INTRODUCTION

The German School of Historical Law became known throughout Europe at the end of the
Napoleonic wars, when many German jurists opposed the introduction of a uniform legal
code to the Germanic Confederation. The leading legal historicist of the time, Friedrich Carl
von Savigny (1779–1861), still holds a status in German ‘legal science’ which is akin to
Charles Darwin for the ‘science’ of biological evolution. Savigny, whose jurisprudence is
extremely influential even to the present day, emphasized the historical limitations of the law
and approached legality as a mere expression of evolving convictions and aspirations of any
particular people over a period of time. The only standards which remained in such a legal
philosophy were contextual and relative, since these standards would have no other support
apart from the temporary conditions of society.

Unfortunately, German legal historicism contributed not only to historicist legal analysis but
also to the development of two of the most deadly totalitarian ideologies this world has ever
seen: Marxism and National Socialism.1

Savigny came on to a scene at a time when Hegelians desired to show and share in the
processes of ‘social evolution’. He felt that a certain sense of historical evolution was a
necessary element in the study of law.2

The philosophical origins of German legal historicism go back to the 18th century and are
rooted in a ‘romantic’ reaction against natural-law philosophy. This was a reaction against the
rationalism, universalism, and individualism which was perceived in natural-law philosophy
and its claim concerning the natural rights of the individual. Instead of a law covering the
world with a rational system of universal values and principles, German historicists
approached law as a result of the Volksgeist; i.e. the ‘spirit of the people’ immersed in the
ongoing movement of the ‘collective life’ organized in the State.

German legal historicism claimed that the evolution of law is linked to the growth of the
nation as a living organism. This growth would derive its strength from the inner powers of
the Volksgeist. Because law was deemed the product of culture and social condition, not
logic or reason, its natural progression should neither be accelerated nor obstructed by the
legislator. Rather, the organic evolution of the law was assumed to take place as an evolving
process of historical growth, which occurs both naturally and unconsciously, from one age to
another. Such idea of natural legal progress was not an argument for the freedom of
individuals and small corporations, but it amounted to a justification of the organic power of
the state. This so being, the state would act as the sovereign manifestation of the collective
will of the nation.

1
de Montmorency, J.E.G., Freidrich Carl Von Savigny, J. Society of Comparative Legislation 11 (1) :32,1910
2
de Montmorency, ref. 1, p. 33
 Savigny’s definition

According to savigny the foundation of the laws has its existence, its reality in the
consciousness of the people. The court, in deciding cases are, in truth applying what has
previously existed in the common consciousness of the people, He further says, “ it is in the
common consciousness of the people that the positive law lives and have to call it.”

Volksrecht- It is the Volksrecht, living and working in all the individuals in common, which
begets the positive law, so that for the consciousness of each individual there is, not by
chance but necessarily, one and the same law.

For Savigny the foundation of the law has its existence, its reality in the common
consciousness of the people .The existence is invisible. We become acquainted with it as it
manifests itself in external acts, as it appears in practice, manners and customs.

Savigny’s definition has been criticises by many jurists. Gray is of the opinion that the
notion that the opinions of the jurists consults are the developed opinions of the people is
groundless.3 In common law countries where the judge are the jurist, it is the opinion of the
judges which are taken into consideration not the opinions of the people.

Savigny observed, “customary laws completely modify and repel a statute; it may create a
new law and substitute it for statutory rule which it is abolished.” Sir Henry Maine regards
custom as a formal source of law. According to Manu ,“Custom is transcendent law.”

