Persons Digests - Aug 17 PDF

PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS DIGESTS
Atty. Charlton Jules Romero

1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
TANADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986 (Resolution); 24 April 1985 (Decision)
Effectivity of Laws & Publication Requirement (Art. 2)
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI). They instituted an action for mandamus to compel the respondents
(members of the Executive branch) to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Petitioners invoked their (1) constitutional rights to be informed of matters of public concern as
per the then 1973 Constitution; and (2) the principle that laws to be must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated for their validity.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the government, averred that the petition should be dismissed
outright for the petitioner’s lack of personality or legal standing.
The Court found that a substantial number of the questioned Presidential Decrees were in fact
not published as required by law. On 24 April 1985, the Court, therefore, reached a decision and
ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished issuances of general
application.
The petitioners, however, came before the Court again and moved for the reconsideration of
April decision, asserting that (1) there is no distinction between laws of general application and
those which are not; (2) publication means complete publication; and (3) publication must be made
in the Official Gazette.
The Solicitor General commented that the petitioner’s motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed. Likewise, the Solicitor General argued that publication is
not always required due to the clause “Unless it is other provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not publication is required without exception as per Article 2 of the Civil Code
Held:
1. Yes, publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may provide that the
usual 15-day period be shortened or extended.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Included are administrative rules and
regulations enforcing or implementing a law, city charters, and presidential decrees. Publication
must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws
Page 1 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
DE ROY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 2988
Supreme Court Decisions; Publication Requirement (Art. 2)
Facts:
The De Roy Spouses owned a burned-building right next to the tailoring shop of the Bernal
family. The firewall of the De Roy’s building collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop, resulting in
injuries to the Bernal family and the death of one of the daughters, Marissa. The De Roys had
allegedly warned the Bernals to vacate their tailor shop, which was right beside the weakened fire
wall.
The Bernals filed a civil action for damages against the De Roys. The Regional Trial Court found
the De Roys guilty of gross negligence and ordered the latter to pay damages to the Bernals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court.
On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, the De Roys filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The Court of
Appeals also denied the motion of reconsideration filed by the De Roys later on. The Court of
Appeals cited the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japzon, G.R. No. 70895, 5 August
1985, which provided that the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended.
The De Roys filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising the propriety of the
CA’s dismissal based on the Habaluyas ruling, which they argued was not applicable in their case
because there was no publication of said ruling as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the Habaluyas case should apply given the lack of publication as required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Held:
1. Yes, the Habaluyas case applied. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Court provided for a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on 30 May 1986 of the Resolution on the application of the ruling in the Habaluyas
case. Clearly, the Habaluyas ruling was correctly applied because the one-month grace period
Supreme Court had already lapsed by the time the De Roy’s filed their motion for extension of time
on 9 September 1987.
Page 2 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
NUEVA ECIJA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

G.R. No. 180642, 3 February 2016
What need not be published in OG/newspaper (Art. 2)
Facts:
Nueve Ecija Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO) is a rural electric cooperative duly organized and
authorized by PD No. 269. On 19 February 1997, the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) had
authorized NEECO and other rural electric cooperatives to use the PPA formula prescribed in RA
7832 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). The ERB likewise ordered that NEECO
submit monthly implementation reports of the PPA formula. NEECO implemented the PPA formula
from July 1999 to April 2005, but then used the ‘multiplier’ scheme from February 1996 to June 1999.
On 8 June 2001, the EPIRA Law or RA 9136 enacted that Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
which replaced the ERB. On 17 June 2003, the ERC issued an order clarifying that the power cost of
electricity of past PPAs shall be based on “gross of the discounts”, while future PPAs shall be based
on “net of the discounts”. In another order dated 14 January 2005, the ERC further clarified that all
PPA computation after the previous order dated 17 June 2003 shall be based on the power cost “net”
of discount.”
Moreover, in the order dated 17 June 2003, the ERC discovered that NEECO had over-recoveries
amounting to more than P60 million pesos due to the latter’s application of the multiplier scheme.
Thus, the ERC ordered NEECO to refund their over-recoveries derived from using said multiplier
scheme.
NEECO appealed to the Court of Appeals and sought the reversal of the two orders by the ERC,
but was denied. Before the Supreme Court, NEECO argued, among others, that these two orders by
the ERC are void because they amended and modified RA 7832 and its IRRs, and thus should have
been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not the two assailed orders of the ERC are void for not having been published in
the OG or newspapers of general circulation.
Held:
1. No, the orders are merely interpretative regulations that need not be published.
The ERC orders merely interpreted the computation of the cost of purchased power. As such
interpretative regulations, their publication in the Official Gazette or their filing with the Office of
the National Administrative Register at the U.P. Law Center was not necessary. Procedural due
process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order to be effective.
However, by way of exception, interpretative regulations need not comply with the publication
requirement set forth in Section 18, Chapter 5, Book I, and the filing requirement in Sections 3 and 4,
Chapter 2, Book VII,65 of the Administrative Code. Interpretative regulations add nothing to the law
and do not affect substantial rights of any person;66 hence, in this case, they need to be subjected to
the procedural due process of publication or filing before electric cooperatives may be ordered to
abide by them.
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1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
MILLAROSA V. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 194538, 27 November 2013
Ignorance of the law; Supreme Court decisions (Art. 3)
Facts:
Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of property in Caloocan known as the
Pangarap Village, totaling 156 hectares and consisting of 3 parcels of land registered in the name
Carmel Farms, Inc.
On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 293, which invalidated the titles of
Carmel Development over the Pangarap Property and declared the same open for disposition and
sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc (MHAI).
