eSHIGENORI KURODA v. RAFAEL JALANDONI et al.
People of the Philippines vs Simplicio Villanueva
, 83 Phil. 171 (1949)
FACTS
Shigenori Kuroda was the Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines from 1943 to
1944. He was charged before a military commission which
was organized through Executive Order No. 68. In his case,
two American Attorneys who were not authorized by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines to practice law; namely
Melville Hussey and Robert Port, were appointed as
prosecutors representing the American Commander in Chief.
Kuroda challenges the participation of these American
attorneys on the ground that they are not qualified to practice
law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether American lawyers may participate in a case under a
military commission when they are not qualified to practice
law in the Philippines
RULING
Yes. American lawyers may participate in a case under
a military commission. The military commission is a special
military tribunal governed by special law and not by the Rules
of Court which govern ordinary civil court. There is nothing in
Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing
before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice
laws in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the
parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
*Dissenting Opinion by Justice Perfecto
The American lawyers are aliens and have not been authorized
by the Supreme Court to practice law there could not be any
question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in the
case as with such appearance they would be practicing law
against the law. In addition, Executive Order No. 68 provides
rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This is a
usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court.
14 SCRA 109 – Legal Ethics – Practice of Law – Isolated
Appearance
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in
the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the
private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to
prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San
Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule
as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the
Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private
law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law
practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at
bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for
free for his friend who happened to be the offended party.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further,
the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fule’s appearance
for his friend should be given credence.
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic
July 4, 2012
223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement
in the Legal Profession – Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio
Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a
complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s
advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
th
7 Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during
office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
1.
2.
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article
3.
entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of Philippine
Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem
no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up
by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in
view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John
Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the
services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the
practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its
advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is
composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under
Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by
Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise
his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal
Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts
can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement
are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement:
Advertisement in a reputable law list
Use of ordinary simple professional card
Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his
specialization
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS.
LADAGA 350 SCRA 326 [2001]
Wednesday, January 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Legal Ethics
FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted
as pro bonocounsel for a relative in a criminal case, without the
previous authority from the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court as required by the AdministrativeCode.
An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for
practicing law without permission from the Department Head
(CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance
as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that
he was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances
as such counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to
which he is assigned knew his appearances as such counsel.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a
pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of law as
prohibited by the Administrative Code.
HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the
statute should be customarily or habitually holding one’s self to
the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in
this case. Nevertheless, for his failure toobtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required by
law, respondent was reprimanded.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12096 August 22, 1916
EMILIO DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO SALAS, Judge of First Instance of the
Province of Sorsogon, and SEGUNDO
SANTIAGO, respondents.
Vicente de Vera for petitioner.
Attorney-General Avanceña for the respondent judge.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for the other respondent.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court.
Its purpose was to obtain the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to require the Court of First Instance to reinstate
and to decide upon its merits a certain election contest
heretofore dismissed by the respondent judge upon a motion to
quash. The said motion to quash was based upon the ground
that the "motion" (or contest) had not been signed by the
contestant personally.
While the pleadings present some minor questions of general
importance, in view of the urgency for a decision upon the
main question, we will now limit ourselves to a discussion and
to a decision of that question only, which is: In an election
contest by a "candidate voted for," for the office of president
of a municipality, may he present or file the "motion,"
provided for by section 27 of Act No. 1582, (Section 576,
Administrative Code), signed by his attorney, or must such
"motion" be signed by him personally?
The facts upon which this actions are based are undisputed
and are as follows:
First. On the 6th of June, 1916, an election was held in the
municipality of Casiguran, of the Province of Sorsogon, for
the election of a president.
Second. At said election several candidates were voted for.
Among such candidates were the petitioner, Emilio de Castro,
and the respondent, Segundo Santiago.
Third. At the close of said election the ballots were counted
and it was found upon said count that the respondent, Segundo
Santiago, had received 258 votes and that the petitioner,
Emilio de Castro, had received 248 votes, and as a result of
said count Segundo Santiago was declared elected president of
said municipality, by the municipal council thereof, on the
12th of June, 1916.
Fourth. That later, and on the 17th of June, 1916, Emilio de
Castro contested said election by presenting a "motion" in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Sorsogon. Said
"motion" was not signed by the "candidate voted for" but was
signed by his attorney.
