites becoming a problem throughout Georgia and the South Ossetia region in
particular.

Level of Strategic The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is state v. sub-state. Therefore, the
Interest conflict is within one state; Georgia.
Outcome of Dispute: Currently the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict is a stalemate. The South Ossetians
still desire to break away from Georgia and establish their own state, and likewise,
Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep the region of South
Ossetia as a part of the state.

Figure 5: Georgia vs. South Ossetia conflict at a glance:

The Abkhaz conflict:

Georgia vs. Abkhazia conflict at a glance:

Type of conflict The Georgian–Abkhazian conflict refers to the ethnic conflict between
Georgians and Abkhazians in Abkhazia
Main actors of conflict Georgia and Abkhazia
Location Abkhazia in Georgia
Duration The conflict involved a 13-month long Abkhazian war, beginning in
August 1992, with Georgian government forces and militia made of ethnic
Georgians who lived in Abkhazia on one side and Russian-backed
separatist forces made of ethnic Abkhazians, Armenians and Russians who
also lived in Abkhazia on the other side

Level of conflict It is an intrastate conflict and is currently at a low threat levels

Level of strategic interest
Casualities
The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is state v. sub-state. Therefore,
the conflict is within one state; Georgia.
During the war, the Abkhaz separatist side carried out full scale ethnic
cleansing campaign which resulted in the expulsion of up to 250,000 ethnic
Georgians and more than 15,000 killed

Resumption of hostilities
In April–May, 1998, the conflict escalated once again in the Gali District.
A ceasefire was negotiated on May 20. The hostilities resulted in hundreds
of casualties from both sides and an additional 20,000 Georgian refugees.In
September 2001, around 400 Chechen fighters and 80 Georgian guerrillas
appeared in the Kodori Valley in extremely controversial conditions. On
August 10, 2008, the war in South Ossetia spread to Abkhazia.
Outcome of dispute Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia have remained tense after the
war. Georgia has moved to increase Abkhazia's isolation by imposing a sea
blockade of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian still desire to breakaway from
Georgia and establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to
retain its territorial integrity and keep the region of South Ossetia as a part
of the state.

Figure 6:Georgia vs. Abkhazia conflict at a glance:

The Georgian civil war

The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia took place in a context of civil war in Georgia proper. In contrast
to other former republics in the Soviet Union, the holding of free elections in 1990 plunged Georgia into a
protracted political crisis that eventually turned into armed violence in late 1991. The victory of the opposition
leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, over Communist Party incumbents in 1990 alienated large segments of the
fragmented opposition, as Gamsakhurdia denied them access to power. In an increasing climate of instability,
ethnic conflict, and uncertainty, Gamsakhurdia’s policies were considered by many to be adding to the troubles
of an already beleaguered transition. The failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev in Moscow, and
Gamsakhurdia’s alleged support of the military putschists, served as a pretext for his opponents to demand his
resignation.Between September and December 1991, massive street demonstrations gradually escalated into
violence and culminated in the attack on and seizure of Parliament House by armed paramilitary groups.
Following the routing of Gamsakhurdia, his followers (including a faction of the National Guard—one of the
main paramilitary groups—that did not defect to the opposition) redeployed to western Georgia, where they
waged an insurgency that lasted until late 1993. This fighting, which overlapped in complex ways with the
conflict in Abkhazia, led Eduard Shevardnadze (the Georgian head of state under the new government) to seek
Russian military assistance, culminating in the accession of Georgia to the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). In addition to thousands of casualties, the Georgian civil war also resulted in the political and
economic supremacy of Georgian paramilitary groups—thus completing the militarization of politics—until
1995 at the earliest.

2008 South Ossetia war or

Russia–Georgia War :

Figure 7: Location of Georgia

(including Abkhazia and South
Ossetia) and the Russian part of
North Caucasus
Actors Georgia vs. South Ossetia or Georgia vs. Russia
Date 7 August 2008 – 16 August 2008

Location South Ossetia, uncontested Georgia, Abkhazia

Result 1. Decisive Russian/South Ossetia/Abkhazian victory
2. Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent republics by Nicaragua, the Russian
Federation, Venezuela, and Nauru.
3. Expulsion of most ethnic Georgians from South
Ossetia and from the Kodori Gorge.

Territorial Georgia loses control over parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Changes Previously held.

Figure 8: Georgia vs. South Ossetia or Georgia vs. Russia

According to Human Rights Watch:“Violence has escalated in South Ossetia, a breakaway province of Georgia
and one of the ‘frozen conflicts’ of the former Soviet Union. The conflict heated up dramatically in the early
morning of August 8, 2008. Georgia declared that it intended to restore constitutional order and launched a
large-scale military offensive. Russia sent additional troops to South Ossetia, saying they were reinforcements
to Russian peacekeepers who are in the area to monitor a 1992 ceasefire between Georgian and South Ossetian
forces.(Human Rights' Watch. 2008. "Q & A: Violence in South Ossetia." August 15. (source :
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htm )

Causes of
conflict:

Figure 9: major causes of Georgian conflict

Grievances and Opportunities:

Almost 70 years of Soviet socialism has left a mixed legacy of substantial economic and social modernization coupled
with structural problems and grievances across the former USSR. These problems are particularly acute in Georgia due to
conflicts and civil war that marred its early years of independence and severe deterioration of the economy and social
conditions.