Pursuant to PD 293, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan inscribed a Memorandum on Carmel

Development’s title on the property, declaring the same invalid, null, and void. Based on PD 293,
Pelagio Juan, a member of the MHAI and predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Millarosa occupied
the lot and built houses there.
On 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Tuason vs. Register of Deeds, which
declared PD 293 as unconstitutional and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
Memorandum inscripted on the title.
Meanwhile, sometime in 1995, Millarosa took over the lot by virtue of an Affidavit executed by
Juan in his favor. Carmel Development then made several oral demands on Millarosa to vacate the
premises pursuant to the Tuason case. Eventually, Carmel Development filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC, which granted the same and ordered Juan to vacate the
property.
Juan appealed to the RTC, which reversed the MeTC, but then Carmel appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which then reversed the RTC ruling and reinstated the MeTC ruling. Millarosa then
appealed to the Supreme Court, and argued that the Tuason case can not apply to him because he
was not a party to the case and that he is a builder in good faith.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the Tuason case does not apply given that Millarosa was not a party to the
case
Held:
1. Yes, the Tuason case applies, because all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts
be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases.
PD 293 is a total nullity. The docrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt
does not apply when the party concerned is a “successor in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem, the judgment in which is binding
against him.” While petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is binding on
him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of the nature of an in rem proceeding.
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1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
Neither may Mirallosa avail himself of the operative fact doctrine, which recognizes the interim
effects of a law prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of
equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law, but it can never be invoked to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act.
Moreover, Mirallosa is not a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is “one who builds with
the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build
thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.” Since petitioner only started occupying the
property sometime in 1995 (when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or
about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of
that ruling. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be “[o]n
one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat.” He
thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in accordance with
Article 449 of the Civil Code.
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1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
CUI VS. ARELLANO

G.R. No. L-15127, 30 May 1961
Exceptions to Waiver (Art. 6)
Facts:
Emeterio Cui was a law student at Arellano University who was awarded scholarship grants for
scholastic merit, so that his semesteral fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and
when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. This was so because his uncle, Francisco R.
Capistrano, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of Arellano University.
For his last semester in law, Cui transferred to the college of law of the Abad Santos University
where his uncle accepted the deanship and chancellorship. Cui eventually graduated from the
college of law of Abad Santos University and applied to take the Bar examination.
Cui was required to submit his transcript of records from Arellano University, but the latter
refused to issue the same until after Cui paid back the total amount of P1,033.87 representing the
amount of tuition of his years in Arellano under scholarship. Cui paid the sum under protest and
filed a collection case against Arellano. University.
Before Cui was awarded scholarship grants, he signed a contract which stated that in he waived
his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University the equivalent of
his scholarship. On the other hand, Memorandum No. 38 series of 1949 of the Director of Private
Schools that essentially provided that scholarships should not be charged to the grantees when they
decided to quit school or transfer to another institution.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not the waiver of right to transfer to another school without refunding the
scholarship is valid under Article 6 of the Civil Code.
Held:
1. No, it is not valid for being contrary to public policy.
The Memorandum No. 38 incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The Director ofPrivate
Schools correctly pointed out such principle in his letter to Arellano University, to wit:
It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public
policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction
which in its object, operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to
sound morality, or to civic honesty
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract
of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an
open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was
repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to
keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige.
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1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-30642, 30 April 1985
Are judicial decisions law? (Art. 8).
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of the deceased employees of Philx who perished as a result of a cave-in that
buried them in the tunnels of the copper mine they worked in Tuba, Benguet on 28 June 1967. They
filed a complaint for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code against Philex before the Court of
First Instance, alleging that Philex violated government rules and regulations and negligently and
deliberately failed to take required precautions for the protection of the lives of workers in the mine.
Out of the 48 workers in the mine, 5 escaped, 22 were rescued within a week, 21 were left to their
fate despite still being alive due to Philex’s decision to abandon rescue operations.
Philex filed a motion to dismiss which was granted on the ground that the complaint was within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the Workmen’s compensation act applies thus the CFI has no jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court is in fact legislating in this case for interpreting damages
under the Civil Code in light of the Labor Code and the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Held:
1. No, the case is one for damages under the Civil Code, thus the CFI has jurisdiction
An ordinary court has jurisdiction over complaints for damages filed by heirs of mining employees
against the mining corporation for death of the former allegedly caused by negligence of their
employer. Jurisdiction is determined by allegations in the complaint and in the case at bar there was
no allegation that they died from accident arising from their employment.
The petitioners’ complaint is one for damages in the total amount of P825,000. They did not invoke
the provisions of the Workmen’s compensation Act to entitle them to compensation. In fact, the
complaint alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect
the lives of its workers. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in
the nature of workmen’s compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of
the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint.
Moreover, the heirs can choose to recover from the employer under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act or under the Civil Code for damages, but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
2. No, the Supreme Court is not legislating contrary to what the dissenting opinion asserts.
The Supreme Court is not legislating as it is merely applying and giving effect to social guarantees of
the Constitution. Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme
Court form part of the law of the land.
As held in People vs. Licera, Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal
system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws
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mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of
law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case. Art. 173 of the new Labor Code did not
impliedly repeal the Civil Code provisions on damages, re: right of injured workers to claim civil
damages against their employer as said Art. 173 diminishes workers rights and collides with the
Constitution. Art. 173 of the new Labor Code repealed only certain laws, including those whose
benefits are administered by SSS or GSIS.
As damages under the new Civil Code are not being administered by the GSIS or SSS, Art. 173 of
new Labor Code does not bar damage suit by injured worker against his employer
Recovery under the new Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article
173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not
administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code
The dissenting opinion clings to the myth that courts cannot legislate. This myth has already been
exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in
certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, “do and must legislate” to fill in the
gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore
cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor has the human mind the infinite
capacity to anticipate all situations.