Fifth. That on the 10th of July, 1916, the respondent, Segundo
Santiago, answered said "motion," and among other defenses
presented, prayed that the "motion" be quashed or dismissed
for the reason that it had not been signed by the "candidate
voted for" as is required by law. (Section 576, Administrative
Code.)
Sixth. That on the 28th of July, 1916, the respondent judge,
Fernando Salas, after hearing the respective parties, dismissed
said "motion" for the reason that it had not been signed by the
contestant himself, Emilio de Castro. The court held that by
virtue of said section 576, the "motion" or contest could only
be initiated by the contestant himself by signing said "motion"
himself personally; that said contest could not be initiated by
presenting a "motion" signed by his attorney.
Seventh. That thereafter, on the 31st of July, 1916, the
petitioner, Emilio de Castro, by his attorney, presented a
motion for a reconsideration of the order dismissing his
"motion" or contest.
Eighth. That on the same day (the 31st of July, 1916), the
respondent judge, Fernando Salas, denied said motion for a
reconsideration of his order dismissing said "motion" or
contest.
Ninth. That on the 2d of August, 1916, the petition for the
remedy prayed for in this court was presented, which was
amended by the substitution of another complaint on the 9th of
August, 1916.
Tenth. That on the 9th of August, 1916, the Attorney-General,
representing the respondent, Fernando Salas, presented an
answer to said petition.
Eleventh. That on the 15th of August, the respondent,
Segundo Santiago, presented a demurrer to said petition.
Upon the foregoing facts and the issue presented by the
petition, the answer, and the demurrer, and after hearing the
respective parties, the questions involved were presented to his
court. Upon the main question presented for our consideration,
authorities and precedents have not readily been found. The
respondents contend that the law (section 576, Administrative
Code) is mandatory and explicit, and cite Act No. 1773 and
some decisions of this court, which they deem to be authority
for their contention, while the petitioner contends that the law
is not mandatory and does not limit the signing of the
"motion" to the contestant himself personally, and cites the
provisions of section 34 of Act No. 190, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 2453, in support of his contention.
It is true that the criminal actions mentioned in said Act No.
1773 can only be initiated by a complaint of the aggrieved
person, or of the parents, grandparents, or guardian of such
person. (U. S. vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. Rep., 410; U. S. vs.
Castañares, 18 Phil. Rep., 210; U. S. vs. Arzadon, 19 Phil.
Rep., 175; U. S. vs. Cruz and Reyes, 20 Phil. Rep., 363;
Quilatan and Santiago vs. Caruncho, 21 Phil. Rep., 399; U. S.
vs. Jayme, 24 Phil. Rep., 90; U. S. vs. Gariboso, 25 Phil. Rep.,
171.)
It must be remembered that the actions provided for under Act
No. 1773 are criminal actions, while the action contemplated
by section 576 is not a criminal action. It is a civil action. It
has none of the elements of a criminal action and should
therefore be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, so far
as the procedure is not expressly defined by the Act providing
for the "motion" or contest. An examination of said section
576 and the other sections of the law relating to election
contests (sections 575-580, Administrative Code) fails to
disclose any express provision which lends any assistance to
the solution of the question presented.
Said section 576 provides for an action for the contest of
elections to offices in general. It provides:
Contests in all elections for the determination of
which provision has not been made otherwise shall
be heard by the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the
election was held, upon motion by any candidate
voted for at such election, etc.
The respondents contend that the provision that the actions
shall be initiated "upon motion by any candidate voted for,"
expressly prohibits the presentation of the "motion" by any
other person than by the "candidate voted for," personally. The
respondents rely upon the provisions of Act No. 1773. That
Act provides that no prosecution for the crimes mentioned
therein "shall be instituted, except upon the complaint of the
aggrieved person," etc. It will be noted that Act No. 1773, by
express provision, inhibits the presentation of the
complaint, except by the "aggrieved person," etc. No such
words of limitation are used in section 576. Had the
Legislature said "except upon motion by any candidate voted
for," then the two statutes would be exactly analogous in their
inhibitions, with reference to the persons who should initiate
the respective actions.
