[G.R. No. 111141.
March 6, 1998] repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale[9] on August
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th
Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this
20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is
claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal
title over the property can be vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong.
The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44[1] ruled in favor of private
respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true and
lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area
of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation
purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September
1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the
land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the
same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and
averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land
which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest,[2] Pablo Espinosa on
August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner[3], asserting
that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold
Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio.[4] This was corroborated by
Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in
1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of
petitioners property was the old Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed
Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the
old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of
petitioners property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.[5]
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts:
He denied petitioners claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of
the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its
coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916,[6] which showed that the land had an area
of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by
property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by
Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz.[7]
Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this
property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No.
5339[8] was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to
24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 5720.[10] However, the property remained in petitioners hands for
only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa[11] who then
declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 12311.[12] Consequently, the
property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosas wife, the late Segundina
Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated
as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5-hectare
property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent[13] in
consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was
issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and
boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax
Declaration No. 2916 under petitioners name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of
the disputed property. The first survey[14] was made for petitioner, while the second
was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain
discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioners
allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was
actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606.
On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of
4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the
discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest[15] before the Bureau of Lands
against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the
municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended because of
the instant case.[16]
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother,
Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased
Leonida Zaragoza,[17] the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare
property of the deceased. The property involved is described in the instrument as
having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301[18] and as bounded on the
North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the
Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax
Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding share in the
estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the
extrajudicial settlement[19] petitioners share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore
appeared to private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurios) property
and declared it a part of his inheritance.[20] The boundaries were likewise altered so
that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on
the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo
Titong.[21] Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted the
course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Concepcion
Verano vda. de Cabug[22] because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa
shortly thereafter.[23]
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as
the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect
private respondents title and ownership over the property and to pay attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, costs and moral damages.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion
for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the
lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The
remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in
the Civil Code:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property.[24] The ground or reason
for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding. Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio
alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of
these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.[25]
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no
other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege
that an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding beclouded the plaintiffs
title over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants
(respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification,
forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same:
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorneys fees. He prayed that, aside from
issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired
laborers from intruding into the land, the court should declare him the true and
absolute owner thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as
clouds cast on his title to the property were private respondents alleged acts of
physical intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be
considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of
title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would
have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The
answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, in bad faith, surreptitiously,
maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land
which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and
natural and common boundary between the properties.[26] Moreover, during the
hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by
evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private
respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the
following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for
quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as
that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed
property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners
interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is
appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly
be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the `instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry,
whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of
possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.[27]
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for
quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same
are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based
on a misapprehension of facts.[28] Upon an examination of the records, the Court
finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner sold, ceded, transferred and
conveyed the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and
possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the
same manner, Espinosas rights of ownership over the land ceased and were
transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in
the Civil Code, as follows:
ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the
thing sold.[29] In the case at bar, petitioners claim of ownership must of necessity fail
because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private
respondents predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through
possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134
of the Civil Code provides that (o)wnership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years, this
provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This
article states that x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim
of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo
titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).[30] The good faith of the
possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received
the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[31] For purposes
of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right.[32]
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As
aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiffs admitted acts of converting the
boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership
thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore
tantamount to bad faith.[33] To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would
run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to
found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription
cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the
Civil Code states that (o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith. Petitioners alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when
private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years.
This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared
upon his request,[34] the tax declaration in his name,[35] the commissioners report
on the relocation survey,[36] and the survey plan.[37] Respondent court correctly held
that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos.
3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a
paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land.[38] A survey
under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the
nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in
severalty a part of the common estate.[39] Therefore, a survey, not being a
conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found
his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not
conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.[40]
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in
accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as
amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send
their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a
piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval.[41] A survey
plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing,
the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec.
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in
evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not
signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not
to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter
the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence
presented by the parties.[42]
Similarly, petitioners tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive
evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by
itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.[43] It is merely an indicium
of a claim of ownership.[44] Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in
proving ones ownership.[45] Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioners tax
declaration and the commissioners report as regards the area of his claimed property
is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioners
property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the
commissioned geodetic engineers survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is
therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private
respondents claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5
hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by
the commissioners report.