Therefore, it should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury
caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed
no-fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the
New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or
culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of
the life, limb and health of the workers.
Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to
the employee, whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully
and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the
employee.
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1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
TAYUG RURAL BANK VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-46158, 28 November 1986
Conflict between law and implementing rule (Art. 10)
Facts:
Tayug Rural Bank is a rural banking corporation in Tayug, Pangasinan. It obtained 13 loans
amounting to P813,000 covered by promissory notes from the Central Bank from 20 December 1962
to 30 July 1963, by rediscounting at the rate of ½ of 1% per annum from 1962 to 28 March 1963 and
thereafter at the rate of 2-1/2% per annum.
The Central Bank issued Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 informing all rural banks that an
additional penalty interest rate of 10% per annum would be assessed on all past loans beginning 4
January 1965, effective 4 July 1965. The Central Bank sued Tayug Rural Bank to recover the 10%
penalty imposed amounting to P16,874 as of 27 September 1968. To restrain the Central Bank from
imposing the penalty, Tayug Rural Bank filed a counterclaim for the outstanding balance of
P444,809.45 plus accrued interest and penalty at 10% per annum on the outstanding balance until
full payment.
The Central Bank argued that Sections 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural
Banks as per Section 3 of RA 720 justified the imposition of the penalty. The Trial Court found in
favor of Tayug Rural Bank, then the Central Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals which
forwarded the entire record of the case to the Supreme Court since the appeal solely depended on
the legal issue of whether or not the Monetary Board had the authority to authorize the Central Bank
to impose a penalty rate of 10% per annum on past loans of rural banks which had failed to pay their
accounts on time.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not the Monetary Board had the authority to authorize the Central Bank to
impose a penalty rate of 10% per annum on past loans of rural banks which had failed to pay
their accounts on time.
Held:
1. No, nowhere in RA 720 is the Monetary Board authorized to mete out on rural banks an
additional penalty rate on their past due accounts.
Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law. There are, however,
limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. When Congress authorizes
promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement given legislation, the regulation
should be contradict, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. A rule is binding on the
courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the
statute granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or its innate wisdom. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a
penalty not so provided in the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much
less one that is applied retroactively.
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VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
Divorce Decree obtained by foreign spouse valid here (exception to Art. 15)
Facts:
Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They
lived in the Philippines and had two children. They were divorced in Nevada, US in 1982 and Alice
Van Dorn later married Theodore Van Dorn.
Upton sued Van Dorn before the trial court demanding an accounting of and the right to manage the
Galleon Ship in Manila, which he alleged is conjugal property. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings in
Nevada, where Upton acknowledged that they had no community property in the Philippines.
The Trial Court, however, denied the motion to dismiss and held that the property involved is
located in the Philippines and the Divorce Decree from the US has no bearing. Van Dorn filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the pivotal fact in
the case is the Nevada divorce of the parties. Upton, on the other hand, argued that the divorce is
not valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction for being contrary to local law and public policy.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not the parties’ Divorce Decree from Nevada is valid and binding in the
Philippines
Held:
1. Yes, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Upton is no longer the husband of Van Dorn and, thus, no longer entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
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REPUBLIC VS. OBRECIDO

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
Reckoning point is not citizenship at time of marriage, but at time divorce decree was obtained (Arts. 14-17)
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in the Philippines in 1981. In 1986, Lady
Myros left for the US with their son. Orbecido later discovered that Lady Myros had been
naturalized as an American Citizen. He learned from his son sometime in 2000 that she had obtained
a divorce decree and married a certain Innocent Stanley with whom she started her own family in
California.
Orbecido filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. The court granted the same, but the Office of the Solicitor General sought
reconsideration, but was denied. The OSG then filed the instant case raising a pure question of law:
can Orbecido remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?
The OSH contended that (1) Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code only applies to a valid fixed
marriage between a Filipino citizen and an alien; (2) the proper remedy is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation; (3) there is no law that governs Orbecido’s situation; and (4) the
case is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Orbecido argued that he is capacitated to marry as a result of his naturalized alien wife’s obtainment
of a divorce decree in the US that allowed her to remarry. He likewise invoked Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the US.
Held:
1. Yes, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
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Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.
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BAYOT VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 155635, 7 November 2008
Recognition of a foreign divorce; (Art. 14-17)
Facts:
Vicente Bayot and Rebecca Makapugay wed in 1979. The Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca as
an American citizen born in Guam. In 1982, Rebecca gave birth to a daughter, Alix, in San Francisco,
California.
Sometime in 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the
Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel.
The Dominican court issued a divorce decree (Civil Decree No. 362/96) in February 1996 dissolving
their marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over their daughter, Alix. The same Dominican court issued another
decree settling their property relations, stating that the conjugal property consists only of real
properties, improvements, and personal properties contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City.
A month after the divorce decree, Rebecca filed with the Makati RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. However, she withdrew this petition and later executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen since 1993 and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente, from whom she was already separated.
On 21 March 2001, Rebecca filed another petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of Vicente’s psychological incapacity. Rebecca asked for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership with application for support pendent lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente
be ordered to pay permanent monthly support for Alix in the amount of P220,000.
Vicente moved to dismiss on the ground that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
Rebecca opposed the motion to dismiss insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ,
and that there is no divorce. The RTC held that divorce invoked by Vicente is a matter of defense
best taken up during actual trial.
Vicente went to the Court of Appeals after the RTC’s denial. The CA granted Vicente’s request for a
eventually reversed the RTC order and dismissed the case. The CA held that (1) Rebecca had no
cause of action for the declaration of nullity of marriage; (2) Rebecca had no legal right in this
jurisdiction to have the marriage declared void due to previously having the union dissolved by the
foreign divorce decree secured as an American City; (3) As per Article 26 of the Family Code, such
divorce restored Vicente’s capacity to contract another marriage; and others.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce judgment rendered
in the Dominican Republic.