Section 34 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2453, after
making provision for the conduct of litigation in courts of
justices of the peace, provides that:
In any other court, the party may conduct his
litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his
appearance must be either personally or by the aid of
a duly authorized member of the bar.
The phrase "may conduct his litigation," must mean that the
party-litigant may either personally or by the aid of a lawyer,
do anything in the progress of the action from the
commencement to the termination of the litigation. Taking
into consideration that there are no words used in said section
576 expressly inhibiting the contestant from presenting the
"motion" by an attorney, in relation with the fact that it has
been the custom ever since the adoption of section 27 of Act
No. 1582 (section 576, Administrative Code), for the
contestants to appear by attorneys, and in view of the above-
quoted provision of Act No. 2453, we are not inclined to adopt
as out view the contention of the respondents. It is also a fact
of public knowledge that the majority of the members of the
Legislature, who adopted section 576 of the Administrative
Code, were attorneys at law, and it is not believed, in view of
the large number of contests which follow each election, that it
was their intention to inhibit attorneys at law from assisting
contestants in the initiation of their contests. In our opinion
there is nothing in the law (section 576) which inhibits
contestants in election contests, under section 576, from
initiating their contests upon a "motion" presented by their
attorneys. (Bragunier vs. Penn, 79 Md., 244; McCauley vs.
State, 21 Md., 556.)
The respondents further argue that the Court of First Instance
having jurisdiction in the premises to consider the questions
presented by the petitioner in his "motion," it had jurisdiction
to decide all of the questions presented. That contention is true
if we limit his jurisdiction to hear and determination questions
presented upon their merits. But when it is alleged that the
court refused to consider the questions upon their merits and
erroneously dismissed the action upon a construction of some
question of law or of practice preliminary to a final hearing,
we have an entirely different question presented. No rule of
law is better established than the one that provides that
mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer
or a court, when honestly exercised and when such power and
authority is not abused. A distinction however must be made
between a case where the writ of mandamus is sought to
control the decision of a court the merits of the cause, and
cases where the court has refused to go into the merits of the
action, upon an erroneous view of the law or practice. If the
court has erroneously dismissed an action upon a preliminary
objection and upon an erroneous construction of the law, then
mandamus is the proper remedy to compel it to reinstate the
action and to proceed to hear it upon its merits. (High on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies [3d ed.], section 151; Castello
vs. St. Louis Circuit Court, 28 Mo., 259; State ex rel. Chism &
Boyd vs. Judge of 26th District Court, 34 La. Ann., 1177;
State ex rel. Citizens' Bank vs. Judge of 7th District Court, 38
La. Ann., 499). Dr. High, in commenting upon the rule laid
down by the court, says:
For example, when, in statutory proceedings
instituted to test the election of an officer, the court
below refuses to try the case upon its merits, and
 quashes the proceedings, upon the ground that the
contestant has not given the notice required by
statute, if such court has erred in its construction of
the statute, as to the notice required, the writ
(mandamus) will be granted to compel it to reinstate
the case and proceed to a hearing. (Castello vs. St.
Louis Circuit Court, 28 Mo., 259.)
Dr. High, in his valuable work, further adds, however: "If,
however, the point raised by the preliminary question be
purely a matter of fact, the decision of the inferior tribunal is
binding and conclusive, and will not be controlled by
mandamus. (Queen vs. Justices of Kesteven, 3d Ad., & E. [N.
S.], 810.)"
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided
over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants
as punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
RATIO:
[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion —

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do
not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
First. That the law does not inhibit the contestant in the government can engage in the private practice of law only
present case from initiating his contest by having the "motion" with the written permission of the head of the department
presented by his attorney. concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules.
Second. That the lower court refused to go into the merits of
said contest, upon an erroneous construction of the law. Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart
the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Therefore, it is ordered and decreed that an order be issued out
of this court to the respondent judge, Fernando Salas, directing
and requiring him to set aside and to annul his order heretofore
rendered, in which he dismissed the action of the petitioner,
and to reinstate said action and to proceed to try said cause
upon its merits. And without any finding as to costs, it is so
ordered.

Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

16AUG
Ponente: CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the
building erected thereon located in Manila. His mother and
brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building.
The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong
barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of
the appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent
ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood