CASE DIGESTS FOR REMEDIAL LAW II – SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS (RULE 72-80) fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
RULE 72
PACIFIC BANKING CORP. VS CA
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, the SC rendered a decision holding that
a petition for liquidation under Sec. 29 of the Central Bank
Act, R.A. No. 265 is a special proceeding and, therefore, the
rules prescribing a period of 30 days for appealing and
requiring a record on appeal apply. Accordingly, the appeal
in G.R. No. 109373 was held to have been duly perfected but
the appeal in G.R. No. 112991 had not been perfected
because of petitioner's failure to file a record on appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the liquidation proceeding is a special proceeding
RULING:
Special Proceeding. Action is the act by which one sues
another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while
special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence,
action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another,
while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property
from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his
purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an
insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the
guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an
insolvent corporation should be classified a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not
seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not
pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can
be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to
file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts
and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of
creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for
the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73
to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose:
the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the
debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate.
The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both
charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In
both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate
is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of
creditors and their rights and the determination of their order
of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals
are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation.
HEIRS OF GABATAN VS CA
FACTS:
The subject matter of this case is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of
land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for
taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. Respondent alleged
that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited
the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan. It
was also claimed that Hermogena is the only child of Juan
Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito, that upon the death
of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother,
Teofilo Gabatan and his wife, Rita for administration. It was
also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded
for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s
death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused
to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject
property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife
died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took
possession of the disputed land despite respondents
demands for them to vacate the same.
Petitioners denied however that respondents mother
Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir
of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan
died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was
survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo,
Macaria and Justa. They inherited the subject land from Juan
Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in
the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the
exclusion of the whole world including respondent. It was
also clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have
no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the
husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was
previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda.
de Gabatan, but the case was dismissed for lack of
interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint
lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the
same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. CA affirmed
decision of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of the decedent’s lawful
heirs should be made in a separate special proceeding or one
which may be included in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and or possession.
RULING:
Yes, it was proper. The general rule provides that the
determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in
the corresponding special proceeding precludes the Regional
Trial Court in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same. The determination of
who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as
in this case. The trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. By way
of exception, the need to institute a separate special
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.
DOCTRINE: A civil action, in which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong necessarily has definite adverse parties,
who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand,
a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a
status, right, or a particular fact, has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at
bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent
is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities,
and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
MONTANER VS SHARIAH DISTRICT COURT
FACTS:
Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao,
Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners herein are their three
children.
Private Respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter,
Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial
partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. They
claim to be the first family of Alejandro.
Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over
the estate of Alejandro because he is a Roman Catholic,
insufficient docket fees and Prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether of not the Complaint is to be treated as a special
proceeding?
RULING:
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed
before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial
partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the
estate of the decedent which is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING.
Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special
proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact." The Supreme Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722).
In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to
establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be
duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would
allow them to exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.
Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro
Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. x x x x
x Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a
decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil
action (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562 (1999)
applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action
which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has
no definite adverse party. x x x As a special proceeding, the
purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities
(Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization v. Court
of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to distribute the
residual to those entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v.
Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001).
RULE 73
CHING VS RODRIGUEZ
(see handwritten file from Ate Devie)
NATCHER VS CA
GR No. 133000
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate. They adjudicated and divided among themselves the
real property. Under the agreement: Graciano received 8/14
share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of
the said property. The heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation – Subdivision of Real Property
with Waiver of Rights". They subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60
square meters registered under Graciano's name. The land
was further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold
the 1st lot to a third person but retained ownership over the
2nd lot. Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher. He sold
the 2nd lot to Natcher, a title was issued under her name.
Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs. A
civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by
the 6 children; alleging that Natcher through the employment
of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd lot
by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale
in her favour; that their legitimes have been impaired. In her
reply, Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was
likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. RTC ruled
that the deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del
Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and
thus a complete nullity, that no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements nor
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them, hence, the spouses are prohibited from
entering into a contract of sale. It is not also a valid donation
BUT can be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance
of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
lower court’s decision ratiocinating t is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution
of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction
when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person.
ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions
as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any
of the heirs?
RULING:
No. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: a) A
civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
 A civil action may either be ordinary or
special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil
action. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. There
lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a
court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according
to definite established rules. The term special proceeding
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless
the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion
 It may accordingly be stated generally that actions
include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions
relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special
proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary
in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to
some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced
without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings,
which are characteristics of ordinary actions. A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be
instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
FACTS:
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized American citizen, died single and childless. In the
last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother Sergio, as the executor of her will for
she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Thereafter respondent Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for the
probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special
administrator. However, petitioners, nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where it
was executed.
The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas
last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTCs order,
petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be
probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of
the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate
of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance
of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is
different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Can a will executed by a foreigner abroad be probated in
the Philippines although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was executed?
RULING:
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has
an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance
of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of
the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;
(c) the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. The rules do not
require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN,
respondent.
FACTS:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married
Paz Lazo. On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner
Isabel de la Puerta. On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel
gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal
Jr., her herein co-petitioner. On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth
to a girl, Aleli, later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal, herein respondent.
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed
a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over
the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died
intestate on November 2, 1964. In the deed, Portugals
siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over
a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering
the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal,
married to Paz C. Lazo. On February 18, 1984, Paz died. On
April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person
adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No.
34292/T-172 in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled
and in its stead TCT No. 159813 was issued by the Registry
of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M.
Beltran, Jr. Consequently, petitioners filed before the RTC of
Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint against
respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in
her name.
ISSUE:
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether
petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for
annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the
TCT issued in her name?
RULING:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly
that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on
February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of
Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of
the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence,
not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case subject of the present case, could and had already
in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased
Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal (Sr.);
3. Wfhether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course
and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under
the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court,
Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render
a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during
the pre-trial.
EDUARDO AGTARAP VS SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, ET. AL.
G.R No. 177099
June 8, 2011
FACTS:
Joaquin Agtarap was married twice. He was first married to
Lucia Garcia and they begot children: Jesus, Milagros and
Jose, with Jose being survived by Gloria, Joseph and Teresa.
After Lucia’s death, he contracted a second marriage to
Caridad Garcia, and they begot children: Eduardo, Sebastian
and Mercedes, with Mercedes being survived by Cecile.
Joaquin died and at the time of his death, he left two parcels
of land with improvements in Pasay City, which Joseph
leasing and improving the realties. Eduardo filed a verified
petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his father
Joaquin with the RTC of Pasay City, further alleging that he
should be appointed as a special administrator to Joaquin’s
properties. After the initial hearing and publication, Joseph,
Gloria and Teresa filed their answer/opposition, alleging that
the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of
Joaquin and Lucia, hence after Lucia’s death, they became
the pro indiviso owners of the properties. They also opposed
the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the grounds
that he is not physically and mentally fit, his interest in the
lots is minimal, and he does not possess the desire to earn.
After giving the parties opportunity to be heard, the RTC
appointed Eduardo as administrator, and an order of partition
was issued, distributing the properties to the heirs of Joaquin.
Eduardo, Sebastian, Joseph and Teresa filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. The RTC then declared that the
real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Joaquin and Lucia. The order was appealed to the CA but the
CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Does the trial court, acting as a probate court, have
jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership?
RULING:
As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the
ownership of the subject real properties, we hold that the
RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the
same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is a dispute, the administrator, the
parties and opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a
decision.
However, there are exceptions to the rule. First, the probate
court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if
the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant
case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and
that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal
is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the
estate of Joaquin.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the
wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,
and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether
the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact,
should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding
for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be
consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin,
being Lucias spouse.
CUENCO VS CA
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctor’s
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco, the petitioner herein, and their two (2)
minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, all
residing at Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City; and by his
children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,
Manuel Lourdes, Concepcion, Carmen, Consuelo, and
Teresita, all residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate
in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss
in CFI Cebu. CFI Cebu issued an order holding in abeyance
its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the
petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last
will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The Quezon City court denied the
motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate
proceeding. The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was
at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of
prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament
and appointing petitioner-widow (Rosa) as executrix
Whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings
filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings
RULING:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding
with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside
all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate
of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant
to the deceased testator's wish.
The Judiciary Act confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts
of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate
and intestate . Under Rule 73, the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decedent or the location of his estate is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. The Rule on venue does not state that the
court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed
acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule provides that "the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading
of the Rule indicates that the court with whom the petition is
first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of
the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for
probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal
domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor
children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be
actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition
and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer
to the second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's
filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it
issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the
dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court,
awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that
court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will
was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then
it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes'
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false
and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the
Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. By its
act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City
court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon
City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu
City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus
indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the
intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon
City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as
to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent
within its territory and venue.
Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed
to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1,
the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of
the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all
other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
Furthermore, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate,
with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon
City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of
said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.
The Court also upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise: testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings, it is found that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings, even if at that state
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in
his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should
the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. This is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings.
RODRIGUEZ VS BORJA
FACTS:
On March 4, 1963, Petitioner Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan, delivered to the RTC of Rizal through the
Clerk of court the purported Last Will and Testament of Rev.
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez, parish priest of Hangonoy, Bulacan
for 30 years until his death after his death on February 12,
1963 of which Petitioner Angela and Maria Rodriguez filed a
petition to examine said will which was later withdrawn by
them before the court could act on the petition. However, on
March 12, 1963 same petitioner Angela and Maria Rodriguez
filed a filed a petition before the RTC of Rizal for the
settlement of the Estate of the deceased Fr. Rodriguez at
8:00 in the morning alleging that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died
without a will and that Maria be appointed Special
Administratix of the said Estate while on the same date while
petitioner Apolonia and Adelaida filed a petition before the
RTC of Bulacan for the for the probation of the will at 11:00
in the morning alleging that the court of RTC Bulacan already
acquired jurisdiction upon the delivery of the will to the Clerk
of Court on March 4, 1963 hence take precedence over the
case filed before RTC of Rizal.
ISSUE:
When was the court acquire jurisdiction over the settlement
of the decedent’s estate? What court has jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the decedent?
RULING:
The jurisdiction of a probate court becomes vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because, upon the will being deposited,
the court could, motu proprio have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Sections 3 Rule 77, of the
old Rules). The use of the disjunctive in the words “when a
will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed” plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere
deposit therein of a decedent’s testament, even if no petition
for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate
is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed
to relate back to the time when the will was delivered.
The power to settle decedents’ estates is conferred by law
upon all Courts of First Instance, and the domicile of the
testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil.
484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Where the estate proceedings were initiated in the Bulacan
Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is
entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue (Sec. 1, Rule
73, Revised Rules of Court)
Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
testate, since intestacy takes place only in the absence of a
valid operative will. Only after a final decision as to the nullity
of testate succession could an intestate succession be
instituted. The institution of intestacy proceedings in one
court may not thus proceed while the probate of the
purported will of the deceased is pending in another court.
ROBERTS VS LEONIDAS
FACTS:
Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78
in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was
survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their
two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda
Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm
Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage
which ended in divorce.
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco,
California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife.
The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored.
The two children of the first marriage were given their
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this
country.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by
Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate. Maxine admitted that
she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by
Ethel in January, 1978 its order dated April 10, 1978, the
Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills
and the codicil It was issued upon consideration of
the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the
attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward
Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first
wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts.
Two weeks later, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete,
and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita
Kegley Grimm, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate. It was stipulated there that Maxine,
Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal
representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate
(par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and
that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in
Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement
indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It
recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the
Angara law firm (par. 5).
Ethel, the daughter of the first marriage, filed a petition for
intestate proceeding. Maxine, second wife, opposed on the
ground of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Utah.
Later on, Maxine, Pete, and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the
lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm’s two
wills, and that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate
court be set aside. They alleged that they were defrauded
due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that
compromise was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void
because Grimm died testate, and that the partition was
contrary to the decedent’s will.
Ethel filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition which was denied
by Judge Leonidas. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or that the two proceedings be consolidated and
heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of
the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the
petition for probate.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition
approved by CFI Manila Branch 20 can be entertained by its
Branch 38.