Ethnicity and Religion:

Georgia is a mosaic of ethnic and religious communities whose differences have been and can be manipulated by political
leaders. Ethnic and religious cleavages are created and malleable rather than primordial and unchangeable. But ethnic
groups provide a framework for the organization and aggregation of common interests and have been the public face of
two separatist conflicts in Georgia.

Economic Deterioration

A devastating decline in the Georgian economy has accompanied independence. Between 1990 and 1995, economic
output fell by more than 70 percent. Areas that were prosperous industrial bastions in Soviet times like Kvemo-Kartli, are
still reeling from the factory closures that left most of the local population out of work. Agriculture presents a similarly
dismal picture.

Deteriorating Social Conditions

As a consequence of economic decline, the overwhelming majority of the population has suffered a disastrous
deterioration in economic and social conditions since the implosion of the Soviet Union. High unemployment and
underemployment have eroded the standard of living for the vast majority of the population. This has precipitated a
massive migration of youths in search of opportunities elsewhere in and outside Georgia.

Political Disaffection

Attitudes towards politics and political engagement have changed dramatically over a decade of independence. While
Georgia struggled for independence, political activism and participation was high. The failure of this period to transform
the lives of many citizens bred disgust with the politics of the past decade that has now led to a deep disengagement of the
citizenry with politics.

Lack of Confidence in Institutions:s

Georgia inherited the shells of Soviet institutions, though little substance actually remains within these shells. Most
pervasive is the lack of a rule of law. The population is keenly aware that legislation has little relationship with the way
laws are enforced. Corruption, bribes, and reliance on informal clan structures are the keys to daily life.

Corruption:

Corruption is a common grievance among Georgians, though most Georgians are also involved in one way or another in
rent-seeking opportunities that supplement their meager salaries. Transparency International’s 1999 ranking of corruption
ranked Georgia 84 of 99 countries examined.

History:

Georgians have little history of violent reaction to social and economic hardship. Tolerance for dismal living conditions
can serve as a conflict inhibitor. The substantial progress that the Soviet Union brought in terms of economic
development, upward mobility and social modernization was accompanied by broad compliance with authority on the
surface.ss

Fear of Instability:s

Many Georgians suggested that the tumultuous experiences of the 1990s created a fear of instability that restrains elite and
mass behavior. Civil war in Tbilisi and the disastrous South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts remain fresh memories.

Weakness of Civil Society:

The weakness of civil society in Georgia may inhibit conflict by making mobilization of discontent difficult.

Georgian Nationalism:

While nationalism has been divisive for ethnic minorities, there is a shared sense of Georgian identity that provides some
degree of national cohesion among ethnic Georgians. This sense of identity is weaker in some regions and may be
nonexistent in others, particularly minority regions in which the state maintains a low profile and Georgian is not the
language of most of the inhabitants.

Trade Networks

Countries that rely on trade and maintain open commercial ties with other states tend to be less conflict-prone. Georgia is
a transit country, trade with neighboring countries is much of the economic activity in the country, and much of state
revenue comes from customs duties. But corrupt elites share a strong interest in maintaining some level of economic
stability and trade relations smuggling.

Political Parties

Political parties formally dominate the political process. Although there are over 100 parties in Georgia, Thus, their
cohesion and durability is tenuous, as shown by the recent fragmentation of the CUG, once the broadest and most
institutionalized Georgian political party.

Neighboring States

A small state with few resources, Georgia depends heavily on relations with its neighbors. While technically at the
crossroads of Europe and Asia, the mountainous terrain of the Caucasus and underdeveloped transportation network
makes physical interactions difficult. The particular and disparate interests of foreign actor’s vis-à-vis Georgia must,
however, be noted.

Russia’s historical relationship with Georgia and physical proximity ensure that it plays a significant role in the
country’s politics and economics. The continuing presence of Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, as well
as CIS peacekeeping forces (under Russian command) in the Abkhaz and Ossetian zones of conflict are a source of
irritation for the vast majority of Georgians.

Armenia also figures prominently among the external actors important for Georgia’s future. The opportunities and
incentives for Armenian involvement in Georgian affairs are multiple.
Turkey and Georgian elites share common geo-political interests forged in no small part by their historic animosity
toward Russia. Turkey is today Georgia’s largest trading partner and potential partner in the construction of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

This is a map of the different environmental issues facing Georgia.

Figure 10: Different environmental issues facing Georgia

Source :( South Ossetian Separatism in Georgia by Rebecca Ratliff /gorgia/ossetia.htm)

The environmental aspects of the dispute are also an important part of the picture. According to a Pro-Natural
Proposal, “The long-lasting conflict in South Ossetia has had a significant impact on the environment, including
the degradation, depletion and mismanagement of natural resources.”( Pro-Natura USA, “Caucasus Peace Park,
a Feasibility Study for Georgia and Russia”, Project Summary, September 2005,) In addition, the territory of
South Ossetia, located in north central Georgia, holds two of the four major border crossings among the
mountains separating Russia and Georgia and has several of Georgia’s important roadways running through it
from east to west and north to south. Retaining control over such roadways and border crossings is important
for Georgia as they aid both inter and intra-state movement of people and goods. In addition, two important oil
pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa (see map), run through Georgia on their way to Black Sea
ports. Separatist movements, such as the South Ossetian movement, pose security threats to the pipelines and
the flow of energy sources. (Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief, Caspian Sea
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/RegionalConflicts.html) So not only is the environmental aspect
important in terms of pollution and degradation, but also in geo-political strategic terms as well. Conflict with
South Ossetia and also Abkhazia, make it very difficult for Georgia, or anyone else, to address environmental
issues and establishing peace with conflict areas like South Ossetia may be nearly impossible without
considering the environmental factors involved. For example, a 2004 report by the United Nations Environment
Programme says, “Environmental degradation and the use of natural resources are identified as factors that
could deepen contention in areas of existing conflicts as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia…”.(12. UNEP,
"Environment and Security-Transforming Risks into Cooperation the Case of the Southern Caucasus", 2004)
Acquiring accurate data about the environmental situation in South Ossetia is very difficult, which is a problem
in of itself, however problems such as the exploitation of natural resources and soil contamination are known to
exist in South Ossetia. Unfortunately

