THE CAUSE

A. DIFFERENT CATEGORIES

1. PROXIMATE

1. BATACLAN V MEDINA

FACTS:

Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM
somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-
zagged and turned turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the
passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus
drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out,
instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning torch
for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It
appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would-be
rescuers were using.

The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.

The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook
to take Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on
the part of Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question
that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by Bataclan and
not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was
the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.

HELD:

Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the bus, because of
the overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid
of the trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went out
looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it
was 2:30AM and the place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and
conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and because he should have
been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the
torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

Proximate Cause – “‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.’ And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.’”

2.mercury drug v baking

2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution

The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sy’s clinic for a medical check-up. The next day, after
undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride levels were
above normal, so he gave him 2 medical prescriptions—Diamicron (blood sugar) and Benalize
(triglyceride). Baking went to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the medicines. However, the
saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, so that was what was
sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one Dormicum pill a
day for 3 days.

On the 3rdday of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car collided
with Josie Peralta’s car. Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not remember anything
about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on
his state at the time of the collision, he returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that what
was sold to Baking was Dormicum.

Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM

To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:

Damage suffered by plaintiff

Fault or negligence of defendant

Connection of cause and effect between A & B

The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will
be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence in selling medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands.

Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient,
the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified
WON the medicine she gave was what was prescribed by Dr. Sy.

MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180

It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of the employee

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT – NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE

Proximate cause – any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise; determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent

Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in reading
the prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that
Baking would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision

AWARD – 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages

3.pilipinas bank v ca

The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui
(11k~) as payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value
of the checks, Reyes requested PCIB Money Shop’s manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from
his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto
Santos was requested to make the deposit.

In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller Reyes’ current account
number to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815”
so that was the number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number coincided with
the name “Florencio,” Efren Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper] thought it was
for Florencio Amador, so he posted the deposit in the account of Amador.

The check in favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes’ ledger indicated that his
account only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days
later but it was dishonored again. This also happened with the check issued in Tui’s favor. Tui
returned the check to Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value.
Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate
verification of his account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The 32k posted in
Amador’s account was transferred to Reyes’ account upon being cleared by the former that he
did not effect a deposit of 32k. The bank then honored the check.

RTC ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay damages to Reyes, and the CA affirmed the RTC.

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY: ALAGASI’S NEGLIGENCE IN ERRONEOUSLY POSTING REYES’ CASH

DEPOSIT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER DEPOSITOR HAVING THE SAME FIRST NAME

For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes’ own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury.

Proximate cause – any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not
have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a
person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result
therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.

Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties

He posted the cash deposit in Amador’s account from the assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the
deposit slip

He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear certainty,
considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create –> checks issued by
Reyes were dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance

4.quezon city v dacara

Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of Toyota Corolla 4-door
Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at
Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As
a result, Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.

Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded negative results.
Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for
damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.

The RTC decided in favor of private respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: whether or not the local government of Quezon City be held be liable.
Held: Explained the court, what really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue
that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the
lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. The unanimity
of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners’ negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these
with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate court’s alleged
errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence already considered in
the proceedings below. Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this
rule. They have not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual
review.

Petitioner's contention that the deceased was over speeding was not raised on the proper time
hence it cannot e appreciated. The said defense was only raised on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the CA's decision. Moreover, it was established that there were no warning
signs installed in the area where the accident happened.

CONCURRENT

1. FAR EASTERN V CA

FACTS:

M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at
the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing
space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the
docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After
a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted
anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea
was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the
landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed
the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the
anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the
pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that
the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right
anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron
of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage
caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;

(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent
negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:

(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her
navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed,
course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective
control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot
does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who
retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It
is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws
have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on
board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of
seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and
thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and
diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be
trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care,
but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and
usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must
exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict
standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he
should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the
presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was
remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure
up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of
a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty
law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held
liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory
only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there
is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the
sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the
owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the
consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with
respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is
limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the
owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and
proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or
navigation.

2.SABIDO V CUSTODIO--NO DIGEST

CONCEPCION, J.:

Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda seek the review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, sentencing the Laguna-Tayabas
Bus Co., Nicasio Mudales, and herein petitioners, Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda, to jointly
and severally indemnify Belen Makabuhay Custodio and her son, Agripino Custodio, Jr., in the
sum of P6,000 and to pay the costs of the suit.

The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals from which we quote:

"Upon a careful study and judicious examining of the evidence on record, we are inclined to
concur in the findings made by the trial court. Here is how the Court a quo analyzed the facts of
this case:

'In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio
Mudales and belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda
and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve.
Agripino Custodio, a passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the left side as truck was full of
passengers was sideswiped by the truck driven by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio
was injured and died (Exhibit A).

'It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was hanging on the left side of the LTB
Bus. Otherwise, were he sitting inside the truck, he could not have been struck by the six by six
truck driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact alone, of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side
of the truck, makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For certainly
its employees, who are the driver and conductor were negligent. They should not have allowed
Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that manner.

'To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and Prospero Sabido throw all the blame on Nicasio
Mudales. From the testimony, however, of Belen Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can
deduce that Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x
6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to
avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never
collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could
have avoided hitting Agripino Custodio. It is incredible that the LTB was running on the middle of
the road when passing a curve. He knows it is dangerous to do so. We are rather of the belief
that both trucks did not keep close to the right side of the road so they sideswiped each other
and thus Agripino Custodio was injured and died. In other words, both drivers must have driven
their trucks not in the proper line and are, therefore, both reckless and negligent'.

"We might state by way of additional observations that the sideswiping of the deceased and his
two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955
when the LTB bus with full load of passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and
sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or
passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309,
Mendoza). Under the above-stated condition, there exists strong persuasion to accept what
Belen Makabuhay and Sofia Mesina, LTB passengers, had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6
cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed (tsn. 15, 74, 175 Mendoza). From the lips of no
less than driver Lagunda himself come the testimonial admission that the presence of three
hanging passengers located at the left side of the bus was noted when his vehicle was still at a
distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus, and yet despite the existence of a shallow canal on the
right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not care to exercise
prudence to avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal 'is not a
passage of trucks.'"

Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. - hereinafter referred to as the carrier - and its driver
Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with
Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by
reason of which all of them were held solidarily liable in the manner above indicated.

Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the
negligence of the carrier and its driver; (2) that petitioners were not guilty of negligence in
connection with the matter under consideration; (3) that petitioners cannot be held solidarily
liable with the carrier and its driver; and (4) that the complaint against petitioners herein should
be dismissed.

With respect to the first two (2) points, which are interrelated, it is urged that the carrier and its
driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the
running board of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was
the proximate cause of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that the lower court had,
likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a proximate
cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners' truck was running at a
considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to its right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the
passenger bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its
running board.
The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the
accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by
certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the
very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the
running board of the bus while the same was still five (5) or seven (7) meters away from the
truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two (2) vehicles was such that he could
have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the
negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of
the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have
produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's
bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense,
petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.

Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver,
because the latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs
from a quasi-delict. The rule is, however, that

"According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible
for the whole injury, even tho his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same
damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor x x x." (38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners
herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REMOTE

1.MANILA ELECTRIC V REMOQUILLO

Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw
making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the
electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨
and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages
brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs
of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the
electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company
did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.

Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occassion.

2.GABETO V ARANETA

FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a
cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant,
Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had
called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the
call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of
Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the
horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the
horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had
unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street
Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta.

RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.

RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently
ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and
taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old,
and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to
the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to
come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the
horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.

3.ANECO V BALEN

Facts of the Case:

ANECO installed an electric post in Ata-atahon, Nasipit, agusan del Norte, with its main
distribution line of 13, 000 kilovolts traversing Angelita Balen’s residence. Balen’s father even
protested the installation with the District Engineer’s Office and with ANECO, but his protest was
not heeded. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa and Celestino Exclamado were
electrocuted while removing the TV antenna from Balen’s residence. The antenna pole touched
ANECO’s main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly,
while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third degree burns. Balen and Lariosan then lodged a
complaint for damages against ANECO. The RTC decided in favor of respondents and against
ANECO. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: Whether or not ANECO was negligent, and thus, must be held liable for damages for
injuries suffered by the respondents.

Ruling of the Court:

The Supreme Court ruled that ANECO’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
injuries sustained by respondent.ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it
complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in installing the
subject high tension wires above MIGUEL BALEN’s house, still a potential risk existed that people
would get electrocuted, considering that the wires were not insulated. Moreover, it was found
that ANECO failed to heed the complaint of Balen’s father about the installation of the line. The
proximate cause of the electrocution of respondents was ANECO’s installation of its main
distribution line of high voltage over the house of Balen, without which the accident would not
have occurred.

The petition was denied.

4. URBANO V IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the
place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went
to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio
Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued,
and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the
bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for
the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital
where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus
toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court
of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain
who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November
5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could
have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to
the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

EFFICIENT INTERVENING

1.PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION V IAC

Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando
Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left,
but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an
action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by
imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew
pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s
own negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not
have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut
off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police
in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that
offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial
moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the
dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at
or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt
have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as
the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which
the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still
find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited.
So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening
cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump
truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and
for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore
closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to
pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall
fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who
blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed
to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though
the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been
in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be
paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no
sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.

2. MCKEE V IAC

NATURE:

Appeal from decision of the IAC

FACTS:

- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck ownedby private respondents, and driven
by Ruben Galang, and aFord Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted inthe deaths of
Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher KohMcKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the FordEscort.- When the
northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters awayfrom the southern approach of the bridge,
two boys suddenlydarted from the right side of the road and into the lane of thecar. Jose Koh
blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left andentered the lane of the truck; he then switched
on theheadlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
thetruck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31,
1977.- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galangwith the crime of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in MultipleHomicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property"
wasfiled with the trial court.

- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal chargeand ordered him to pay damages.
Galang appealed to IAC.IAC affirmed decision.- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and
awardedprivate respondents moral damages and exemplary damages,and attorney¶s fee.
Petitioners appealed to IAC. In itsconsolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of
the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. Thedecision is anchored principally
on the findings that it wasGalang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which causedthe
accident. The appellate court further said that the lawpresumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, asemployers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of thelatter; it was further
asserted that these defendants did notallege in their Answers the defense of having exercised
thediligence of a good father of a family in selecting andsupervising the said employee.- In an
MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases wasreversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUES

WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolutionare supported by evidence or are
based on mere speculations,conjectures and presumptions.

HELD

YES

- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appealsmay be set aside when such
findings are not supported by theevidence or when the trial court failed to consider the
materialfacts which would have led to a conclusion different from whatwas stated in its
judgment.- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of
the truck and that the collisionoccurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that thedriver
of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of thispresumed negligence, IAC immediately
concluded that it wasJose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximatecause of the
collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as theevidence for the petitioners convincingly shows
that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached thesouthern end of the
bridge, two boys darted across the roadfrom the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.-
Negligence is the omission to do something which areasonable man, guided by those
considerations whichordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable manwould not do

- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence ina particular case: Did the
defendant in doing the allegednegligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
anordinarily prudent person would have used in the samesituation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried toavoid running over the two boys by swerving the car
away fromwhere they were even if this would mean entering the oppositelane.- Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "onewho suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and isrequired to act without time to consider the best means thatmay be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and uponreflection may appear to have been a better method, unlessthe emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about byhis own negligence.- Assuming,arguendothat Jose Koh is
negligent, it cannot besaid that his negligence was the proximate cause of thecollision.
Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause,which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by anyefficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and withoutwhich the result
would not have occurred; the proximate legalcause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, allconstituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, eachhaving a close causal connection with its immediatepredecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effectingthe injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
whichfirst acted, under such circumstances that the personresponsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudentand intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at themoment
of his act or default that an injury to some personmight probably result therefrom.-

Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain
of events, it cannot besaid that the same caused the eventual injuries and deathsbecause of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, thenegligent act of the truck driver, which was the
actual cause of the tragedy.

The entry of the car into the lane of the truckwould not have resulted in the collision had the
latter heededthe emergency signals given by the former to slow down andgive the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane.Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right
of theroad, which was the proper precautionary measure under thegiven circumstances, the
truck driver continued at full speedtowards the car.- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in
the records. Hehimself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the
bridge while the maximum speed allowed bylaw on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185
of the CivilCode, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at thetime of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of
lastclear chance finds application here.

3. manila electric v. remoquillo (supra)

4. teague v fernandez

FACTS:

The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-
concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila
was owned and operated by Teague. The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of
about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width,
it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence
of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten
meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in
the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and
six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried
to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not
be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept
on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. No part
of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including
Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured
on account of the stampede. The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages
against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by the CA. The
CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the
provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation
of the ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only
one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of
the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.

The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as
follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4)
panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of
the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability
since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained
of. According to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.”

ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence

HELD:

It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy
of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of
safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of
the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to
evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.

“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in
the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was
intended to prevent.” To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the
injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say
that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.
Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause
applies to such violation.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

5. URBANO V IAC (SUPRA)

B. TEST TO DETERMINE PROXIMATE CAUSE

But For

1. BATACLAN V MEDINA (SUPRA)

SUFFICIENT LINK

1. DY TEBAN V JOSE CHING

FACTS:

Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, wasdriving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy
Teban Trading,Inc. along the National Highway in Butuan City, going toSurigao City. A Joana Paula
passenger bus was cruising on theopposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles
wasa parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by privaterespondent Liberty Forest, Inc.The
night before, the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The driver, private respondent
Cresilito Limbaga,parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portionof the national
highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. Heparked the prime mover with trailer at the
shoulder of the roadwith the left wheels still on the cemented highway and theright wheels on
the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway.The prime mover was not equipped with early
warning devicerequired under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute,Limbaga placed a
banana trunk with leaves on the front andthe rear portion of the prime mover to warn
incomingmotorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosenelighted tin cans on the
front and rear of the trailer.To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane,
theincoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane ofthe approaching Nissan van.
Ortiz saw two bright and glaringheadlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his
break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus butthe van hit the front of the
stationary prime mover. Thepassenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz andCatamora
only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van,however, became inoperable as a result of the
incident.Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against privaterespondents. The trial court
ruled that the proximate cause ofthe vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga inparking
the prime mover on the national highway without anearly warning device on the vehicle.The CA
reversed the RTCdecision, holding that the proximate cause of the collision wasthe negligence of
Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of thepassenger bus.