There is also nothing in the commissioners report that substantiates petitioners claim
that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower
courts statement in its decision[46] that as reflected in the commissioners report
dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the
defendants (Exhibit 2)[47] or the private respondents. A careful reading of the
decision would show that this statement is found in the summary of defendants
(herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be
attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the defendants
assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-hectare property. Hence, it is not
amiss to conclude that either petitioner misapprehended the lower courts decision or
he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorneys fees of
P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is
replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established,
the award of moral damages is in order.[48] This pronouncement finds support in Art.
2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts
enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that (a)ny person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The moral
damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in
holding that the award of attorneys fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly
unfounded civil action.[49]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is
immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ. (Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40177 March 15, 1934
LI SENG GIAP & CO., applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
Manly and Reyes for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of individuals who
are not citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, but aliens, instituted
these proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for the registration
in its name in the registry of deeds, of the three parcels of land described in the plans
Exhibits A and B, and technical descriptions attached to its application, in accordance
with the provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII or Title II of Act No. 2874.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as his
grounds that the three parcels of land in question were public lands belonging to the
Government of the United States under the administration and control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and that, being an alien, the applicant
partnership cannot invoke the benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said Act
No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act
invoked by the applicant. The Director of Lands has made no reference to Act No.
496 in his opposition for the reason that the Act in question merely prescribes, in
general terms, the manner or procedure to be followed by an applicant in the
obtainment of the certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or issuance thereof, as
the case may be, by the court or by the Government agencies therein mentioned.
After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment therein
denying the application of the applicant partnership on the ground that it is an alien,
and holding, at the same time, that the parcels of land it sought to register in its name
are a portion of the public domain. The said applicant took exception to and appealed
from such judgment, claiming that the trial court committed the following alleged
errors, to wit:
I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co. being a
partnership made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine Islands
nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this reason, to register the land described
in its application under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the application a part
of the public domain.
III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicant's motion for reconsideration as
well as its motion for new trial.
It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three parcels of land in question. The
record shows that they are agricultural lands which at present contain coconut trees,
abaca and cacao with which they have been planted for over forty years. The coconut
trees there on range from one to forty years in age. The said three parcels had
likewise been cultivated and had actually been occupied for many years during the
Spanish regime by several natives of the Province of Camarines Sur, named
Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron, Margarita Labordes, Doroteo Quitales and Cornelio
Vargas. The occupation or possession thereof by the above-named persons was
under claim of ownership but neither the exact date when such possession began nor
the circumstances under which they acquired the property in question has been
determined. However, it seems certain that such occupation began some fifty-five
years ago and continued without interruption from that time until said persons decide
to sell them to Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien like the herein applicant.
Neither is there anything of record to show when the sale was made but it also seems
certain that it took place during the Spanish regime. Sebastian Palanca continued in
possession of the aforesaid three parcels of land from the time he acquired them in
the manner hereinbefore stated until July 22, 1930, when he sold them to the herein
applicant-appellant. However, before selling them and while he was in possession
thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he failed to obtain a gratuitous title or
even a mere possessory information therefor, which would serve to protect his claim
of ownership, by taking advantage of the benefits afforded by the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, which was promulgated in the Philippines and published in the
Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April 17th of the same year.
The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19 and 21 of the Maura
Law, and which had been in force in the Philippines during the last years of the
Spanish regime and continued to be so until the enactment of the Public Land Act
and the amendments thereto, read as follows:
ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and mountains not included in the
following exceptions shall be considered alienable public lands: First, those which
have become subjected to private ownership and have a legitimate owner. Second,
those which belong to the forest zones which the State deems wise to reserve for
reasons of public utility.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under cultivation who have not
obtained nor applied for composition on the date this decree shall be published in the
Gaceta de Manila, may obtain a gratuitous title of property, by means of a possessory
information in conformity with the law of civil procedure and the mortgage law
whenever they establish any of the following conditions:
First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption during the
preceding six years.1ªvvphi1.ne+
Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years, and having
had them under cultivation until the date of the information, and for three years before
that date.
Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption, for thirty or
more years, although the land is not under cultivation.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted order to perfect the
informations referred to in articles 19 and 20.
Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-mentioned
provided as follows:
ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, the inextensible period for carrying out the informations referred to in the two
preceding articles, shall be counted as on the 17th day of April, 1895.
Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator and possessors to the
obtainment of free title shall lapse, and the full property right in the land shall revert to
the State or, in a proper case, to the public domain.
Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited article the three
parcels of land in question reverted to the State as property of the public domain upon
the expiration of the period specified therein, by reason of negligence on the part of
the possessors thereof.
The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of section 54, paragraph
6, of Act No. 926, it has necessarily acquired the right to have the corresponding
certificate of title issued to it upon registration of the said parcels of land in its name in
the registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had actually been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, not only by
itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from whom it had purchased them, for more
than ten years prior to July 26, 1904, the date on which the aforesaid Act went into
effect, in accordance with the proclamation of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of the same date.
The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right,
occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply
to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
had fulfilled all the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the
Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public lands, including the payment of the
purchase price, but who failed to secure formal conveyance of title;
2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States,
having applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey, auction,
and an award, or a right to an award, of such lands, did not receive title therefor
through no default upon their part;
3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States,
having applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey and
award of same, did not, through negligence upon their part, comply with the
conditions of full or any payment therefor, but who after such survey and award shall
have occupied the land adversely, except as prevented by war or force majeure until
the taking effect of this Act;
4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment or composition
of title to lands against the Government under the Spanish laws and royal decrees in
force prior to the royal decree of February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, but who failed to receive title therefor through no default upon their part;
5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands by "possessory
proceedings" under the provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of the royal decree
of the King of Spain issued February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
and who, having complied with all the conditions therein required, failed to receive the
title therefor through no default upon their part; and
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of
this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of this section
must establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are
therein required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided,
however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under paragraph 1, 2, 3,
4 or 5 of the aforecited section, which, by the way, conclusively shows that prior to the
enactment of Act No. 926, the said Maura Law was the last law which regulated the
acquisition of alienable public lands and the issuance of the corresponding title to
those who could establish their claim that they were entitled thereto. Being aware of
this fact, the applicant has never invoked said paragraphs. He merely confines
himself to invoking the provisions of paragraph 6 thereof, in support of which he cites
the rulings of this court in the cases of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil.,
128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883).
In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan Yungquip, who
was a Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land which he
sought to register in his name, some by purchase and others by inheritance; that he
and his predecessors in interest had been in the open, peaceful, continuous and
notorious possession of the same for at least thirty years, and that such parcels of
land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was entitled to have them registered in his
name under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason
that he filed his application to that effect more than one year prior to the enactment
and enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held therein that the matter should
be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the ground that no valid law could be
found, at least on that occasion, which prohibited the registration in his name in the
registry of deeds, of the parcels of land of which he claimed to be the owner.
In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, it was
likewise held that lands held in private ownership constitute no part of the public
domain and cannot, therefore, come within the purview of said Act No. 2874 on the
ground that said subject (lands held in private ownership) is not embraced in any
manner in the title of the Act, and that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the
same was to limit the application thereof exclusively to lands of the public domain.
Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited case of Tan
Yungquip vs. Director of Lands to the effect that the application of the therein
applicant should be granted on the ground that the provisions of section 54 of Act No.
926, which were therein under consideration and interpretation, do not distinguish
between citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and aliens, however,
the appellant contends that the aforecited section has such scope and that the
question raised in this case should be decided under the latter interpretation.
We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two cases and that in the case of
Agari vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are decisive and
applicable to the case under consideration, on the ground that although it is true that
Agari, who was the applicant in the last case, was an alien, it was likewise true that
the persons, from whom he had acquired the land which he sought to register in his
name in the registry of deeds during the time Act No. 926 was still in force, were
natives of the Philippine Islands, who, in turn, had acquired it through their father, who
was likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with the State in accordance with
the laws then in force; nor that, under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of
Act No. 926, the applicant-appellant Li Seng Giap & Co. could have succeeded in
securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first place, because the three
aforecited decisions refer to cases which are different from the one now under
consideration; in the second place, because said decisions were based on the
supposition that the parcels of land in question therein were of private ownership and
at that time no law was known to be in existence, which prohibited the registration of
said parcels of land in the registry of deeds, in the name of the aforesaid applicants
Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz and Agari, and in the third place because while Act No.