An analysis of the Russia-Georgia conflict from a geopolitical point of view

An analysis of the Russia-Georgia conflict from a geopolitical point of view brings out the strategic gains
pocketed by Russia. They have put a brake on NATO’s enlargement, which is responsible for Russia’s
perception of encirclement. On a wider scale, the conflict represents the arrival of a multipolar world. The
European Union is directly concerned by this clash between Russia and the United States over the forming of
spheres of influence on the Eurasian landmass. From the perspective of a ‘political Europe’, the security
interests of the Union are dictated by geography. Renunciation of the enlargement of the EU and the Atlantic
Alliance would be a response to the imperatives governing the stability of the continent and would open the way
to a new Eurasian security system.

A new geopolitical balance post-conflict

The new situation on the ground enables Russia to strengthen its own security.

Russia has firm control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Whether incorporated or not in the Russian Federation,
these are strategic territorial gains. Russia’s presence in Abkhazia enables it to improve its access to the Black
Sea and, in the event of a conflict with a hostile force establishing itself on Georgian territory, would enable it
to neutralize the Georgian deepwater port of Poti more quickly. Its presence in South Ossetia, close to the
territorial heart of Georgia, enables Russia to reach the capital Tbilisi very rapidly, to cut the country’s main
east-west communications corridor, and to neutralize the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which supplies the
world markets and passes south of the Georgian capital.

Russia could also exercise more influence on the Eurasian continent’s balance by making more difficult the use
of Georgian territory by Israeli and American aircraft for refueling in the event of a bombardment of Iranian
nuclear installations.

The desire of the United States and some European countries to reduce their dependence on Russia, in order to
diversify world and European energy supplies, is compromised if they try to avoid negotiating with Russia. The
energy and commercial links between Europe and Central Asia passing through Russia have been strengthened
and the alternative route through the South Caucasus has been rendered less certain.

Georgia’s strategic value to the Atlantic Alliance has been diminished by the de facto loss of a third of its
territory.

Analysis: energy pipeline that supplies west threatened by war Georgia conflict

Figure 11: A section of the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
30 miles south Tbilisi,
Georgia, under construction
in 2003.
The conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal role in the
global energy market. Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oil
from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US. Crucially, it is the only practical route from
this increasingly important producer region that avoids both Russia and Iran. The threat of another attack by
separatists in Georgia itself is very real. The latest eruption of violence could easily spur fresh attacks. The BTC
pipeline, which is buried throughout most of its length to make sabotage more difficult, was a politically highly
charged project. It was firmly opposed by Russia, which views the Caucasus as its own sphere of influence and
wants central Asian oil to be exported via its own territory

. Russia also backs the South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists in Georgia and relations between Moscow and
Tbilisi have curdled into outright hostility in recent months. The BTC pipeline, which cost $3 billion to build, is
a key plank of US foreign policy because it reduces Western reliance on oil from both the Middle East and
Russia.

THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ABKHAZIA CONFLICT

The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially
during the war's initial stages. Whereas Russia has endorsed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia,
Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-
controlled territory, Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available to
shell Georgian-held Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defended
Abkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli. Russia has played a decisive role in determining the course and outcome of the
war in Abkhazia, both positive and negative. Throughout the conflict, Moscow maintained official neutrality,
condemned human rights violations, and imposed sanctions on both Georgia and Abkhazia in response to their
misconduct. It is this scenario more than any other that may explain why Russia has neither acknowledged its
own responsibility, nor condemned the acts of others when Russian weapons found their way into the hands of
Georgia's enemy and Russian planes and ships were used to attack Georgian-controlled territory.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ABKHAZ CONFLICT

In the post-Cold War world, the influence of the United States in the former Soviet republics has grown
tremendously. U.S. policy toward the conflict in Abkhazia therefore also merits scrutiny. American policy
appears to have been guided by three overall principles: first, support for the independence of Georgia; second,
support for the territorial integrity of Georgia with respect to Abkhazia; and third, support for Shevardnadze
personally. Although these three policies are themselves political matters beyond Human Rights Watch's
mandate, they have led the U.S. to be, in Human Rights Watch's view, less demanding on matters of
humanrights from the Georgian government than it might have been. They have also led the U.S. to pursue a
policy of engagement with the Georgian government that appears to Human Rights Watch, from the standpoint
of human rights protection, unjustifiably credulous. The U.S. has, however, been sensitive to the humanitarian
crisis in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze stated during his March 1994 visit to Washington that the U.S. had provided
some $200 million in humanitarian aid, principally for the support of refugees from the Abkhaz war.

(source : Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 62.