Savigny eminently pointed out the national character of the law and that it develops like
language and bind people into one whole because of their common faiths and gains beliefs
and convictions. “The organic evolution of law with the life and character of the people
develops with the ages, and in this it resembles language. As in the latter, there can be no
instant of rest, there is always movement, and development of law is governed by the same
power of internal necessity as simple phenomena. Law grows with the nation, increase with
it, and dies at tit dissolution and is characterstics of it.”4

James Carter also supports historical view and says “what has governed the conduct of men
from the beginning of time will continue to govern to the end of time. Human nature is not
likely to undergo radical change and law will for ever continue to be custom.”5

3
Gray, (The Nature and Sources of Law) (2nd Ed) p.82
4
Quoted from Savigny’s essay Vom Beruf
5
Carter James: Law, its origin, Growth and Function, p.120
Historical School Of Law

The historical approach shows the evolution of the law, its rules and theories. It is the reverse
of the analytical method in that it begins when the law began and traces its development to
the recent order. Its point of view is retrospective. It sees law as a result out of the entire play
of the forces of the past. Its tendency is to emphasize the genetic element in the law.

Savigny is regarded as the founder of the historical school. He is described as the Darwinian
before Darwin, Montesquieu, Maine, Puchta, Blackstone and Carter can be regarded as
representatives of this school. Maine is the founder of the historical school in England.
Fredrick Pollock one of the ardent supporters of historical school o0f law firmly believed that
morals , as such was out of the domain of Judge or Jurists.6

The historical school sees in law ‘a product of times , the germ of which ,like the germ of the
state ,exists in the nature of a man as a being made for society and which develops from this
germ in various forms , according to the environing influences which play upon it.

Savigny sees law as a spontaneous evolution of the national spirit , having its justification in
the social pressure behind it or in historic necessity. ‘The foundation of law, says “ Savigny ,
has its existence ,its reality in the common consciousness of the people we become
acquainted with it as it manifests itself in external acts, as it appears in practice ,manners and
customs. Custom is the sign of positive law.” And again , Savigny says “Law like language
stands in organic connexion with the nature and character of the people and evolves with the
people.” “All law is a compromise between the past and the present between tradition and
convenience.” Law is not made but found. It is not a product of a reason at all, but the result
of inevitable historic necessity, that is , the steady and inevitable advance of human
development.

Savigny saw laws being formed by the silently operating forces of custom and popular
consent, codification was deemed by him a hindrance to the evolution of the law. And yet,
Savigny also protested against the tradition of natural law, believing that such doctrine
prevented nations from securing the free development of legal progress. The appreciation of
history would be a safeguard against the ‘self-deception’ of supposing that somebody’s
values is something that can to be applied to everybody else. Thus Savigny contended that the
origin and historical evolution of legal institutions and rules should emphasize the peculiar
characteristics of a given people among all others.7

6
Pollock: Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics
7
Rahmatian, A., Friederich Carl von Savigny’s Beruf and Voksgeistlehre, J. Legal History 28(1):8, 2007
The German School of Historical Law became known throughout Europe at the end of the
Napoleonic wars, when many German jurists opposed the introduction of a uniform legal
code to the Germanic Confederation. The leading legal historicist of the time, Friedrich Carl
von Savigny (1779–1861), still holds a status in German ‘legal science’ which is akin to
Charles Darwin for the ‘science’ of biological evolution. Savigny, whose jurisprudence is
extremely influential even to the present day, emphasized the historical limitations of the law
and approached legality as a mere expression of evolving convictions and aspirations of any
particular people over a period of time. The only standards which remained in such a legal
philosophy were contextual and relative, since these standards would have no other support
apart from the temporary conditions of society. Unfortunately, German legal historicism
contributed not only to historicist legal analysis but also to the development of two of the
most deadly totalitarian ideologies this world has ever seen: Marxism and National
Socialism.

The philosophical origins of German legal historicism go back to the 18th century and are
rooted in a ‘romantic’ reaction against natural-law philosophy. This was a reaction against the
rationalism, universalism, and individualism which was perceived in natural-law philosophy
and its claim concerning the natural rights of the individual. Instead of a law covering the
world with a rational system of universal values and principles, German historicists
approached law as a result of the Volksgeist; i.e. the ‘spirit of the people’ immersed in the
ongoing movement of the ‘collective life’ organized in the State.