2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid, and if so, what are its legal effects?
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Held:
1. Yes, Rebecca was an American citizen at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce
from Vicente.
The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born
in Agana, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting
American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself
as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2)
in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
There was also the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an American citizen.
Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca’s recognition as a Filipino citizen

through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds
to the eventual issuance of Rebecca’s passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
Therefore, Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen
when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
2. Yes, the divorce decree is valid and has the effect of res judicata in this jurisdiction.
Rebecca was an American citizen at the time the divorce decree was issued. For as we stressed at the
outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country’s policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the
time a valid divorce is obtained As an American citizen, divorce is allowed. Moreover, the property
relations were properly adjudicated through their Agreement as affirmed by the second decree by
the Dominican Court.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient. As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured
the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, in said proceedings. As
things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of
marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship
during the valid divorce proceedings. With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no
more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or
nullified. Meanwhile, Alix is now 26 years old. The issue of back support is best litigated in a seprate
civil action for reimbursement.
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LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF LUNA

G.R. No. 171914, 23 July 2014
Invalid Divorce Decree and Subsequent Marriage (Art. 14-17)
Facts:
Atty. Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna were married for 20 years and had seven
children until they agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966. They entered into a written
agreement entitled “Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement” dated 12 November 1975,
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property.
Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic.
On the same date, he contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad Lavadia. Atty. Luna and
Soledad lived together as husband and wife in the Philippines until 1987.
Sometime in 1992, Atty. Luna’s first law firm, LUPSICON, was dissolved and the condominium unit
which housed the law office was partitioned by the partners. It was stipulated that Atty. Luna’s
share was 25/100. Later, Atty. Luna established another law firm and used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office until his death on 12 July 1997.
Gregorio, who is Atty. Juan’s son, took over his father’s share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein and leased out the 25/100 portion to Atty.
Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own firm.
Soledad filed a complaint against Atty. Luna’s heirs the subject of which was the 25/100 pro indiviso
share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and
equipment. The complaint alleged that these properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad through their joint efforts since they had no children.
Thus, Soledad claimed to own to the extent of ¾ of the pro indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share
in the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of Atty. Luna which was bequeathed to her
in the latter’s last will and testament. Soledad alleged that the heirs of Atty. Luna through Gregorio
Z. Luna excluded her from her share in the subject properties.
The RTC ruled against Soledad. Both parties appealed to the CA, which modified the trial court’s
ruling, but still favored Atty. Luna’s heirs. The CA held that divorce acquired in the Dominican
Republic was not valid between Filipino citizens. Soledad appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had validly dissolved the first
marriage;
2. Whether or not the second marriage entered into by the late Atty, Luna and Soledad entitled
the latter to any rights in property.
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Held:
1. No, Atty. Luna’s marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality
rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage. Hence, the conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. The mere
execution of their agreement regarding property did not dissolve said property relations.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,
even if either or both of the spouses reside abroad.
The Divorce Decree from the Dominican Republic did not dissolve Atty. Luna’s marriage to Eugenia
which subsisted until his death. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The nonrecognition
of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must
be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law.
2. No, the second marriage with Soledad was void for being bigamous, thus properties
acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Bigamy is an
illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void
ab initio. Consequently, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code
To establish co- ownership, therefore, it became imperative for Soledad to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co- ownership, without sufficient
and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. It should then be justly concluded
that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his
death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty.
Luna.
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GARCIA VS. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
Burden of proving foreign divorce law; requisites (Art. 14-17)
Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian, on 1 March 1987 in the
Philippines. They lived together in Australia until an Australian Family Court issued a decree of
divorce on 18 May 1989.
Recio became an Australian citizen on 29 June 1992 as shown by a Certificate of Australian

Citizenship. He later married Grace Garcia, a Filipino, on 12 January 1994 in Cabanatuan City. Recio
declared he was a single Filipino in their application for a marriage license.
However, Garcia and Rederick starting living separately on 22 October 1995 without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While living in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on 16 May
1996 according to their Statutory Declarations secured there.
On 3 March 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Garcia claimed that Recio’s had prior subsisting marriage when they wed in 1994. Garcia
claimed she learned of Recio’s marriage to Samson only in November 1997. Recio countered that in
1993 he revealed to Garcia his prior marriage and its subsequent divorce. He added that he was
legally capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994 because his marriage to Samson was validly dissolved in
1989.
On 7 July 1998, Garcia secured a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney because their
marriage “had irretrievably broken down.” The RTC declared Garcia and Recio’s marriage dissolved
on the ground that the divorce Garcia secured in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. The RTC deemed the marriage ended due to Recio’s lack of legal capacity to remarry
and not due to any defect in an essential element of marriage. Hence, the divorce decree obtained by
Garcia ended the marriage, thus there was no more marital union to annul.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Recio’s divorce to Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia.
Held:
1. No, presenting the Divorce Decree alone is not sufficient compliance with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Recio has the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law that applies to him and our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws, which must be alleged and proved.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15
and 17 of the Civil Code.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before a foreign
Page 17 of 47
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divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
Although the Divorce Decree of Recio’s marriage to Samson was admitted and given weight by the
judge because Garcia’s lawyer failed to properly object, Recio did not prove the pertinent Australian
law.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
2. No, there is absolutely no evidence that proves Recio’s legal capacity to marry Garcia.
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.
The certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of Recio, had he duly presented it in court.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. (Note: see original for the other evidence submitted
by the parties in this case that the Supreme Court held was insufficient to show legal capacity to remarry).