RULING:
Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying
Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm
died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838,
Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara,
74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088,
May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of
a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing
the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality
of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other
pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies
of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
CAYETANO VS LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos
(father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and
Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory
heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication,
adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of
a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an American
citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion
died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a
will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was valid
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate
proceedings
Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it
divested the father of his legitime which was reserved by the
law for him and the same would work injustice and injury to
him.
RULING:
1. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was
an American citizen and the law which governs her will is the
law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the
decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent must
apply.
2. As to the issue of jurisdiction --
The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it
was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her
death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania,
USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is
a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and
after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.
GARCIA FULE VS CA
[G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976]
FACTS:
Virginia Garcia Fule (petitioner) filed before CFI of Calamba,
Laguna a Petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. She moved ex parte for her appointment
as special administratrix of the estate. This was GRANTED.
Preciosa Garcia filed for a motion for reconsideration
contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction. There
was no notice of the petition for letters of administration has
been served upon all persons interested in the estate. She
contends that she should be preferred in the appointment of
a special administratrix, being the surviving spouse of
Amado; and, Virginia is not an heir but a debtor of the estate
of Amado G. Garcia.
While the MR is pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove
Virginia as administrator. During the hearings for the case,
Virginia presented that: Amado resided in Quezon City 3
years before his death, therefore CFI Calamba has no
jurisdiction over the case.
CFI DENIED the two petitions of Preciosa. CA REVERSED the
decision. It vacated the decision made by the CFI. It held that
CFI Calamba, Laguna does not have jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE:
W/N the venue is improperly laid.
RULING:
YES, SC ruled in favor of Preciosa.
JURISDICTION is the power and authority of the court over
the subject matter. Jurisdiction of all probate cases is within
the Court of First Instance which is different from the place
of residence of the deceased. It cannot be changed by
procedure and be stipulated by the parties.
VENUE is the place of the hearing. Since there are many Court
of First Instance, the venue can be fixed. The rules provides
that the venue is the place of residence of deceased or the
province.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate.
SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased
should be the venue of the court. IN HERE, the decedent died
in Quezon City as provided by the death certificate.
NOTES:
“Resides” should be seen as the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
The term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.
The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the
judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity,
justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a
regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for
the judge to consider the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all
others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent. Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in
the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property.
UY vs. JUDGE DIZON-CAPULONG
DOCTRINE: When questions arise as to ownership of property
alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate
court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction.
FACTS:
A certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz
Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for
settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Respondent
Judge Dizon-Capulong appointed her as SPECIAL
ADMINIATRIX. She alleged that parcels of land of the
decedent had been sold to petitioner Jose Uy in 1978. A
freeze order was then issued by the judge regarding
transactions of the properties without the signature of special
adminiatrix.
A motion to cancel the titles of Uy was filed stating that the
registration thereof was made through fraud. Judge ordered
the cancellation.
Uy filed with the CA a petition to annul the order of the Judge
with TRO which was granted by the CA. A resolution by the
Supreme Court was also issued and stated that:
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply provides that
a person who is suspected of having in his possession
property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court
may examine him under oath on the matter. Said section
nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question
of ownership of such property. Furthermore, the declaration
of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land under administration
and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title
issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a
mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of
said vendee over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction.
To recover the property, an independent action against the
vendee must be instituted in the proper court"
Despite the resolution, Judge Dizon-Capulong defied and
disregarded the same and still granted the petition of the
special adminatrix to order new titles.
An administrative complaint was filed against the judge
ISSUE:
WON IN SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS,
PROBATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP WHERE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO
ESTATE CLAIMED BY ANOTHER PERSON?
RULING:
NO. The same should be settled in an appropriate proceeding
and not with the probate court. When questions arise as to
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate
court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction.
Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title
to land has already been registered and the certificate of title
thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only
be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose.
Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties
on mere motion of a party and without affording them due
process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to
uphold the law and promote the administration of justice. It
has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it
or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
Judge Dizon-Capulong was dismissed from service and
retirement benefits forfeited.
JIMENEZ VS CA
(please refer to Ate Devie’s handwritten file)
BARRETTO REALTY VS CA
GR No. L-62431-33
FACTS:
The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin
were initiated shortly after his death with the filing of a
petition for probate of his holographic will. The estate is
saddled with claims of creditors named in the Drepin will and
creditors who have filed their claims within the reglementary
period. The only way to pay their claims is to sell the Drepin
lots, so that from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of the
estate could be paid, and any remaining balance distributed
to the Drepin heirs. Since the filing of the petition for probate
of the Drepin will, nine (9) offers had been made for the
purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM
Management Phils., through its President Honor P. Moslares.
Basis was that the deceased sold 80.3980 hectares of land
absolutely and perpetually to Honor P. Moslares for the sum
of P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To
secure the payment of the remaining P2,300,000.00, the
latter mortgaged the land to the former.
The parties further agreed not to register the sale yet until
P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin and
P1,000,000.00 paid to Drepin’s creditors. Subsequently,
Drepin and Moslares entered into a “Joint Venture
Agreement”. Said agreement listed Drepin as the registered
“owner” of the lots and denominated Moslares as “developer”
tasked with converting the lands into a residential
subdivision. Upon learning of the existence of Special
Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein respondent
Moslares, informed the Judicial Administrator Atty. Tomas
Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made
subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that
he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage
in accordance with the terms of his written proposal.

The probate court, issued an order approving respondent
Moslares’ proposal and authorizing administrator Trinidad to
enter into the appropriate agreement. Requests for revision
of payment and extension of period within which to pay the
balance were made by Moslares. However, he was not able
to pay it. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order and
based on this order administrator Trinidad executed the Deed
of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. transferring the
titles to the properties in question in the name of the latter.
The same was duly registered. On October 20, 1980, the
probate court approved the report of administrator Trinidad
dated October 16, 1980, with xerox copies of the Deed of
Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. of the estate of
Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent court’s order
authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of
Undertaking with the vendee. An urgent Motion and
Manifestation was filed by respondent Moslares praying that
all pending motions be resolved and praying that the Deed of
Sale and Deed of Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be
cancelled. The same remained unacted upon.
On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Metro
Manila to determine title and ownership over the Drepin
lands. Judgment was rendered by respondent court in favor
of respondent Moslares. The said court refused to exclude the
parcels of land involved from the testate proceedings of the
Drepin estate. Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
exclude the parcels of land involved from the testate
proceedings of the Drepin estate?
HELD:
No. For continually presuming that the three titled lots were
part of the Drepin estate and for refusing to provisionally pass
upon the question of exclusion, did the respondent court act
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion? We hold that even with such presumption and
refusal, the respondent court still acted within its jurisdiction
and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the
jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate
court ‘may’ provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion,
not ‘should’. The obvious reason is the probate court’s limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate
action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed all the way
that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of
Drepin’s estate, that would not prevent nor defeat petitioner’s
remedy in a separate suit. And We hold that Civil Case No.
41287 is just such a suit instituted to settle the question of
ownership over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos.
259060, 259061 and 259062, despite the claim for damages,
because of the composite effect of the prayer in the complaint
thereof. In effect, We are saying that the question of whether
the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner should be excluded
from the probate proceedings below, cannot be determined
with finality by Us in this case, because in this petition We
are merely reviewing the acts of the respondent. CFI as a
probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to include
those properties ‘is only provisional in character and is
without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the
issue of title or ownership’ Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27,
1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently, in reviewing the exercise
of such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion of the properties involved, as
prayed for to do so would expand the probate court’s
jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set by law and
jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue be
ventilated and finally resolved in the already instituted Civil
Case No. 41287, even as We hold that respondent court’s act
of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E. MENESES
G.R. No. 42108 December 29, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her
brother, petitioner Oscar D. Ramos, the amounts of P
5,000.00 and P 9,000.00 in connection with her business
transaction As security for said loan, private respondent
Adelaida Ramos executed in favor of petitioners two (2)
deeds of conditional sale of her rights, shares, interests and
participation respectively over a lot registered in the name of
their parents, and another lot then registered in the names
of Socorro, Josefina and Adelaida Ramos.
Upon the failure of said private respondent as vendor a retro
to exercise her right of repurchase within the redemption
period, petitioner filed a petition for consolidation and
approval of the conditional sale in Special Proceedings,
entitled "Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Denoga. The
said probate court issued an order which approved the
conditional sale (but not as to the petition for the
consolidation of ownership).
ISSUE:
Can the probate court pass upon issues of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceeding?
RULING:
No. A reading of the order of the probate court will show that
it is merely an approval of the deed of conditional sale
executed by petitioner Adelaida Ramos in favor of petitioners.
There is nothing in said order providing for the consolidation
of ownership over the lots allegedly sold to petitioners nor
was the issue of the validity of said contract discussed or
resolved therein. The approval of the probate court of the
conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the
intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere
recognition of the right of private respondent Adelaida Ramos
as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her
inheritance even before partition.
Moreover, the probate jurisdiction of the former court of first
instance or the present regional trial court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment
and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and
trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in this
case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate
court to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceeding. The parties concerned may
choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience
in the preparation or presentation of evidence. Obviously, the
approval by the probate court of the conditional sale was
without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for
consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument
in the proper court within the statutory period of prescription.
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
PASTOR VS CA
FACTS:
This is a case of hereditary succession.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in
Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia
Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two
legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia
Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not
natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA
PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized
in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino
by his mother's citizenship.
On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the
probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of
PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will
contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in
favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42%
share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in
Pina-Barot, Cebu.
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion
of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him
special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR.,
whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will.
He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing
a bond of P 5,000.00.
On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator,
instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which
included the properties subject of the legacy and which were
in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria
Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners
thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The
action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed
their opposition to the petition for probate and the order
appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order
allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 52961- R, the order was affirmed in a decision
dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same
to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on
January 11, 1978.
ISSUE:
W/N the probate court can allow the probate of the will
without considering the issue of conjugal partnership of
Pastor Sr.
RULING:

No.
Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his
wife, aside from his two legitimate children and one
illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the
conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR,
SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the
administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
which will include, among others, the determination of the
extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her
death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on
December 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the
community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior
definitive determination of the assets of the estate of
PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties
presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does
not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it
was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of
properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR,
SR. was still being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less
payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed,
it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where
the Probate Court ordered that-
... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having
money claims against the decedent to file them in the office
of the Branch Clerk of this Court."
(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at
least provided for, as of December 5, 1972.
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined,
the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not
be ascertained.
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not
possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a
fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part
of the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an
impairment of the legiftime of the compulsory heirs.
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the
intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was obviously
for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7
years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court
scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will..
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as
to what properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the
face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA.
ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties not in the
name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on
the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no
basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of
1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to
the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order
of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent
implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy,
in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of
basis.
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the
rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased,
i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and
payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment
and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
(Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
TRINIDAD VS CA
G.R No. 75579
September 30, 1991
FACTS:
An information has been filed against Tomas Trinidad in the
CFI of Manila, charging him with violation of PD 957 for non-
deliver of title. It was alleged that he, being the administrator
of the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin, president and General
MANAGER OF THE Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation, is aware and has knowledge of the sale of a
parcel of land in the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision to
Francisca Dimabuyo, failed to deliver the title of said lot upon
full payment thereof. Dimabuyo averred that she made the
payments required and that she received receipts for such
payment but the title was not delivered to her. Petitioner
however rebuts that she has not complied with all the
requirements as she had not paid the taxes on the property.
The CFI (now RTC) convicted him as guilty for violation of PD
957, to which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Can an administrator proceed with the delivery of the title
without the probate court’s authorization?
RULING:
No. Petitioner maintains that to proceed execute the deed of
absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate Court is to
be recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as well as to
render void his actuations done without the permission of the
Probate Court.
This contention is correct and is impressed with merit.
Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already
deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate Court, it
was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give
authorization to administrator of the estate to deliver titles of
lots which had previously been sold. The decedent after all,
might be considered the alter ego of the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation. The private complainant had been
duly instructs by the accused herein to file the proper petition
or motion wit the Probate Court for delivery of said title but
said complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said
instructions. If at anybody should be blamed, it should be
private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the
needed authorization fro the court. Indeed, questions of title
to any property apparent still belonging to estate of the
deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with
consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons
such as the herein private complainant. In fact, third persons
may even intervene in the testate or intestate proceedings to
protect their interest. We uphold petitioner's contention
therefore that if he had proceeded to immediately cause the
delivery of the title of private complainant herein, he could
have been held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction
and function of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught
between the horns of a dilemma which was not of his own
making.
VALERA VS INSERTO
FACTS:
Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18 hectare
fishpond in Iloilo by the Government to last during his
lifetime. He transferred all his leasehold rights by fictitious
sale to his daughter, Teresa Garin; having been resorted to
so that she might use the property to provide for her
children's support and education, with the agreement that
the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion
of the schooling of Teresa Garin's children.
Valera and his spouse Consolacio Sarosa and their child
Teresa died. The heirs of Teresa, her husband Jose Garin and
their children, bought the fishpond, from the Government,
acquiring title thereto.
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion
Sarrosa, the administrators claim that he fishpond should be
returned to the spouse’s estate
The Probate Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Adil, held
that there has been an implied trust created, therefore, the
fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses
pursuant to Art 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code. Pursuant
thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforce reconveyance of
the fishpond to the estate.
The fishpond was leased by the Garin heirs to Fabiana, who
although willingly surrender it to the sheriff, later filed a
complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking
vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond,
based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and
Jose Garin, as lessor. This was dismissed so he instituted a
separate action for injunction and damages
CA reversed (fishpond to be returned to Garin Heirs and their
lessee Fabiana) saying that:
Probate Court has no jurisdiction
The title of the Garin heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the
presumption that the estate owns the fishpond and
That assuming the Probate Court had competence to resolve
ownership, a separate action has to be filed
ISSUE:
WON the Probate Court had authority to order reconveyance
of the fishpond
HELD:
No. The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,
and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the
Other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to
the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third
persons are not thereby prejudiced
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. It was at all times
clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance
was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it
was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being
explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action,"
but merely to determine whether it should or should not be
included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether
or not the property should be included in the inventory is one
clearly within the probate court’s competence, although the
Court’s determination os merely provisional in character , not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action that may be instituted by the parties
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question
of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on
the property with any character of authority, definiteness or
permanence, having been made only for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the
hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of
execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose
right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in
an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater
cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is
not in the decedents' names but in others
A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to
recover the property
LORENZO VS POSADAS
FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died leaving a will and considerable
amount of real and personal properties. A probate
proceeding of his will and the settlement and distribution of
his estate were filed in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. At the same
time the , the government through the CIR assessed against
the estate an inheritance tax in the amount of P1,434.24
which, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment
consisting of a 1 per cent monthly interest from July 1, 1931
to the date of payment and a surcharge of 25 per cent on the
tax, amounted to P2,052.74.
ISSUE:
(a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it
be satisfied?
(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of
the value of the estate at the time of the testator's death, or
on its value ten years later?
(c) What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions
of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be given
retroactive effect?
(d) Has there been deliquency in the payment of the
inheritance tax? If so, should the additional interest claimed
by the defendant in his appeal be paid by the estate?
RULING:
(a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the
obligation to pay the same. Section 1536 as amended, of the
Administrative Code, imposes the tax upon "every
transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest,
gift mortis causa, or advance in anticipation of
inheritance,devise, or bequest." The tax therefore is upon
transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a
decedent, made effective by his death. (61 C. J., p. 1592.) It
is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to
succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the
intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at
or after death. According to article 657 of the Civil Code, "the
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J.,
". . . the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of
the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at
the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if
the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for
the same before his death."
Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the
inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event
at the moment of the decedent's death. The time when the
heirs legally succeed to the inheritance may differ from the
time when the heirs actually receive such inheritance.Thomas
Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax
accrued as of the date.
(b) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas Hanley,
in so far as the real properties are concerned, did not and
could not legally pass to the instituted heir, Matthew Hanley,
until after the expiration of ten years from the death of the
testator on May 27, 1922 and, that the inheritance tax should
be based on the value of the estate in 1932, or ten years after
the testator's death. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending
to show that in 1932 the real properties in question had a
reasonable value of only P5,787. This amount added to the
value of the personal property left by the deceased, which
the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would generate an inheritance
tax which, excluding deductions, interest and surcharge,
would amount only to about P169.52.
If death is the generating source from which the power of the
estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon
the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the
right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be
measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time
of the decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent
contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in
value. The right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at
the moment of death, and hence is ordinarily measured as to
any beneficiary by the value at that time of such property as
passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or depriciation is
immaterial."
Transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of
the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the
beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the
property transmitted at that time regardless of its
appreciation or depreciation.
(c) The defendant levied and assessed the inheritance tax
due from the estate of Thomas Hanley under the provisions
of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by section 3 of Act No. 3606. But Act No. 3606 went
into effect on January 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not the law
in force when the testator died on May 27, 1922. The law at
the time was section 1544 above-mentioned, as amended by
Act No. 3031, which took effect on March 9, 1922.
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the
statute in force at the time of the death of the decedent. The
taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to be required to
guess the outcome of pending measures. Of course, a tax
statute may be made retroactive in its operation. Liability for
taxes under retroactive legislation has been "one of the
incidents of social life. But legislative intent that a tax statute
should operate retroactively should be perfectly clear. The
defendant Collector of Internal Revenue consider the
provisions of Act No. 3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer
than those of Act No. 3031, that said provisions are penal in
nature and, therefore, should operate retroactively in
conformity with the provisions of article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code. Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent
is based on the tax only, instead of on both the tax and the
interest, as provided for in Act No. 3031, and (2) the taxpayer
is allowed twenty days from notice and demand by the CIR
within which to pay the tax, instead of ten days only as
required by the old law.
(d) The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay a tax
may arise at a certain time and the tax may be paid within
another given time. As stated by this court, "the mere failure
to pay one's tax does not render one delinquent until and
unless the entire period has elapsed within which the
taxpayer is authorized by law to make such payment without
being subjected to the payment of penalties for failure to pay
his taxes within the prescribed period."
That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy deeply
intrenched in our tax system. Thus, no court is allowed to
grant injunction to restrain the collection of any internal
revenue tax.
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the
date when Moore became trustee. The interest due should be
computed from that date and it is error on the part of the
defendant to compute it one month later. The provisions
cases is mandatory , and neither the CITR or this court may
remit or decrease such interest, no matter how heavily it may
burden the taxpayer. As the tax and interest due were not
paid on that date, the estate became liable for the payment
of the surcharge.
RULE 74
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
DELGADO
FACTS:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a
Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate
of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
(died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed
by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they
should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then
allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to
intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the
status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence,
she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later,
Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together
without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted
dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed
dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of
the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of
the estate noting that Josefa and Guillermo did not contract
marriage.
RULING:
The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses,
that marriage between Josefa and Guillermo never occurred.
Although it is presumed that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since, no
marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must be
settled in different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot
be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of
the deceased.
VDA DA REYES VS CA
July 26, 1991
FACTS:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land
of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at
Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring
said land under the operation of the Torrens System of
registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921
without the title having been issued to him. The application
was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the
administrator of his property.
In 1936, the property was subdivided by Gavino’s heirs.
However, the heirs did not knew that a Original Certificate of
Title No. 255 was issued on 1941 and was kept by Juan
Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes. In 1967, the heirs of
Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate based on the aforestated subdivision plan. As a result
of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, several transfer certificates of title
covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the
respective adjudicatees.
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-
A-14 from Hebron, petitioners, as successors-in-interest of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional
Trial Court against private respondents for recovery of
possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification,
accounting and damages. They allege therein that after
"having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners
of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael
Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to
defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the
parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants
refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said
land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was
allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that
they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful
possession and enjoyment of the property since September
1969.
The RTC ruled that the continued possession by private
respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did not
ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was
already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. In CA, reversed the
decision.
ISSUE:
WON the partition is valid.
RULING:
Yes, the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in
1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law
that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be
valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, this Court, interpreting Section
1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement
that a partition be put in a public document and registered
has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does
not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights
of creditors are not affected.
Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution
in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be
inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential
requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid. Additionally, the validity of such oral
partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court
in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition
executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another,
We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the
death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically
became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be
held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner
may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property
subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is
eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of
the co-ownership.
PEDROSA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Miguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina
and their legally adopted daughter Maria Pedrosa, the
petitioner. Rosalina and Maria entered into an extra judicial
settlement of his estate. The other Private respondents, the
Rodriguezes, however filed an action an action to annul
Maria’s adoption which the CFI upheld. It was also appealed
to the Court of Appeals which also upheld the adoption as
legal.
In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away
with no other heirs but her brothers and sisters, the private
respondents who then entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the
estate of Miguel and of his sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. The Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen
parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square
meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen,
Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely
by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition, respondents Rodriguez were able to secure new
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer
some parcels to the other respondents herein.
Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties
and after being unable to do so, filed a complaint to annul the
partition. Her complaint was dismissed by the RTC and on
appeal was also dismissed by the CA.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the “Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition” had already prescribed
and Whether or not said deed is valid
RULING:
No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribed
Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides for a two
year prescriptive period: (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section
Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or
through guardians.
Petitioner did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. So
the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as
provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964),
which held that: [The action to annul] a deed of “extrajudicial
settlement” upon the ground of fraud...may be filed
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, “no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.” As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years
from its execution in 1941. As to the next issue, the deed of
partition is not valid. No extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.
Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement
cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a
notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was
when publication was done in the instant case. Following
Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena
did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not
binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when
the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on
the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition
executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her
adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article
1003 of the Civil Code
CUA VS VARGAS
(please refer to Ate Devie’s handwritten file)
TEVES vs. CA
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died
intestate and without debts in 1943 and 1953, respectively.
They had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria.
During their lifetime, the spouses own two parcels of land
designated as Lot 769-A registered in the name of Marcelina
and Lot 6409 registered in the name of Joaquin and his two
sisters. However, Joaquins sisters died without issue, causing
the entire property to pass to him.
After Marcelina and Joaquin died, their children executed
extrajudicial settlements entitled EXTRA-JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND SALE purporting to adjudicate unto
themselves the ownership over the two parcels of land and
to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their sister
Asuncion Teves for a consideration of Php425 and Php80.
The division of Lot 769-A was embodied in two deeds. The
first Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale was entered
into on June 13, 1956 while the second deed was executed
on April 21, 1959. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale covering Lot 6409 was executed on December 14, 1971.
After the death of Asuncion Teves, her children, private
respondents herein, extrajudicially settled her property,
adjudicating unto themselves said lots.
On May 9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina and
Joaquin, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental against private respondents for the
partition and reconveyance of the aforesaid parcels of land,
alleging that the extrajudicial settlements in favor of their
mother, Asuncion, were spurious -
Maria Teves alleges forgery since she always signs using her
husband's family name name;
The children of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves and Gorgonio
Teves also alleged that the signature of their parents are all
forgeries.
Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed with the
word "sale" in handwriting.
The consideration of "One peso" stated in the document is
intercalated with the word "hundred" in handwriting.
The thumbmark imposed on the name of Gorgonio Teves
does not actually belong to Gorgonio Teves who was an
educated man and skilled in writing according to his
daughter.
Private respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the
assailed documents were executed with the formalities
required by law and are therefore binding and legally
effective as bases for acquiring ownership over the lots in
question.
Furthermore, it is contended that petitioners have slept on
their rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned
such rights. Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor of private
respondents and upheld the validity of the extrajudicial
settlements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision with a slight modification.
ISSUES:
WON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENTS EXECUTED BY THE
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN AND MARCELINA CIMAFRANCA ARE
VALID AND BINDING? DOES THE FACT THAT IT IS
UNREGISTERED MAKE IT BINDING STILL? DID LACHES BAR
THE PARTITION?
HELD:
ALL YES.
The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin
Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate is
authorized by Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
for a partition pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid,
the following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left
no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts
left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they
are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial
guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made
by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with
the Register of Deeds.