Role of United States in Georgia

Institutionally, US participation in the peace process is limited to its membership of the Friends of the
Secretary-General and the UN Security Council. However, the emergence of the Caucasus as a crucial
geostrategic region has increased US interest in the energy routes that will transport potentially vast supplies of
oil, gas and metal ores from central Asia and Azerbaijan to the West. To ensure that the USA and its Western
allies secure this East–West corridor across the Caucasus it needs politically stable and independent Caucasian
states. The USA views Georgia as a vital military, strategic and commercial ally in the region. Failure in
Georgia would unravel US strategy and permit greater Russian and Iranian influence. The USA therefore rejects
the unilateral secession of Abkhazia and urges its integration into Georgia as an autonomous unit. In 1998 the
USA announced its readiness to allocate up to $15 million for rehabilitation of infrastructure in the Gali region
if substantial progress is made in the peace process. USAID has already funded some humanitarian initiatives
for Abkhazia. The USA has in recent years significantly increased its military support to the Georgian armed
forces but has stated that it would not condone any moves towards peace enforcement in Abkhazia.

On 29 April 2002 the Department of Defense announced the beginning of the Georgia Train and Equip program
(GTEP). This program implements President Bush's decision to respond to Government of Georgia's request for
assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. This
effort will complement other counter-terrorism efforts around the globe and will increase stability in the
Caucasus. The 20-month, $64-million plan, involving a maximum of 150 US soldiers, is expected to be
duplicated in 20 other countries. A flexible, time-phased training initiative, GTEP built upon the strong
military-to-military relationship developed between the two countries since the end of the Cold War, and further
underscores U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Under the Georgia
Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) program, the US provided the Georgian border guard,
customs, MOD, and other border security and law enforcement agencies with communications equipment,
vehicles and helicopters with spares/repair parts for transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment,
computers for automation of applications, licensing and regulatory systems, and forensics laboratory assistance.
In mid-2002 the US Army Corps of Engineers' Europe District helped the Georgian State Frontier Defense
Department celebrate its 10th anniversary in grand style

(Source: www.global security .org)

USA Military Assistance in Georgia

Figure
12: USA Military Assistance in
Georgia

This figure shows the USA military

assistance and military sales to
Georgia pre –September11 Vs.post
September11. We can easily
understand the increasing level of
arms dealing of USA to Georgia.

Following the war between Georgia

and Russia, both Europe and the United States have largely stopped selling lethal military equipment to
Georgia. The United States has nonetheless continued training Georgian forces for operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq under a program titled the “International Military Education and Training Program” (IMET), and
funding appears to have increased for this training. Relatively speaking, military equipment sales to Georgia
were much higher than training funding up to 2008, but have dropped to zero in 2009 (see charts based on data
from the Lugar report).
 Figure 13:
military aid to Georgia

Georgia has embraced the report while Russia

and the breakaway territories of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia argue arms sales to Georgia
could lead to another outbreak of violence in
the region.

Analysis: why the Russia-

Georgia conflict matters to the
West

It would be a serious mistake for the international community to regard the dramatic escalation of violence in
Georgia as just another flare-up in the Caucasus. The names of the flashpoints may be unfamiliar, the territory
remote and the dispute parochial, but the battle under way will have important repercussions beyond the region.
The outcome of the struggle will determine the course of Russia’s relations with its neighbours, will shape
Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency, could alter the relationship between the Kremlin and the West and crucially
could decide the fate of Caspian basin energy supplies. Quite what triggered the Georgian offensive, on the day
that the world was supposed to gather in peace for the start of the Beijing Olympics, is not yet clear.

(source : Times Online August 8, 2008 )

Russia-Georgia conflict: Why both sides have valid points

What is Georgia's view?

When the USSR broke up in 1991, Georgia won its independence and was admitted to the United Nations as a
sovereign state within its Soviet-era borders. Under international law, therefore, the breakaway territories of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia belong to Georgia. Tbilisi alleges, with considerable evidence, that Russian
meddling during the bitter civil wars that followed helped the two statelets win their de facto independence and
that Moscow's support has been crucial to keeping them going ever since. (www.global security.org)

In 2003, the pro-democracy "Rose Revolution" brought Mr. Saakashvili to power on pledges to reunite the
country and lead it into the premier Western military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Georgia claims that Russia, which brutally suppressed its own separatist uprising in Chechnya, backed the
Ossetian and Abkhazian rebels in order to keep Georgia weak and dependent upon Moscow.

After Saakashvili was elected, Russia began upgrading its relations with the two rebel statelets and issued
Russian passports to the majority of its citizens – in preparation, Tbilisi says, for a showdown. It contends that
this year, as NATO considered Georgia's application for entry, the Russian 58th Army – which roared into
South Ossetia 10 days ago to blunt the Georgian assault – massed provocatively near Georgia's border.

The separatists' case?

Abkhazians and Ossetians are both distinct ethnic groups with a long history of tense relations with their
Georgian neighbors. Both groups claim that they were folded into the Soviet Republic of Georgia against their
will by dictator Joseph Stalin (an ethnic Georgian), who also ordered Georgian settlers to flood into their
territories. Abkhazia and Ossetia argue that their citizens were Soviet citizens, never Georgians, and therefore
they had a right to declare independence as Soviet Union was collapsing. Tbilisi's reaction, which was to
attempt to suppress both rebellions with military force, invalidated Georgia's rights to sovereignty, they say.