ISSUE:

Whether the negligence of Limbaga was the proximatecause of the collision.

RULING

: Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, innatural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficientintervening cause, produces the injury, and without which theresult would not
have occurred. More comprehensively,proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing
theinjury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, eachhaving a close causal connection with its
immediatepredecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effectingthe injury as natural
and probable result of the cause whichfirst acted, under such circumstances that the
personresponsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudentand intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at themoment of his act or default that an injury to some
personmight probably result therefrom.

Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between theact or omission and the damage or
injury. That link must not beremote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. Thedamage
or injury must be a natural and probable result of theact or omission. In the precedent-setting
Vda. de Bataclan v.Medina, the Court discussed the necessary link that must beestablished
between the act or omission and the damage orinjury, viz.:

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, andpins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, ifthrough some event, unexpected and extraordinary,
theoverturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if somehighwaymen after looting the
vehicle sets it on fire, and thepassenger is burned to death, one might still contend that
theproximate cause of his death was the fire and not theoverturning of the vehicle. But in the
present case and underthe circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate tohold that
the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was theoverturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when thevehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural orunexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torchwas in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductorthemselves, and that because it was very dark (about
2:30 inthe morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; andcoming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns andflashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the
mosthandy and available; and what was more natural than that saidrescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle toextend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
Inother words, the coming of the men with the torch was to beexpected and was natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers bus, the trapping
ofsome of its passengers and the call for outside help.

The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequentcases as authority for the
proposition that the damage or injurymust be a natural or probable result of the act or
omission.Here, the Court agree with the RTC that the damage caused tothe Nissan van was a
natural and probable result of theimproper parking of the prime mover with trailer. The
skewedparking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncomingmotorists. Limbaga failed to
prevent or minimize that risk. Theskewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series
ofevents that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of thepassenger bus and the Nissan
van.

SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR

1.PHILIPPINE RABBIT V IAC

FACTS.

1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.

2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so the
driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep who is running unbalance made a uturn
so that the front part face the south where it come from and its rear face the north where it is
going.

3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the
three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.

4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.

5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first instance of Pangasinan.

6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant and the respondent.

7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.

ISSUE.

Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?

RULING:

According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.

So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated.

DOCTRINE

: (1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the owners anddrivers
of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
fromthe carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligentdriver and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.

In culpa contractual

the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to havebeen at fault or to
have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome byevidence that
he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756of the
New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.(3) The
driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of thecontract
of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and inthe
event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if
suchbreach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his
liabilityon the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.
Secondly, thatwould make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and
consequently, entitled torecover only the share which corresponds to the driver contradictory to
the explicit provision of Article2181 of the New Civil Code.

MIXED CONSIDERATION

CAUSE V CONDITION

1.PHOENIX V CA (SUPRA)

2. DY TEBAN V JOSE CHING

3.MANILA ELECTRIC V REMOQUILLO

4. RODRIGUEZA V MANILA RAILROAD

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted jointly by Remigio Rodrigueza and three others in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay to recover a sum of money of the Manila Railroad Company as
damages resulting from a fire kindled by sparks from a locomotive engine under the
circumstances set out below. Upon hearing the cause upon the complaint, answer and an agreed
statement of facts, the trial judge rendered judgment against the defendant company in favor of
the plaintiffs and awarded to them the following sums respectively as damages, to wit, (1) to
Remigio Rodrigueza, P3,000; (2) to Domingo Gonzaga, P400; (3) to Cristina Luna, P300; and (4) to
Perfecta Losantas, P150; all with lawful interest from March 21, 1919. From this judgment the
defendant appealed.

The facts as appearing from the agreed statement, in relation with the complaint, are to the
effect that the defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the
municipality of Albay; that on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great
quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby
communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same
were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with the exception of the
house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with
nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind
was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the complaint or in the agreed statement
whose house caught fire first, though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first
communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.

In the fourth paragraph of the complaint — which is admitted to be true — it is alleged that the
defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire, in
the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees
in charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to
be operated without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks;
thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality
which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity.

The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza stood
partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company, though exactly how far
away from the company's track does not appear. It further appears that, after the railroad track
was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company and to
remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he
promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials
of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this
fact it is contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of
Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and
that for this reason the company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for the
reasons which we shall proceed to state.

In the first place, it will be noted that the fact suggested as constituting a defense to this action
could not in any view of the case operate as a bar to recovery by the three plaintiffs other than
Remigio Rodrigueza, even assuming that the fire was first communicated to his house; for said
three plaintiffs are in nowise implicated in the act which supposedly constitutes the defense. In
this connection it will be observed that the right of action of each of these plaintiffs is totally
distinct from that of his co-plaintiff, so much so that each might have sued separately, and the
defendant if it had seen fit to do so, might in this case have demurred successfully to the
complaint for misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The fact that the several rights of action of the
different plaintiffs arose simultaneously out of one act of the defendant is not sufficient of itself
to require, or even permit, the joinder of such parties as coplaintiffs in a single action (30 Cyc.,
114) if objection had been made thereto. Domingo Gonzaga, Cristina Luna, and Perfecta
Losantas are therefore entitled to recover upon the admitted fact that this fire originated in the
negligent acts of the defendant; and the circumstance that the fire may have been
communicated to their houses through the house of Remegio Rodrigueza, instead of having
been directly communicated from the locomotive, is immaterial. (See 38 Am. Dec., 64, 77; 1 11
R. C. L., 968-971; Kansas City, etc. Railroad Co. vs. Blaker, 64 L. R. A., 81 Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
vs. Hope, 80 Pa. St., 373; 21 Am. Rep. 100.)

With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house stood upon
this ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no
proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of
building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company, upon making this
extension, had acquired the land only, leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence
he cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the
sufferance of the defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed
position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires
occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he
cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful
negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the
possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care
of the ordinary prudent man. (Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St.,
182; 21 Am. Rep., 97.)

In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that
occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that
Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore
in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact
have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as
contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not
created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and
therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the
house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying
it. (Grand Trunk Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry.
Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net

The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio Rodrigueza's
house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a
trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself
imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company could at
any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it
elected not to do so.

