G.R. No.

200370, June 07, 2017

MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the Decision2 dated
November 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which
affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.4

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,5 Veridiano was charged with the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued.7

During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Guillermo Cabello (PO1 Cabello) and PO1 Daniel Solano (PO1 Solano) to
testify.8

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves,
police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified
as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.9
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who were both
on duty.10 Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay
Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.11

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass through after
checking that he was not on board.12 At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo, Laguna.13 They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark.14 The
police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove
the contents of their pockets.15

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana."16 PO1 Cabello
confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.17 Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional
rights.18 He was then brought to the police station.19

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials.20 PO1
Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.21 The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.22

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City on January 15, 2008.23 After participating
in the festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound for Nagcarlan.24 At around 10:00 a.m.,
the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan.25 Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being
followed by three (3) motorcycles, each with two (2) passengers in civilian attire.26

When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the jeepney.27 Two (2) armed
men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.28 However, they found nothing on his person.29 Still, Veridiano was
accosted and brought to the police station where he was informed that "illegal drug was . . . found in his possession."30

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,31 the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.32

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."33 He argued that the tea
bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'"34 Veridiano further
argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of custody.35
On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over [the person of the accused]."36 Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity
in his arrest.37 With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution
argued that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the
warrantless search.38

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision39 affirming the guilt of Veridiano.40

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his possession.41
Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity that may have attended
his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.42 Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked
him to remove the contents of his pocket.43

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44

On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.45

Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.46 He asserts that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was merely seated inside the jeepney at
the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give the police officers reasonable ground to
believe that he had just committed a crime or that he was committing a crime.48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable
information is insufficient to constitute probable cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest.49

Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues that "the accompanying [warrantless] search was likewise illegal."50
Hence, under Article III, Section 2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the Constitution, the seized tea bag
containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a poisonous tree."53

Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is admissible in evidence, petitioner contends
that the prosecution failed to preserve its integrity.54 The apprehending team did not strictly comply with the rule on
chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.55

In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the petition.56 In the
Manifestation and Motion dated August 1, 2012,57 respondent stated that it would no longer file a comment.
The following issues are for this Court's resolution:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and

Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest
becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to
quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped
from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."58

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during trial
cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest.59 The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning the
admissibility of evidence seized.61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question
the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the
constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

As a component of the right to privacy,62 the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures is guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.63

To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III, Section 3(2) of
the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible.64

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures.65 It is only directed against those
that are unreasonable.66 Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and
are not forbidden.67

In People v. Aruta,68 this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches and seizures are
normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest."69 The requirements
of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.70

However, People v. Cogaed71 clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless."72 The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid down in
jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,"73 (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,'" (3)
"search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6) "stop and frisk," and (7)
"exigent and emergency circumstances."74

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given situation, "[w]hat
constitutes a reasonable . . . search . . . is purely a judicial question," the resolution of which depends upon the unique
and distinct factual circumstances.75 This may involve an inquiry into "the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured."76

II

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the warrantless search was incidental to a
lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto of having marijuana in his
possession making the warrantless search lawful.77

This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise
stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed."78 For there to be a lawful arrest,
law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest
requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."80

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the
warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act
within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was
apprehended.81

The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered unlawful.83 The police officers received information
that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler, Aurora. The informant
added that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-shirt."84 The police officers waited for the bus along the
national highway.85 When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a
tricycle.86 Suddenly, the police officers approached him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected
of having shabu in his possession.87 As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell yielding a
sachet of shabu.88
In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not "committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended.89 Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a
tip.90 Although there are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches.91

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.92 The rule requires that an offense has just
been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact committed does not
automatically bring the case under this rule.94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a
time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge
of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.

People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused
was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425.96 He assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana
leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest.97 On
appeal, the accused's conviction was affirmed.98 This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating
that the accused killed the victim:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They
saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death:
a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness,
Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If
they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions
did.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the commission of an offense
was underscored in In Re Salibo v. Warden.100

In Re Salibo involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of
the accused in the Maguindano Massacre.101 Salibo presented himself before the authorities to clear his name.
Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and detained.102 In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that
Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court process or order.103 Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a
valid warrantless arrest:104

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to
prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers
of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had
no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner.105 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit
any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless
arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed,
was being committed, or is about to be committed.106

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had
just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based
on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to
probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

III

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua107 as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband."108 Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search
is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons."109

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime
prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.110

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not
required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch.111 Law enforcers must
have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal
activity may be afoot.112 Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable
search.113
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,114 the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City Cemetery, a
place reportedly frequented by drug addicts.115 They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes and [was]
walking in a swaying manner."116 Suspecting that the man was high on drugs, the police officers approached him,
introduced themselves, and asked him what he was holding.117 However, the man resisted.118 Upon further
investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the man's possession.119 This Court held that the circumstances
of the case gave the police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.120

In People v. Solayao,121 the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons within Caibiran.122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused in a camouflage
uniform.123 When the police officers approached, his companions fled leaving behind the accused who was told not
to run away.124 One (1) of the police officers introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in
dry coconut leaves.125 This Court likewise found justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions
fled upon seeing the government agents."126

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in both cases exhibited
overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast with Manalili and
Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed127 was considered as an invalid "stop and frisk" search because of the
absence of a single suspicious circumstance that would justify a warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana.128 A
passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver then disembarked and
signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana.129 The police officers approached the two (2) men,
who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their
bags.130

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's bag.131 In holding
that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single suspicious circumstance"
that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search their belongings.132 Cogaed did not
exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in possession of marijuana.133

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would
give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in
a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge
that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.

IV
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search.
Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the
prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence.134 Consent to a warrantless
search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."135

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances.136 This may involve
an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the presence of coercive police
procedures."137

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no
consent at all.138 In Cogaed, this Court observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the
police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing
that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases,
such waivers are not to be presumed.139

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the warrantless search.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing searches and seizures
have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes.140 Police officers cannot be
expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency
of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles.141 However, the inherent mobility
of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches.142 Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause.143

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle.144 Due to the number of cases involving warrantless
searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the parameters by which
searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid.145 They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of individuals
and ensure their safety.146 They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in danger.147
Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'"148 to a certain extent, they
must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists."149 The extent of routine inspections must be limited to a
visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.150
In Valmonte v. De Villa,151 this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search[es]."152 Thus, a search where an "officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable.153

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have probable cause
to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense.154

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual search. This
holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible only when they are founded upon
probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an extensive search absent
probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is
still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any
other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information, there have been
other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.

In People v. Breis,155 apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents observed
suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed.156 The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law enforcers introduced themselves and
inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused had in their possession.157 In their attempt to leave the bus,
one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the way.158 Immediately alighting from a bus that had
just left the terminal and leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.159

In People v. Mariacos,160 a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was about to be
transported on a passenger jeepney.161 The bag was marked with "O.K."162 On the basis of the tip, a police officer
conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney.163 Upon seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside
and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the bag.164 The tipped information and the police officer's
personal observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.165

The police officers in People v. Ayangao166 and People v. Libnao167 likewise received tipped information regarding
the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the accused based on their
three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the accused was arrested.168 On the other hand, in
Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the
accused.169

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless
searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received.
They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on reasonable suspicion as
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals170 where this Court justified the warrantless search of the accused who attempted to
flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified themselves.171

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v. People,172 the search
conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in accordance with routine security measures in
ports.173 This case, however, should not be construed to apply to border searches. Border searches are not
unreasonable per se;174 there is a "reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or stop
at airports or other ports of travel.175

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana
seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP and the
Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No.
33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED

DIGEST

Facts:
In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,[5] Veridiano was charged with
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Guillermo Cabello (PO1 Cabello) and PO1 Daniel Solano (PO1
Solano) to testify.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3
Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who
was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who
were both on duty.
Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay,
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna.
The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his
possession.
On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
Issues:
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."
He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a
poisonous tree.'"
Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of custody.
ith regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued that
Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless
search.
Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity that may have
attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
He asserts that his arrest was illegal.
Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to constitute probable cause that would support a
valid warrantless arrest.
Hence, under Article III, Section 2,[51] in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)[52] of the Constitution, the seized
tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a poisonous tree."[53]
The following issues are for this Court's resolution:First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;Second,
whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; andLastly, whether there is enough evidence
to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a)
of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who
did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting
the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is
insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a
crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP and
the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and
is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.SO
ORDERED.
Principles:
The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident
to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.Lack of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to
quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is
"estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during
trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest.[59] The reason for this rule is that "the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."[60]Nevertheless,
failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning the
admissibility of evidence seized.[61] The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to
question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an
accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of
an illegal arrest.As a component of the right to privacy,[62] the fundamental right against unlawful searches
and seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[63]To underscore the importance of
an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers
any evidence obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible.[64]The Constitutional guarantee does not
prohibit all forms of searches and seizures.[65] It is only directed against those that are unreasonable.[66]
Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and are not
forbidden.[67]
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless
arrest requires compliance with the overt act test[79] as explained in Cogaed:[F]or a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.[92] The rule requires that an offense
has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."[93] That a crime was in fact committed
does not automatically bring the case under this rule.[94] An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.Law enforcers
need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.