German legal historicism claimed that the evolution of law is linked to the growth of the
nation as a living organism. This growth would derive its strength from the inner powers of
the Volksgeist. Because law was deemed the product of culture and social condition, not
logic or reason, its natural progression should neither be accelerated nor obstructed by the
legislator. Rather, the organic evolution of the law was assumed to take place as an evolving
process of historical growth, which occurs both naturally and unconsciously, from one age to
another. Such idea of natural legal progress was not an argument for the freedom of
individuals and small corporations, but it amounted to a justification of the organic power of
the state. This so being, the state would act as the sovereign manifestation of the collective
will of the nation. Indeed, German legal historicism regarded the state as an organic entity
and, as such, the living embodiment of the nation’s cultural, intellectual, ethical, and spiritual
manifestations.

It is only through history that legality could be actively connected with the primitive
conditions of the people, although “the loss of this connection must take away from every
people the best part of its spiritual life”. Any non-historical process, therefore, would make
the law lose its own national consciousness. Hence, the primary object of the historic-
jurisprudential method would be to trace the established system to its root, thus discovering
the organic principle whereby the national life may be separated from that which is lifeless
and only belongs to historical context.8

The historical jurists believe that law has biological growth and it has not evolved in an
arbitrary and erratic manner. According to Sir Henry Maine (1689-1755)9, Montesquieu was
the first jurist who adopted historical method of persuing the study of legal institutions and
came to the conclusion that , “laws are the creation of climate and local situations.” He did
not probe further into the relationship between law and society but pointed out that law must
keep pace with the changing needs of the society.

Savigny’s theory of Volkegeist, is an alarm for all the hasty legislations and introduces the
revolutionary abstract ideas in the legal system unless they mustered support of the popular
will.10

8
de Montmorency, ref. 1, p. 47
9
Montesquieu’s work Spirit of law was published in 1748 and was later translated into English.
10
Dr. N.V Paranjape , Studies in Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, P.38
Carl von Savigny—the ‘Darwin’ of German legal theory

Such idea of natural legal progress was not an argument for the freedom of individuals and
small corporations, but it amounted to a justification of the organic power of the state.

From an aristocratic family of Prussian soldiers, diplomats and lawyers, Friedrich Carl von
Savigny was the most distinguished representative of the German School of Historical Law.
On the foundation of the University of Berlin, in 1810, he was appointed the chair of law, a
position which he held until 1842. In 1819, Savigny became Counsellor to the Court of
Revision and Cassation at Berlin, and in 1842 he was appointed the Prussian Minister of
Justice, a post which he filled until 1848.

Savigny came on to the scene at a time when Hegelians desired to show and share in the
processes of ‘social evolution’. He felt that a certain sense of historical evolution was a
necessary element in the study of law.Because Savigny saw laws being formed by the silently
operating forces of custom and popular consent, codification was deemed by him a hindrance
to the evolution of the law. And yet, Savigny also protested against the tradition of natural
law, believing that such doctrine prevented nations from securing the free development of
legal progress. The appreciation of history would be a safeguard against the ‘self-deception’
of supposing that somebody’s values is something that can to be applied to everybody else.
Thus Savigny contended that the origin and historical evolution of legal institutions and rules
should emphasize the peculiar characteristics of a given people among all others.

Savigny also argued that given the historical limi, law should be grounded in a ‘popular
consciousness’ which evolves over time so as to reflect the general ‘spirit of the community’.
And yet, the legal codes of the 18th century were framed on a rationalist premise by which
the state creates a legal system based on universal moral values that are supposedly valid in
all times and all circumstances. Savigny refused to accept such axiom and believed, instead,
that “each nation has some peculiarities of custom and attitude which cannot be learned from
their written codes or treatises or even wholly from their judicial decisions”.11 His Volksgeist
theory was antagonistic to the idea of universal moral laws which must be applied for all
nations and cultures.