Questions similar to that now before us have been under the consideration of American courts
many times, and their decisions are found to be uniformly favorable to recovery where the
property destroyed has been placed in whole or in part on the right of way of the railroad
company with its express or implied consent. (L. R. Martin Timber Co. vs. Great Northern Railway
Co., 123 Minn., 423; Ann. Cas., 1915A, p. 496, note; Burroughs vs. Housatonic R.R. Co., 15 Conn.,
124; 38 Am. Dec., 64; 74; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Patterson, 105 Va. 6; 8 Ann. Cas., 44.) And the case
for the plaintiff is apparently stronger where the company constructs its line in proximity to a
house already built and fails to condemn it and remove it from its right of way.

From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment appealed from is in all respect in
conformity with the law, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

A.HISTORY AND RATIONALE

B.STATEMENT OF THE RULE

C.APPLICATION

1.PICART V SMITH

In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter long
bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.’s car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a
distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart did not move his
horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving
towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to
the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse struck
the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical
attention while the horse eventually died.

ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.

HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smith’s
negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart
and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the other lane
at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to
avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has approached the horse at such proximity it
left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can
therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his
contributory negligence.
2.PHOENIX V IAC(SUPRA)

3.GLAN V IAC

FACTS:

Engineer Orlando Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the withCalibo at the
wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towardsthe direction of Davao City.
At about that time, a cargo track driven by PaulZacarias, coming from the opposite direction of
Davao City had just crossed saidbridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo
truck and the jeepcollided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and
Patossustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. The instant case for damages wasfiled by
the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo against thedriver and owners of the
cargo truck. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Accordingly,moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias, the jeep of
the deceased Calibo was zigzagging. Further, that there were skid marks left by thetruck's tires at
the scene, and none by the jeep, demonstrates that the driver of thetruck had applied the
brakes and the jeep's driver had not, and that the jeep had onimpact fallen on its right side is
indication that it was running at high speed. Underthe circumstances, given the curvature of the
road and the descending grade of the jeep's lane, it was negligence on the part of the driver of
the jeep for not reducinghis speed upon sight of the truck and failing to apply the brakes as he
got withincollision range with the truck. And even if it be considered that there was
someantecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision in that hehad
caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of theroad, Engr. Calibo had
the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he stillhad ample room in his own lane to
steer clear of the truck, or he could simply havebraked to a full stop. The Court of Appeals
however reversed the trial court, stating that the truck drivenby defendant Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred,and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance
of about 150 meters, he did notdrive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the
oncoming jeep.

ISSUE:Whether or not Zacarias is guilty of negligence.

RULING:No. The finding that the truck driven by Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep whenthe
collision occurred is a loose one. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradictedevidence, the
actual center line of the road was not that indicated by the paintedstripe but, according to
measurements made and testified by Patrolman Dimaano,correctly lay thirty-six (36) centimeters
farther to the left of the truck's side of saidstripe. Thus, although it was not disputed that the
truck overrode the painted stripeby twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was still at least eleven (11)
centimeters awayfrom its side of the true center line of the road and well inside its own lane
when theaccident occurred. Since it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed into thestopped
truck, it may also be deduced that the jeep was at the time travellingbeyond its own lane and
intruding into the lane of the truck by at least the same 11-centimeter width of space.
4.CANLAS V CA

FACTS:

August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Vicente
Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land situated in BF Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife
Angelina Canlas.

Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the lands to Mañosca for P850K, P500K payable
within 1 week, and the balance serves as his investment in the business. Mañosca issued 2
checks P40K and P460K. The P460K lacked sufficient funds.

September 3, 1982: Mañosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K
with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the Spouses Canlas.

September 29, 1982: Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB)
for P500K with the parcels of land as security and with the help of the same impostors. The loan
was left unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.

January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the mortgage was without their
authority. He also requested the sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the auction. Both parties
refused.

The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing a Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale and annulled the mortgage

CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for coming to the bank with Mañosca and letting himself
be introduced as Leonardo Rey

ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear chance

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply

The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family not even
a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity acted
simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the
signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno previous deed of mortgage did
not bear the tax account number of the spouses as well as the Community Tax Certificate of
Angelina Canlas
doctrine of last clear chance

where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought
about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom

the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence

Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Mañosca the
opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting him the owner's copy of the transfer
certificates of title of subject parcels of land

Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the
requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them - ASB
bears the loss

Canlas went to ASB with Mañosca and he was introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't correct
Mañosca. However, he did not know that the lots were being used as a security for he was there
to make sure that Mañosca pays his debt so he cannot be estopped from assailing the validity of
the mortgage

But being negligent in believing the misrepresentation by Mañosca that he had other lots and
that the lot were not to be used as a security, Canlas was negligent and undeserving of
Attorney's fees.

the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete
nullity

5.LAPANDAY V ANGALA

FACTS:

On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was driven by
Apolonio Deocampo bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by
Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural Development
Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez.
Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael
Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left
fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.

Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against
LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his
pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left
turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was
running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was
seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place.
Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking
at the speedometer.

Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he incurred
because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against
LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.

In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of
defendant and ordered LADECO and Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court
found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and
Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 13, 1995.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in
toto the trial court’s decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its March 11,
2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.

RULING:

Yes.

Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of
the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower
speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could
have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo
was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing
the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
6.PHIL BANK OF COMMERCE V CA

FACTS:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of
cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds
in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)

They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7
of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas

Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and
confidence on PBC

Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always
validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad :

original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number -
retained by the bank

duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account
holder was left blank

After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the
duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number

This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge

Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and
later on filed in the RTC

RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable

CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees

ISSUE:

1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by
not exercising the proper validation procedure-YES

2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC

1. YES.

The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits
should not relieve the PBC of responsibility
The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of the
account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.

Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself
in its lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.

Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-
President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to
know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation
procedures until 7 years later

last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril

where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than
that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof

antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who
had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.

Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it cannot
be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury
incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks,
however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty
bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care

2. YES.

it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its
monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not
have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a
little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent

Article 2179 of the New Civil Code

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded

7.CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA

Facts: Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation while private respondent L.C. Diaz and
Company, CPA’s (“L.C. Diaz”), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting
and which opened a savings account with Solidbank. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes
Macaraya , filled up a savings cash deposit slip and a savings checks deposit slip. Macaraya
instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank and
give him the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the
two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning
to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Since the transaction took time and
Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with
Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed
him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident
to Macaraya. The following day,, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz, called
up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new
account followed by a formal written request later that day. It was also on the same day that L.C.
Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before of P300,000 from its savings
account. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz,
namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip.
A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C. Diaz filed
a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court.
After trial, the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N Solidbank should be liable for the recovery of the sum of money

HELD: YES. CA AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation shall pay private
L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA’s only 60% of the actual damages awarded by the CA. The remaining
40% of the actual damages shall be borne by private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA’s

Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual

contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
simple loan
Section 2 of RA 8791 effected on June 13 2000, declares that the State recognizes the “fiduciary
nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance

Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative

Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat
superioror command responsibility

The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is
not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss - not applicable

This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor
his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability

In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed
by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank
should be reduced.