926 was still in force (it is no longer in force, having been expressly repealed by
section 128 of Act No. 2874, on December 28, 1919), it should have been interpreted
in the light of the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known
as the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch as the former had been
approved under the authority of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act. The very
title of Act No. 926 above referred to shows that one of the purposes for which it was
approved was to carry out the provisions of sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the
aforecited Act of Congress, which title reads in part:
An Act . . . providing for the determination by the Philippines Court of Land
Registration of all proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in said Islands, as
authorized by sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixty-two of the Act of Congress
of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An Act temporarily to provide for the
administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other
purposes".
Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear relation to the
question under consideration, provide as follows:
SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the
conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain
for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the
Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any
native of said Islands, conveying the title to any tract of land not more than sixteen
hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such
native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands in hereby authorized and
empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for
the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise,
not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of
not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the
purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon
actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold
for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee
cannot alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not
apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of
the estates of decedents.
It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that gratuitous title to
property may be issued only to natives of the Philippine Islands who are in
possession of the necessary qualifications specified therein. It may therefore be
inferred from the foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a different scope from that
given it by the aforecited Act of Congress and, therefore, the phrase "all persons"
employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of the former Act should be understood to
mean only citizens of the Philippine Islands or citizens of the United States or of any
insular possession thereof.
The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have reverted
to the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of private ownership.
Neither were they so on or after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show
any title thereto either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be
considered as having been issued by the Government. The only basis on which it
now claims the right to have them registered in its name is its alleged possession
thereof together with that of Sebastian Palanca and of the former possessors, as if to
say, that it is entitled to the registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the parcels
of land in question already belong to it, having acquired them by prescription through
the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of
ownership, at least since the Spanish regime in the Philippine Islands. However, the
truth is that the law expressly provides that no public land may be acquired by
prescription, and that such mode of acquisition does not hold as against the
Government. This provision is contained precisely in the very law invoked by the
applicant, that is section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case of Ongsiaco vs.
Magsilang (50 Phil., 380, 386), this court said:
". . . in a controversy between private individuals, where the Government has not
intervened, and where it appears that the land has ceased to be of public domain and
has come to be of private ownership, a petitioner may obtain registration of land upon
a title acquired by adverse possession as against individual opponents. The same
rule does not maintain with respect to land claimed by the Government and as to
which the Government is opposing." In the case of Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Abad (56 Phil., 75, 80), this court, deciding a question similar to the one
raised herein by the appellant, said as follows: "Subsection (b) of section 45 of Act
No. 2874 is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relied upon by the appellant,
as depriving the appellant of property without due process of law. That provision has
reference to property to which the citizen has acquired a vested right. It does not
extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never been asserted or perfected.
The contention of the appellant . . . is therefore without merit." There is no justifiable
reason for disturbing the holdings of this court in the aforecited two cases. On the
contrary, it is considered timely to reiterate them herein inasmuch as they decide the
same question.

The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45, paragraph
(b), of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to permit aliens to
obtain title to lands in their favor. It should not be understood, however, that the
constitutional guaranty that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws, is violated thereby, because, as this court has said in the case of In re Patterson
(1 Phil., 93, 95, 96), "Unquestionably every State has a fundamental right to its
existence and development, as also to the integrity of its territory and the exclusive
and peaceable possession of its dominions which it may guard and defend by all
possible means against any attack . . . . Superior to the law which protects personal
liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and for
the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each
State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty." It is
upon grounds of public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of aliens,
cannot prevail against the aforesaid right of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
and more particularly when, as in the present case, far from violating any
constitutional law, it deals precisely with the enforcement of the provisions of the first
organic law of the country and those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that
lands of the public domain should not be disposed of or alienated to persons who are
not inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is
hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur.

Imperial, J., concur in the result.