Savigny conceded, however, that legislation (apart from ‘political’ legislation, which he did
not discuss) could be used to improve procedure and to record established customary law. He
adopted a strictly Hegelian position to oppose legal codification:

“It is impossible to annihilate the impressions and modes of thought of the jurist now
living—impossible to change completely the nature of existing legal relations; and on this

11
Patterson, E., Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, Foundation Press, Brooklyn, NY, p. 414, 1953
twofold impossibility rests the indissoluble organic connection of generations and ages;
between which, development only, not absolute end and absolute beginning is conceivable.”12

It is only through history that legality could be actively connected with the primitive
conditions of the people, although “the loss of this connection must take away from every
people the best part of its spiritual life”. Any non-historical process, therefore, would make
the law lose its own national consciousness. Hence, the primary object of the historic-
jurisprudential method would be to trace the established system to its root, thus discovering
the organic principle whereby the national life may be separated from that which is lifeless
and only belongs to historical context.

In 1814, a time in which Savigny worked as a tutor to the Prince Royal of Prussia, he issued
The Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Legal Science, which became extremely
influential in Europe throughout the 19th century as a powerful legal codification. Therein he
claimed that a civil code should not be enacted for the whole of Germany as a means of
unifying the nation.13 Napoleon’s Civil Code, wrote Savigny, “served him as a bond the more
to fetter nations: and for that reason it would be an object of terror and abomination to us,
even had it possessed all the intrinsic excellence which it wants”. He was determined to
restore the natural evolution of German law by appealing to a ‘real, living jurisprudence’
which could not be founded upon any civil codes, even the newly proposed German Civil
Code.14 According to Rahmatian:

“… codification of a legal system is an indicator of the decline of organic development of the

living body of the law and its legal science in the course of history. The codification
movement of Savigny’s time was, in his opinion, driven by artificial concepts of Reason that
disregarded the existing laws, and it was detached from the people’s consciousness and
history. Instead, a lawyer must first be able to understand the history which gave every age
and legal institution … their peculiar shape; and, secondly, to appreciate their place in the
broader systematic context.”

Although Savigny’s Vocation “is not always written in a lucid and concise style … and
appears in a few places as a text of almost mystic obscurity”, the idea of Volksgeist contained
in the book provided “a speculative and anti-rationalist theory of the evolution of law”.
Savigny looked at the concept of legal evolution in light of a holistic organic development
which also embodied the culture, tradition, and character of the people. In this context, the
indIn a laudatory article published in 1910 in the journal of the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, J.E.G. de Montmorency commented that Savigny’s
contribution to “the history of evolution of law” placed him “among the great jurists of the
world”. Savigny is lauded as ‘the Darwin of the science of law’, because, according to its
author, his achievements for ‘the science of law’ resembled the achievements of Charles
Darwin for the ‘science of biology’. As Montmorency put it, Savigny interpreted the law as a

12
de Montmorency, ref. 1, p. 46.
13
Rahmatian, ref. 3, p. 2.
14
de Montmorency, ref. 1, p. 48.
living organism that is subject to natural history and obedient to a cosmic process that runs
through the ages, so that law would have to grow organically together with “the evolution of
races and kingdoms and tongues”.15 This attitude fuelled Savigny’s strong objection to the
codification of laws, because if law is always the manifestation of any given society culture
and tradition, then the codification of laws essentially stunts the naturalist process of organic
evolution of the law. Further, such codification has the effect of imposing a universal set of
rules upon a specific political area which would not, on the whole, reflect its individual legal
history. Montmorency thus explained that Savigny believed that codification represented an
abuse of power used for the sake of unification itself rather than to harmonize German
laws.ividual would become an atomized element subject to the organic body of society, just
as each age of a nation constitutes the continuation and development of all past ages. History
is hereby observed is hereby observed not in terms of the source of tradition and example, but
rather as the ongoing path of evolution which leads to the “true knowledge of our own
condition”.16