Abkhazian Deputy Foreign Minister Maxim Gunjia says that Tbilisi's latest attempt at reconquest settles the
issue. "Neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia will ever be part of that country; Georgia has shown us its true
face," he says in a telephone conversation from Sukhumi, Abkhazia.

Georgia has traditionally responded to such claims by saying that any independence referendum in the
breakaway territories must take into account the views of the Georgian population displaced by the wars of the
early 1990s. Nearly a quarter of a million Georgians were driven out of Abkhazia in 1993 and workers from the
New York-based Human Rights Watch have found evidence that ethnic Georgian civilians were targeted in the
latest fighting in South Ossetia, where nearly a third of the population was Georgian.

The UN refugee agency says more than 150,000 have been displaced by fighting in Georgia, including 30,000
in South Ossetia. (www.global security.org)

What is the Russian position?

Many Russians bristle defensively in the face of Western accusations of "aggression" against Georgia,
maintaining that the Kremlin was left with few choices when the Georgians began bombarding Tskhinvali – the
capital of South Ossetia, where 9 in 10 residents carry a Russian passport.

Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while calling some of Russia's actions "disproportionate" after
meeting with President Medvedev, said that "it is rare that all the blame is on one side. In fact, both sides are
probably to blame. That is very important to understand."

Many Russian officials here argue that it's not so strange that, as the successor state to the Russian Empire and
the USSR, post-Soviet Russia should have ongoing obligations to former subjects such as the Ossetians and the
Abkhazians. Russia was a key party to the accords that ended the cycle of conflicts in the early '90s, which left
Russian peacekeeping troops holding the tripwire position in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Under a 1992
law that entitled any former Soviet citizen to apply for a Russian passport, most inhabitants of the two
breakaway republics have since acquired Russian citizenship. Alexei Mukhin, director of the independent
Center for Political Information in Moscow, says that Americans ought to be more understanding, since the US
has guaranteed the security of at least one breakaway statelet, Taiwan, with its own military force for over half a
century.

More recently, Russian officials point out, NATO fought a 1999 war that was labeled a humanitarian
intervention, which wrested the Albanian-populated province of Kosovo away from Serbia. Despite the fact that
Serbia, a member of the UN, includes Kosovo within its sovereign territory, most Western powers recognized
Kosovo's self-declared independence earlier this year. Russia opposed the Kosovo war and later argued that the
West should preserve Serbia's territorial integrity by convincing the Kosovars to accept Serbian offers of
sweeping autonomy instead of independence. Now that Kosovo's independence has been effectively granted –
though it has not been admitted to the UN – the Kremlin warns the West has upset the rules that formerly
covered separatist movements around the world.

Some extreme nationalist politicians in Moscow, jubilant about this Kosovo precedent, say it's only a matter of
time before Russia follows suit, and unilaterally recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and perhaps other
breakaway statelets in the post-Soviet region as well.

Concern of European Union

South Caucasus: EU must play greater role in stabilizing the region, say MEPs

• The EU must steer a strategy for stability, prosperity and conflict-resolution in the South Caucasus.
• MEPs wish the EU strategy for the South Caucasus to concentrate on three domains: conflict resolution,
promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; and economic cooperation and social
development.
• Free and fair elections needed in Georgia: MEPs insist that measures be taken to ensure international
electoral norms are respected.
• The EP's Foreign Affairs Committee plans to send an ad-hoc delegation of seven MEPs to observe the
May elections in Georgia.
• Concern for freedom of the press :MEPs also expressed concern over the lack of media pluralism in
the South Caucasus
• Energy security, conflict resolution and economic cooperation:The current situation of conflict in the
region is neither acceptable nor viable, states the resolution, which expresses concern over the recent
increases in military spending. "Frozen conflicts" are an obstacle to economic and social development,
warn MEPs.
• MEPs call on Catherine Ashton, the EU's High-Representative for Foreign Affairs, to play an active part
in promoting conflict resolution in the region.
• Finally, recognising the importance of the region for the EU's energy security and supply, MEPs express
their support for the strengthening of EU-South Caucasus cooperation in energy projects, in particular
for the successful realization of the Nabucco pipeline.

The Six Points of the European Union-sponsored "Sarkozy Plan"

 Not to resort to force;

 To end hostilities definitively;
 To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
 Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
 Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security
measures;
 Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Source :http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102338.pdf)

Role of UN in Georgia conflict:

UNOMIG's Mandate: After UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the resumed fighting in
Abkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881
(1993) of 4 November 1993.to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military
contingent, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to
United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement.

• To observe the operation of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
• To verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the
security zone.
• To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone.
• To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori Valley to places
beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia;
• To patrol regularly the Kodori Valley;
 • To investigate, at the request of either party or the CIS peacekeeping force
• To report regularly to the Secretary-General within its mandate, in particular on the implementation of
the Agreement, any violations and their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant
developments;
• To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peacekeeping
force

(source : www.unomig.org )

UN role in Georgia unclear as conflict is unresolved

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said Monday the small UN military observer force in Georgia cannot be given a clear
mandate because of the unsettled Russia-Georgia conflict that erupted in August.

• The 134-strong UN force known as UNOMIG was pulled out of the strategic Kodori Valley in Georgia when
fighting between Russian and Georgian troops spread from South Ossetia to Abkhazia in the first half of August.
UNOMIG was monitoring the valley that separated Tbilisi and Abkhaz separatists.