In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the
effect that the grantor executed a certain document and
acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere
preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the
evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to
exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the
certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate
will be upheld. The appellate courts ruling that the evidence
presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the
clear, strong, and convincing evidence necessary to
overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial settlements
executed by the parties, all of which are public documents,
being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect
by the appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial
settlements, it is noted that the extrajudicial settlements
covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However, in the
case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting Section
1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the validity of an
oral partition of the decedents estate and declared that the
non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect
its intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that - [t]he
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and
at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no
such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by law. Thus,
despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements
involving Lot 769-A are legally effective and binding among
the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no
creditors at the time of her death.
No explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to why
they instituted the present action questioning the
extrajudicial settlements only in 1984, which is more than 25
years after the assailed conveyance of Lot 769-A and more
than 10 years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of
title over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such
tardiness indubitably constitutes laches, which is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a
defensible cause of action, they are barred from pursuing the
same by reason of their long and inexcusable inaction.
PEZA v. FERNANDEZ
GR No. 138971
FACTS:
Lot 4673 was registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya,
Victorino Cuizon among others covered by an OCT. Sometime
thereafter, Jorgea Igot-Soro ño et al executed an Extra-
judicial Partition claiming to be the only surviving heirs of the
registered owners, through which they were issued a TCT.
Said lot was among the object of an expropriation proceeding
before the RTC. Said RTC approved the compromise
Agreement b/w the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
and Igot-Soroño et al wherein EPZA would pay a certain
amount in exchange for the subject property. PEZA acquired
title to said land by virtue of the RTC decision and was issued
a corresponding TCT. The Heirs of the Florentina Rapaya and
Juan Cuizon filed a complaint to nullify several documents
including the TCT issued to EPZA for they were excluded from
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. PEZA filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of prescription and was denied thus
elevated the case to the CA wherein the CA ruled that the
heirs of Igot-Soroño defrauded the other heirs by falsely
representing that they were the only heirs enabling them to
appropriate the land in favor of EPZA. This method of
acquiring property created a constructive trust in favor of the
defrauded party and grants them the right to vindicate
regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent’s claim over the expropriated
land has prescribed?
RULING:
Yes. As provided under the Rules of Court, persons unduly
deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may
assert their claim only w/in the 2-year period after the
settlement and distribution of the estate. However, this
prescriptive period will not apply to those who had not been
notified of the settlement. The Private respondents are
deemed to have been notified of the extrajudicial settlement
since it was registered and annotated on the certificate of title
over the lot. The only exception to this rule is when the title
still remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently
caused the partition of the said property. In the case at bar,
the title has already passed to an innocent purchaser for
value, the gov’t through EPZA. Their remedies of action for
reconveyance resulting from fraud, and action for
reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust has
already prescribed as well the former having prescribed 4
years from the discovery and the latter prescribing 10 years
from the alleged fraudulent registration.
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO v.
COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-
in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, et al.
G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998
FACTS:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario
Cuado, were the co-owners of a property. Thereafter,
Lourdes died intestate without issue. Subsequently, private
respondents, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition
(under Art. 494 of the Civil Code) and damages. After trial,
the trial court declared private respodents as the rightful
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private
respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition
of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision and
further held that a prior and separate judicial declaration of
heirship was not necessary and that private respondents
became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned
and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her
death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate
possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership
as provided for by law, including the right to demand partition
under Art. 777 of the Civil Code, holding that the property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent,
as completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death.
Petitioners, however, pursued the present case arguing that
a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement
of the deceased's estate and compliance with all legal
requirements especially publication.
ISSUE:
Is prior settlement of the estate and publication essential
before the heirs can commence any action of partition
pertaining to the property co-owned by the deceased?
HELD:
No. In conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil Code,
from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner,
incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time
or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her
rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents
merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would
have been correct had the action been for the partition of the
estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the
summary settlement of estates of small value (under Rule
73). But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere
segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited;
from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case
of ordinary partition between co-owners under Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court and not Rule 73, the latter requiring
publication.
 LITONJUA VS MONTILLA
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 868 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against
Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4,000 with
legal interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00. In due time,
a writ of execution was issued, but no property of Claudio
Montilla was found which could be levied upon.
On June 12, 1950, Pedro L. Litonjua filed in Special
Proceeding No. 532 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr.,
deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and
participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin
Montilla, Sr., in the latter's intestate estate be sold and out
of the proceeds the judgment debt of Ciaudio Montilla in favor
of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was opposed by
Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of
the intestate estate.
On August 7, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental issued an order denying the motion. From this
order Pedro L. Litonjua appealed. In the case of Ortiga
Brothers & Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345,
ISSUE:
W/N the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitles
to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by
inheritance to said heirs?
RULING:
Yes.
It was held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person
is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which
pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after all the debts
of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and
when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are
known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid
before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a
person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or
intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings
brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of
the succession. We quote hereunder pertinent passages of
the decision:
"A person who, having a claim against a deceased person
which should be considered by the committee does not, after
publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the
committee as provided by law, shall be barred from
recovering such demand or from pleading the same as an
offset to any action, under the provisions of section 695 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, excepting the case referred to in
section 701 of the same; with still less reason can one who is
not a creditor of the said deceased intervene in the
proceedings relative to the latter's intestate estate and to the
settlement of his succession (article 1034 of the Civil Code),
because such creditor has no right or interest that call for the
protection of the law and the courts, except in any remainder
which may be found due the heir.
"It is true that Yap Tico, as the creditor of the widow and heirs
of the deceased Ildefonso, is entitled to collect what is due
him out of the property left by the latter and which was
inherited by such widow and heirs, but it is no less true that
only after all the debts of the said estate have been paid can
it be known what net remainder will be left for division among
the heirs, because the debts of the deceased must be paid
before his heirs can inherit. (Arts. 659 et seq. 1026, 1027,
and 1032 of the Civil Code, and secs. 734 et seq., Code of
Civil Procedure.)
"An execution can, not legally be levied upon the property of
an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow and
heirs of tha deceased, until the credits held against the latter
at the time of his death shall have been paid, and only after
the debts of the estate have been paid can the remaining
property that pertains to the said debtor heirs be attached
(Art. 1034, aforecited, Civil Code.)" (pp. 350-51)
The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the
case at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the
deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his
claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir,
before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, and it is so
ordered with costs against the appellant.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY VS CA
G.R.No. 128102
March 7, 2000
FACTS:
The subject lot with 34,325 square meter was acquired by
AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an
extrajudicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute
sake. After its registration with the Register of deeds of Lapu-
Lapu City and sale, AZNAR declared this property under its
name. then it was alleged that the private respondents in this
case were allowed to occupy some portions of the property
by mere tolerance on the condition that they will leave once
the company uses the land for its purpose. AZNAR then
entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty
Development Corp. for the development of the land. The
private respondents refused to vacate the premises,
prompting AZNAR to file a case for unlawful detainer and
damages. Private respondents rebutted that they are the
successors and descendants of the eight children of Crisanta
Maloloy-on, and that the extrajudicial partition of real estate
with deed of absolute sale is void ab initio. They filed a case
with the RTC for annulment of said document. The MTCC
ordered private respondents to vacate the premises.
Aggrieved, they appealed to RTC, to which the court affirmed
the decision of the MTCC. The decision was appealed to the
CA and the CA reversed the ruling, reasoning that private
respondents have already been in the possession of the land
since time immemorial. The CA also reasons that not all heirs
have participated in the document, hence it is not valid.
ISSUE:
Is the Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale valid?
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made
with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or
fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter
shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted
the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no
evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As
to the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs,
Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall
be void only with respect to such person." In other words, the
participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void
in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them.
It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed
of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in
its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof
of authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Private respondents failed to discharge this burden of
proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned
deed stands.
Anent the non-annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale in the reconstituted Original Certificate
of Title No. RO-2856, the same does not render the deed
legally defective. It must be borne in mind that the act of
registering a document is never necessary to give the
conveyance legal effect as between the parties and the
vendor's heirs. As between the parties to a sale, registration
is not indispensable to make it valid and effective. The
peculiar force of a title is exhibited only when the purchaser
has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the
conveyance.
RALLA VS UNTALAN
FACTS:
Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of
his own will in the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Albay (Special Proceedings No. 564). In his will
he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein
who, upon his death during the pendency of this petition, was
substituted by his heirs), leaving nothing to his other son,
Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition
of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2023.
In the course of the hearing of the probate case (Special
Proceedings No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer
interested in the allowance of the will of his late father,
Rosendo Ralla, for its probate would no longer be beneficial
and advantageous to him.
This motion was denied. The Court of Appeals agreed with
the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood
to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed
because then he would not be compelled to submit for
inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo Ralla 149
parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting
rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice
of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who was being deprived of his
successional rights over the said properties.
Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho,
declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla
who should share equally upon the division of the latter's
estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into
one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to compromise in the
partition case (Civil Case No. 2023). On December 18, 1967,
they entered into a project of partition whereby sixty-three
parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their
deceased mother, Paz Escarella, were amicably divided
between the two of them. This project of partition was
approved on December 19,1967
Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin
Chancoco, brother-in- law of the petitioner (Pablo) filed a
petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1106, for the
probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that
the decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla then filed a
manifestation stating that he had no objections to the
probate; thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as
Petitioner for the Probate of the Will." This motion was
granted despite the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro
Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate was granted;
Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed
special administrator.
However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to
the estate of Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico Almine also took
possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by the
project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the
heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved
to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid
parcels of land.
Judge Romulo P. Untalan ruled, that the sixty-three (63)
parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the
probate proceedings and, likewise from the administration of
Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr.
ISSUE:
WON the 63 parcels of land be excluded in the probate of the
will if Rosendo Ralla
HELD:
The 63 parcels of land should be excluded. The
aforementioned partition was made in the civil case for
partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from,
and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate
of the will of Rosendo Ralla.
There can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the
will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the
properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in
this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case
No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564
originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate
of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla,
respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
The properties involved in the present petition were the
subject of the project of partition signed by both the
petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla in Civil Case No.
2023; the lower court approved the said project of partition
on December 19, 1967; subsequently, Pablo and Pedro Ralla
jointly manifested that they had already received "the
ownership and possession of the respective parcels of land
adjudicated to them in the said project of partition," and upon
their motion Judge Ezekiel Grageda declared the partition
case closed and terminated in its Order of December 29,
1967; there was no appeal made from this decision within the
reglementary period to do so, consequently, it attained
finality.
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus
become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate
in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and
the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they
are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any
part of it.
The partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon
the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs,
especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession
to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from
their mother, the late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to
respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in
the document of partition.
Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of
the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, vs. CA, G.R.
No. 118680 March 5, 2001
FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez
initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the
legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez
Pedrosa which the CFI granted the petition and declared
petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
Thereafter Miguel the adoptive father died intestate.
Petitioner and Rosalina, the widow entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
However, the siblings of Miguel filed an action to annul the
adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City. CFI
denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption.
Respondent filed and appeal, while said appeal was pending,
the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already
prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid; and
(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots
which had already been transferred to the respondent
buyers.
RULING:
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the
prescriptive period which should be applied is four years. She
also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year
prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party
assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two,
the party assailing the partition must have participated
therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present
in her case,12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." And no knowledge
and consent to the same, is therefore fraudulent. She asserts
that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years. The
action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the
ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register
of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name
of respondents exclusively.
Moreover,a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and
consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena
and Rosalina, the adopting mother are heirs of Miguel and
as such, a lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate.
The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they
were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even
filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. The decree
of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting,
it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of
partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
BENATIRO VS HEIRS OF CUYOS
FACTS:
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian
(respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.Victor Elliot Lepiten
(Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI)
now Regional Trial Court(RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition
for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding
(SP) No.24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner."
The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who
was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray.
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties
together with their respective counsels appeared. Both
counsels manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle their case. The trial courton even date
issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of the
estate. Subsequently, the respondents questioned the said
Compromise Agreement for they did not give their consent
and participation. The petitioners claimed that they were
constructively notified through publication.