Savigny’s magnum opus is his eight-volume History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages (five
published in 1840–1841 and the rest in 1847–1849). The work amplifies the views expressed
in The Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence. Thus Savigny explains in
more details that the main objective of his historical school is not to “subject the present to
the government of the past”, but instead to create a historical view of ‘legal science’ which

“… consists in the uniform recognition of the value and the independence of each age, and it
merely ascribes the greatest weight to the recognition of the living connection which knits the
present to the past, and without the recognition of which we recognise merely the external
appearance, but do not grasp the inner nature, of the legal condition of the present.”17

15
de Montmorency, ref. 1, p. 52.
16
Savigny, F.C., On the Vocation of Our Age For Legislation and Jurisprudence, quoted in Jones, G.S., Preface;
in: Marx, K. and Engels, F., The Communist Manifesto, Penguin, London, p. 152, 2002.
17
Quoted in de Montmorency, ref. 1, p. 48
Savigny: The Volksgeist & Law

“Before they addressed themselves to the impractical task of changing men by changing
laws, the justices might have pondered the words of Savigny, who wrote, ‘Law is no more
made by lawyers than language by grammarians. Law is the natural moral product of a people
. . . the persistent customs of a nation, springing organically from its past and present. Even
statute law lives in the general consensus of the people.'” –Wilmot Robertson, The
Dispossessed Majority (1981)

The concept of the Volksgeist, or “the spirit of the Volk,” was developed by German
philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). The application of Herder’s theory to
law was made by German jurist and legal historian Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861).

Herder’s Volksgeist is a manifestation of the people; it animates the nation. Every Volk is, as
an empirical matter, different from every other Volk, each nationality characterized by its
own unique spirit. Every people possesses its own cultural traits shaped by ancestral history
and the experience of a specific physical environment, and mentally constructs its social life
through language, law, literature, religion, the arts, customs, and folklore inherited from
earlier generations.

Laws, too, must be adapted to the spirit of each nation, for rules applied to one nation are not
valid for another. The only legitimate governments are those that develop naturally among
particular nations and reflect, in their differences from other polities, the cultures of the
people they govern.

Law is the unique creation of a race, a people, a Volk. Like language or values, it is the result
of collective human action and reason over generations, not the result of human design.
Language and law were never consciously invented at a specific moment in time. Rather,
they represent slow accumulations, organic emanations of discrete peoples.

To cite but one example, European law and values and Jewish law and values are as different
as night and day. In adopting torture, assassination, criminalization of free speech, thought,
and association, genocide, and the abolition of formal restraints on tyranny, whites overnight
lost half a millennium or more of slow, painful moral and legal progress.

Savigny considered law to be an emanation of a people’s spiritual and historical experience.

It “is first developed by custom and popular acceptance, next by judicial decisions—
everywhere, therefore, by internal silently operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of the
law-giver.” The essential prerequisite was a deep and far-reaching appreciation of the genius
of a particular Volk; the prescriptive content of the law must accord with the Volksgeist.

For Savigny, German law was an expression of the Volksgeist of the German people. Law is
only properly understood in the light of past and present history, and reflects the inner
convictions. The Volksgeist, constantly changing and evolving as the German people
changed and evolved, drove the slow evolution of law over the course of history. Savigny
believed that the Volk of every land had a similar effect on each nation’s law.

According to Savigny codification of law may hamper its continuous growth and therefore it
should be resorted to when the legal system has fully developed and established.18

Legal institutions and values, like music, art, or language, are an indigenous expression of the
culture. Savigny, like Herder, thought that there was “an organic connection of law with the
being and character of the people. Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with the
strength of the people, and finally dies away as the nation loses its nationality.”

Again like Herder, the Volksgeist is best understood through careful examination of historical
data. That is why Savigny is considered a pillar of the historical school of jurisprudence.
Time and again he traced the natural history of law, its organic growth as a living thing, and
indicated the processes by which it adjusted to the needs of successive generations.