• Ban asked the UN Security Council to extend the presence of UNOMIG until mid-February pending negotiations
in Geneva beginning on October 15 to resolve the conflict. He said UNOMIG cannot be given a clear mandate
unless the conflict is resolved.

(Source: http://unomig.org/glance/mandate/)

Initiatives of civil society for Georgian peace

Some peacemaking interventions have been instigated by local academics, teachers or journalists affected by
the conflict and searching for ways to address its consequences. In some cases such people in both Georgia and
Abkhazia have formed NGOs to pursue their goals. Other initiatives have come from international NGOs or
individuals outside the region. Activities and roles have changed over time, reflecting the dynamics of the
political and security Some conflict resolution initiatives undertaken by Western European, American and
Russian organizations began before the 1994 ceasefire, when the introduction of UNOMIG and the CISPKF
provided sufficient security for international NGOs to begin exploring their potential contribution. The
development of a United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme, combined with greater stability on the ground
from 1995 encouraged civic initiatives by providing information and analysis and by facilitating numerous
INGO visits to Abkhazia.

A Framework for Conflict Analysis C.R SIPABIO

 Context

Cul
tur Cla
e ss
Sources
R
el
ig Outcome Issues
io
Relationshi Geo
n
p gra
phy
B
Po Pat
o ter
we
Ge Interventio n ns
Parties
r
nd n d
er

Attitud
Behavio His
es
r tor
y

Et
Med hni
ia cit
Oth y
er

Figure 14: A Framework for Conflict Analysis CR SIPABIO

(From:Say Peace:Conflict Resolution TrainingManual ForMuslim Communities.Amr Abdalla,et al, 2002 )

Context:
Context is the sociological, economical and political settings in which a conflict takes place.
In order to illustrate how context factors operate in conflict situations, we will discuss the following context
factors: ethnicity, religion and geography, as they emerged within conflicts in Georgia.
Ethnicity, Religion and Geography: The case of Georgia conflict.
Most conflicts are influenced by more than one contextual factor, and it is this combination that can contribute
to the complexity of conflict situations. Abkhazians and Ossetians are both distinct ethnic groups with a long
history of tense relations with their Georgian neighbors. Ethnicity In south Ossetia according to 2007 census
67.1% Ossetians25.0% Georgians,3.0% Russians,1.3% Armenians 0.9% Jews and 2.6%others. In Abkhazia
ethnic groups: Georgian 70%, Armenian,Russian, Azeri, Ossetian, Abkhaz Religion: Georgian Orthodox 65%,
Muslim 11%, Russian Orthodox 10%.Georgia is a mosaic of ethnic and religious communities whose
differences have been and can be manipulated by political leaders. (www.wikipedia.com) Ethnic and religious
cleavages are created and malleable rather than primordial and unchangeable. But ethnic groups provide a
framework for the organization and aggregation of common interests and have been the public face of two
separatist conflicts in Georgia.
Geography:
Georgia is a sovereign state in the Caucasus region of Eurasia. Situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe and
Western Asia, it is bounded to the west by the Black Sea, to the north by Russia, to the south by Turkey and
Armenia, and to the east by Azerbaijan. Georgia covers a territory of 69,700 km² and its population is 4.385
million. Georgia plays the role of a pivotal state in the Caucasus, since the control of its territory enables
decisive influence to be exerted over geostrategic, energy and economic questions on the Eurasian continent.
The conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal role in the
global energy market. Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oil
from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.
Relationship:
There are different levels of conflict: inter-state and intra-state.

• The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is state v. sub-state. Therefore, the conflict is within
one state; Georgia.
• The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is state v. sub-state. Therefore, the conflict is within one
state; Georgia.
• The conflict between Georgia and Russia is state vs. state .there for the conflict is inter-state conflict.
• And also there prevails a strategic conflict between USA and USR.

Bond:
The significance of the relationship bond lies in its cultural meaning .The meaning of a bond therefore may
influence how people behave in given conflict situations.

• To ensure that the USA and its Western allies secure this East–West corridor across the Caucasus it
needs politically stable and independent Caucasian states. U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity. Under the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
(GBSLE) program, the US provided the Georgian border guard, customs, MOD, and other border
security and law enforcement agencies

• The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side,
especially during the war's initial stages. Whereas Russia has endorsed the territorial integrity of the
Republic of Georgia, Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian
targets in Georgian-controlled territory.
The conflict in south Ossetia, Russia attacked Georgian territory because of strong bondage with south Ossetia.
Here is noted that maximum ossetians are citizen of Russia and they want to be a part of North Ossetia.

Power:
Power is a significant dynamic in any conflict situations. People derive their power in conflict situations usually
from contextual factors.
Among the contextual factors ethnicity plays a vital role for acquiring power in conflict. if we analyze the
Abkhazia and south Ossetia conflict with Georgia we can easily realize that both groups are majority according
to their ethnicity in their own territory. From the general perceptions they gained power from the common
people. External power influenced them on the basis of their relationship with other neighboring states. South
oissetia and Abkhazia got power from Russia. Russia provided military assistance and political and economical
support to the Abkhazian and ossetian people.
On the other hand Georgia is a recognized independence state. It has alliances and relations with European
states and also USA. United States have good relations with Georgia. USA military assistance to Georgia is
significantly increasing. USA has interests in Georgia for its transition for oil on the other hand Georgia wants
to increase power for its own safeguard especially from Russia. It is noted that Georgia wants its territorial
integrity which indirectly derives power.
Patterns : often in conflict situations parties engage in patterns of behavior that are intended to advance their
positions .patterns are certain behaviors that parties resort to frequently during conflict situation.
Patterns of conflict in Georgia are civil in nature. Firstly it was political in nature then it is tended to arms
conflicts. South Ossetia and Abkhazia wants separation from Russia and they have already declared their
independence but Georgia wants its territorial integrity.
Both parties are strong in their own position ant it creates conflicting situations. Both parties use arms and many
causalities were happened.
Some sources and causes of conflict according to Moore
Value conflicts are caused by