G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 28 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-I I C. No.
03316, which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant Hadji Socor Cadidia (Cadidia) of violation of Section
53 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

The prosecution presented Marilyn Trayvilla (Trayvilla), a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the Philippine National Police,
who testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while performing her duty as a female frisker assigned
at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I (domestic airport) in Pasay City, she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her
entry at the departure area4 and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon
inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness.5 Not convinced
with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican (Bagsican) brought the accused
to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her
underwear, they discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu . The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their
supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang).6 Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that the two sachets of shabu
were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the same.7 The accused was identified
and found to be bound for Butuan City on board Cebu Pacific Airline as evidenced by her confiscated airline ticket.8 In
open court, Trayvilla identified the two sachets containing shabu previously marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3." She
also identified the signature placed by her co-employee, Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as the picture of the
sanitary napkin used by the accused to conceal the bags of shabu.9

The second prosecution witness, Bagsican, corroborated the testimony of Trayvilla. She testified that together with
Trayvilla, she was also assigned as a frisker at the departure area of the domestic airport. While frisking the accused,
Trayvilla noticed something bulky in her maong pants.10 As a result, Trayvilla asked for her help and with the accused,
they proceeded to the comfort room inside the domestic airport. While inside the cubicle of the comfort room,
Bagsican asked the accused to open her pants and pull down her underwear. Inside the accused’s sanitary napkin were
two plastic sachets of shabu which they confiscated. Thereafter, she reported the incident to their supervisor SPO3
Appang, to whom she endorsed the confiscated items. They then proceeded to their office to report to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group.11 In open court, she identified the accused Cadidia as the one whom they
apprehended. She also identified the two plastic sachets of shabu they confiscated from Cadidia and pointed to her
initials "LMB" she placed on the items for marking as well as the picture of the napkin likewise marked with her
initials.12

Finally, the prosecution presented domestic airport Police Supervisor SPO3 Appang who testified that on 31 July 2002
at around 6:40 in the morning, the accused passed the walk-thru machine manned by two domestic airport friskers,
Trayvilla and Bagsican. When Trayvilla frisked the accused, she called his attention and informed him that something
was kept inside the accused’s private area. Accordingly, he instructed Trayvilla and Bagsican to proceed to the comfort
room to check what the thing was.13 Trayvilla and Bagsican recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from the
accused. The plastic sachets together with the sanitary napkin were turned over to him by the friskers Trayvilla and
Bagsican. Subsequently, he turned over the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the Intelligence and Investigation
Office of the 2 nd Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), Domestic International Airport.14 The seized items were
then turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of NAIA-DITG.15 SP03 Appang placed his initials on the confiscated items at
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Office (PDEA) located at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.16
The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Samuel B. Cobilla (PO2 Cobilla) of the NAIA-DITG to Forensic Chemist Elisa
G. Reyes (Forensic Chemist Reyes) of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination.17

Due to the loss of the stenographic notes regarding the latter part of the direct testimony of SPO3 Appang and of
Forensic Chemist Reyes, the prosecution and the accused agreed to dispense with their testimonies and agreed on the
following stipulation of facts:

a. The prosecution will no longer recall SPO3 Appang to the witness stand in view of his retirement from service;18

b. The parties agreed on Forensic Chemist Reyes’ competence and expertise in her field;19

c. That she was the one who examined the specimen in this case against Hadji Socor Cadidia, consisting of one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet, previously marked as Exhibit "1" containing 48.48 grams of white crystalline
substance of Shabu, and, one (1) knot-tied transparent plastic bag with marking "Exhibit-2 LMB, RSA containing 98.29
grams white crystalline substance of Shabu or Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;20

d. That after conducting laboratory examination on the two (2) specimens, she prepared the document and reduced
her findings into writing which is Chemistry Report No. D-364-02 which is the Initial Laboratory Report marked as Exhibit
"C"21; and,

e. That thereafter, Forensic Chemist Reyes likewise prepared the Final Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "D."22

The accused, of course, has a different story to tell.

Cadidia testified that on 31 July 2002, at around 8:15 in the morning, she proceeded to the departure area of the
domestic airport at Pasay City to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Butuan City. When she passed-by the x-ray
machine, two women, whom she later identified as Trayvilla and Bagsican, apprehended her.23 Trayvilla and Bagsican
held her arms and asked her if she was a Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative, the two women said that she
might be carrying gold or jewelries.24 Despite her denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the comfort room and
told her she might be carrying shabu. She again denied the allegation but the two women told her to undress.25 When
she asked why, they answered that her back was bulging. In reply, she told them that she was having her menstrual
period. Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove her underwear. They later frisked
her body but failed to recover anything.26 Thereafter, the two women asked for money as they allegedly recovered
two plastic sachets containing shabu from her.27 At this moment, Cadidia became afraid and called her relatives for
money, particularly her female relative Dam Bai.28 Her relatives arrived at the airport at around 1 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day but she failed to talk to them because she has already been brought to Camp Crame for
drug examination.29 She called her relatives again to ask for ₱200,000.00 and to bring the amount at 7 o’clock in the
morning of the next day. Her relatives arrived on the agreed day and time but managed to bring only ₱6,000.00 which
the police officers found unacceptable.30 As a consequence, Cadidia was subjected to inquest proceedings.31 In her
re-direct, she testified that at that time, she was engaged in selling compact discs in Quiapo, Manila. She recalled that
the names of the relatives she called for money were a certain Lani and Andy.32

The defense presented its next witness Haaji Mohamad Domrang (Domrang) to corroborate the statement of accused
Cadidia that she called up her relatives including him to bring money to the airport and give the same to the police
officers.33 Domrang testified that he knew Cadidia as a jeweller with a place of business in Greenhills. He recalled at
around 9 o’clock in the morning of 31 July 2002, he was with his nephew when the latter received a call from Cadidia
and was told by the accused that she needed money amounting to ₱200,000.00.34 His nephew told him that he would
go to the airport, so he accompanied him. They arrived there at around one o’clock in the afternoon but failed to see
Cadidia. However, they were able to talk to the police officers at the airport and inquired about the accused. The police
officers replied that she was brought to Camp Crame but will be brought back to the airport at 7:00 o’clock in the
evening.35 The police officers told Domrang and Andy that if they would not be able to raise the ₱200,000.00, they
would file a case against Cadidia. Since they were able to raise ₱6,000.00 only, the police officers rejected the money.36

After the arrest, the following Information was filed in Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of
Republic Act No. 9165:

That on or about the 31st of July 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.37

Upon arraignment on 12 August 2002, Cadidia entered a plea of "not guilty."38

On 7 April 2008, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. The disposition reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5
of Republic Act [No.] 9165, she is hereby sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay the fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

The methamphetamine hydrochloride recovered from the accused is considered confiscated in favor of the
government and to be turned to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its disposal.39
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’ Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them instructed the accused-
appellant to bring out the contents of her underwear.40 Another contradiction pressed on by the defense was the
recollection of Bagsican that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for
safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort
room, they immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-appellant.41 Appellant likewise
argued against her conviction by the trial court despite the fact that the identity of the illegal drugs allegedly seized
was not proven with moral certainty due to the broken chain of custody of evidence.42

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the prosecution’s
witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded for they failed to affect the credibility of
the evidence as a whole. The alleged inconsistencies failed to diminish the fact that the accused-appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto at the departure area of the domestic airport transporting shabu. The defenses of frame-up and
alibi cannot stand against the positive testimonies of the witnesses absent any showing that they were impelled with
any improper motive to implicate her of the offense charged.43 Finally, the OSG posited that the integrity of evidence
is presumed to be preserved unless there is any showing of bad faith, and accused-appellant failed to overcome this
presumption.44

In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the alleged
contradictory statements of the prosecution’s witnesses did not diminish their credibility as they pertained only to
minor details and did not dwell on the principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that the more important matter
was the positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of illegal transportation of
dangerous drug.45 Further, it upheld the trial court’s ruling that the prosecution satisfactorily preserved the chain of
custody of evidence over the seized drugs as well as the integrity of the specimen confiscated from the accused-
appellant.46

In this instant appeal, the accused-appellant manifested that she would no longer file her Supplemental Brief as she
had exhaustively discussed her assignment of errors in her Appellant’s Brief.47

Before this Court for resolution are the two assigned errors raised by the accused-appellant:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.48

We uphold the ruling of both the trial and the appellate courts.