8.bustamante v ca

FACTS:

April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven
by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the
national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite

front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
passenger bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat

several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they
sustained:

1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria,
Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;

2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;

3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;

4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina

The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger
bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado

before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming
from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away,
Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the
truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the
driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give
more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the
highway

RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary

CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the
collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the
collision making him solely liable

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.

the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.

a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.

9.pantranco v baesa

FACTS:

Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses

While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico,
died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.

CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid
the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.

Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable
to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as
a defense to defeat claim for damages

For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly
has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it

there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger

When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed
that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form
the opposite direction

Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it

last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered.

10.engada v ca

FACTS:

November 29, 1989 1:30 pm: Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney with the
owner Sheila Seyan as passnger.

The speeding Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Rogelio Engada came from the opposing direction
and swerved to its left encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw. In attempt to avoid the pick-
up, Seyan shouted at Iran to swerve to the left but the Engada also swerved to its right hitting
the Tamaraw at its right front passenger side causing its head and chassis to separate from its
body.

Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan and Iran were brought to
Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. Seyan suffered a fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound
on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the
upper-lower pole of the right kidney. Upon discharge, she Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical
expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap totalling a loss of P80,000

MTC: Engada guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical
injuries

CA: Affirmed MTC

Engada appealed alleging that CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go
back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran,
the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left

ISSUE: W/N under the doctrine of last clear chance Iran should be liable.

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

Engada's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision

in abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite lane was free of oncoming
traffic and was available for a safe passage

after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, he did not slow down

emergency rule

An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence - Iran
cannot be faulted

at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached
the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear
chance to speak of.

11.ong v metropolitan

FACTS:

July 5, 1952 1:45 p.m.: For the 4th or 5th time, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school
student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to Metropolitan Water
District's recreational swimming pools charging a nominal fee (P0.50 for adults; P0.20 for
children)

4:35 p.m.: Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining
building to drink a bottle of coke

Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small
pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke.

Lifeguards Manuel Abaño (8 am - 12 nn;2 pm - 6 pm) and Mario Villanueva (7:30-11:30 am;2:30
to 4:30 pm) were on duty

4-5 pm: there were about 20 bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abaño was going around
the pools to observe the bathers in compliance with the instructions of his chief

4:40-4:45 p.m: some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres
Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time

Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening so he immediately
jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong
from the bottom

The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately applied manual artificial
respiration

Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards,
boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he
injected the boy with camphorated oil

After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the
Philippines

Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive
him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted

Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but the same became of no
use because he found the boy already dead. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the
clinic.

The autopsy of Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division of the NBI found that
the death was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.

lower court: dismissed the complaint

Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong: failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately respond to their call
may and even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate
incident, defendants may still be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the
reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so

ISSUE: W/N the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of
Metropolitan Water District and/or its employees

HELD: NO. decision appealed from is affirmed

Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be
observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is
caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of
his employees

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of
the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury

Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we find
supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence
presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5
feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the
pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which to his drowning. As a boy scout he
must have received instructions in swimming. He knew, or have known that it was dangerous for
him to dive in that part of the pool."

12. anuran v buno

FACTS:

January 12, 1958 noon: passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara and
driven by Pepito Buño overloaded with (14-16 passengers) was parked on the road to Taal,
Batangas when a speeding motor truck owned by Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro driven by
Guillermo Razon negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three passengers
died and two others suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital
for many days

Jeepney was parked to let a passanger alight in such a way that 1/2 of its width (the left wheels)
was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of the road

suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover
consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver
and the owners of the jeepney
CFI: absolving the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck driver and the
owners to make compensation

CA: Affirmed exoneration of the jeepney

ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of last clear chance can apply so that truck driver guilty of greater
negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision will be solely liable

HELD: NO. The three defendants last mentioned are required to pay solidarily with the other
defendants-respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision.

New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756)

principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable
to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver
was likewise guilty of negligence

13. raynera v hiceta

FACTS:

Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an accident on his way home
at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were owner and driver,
respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which was involved in the said accident. On March 23, 1989,
at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a
motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The
Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The truck was loaded
with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on
the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal
plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera
crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights.
Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6
rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending
physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.

At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki Motors
(Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from respondents' payment of
damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident. The
respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners, hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila a complaint for damages against respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck.
Petitioners sought recovery of the damages caused by the negligent operation of the truck-
trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail the lights.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that respondents'
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death. The trial court also
applied the doctrine of contributory negligence and reduced the responsibility of respondents
by 20%.

(2) Court of Appeals: held that the victim's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was
the proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability.

ISSUE:

Whether the truck is responsible for the accident

RULING: No.

Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible in the highway.
It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the
service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to
passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No.
4136)" 25 respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo
load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; THE DRIVERS OF THE VEHICLES "WHO BUMP THE REAR OF
ANOTHER VEHICLE" ARE PRESUMED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, UNLESS
CONTRADICTED BY OTHER EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — It has been said that drivers of vehicles
"who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the
rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of
him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the
front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame
but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the
Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.

He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the
highway.

II.PERSONS LIABLE

A.TORTFEASOR

1. WORCESTER V OCAMPO
FACTS:

Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication
againstMartin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et al,
as the owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily newspaper “El
Renacimiento” (Spanish version) and “MulingPagsilang” (tagalong version). Worcester alleged
that the defen dants have been maliciously persecuting andattacking him in the newspapers for
a long time and they published an editorial entitled “Birds of Prey” with the malicious intent of
injuring Worcester, both as a private person and as a government official as the editorial
obviouslyreferred to him.

Worcester alleged that he was likened to “birds of prey” in the following manner: “Such are the
characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture
who gorges himself on the dead andputrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant omniscience
and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.”

TC:

In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for the P60k total damages.

ISSUE: WON the defendants’ individual properties can be made jointly and severally liable for
the damages under the civil and commercial codes,

HELD:

Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved.The present action is a tort.

Universal doctrine: each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he
participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors.If several persons commit a tort, the
plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly,or one of them
separately, because the

TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL.

It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal act- e.g. assault and battery
committed by variouspersons, under the common law, they are all principals.Under common
law, he who aided or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal
ashe who inflicted or committed the actual tort.

General Rule:

Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise,countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent
and in the same manner as if they had performed thewrongful act themselves.Joint tortfeasors
are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro
rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except amongthemselves. They cannot
insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.

They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.

A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies any claim which might exist
against the others. Therelease of one of the joint tortfeasors by agreement generally operates to
discharge all.The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint tortfeasors
are liable and which are not, even if they are charged jointly and severally.

2.CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD

The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. J.H. Chapman visited a friend in Santa Ana and
while he was about to ride a vehicle to take him home he was struck by a car owned by James
Underwood and driven by his chauffeur. Chapman was on the correct lane. Underwood was
riding in the car when the incident happened. Apparently, the chauffeur, coming from the
opposite direction and was driving straight ahead and when the automobile about to be
boarded by Chapman was in front of him, he [the chauffeur] instead of swerving left he suddenly
swerved right to the direction of Chapman thereby hitting and running over him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Underwood is liable for the negligent act of his chauffeur.