• Different criteria for evaluating ideas or behavior

• Exclusive intrinsically valuable goals

• Different ways of life ,ideology or religion

Structural conflicts are caused by

• Destructive patterns of behavior or interaction

• Unequal control, ownership or distribution of resources

• Unequal power and authority

• Geographical, physical or environmental factors that hinder cooperation

• time constraints
Interest conflicts are caused by
 • perceived or actual competition over substantive interests

• procedural interests

• psychological interests
(source : Moore ,The Mediation Process,p.54)

On the basis of the theory of Moore

Georgia consists various ethnic groups such as osetians, Abkhazian, Armenian, Russian and Georgian .every
groups belong their own ideology, religion and values and they want to establish their own identity and want
recognitions as a nation. . For this reason there are being occurred various value conflicts.
Destructive patterns of behavior of Georgia to south Ossetia and Abkhazia derives conflicts. Unequal control,
ownership of natural resources, geographical and time constraints intended to structural conflicts in Georgia.
Perceived competitions over substantive interests and psychological interests of Russia and USA have triggered
conflicts in Georgia.

Issues:
• the specific tangible interests or aspirations

• issues refer to the inter-related goal incompatibilities of adversaries

The main issues of Georgian conflicts are aspirations of independence of south Ossetia and Abkhazia. In
Georgia there are inter related goal incompatibilities .south Ossetia and Abkhazia want their separation and
Georgia wants its territorial integrity.

Types of issues:
• Issues that arise out the need for continued existence (survival conflict).south Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Georgia all parties are involved in survival conflict. South Ossetia and Abkhazia want separation for
their own identity and territory but Georgia wants its territorial integrity.

• Issues that arise over relationship dynamics (negative dynamics and power issues).
In Georgia conflicts there are many negative dynamics and power issues involved.
Russia and USA have an involvement in Georgian conflict. Russia wants to show his power in this
region and United States wants territorial stability in Georgia because of its own interests in case of oil
transition

Parties:
Participants in conflict. Parties can be individuals, groups, organizations, communities or nations.Parties may
divide into three categories:

• primary : those who have a direct vested interests in conflict (Georgia, south Ossetia, Abkhazia )

• secondary : those who have an indirect interests in conflict ( Russia ,USA)

 • tertiary : those who have a distant interest in the conflict ( neighboring states of Georgia ,EU)

Attitudes:
• the emotions and perception influencing parties

• common patterns of expectations, emotional orientation and perception which accompany involvement
in a conflict situation

• perceptions about conflict

The emotions and perceptions of Russia and USA as influencing parties to Georgia are different from their own
perspectives. Russian emotions to south Ossetia and Abkhazia is notable, Russia has sympathy of those states as
the member of former soviet republic.
United States has interests in Georgia and that indirectly creates observation of USA in Georgia.USA shows
friendly attitudes to Georgia and support Georgia.

Behavior:
• parties actions in conflict

• And finally the behavior of the conflicting parties breaks out into actions.
As a result in Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia were involved in war.

• Actions undertaken by south Ossetia and Abkhazia party in any situation of conflict aimed at the
opposing party Georgia with the intention of making that Georgia abandoned or modify its goals and
establish their independence and want recognition.

Intervention:
Intervention is the parties ‘or third parties’ actions taken with the purpose of reaching a resolution or
satisfactory outcome.
Intervention usually takes one of the following approaches:

• Conflict management

• Conflict resolution

• Conflict transformation
In Georgia conflicts United Nations, European Union, NATO, Russia and USA intervened in various
perspectives.

UNOMIG's Mandate: After UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the resumed fighting in
Abkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881
(1993) of 4 November 1993.to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military
contingent, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to
United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement.

Georgian and Ossetian sides began Russian and OSCE-mediated negotiations on peaceful resolution of the
conflict on October 30, 1995. The major break through in negotiation happened in May 1996 when the two
sides signed a 'Memorandum on measures for providing security and joint confidence' in which the two sides
renounced the use of force in future.

The Six Points of the European Union-sponsored "Sarkozy Plan"

 Not to resort to force;

 To end hostilities definitively;
 To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
 Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
 Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security
measures;
 Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Outcome:
Outcome is the effect of conflict behavior and intervention on the state of conflict these effects are not always
positive. An outcome may take the form of a temporary resolution that needs to be worked on.
During the war, the Abkhaz separatist side carried out full scale ethnic cleansing campaign which resulted in the
expulsion of up to 250,000 ethnic Georgians and more than 15,000 killed.
June 8, 1992 over 1,000 civilian and military deaths in Georgia –south Ossetia conflict. During the violence in
2004, at least 22 people died. in 1991, causing thousands of casualties and creating tens of thousands of
refugees on both sides of the Georgian-Russian border.” In 2008, Civilian casualties: South Ossetia: 162
according to Russia, 365 according to South Ossetia.
Georgia:Georgian government says 228 civilians dead or missing.
One foreign civilian killed and 3 wounded. At least 158,000 civilians displaced.
Currently the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict is a stalemate. The South Ossetians still desire to break away from
Georgia and establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep
the region of South Ossetia as a part of the state

Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia have remained tense after the war. Georgia has moved to increase
Abkhazia's isolation by imposing a sea blockade of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian still desire to breakaway from
Georgia and establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep
the region of South Ossetia as a part of the state.