Without such evidence, it cannot be concluded that Recio, who was already a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994. In fact, the divorce decree was not even one
of absolute divorce, but akin to bed and board separation (legal separation). Moreover, the Supreme
Court cannot grant Garcia’s prayer to declare their marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy
because it may turn out that Recio was really capacitated to marry her. The most judicious course is
to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner.
Therefore, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the RTC the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show Recio’s legal
capacity to marry Garcia, otherwise, declare their marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
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SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007
Reiterating Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Republic vs. Obrecido, and Garcia vs. Recio; (Art. 14-17)
Facts:
Felicisimo San Luis, the former governor of Laguna, contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on 17 March 1942 out which were born six children (relevant in this case are
Mila, Linda, Rodolfo, and Edgar). On 11 August 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
On 1 May 1968, Felicisimo married Mary Lee Corwon, an American, with whom he had a son.
However, on 15 October 1971 filed for divorce in Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody to her.
On 20 June 1974, Felicisimo wed Felicidad San Luis in a Presbyterian Church in Califonia, USA.
They had no children, but they lived together for 18 years until is death on 18 December 1992.
Felicidad sought to dissolve their conjugal partnership assets and settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
She petitioned to be declared the administrator of his estate, on the ground that she is his widow.
Rodolfo and Linda, however, moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that, among others,
Felicidad has no legal personality to file such petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo,
who was still legally married to Mary Lee when he died in 1992. The RTC denied their motions.
Felicidad was unaware of the denial by the RTC, so she submitted documentary evidence: (1) she
and Felicisimo lived in the house they bought together in Alabang; and (2) the Decree of Absolute
Divorce from Hawaii dissolving his marriage to Mary Lee. Thus, she claimed Felicidad was
capacitated to marry her in 1974 by virtue of Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine in Van
Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
Linda, Rodolfo, and Edgar separately filed motions for reconsideration, on the ground that Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the 1974 marriage to Felicidad because it
impairs the vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. The RTC granted this and
dismissed Felicidad’s petition and held that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen.
Felicidad appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court and held that Felicisimo
had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and
the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
Issue(s):
1. Whether a Filipino is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized before the
Family Code took effect.
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Held:
1. Yes, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that Felicisimo could validly remarry
Felicidad.
The Supreme Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art.
26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing it to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations.
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay Somera where the Court recognized the validity
of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party
in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. Although decided on December 22, 1998,
the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In Garcia v.
Recio, the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
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The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
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TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
Divorce between Filipinos obtained by spouse abroad is contrary to public policy (Art. 15 and 17)
Facts:
On 24 February 1948, 27-year-old Vicenta Escano exchanged marriage vows with 82-year-old Pastor
Tenchavez without knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic captain in a house in Cebu City. The
marriage was duly registered with the local civil registry. The two were deeply in love. They
planned their marital future with the help of their friend and matchmaker, Pacita Noel.
Vicenta’s parents discovered the marriage and were disgusted. Rather than recelebrate in church,
Vicenta’s mother was given a letter from San Carlos students disclosing an amorous relationship
with Pastor and Pacita. Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new marriage and lived with her
parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Although they continued correspondence,
Vicenta and Pastor became estranged by June 1948. A lawyer filed for Vicenta a petition to annul her
marriage, but she did not sign it, hence it was dismissed without prejudice.
On 24 June 1950, Vicenta applied for a passport without Pastor’s knowledge. She indicated she was
single and that she intended to return to Cebu City after studying in the United States. On 22 August
1950, she obtained a final and absolute decree of divorce from Nevada on the ground of “extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.” Meanwhile, her parents filed a petition with the Archbishop of
Cebu to annul Vicenta’s marriage.
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Moran, in Nevada and started a
family. She became an American citizen on 8 August 1958. On 08 July 1955, Pastor filed a complaint
for legal separation and a million pesos in damages against Vicenta and her parents. The trial court
freed Pastor from supporting Vicenta and to acquire property to her exclusion, but also awarded
damages against Pastor in favor of Vicenta’s parents.
Pastro appealed to the Supreme Court and claimed the trial court erred for not declaring legal
separation.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in not declaring the legal separation of Pastor and
Vicenta.
Held:
1. Yes, the trial court erred in no decreeing legal separation on the ground of adultery due to
Vicenta’s invalid subsequent marriage to Leo Moran.
The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from Nevada.
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine Iaw and Article 15 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code of
the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce. Instead of divorce, the present Civil
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Code only provides for legal separation and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed"
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the
state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court, primarily, because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
private parties as per Article 17 of the Civil Code.
There flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must
be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong
caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil
Code, Art. 2176).
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a
person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery."
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GONZALEZ VS. GONZALEZ

G.R. No. 37048, 7 March 1933
Divorce Decree incorrectly recognized and applied to Sec. 9 of Act 2710 (Art. 15 and 17)
Facts:
Manuela Gonzalez and Augusto Gonzalez, Sr. are Filipinos who wed in Manila on 19 January 1919.
They lived together until 1926 when they voluntarily separated. They agreed Augusto should
support Manuela and their four children.
Augusto Sr. then secured an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion from Nevada dated 28
November 1927. On the same date, he married an American with whom he has three children. He
then stopped sending support to Manuela and their four children altogether. Soon after his return,
Manuela asked the courts to ratify the divorce decree from Nevada and enforce Section 9 of Act 2710
(An Act Establishing Divorce) which dissolves the community of property and delivers their legal
portion or legitime as though said spouse died intestate or without a will.
The Trial Court granted the same and ordered Augusto Sr to pay P500 of support per month. The
court granted the same and Augusto Sr. appealed and the Supreme Court noted that while the
parties are in dispute over financial matters, they are, in fact, trying to have the courts recognize the
Nevada divorce decree.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the divorce decree from Nevada can be recognized and approved of by
Philippine courts, thus applying Sec. 9 of Act 2710.