HELD: No. The general rule is that an owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after
he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible,
either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of
the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his
own. In the case at bar, it was not shown that there was a sufficient period for Underwood to
dissuade the chauffeur from the negligent act as the swerving of the vehicle by the chauffeur
was sudden.

3.CAEDO V YU KHE THAI

FACTS:

Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Private respondents
were traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of Yu. Both vehicles
were running at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the same direction as
Bernardo’s. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling and caused
multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of the
accident be held solidarily liable.

RULING:

The court ruled that if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the existence of
due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather
the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if
he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

4.RODRIGUEZ LUNA V IAC

Equity will not be applied if to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Father’s liability for
damages made by his son who later become emancipated but is now abroad and could hardly
support himself cannot be merely subsidiary.

FACTS: The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision.
The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive,
and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license. In a
suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father
Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the
following judgment: Judgment was rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose
dela Rosa to pay, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as
unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00
for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. The private respondents failed to
pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution. The execution yielded
only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His
compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet."

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose, the father, should be primarily or subsidiary liable with his son, Luis.

HELD: Primarily liable. The Dela Rosas invoke Elcano vs Hill for subsidiary liability only. In Elcano
vs Hill, it was held that article 2180 was applied to Atty Hill despite the emancipation by
marriage by his son, but as his son attained age, as a matter of equity, Atty Hill's liabilty should
only be subsiadiary as to his son. However, the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply equity
instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa
is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property
either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.

B.VICARIOUS LIABILITY

1. PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

1.LIBI V IAC

Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December 1978,
Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann
refused to give Wendell his second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead
inside Julie Ann’s house. Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was 21).

Apparently, Wendell used his father’s gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed suicide.

The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the parents of Wendell (Cresencio and
Amelia Libi).

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?

HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in
safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that
their son had possession of said gun. They only found out about it when the shooting happened.
Further, they were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local Constabulary
(police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent and were not acting with the
diligence required by law (that of a good father of a family) in making sure that their minor
children shall not cause damages against other persons.

What is the nature of their liability?

In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in cases
like this is not merely subsidiary. Their liability is primary. This is whether or not what the
damage caused by their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is also
the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that they have acted with
the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely subsidiary, they can never pose
the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.

2. TAMARGO V IAC

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed
a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the
time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such
petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child
where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents,

their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the
case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with
the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
“Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil code”.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had
been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the
natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

3.EXCONDE V CAPUNO

Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary School. In March
1949, he attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took
control of the wheels which he later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing
two other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other. Isidoro’s mother, Sabina Exconde, sued
Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved her
right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin
Capuno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with
them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means”, while, on the
other hand, gives them the “right to correct and punish them in moderation”. The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.

On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, “teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody”, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution.

JUSTICE J.B.L. REYES Dissenting:

Delfin Capuno should be relieved from liability. There is no sound reason for limiting the liability
to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It
cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching do
not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise
authority and supervision over the pupil.

4.SALEN V BALCE

Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living
with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide
and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this
action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their
right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to
criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.

Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art.
2180 of the CC.

Ruling: Judgment reversed.

Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable
for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with
criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this
particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which
cover equal or identical cases.

5.FUELLAS V CADANO

FACTS:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years
old and classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was studying his
lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed
it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who
returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to
the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went
ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met
by Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito
extended his hand to Rico, but the latter instead held the former by the neck and with his leg,
placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his
right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was
helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General
Hospital for treatment and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a complete fracture of
the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a civil
case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico.

ISSUE:

WON Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor
son.

HELD:

YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company. This civil liability of the father or the mother, as the case may be, is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and the only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since children and wards do not yet have the
capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty of
exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that damages to
third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards
may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the
consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused”.

6.gutierrez v gutierrez

FACTS:

On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on a bridge. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo
Velasco, and was owned by saturnine Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio
Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio’s father and mother, Mr. and Mrs.
Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother,
together with several other members of the Gutierrez family were accommodated therein.

The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a
fractured right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable period of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not both the driver of the truck and automobile are liable for damages and
indemnification due to their negligence. What are the legal obligations of the defendants?

HELD: Bonifacio Gutierrez’s obligation arises from culpa aquiliana. On the other hand, Saturnino
Cortez’s and his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco’s obligation rise from culpa contractual.

The youth Bonifacio was na incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of
speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by
his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted
a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on
these facts, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not
the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.

The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests
on a different basis, namely, that of contract.

7.CUADRA V MONFORT

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary
School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises.
While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an
earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got
infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but
she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT
Monfort’s dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort
should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis
of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that
which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and
may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the
last paragraph of Article 2180, which states “that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.”

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in
the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused
it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was,
as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far
as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
trait in the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents.

JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting;

MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying “aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,”
it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing
in the record that would indicate that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything
at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child.

8.ST.MARY'S ACADEMY V CARPITANOS

Facts:

For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive through visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying.
Among the students of SMA who took part in the campaign was Sherwin and James. Sherwin
and other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva
and driven by by James, then 15 years old. On their way to Dapitan City, the jeep turned turtle
resulting in the death of Sherwin.

The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his parents, Vicente and SMA. At the trial, the
traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because
the steering wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic
investigator was not disputed by any of the parties.

After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it had special
parental authority at the time of the accident. The parents of Dino were found to be only
subsidiarily liable and were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the school. Dino
was absolved for being only a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Vivencio,
the vehicle owner was not held liable at all.

Issue:

Was the lower court correct?

Held:

No.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery
is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is
unfounded.

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed the minor James
to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did not allow James to drive the jeep. So
whether the accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are
events which it had no control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who should
be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even
if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. (St.
Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al G.R.143363, February 6,2002).

2. TEACHERS AND SCHOOL

A.UNDER CIVIL CODE

1.PALISOC V BRILLANTES

In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and
Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a
school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This
caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon
delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school
president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio
Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.

The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that
Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable
“so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs
Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of
their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the
school – which Daffon was not.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde
Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and
Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of
providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to
protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At
any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance
with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of
the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The
SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and
boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held
liable for the tortious acts of their students.

2.AMADORA V CA
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school
auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo
died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo
sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s
negligence.

The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of
boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that
when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even
though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school
requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA
ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational
schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of
Article 2180 which provides:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the
changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and
academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not,
may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.

The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be
held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.

For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly
liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools,
the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic
schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the
tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.

The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or
when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of
the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance
of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if
the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of
Article 2180.

At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid
subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater
familias.

In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no
sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct
liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily
liable too.

This case abandoned fully the cases of Exconde vs Capuno and Mercado vs Court of Appeals.

3.SALVOSA IAC

Facts of the Case:

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution of arts

and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering
Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman
and Automotive Mechanics courses.

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon
received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his
salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a
commerce student of the BCF.

On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the
former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and
Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide.

Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and
the BCF .

Issue:WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.