ISSUE:
WON the said agreement is binding to the heirs who did not
consent to the Agreement?
HELD:
No. Said agreement is not binding upon those heirs who did
not give their consent to saidagreement. The Supreme Court
held as follows:
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the
heirs were called to a hearing to validate theReport. The CFI
adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirsshowing conformity thereto. The CFI
adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only
six outof the nine heirs attended the conference,
thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance
to beheard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shallbe deprived
of property without due process of law. We find that the
assailed Order dated December 16,1976, which approved a
void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of
due process.
RODRIGUEZ VS TAN
G.R. No. L-6044 November 24, 1952
FACTS:
It is averred in the petition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on
February 8, 1944, at Parañaque, Rizal, leaving an estate with
a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow,
Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the
petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs,
who were then already of age, entered into a verbal
agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of
the estate but to place it under the administration of the
widow with the understanding that each of the six children
would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal
shares from year to year for the needs of their families
provided that they do not exceed the participation to which
they are entitled;
On March 19, 1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano
Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez filed a petition for
administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in
spite of his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all
the heirs were of age. On June 2, 1952, the petitioners
objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is
free from obligations and the heirs are all of age, no
administration proceedings shall be allowed. The CFI
respondent Judge appointed Abelardo Rodriguez
administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge erred in maintaining the
administration proceedings and in appointing Abelardo
Rodriguez as administrator of the estate notwithstanding the
fact that the estate has no debts and all the heirs entitled to
share in its distribution are all of age.
RULING:
No. Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1
allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of
partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is
not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the
use made therein of the word may. If the intention were
otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the
word shall as was done in other provisions that are
mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not
only once but in the whole section which indicates an
intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the
heirs.
In this particular case, however, we find that the core of
petitioners' objection is not that the heirs have erroneously
instituted these administration proceedings but that the court
erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the
estate. It is claimed that Abelardo Rodriguez was appointed
administrator without the petitioners having been given an
opportunity to be heard. The respondent judge finds that
Abelardo appears to be qualified to act as administrator of
the estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not
possess any of the disqualifications. Moreover, he is one of
the heirs left by the deceased. Inasmuch as one of the As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect
oppositors appear to be more qualified to act as administrator the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a
of the estate, the court is inclined to grant the petition condition of jural validity or as a means of
presented by Abelardo Rodriguez. providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form
exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, “is for
evidential purposes only.” The Civil Code, too, requires the
HERNANDEZ VS ANDAL accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument,
G.R. No. L-273, March 29, 1947 not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure
its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or
FACTS: contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be
compelled to execute the document. It must be noted that
Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the
brother and sisters, who acquired in common a parcel of land essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says
from their deceased father. Maria and so in clear and unequivocal terms.
Aquilina sold to the spouses Andal a portion thereof, which
they purport to be their combined shares by virtue of a verbal Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court contains no such
partition made among the siblings Hernandez. After the sale, express or clear declaration that the required public
Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal but instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or
the latter refused to sell the same. Later, Andal resold the an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the
same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and parties. The requirement that a partition be put in a public
Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition among document and registered has for its
them and their brother and sisters, and that there are purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
witnesses ready to prove such partition. However, Cresencia protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
asserted that under the Rules of Court, parol evidence of object of registration is to serve as constructive
partition is inadmissible. notice. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into
play when, as in this case, there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights
of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
ISSUE:
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
Whether or not oral evidence is admissible in proving a Judgment reversed.
contract of partition among heirs

RULING: YAP VS CA
 (please refer to Ate Devie’s handwritten file)
RULE 75
PASTOR VS CA
(supra)
RULING:
No.
Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will –
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his
wife, aside from his two legitimate children and one
illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the
conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR,
SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the
administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
which will include, among others, the determination of the
extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her
death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on
December 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the
community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior
definitive determination of the assets of the estate of
PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties
presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does
not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it
was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of
properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR,
SR. was still being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less
payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed,
it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where
the Probate Court ordered that-
... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having
money claims against the decedent to file them in the office
of the Branch Clerk of this Court."
(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at
least provided for, as of December 5, 1972.
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined,
the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not
be ascertained.
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not
possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a
fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part
of the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an
impairment of the legiftime of the compulsory heirs.
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the
intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was obviously
for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7
years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court
scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will..
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as
to what properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the
face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA.
ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties not in the
name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on
the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no
basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of
1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to
the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order
of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent
implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy,
in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of
basis.
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the
rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased,
i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and
payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment
and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
(Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
ALVARADO VS GAVIOLA
GR No. 74695347
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed
a notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited
an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly
revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time
awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna. According to
Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when
the said notarial will was executed, together with three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the
testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from
glaucoma. Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document
and read the same aloud before the testator, the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four
following the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them. Thereafter, a codicil entitled
“Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad
sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni
Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generathe cash for
the testator’s eye operation. Said codicil was likewise not
read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner
as with the previously executed will. When the notarial will
was submitted to the court for
probate, Cesar Alvarado filedhis opposition as he said that
the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to
senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress,
or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and
that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or
trick.
ISSUE:
Whether the notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be
admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in
the execution and attestation thereof as testator was
allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-
reading requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not
complied with?
RULING:
Yes. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter
was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure
the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should
be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the
testator’s will.
Cesar Alvarado was correct in asserting that his father was
not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will
and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for
purposes of Art. 808. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly
is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of
making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate)
and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his
wishes. Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses,
and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the
testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing
and acknowledgment take place. There is no evidence that
the contents of the will and the codicil were not sufficiently
made known and communicated to the testator. With four
persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading
word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what
was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to
the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to
himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they
are not in accordance with his wishes. Although there should
be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law
in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may
only defeat the testator’s will.
NEPOMUCENO VS CA
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
FACTS:
Martin Jugo died and left a last Will and Testament. In the
said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner
Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his
estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as
husband and wife. In fact, the testator and the petitioner
were married. The testator devised to his forced heirs,
namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar
and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof
to herein petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will
and Testament and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary. Thereafter, the legal wife of the testator,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging
inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue
and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at
the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already
very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and
thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground
that as the testator admitted in his Will to co-habiting with
the petitioner, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.
ISSUE:
Can the probate court pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision of the Will in the present case?
HELD:
Yes, but only as a way of exception. As a general rule, the
only purpose of the probate is to establish conclusively as
against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity
to execute the same (extrinsic validity of the Will). The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court,
the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this
nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
would be superfluous.
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the
extrinsic validity of the Will. However, in the present case,
the testamentary disposition in favor of the petitioner is void
in accordance to Article 1028, in relation to Article 739 of the
Civil Code (void donations).
Invoking "practical considerations", that in view of certain
unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality,
the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.
AJERO VS CA
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS:
In the will of Annie Sand, decedent named as devisees, the
following: petitioner spouses and private respondent, et al.,
and their children.
Petitioners instituted a special proceesing for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. Private respondent opposed the
petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body
nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the
decedent's holographic will to probate.
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for
probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of
Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did
not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either
unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found
that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by decedent. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the appellate court err in dismissing the probate of the
will for non-compliance with Article 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code?
RULING:
Yes. Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have
not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of
its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on
the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the
signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the
testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to
disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will
to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether
the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will
and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether
the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
acts of the decedent.
In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is
the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article
810 of the New Civil Code.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814.
RULE 76
TOLENTINO VS FRANCISCO
FACTS:
At the time of his death, Gregorio Tolentino was 66 years old.
He, together with his wife who predeceased him,
accumulated a very considerable estate. The pair had no
children and he let his wife’s kin live with him. He made a will
bequeathing properties to his wife’s kin but after having
strained relations with them, he planned to make a new will
with which the bulk of his estate will be given to Adelaida
Tolentino de Concepcion. He then went to the office of Atty.
Repide, informing him that he wanted to make a new will. He
then assigned Atty. Repide, Sunico and Monzon as his 3
attesting witnesses. After reflecting over the provisions of the
will, he again appeared in the office of Repide, requesting the
attesting witnesses to be changed to Jose Syyap, Agustin
Vergel de Dios and Vicente Legarda. Certain arrangements
have been made for the signing of the will by the attesting
witnesses. The morning after such signing, he was
assassinated in his home. In the probate of the will, two of
the attesting witnesses repudiated their participation in the
execution of the will.
ISSUE:
Can the repudiation of the attesting witnesses affect the
validity of the will?
RULING:
No.
We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these
two witnesses on this point, the same being an evident
fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In
the first place, the affirmative proof showing that the will was
properly executed is adequate, consistent, and convincing,
consisting of the testimony of the third attesting witness,
Vicente Legarda, corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana
Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La
Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's office when
the will was executed and who lent a discerning attention to
what was being done. each of the seven signatures affixed to
his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been
made by using the same pen and ink that was used by
Legarda in signing the will.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call
all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the validity of
the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the
will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to
probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the
subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others,
in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will
rests. When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent
to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the
validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support
of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted
to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the
subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others,
in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will
rests.
MERCADO VS SANTOS
GR 45629 Sep 22, 1938
FACTS:
[May 28, 1931] Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition
for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa,
with the Pampanga CFI.
[June 31, 1931] The will was admitted to probate.
[October 27, 1932] Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed
with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint against Mercado for
falsification/forgery of the will probated. Mercado was
arrested. The complaint was subsequently dismissed at the
instance of de Leon herself.
[March 2, 1933] Same intervenor charged Mercado with the
same offense, this time in the justice of the peace court of
Mexico, Pampanga. Mercado was arrested again. The
complaint was likewise dismissed, again at de Leon’s
instance.
[February 2, 1934] Same situation as in March 2, 1933. Upon
due investigation, the case was dismissed on the ground that
the will alleged to have been falsified has already been
probated and that there was no evidence that Mercado had
forged the signature of the testatrix but that, on the contrary,
satisfactory evidence was presented that established the
authenticity of said signature.
[April 11, 1934] Rosario Basa de Leon and other intervenors
moved ex parte to reopen the probate proceedings, alleging
lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and to close the
proceedings. This motion was denied, having been filed ex
parte.
[May 9, 1934] The provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation
of the criminal case for forgery before the Pampanga CFI. The
motion was granted, and for the fourth time, Mercado was
arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year
[May 24, 1934] A second motion to reopen and close probate
proceedings was filed, this time with notice to the adverse
party. Same was denied.
[February 18, 1935] the CFI ordered the forgery case to be
tried on the merits.
[July 26, 1935] Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the probate court’s order of
denial.
[c. 1936~37] Mercado moved to dismiss the case, claiming
again that the will alleged to have been forged had already
been probated and, further, that the order probating the will
is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof.
The CFI overruled the motion. Mercado thus filed a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals, which promptly denied same.
ISSUE:
WON the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s
criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of said will.
RULING:
Applicable law: Code of Civil Procedure (then governing the
law on wills)
Sec. 306 provides, as re: the effect of judgments: in case of
a judgment/order in respect to the probate of a will, such
judgment/order is conclusive upon the will.
Sec. 333 establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor
of judgments declared by the Code to be conclusive.
Sec. 625 provides, as re: conclusiveness of the due execution
of a probate will: “… the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.”
Basis for PH law on wills (particularly Sec. 625 of the Code of
Civil Procedure) — Statutes of [the US state of] Vermont.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Vermont re: effect of
probate of a will are of persuasive authority in PH.
Says the Vermont SC in Missionary Society vs. Eells: “The
probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as to its due
execution against the whole world.”
In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, a criminal action will not lie against
the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION:
Mercado is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against
him quashed; CA judgment is reversed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ vs. TOLETE, G.R. No.
76714 June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cuananan
both executed a separate last will and testament,
bequeathing to each other "all the remainder" of his real and
personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever
situated" whoever will survived ahead of the other. When a
fire broke out and the entire family of Dr. Cunanan perished.
Petitioner Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan, filed with the RTC of. Malolos Bulacan, a petition
for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate
proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be
appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased couple in which a letters of special administration
was issued in her favor upon posting a bond.