With the growing complexity of law, the popular consciousness is represented by lawyers
who are nothing but the mouthpiece of the popular consciousness. It is for this reason that
lawyers and jurists are more important than legislators in the process of development of a
legal system.19

18
Dr. NV Parajape (Studies in Jurisprudence and Legal Theory) p.36
19
Freidmann: Legal Theory (5th Ed.) p. 211
Criticism on Volksgeist

Even those who accept the idea of volksgeist point at the difficulties in fixing it with the
precision. Savigny treated it as a discoverable thing . However, our experience is that even in
a small group, people hold different views in different subjects. This is all true for a nation.
Some critics go to the extent of saying that the geist does not exist.

History is replete with example of transplantation of law im alien land. Roman law was
planted in Europe. Roman – dutch law was taken at distinct places, and it still survives in
South Africa and Sri Lanka, long ago it has disappeared from its homeland. The reception of
English law in many parts of the world, including India, is also an evidence of super- national
adaptability and resilience. All this is inconsistent with Savigny’s idea of Volksgeist, and
goes to show that there is some quality in law other than just popular consciousness.

It has been pointed out that influence of Volksgeist is only a limited one. Its influence seems
to manifest itself more strictly in some branches of law than in others. For instance, inspite of
the successful introduction of an alien system of law into India and Turkey, the indigenous
family laws remained practically unaffected.

Some commentors have drawn attention to the distinction between the creative influence of
Volksgeist, and its adaptive and abrogative influence. In modern times, the function of
Volksgeist is that of modifying and adapting rather than creating. The fact that law is
sometimes used deliberately to change existing ideas and may also be used to further inter-
state co-operation in amny spheres, is not recognised by the historical school. German
historicists used the word Volk to describe not just a group of people speaking the same
language and sharing a common culture, but mainly an ‘organic community’ of individuals
who share among themselves the same biological traits. Inspired by the ideal of the organic
community, the Nazis introduced laws that were intended to unify the ‘social body’ so it
could triumph against other allegedly inferior races in the struggle for existence. As such, the
chief purpose of the Nazi legal system was to forge the unity of the German Volk as an ethnic
or racial community. This implied a Hegelian conception of ‘liberty’ whereby the historical
interests of the Volk takes precedence over the liberty of the individual.20 “It is thus
necessary”, declared Adolf Hitler in a speech on 7 October 1933,

“… that the individual should come to realize that his own ego is of no importance in
comparison with the existence of his nation; that the position of the individual ego is
conditioned solely by the interests of the nation as a whole … that above all the unity of a

20
Hitler’s speech on 1 May 1934, quoted in: Weikart, R., Hitler’s Ethic: The Nazi Pursuit of Evolutionary
Progress, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 113, 2009.
nation’s spirit and will are worth far more than the freedom of the spirit and will of an
individual.”21

Some other limitations of Volksgeist also need to be mentioned. Many institutions have
originated , not in volksgeist , but in the convenience of the ruling oligarchy. Slaver is a clear
example of this, in india , the practice of untouchability was started by the dominant classes.
It is pertinent to point out that many customs owe their origin to thier force of imitation , and
not to any innate of their righteousness.

Volksgeist does not adequately explain the existence of local custom. The question is if law is
the product of Volksgeist , how is it only some people and not all have evolve a special rule?
Savigny tries to explain this by recognising the existence of inner circle within a society.

In any modern state important rules of law very often develop as the result of conscious and
violent struggle between conflicting interests, and not as a result of impercitible growth , the
laws protecting the rights of labourers and the landowners has seen violent agitation and
interventiomn of law in the form of land reform legislation. Thus , atleast in some cases,
instead of being a reflection of Volksgeist , law has in effect shaped Volksgeist.