Ruling of the Case:

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long
as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in
their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance
in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.

B.UNDER FAMILY CODE

1.ST MARY'S ACADEMT V CARPITANOS (SUPRA)

2.ST.JOSEPH'S COLLEGE V MIRANDA

OTHER CASES:

3.PASCO V CFI

PARAS, J.:

The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is whether the provision of the
penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which states:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

is equally applicable to academic institutions.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with two
companions, while walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after
attending classes in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led
by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta
University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to
save his life.

On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages
against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University which
was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based
on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.

On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under which it was
sued applies only to vocational schools and not to academic institutions;

b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability in this case arises from a criminal action which
the defendant university has not committed;

c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the plaintiff, hence, it
would be premature to bring an action for damages against defendant University. (Rollo, p. 96)

On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner
moved to reconsider the Order of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground
that there is no sufficient justification to disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for
certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440, praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the
questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against respondent school and
the order of July 17, 1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal, with
costs against respondent school.

We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to educational institutions

(which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not,
under the article, the school or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads)
is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of
"teachers or heads."

WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

4.YLARDE V AQUINO

FACTS:

1962: Sergio Banez started burying huge stones which were remnants of the old school shop
that was destroyed in World War II because they were serious hazards to the schoolchildren

October 7, 1963: Edgardo Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to 11, after class
dismissal and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried.

The work was left unfinished.

October 8, 1963: Aquino called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito
Ylarde of the original 18 pupils to continue the digging
they dug until the excavation was 1 meter and 40 centimeters deep

Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose
soil that was brought about by the digging

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, they got out of the hole

Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez
who was about 30 meters away to key to the school workroom where he could get some rope

A few minutes after Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit.

without any warning at all, Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down
towards the opening.

Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time

unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to
the wall in a standing position

Ylarde sustained the following injuries:

1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic region.

2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.
3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis
4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.
5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and urine about 2 liters.
6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis
7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost entirely separated from its
neck.
3 days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano, principal

lower court:

digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education

Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person

demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence

CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Aquino and Soriano should be held liable for negligence

HELD: YES. the petition GRANTED. Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners the following:
(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00
(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00
(3) Moral damages 20,000.00
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child
Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades

Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging

GR: teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students

EX: where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable

Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:

(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers

(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing
that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge
stone was at the brink of falling
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety
(5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal
connection to the death of the child Ylarde

it was but natural for the children to play around

the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by Aquino

the excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the
like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that could result in death or
physical injuries

A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site,
and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily
careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

5.ST.FRANCIS V CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a
school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo,
because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to
the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their
teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance
of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which
did not have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere
knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to
the holding of the same.

No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages

to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her
best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or
damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

6.PSBA V CA

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic community, while in
the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit
against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action
against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence
of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco
parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case
for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form
liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For
its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe
its rules and regulations.

Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death.

Petition denied.

7.SOLIMAN V TUAZON

FELICIANO, J.:

On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy
B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged that:

. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and
premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular
enrolled student of said school taking his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON,
who was on said date and hour in the premises of said school performing his duties and
obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and control of
his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without
any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent
to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a
deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused plaintiff's death were
it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated and confined at
Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be able
to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for
a duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely healed. 1

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no
cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the
injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private respondent school was not
the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for
any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th
paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
school.

In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted private respondent school's
motion to dismiss, holding that security guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the
school which accordingly could not be held liable for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, without success.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180,
as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil Code and granted the school's motion
to dismiss.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one
against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for
acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held
vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

xxx xxx xxx

The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged
wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private
respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon
was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security
Agency Inc. It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or
watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a general rule, a client
or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards
or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of
events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security
guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security
guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions
are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered
into with the security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between the
Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the
Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.

Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of
the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-
quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability
upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.

The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision
over the conduct of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of
the heart and mind of the pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and president of a
school of arts and trades known as the "Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila,
responsible in damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which
resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be
seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article
2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant
case.

Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon
a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant
case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury
to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school
had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.

Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one based
wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge
was correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not be held liable upon any
other basis in law, for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle
respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?

The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of
Appeals, 5 requires us to give a negative answer to that question.

In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student
had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise
any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the Court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. 6

In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from
gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out
a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place. 7

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against
it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at
bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly
tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal,
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could
have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial
judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex
lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a
possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting aside technical considerations, we
consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error correctible by this Court in the
instant case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the
comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated
29 November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings
consistent with this Resolution.

3. OWNERS /MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT/EMPLOYERS

A.EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

1.SPS.JAYME V APOSTOL

Facts:

Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by
Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered
under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan.
Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General
Santos City to catch his Manila flight.

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin
some fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving
at a very high speed at the time of the accident. The victim was brought to the hospital, but
despite medical intervention he did not survived.

Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint
for damages with the RTC against respondents Apostol [registred owner of the vehicle],
Simbulan [possessor of the car], Lozano [driver], Miguel [passenger], Municipality of Koronadal
[employer Lozano].

The RTC rendered a decision absolving defendant Municipality of Koronadal being an agency of
the State performing governmental functions. The same with defendant Simbulan, not being the
owner of the subject vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. However, defendants Lozano,
Apostol, and Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and
severally to pay the plaintiff.

The CA affirmed the decision, absolve Mayor Miguel of liability.

Issue:

Whether or not Mayor Miguel is solidarily liable with Lozano.

Held:

For the determination of the liability of Miguel, it must be established that he is the employer of
Lozano.

Per Article 2180 of the Civil Code -a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual acts,
but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees,
the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the
employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.

Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be
established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was
performing his functions.

Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the

plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence. In resolving the present
controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and
therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's power of selection;
(2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of
doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.

Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal
which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that
Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to
Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several
occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was
loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists.
In the case under review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer
notwithstanding Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.

As to the contention that Miguel has the control over Lozano when the accident happen- the
same has no leg to stand on and must necessarily fail. No negligence, said the Court, may be
imputed against a fellow employee [Miguel as mayor of Koronadal] although the person may
have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be
attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever
right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an
application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.

In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered
owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that
will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time
of the accident.

Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing
him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter's
negligent acts. The driver's duty is not one that may be delegated to others.
2.PROFESSIONAL SERVICE INC V AGANA

FACTS

Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and
bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr.
Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread
on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil,
who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr.
Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on
the Record of Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no
avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing). A “diligent search” was conducted
but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.

A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her
that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult
an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation.
After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of
cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from
her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away.
However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece
of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.

Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil,
and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in
Natividad’s body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also
filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors
with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad).
Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found
PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr.
Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS
GUILTY

WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO

WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence. YES

RATIO

DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE

His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who
put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record
(re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work
and found it in order].

Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at least prima
facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required
to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it
is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had
been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her
body as her condition might permit. What’s worse in this case is that he misled her by saying
that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health
care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would have done [or wouldn’t have done], and that the failure or action
caused injury to the patient.

Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to do
so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it

Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient

Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery

Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still
missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patient’s vagina

DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE

The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’ does not convince the
court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

Occurrence of injury

Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the defendant [DR.
FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL

Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those
who had control or management used proper care
Absence of explanation by defendant

Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of
the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged
such role is evident from the following:

He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy

He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order

He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave

He ordered the closure of the incision

HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE
TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]

Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its professionals.
However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are
taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing
staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the
universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Court’s bases for sustaining PSI’s liability:

Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee

relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR
LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of control]

Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow misleading the
public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869]

PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of their physicians.
Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly
paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence.

If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the quality of its services,
the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for its agents’ acts.

Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability for the negligent acts of
health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of respondeat superior.
This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty
of exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for
medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the note of
the count nurse, and this established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and
concealment about the gauzes.

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending nurses
+ the fact that the operation was carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff

It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its
walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence committed

PSI also liable under NCC 2180

It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family
in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil

B.WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ASSIGNED TASK

1.FILAMER V IAC

NOTE: This case reversed Filamer vs IAC (October 16, 1990)

Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned as the
school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school
president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977
at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to
report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in
the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together.
Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha
was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days.
Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against
Funtecha.

In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the
tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which
provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision
and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are
excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations
between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only
attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA
denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.

HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time
Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR
was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions
of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In
other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There
is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit
for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working
student of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule
on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act
of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this
enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

2.NPC V CA

Topic Query: In a vehicular collision, who is vicariously liable to the victims, the employer of the
driver, or the contractor who hired him?

Facts

One fateful day on July 22, 1979, a dump truck owned by the National Power Corporation and
driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on collision with a Toyota Tamaraw, resulting in the
death of three of the car’s passengers and various physical injuries of the other passengers. The
heirs filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated, the contractor who
hired Ilumba. The latter contends that it cannot be considered as the employer but merely the
agent of the principal, NPC, as PHESCO merely provides labor-only services to NPC. The latter on
the other hand, avers that it cannot be held liable to third persons who are injured because of
the tortuous acts of its employees. NPC raised Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which provides that the employer shall only be responsible
to the workers. In fine, NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to compliance with
the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages.

It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the critical path
network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO. Likewise, the manning schedule
and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation by NPC. Then too, it
cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease, again NPCs concurrence
is needed. Another consideration is that even in the procurement of tools and equipment that
will be used by PHESCO, NPCs favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools
and equipment can be purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that
will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the
project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities, is related to
NPCs principal business of power generation. In sum, NPCs control over PHESCO in matters
concerning the performance of the latters work is evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to
wield such power to be considered as the employer.

Issue(s)

Who is liable to the heirs of the victims in the vehicular accident?

Ruling

NPC. Clearly, PHESCO is a mere agent of NPC, as it merely delivers labor-only services to the
latter. Even considering the amount of control that NPC has over the exercise of PHESCO’s
activities (including approving the expenditure, hiring standard, and pay scale) also alludes to
this fact. Furthermore, NPC’s reliance on the IRR of the Labor Code is misplaced, as the case is
not a labor dispute but rather the recovery of damages against both NPC and PHESCO. In other
words, what governs here is the Civil Code rule on vicarious liability as enshrined in Art. 2180,
and not the Labor Code.

3.CASTILEX V VASQUEZ

4.VALENZUELA V CA

FACTS:

June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction
of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the
sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked help

She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon

While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly
hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed
accross his windshield and fell to the ground

She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was
replaced with an artificial one.

Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]

RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the
stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990,
P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the
date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000
in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.

CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer

Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated

Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the
accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very
fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)

ISSUE:

1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO

2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO

3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES

4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO

If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have
avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time
and distance

it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision
with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was
running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane
going to Cubao

2. NO.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection

emergency rule

an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence

She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark
Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her

She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and
to solicit help if needed

she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car

3. YES.

Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant
(must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately
falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of his employees

Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him
of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either
their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.

Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he
was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a bare allegation which was
never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came
from his officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate
had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other
work related strategies.

Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion
that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent
and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s
grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo
through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding
adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented,
are painful.

5.PROFESSIONAL SERVICE INC V.AGANA(SUPRA)

C.PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

D.REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTION

1.LAMPESA V DE VERA

VERAFACTS:

On December 28, 1988,

De Vera, Jr. boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City

driven byrespondent Modesto Tollas.Upon reaching the Km. 4 marker of the national highway,
the jeepney came to a completestop to allow a truck ,then being driven by Dario Copsiyat, to
cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at aprivate parking lot on the right side of the
road.AsTollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly along its path ,the truck, which had just left
the pavement, suddenly started to slide back towards the jeepneyuntil its rear left portion hit
the right side of the jeepney. De Vera, Jr., who was seated in the front passenger seat, noticed his
leftmiddle finger was cut off as he was holding on to the handle of the right side of the jeepney.
He asked Tollas to bringhim immediately to the hospital.After delivering a load of vegetables,
truck owner Lampesa instructed his driver, Copsiyat, to park the truck in the parking lot across
the highway. While the rear of the truck was still on the pavement of the highway, an
approaching passenger jeepney sideswiped the rear portion of the truck. This resulted in the
dismemberment of De Vera, Jr.’s leftmiddle finger, according to the defense.Lampesa offered
P5,000 to De Vera, Jr. as a gesture of humanitarian support, but the latter demanded P1
millionalthough this amount was later lowered to P75,000. The parties failed to settle amicably;
thus, De Vera, Jr. filed an actionfor damages against Lampesa, Copsiyat, Ramos and Tollas, as the
truck owner, truck driver, jeepney owner/operator and jeepney driver, respectively.

The trial court found driver Copsiyat negligent in the operation of his truck and ruled that his
negligence wasthe proximate cause of the injuries suffered by De Vera, Jr. Upon review,the Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court’s findings of negligence on the part of Copsiyat and Lampesa.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: w o n thatpetitioners are liable for the injury sustained by De Vera, Jr.

HELD:

In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found Copsiyat negligent in maneuvering the
truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by De Vera,
Jr. Lampesa was alsoheld accountable by both courts because he failed to exercise due diligence
in the supervision of his driver.

ThisCourt is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties, particularly
where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter of petitioners’
negligence coincide.

The resolution of factual issues is afunction of the trial court, whose findings on these matters
are, as a general rule, binding on this Court more so wherethese have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

On a final note, petitioners’ liability for moral damages and attorney’s fees cannot now be
questioned for failure of petitioners to raise it before the Court of Appeals.

It is a well-entrenched rule that issues not raised belowcannot be raised for the first time on
appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.

Moreover, the award of moral damages in this case is justifiable under Article 2219 (2)of the
Civil Code,which provides for said damages in cases of quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.

The award for attorney’s fees is also proper under Article 2208 (2)of the Civil Code, considering
that De Vera, Jr. was compelled to litigate when petitioners ignored his demand for an amicable
settlement of his claim.

WHEREFORE,the petition is DENIED.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for thedamage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which we cannot pass upon in a
petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.

Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that
the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee.

To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof that he
exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.