At the outset, We find it unnecessary to discuss the propriety of the charge of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165 against Cadidia for illegal transportation of 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride by the
prosecution. As elucidated by the trial court, "there is no doubt that the accused had the intention to board the flight
bound for Butuan as per her plane ticket and had submitted herself to body frisking at the final check-in counter at the
airport when she was found to be carrying prohibited drugs in her persons (sic). In like manner, considering the weight
of the "shabu" and the intention of the accused to transport the same to another place or destination, she must be
accordingly penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, x x x.49"

Now to the issues presented before this Court.

As to the first assignment of error, the accused casts doubt on the set of facts presented by the prosecution particularly
the narration of Trayvilla, Bagsican and SPO3 Appang. She alleges that since the testimonies given by the witnesses
were conflicting, the same should not be given credit and should result in her acquittal. She cited two instances as
examples of inconsistencies. First, Trayvilla in her testimony recalled that she was the one who asked the accused to
bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it was Bagsican who asked the
accused. Bagsican, in turn testified that she was the one who asked the accused while Trayvilla was beside her.50
Second, Bagsican in her testimony recalled that after confiscation of the alleged illegal drugs, she placed the items
inside her blazer for safekeeping. However, SPO3 Appang testified that when the two female friskers came out from
the comfort room, they immediately handed to him the seized illegal drugs allegedly taken from Cadidia.51

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.52 Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect
because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling
the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and
credibility of the witnesses.53

Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the narration of events of the prosecution witnesses. In her direct
testimony, Trayvilla testified that both of them asked Cadidia to remove what was inside her underwear when she and
Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room to check what was hidden inside.54 However, in her re-direct, she
clarified that it was really Bagsican who particularly made the request but she was then also inside the cubicle with the
accused.55 This clarification is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the two of them were inside the cubicle when
the request to bring out the contents of the underwear was made and the concealed illegal drug was discovered.

The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains to what happened during the confiscation of the illegal drug
at the cubicle. The accused alleges that Bagsican and SPO3 Appang differed in their statements. Upon review, We find
no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets of shabu in her blazer
for safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the accused and the plastic sachets to SPO3
Appang.56 SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room, they
handed to him what was taken from the accused. The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken
recollection of events.

Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, We have consistently held time and again that
minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would
still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another on material details
surrounding the commission of the crime.57

The accused also assails the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the witnesses. She
claimed that the self-serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution.58

Again, we disagree.

In People v. Unisa,59 this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given
to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers."

In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against
Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray
machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in
her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her
supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female
friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered
by the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither
could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the
apprehension.
As final attempt at acquittal, the accused harps on the alleged broken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs. She
casts doubt on the identity of the drugs allegedly taken from her and the one presented in open court to prove her
guilt.60 She also questions the lack of physical inventory of the confiscated items at the crime scene, the absence of
photographs taken on the alleged illegal drugs and the failure to mark the seized items upon confiscation.61

The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged when the arresting law enforcer
ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
defines the chain of custody as:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody was of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.62

In Mallillin v. People,63 the requirements to establish chain of custody were laid down by this Court. First, testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence. Second,
witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item.

The prosecution in this case was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that the integrity of the seized
item was preserved every step of the process.

As to the first link, Trayvilla and Bagsican testified that upon confiscation of the two plastic sachets of illegal drug from
the accused, the seized items were transferred to SPO3 Appang, who himself confirmed such transfer. The second link
pertains to the point when SPO3 Appang turned over the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the RASO of the
Domestic International Airport.64 As to the marking, Bagsican testified that she put her initials and signature on the
plastic sachet and the sanitary napkin at the Investigation Office. Afterwards, the seized items were turned over to
SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of the NAIA-DITG.65 SP03 Appang signed the confiscated items at the PDEA Office which is also
located at the airport.66

As evidenced by the Initial Laboratory Report,67 the specimens were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the NAIA-DITG to
Forensic Chemist Reyes of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. Finally, based on the
Chemistry Report68 of Forensic Chemist Reyes and stipulation69 of facts agreed upon by both parties, the specimen
submitted by PO2 Cobilla tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride after qualitative testing. The same
specimens contained in the two plastic sachets previously marked were identified by two female friskers Trayvilla and
Bagsican in open court as the same ones confiscated from the accused.70

As to non-compliance of all the requirements laid down by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
regarding the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs,71 the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. What is important is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.72 The successful presentation of the prosecution of every link
of chain of custody as discussed above is sufficient to hold the accused liable for the offense charged.

On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure.1âwphi1 As held in similar
cases of People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes
Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their body illegal drugs
upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport frisking thus:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking
and terrorism has come increased security at the nation s airports. Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches arc reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity or the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed.
travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that the
are subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would he subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.75

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 August 2009 in
CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 03316 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

PEOPLE VS. CADIDIA

FACTS:Marilyn Trayvilla testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while
performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I,
she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area and she noticed
something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia
answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not
convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M.
Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check.
When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered that
inside were two sachets of shabu.

The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the accused-
appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’ and that the identity of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized was not proven with moral certainty due to the broken chain of custody of
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid? YES

HELD: Airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure. As held in similar
cases of People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court affirmed the conviction or
the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when they
were found to be in hiding in their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both
cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport frisking thus:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to hoard an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted
to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches arc
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed. travellers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut (Manago) assailing the
Decision2 dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
CEB-C.R. No. 01342, which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. CBU-79707, finding Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11,
Article II5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts
On April 10, 2007, an Information7 was filed before the RTC, charging Manago of Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2007, at about 11:50 in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then
and there have in his possession and under his control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet of white
crystalline substance weighing 5.85 grams containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride [sic], a dangerous drug,
without being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio Din (PO3 Din) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when
two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din identified himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots
with the two suspects. After the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a red
Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were noted by PO3 Din.9chanrobleslaw

After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano),10 that the robbery suspects
were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp. George Ylanan (S/Insp. Ylanan) conducted an investigation in
the said barangay, and discovered that before the robbery incident, Manago told Cano that three persons - namely,
Rico Lumampas, Arvin Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his employees in his roasted chicken business, and they were
to stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the getaway vehicles with the Land Transportation Office, the
police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was
registered in the name pf Zest-O Corporation, where Manage worked as a District Sales Manager.11chanrobleslaw

With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers, comprised of a team including PO3 Din and S/Insp.
Ylanan, conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the robbery incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting
up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven
by Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the vehicle. The police officers then
ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a thorough search of the vehicle. As the search produced no
contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago, resulting in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the
plastic pack, arrested Manago, informed him of his constitutional rights, and brought him and the plastic pack to their
headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters, S/Insp. Ylanan turned over the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel Taboada,
who in turn, prepared a request for a laboratory examination of the same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered the said
sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude Daniel Mendoza of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who, after conducting an
examination, confirmed that the sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.12chanrobleslaw
In his defense, Manago denied possessing the plastic pack recovered by the police officers. He claimed that at around
11:50 in the evening of March 16, 2007, he was about to start his vehicle and was on his way home from the office
when a pick-up truck stopped in front of his car. Three (3) police officers armed with long firearms disembarked from
the said track. One of the officers knocked on the door of Manago's vehicle and asked for his driver's license, to which
Manago complied. When the same officer saw Manago's name on the license, the former uttered "mao na ni (this is
him)." Manago was then ordered to sit at the back of his car as the vehicle was driven by one of the police officers
directly to the Cebu City Police Station. After arriving at the police station, Manago was interrogated about who the
robbers were and to divulge their whereabouts so that no criminal charges would be filed against him. Manago claimed
that he requested for a phone call with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the warrant for his arrest, but both requests
went unheeded. After he was dispossessed of his laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile phones, he was then photographed
and placed in a detention cell. Thereafter, he was brought to the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office where he was charged
with, among others, illegal possession of shabu.13chanrobleslaw

Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause and/or Motion for the
Suppression of Evidence,14 contending, inter alia, that there is neither probable cause nor prima facie Evidence to
conduct an arrest and search on him; as such, the item seized torn him, i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu, is
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.15 However, in kn Order16 dated May 31,
2007, the RTC denied the said motion. The RTC held that while (a) the police officers, through PO3 Din, had no personal
knowledge of Manago's involvement in the robbery as they had to conduct in investigation to identify him as the
registered owner of the motorcycle and (b) there was no in flagrante delicto arrest as Manago was merely driving and
gave no indication that he was committing an offense, the RTC nevertheless held that there was a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din had probable cause to believe that Manago was part of the
robbery, because the latter was driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident.17chanrobleslaw

On July 12, 2007, Manago was arraigned with the assistance of counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him.18chanrobleslaw

During the course of the trial, the contents of the plastic sachet were re-examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation, revealing that out of the 5.7158 grams of white crystalline substance contained in the sachet, only 0.3852
grams is methamphetamine hydrochloride, while the rest is potassium aluminum sulphate or tawas, which is not a
dangerous drug substance. Thus, Manago applied for and was granted bail.19chanrobleslaw