21
Hitler, A., 7 October 1933, quoted in: DeMar, G., Ominous Parallel: The End of Freedom in America, Stein
and Day Publishers, New York, p. 3, 1982.
Conclusion

In his civil law casebook (1994), John Henry Merryman asked (but did not answer) the
question: “Does a nation have only one Volksgeist or do ethnically diverse nations have a
Volksgeist for each cultural group?”

German legal historicists saw nations and ethnic groups as evolving natural units. They
assumed that law is divorced from objective truth and destined to be replaced by future
generations.22 The final result is not only legal positivism but legal nihilism, because the only
standards which remain in place are subjective in character and derived from the particular
choices of society.23 So it did not take too long for legal historicism to descend into moral
relativism.24

In multiracial ex-white nations, the dominant Volk, the Jews, freely express their Volksgeist
through Jewish and general law, but other groups are limited by the will of the rulers. This is
true even of currently favored groups like Muslims, with their Sharia law.

But oppressed whites no longer have a Volksgeist. Culture distortion simultaneously destroys
both the collective life of the people and its law, which is supplanted by a rigid, racist legal
positivism characteristic of contemporary totalitarian regimes.

But if we eventually regain our freedom and independence, Savigny’s Volksgeist should
inform our reacquisition of law. The applicability to a racialist jurisprudence of a view of law
as organically evolved over time out of the consciousness or spirit of a people is obvious.

Because biological race consists of a system of nested hierarchies, law may be adapted to any
appropriate level of specificity or generality circumstances call for. At present, a higher level
of racial generality than was characteristic of the old European nationalisms appears most
suitable to the needs of what is ultimately likely to be a greatly diminished, ingathered
population.

The essence of Savign’s Volkegeist was that a nation;’s legal system is greatly influenced by
the historical culture and traditions of the people and the growth of law is to be located in
their popular acceptance. This laid the foundation of historical school of jurisprudence which
was carried further by Sir Henry Maine in England. Vindradoff, Lord Bryce and many others.
Echrilich devised his theory of interest on the foundation laid by Savigny. Savigny’s
approach to law also gave birth to comparative jurisprudence which has been accepted as one
of the most important branches of legal studies in modern times. Maitland has supported
Savigny’s approach to jurisprudence and pointed out that the course of development of

22
Strauss, ref. 40, p. 25
23
Strauss, ref. 40, p. 18
24
Kelly, J.M., A Short History of Western Legal Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 324, 1992
common law in England was determined by socio- political conditions obtaining in England
at that time.

Above all, Savigny’s legal theory served as a sound warning against hasty legislation and
introduction of revolutionary abstract ideas in the legal system unless they mustered support
of the popular will.
References

1. de Montmorency, J.E.G., Freidrich Carl Von Savigny, J. Society of Comparative

Legislation 11 (1) :32,1910

2. Salmond, op., cit., p.41

4. Definition Of Law ,Prof. Nomita Aggarwal, Central Law Publications, p.17

Gray, (The Nature and Sources of Law) (2nd Ed) p.82

5. Whitley Stokes, The Anglo-Indian Codes (1888),Vol 2,p.381

6. Ibid., p.384

7. NK Jayakumar, Lectures in Jurisprudence, (2nd Ed)

8. Rahmatian, A., Freidrich Carl Von Savigny’s Beruf and Voksgeistlehre, J. Legal
History 28 (1):8, 2007

9. Savigny, F.C., On the Voaction of our age for legislation and Jurisprudence , quoted
in Jones, G.S., preface in Arx k and Engels f., the Communist Manifesto , Penguin , London
,p.152, 2002.

10. Hitler’s Speech on 1 May 1934, quoted in; Weikart, R., Hitler’s Ethic: The Nazi
Persuit of Evolutionary Progress, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.113, 2009.

11. Klinbe, D.C, Dominion and Wealth: A Critical Analysis of Karl Marx’s Theory Of
Commercial Law, 2nd edition D. Reidel Publishing Co. Dordrecht, p.48.1987

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