However, the siblings of Dr. Cunanan filed a motion to nullify
the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to
disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan
because as "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving
heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately
excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills
of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court
to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses and
also that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., and prayed that that
the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2)
that the appointment of petitioner as the letters of special
administratrix be set aside instead Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.
be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the
deceased spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all the heirs of the deceased spouses were
notified of the probate proceedings. Whether or not the two
wills executed in New York be allowed in the Philippine
Probate Court and be probated jointly not separately.
RULING:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are
as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that
the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be
probated jointly and the rules shall be "liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding." A literal application of the
Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay
in the administration of justice.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills
either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of
a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In
the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate
wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same
provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are
conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint
probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation.
Petitioner considered herself only the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she failed to notify his siblings, herein
respondents, in the filing of the probate proceedings. The
court ruled that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under
Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court
shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated
or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
TRILLANA VS CRISOSTOMO
FACTS:
The deceased, Damasa Crisostomo, allegedly made two wills:
one will was made on August 16, 1948 and the other will was
executed on October 19, 1948. Trillana, the administrator of
the estate, presented the subsequent will executed on
October 19 for probate, and was granted by the court.
Crisostomo and others, claiming to be nephews and nieces of
the deceased, filed a petition for relief of the judgment
rendered by the probate court to disallow the subsequent will
and allow the former will executed on August 16, alleging that
the proceedings during the probate of the subsequent will
was attended by fraud.
Contention of the Appellants( Crisostomo et al):
Appellants argue that they are interested parties and
therefore may appeal in the present case, because in the
event the will of October 19 is disallowed and that of August
16 is allowed, and the legacies in the latter are declared
invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will
go to the appellants.
Contentiton of the Appellee (Trillana)
The will of August 16, 1948 was expressly and absolutely
revoked by the will of October 19, 1948, executed by the
same executrix or deceased. The probate of the subsequent
will was not attended by fraud and the appellants show no
proof of the alleged fraud committed in the probate of the
subsequent will.
ISSUE:
Whether a revoked will must be included in the probate of the
subsequent will.
Are the appellants parties in interest in the present case and
therefore entitled to appeal the decision of the lower court?
RULING:
1. No, a revoked will may no longer be presented in the
probate of the subsequent will.
If two wills are presented for allowance but one of them was
a revoked will, it cannot be included in the probate of the
latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste of time to
allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is
allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only
if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed.
2. No, the appellants are not considered as interested parties
in the probate proceedings of the will of the deceased Damasa
Crisostomo, and therefore, are not entitled to appeal the
decision of the lower court.
In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise
provided by law, the interest in order that a person may be a
party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will
be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's
order, decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent.
The appellants in the present case merely allege in their
petition for relief that they are "nephews and nieces and
therefore legal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo,"
without specifying the degree of relationship they had to the
latter. They contend that if the will made on October 19,
1949, be disallowed, they will inherit the estate left by the
testatrix. The interest claimed by the appellants is purely
contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future
events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948
(2) The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and (3)
invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16,
1948.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
FACTS:
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized American citizen, died single and childless. In the
last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother Sergio, as the executor of her will for
she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Thereafter respondent Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for the
probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special
administrator. However, petitioners, nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where it
was executed.
The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas
last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTCs order,
petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be
probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of
the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate
of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance
of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is
different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Can a will executed by a foreigner abroad be probated in
the Philippines although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was executed?
RULING:
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has
an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance
of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of
the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;
(c) the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. The rules do not
require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.
BALTAZAR VS ALAXA
GR No. 174489, April, 11,2012
FACTS:
Pacencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made the last
will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento
Miss Pacencia Regala" (September 30,1981). The will was
executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, witnessed by
Dra. Maria Limpin, Francisco Garcia and Faustino Mercado.
The will was read twice to the testatrix. Her signature was
affixed at the end of the said document on page 3 and on the
left margin of 1,2 and 4 thereof. The witnesses affixed their
signatures below its attestation clause and on the left
margins of page 1,2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Pacencia
and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public. All properties
were bequeathed to respondent Lorenzo Laxa, and his wife
Corazon Laxa and their children Luna and Katherine Lorenzo
is Pacencia's nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Six days after the execution of the will, Pacencia left for the
United States , there, she resided with Lorenzo and his family
until her death on January 4, 1996. On April 27,2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua , Pampanga for the
probate of will of Pacencia and the issuance of the letters of
administration in his favor. RTC issued an Order allowing
Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22,2000. Dra. Limpin
testified as to the execution of the last will of Pacencia and
attested to the present condition of his father retired Judge
Limpin who acted as the notary public.
On June 23,2000, petitioner Antonio filed an opposition which
was joined by the other petitioners contending that
Pacencia's will was null and void and because ownership of
the properties had not been transferred to Pacencia before
her death and that Lorenzo is disqualified to be appointed, he
being a citizen and resident of USA. On January 29, 2001, the
RTC issued an order denying both of their requests.
Proceedings on the petition for the probate of will continued,
and Dra Limpin was called again for cross-examination. Also,
Monico Mercado testified as to his father's(Faustino) condition
that his father can no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage.
On the part of Antonio, he presented Rosie. Rosie testified
that Pacencia is in the state of being forgetful based on her
personal assessment. Antonio testified that the execution of
will was attended with force. RTC denied the petition giving
weight to the testimony of Rosie that Pacencia is forgetful,
hence she is unfit to execute a will. On appeal to the CA, it
was reversed. The CA ruled that" the state of being forgetful
does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render
Pacencia unfit for executing a will.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the will complied with the requirements of
law
2. Whether or not the will complied with tequirements set
forth in Section 11, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 75:" Allowance necessary.
Conclusive as to the execution. No will shall be passed either
real or personal estate unless it is provedand allowed in the
proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance
of the will shall be valid as to its execution. " Due executiom
of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the
testator, being of sound mind freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Upon
examination of the will, it shows that the formalities laid
down by the law is faithfully complied with.
Furthermore, the burden to prove that Pacencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies
on the shoulder of the petitioners. There was no
substantial evidence presented that will show that Pacencia
was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will.
2. Yes. Section 11, Rule 76 states that " If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses and the notary public
in the case of the wills executed under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must
be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or
insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
court. " Applying it to the foregoing, the inability of Faustino
and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. Thus,
the SC hold that, for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was
able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of
the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify
in court. It is an established rule, that a testament may not
be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare
against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses
declare in favor of its legalization
CODOY VS CALUGAY
FACTS:
The deceased Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal executed a
holographic will on August 30, 1978. Herein respondents
Eugenia Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas are
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased.
They filed with the RTC of Misamis a petition for probate of
the holographic will of Matilde who died on 16 January 1990
which was written in Visayan.
Petitioners Eugenia Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition to the probate stating that the holographic will was
a forgery and the same was illegible. They also argued that
the will is out of the ordinary since it was signed and dated
after every disposition and not just one signature at the
bottom. They also alleged that it was made under undue
pressure.
Respondents however contend that the deceased was of
sound and disposing mind when she executed the will and
that no fraud or undue influence and duress happened and
that the will was written voluntarily. They presented six
witnesses with various documentary evidence.
Petitioners on their part filed a demurrer to evidence claiming
that respondents failed to establish to establish sufficient
factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. All the 6
witnesses that respondents presented expressed familiarity
with the deceased’s signature. But there was no mention of
the fact that there were witnesses at the time Matilde
executed the will.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court
who produced and identified the records of the case bearing
the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to
produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the
same was already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had
acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting
rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and
the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified
that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written,
dated and signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in
the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that
the signature on the will was similar to that of
the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she
was familiar with the signature of the deceased which
appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The
fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had
lived with the deceasedsince birth where she had become
familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the
will was genuine.
The lower court denied the probate. On appeal, respondents
again reiterated the testimony of the witnesses Augusto,
Generosa, Matilde Binanay, Teresita, Fiscal Waga, and
Evangeline. The CA sustained the authenticity of the
holographic will and allowed the probate and ruled that the 3
witness rule is merely permissive since compliance with
Art.811 is impossible as no witness may have been present
during the making of the holographic will. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
permissive or mandatory?
2. WON the signature was proven to be authentic?
RULING:
The Court ruled that it is mandatory. The article provides,
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to.
As a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic
will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the
signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled
that “shall” in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word “shall,” when used in a
statute is mandatory.”
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their
truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false
document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is
why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting
of the deceased.
Fiscal Waga one of the witnesses expressed doubts as to the
signature of the deceased. Evangeline, on her part, testified
that as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the
deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She
never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign
a document. In Matilde’s testimony, she saw pre-prepared
receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed
or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the
deceased sign a document or write a note. Furthermore, in
her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the
fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted
children of the deceased. The will was also not found in the
possession of the deceased when she died. Such actions put
in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners
and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seño Vda. de
Ramonal.
2. Not Authentic. Comparing the signature in the
holographic will dated August 30, 1978,[33] and the
signatures in several documents such as the application letter
for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,[34] and a letter
dated June 16, 1978,[35] the strokes are different. In the
letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing
that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
(please refer to Ate Devie’s handwritten file)
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS:
In the will of Annie Sand, decedent named as devisees, the
following: petitioner spouses and private respondent, et al.,
and their children.
Petitioners instituted a special proceesing for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. Private respondent opposed the
petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body
nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the
decedent's holographic will to probate.
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for
probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of
Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did
not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either
unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found
that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by decedent. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the appellate court err in dismissing the probate of the
will for non-compliance with Article 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code?
RULING:
Yes. Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have
not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of
its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on
the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the
signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the
testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to
disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will
to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether
the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will
and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether
the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
acts of the decedent.
In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is
the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article
810 of the New Civil Code.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814.
CANIZA VS CA
FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was
declared incompetent by judgment in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.
Caniza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian
Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject the spouses
Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent
Caniza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that
plaintiff Caniza was the absolute owner of the property in
question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada
Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza
already had urgent need of the house on account of her
advanced age and failing health, “so funds could be raised to
meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical
treatment;” among others.
The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s
house since the 1960’s; that in consideration of their faithful
service they had been considered by Caniza as her own
family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will
by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and lot
in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house
to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they
remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her
judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the
ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will may be given effect
RULING:
No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: “No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” An
owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with
the former’s taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. And that, in this case, there was
sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from
her extreme age.
AZAOLA VS SINGSON
FACTS:
 An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.
 This case involves the determination of the quantity of
evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.
 September 9, 1957: Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died;
Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate, submitted
the said holographic will whereby Maria Alilagros Azaola
was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the
deceased Cesario Singson (respondent).
 Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will
a month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix,
as the same was handed to him and his wife; he also
testified that he recognized all the signatures appearing
in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix.
 Additional evidence: residence certificates to show the
signatures of the testatrix for comparison purposes.
Azaola testified that the penmanship appearing in the said
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the
testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are
the signatures of the testatrix (as contained in the
stenographic notes).
 The probate was denied on the ground that under Article
811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three
witnesses who could declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
being contested. The lone witness presented by the
proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the
will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”
ISSUE:
WON three witnesses are necessary to establish the
handwriting/ signature contained in a will.
RULING:
NO. The decision appealed from is set aside, and the records
ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to
hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion.
RATIO:
 Where the will is holographic, no witnesses need to be
present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of
three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if
absurd results are to be avoided. The rule of the first
paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely
directory and is not mandatory.
 Art. 811, Civil Code: “In the probate of a holographic will,
it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three of such witnesses shall be required.
 In the absence of any competent witness referred to in
the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.”
 Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the
proponent was not required to produce more than one
witness. Even if the genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, the Court is of the opinion that Article
811 of our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of
having the probate denied.
 Since no witness may have been present at the execution
of a holographic will (none being required by law) the
existence of witnesses possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and
producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses
"who know the handwriting and signature of the testator"
and who can declare truthfully "that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator."
 Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811
may even be impossible. This is evidently the reason for
the second paragraph of Art. 811. The law foresees the
possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or may
refuse to testify), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
 The requirement can be considered mandatory only in the
case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the
presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of
ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity.