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision20 dated March 23, 2009, the RTC found Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 0.3852
grams of shabu and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00.21chanrobleslaw
Echoing its earlier findings in its May 31, 2007 Order, the RTC found that the police officers conducted a valid
warrantless search of a moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din positively identified the red Toyota Corolla, then being
driven by Manago, as the getaway vehicle in the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. Thus, the item found in the search,
i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu obtained from Manago, is admissible in evidence and is enough to sustain a
conviction against him for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.22chanrobleslaw

Manago moved for reconsideration23 and applied for bail pending appeal, which were, however, both denied in an
Omnibus Order24 dated May 12, 2009. Aggrieved, Manago appealed his conviction before the
CA.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

The CA Proceedings

Upon Manago's motion to post bail, the CA rendered a Resolution26 dated August 13, 2010, allowing Manago to post
bail in the amount of P200,000.00, noting that the quantity of the shabu seized from him was only 0.3852 grams, thus
bailable, and that the Office of the Solicitor General did not oppose Manago's motion.27chanrobleslaw

In a Decision28 dated May 20, 2013, the CA affirmed Manago „ conviction in toto. It held that the police officers
conducted a valid hot pursuit operation against Manago, considering that PO3 Din personally identified him as the one
driving the red Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As such, the CA concluded that the
warrantless arrest conducted against Manago was valid, and consequently, the plastic sachet seized from him
containing shabu is admissible in evidence as it was done incidental to a lawful arrest.29chanrobleslaw

Undaunted, Manago moved for reconsideration,30 which was denied in a Resolution31 dated November 6, 2013;
hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Manage's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 2, Article III32 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III33 of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.34chanrobleslaw

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed.35chanrobleslaw

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and cralawlawlibrary

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.36chanrobleslaw
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be
coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded
through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the
1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,37 the Court explained the requirement of immediacy as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested; committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case.

However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances
are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his
personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and
the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to
comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element
of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited
time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts
or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be
limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating
these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.38 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed a
robbery incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his brief
shootout with the armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red Toyota Corolla. Through an investigation
and verification made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, they were able to: (a) find out that
the armed robbers were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway vehicles to Manago. The next
day, or on March 16, 2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait where, at around 9:30 in the
evening, the red Toyota Corolla being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by the police officers. The
police officers then ordered Manago to disembark the car, and from there, proceeded to search the vehicle and the
body of Manago, which search yielded the plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereupon, they effected Manago's arrest.

The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above was
present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident and even engaged the armed robbers
in a shootout - the required element of immediacy was not met. This is because, at the time the police officers effected
the warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted,
which consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court
sees it, the information the police officers had gathered therefrom would have been enough for them to secure the
necessary warrants against the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which -
considering the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor. Thus, there being no
valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that Manago was lawfully arrested.

In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in ruling that the incidental
search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said search was made even before he was arrested and
thus, violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made.

For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the police officers conducted a lawful warrantless search of
a moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.

In Caballes v. People,39 the Court explained the concept of warrantless searches on moving
vehicles:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search
of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.40
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or police checkpoints - as in
this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies
of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.41 Case law further states that routine inspections
in checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches, and thus,
permissible, if limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the Vehicles
is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
area.42chanrobleslaw

It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte blanche discretion to conduct
warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search
- as opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.43chanrobleslaw

In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a thorough investigation and
verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where
they reside; and (c) the ownership of the getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota
Corolla. As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already enough for said police officers to secure the
necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no longer any exigent circumstance that
would have justified the necessity of setting up the checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the subject
vehicle. In addition, it is well to point out that the checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was
already identified as the culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be said that the checkpoint
was meant to conduct a routinary and indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather, it was used as a subterfuge to
put into force the capture of the fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the legal
requirement of - procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case. Hence, the search
conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.

In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his moving vehicle were all
unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant
to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal
liability.44chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut as hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198389 December 11, 2013

VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set
aside the Decision2 dated April 29, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32192. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision4 dated July 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88, finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act."

The Facts

Roallos was charged in an Information5 for the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108825 before the RTC, viz:
The undersigned accuses VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Sec.
5(b)[,] Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon
the person of one [AAA]6, a minor, 15 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and kissing her cheek, against
her will which act debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA] as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Upon arraignment, Roallos pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.8 On June 24, 2002, the pre-trial conference
was deemed terminated. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.9

Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of the Aguinaldo Vets and
Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAA’s mother, worked as the secretary and treasurer of Roallos.

On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBB’s office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was
then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother’s office and wait for the latter to return. At that
time, two women were talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office.

AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked outside to see if anybody
was around, and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if there was any pain bothering her; the latter
replied that her tooth ached. Thereupon, Roallos held AAA’s hand and intermittently pressed it. He then asked AAA if
there is anything else aching in her body. AAA said none. Roallos then placed his left hand on the table while his right
hand was on AAA’s right shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a chair without a backrest while Roallos was
standing behind her. Roallos then slid his hand towards AAA’s right breast and mashed it. AAA asked Roallos why he is
touching her. Roallos ignored her. He then mashed AAA’s left breast. AAA shouted "Ano ba!," but Roallos still ignored
her and, instead slid his hand towards AAA’s abdomen. AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards
Roallos. Roallos then left the office.

Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, after about ten minutes, Roallos
returned to the office and approached AAA. He then asked AAA if she was hungry, the latter told him that she would
just wait for BBB to return. Roallos then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but the latter refused the
offer. AAA then felt Roallos’ body pressing against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss AAA. AAA was unable
to escape as there was no space in front of her; she just turned her face to avoid his kiss. He then held AAA’s right
cheek, pulled her face towards him, and kissed her left cheek. AAA then stomped her feet, still trying to free herself
from the grasp of Roallos. Roallos then left the office. This time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait
for her mother to return.

Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she was crying. AAA then relayed what Roallos
did to her. BBB then confronted Roallos about the incident. Roallos, however, denied having done anything to AAA.
BBB and AAA thereafter left the office. However, BBB saw that Roallos was following them. Fearing that Roallos would
do something to harm them, BBB and AAA immediately entered the office of the Department of National Defense
(DND) in Camp Aguinaldo. They were then advised by the employees therein to go to DND’s legal department office,
where they were advised to report the incident to the police authorities.

AAA and BBB went to the police station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They then referred the
report to the provost marshal for proper coordination and to effect the arrest of the accused. Thereafter, the police
and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police station for investigation.

In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the incident, he merely stayed
with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother; that he went out of the office twice to meet clients
of AVACC. Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He
likewise averred that he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any
preliminary investigation.

On July 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision10 finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum; to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of
[P]20,000.00 by way of moral damages; and pay the fine of [P]15,000.00.

SO ORDERED.11

Roallos’ Amended Motion for Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC in its Order13 dated June 30, 2008.

On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated April 29, 2011 which affirmed the RTC Decision dated July 26, 2007,
albeit with the modification that the awards of moral damages and civil indemnity were both increased to ₱50,000.00.
Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision dated April 29, 2011,14 but it was likewise denied by the CA in its
Resolution15 dated August 19, 2011.

In support of the instant petition, Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction considering that the
Information filed against him was defective since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He further argues that
he was denied due process as he was not made to undergo a preliminary investigation. Roallos also asserts that his
arrest was illegal considering that the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the
charge against him should have been dismissed considering the unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the case.

Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective since neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information that
was filed against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the prosecutor had no authority to file the said Information and,
accordingly, the charge against him was defective.

Furthermore, Roallos alleges that the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 only applies
when the victim is a child engaged in prostitution or when they indulge in lascivious conduct due to the coercion of an
adult or a syndicate. Thus, he claims that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution. In any case, he avers that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is
not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

Issue

Essentially, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming Roallos’ conviction for
the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of any merit.

First, Roallos’ claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission of two
crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear – Roallos was charged with the
crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged with the
felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is
specifically delimited to that committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

In any case, "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information,
or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but
by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information."16

The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against Roallos clearly makes out
a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]

2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse[; and]

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.17

(Emphasis supplied)

The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts towards AAA, i.e., that he
mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise alleged that AAA, at the time she was subjected to
sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.

In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding Roallos criminally liable for violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident.
Further, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the committed lascivious conduct towards
AAA, who is a child subjected to sexual abuse within the purview of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court
cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and
respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will
re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below.18 The Court finds no reason to overturn the factual
findings as the lower courts in this case.

Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a
child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused
for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very
title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only
to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to
"other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult."19

Second, Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he
was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise untenable. In Miclat, Jr. v. People,20 the Court emphasized that
the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped
from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which
the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.21 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be
timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his plea and
actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived.
This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor
to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already
submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of
the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation.
However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman’s
verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by
attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the
trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in
the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary
investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to
have waived his right to preliminary investigation.23 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)

It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his
arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the
RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated.1âwphi1 The right to speedy
trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the
determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors
to consider and balance.24 In order for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must
show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of
justice.25

As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays. The postponements sought for by the prosecution did not, in any way, seriously prejudice
Roallos. If at all, the delay in the proceedings below is only attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not render the charge against the
latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to the filing of the Information against Roallos. AAA and
BBB vigorously pursued the indictment against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos’ claim, AAA executed a complaint-
affidavit for the indictment of Roallos.26 The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate the conformity of both AAA and
BBB to the charge against Roallos.

For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty prescribed is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law,
Roallos may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Roallos
shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by R.A.
No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of
which is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. On the other hand, the
maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and maximum term of the same
is as follows: minimum – fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months; medium – seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and maximum –
reclusion perpetua.27

Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in this case, both the RTC and the
CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium
as the minimum term to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum
term. The Court likewise upholds the fine imposed by the lower courts in the amount of ₱15,000.00.

Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity awarded by the CA.1âwphi1
The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00. The CA increased the amount of
moral damages awarded by the RTC to ₱50,000.00 and imposed an additional award for civil indemnity in the amount
of ₱50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence,28 the Court deems it proper to reduce the award of moral damages
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards for damages at
the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.29

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011
and the Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION in that Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes is ordered to pay ₱15,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as
civil indemnity. He is likewise ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (
6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

FACTS: Roallos was charged in an Information for the crime of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 before the RTC.

Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the incident, he
merely stayed with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother; that he
went out of the office twice to meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed that his
arrest was illegal since the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise
averred that he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he
made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,

Roallos appealed the case until it reached the Supreme Court. In support of the instant
petition He argues, among other things, that he was denied due process as he was not
made to undergo a preliminary investigation. Roallos also asserts that his arrest was illegal
considering that the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. Moreover, he alleges
that the charge against him should have been dismissed considering the unreasonable
delay in the prosecution of the case.

ISSUE: WON Roallos was denied due process since he was arrested without any
warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation? NO

HELD:
 that the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his
arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground prior to arraignment, viz:

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.

Similarly, in Villarin v. People, the Court stressed that the absence of a proper
preliminary investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have
waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively
participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must
not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which,
necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted
by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which
led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."

It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to
the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation.
Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.

MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS
VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT,
and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF

JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional
rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining
the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process
of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the
trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as
by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the
trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as
to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain
the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution
dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement.
However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it
should be resolved now rather that later.

Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a
criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal
liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of governmental
power versus a preferred freedom.

We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys
unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of the
editorial board, the managing editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.

I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead
of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of
malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However,
this case is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads
the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned
that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press which would
inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers
to argue before a trial judge.

There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the
usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or
to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw
the demarcation line.

As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves
the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism
is to be expected and should be borne for the common good.

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must
speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a
freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)

In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous
charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily
be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high
government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.

This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for
libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guaranty. In other
words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words
may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. If, instead of
merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain
issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our
decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on
what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations
in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
"libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83
S Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the other various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court,
libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are
subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that
hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at pp. 700-701)

Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven,
Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of
falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their
particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law
includes publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and
editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech
clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or
disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a
media personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not been
considered.

I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no
reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue
discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before
he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President
should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody
vilifies or maligns him or her.

The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of
our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of possible consequences to
their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we
allow the possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully
explore the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom
of expression.

However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the
dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:

If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent
with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression.

In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be
faithfully applied.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement.
However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it
should be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a
criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal
liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of governmental
power versus a preferred freedom.

We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys
unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of the
editorial board, the managing editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.

I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead
of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of
malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However,
this case is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads
the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned
that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press which would
inevitably follow.

I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers
to argue before a trial judge.

There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the
usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or
to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw
the demarcation line.

As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves
the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism
is to be expected and should be borne for the common good.

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must
speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a
freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)

In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous
charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily
be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high
government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.

This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for
libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guaranty. In other
words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words
may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. If, instead of
merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain
issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.

Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our
decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on
what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations
in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).<äre||anº•1àw>

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
"libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83
S Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the other various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court,
libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are
subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that
hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at pp. 700-701)

Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven,
Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of
falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their
particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law
includes publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and
editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech
clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or
disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a
media personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not been
considered.

I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no
reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue
discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before
he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President
should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody
vilifies or maligns him or her.

The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of
our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of possible consequences to
their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we
allow the possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully
explore the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom
of expression.

However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the
dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent
with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression.

In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be
faithfully applied.

[G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996]

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF
REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ,
respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals affirming the
action of the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo.

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo
aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioners
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent Board
of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The
Board classified the series as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.

Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the
Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992,
the Office of the President reversed the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128
to be publicly telecast.

On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC,
NCR, Quezon City.[1] Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under P.D. No. 1986 in relation
to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.

On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties
orally argued and then marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its exhibits, viz.:

(1) Exhibit A, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on petitioners Series
No. 115 as follows:[2]

REMARKS:

There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for this program to show series of
Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects and using it in their discussion about the bible. There are remarks
which are direct criticism which affect other religions.

Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions.

(2) Exhibit A-1, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent action on
petitioners Series No. 115 as follows:[3]
REMARKS:

This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible.

We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faith.

(3) Exhibit B, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on petitioners Series No.
119, as follows:[4]

REMARKS:

The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin
Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so.

This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision.

(4) Exhibit C, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on petitioners Series No.
121 as follows:[5]

REMARKS:

I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion.

I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which they
clearly present in this episode.

(5) Exhibit D, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on petitioners Series
No. 128 as follows:[6]

REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestants beliefs.

We suggest a second review.

(6) Exhibits E, E-1, petitioners block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated September 1, 1992.[7]

(7) Exhibit F, petitioners Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation.[8]

(8) Exhibit G, letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed to
Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the showing of petitioners Series
No. 129. The letter reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression under
Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.

We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as studied the passages found by MTRCB to be
objectionable and we find no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger sufficient to limit the said
constitutional guarantee.

(9) Exhibits H, H-1, letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V. Ramos
appealing the action of the respondent Board x-rating petitioners Series No. 128.

On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:

(1) Exhibit 1, Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing the showing of
Series No. 128 under parental guidance.

(2) Exhibit 2, which is Exhibit G of petitioner.

(3) Exhibit 3, letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era Broadcasting Service
which reads in part:

xxx

In the matter of your television show Ang Iglesia ni Cristo Series No. 119, please be informed that the Board was
constrained to deny your show a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack against another religion
which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be guided in the submission of future shows.

After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioners bond
of P10,000.00.

The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs.[9] The pre-trial briefs show
that the parties evidence is basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction.
The trial of the case was set and reset several times as the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed
and the records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a Judgment,[10] on December 15,
1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:

xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
(BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program.

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in
showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[11] praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for review
the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the motion.[12] On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered:[13]
xxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the Courts Order dated December 15,
1993, directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo
program is hereby deleted and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo
to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.

Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied.[14]

On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals[15] reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board
has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act
with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo
on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO PROGRAM
IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY
IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE
POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO, A
PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.

The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioners
TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they
constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under P.D. No. 1986. Its Section 3 pertinently
provides:

Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity
materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for
theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the
Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export.

c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage
the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:

i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the
economic and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government and/or duly constituted
authorities;

iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;

iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or pornography;

v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;

vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;

vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are sub-
judice in nature (emphasis ours).

The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs. By the clear terms of the
law, the Board has the power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast
of x x x television programs x x x. The law also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard to determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.

Petitioner contends that the term television program should not include religious programs like its program Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene Section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees
that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.

We reject petitioners submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea.
Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present.
We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.[16] We have also laboriously defined in
our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship. To quote
the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:[17]
Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones
beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories
about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the
divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul in fact,
cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they
be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove
his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot
prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think
that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.

Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice,
as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to go forth and multiply are nevertheless
not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes
on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An
atheist cannot express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The police power can be
validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to
immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.

We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its
public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that
reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State
is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels
the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today.
Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious
beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the
near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence
as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For
sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys,
the State should not stand still.

It is also petitioners submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling of the
respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that the respondent
Board disallowed the program series for attacking other religions. Thus, Exhibits A, A-1, (respondent Boards Voting Slip
for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for x x x criticizing different religions, based on
their own interpretation of the Bible. They suggested that the program should only explain petitioners x x x own faith
and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths. Exhibit B shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because the Iglesia ni
Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be
condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance x x x. Exhibit C shows that
Series No. 121 was x-rated x x x for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. x x x (T)hey can
not tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong x x x. Exhibit D also shows that Series No.
128 was not favorably recommended because it x x x outrages Catholic and Protestants beliefs. On second review, it
was x-rated because of its unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the Bible.[18] In sum, the respondent Board x-
rated petitioners TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioners controversial biblical
interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held
that the said attacks are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.