G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO
ROSALES, GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO
ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO
MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela
having an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land
bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern
portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion
would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled
with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear
during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the
rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9
May 1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from
Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the
Deed of Absolute Sale1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of
8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East
by National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River;
declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina
Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio
Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second
purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The
second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of
18,000 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the
South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial
Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration
No. 3152. . . .2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October
1969, the two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and
consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains
4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio
Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina
Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought
from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included in
Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by
respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks
at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—
and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The
eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is
inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is
the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent
Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point
where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into
the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is
susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when
the cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the
western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an
island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969.4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821
and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of
11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from
the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season
and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land
bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs
to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is
adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they
own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the
fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also
cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer.5 This situation
compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20
May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for
failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again
filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints6 before the then Court of
First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages
against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought
separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed
that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the
unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered
declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The
case was then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or
to enter into a stipulation of facts.7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a
decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment
against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land
in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the
land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of
the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2)
branches of the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of
Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered
separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot
821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed owned by
respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners
that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is,
during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court
of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying.
Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of
questions of fact.10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is
correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court.11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides
with their findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river
water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of
alluvion (Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water
separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2)
parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina
Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve
(12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3"
and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparian
land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an
express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the
current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408).12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial
court, thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of
the word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be
part of the Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the
heavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from September to
November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes
swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its
southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is where the water of the
Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip
of land would be under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —
According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary
one, and the highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch
as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or
most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the
general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If
according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the
natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their
highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground
covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to
the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary
level of the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which
is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural
Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of
the small stream already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan
Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded.13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That
case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the
legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores,
in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed property.
Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found
in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is
involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the
law applicable to the case at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its
waters during the highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the
ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the
river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the
eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to
August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September
to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon
evidence of record.1âwphi1 Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that
the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the
1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the
Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring
the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale
signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or
the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached
to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the
Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what
this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination
depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to
"W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible.16
Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east
and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried
up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like
slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and
very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge
volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In
addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he
called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the
depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight
(8) meters.17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel
on the surface of the earth. However, Exhibit "E"18 for the prosecution which was the
Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that
the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The
words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the
claim of private ownership over the submerged portion—is an implied admission of
the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by
respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de
Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could
have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not
acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was
included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina
Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted
property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term
which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in
commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article
420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river
beds:
La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea
necesario considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes.
En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce,
y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico,
como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el
Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el
dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en
cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1, donde dice:
son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que
concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de
dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no se hallen
comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la
extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias.20 (Emphasis
supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of
basis even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to
encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina
Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law,
respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced
respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers
are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters.
That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article
457 of the Civil Code.21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307,
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the
Court considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to
Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of
acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of
three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea);
and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or
the sea coast).22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent
Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by
this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court
river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river. feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821,
adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale
transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner
the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River
action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821
lower court made mention of several floods that caused the land to reappear making shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested
it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs.
the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow
and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian SO ORDERED.
owner.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is
the northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find
it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion
to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent
Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares
from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot
821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821
has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's
contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had
more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court
considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes
separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This
topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that
Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant
action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan
River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over
Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the
parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad
were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through
his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent
Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation
purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice
instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax
declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and
adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307
and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga
Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also
cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the
Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax
declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under
Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least
THIRD DIVISION
ALEJANDRO B. TY and INTERNATIONAL REALTY CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
- versus -
QUEENS ROW SUBDIVISION, INC., NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC.,
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAVITE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173158
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62610 and the
Resolution of the same Court dated 29 July 2006 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. Said Decision affirmed the Joint Decision dated 18 November 1997
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite dismissing the separate Complaints
for Declaratory Relief filed by petitioners Alejandro B. Ty and International Realty
Corporation (IRC).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Ty is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3967. Petitioner IRC, on
the other hand, is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in the same
barangay covered by TCTs No. T-1510, No. T-3617 and No. T-3618. The four titles
were issued to petitioners sometime in 1960 and 1961.
In 1970, respondent Queens Row Subdivision, Inc. (QRSI) was issued TCTs No. T-
54188, No. T-54185, No. T-54186 and No. T-54187, covering exactly the same areas
and containing the same technical descriptions as those embraced in the titles of
petitioners.
