G.R. No. L-29155 November 5, 1928JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA, vs.

HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA, OSTRAND, J.:

In G. R. No. 21706, the Court of First Instance ordered the rescission of a lease of the
Tacgajan Sugar Pleantation and the payment by Villanueva of the unpaid balance of the rent
with interest. The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered
to Larena. before levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money
judgment was to be satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to Larena of
a dwelling house. The agreement was carried out in accordance with its terms. In the
meantime, Villanueva had harvested the sugarcane crop produced, and after having satisfied
the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in possession of the plantation long enough
to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop. De Larena filed an action wherein
she alleged that while first case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Villanueva knew
positively that the aforesaid lease was declared rescinded by the Court of First Instance and
that Villanueva, also knew that he thereafter was not entitled to the possession of the
aforesaid hacienda; that he, nevertheless, in bad faith continued in such possession during the
agricultural year 1922-1924 and appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year. In his
answer Villanueva alleges that according to the pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two
causes of action were included in that case and, therefore, must be considered res judicata.

ISSUE: WON this case involved the doctrine of res judicata?

HELD: No. Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but
rests on the well-known and firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to
split up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several suits. But that is not this
case. The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in
separate installments, each installment is an independent cause of action, though it has been
held and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the
installments due at the time the action brought must be included in the complaint and that
failure to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent. The
aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was brought on August 23, 1922, Larena demanding
payment of then sue rent in addition to the rescission of the lease. In 1923, Larena amended
the prayer of the complaint by asking judgment for rent for years subsequent to 1922. The
lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, and it appears
that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the
corresponding year. It follows that the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 has not
become due at the time of the trial of the case and that consequently the trial court could not
render judgment therefore. The action referred to is, therefore, no bar to the first cause of
action in the present litigation.
BLOSSOM & CO. V. MANILA GAS CORPORATIONS

Facts: Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a
contract. The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of
specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It was agreed that the
price would prevail only so long as the raw materials (coal and crude oil) used by the
defendants in the manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time
of the contract. In the event of an increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there
would be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price of tar. The contract was later
amended to extend the period for ten years. In consideration of the modification, the plaintiff
agreed to purchase from the defendant a certain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant. The
defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage to
secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Around 4 years from the execution
of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the defendant to obtain specific performance
and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract by
ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar
products and its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid. CFI Manila ruled
in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages but refused to order the
defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the defendants
for any subsequent breach of contract. Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the
ground that the defendant breached the contract once more after refusal to perform its
obligation under the same contract.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages

Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.Doctrine
Divisible contracts (as a general rule)- A contract to do several things at several times is
divisible. A judgement for a single breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a
subsequent breach. Entire contract (case at bar)- When the contract is indivisible and the
breach is total, there can only be one action in which the plaintiff must recover all damages.
The recovery of a judgement for damages by reason of a breach is a bar to another action on
the same contract and on account of the continuous breach.- The contract between the parties
is an entire contract.- In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the continuing contract by
absolute refusal. The claim for damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final
judgement was rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter sustain