First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious
speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows.[19] It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking other religions,
especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits A, A-1, B, C, and D will show that the
so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes
were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell
v. Connecticut,[20] viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one
man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know,
at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to
false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history that inspite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of democracy.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State
to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at
war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no
banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the
speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and
the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury
of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of
opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground attacks against another religion in x-rating the religious program
of petitioner. Even a sideglance at Section 3 of PD 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order
prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners television program. The ground attack against another religion was merely
added by the respondent Board in its Rules.[21] This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that
administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize attack against any religion as a ground allegedly x x x because
Section 3 (c) of PD 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which
are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits shows which
offend any race or religion. We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word attack is not synonymous with the
word offend. Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included attack against any religion as a ground for censorship.
The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other
intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then
Minister of Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:

xxx

However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television program of
INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is substantially the same
as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards of censorship, to wit:
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or
its people or with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a wrong as determined by the
Board, applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard. As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the
INCs television program to previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious program makes mention
of beliefs and practices of other religion. On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship
of said program by the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to be within the
contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law. (Italics supplied)

Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule.
In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,[22] this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear
and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union,[23] we further ruled that x x x it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely
bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality
already on ground.

It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the United
States, it is true that the clear and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who
formulated the test in Schenck v. US,[24] as follows: x x x the question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine
the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech
other than subversive speech.[25] Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing.[26]
The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950s when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States
involving communist conspiracy.[27] In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted
Judge Learned Hands formulation that x x x in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. The imminence
requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969,
however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,[28] when the High Court restored in the test
the imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured
that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished.[29] Presently in the United States, the clear and
present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and
defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas,
speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a
fair trial.[30] Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present
danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile
audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.

It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue
involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first
allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended
cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped
and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring
about the substantive evil feared by the law.

Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that x x x the determination of the question as to whether or not such
vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is
a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors. He submits that a
system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. The same
submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid down
by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day.[31] By 1965, the US
Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland[32] was ready to hold that the teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.[33]

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant
an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to
review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this set-up in Sotto vs. Ruiz,[34] viz.:

The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse.
Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character.

On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the mails, in the exercise of executive
power, is extremely delicate in nature and can only be justified where the statute is unequivocably applicable to the
supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any publication for the mails, the object should be not to interfere
with the freedom of the press or with any other fundamental right of the people. This is the more true with reference
to articles supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or is not libelous, is
fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be
subject to revision by the courts in case he had abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex-parte Jackson
[1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing Co. vs. Murray [1916], 23-
Fed., 773)

As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication contains printed matter of a
libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every
intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases coming
from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States Postmaster-General), that the courts will
not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid Co.
vs. Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed.,
24. But see David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a somewhat different doctrine and relied upon by the
Attorney-General).

To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether or not courts alone are
competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected.[35] The issue involves highly arguable policy
considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it
sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and
is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioners TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

GLESIA NI CRISTO V. CA, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TV

INC has a TV show called Ang Iglesia ni Cristo which is aired every Saturday and Sunday on Ch. 2
and 13 respectively. The show propagates INC’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices in
comparative studies with other religions.

In Sept-Nov 92, INC submitted to respondent Board (BRMPT) tapes of its TV program series nos.
116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board x-rated the series, “x” meaning not for public viewing since they
offend and attack other religions.

INC appealed the Board’s action to the Office of the President and the latter reversed the Board’s
decision as regards series 128, allowing it to be telecast. INC also filed with the RTC a case
alleging that the Board acted with GAD. The Board invoked its power under PD 1986 in relation to
Art 201, RPC.

The Board had said in relation to INC’s evidence that some are merely direct criticism as to how
the others interpret the Bible, there was an attack against veneration of Mary, that it is intolerant of
other sects’ freedom of choice, that INC cannot say that their religion is right and that everyone
else’s is wrong. Trial court ruled for INC, ordering the Board to grant it permit for all the series of
nd
the program. In the 2 paragraph of the ruling, INC was directed to refrain from offending and
attacking other religions.
nd
INC moved for reconsideration, praying for the deletion of the 2 paragraph of the ruling and for
the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring INC to submit tapes for review. TC granted MR.

On appeal to CA, the trial court ruling was reversed entirely. It found the series indecent, contrary
to law and good customs, and said that the Board has jurisdiction and power to review the
program. Hence this appeal by INC.

Issues: Did the Board commit gadalej in prohibiting the airing of INC’s program? – Yes.

Ruling: Under PD 1986, the Board is given the power to screen all TV shows and to approve,
delete or prohibit the broadcast of TV shows, applying “contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard” to determine what is immoral, indecent, contrary to law and good customs, injurious to
the Republic or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of a crime. INC contends
that to the foregoing should not be included its program.
While INC is wrong in its argument, it is true that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred
status by the framers of our consti.it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs and to
live as he ought to live consistent with the liberty of others.

The right to religious profession and worship has a 2-fold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute. It covers worshipping any god one chooses, or none at
all, embrace or reject any religion, etc and no matter how absurd his belief is, one has full freedom
to believe as he pleases. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated to
external acts that affect the public welfare. Under this, religious freedom can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. Police power can be used to prevent religious exercises
inimical to society. Religious freedom is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, but not
16
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.

INC’s argument that its show is beyond review of the Board is wrong, since broadcasting its show
is an exercise of religious freedom that can be regulated by state when it will bring about clear and
present danger of some evil that the State has a duty to prevent.

However, for the ff reasons, the CA ruling must be overturned: (1) There should be no prior
restraint of speech, including religious speech. Any restraint is presumed invalid and it is the
burden of the Board to overthrow this presumption, but it failed to do so.

(2) CA did not review the tapes, because they were not presented as evidence, and yet they were
considered by the court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs. This ruling suppresses
INC’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.

The Board may disagree with INC’s criticisms against other, but that gives it no right to interdict
such. It is not the task of the state to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. As regards religious differences, the state enjoys no banquet of option. Neutrality is its and
immovable stance. The Board cannot thus squelch the speech of INC simply because it attacks
other religions, even if such be the most numerous church in the country. [freedom to differ]

(3) The respondents cannot rely on the ground that the show attacks other religions in x-rating
INC’s show. PD 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the
airing of INC’s program. Such ground “attack against another religion” was merely added by the
Board in its rules. Hence, this rule is void for admin rules and regulations cannot expand the letter
of the law they seek to enforce. Moreover, RPC punishes anyone who exhibits shows which offend
any race or religion, but “attack” is not the same as “offend.” Also, Art 201 of the RPC can only be
used to justify subsequent punishment of a show which offends religion, it cannot be used for
justify prior censorship of speech.

(4) In x-rating the show, respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The
decision of the Board is bereft of findings of facts that justify the conclusion that the subject tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against other religions. There was no showing of any harm the
tapes will bring about, especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint
on religious speech cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by a showing of substantive,
imminent evil that is real.
G.R. No. L-27588 December 31, 1927

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA, as representative of the Roman

Catholic Apostolic Church, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ILOCOS NORTE, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Vicente Llanes and Proceso Coloma for plaintiff-appellant.

Provincial Fiscal Santos for defendant-appellants.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, possesses and is the
owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets.
On the south side is a part of the churchyard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, containing
an area off 1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the center is the
remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a
portion where formerly stood a tower, the base of which still be seen, containing a total area of 8,955 square meters.

As required by the defendants, on July 3, 1925 the plaintiff paid, under protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining the
convent and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with the portion where the tower stood.

The plaintiff filed this action for the recovery of the sum paid by to the defendants by way of land tax, alleging that the
collection of this tax is illegal. The lower court absolved the defendants from the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining
convent and declared that the tax collected on the lot, which formerly was the cemetery and on the portion where the
lower stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed from this judgment.

The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the
home of the parties who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties.
In therefore must, in the sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground
destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities where the density of the population and the
development of commerce require the use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house
and, in the case of a convent, it use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under the
exemption.lawphi1.net

In regard to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither is it used for commercial
purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious
festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the exemption.