On 29 June 1971, mortgages entered into by QRSI in favor of respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) were annotated at the back of the four
titles of QRSI.
In October 1973, petitioners Ty and IRC instituted with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Bacoor, Cavite four Complaints for the cancellation of the four
aforementioned certificates of title of QRSI, impleading only the latter and the
Register of Deeds. GSIS was not impleaded, despite the fact that the mortgage in its
favor had already been annotated in the subject titles. The Complaints were docketed
as Civil Cases No. B-44, No. B-45, No. B-48 and No. B-49. Petitioners did not move
to have a notice of lis pendens annotated in the subject titles.
On 8 December 1980, the CFI of Bacoor, Cavite, rendered a Decision declaring that
Tys certificate of title, TCT No. 3967, was validly issued, and ordering the Register of
Deeds to cancel QRSIs TCT No. 54188 for being void. On 20 December 1985, the
same CFI rendered a Joint Decision ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel QRSIs
TCTs No. T-54185, No. T-54186 and No. T-54187. Both Decisions were rendered for
failure of respondent QRSI to appear at pre-trial despite filing an Answer to the
Complaints.
QRSI defaulted in the payment of its mortgage indebtedness to GSIS, leading to the
foreclosure of the mortgages. The properties were sold at public auction, with GSIS
emerging as the highest bidder. On 10 April 1986, Certificates of Sale were issued in
favor of GSIS.
QRSI failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the one-year redemption
period, allowing GSIS to consolidate its ownership thereof. TCTs No. T-230070, No.
T-230071, No. T-230072 and No. T-225212 were, thus, issued in the name of GSIS.
Thereupon, GSIS entered into a joint venture agreement with respondent New San
Jose Builders, Inc. (NSJBI) for the development of the properties. NSJBI
subsequently commenced construction and development works thereon.
On 8 November 1993, petitioners counsel, through a letter, demanded that GSIS and
NSJBI vacate the subject properties.
On 7 August 1994, Ty and IRC each filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief to Quiet
Title/Remove Cloud from Real Property against respondents with the RTC of Imus,
Cavite, this time impleading all respondents, QRSI, GSIS, NSJBI, and the Register of
Deeds of Cavite. The cases were docketed as Civil Case No. BSC 94-2 and Civil
Case No. 94-3. The cases were consolidated under Branch 20 of said court.
On 18 November 1997, the RTC of Imus, Cavite, rendered its Joint Decision
dismissing the complaints.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 62610 and was raffled to the Seventh Division. On 31 January 2005, the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the Joint Decision of the RTC. On 29
June 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Petitioners.
Hence, this Petition, wherein petitioners present the following issues for our
consideration:
I.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT GSIS, BEING A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, IS CHARGED
WITH THE DUTY TO EXERCISE MORE CARE AND PRUDENCE IN DEALING
WITH REGISTERED LANDS FOR ITS BUSINESS IS ONE AFFECTED WITH
PUBLIC INTEREST KEEPING IN TRUST MONEY BELONGING TO ITS MEMBERS
AND SHOULD GUARD AGAINST LOSSES AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT INVOKE
THE PROTECTED MANTLE OF LAND REGISTRATION STATUTE (ACT 496).
II.
THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS BEING SUPERIOR TO THAT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT QUEENS ROW, THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE
REMAINED UNAFFECTED AND PETITIONERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN GUILTY
OF LACHES, ESTOPPEL, MUCH LESS PRESCRIPTION.[2]
Innocent Purchaser for Value
In the first issue raised by petitioners, they assail the finding of the Court of Appeals
that GSIS was an innocent purchaser for value. The appellate court held:
The records clearly show that the mortgages entered into by Queens Row and GSIS
were already inscribed on the formers titles on June 29, 1971 as shown by the entries
appearing at the back of TCT Nos. T-54188, T-54185, T-54186 and T-54187, even
before Civil Cases Nos. B-44, 45, 48 and 49 were instituted. In spite of this,
petitioners-appellants (plaintiffs then) did not implead the GSIS as a party to the
complaints. Moreso, no adverse claim or notice of lis pendens was annotated by
petitioners-appellants on the titles of Queens Row during the pendency of these
cases. To make matters worse, as earlier stated, petitioners-appellants, after securing
favorable decisions against Queens Row, did not enforce the same for more than ten
(10) years. By their inaction, the efficacy of the decisions was rendered at naught.