 The resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words
"if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what
the law deems essential is that the Court should be
 convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed
number of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it
may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide
if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can
be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence,
until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with
the testimony of the lay witnesses.
RODELAS VS ARANZA
G.R. No. L-58509
December 7, 1982
FACTS:
Appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic
will of Ricardo Bonilla, but was opposed by the appellees on
the following grounds: appellant was estopped from claiming
that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within 20 days of the death of the testator; the alleged copy
of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after
death; and the deceased did not leave any will, holographic
or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. After
consolidation of another special proceeding, which was
granted by the court, appellees filed for a motion to dismiss.
The motion was denied, but it was later reversed by the court
upon filing of a motion for reconsideration, ruling that once
the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy cannot
stand in lieu of the original. Appellants appealed to the CA,
which was denied.
ISSUE:
Can a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found, be
proved by means of a photostatic copy?
RULING:
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of
holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after
its due execution has been proved. The probate may be
uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts
may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has
been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
can not be probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary
that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it
says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or
by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox
copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
 GAN VS YAP (XPN: TO RODELAS VS ARANZA)
GR L-12190 Aug 30, 1988
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in
Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila. Fausto E. Gan, her nephew,
initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for
the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidad’s husband,
Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was presented were
witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to
make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the
witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about
it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she
made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap
asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed
any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the
Judge refused to probate the alleged will on account of the
discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is
strange that Felicidad made her will know to so many of her
relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would
not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that
her husband may have access to it. There was also no
evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to
accept the oppositor’s evidence that Felicidad did not and
could not have executed such holographic will.
ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it
was in the handwriting of the testator?
2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.
RULING:
1. No. The will must be presented.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills
in its arts. 810-814. “A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.”
This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities
provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from
1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator
and three credible witnesses in each and every page; such
witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the
fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they
signed in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements
to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for
allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the
subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no
opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must
testify, if available. From the testimony of such witnesses
(and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its
opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the
testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth
and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no
witnesses; provided however, that they are “entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.”
“In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code,
“it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting
of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such
witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such
witnesses, (familiar with decedent’s handwriting) and if the
court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted
to.”
The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the
holographic will, but they must be familiar with the
decedent’s handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not
submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the
evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of
authenticity — the testator’s handwriting — has disappeared.
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof
(and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary —
evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original
document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated
holographic wills. Rule 77 cannot be extended, by analogy,
to holographic wills.
Holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself
alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or
its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of
simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know
of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they
think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can’t do
unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by
testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference
lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee
of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and
of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails
the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is
lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three
witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then
their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts
and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would
be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc.
And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator
they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent
scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they cannot
receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony
were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this
way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the
handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive
to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the
forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall
for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its
genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the
forger may have purposely destroyed it in an “accident” —
the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error,
because the document itself is not at hand. And considering
that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages,
and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the
unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may
go undetected.
In the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act
of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of
a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an
opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly
contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself
is not at hand.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish
and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up
to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and
probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up
to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
FERNANDEZ vs. TANTOCO, G.R. No. 25489,
September 8, 1926
FACTS:
Basilica Tantoco, a known philanthropist, single and no force
heirs executed a will in favor of the catholic church, few days
thereafter she died. The said Will was delivered to the
chatholic church of Malolos throough Fr. Vicente Fernandez,
the parish priest of Malolos to be used for the assistance of
the catholic school in Malolos, under the administration of
the said priest in accordance with the Tantoco’s wish.
Thereafter, an application for probate was filed by father
Vicente Fernandez, which was later opposed by the three
brothers and a nephew of the deceased alleging the the will
is not valid due to some irregularity in the execution of the
will on the part of the attesting witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all three of said witnesses were present
together at the time and place when the testatrix and the
witnesses affixed their signatures to the document? Whether
or not the trial court erred in refusing probate of the will?
RULING:
The court upheld the testimony of Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-
law of the deceased who had been in attendance upon her at
the hospital that during the execution of the will, all the three
three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Vicente
Platon, Fidel Macapugay, and Placido Suarez were present
together at the time and place when the testatrix and the
witnesses affixed their signatures to the document. The court
give weight to the the testimony of the attorney, Sr. Platon,
was in every effect respect worthy of credit, considering that
he gives a detailed account of the incidents connected with
the execution, which only by a person who had his attention
fixed upon the occurrences connected therewith. He also
shows that the testatrix understood the contents of the
instrument and that its provisions were found to be in
conformity with her wishes. At the time of the execution of
the instrument she was sitting up in her bed and was able to
affix her signature in a clear and legible hand at the close of
the will and upon each of its pages, as the law requires.
Contrary to what the attesting witnesses would like to imply
but only to buttress the witnesses manifest and deliberate
intention to depart from the truth. More so, it was admitted
by all of the witnesses that Aurea Gaspar was present in the
room at the time the will was executed, and she corroborates
Sr. Platon upon the point that all of the witnesses were
present throughout the ceremonies attending the execution
of the will. This witness speaks with apparent frankness, and
we believe her testimony to be true, notwithstanding the fact
that she possibly has a minor interest in the establishment of
the will.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will
and the testimony of a the attorney, who has been charged
with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of
the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the
testimony those persons casually called to participate in the
act.
The trial court ERRED IN REFUSING THE PROBATE OF THE
WILL , here exist there is a prima facie case that the Will
was made and prepared to be properly drawn and attested
and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic. I bears
therefor a presumption of regularity and which merits to be
admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that
some fatal irregularity occurred.
OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E. MENESES
G.R. No. 42108 December 29, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her
brother, petitioner Oscar D. Ramos, the amounts of P
5,000.00 and P 9,000.00 in connection with her business
transaction As security for said loan, private respondent
Adelaida Ramos executed in favor of petitioners two (2)
deeds of conditional sale of her rights, shares, interests and
participation respectively over a lot registered in the name of
their parents, and another lot then registered in the names
of Socorro, Josefina and Adelaida Ramos.
Upon the failure of said private respondent as vendor a retro
to exercise her right of repurchase within the redemption
period, petitioner filed a petition for consolidation and
approval of the conditional sale in Special Proceedings,
entitled "Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Denoga. The
said probate court issued an order which approved the
conditional sale (but not as to the petition for the
consolidation of ownership).
ISSUE:
Can the probate court pass upon issues of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceeding?
HELD:
No. A reading of the order of the probate court will show that
it is merely an approval of the deed of conditional sale
executed by petitioner Adelaida Ramos in favor of petitioners.
There is nothing in said order providing for the consolidation
of ownership over the lots allegedly sold to petitioners nor
was the issue of the validity of said contract discussed or
resolved therein. The approval of the probate court of the
conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the
intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere
recognition of the right of private respondent Adelaida Ramos
as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her
inheritance even before partition.
Moreover, the probate jurisdiction of the former court of first
instance or the present regional trial court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment
and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and
trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in this
case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate
court to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceeding. The parties concerned may
choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience
in the preparation or presentation of evidence. Obviously, the
approval by the probate court of the conditional sale was
without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for
consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument
in the proper court within the statutory period of prescription.
RULE 77
VDA. DE PEREZ VS TOLETE
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan,
who became American citizens and residents of New York,
each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions
on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not
known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall
be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire
family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael,
who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate
probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for
reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was
not an heir according to New York law. He contended that
since the wills were executed in New York, New York law
should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he
and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such
entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud
failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter,
Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New
York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order,
disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed
RULING:
No. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are
as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that
the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of will Except for
the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all
the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws
upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of them.
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching
on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate
of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of
an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices,
the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the
first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or
personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he
is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place
for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of
the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to
be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time
within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate
of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the
brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate
proceedings.
PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS
FACTS:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will
executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been
probated in its place of execution. 

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a
Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.)
citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her
will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the
U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC a petition for the
probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. Petitioners Manuel Miguel
Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the
ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having
been executed under duress and without the testator’s full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they
claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the
estate. Since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz
and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for
a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC
for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the
issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated
in and allowed by a court in the Philippines. 
 Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a
RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last
will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.- based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto. CA AFFIRMED: The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does
not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the
country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. 
 The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. 
 the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.

RULING:
YES, CA decision affirmed. But our laws do not prohibit the
probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.
- Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.


- Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that
the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any
other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after
the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction
to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed 

- Our rules require merely that the petition for
petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages,
and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for established. 

whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been
delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody
of it. 
 RULE 78

- Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death VENTURA vs. VENTURA

of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an FACTS:
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province 
  Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of
the deceased Gregorio Ventura. Juana Cardona is her
- The rules do not require proof that the mother and the surviving spouse of Gregorio.
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the  Appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the
country of its execution. 
 deceased's legitimate children with his former wife,
the late Paulina Simpliciano.
- In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have  On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a
been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petition for the probate of his will which did not include
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the the appellees. (HENCE THERE WAS PRETERITION!) In
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an

 illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the
testator to be the executrix of his will and the
- But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will administratrix of his estate. Said will was admitted to
already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different probate on January 14,195.
from that probate where the will is presented for the first time  Gregorio Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed
before a competent court. 
 executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary
was issued in her favour.
- Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77  Oppositions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and
of the Rules of Court. 
 Gregoria Ventura to remove as executrix and
administrator Maria Ventura on the grounds that (1)
- Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has
latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be maliciously and purposely concealed certain
made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she
court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no
harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the
 executrix has neglected to render her accounts and
failed to comply with the Order of the Court.
 The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria
Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate, was
inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with
the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-
to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay
the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered the
questioned decision.
 While the case was pending, the SC ruled in a case
that the will of Gregorio resulted to intestacy due to
the preterition of compulsory heirs. Hence the
institution of heirs including that of Maria were
annulled. Hence, a new administrator needs to be
appointed.
ISSUE:
Who should be the new administrator?
RULING:
First, Juana Cardona – the surviving spouse and mother of
Maria Ventura.
Second, Legitimate children being nearest of kin
Third, illegitimate children
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration
granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, a petition shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;"
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased
Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons
who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent's property
It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in
the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator.” Among members of a class the strongest
ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred." As decided by the lower court and sustained by
the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the
legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of
Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and
Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving
spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin,
or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
RULE 79
DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
GR No. L-78590
FACTS:
On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed
a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Manolito de Guzman before RTC of Makati City. The petition
alleges among others that petitioner as the surviving spouse
of the decedent is most qualified and entitled to the grant of
letters of administration. On May 22, 1987, PR filed a motion
for writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under the
name of the said deceased person, alleges to be conjugal
properties of the de Guzmans and in order to preserve the
assets of her late husband, but which are at present in the
possession of PR’s father-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro de
Guzman.
On May 28, 1987, PR filed her “ex-parte motion to appoint
petitioner as Special Administratix of the estate of Manolito
de Guzman”. Hearing was set on June 5, 1987, however, no
notice was given to petitioner. In the order dated June 5,
1987, the RTC granted the PR’s motion to be appointed as
special administratix. The RTC issued another order dated
June 8, 1987, granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for
assistance filed by PR for appointment of two deputy sheriffs
with some military/policemen to assist her in preserving the
estate of her late husband. Petitioner resisted on taking the
subject vehicles on the ground that they were his personal
properties. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to annul the
RTC’s orders dated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He alleges that
the appointment of a special administrator constitutes an
abuse of discretion for having been made without giving
petitioner an opportunity to oppose said appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate court may appoint a special
administratix and issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate of
the said deceased person even before the probate court
causes notice be served upon all interested parties?
RULING:
No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent
court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the
filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by
the private respondent. Verily, notice through publication of
the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition
void and subject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice
as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it
acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in
the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to
preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the probate court
to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or
general administrator is appointed." The petitioner as creditor
of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the
estate as the private respondent who happens to be the
widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity
of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear
from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued
if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least
until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of
a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
RULE 80
DE GUZMAN VS GUADIZ
G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition Special Proceeding No. 865 for the
probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one
Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and
universal heir and naming him as executor. The private
respondents, thereafter, filed a motion to dismiss and/or
opposition contending, among others, that all the real
properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by
virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter vivos execute.
Respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said
motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their
evidence. However, a motion for the appointment of a special
administrator was filed by the petitioner alleging that the
unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the
probate of the will and the appointment of an executor. The
appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the
necessity of enabling somebody to take care of the properties
where there is a considerable delay in the appointment of a
regular administrator. In the present case, since the
properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in the
possession of the oppositors who claim to be the owners
thereof, the Court sees no necessity of appointing a special
administrator.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order
denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special
administrator?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, the
probate court may appoint a special administrator should
there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this
qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies
in the discretion of the Court which must be sound, that is,
not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal
principle.
The reason for the practice of appointing a special
administrator rests in the fact that estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby
being exposed to great waste and losses if there is no
authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets
in the interim. No temporary administration can be granted
where there is an executor in being capable of acting,
however.

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is
to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully
authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.
It appears that the estate of the deceased Catalina Bajacan
consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land.
It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P 50,000.00
worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is
an immediate need for a special administrator to protect the
interests of the estate as regards the products.
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special
administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the
appointment of a special administrator in this case because
the respondents are already in possession of the properties
covered by the will. The respondent judge has failed to
distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants and
the neutral possession of the special administrator under the
Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is
regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties
suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in
charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the
court. The accountability which the court, which attaches to
the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the
court is absent from the personal possession of private
respondents.
DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
(supra)
RULING:
No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent
court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the
filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by
the private respondent. Verily, notice through publication of
the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition
void and subject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice
as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it
acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in
the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to
preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the probate court
to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or
general administrator is appointed." The petitioner as creditor
of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the
estate as the private respondent who happens to be the
widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity
of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear
from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued
if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least
until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of
a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
MANUNGAS VS LORETO
DOCTRINE:
As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have,
the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person
to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. There is no
logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the
estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.
FACTS:
1. This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.
2. Engracia Manugas was the wife of Florentino Manugas.
They had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel
David Avila(Avila).
3. Florentino died intestate while Avila predeceased his
adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. De Manugas.
4. Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino. There she
stated that there were no other legal and compulsory
heirs of Florentino except herself, Avila and Ramon
Manugas whom she acknowledged as the natural son
of Florentino. Avila’s widow executed a waiver of
rights and participation renouncing her rights over the
property of her husband in favor of Engracia.
5. Consequently, a Decree of Final Distribution was
issued in the intestate estate of Florentino distributing
the properties to Engracia and Ramon. (TAKE NOTE:
At this point, the intestate estate proceedings as
regards Florentino’s properties were already
terminated)
6. Thereafter, the RTC of Panabo City appointed Parreño,
the niece of Engracia as the Judicial Guardian of the
properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
7. Through Parreño, Engracia instituted a civil case
against the Spouses Diosdado Salinas
Manugas(Diosdado) and Milagros Pacifico for illegal
detainer and damages. MTC issued a summary
judgment in favor of Engracia due to the failure of
Diosdado to file an answer.
8. After sometime, Diosdado instituted a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Engracia’s
Estate in his favor before the RTC of Tagum. He
alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino,
is an heir of Engracia.
9. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila
Loreto(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado
was incompetent as an administrator:
a. He was not a Manugas
b. He was a debtor of the estate
10. RTC-Appointed Parreño as administrator
11. Upon MR, the RTC reversed it’s ruling while appointing
Diosdado as Special Administrator.
12. CA- RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion and
reinstated Parreño as the administrator of the estate.
Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred when it ruled to annul the appointment of
Diosdado herein petitioner as judicial administrator and
reinstating the appointment of Parreño. NO. (Relevant to our
topic)
RULING:
● Reiterated in Ocampo
The RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion(CA did not err
in reversing RTC’s order)
● The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of
Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled
or even qualified to become the special administrator
of the Estate of Engracia.
● Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a
special administrator lies within the discretion of the
court.
● Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel
“It is well settled that the statutory provisions
as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to
the appointment of administrator under Section 1,
Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator
● While the trial court has the discretion to appoint
under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule
83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall
be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or
court has discretion in the selection of the person to
be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is,
not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.”
“While the RTC considered that respondents
were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in
their appointment as joint special administrators, this
is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.
It has long been settled that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other
than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion,
such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the
issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the
order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator,
do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principles, interference by higher
courts is unwarranted.”
anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by
 the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role
of a special administrator is to preserve the estate
until a regular administrator is appointed as stated in
Section 2 Rule 80 of the Rules of court.
○ There is no logical reason to appoint a person
who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased.
● Diosdado is a stranger to Engracia while Parreño is
the latter’s relative.
○ evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not
related to the late Engracia and so he is not
interested in preserving the latter’s estate
○ Parreño is a former Judicial guardian of
Engracia when she was still alive and who is
also the niece of the latter, is interested in
protecting and preserving the estate of her late
aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap
the benefit of a wise administration of the
decedent’s estate
● It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino
Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the
proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of
a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of
Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the
Estate of Manungas.
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
G.R. No. 187879
July 5, 2010
FACTS:
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate. Petitioners
Dalisay, Vince, Melinda and Leonardo, Jr. are the surviving
wife and children of Leonardo Ocampo, respectively.
Respondents Renato and Erlinda are the legitimate children
and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima. 5 months
after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings of the estate of Sps. Vicente and
Maxima, and Leonardo in the RTC of Laguna. They alleged
that Leonardo, respondents’ brother, managed the estate of
their parents, but after his death, respondents took
possession of the properties, thus they ask for the settlement
of estate and the award of the estate to the rightful heirs.
Respondents contended that the petition was defective
because of settling two estates in a single proceeding. They
also prayed that they be appointed as special joint
administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima. The RTC
denied the opposition but admitted their counter-petition for
appointment of special joint administrator. The RTC
appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators,
but was opposed by respondents in their motion for
reconsideration, stating that Dalisay was incompetent and
unfit to be appointed as administrator. The RTC then revoked
the appointment of Dalisay, as respondents are the nearest
kin of Vicente and Maxima. After a few months, petitioners
filed a motion to terminate or revoke the special
administration, contending that the special administration
was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex,
the properties are properly identified and not involved in any
litigation necessitating special administrators. The RTC
granted the motion. Respondents the filed a petition for
certiorari before CA to which CA ruled in favor of repondents
ISSUE:
Was there a need to appoint a special administrator?
HELD:
Yes. Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should
be appointed as administrator of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise
to appoint joint special administrators pending the
determination of the person or persons to whom letters of
administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing
so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in
the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section
1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June
15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special
administrators, imposing upon each of them the obligation to
post an administrators bond of P200,000.00. However,
taking into account the arguments of respondents that
Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a
special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her
appointment when petitioners nominated Bian Rural Bank as
special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007,
revoked Dalisays appointment and substituted her with
Erlinda.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject
to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best
interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth
administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he
or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the
parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of
the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve
the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest
of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint
special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement
for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed
by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators.
The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need
to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness and the application of the order of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a
regular administrator, do not obtain.
ROWENA F. CORONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMARICO G. VITUG et al
FACTS:
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New
York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated
October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent
Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a
formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three
weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband
Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct
amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal
separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties
in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L.
Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F.
Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F.
Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the
probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for the appointment
of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is
presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico
Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the
Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be
disallowed on the ground that they were procured through
undue and improper pressure and influence, having been
executed at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and
under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's
husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime.
Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special
Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed
is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected,
besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.
On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of
December 2, 1980 appointing Nenita as Special
Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband,
Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of
P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section
6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first
in the order of preference for appointment as Administrator
as he has an interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of
the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the
next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is
not competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that
the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a
niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than
half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion
for the appointment of co-Special Administrators.
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Probate Court stating that the Probate Court
strictly observed the order of preference established by the
Rules; that petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged
Will, declined the trust and instead nominated a stranger as
Special Administrator; that the surviving husband has
legitimate interests to protect which are not adverse to the
decedent's estate which is merely part of the conjugal
property; and that disinheritance is not a disqualification to
appointment as Special Administrator besides the fact that
the legality of the disinheritance would involve a
determination of the intrinsic validity of the Will which is
decidedly premature at this stage.
ISSUE:
WON Nenita Alonte be appointed as co-Special Administrator
RULING:
Yes. Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the
wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her
Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest consideration.
Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of
impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the
fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the
deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent's estate.
It is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while
they may have respective interests to protect, they are
officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of
the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and
its earliest settlement.
DISPOSITIVE: The Court of First Instance of Rizal, hereby
ordered Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special Administrator,
properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other
Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.
LIWANAG vs. REYES
G.R. No. L-19159 September 29, 1964
FACTS:
Pio D. Liwanag executed a real estate mortgage with
acceleration clause in case of non payment within at a rate of
12% per annum over a parcel of residential land with building
and improvements in favor of Rotegan Financing, Inc., to
secure the payment of a loan. Liwanag died intestate leaving
the loan unpaid. Thereafter, a complaint for foreclosure
against the Estate of Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as
administratrix of the estate and an action for the appointment
of a receiver. The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure, on the theory that
she may not be sued as special administratrix. Also
expressed opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of receivership, on the ground that the property subject of
the foreclosure proceeding's is in custodia legis, since
administration proceedings had already been instituted for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for foreclosure be brought against
the special administratrix or the appointment of a received is
proper in a foreclosure proceedings.
RULING:
The case raises the following fundamental issues: first, the
correctness of the Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of
Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security
and prosecute his claim in the testate or intestate proceeding
and share in the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security
by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a
party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of
the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the
testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively
upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the
ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon
the mortgage, he shall not be admitted as creditor of the
estate, and shall not share in the distribution of the assets.

Here respondent has chosen the second remedy by filing his
action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the
property. Under the Rules of Court it does not expressly
prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a
suit against the estate otherwise to deny the present action
on technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular
administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the
mortgage was constituted will be defeated.
It is also emphasized that the will of the deceased himself in
case of foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a
receiver, and this provision should be respected by the
administratrix of the estate. The allegation of the petitioner
on the theory that property in custodia legis can not be given
to a receiver is not tenable because this is an action to
enforce a superior lien on certain property of the estate and
the appointment of a receiver is the very convenient and
feasible means of preserving and administering the property.
ZAYCO VS HINLO JR.
FACTS:
After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his
heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Silay
City, Branch 40. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was
initially appointed as special administratrix of Enriques
estate. On December 23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco
and Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu
of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could no
longer effectively perform her duties as special
administratrix.
On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a
grandson of Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of
representation, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the
removal of petitioners as co-administrators of Enriques
estate. Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.
RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners as co-
administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the
issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent on
a P50,000 bond. Respondent posted the required bond, took
his oath as administrator and was issued letters of
administration.
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on
August 2, 2002 and moved for its reconsideration on August
9, 2002. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
RTC denied the notice of appeal and record on appeal. It ruled
that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the July 23,
2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were interlocutory and not
subject to appeal. Even assuming that appeal was the proper
remedy, it was filed late.
Petitioners challenged the RTC order in CA by way of a
petition for certiorari and mandamus. CA dismissed the
petition. MR was denied by CA as well.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC errend when it ruled that the July 23,
2002 and 2003 orders were not appealable.

RULING:
An order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons
estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in
connection with the administration, management and
settlement of the decedents estate.[10] It is a final order and,
hence, appealable.[11]
In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is
required. The notice of appeal and the record on appeal
should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice
of judgment or final order.[12] Pursuant to Neypes v.
CA,[13] the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and
record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order
(denying their motion for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002
order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30 days or until August 30,
2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. They
did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on
time.
. RULING:
TAN VS GEDERIO, JR.
G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
FACTS:
Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private
respondents Rogelo Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who
were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for
the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as
special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner
Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none
of the respondents can be appointed since they are not
residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the
same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as
the de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest
of kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice
of administrator (claiming that the respondent were
illegitmate children).
However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to
account for the income of the estate, the court granted
Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied,
hence the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court in their selection of a special administrator.
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the
court, and is not appealable.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of
preference , they should pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated
the appointment of a special administrator.