The judgment appealed from is reversed in all it parts and it is held that both lots are exempt from land tax and the
defendants are ordered to refund to plaintiff whatever was paid as such tax, without any special pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

The Assessment Law exempts from taxation "Cemeteries or burial grounds . . . and all lands, buildings, and
improvements use exclusively for religious . . . purposes, but this exemption shall not extend to property held for
investment, or which produces income, even though the income be devoted to some one or more of the purposes
above specified." (Administrative Code, sec. 344; Act No. 2749, sec. 1.) That is the applicable law. The facts may be
taken as found by the judge of First Instance, who made his findings more certain by an ocular inspection of the
property under consideration. The testimony and the inspection disclosed that the lot Known as "huerta" was not
devoted to religious purposes, and that the old cemetery had long since leased to be used as such and had been planted
to corn. Those are the facts. The test to be applied to the combined law and facts must be the actual use of the property.
The property legally exempt from the payment of taxes must be devoted to some purpose specified in the law. A
"huerta" not needed or used exclusively for religious purposes is not thus exempt. A cemetery or burial ground no
longer a cemetery or a burial ground is not thus exempt. Accordingly, I prefer to vote for the affirmance of Judge
Mariano's decision.
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-

Appellant.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268,
finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, armed with a
gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money
amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented by Enrique
Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.4

Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique Sumulong
(Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).

Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on May
31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini
Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up
and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the
amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were
at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of
the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at
the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after
getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his
gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of
San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion
of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag
was taken away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions
were brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig
City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara
was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and
robbed them of San Sebastian’s money.5

SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55
in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along
Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at the police station, Lara was placed in
a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was
informed of his rights and subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) on
May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City;
(c) he, together with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the
police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6)
deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police
station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought
after the incident.7

In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on
May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort
room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around
7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was
Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay
Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we
were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police station
and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told
the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses;
(i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day; (j)
while he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at
uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an
inquest.8

To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May 31,
2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in
the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the
whole day of May 31, 2001.10

On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic Act
7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties prescribed by law.

Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12

The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted away
the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 o’clock in the morning along
the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his
instantaneous death on the same day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper, an accused must
show he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime
scene at the time of the commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of
the distance between the place of the incident and the residence of the accused where he allegedly stayed the whole
day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same barangay. The
positive identification of the accused which were categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested without
a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings including those
that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified
by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part
of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the
alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from
him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the
trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it
was his unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably
claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony
of his witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their
testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and
neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.

The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of
the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea;
otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction
duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:
Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.

It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily
submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest
since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the Information.

What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be
deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.14 (Citations omitted)

As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was violated,
the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not
part of custodial investigation.

Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a police line-up and
therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial
investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group
of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to appellant’s hollow cry that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that during the police line-up, the accusatory process
had not yet commenced.

Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it does not
in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis
of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)

The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s failure to present a witness who actually saw him commit the
crime charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he shot
the victim and took the money.

Such posture is unpersuasive.

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim. Sumulong
vividly recounted, viz:

"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other words spoken by this person?

A There was, sir.

Q What did he say?

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.

Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?

A I was looking at his face, sir.

Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?

A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.

Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?

A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or the bag so I immediately threw away the
bag at the back seat, sir.

Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.

Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the vehicle, what did that person do?

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody shoot a gun?

Q Who was firing the gun?

A The one who held-up us, sir.

Q By how, do you know his name?

A No, sir.

Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the person you saw holding you up at that
time is in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?
Interpreter:

The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and black
pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).

Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran away with it, what did the accused do?
(sic)

A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.

Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?

A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.

x x x x x x"

"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you stepped down from the Nissan pick-
up, that is correct?

A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.

Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store to call your office by phone, that is
correct?

A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.

Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard this gunfire?

A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle, that is correct?

A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.

Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.

Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?

A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.

Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was holding the gun, am I correct?

A Yes, sir."

xxxx

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following
requisites concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:

1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly emerged
and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag containing the money.

2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.

3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.

4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.

5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)

Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince. Specifically:

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and
denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed to prove
the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the felonious act. He
himself admitted that his house was just a stone’s throw (about three minutes away) from the crime scene.17 (Citations
omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their right
to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.

Issues

The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following issues:

a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without the assistance of counsel;

b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction;

c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and

d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to deny the appeal.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest
or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court.19 Any objection to the
arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise
the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and
participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was
arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of
a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

II

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not invalidate
the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not
render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of
custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts
when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person
to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing
and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.23 (Citations omitted)

III

It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial
evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial evidence can overcome
the presumption of innocence.

However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom
a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had
if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.24

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon
the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free
and denying proper protection to the community.25

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly indicate
Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing the gun at
Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing the money;
(c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when
Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while
doing so, fired his gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood
was on the crime scene and empty shells were recovered therefrom.

Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation by the accused must be
presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the
homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove
the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at
him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order
to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of visibility
are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity
of the malefactor should be normally accepted.27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious motives
to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to be
forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do
with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith
that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.28

IV

In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi outright. It is well-settled
that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi
is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.29

Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible
for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.

In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Lara’s
claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is possible that his
witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning given that the distance between his house and the place
where the subject incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara
and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

FACTS: RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide. On appeal, Lara pointed out several
errors that supposedly attended his conviction, and alleged among others that he was not
assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the
witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON his constitutional right to a lawyer was violated when he was made to stand
in a police line-up without counsel.

HELD: No. Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was
placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That
he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s
identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up
is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in
People v. Amestuzo:22

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the
custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the
more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
[G.R. No. 142932. May 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ,

and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused,

JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch
6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals
of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor
Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.

Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph Bernaldez with robbery with
homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information which alleged

That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent to
gain, in conspiracy with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
Seiko divers watch valued at P1,000.00, one Sanyo cassette valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00, with
a total value of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P4,325.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to
Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his heirs, represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the
aforestated sum; and on the occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed handgun and a knife, with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm one
NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon they were tried.[3]

On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court for Reinvestigation, which the court granted. As
a result of the reinvestigation, a Motion to Dismiss with respect to accused Joseph Bernaldez was filed. On September
9, 1993, the court issued an order stating

On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by OIC 1st Asst. Provl. Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza.
Finding the grounds stated therein to be well-taken and in order, said motion is granted.

WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is hereby ordered dismissed. The Provincial Warden is
hereby directed to release immediately from custody the person of Joseph Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will
warrant his further confinement in jail.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:

At about 9:30 oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and Carolita Suralta had visitors at their house
in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao,
and Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one carrying a gun and the other a knife, suddenly entered the house
through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the
other one carrying a knife had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knife-wielder held Chona,
the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in the house were ordered to go inside the
bedroom, about two meters away from the sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor.
Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife to give money to the holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00,
which was intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-
wielder ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the school expenses
of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the familys Sanyo cassette recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also
divested Arsenio Abonales, one of the guests, of his Seiko divers wristwatch and then left.[5]

As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the first one was a mere warning shot,
but later Nicanor was heard moaning. Carolita became hysterical after seeing her husband lying in a pool of his own
blood. Nicanor was immediately brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital where he was given first aid. Thereafter, he
was transferred to the Tagum Regional Hospital but he eventually died.[6] The death certificate (Exh. B) states the
cause of his death as

Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST

Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS] PENETRATING ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE
CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL TRANSECTION MESENTERIC VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM &
SIGMOID

Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA.[7]

The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night. Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales gave
descriptions of the holduppers and told the responding police investigators that they would be able to recognize the
suspects if they saw them again.[8]

On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus compound in the neighboring municipality
of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team sent to investigate the incident was able to pick up
suspects,[9] one of whom was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a
handgun (Exh. H). Other items, consisting of watches, a cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were
recovered from his house, some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF bus line.[10]

Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team investigating the robbery of the ACF bus
compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San Isidro, about the apprehension of accused-appellant
Gonzales and the recovery of the items from him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam, Carolita Suralta, and
Arsenio Abonales proceeded to the Governor Generoso Police Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-
appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified as the man armed with
a gun who wore a bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the knife-wielder who wore a
handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face.[11]

Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her nephew. Carolita and Arsenio said that they were
able to recognize the suspects despite their disguises because they were only one to two meters away from each other
during the holdup, and the rooms of the house were well-lighted.[12] In addition, Carolita was able to identify the
Sanyo cassette recorder (Exh. D) as the one taken from their house because of the broken antennae and the name Nick
Suralta written inside the battery compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise identified the Seiko divers watch
(Exh. A) as his.[13]

Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.

Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole
day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-laws farm, piling coconut palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In
the evening, he had supper in his house and slept there together with his family.[14]

On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he was awakened by Policeman Danny
Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took him to the Governor Generoso police station in
connection with a robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad
and thereafter put in jail. While inside the jail, people came to see him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman
companion if he was one of the persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman answered, I do not know
them. For this reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return, the woman said that she
recognized the men and pointed to him and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the
robbery.[15]

On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by Policemen Ernesto Bahan and Alfredo Castro, but,
before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they alighted from the jeep and he was made to kneel. He was beaten up
by Bahan and Castro with the use of an armalite and hit on the chest and the back. He was then brought to the Mati
Cemetery and there forced to confess. Thereafter, he was placed inside an open tomb for 12 minutes and then he was
taken to the Mati Municipal Jail. After three days, he was taken to Governor Generoso. He denied participation in the
crime and stated that the cassette recorder and other items were not confiscated from him.[16]

For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at around 9:30 oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, he
was sleeping in his house in Tibanban, Governor Generoso together with his father, mother, and two sisters. On July
13, 1998, he went to the Municipal Jail of Governor Generoso to answer accusations by the police that he was
concealing a firearm. At the police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept,
which he denied. He was later placed in jail.[17] Inspector Malintad, however, testified that Bernaldez was actually
arrested in his house in Tibanban.[18]

Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita Suralta, accompanied by Policemen Sakkam and
Malintad, went to the jail and made the prisoners stand up, after which they went to Malintads office. Then, the two
returned to the jail cell after a few minutes and Carolita pointed to him as among those involved in the robbery.[19]

Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25 kilometers from Manikling, San Isidro, where the
robbery with homicide took place, and could be reached by several means of land transportation.[20]

Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the defense.

Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-appellant Joel Gonzaless testimony. According to
Bahan, at around 5 oclock in the morning of July 21, 1992, he left for Governor Generoso on official mission together
with SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and PO3 Hassan, upon order of his superior to fetch Joel Gonzales, per letter-
request of Assistant Provincial Director Supt. Melchisedeck Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo Castro
of Municipal Trial Court of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso, to turn over
Joel Gonzales. The party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11 oclock in the morning and arrived in Mati at around
1:30 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1992. To support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the court page 362 of the
police blotter for July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:

SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan arrived [at the] Police Station from Governor Generoso and
brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding the request of Chief Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or
Provincial Command, Mati Dvo Or to Mun. Trial Court of Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Or duly signed by
[Judge] Rodolfo Castro to turn over the custody of accused to Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on] to CC
No. 7183 for Robbery with Homicide which is now pending in the Mun. Trial Court of Mati, same the Chief of Police of
Governor Generoso granted to be brought at Mati Police Station provided that maximum security must be
implemented and to be returned said to Governor Generoso Police Station within three (3) days same said Joel
Gonzales also involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No. 7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses subject is hereby
placed under police custody as per verbal order of OIC SPO1 Fortuna to the Jailer guard BJMP SPO3 Cabillada.[21]
SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales to the Mati Cemetery. He said that when they arrived
in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel Gonzales to the Chief of Police, who then turned him over to the investigating
section.[22]

He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken to Mati in connection with Criminal Case No. 7183.
Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been administratively charged with maltreating detention prisoners, he said
the case was later dismissed and he was exonerated.[23]

After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of the victim, Nicanor Suralta,
the sum of P50,000.00, to indemnify also jointly and severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus the costs of the
proceedings.

The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit D) is ordered returned to the Suralta family, while the wristwatch (Exhibit A) to Arsenio
Abonales.

SO ORDERED.[24]

Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE ACCUSED WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL ARE INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.[25]

On the other hand, the Public Attorneys Office, on behalf of both accused-appellants, assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.[26]

We find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit.

After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution evidence establishes the guilt of accused-
appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the
property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion
of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense becomes the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery. Even the Public Attorneys Office concedes that the prosecution was successful in proving
the commission of the crime, questioning only the identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.[27]

First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the identification made by the two
prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales. They argue that the manner by which accused-appellants
were identified was suggestive and showed partiality. They argue further that, most often, the bereaved families of
victims are not concerned with the accuracy of identification because they are overwhelmed by passion for vindication,
regardless of whether or not the suspect is the real culprit.

This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside the lower courts conclusion on the accuracy and
correctness of the witnesses identification of the accused-appellants as the persons who robbed the Suralta spouses
and the couples guest Arsenio Abonales and killed Nicanor Suralta. It is the most natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victims
minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.[28] There is no evidence to show that the eyewitnesses were
so paralyzed with fear that they mistook accused-appellants for the men who robbed and killed the victims. On the
contrary, fear for ones life may even cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings.[29] Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the
victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in identifying criminals.[30] The desire to see that justice is done
will not be served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the
crime.[31]
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-appellants as the armed men who held
them up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim. There was no possibility of mistaken identification because prosecution
witnesses were able to observe their movements and their body built and height despite the fact that accused-
appellants covered their faces.[32] As Carolita Suralta testified:

COURT TO THE WITNESS:

Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that right?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not able to identify him?

A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his actions.

Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?

A When they got inside, Your Honor.

....

Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements that he is the accused Joel Gonzales, considering that
he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?

A Because at the time he said, silence, I recognized his voice, Your Honor.[33]

Accused-appellants counsels attempted to confuse prosecution witnesses during the trial by using the word recognize
to simultaneously mean identification of face and knowledge of the name. But the witnesses were able to stand their
ground. We agree with private prosecutor that a mistake is likely when one equates knowing the person by his
movements and by his voice with knowing a person by his name. Although the names of accused-appellants were
supplied by the police, the witnesses nevertheless recognized accused-appellants when they visited them in the
Governor Generoso jail.[34] What is important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the true and correct names of
the accused, but rather his ability to identify the persons actually seen committing the offense.[35]

Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is presumed that he was not so
moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[36] That presumption has not been overcome
in this case. Consequently, the identification of accused-appellants as the killers of Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is motive
for the killing important when there is no doubt as to the identity of the perpetrators of the crime.[37] But here the
motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob him of his possessions.

Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused-
appellants. The defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot
be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimonies of credible witnesses.[38]

Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant
Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in violation
of 2 and 12, Art. III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is inadmissible in
evidence against them.

This contention lacks merit.

Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was picked up at around
8:00 a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso. Accused-appellant Gonzales had a handgun tucked
in his waistline and was wearing a wristwatch. According to Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Gonzales admitted
participation in the crime upon interrogation and voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.

ATTY. LADERA:

Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?

A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.

....
Q In his residence?

A In the vicinity of his residence.

Q Where?

A At the barangay road.

Q Was he sitting or standing?

A He was standing.

Q He was not bringing anything?

A A handgun and a wristwatch.

Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?

A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.

Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]

A Yes.

....

Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I brought him to the police station and interrogated him
and after the interrogation, he accepted the commission of the crime and he told me that he will voluntarily surrender
the items in his house.

....

Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that that you said he voluntarily turned over the loot?

A On that date.

Q The time when you went to the house?

A Yes.

....

Q Did you have any search warrant?

A I did not go inside the house.

Q How many of you went to the house?

A About ten (10).

Q You were armed?

A Yes.

Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?

A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender the items.[39]

To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made their admissions to the
police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had began to
focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom
in a substantial way.[40] Hence, the admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
Art. III, 2(1) and (3) of the Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise its objections to the admissibility of these
statements immediately, as required by Rule 132, 36, when Inspector Malintad was presented as a witness for the
prosecution or when specific questions concerning the confession were asked of him. Consequently, accused-
appellants are deemed to have waived their right to object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintads testimony.[41]
Indeed, it was even the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate on the
circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales admission in the course of his cross-examination of the said witness.

Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales told him that one of his companions was Romeo
Bernaldez. He said:

ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)

For accused Romeo Bernaldez.

....

Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?

A He was picked up later.

Q Where did you pick him up?

A At Tibanban.

Q Why did you pick him up?

A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.

Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo Bernaldez is one of his companions?

A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we picked him up.[42]

On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail at the Police Station of Governor
Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked them who killed the victim and accused-appellant Romeo
Bernaldez answered that it was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.

COURT:

....

Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?

A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim, and the other one answered - I was not responsible
in the killing - and he said, Joel Gonzales killed the victim.

Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim was Joel Gonzales?

A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.[43]

Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his co-appellant Joel Gonzales. For
the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed
the crime.[44]

Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no warrant when the latter conducted a
search of his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during the robbery in the ACF bus compound and the
cassette recorder and wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales voluntarily
surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches,
cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him. What thus happened was a consented search, which
constitutes a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a search warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure
from an unreasonable search may be waived either expressly or impliedly.[45] And when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art. III, 3(2)) in the Constitution
does not apply.

Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken from him. Inspector Malintad
testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and spare parts from accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales when he arrested the latter in his house. There is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintads claim that the stolen
items were indeed recovered from accused-appellant Gonzales. These items were definitively identified by the owners
as those taken from them. Between the testimonies of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of regularity in
their duties, and the bare denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the police officers. This is true
especially considering that the police officers have not been shown to have any motive to testify falsely against accused-
appellants.

Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing
of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. Since the subject items were found in the possession of accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was
unable to satisfactorily explain his possession of the stolen items.

All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Under
Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for robbery with homicide ranges
from reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court on accused-
appellants.

The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the
same being in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[46] An additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages should
also be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim. Such damages require no further proof other than the death of the
victim.[47] The restitution of the cash and of the stolen items to their respective owners ordered by the trial court is
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati,
Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nicanor Suralta the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs of the
proceedings. The cassette recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor Suralta, and the wristwatch to Arsenio
Abonales.

SO ORDERED.