Verily, a buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for
value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. In the instant
case, the GSIS clearly had no notice of any defect, irregularity or encumbrance in the
title of Queens Row when the latter mortgaged the subject property. Neither did GSIS
have any knowledge of facts and circumstances which should have put it on inquiry,
requiring it to go [beyond] the certificate of title. Obviously, GSIS was an innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith at the time it acquired the subject property.[3]
Petitioners claim that since GSIS is a financial institution, it is charged with the duty to
exercise more care and prudence in dealing with registered lands. On this basis,
petitioners conclude that GSIS cannot invoke the protection of land registration
statutes insofar as they protect innocent purchasers for value.
While we agree with petitioners that GSIS, as a financial institution, is bound to
exercise more than just ordinary diligence in the conduct of its financial dealings, we
nevertheless find no law or jurisprudence supporting petitioners claim that financial
institutions are not protected when they are innocent purchasers for value. When
financial institutions exercise extraordinary diligence in determining the validity of the
certificates of title to properties being sold or mortgaged to them and still fail to find
any defect or encumbrance upon the subject properties after said inquiry, such
financial institutions should be protected like any other innocent purchaser for value if
they paid a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before having notice of
some other persons claim on or interest in the property.
On this note, petitioners insist that GSIS was guilty of gross negligence in its failure to
inquire and investigate the status and condition of the property when it approved the
loan of private respondent Queens Row.[4] This allegation has no leg to stand on.
Respondents allege that GSIS ascertained to its satisfaction the existence and
authenticity of the titles of its predecessor-in-interest, QRSI; and was, in fact, able to
procure true copies of the latters titles from the Registry of Deeds.[5] GSIS
furthermore conducted an ocular inspection and found that the property was not in the
possession of any person claiming an interest that was adverse to that of its
predecessor-in-interest.[6] Respondents allegations are much more convincing in
light of the fact that NSJBI was able to enter the subject property by virtue of its joint
venture agreement with GSIS, and was able to commence construction and
development works thereon.
Petitioners have presented absolutely no evidence to prove their allegation of fraud
on the part of QRSI and bad faith on the part of GSIS. They want us to merely
conclude the same on the ground that they were able to secure the favorable
decisions they obtained in Civil Cases No. B-44, No. B-45, No. B-48 and No. B-49.
However, as shall be discussed later, these are already stale judgments, which
cannot be executed anymore. Furthermore, these judgments were obtained ex parte,
for failure of respondent QRSI to appear at the pre-trial despite filing an Answer to the
Complaints. GSIS, on the other hand, was never impleaded in these four Complaints
for cancellation filed in October 1973, despite the fact that the mortgages in GSISs
favor had been annotated on the subject titles since 29 June 1971. GSIS, therefore,
never had any notice of these proceedings.
Petitioners cannot expect GSIS to check the technical descriptions of each and every
title in the Registry of Deeds of Cavite in order to determine whether there is another
title to the same property. There is no one to blame for the failure of GSIS to have
notice of such fact other than petitioners themselves. As stated above, they did not
implead GSIS in their actions for cancellation of title despite the fact that, at the time
of the filing of the cases, the mortgages in GSISs favor had already been annotated
on the subject titles. Petitioners likewise neglected to have a notice of lis pendens of
the cancellation cases annotated on the subject titles, fueling respondents suspicions
that the former wanted their actions for cancellation to be uncontested by GSIS, the
party really interested in challenging the same.
Laches
Petitioners challenge the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding them guilty of laches
for their failure to execute the favorable decisions they obtained in Civil Cases No. B-
44, No. B-45, No. B-48 and No. B-49, arguing that laches cannot be raised even as a
valid defense for claiming ownership of registered land, more so, if titles are tainted
with fraud in their issuances.[7] Their basis for this claim is the 1950 Court of Appeals
case Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz.[8]
We are not persuaded.