RECOMMENDATIONS
To All Sides (Georgian, South Ossetian, North Ossetian, Russian) in the Joint Control Commission:

• Agree on changes to the negotiations format that emphasise direct Georgian-Ossetian dialogue and give the
EU a role on a par with Russia and the OSCE.
• Avoid inflammatory rhetoric.
• Establish an OSCE/Joint Peacekeeping Forces observation point at Didi Gupta, agree on a mutually
acceptable monitoring regime for the Roki tunnel and sign an agreement on non-use of force.
• Set up joint policing, with an international civilian police component, including Russia, gradually scale
down the JPKF operation and replace it in time with a flexible crisis response mechanism.
• Further interethnic cooperation and confidence by implementing economic development and rehabilitation
through the joint efforts of the OSCE-led Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP), not competing unilateral
projects.

To the Georgian and South Ossetian Sides:

• Dismantle fortifications, clear mines, fill in trenches and remove all unauthorised equipment and
personnel from the zone of conflict.

• Allow unhampered JPKF and/or OSCE patrolling throughout the entire JPKF area of responsibility.
• Remove unauthorised law enforcement posts from the zone of conflict.
• Reestablish the Special Coordinating Centre for law enforcement and enhance its operational capacity;
organise joint police training programs and regional police chief meetings; and launch joint police
patrolling and a mechanism for joint criminal investigation.

To the Georgian Side:

• Focus on restoring territorial integrity through gradual confidence building, not rapid status
determination.
• Engage in substantive dialogue with the Tskhinvali de facto authorities, while allowing ample time for
Sanakoev to build credibility with South Ossetians.
• Show respect for Ossetian self-determination aspirations and security fears; consider reconciliation
strategies and a statement regretting past injustice.
• Implement the Law on Property Restitution and Compensation.
• Allocate economic rehabilitation assistance to OSCE-led programs in at least equal measure to unilateral
programs.

To the Ossetian Side:

• Build a pluralistic, open society and discuss amending negotiation and peacekeeping formats with
Tbilisi.

To the Russian Federation:

• Encourage Tskhinvali to be more open-minded on changes to the negotiation and peacekeeping formats.
• Encourage both sides to implement verifiable demilitarisation measures.
• Halt unilateral economic rehabilitation programs benefiting the Ossetian side alone.

To the Wider International Community:

• Set up an informal consultative group (with at least the EU, U.S. and Russia) to assist the sides,
including by developing new ideas, and commit new economic funding in the zone of conflict only for
joint projects

Concluding remarks:

The basic domestic and international issues surrounding the conflicts are the South Ossetians' and Abkhazian
claim of unequal treatment under Georgian rule and subsequent demands for cultural, social, economic and
political protections as a minority group, Russia’s desire to punish Georgia for its increasingly pro-Western
political orientation, and outside concerns about the stability and accessibility of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline running partly through Georgia. However, at the conflict’s most basic level, it is a conflict over land
and territory. The involvement of Russia and United states and concern of European Union added a new
dimension in these conflicts. The South Ossetians and Abkhazians still desire to break away from Georgia and
establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep the regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as parts of the state.

References

• Say Peace:Conflict Resolution TrainingManual ForMuslim Communities.Amr Abdalla,et al, 2002

• Moore ,The Mediation Process,p.54

• Times Online August 8, 2008

• Council of the European Union. General Affairs and External Relations - PRESS RELEASE
Extraordinary meeting - Brussels, 13 August 2008 - Council Conclusions on the situation in Georgia -
Brussels, 13 August 2008 -Council of the European Union.

• Pro-Natura USA, “Caucasus Peace Park, a Feasibility Study for Georgia and Russia”, Project Summary,
September 2005, Article
• UNEP, "Environment and Security-Transforming Risks into Cooperation the Case of the Southern
Caucasus", 2004 Article

• Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 62.

• Human Rights' Watch. 2008. "Q & A: Violence in South Ossetia." August 15.

• South Ossetian Separatism in Georgia by Rebecca Ratliff /gorgia/ossetia.htm)

• A Modern History of Georgia, pp. 232–6. Lang, David Marshall (1962). London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.

• America Abroad, TIME Magazine, June 10, 1991

• Russia accuses Georgia of open aggression". The Globe and Mail. 2008-07-04. 

• South Ossetia threatens Georgia with retaliation". Russia Today. 2008-07-04.

• S.Ossetia Claims it Holds Four Georgian Soldiers". Civil Georgia. 2008-07-08.

• Georgia plans operation to free detained soldiers". Reuters. 2008-07-08..

 • . BBC News. 2008-08-05. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7543099.stm. Retrieved 2010-03-29.
• Roy Allison, Russia resurgent? Moscow’s campaign to ‘force Georgia to peace’, in International
Affairs, 84: 6 (2008) "Day-by-day: Georgia-Russia crisis". BBC
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www.global security.org
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http/unomig.org/glance/mandate/
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102338.pdf];

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102315.pdf

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htm
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/RegionalConflicts.html