Firstly, as discussed above, while petitioners persistently harp on their allegation of
fraud in the issuance of the title of GSIS, nevertheless, they have not presented any
evidence to prove the alleged fraud on the part of either GSIS or even QRSI.
Secondly, it must be stressed that the Decisions of this Court are the only judicial
decisions that form part of our legal system. While rulings of the Court of Appeals
may serve as precedents for lower courts, they only apply to points of law not covered
by any Supreme Court decision.[9]
Thirdly, this Court has, on several occasions, already ruled that even a registered
owner of a property may be barred from recovering possession of the same by virtue
of laches. Thus, in Heirs of Panganiban v. Dayrit,[10] this Court discussed several
cases wherein the principle of laches was applied against the registered owner:
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may
be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. Thus, in the
case of Lola v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the
land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to
respondents failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In
Miguel v. Catalino, this Court said that appellants passivity and inaction for more than
thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the
equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia, we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued possession for
thirty-seven (37) years, the original owners right to recover possession of the property
and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latters long period of possession
and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which by exerting due diligence could or should have been done earlier.[11]
The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent, and not those who sleep when the
law requires them to act.[12]
The Court of Appeals based its finding of laches on the fact that petitioners Ty and
IRC failed to move for the execution of the favorable ex parte judgments, which they
obtained on 8 December 1980 and 20 December 1985, respectively. If we read
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court together with Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
we would see that the winning party in litigation has a period of five years from the
date of entry of judgment to execute said judgment by motion, and another five years
to execute it by action. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion
for the execution of a final judgment or order may be filed within five years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced
by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations referred to in the above section is found in Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
While indeed, the above provisions on extinctive prescription cannot be the basis for
depriving a registered owner of its title to a property, they nevertheless prohibit
petitioners from enforcing the ex parte judgment in their favor, which can likewise be
the basis of a pronouncement of laches. In Villegas v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held
that:

But even if Fortune had validly acquired the subject property, it would still be barred
from asserting title because of laches. The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law that
no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that
even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by
virtue of laches. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners neglect in asserting their rights is likewise manifested in their failure to

implead GSIS in the four Complaints for cancellation, which they filed in October
1973, despite the fact that the mortgages in the GSISs favor had been annotated on
the subject titles since 29 June 1971. It even became more evident from the fact that
petitioners failed to have a notice of lis pendens annotated on the subject titles of the
said cancellation of title cases, leading GSIS to believe that there were no other
certificates of title to the same properties when it proceeded to foreclose the subject
properties in 1986. We, therefore, find no reason to overrule the finding of the Court
of Appeals that petitioners were guilty of laches.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 31 January 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62610 and the Resolution of the same
Court dated 29 July 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG,
respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing
that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing
petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title
to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without
petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of
a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance
from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro
Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is
identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the
same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a
gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance
of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square
meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh.
C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square
meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered
upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages
corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and
costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering
respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and
to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the
gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a
navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the
survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not
the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet
started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and
the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the
accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or
1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by
accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness
Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with
an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only
declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec.
No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to
defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226
(Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year
1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since
1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for
it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be
acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an
accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the
plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo,
that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no
moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the
owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas
v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of
appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa,
C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they
have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property
by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but
considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been
in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the
land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be
considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496:
and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by
another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly
stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium,
which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence
for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it
should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule
of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through
prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land
in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate
is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act
No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and,
second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the
present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the
Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not
ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title
established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond
the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be
productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical
description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in
so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared
not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these
provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et
al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo
Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in
1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as
the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1).
This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of
the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay.
Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties
nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for
three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that
since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the
defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said,
was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in
1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the
defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file
an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the
land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande
admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This
last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square
meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession —
from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by
the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for
taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior
possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken
steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of
funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any
serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their
right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have
it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs
by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter,
were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their
copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in
favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the
alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article
366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are
the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the
accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it
is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension,
become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership
over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil
Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give
title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But
to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact
remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property
(which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment,
therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to
the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens
system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical
possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these
facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the
pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of
the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.