Held:
1. No, Article 9 and the last paragraph of Article 11 (now Articles 15 and 17, respectively)
prohibit such recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce
has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile
or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these
Islands.
Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition,
and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they
reside in a foreign country."
And Article 11, the last part of which reads:
"the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and
those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall not be
rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything
done or any agreements entered into in a foreign country,"
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It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit
the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a
manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and
defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action.
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DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014
Foreign national’s obligation to support; criminal liability (Art. 14 and 15)
Facts:
Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem wed in Holland on 25 September 1990. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem on 19 January 1994. Unfortunately, their marriage
ended on 19 July 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the Court of Holland.
Del Socorro and Roderigo went home to the Philippines. Roderigo was only 18 months old when the
marriage was divorced. Del Socorro alleged that Van Wilsem promised to provide monthly support
worth P17,500 more or less. However, no support was sent ever since they came back to Cebu City.
Later, Van Wilsem came back to the Philippines and re-married in Cebu and has been residing there.
He and his new wife put up a business known as Paree Catering.
On 28 August 1999, Del Socorro filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
against Van Wilsem for economic abuse against his son Roderigo, a violation of Section 5, Paragraph
E(2) of RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act). Later, an information was filed
in the RTC of Cebu, but was dismissed upon motion of Van Wilsem. Del Socorro then appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law.
2. Whether or not said foreign national can be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Held:
1. Yes, given Van Wilsem’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands, the doctrine
of processual presumption applies, such that our courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal law
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.
Del Socorro cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
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However, Van Wilsem never proved that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a
divorce decree). Foreign laws must be alleged and proved.
Due Van Wilsem’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the noncompliance
therewith. In any event, if such a divorce decree be recognized, the same could still provide for the
obligation to support.
2. Yes, he can be held criminally liable under RA 9262.
Even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied financial support. However, Van
Wilsem no longer has any obligation to support his wife. As held in San Luis vs. San Luis, to wit:
“As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.”
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son
Additionally, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, Del Socorro
correctly argues that Article 14 of the New Civil Code applies to the instant case, which provides
that: “[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.”
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of Van Wilsem in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent.
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BELLIS VS. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678. 8 June 1967
National law of the person whose succession is under consideration (Art. 16)
Facts:
Amos Bellis was born in Texas, thus a US citizen. He had five children with first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced. With his second wife, Violet Kennedy, he had three children. Finally, he
had three illegitimate children.
On 5 August 1952, Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which he directed that his distributable
estate should be divided in trust in the following manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Bellis died on 8 July 1958 a resident of Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of
Manila on 15 September 1958. The executor of the will, People’s Bank and Trust Company, divided
the Bellis’s estate as willed by the latter.
On 17 January 1964, Maria Christina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis opposed the partition of the
estate on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The trial court overruled the oppositions and approved the executor’s final account, report, and
project of partition and applied Article 16 of the Civil Code. The trial court applied the national law
of Bellis, which is Texas law, and thus does not provide for legitimes.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not Texas law or Philippine law applies in the partition of Bellis’s estate.
Held:
1. Yes, Texas law applies as per Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. Art. 1039 provides that capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A. There are no forced heirs or legitimes in
Texas law. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
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Moreover, a foreigner cannot stipulate in his will that Philippine law and not his national law shall
govern the distribution of his estate because it violates Article 16.
MICIANO VS. BRIMO
G.R. No. 22595, 1 November 1924
Proving national law of the person whose succession is under consideration (Art. 16)
Facts:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, passed away and a controversy arose in the partition of his estate.
The administrator of Brimo’s estate filed a scheme of partition, but Andre Brimo, the brother of the
deceased, opposed it. Nevertheless, the court approved said scheme.
Andre appealed to the Supreme Court raising, among others, the following issues: (1) the
declaration of Turkish laws are irrelevant to this case; and (2) the failure not to postpone the
approval of the scheme of partition and delivery of the deceased’s business to Pietro Lantza until the
receipt of the depositions requested by Turkish laws. Apparently, there were provisions in Brimo’s
will that do not adhere to Turkish laws. Andre invoked Article 10 (now Article 16) of the Civil Code.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Turkish laws are irrelevant to the
deceased’s estate.
Held:
1. No, it has not been proven that the will does not adhere to Turkish laws.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines.
There is no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated
in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with. Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous.
In any event, the Court held that the second clause of the will is void because the deceased could not
lawfully will that Philippine law be followed and not his national law (Turkish) in the distribution of
his estate.
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MO YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. 21289, 4 October 1971
Ipso facto citizenship when foreigner marries Filipino citizen as per Section 4 of CA 473
Facts:
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as non-
immigrant. She stated she was a Chinese residing in Hongkong who wanted to take a pleasure trip
to visit her great grand uncle Lai Ching Ping for a month. She was allowed to stay for a month or
until 13 April 1961. Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within such period.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
She filed a petition for injunction with preliminary injunction because she anticipated the
Commissioner on Immigration would confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation after the expiration of her lawful stay.
During the hearing, which took place one and a half years after her arrival, she admitted that she
could not write either English or Tagalog. She also could not speak either English or Tagalog except
for a few words. Neither could she name any Filipino neighbor with a Filipino name or her in-laws.
The Court of First Instance held that Lau Yuen Yeung’s petition for injunction cannot be sustained
because Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law implies that an alien woman may be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law. She lacks, at least, the requisite
length of residence in the Philippines.
Notably, however, the testimony of Lau Yuen Yeung shows that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for her naturalizations. She was also sevenths pregnant a child by her husband.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino.
Held:
1. Yes, under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified
to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
The landmark case of Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang is similar to the case at bar. Similarly, the issue boiled
down to whether or not an alien female who marries a male Filipino citizen follows ipso facto his
political status. Section 15 of CA 473 provides, “any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.”
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Furthermore, said landmark case held that (1) disqualified from being naturalized are those
enumerated in Section 4 of CA 473; (2) evidence that one is not disqualified may be presented in an
action to recover the bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration; (3) Upon proof of such
fact, one may be recognized as Filipino; and (4) That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated
in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications
so long as such person does not belong to the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4.
This doctrine was just reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ricardo Cua vs. Board of Commissioners, on
22 May 1957. Therefore, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such
marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said
law.
It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but
it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the
qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a
Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase “who may
be lawfully naturalized,” found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied
verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities.
We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so- called
“melting pot” of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country
whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot
be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts
and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be
regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the
undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation it is
purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the
dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress.
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to
be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
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FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. 120295, 28 June 1996
Repatriation under PD 725
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon in the 8 May 1995 elections. Raul Lee was another
candidate while the incumbent vice-governor is Oscar Deri.
Lee, however, filed a petition to disqualify Frivaldo because he is not yet a citizen of the Philippines.
It appears that Frivaldo has twice been declared by the Supreme Court as an alien thus disqualified
to hold public office. COMELEC granted the petition to disqualify.
Frivaldo’s motion for reconsideration remained pending until after the elections. The Provincial
Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of election returns and it showed that Frivaldo had the
highest votes (73,440), Lee second (53,304), Escudero Jr third (51,060) and Isagani Ocampo last
(1,925). Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon. He
was proclaimed governor on 30 June 1995, 8:30PM.
On 6 July 1995, Frivaldo filed with COMELEC a new petition praying to annul the proclamation of
Lee as the Governor. Frivaldo alleged he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines on
30 June 1995, 2PM.
On 19 December 1996, COMELEC Division held that Lee was not entitled to be proclaimed as duly-
elected governor because Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. Frivaldo had reacquired
his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on 30 June 1995 under Presidential Decree 725.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation under PD 725 is valid and legal, thus curing his lack
of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed Governor of Sorsogon?
Held:
1. Yes, Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid and legal under PD 725.
The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship
unlike that for residence and age
The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,
1994. PD 725 was intended to be a curative statute. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other “natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship,” because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
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ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.
Residency Requirement
Facts:
Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the
First Disrict of Leyte on 8 March 1995. She provided that she had been residing in the constituency
where she sought election for the past 7 months.
On 23 March 1995, Cirilo Montejo, the incumbent representative, filed a petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification, alleging that Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency
of one year. On 29 March 1995, Marcos filed an amended/corrected COC changing the entry of
“seven months” to “since childhood.” She averred that the initial entry in her original COC was the
result of an honest misinterpretation which she sought to rectify by adding the words since
childhood and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
COMELEC Division, howeover, voted 2-1 to strike off Marcos’s amended COC. It held that Marcos’s
conduct clearly revealed her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a
voter in different places and declared on several occasions that she was a resident of Manila. She is
considered to have abandoned her domicile in Tacloban. COMELEC En Banc denied Marcos’s MR.
Marcos eventually, however, obtained the highest votes as completed by the canvass of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Marcos was a resident of Tacloban, thus satisfying the residency requirement
mandated by Sec. 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
1. Yes, Marcos is a resident of Tacloban. She never had an intention to abandon her domicile
of origin in Tacloban, Layte.
Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place”
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary
conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is
to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an
individual to have different residences in various places.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election
law, it actually means only “domicile.” It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
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otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately
and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification. The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy regarding the period of residency
does not negate the fact of residence in a congressional district if such fact is established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The
assertion by the COMELEC that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one
is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was
her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached
the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent’s averments.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond
with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner’s former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Moreover, the presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of
law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. A survey of
jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon
marriage. It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of the Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to
“residence.”
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner).
What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence—she did not lose her domicile of origin
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PT&T VS NLRC
G.R. No. 118978, 23 Mary 1997
Illegal Discrimination against Married Women
Facts:
Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company (PT&T) hired Grace de Guzman as a reliever (a
“Supernumerary Project Worker”) for fixed periods of time when a regular employee was on
maternity leave.
On 2 Septmeber 1991, PT&T hired de Guzman this time as a probationary employee. De Guzman
filled up her application form and indicated she was single although she had gotten married on 26
May 1991. Apparently, she had also indicated in two previous reliever agreements that she was
single.
When PT&T learned that de Guzman was married, the branch supervisor sent her a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy and reminding her of the company’s policy of not accepting
married women for employment. De Guzman explained she was not aware of such a policy, but
PT&T eventually dismissed her. De Guzman filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the NLRC
arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter held that De Guzman was illegally dismissed and ordered her reinstatement. The
Labor Arbiter held that she was discriminated against for having contracted marriage contrary to
company rules. The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter, but modified to the effect that De Guzman
deserved three months suspension for her dishonest acts.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not PT&T’s policy for not hiring married women is unlawful discrimination.
Held:
1. Yes, PT&T’s policy is unlawful.
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against discrimination afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. The record discloses clearly that her
ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
Moreover, the Policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be
single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry declared void
in Zialcita, et al. v. Philippine Air Lines. Such a policy violates a woman’s right to be free from any
kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment as per Article 136 of the
Labor Code. The danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it
strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and,
ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here
in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of
the land is not only in order but imperatively required.
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ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651, 22 June 2006
Religious freedom; Administrative Case for Immoral Conduct; Jehovah’s Witness
Facts:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes of RTC Las Pinas requesting for
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter, is living with a man
not her husband. They allegedly have a child aged 18 to 20. Estrada is not personally related either
to Escritor or her partner, but he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court.
Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow as her
husband died in 1998. She admitted she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. As a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, such a conjugal arrangement conforms with their
religious beliefs. After 10 years of living together, she executed on 28 July 1991 a Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness to Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr., who executed a similar pledge on even date.
Apparently, Quilapio, Jr. was married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife.
A presiding minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses explained that the Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness gives the view that the couple has put themselves before God and man; as if that
relation is validated by God.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Escritor is liable for gross misconduct under Section 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code for her relationship with Quilapio, Jr.
Held:
1. To properly determine the case, the government must be heard and given an opportunity
to discharge its burden of proving the state’s compelling interest which can override
Escritor’s religious belief and practice.
It is necessary to determine the sub-issue of whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom
should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which
government employees are held administratively liable.
Not represented by counsel, respondent, in layman’s terms, invokes the religious beliefs and
practices and moral standards of her religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement with a man not her legal husband does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct
for which she should be held administratively liable. While not articulated by respondent, she
invokes religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution.
(See original for SC’s discussion on theocracy. The SC traced the history of how one authority figure
used to promulgate laws and religious rules as far back as the Hammurabi Code. The SC also
discussed Religion clauses in the US and Religion clauses in the Philippines.)
In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which he/she may be held administratively liable. In
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these cases, the respondents themselves did not contend that their conduct was not immoral, but
sought to prove that they did not commit the alleged act.
However, in this case, Escritor invokes religious freedom since her religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses,
has allowed her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio based on the church’s religious beliefs and
practices. This distinguishing factor compels the Court to apply the religious clauses to the case at
the bar.
Morality refers to, in Socrates’ words, “how we ought to live” and why. Thus, when the law speaks
of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of Professional Responsibility for
lawyers, or “public morals” in the Revised Penal Code,437 or “morals” in the New Civil Code, or
“moral character” in the Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the
one hand, and religious morality, on the other should be kept in mind. Morality referred to in the
law is public and secular, not religious.
The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed—albeit not exclusively—in the
law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
More concretely, should the Court declare respondent’s conduct as immoral and hold her
administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the realm of public morality, her conduct is
reprehensible or there are state interests overriding her religious freedom. For as long as her conduct
is being judged within this realm, she will be accountable to the state.
But in so ruling, the Court does not and cannot say that her conduct should be made reprehensible
in the realm of her church where it is presently sanctioned and that she is answerable for her
immorality to her Jehovah God nor that other religions prohibiting her conduct are correct. On the
other hand, should the Court declare her conduct permissible, the Court will be holding that under
her unique circumstances, public morality is not offended or that upholding her religious freedom is
an interest higher than upholding public morality thus her conduct should not be penalized.
But the Court is not ruling that the tenets and practice of her religion are correct nor that other
churches which do not allow respondent’s conjugal arrangement should likewise allow such
conjugal arrangement or should not find anything immoral about it and therefore members of these
churches are not answerable for immorality to their Supreme Being.
Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, the more difficult
task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secular morality fall under the phrase
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which a government employee may be held administratively
liable.
Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a government
employee whose partner is legally married to another which Philippine law and jurisprudence
consider both immoral and illegal.
The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent’s claim of religious
freedom to the “compelling state interest” test from a benevolent neutrality stance—i.e. entertaining the
possibility that respondent’s claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception
Page 37 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should
the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened.
There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious
belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be
sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued to her by her
congregation after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she
entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a
practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to avoid legal
punishment for illicit conduct but to make the “union” of their members under respondent’s
circumstances “honorable before God and men.” She is a practicing member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member in good standing.
It is apparent from the OCA’s reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it upholds is the
preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the OCA’s memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious
freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the
least restrictive to respondent’s religious exercise.
We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must
instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it
has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling
interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first
impression where we are applying the “compelling state interest” test in a case involving purely
religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as how we will decide the case
will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent who stands not only before the Court but
before her Jehovah God.
To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that
her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free
exercise protection. Otherwise, should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct which is protected
by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom.
The case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator. The OSG is ordered to intervene
where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to
override respondent’s religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts
in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
Page 38 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
GOITIA VS. CAMPO-RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263, 2 November 1916
Obligation to support spouse
Facts:
Eloisa Goitia y De La Camara and Jose Rueda we married in Manila on 7 January 1915. They lived
together for a month until Eloisa returned home to her parents.
Eloisa claimed that Jose demanded that she “perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs,” but she refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Jose then beat
her. Unable to convince Jose from desisting from his repugnant desires, she left their conjugal abode
and went back to live with her parents. She then filed an action against Jose for support outside of
their conjugal home.
The trial court held that Jose cannot be compelled to support Eloisa except in his own house, except
by virtue of a judicial decree granting divorce or a separation from him.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Jose can be compelled to support Eloisa outside the conjugal home.
Held:
1. Yes, Article 49 of the Civil Code obliges Jose to support Eloisa either by paying a pension
or supporting Eloisa in his own home.
Marriage is something more than a contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties.
When once formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by agreement,
and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The
spouses must be faithful to, assist, support, and live with each other.
The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to
furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The
failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on
the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital
concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.
Page 39 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
BALOGBOG VS. CA
G.R. No. 83598, 7 March 1997
Presumption of Marriage in the Civil Code (pre-Family Code)
Facts:
Gavino Balogbog, Leoncia Balogbog, and Gaudioso Balogog are siblings. Gavino died in 1935. In
1968, Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog (the children) claimed to be legitimate children of Gavino
and his wife Catalina Ubas and filed an action for partition and accounting against Gaudioso and
Leoncia. Gaudioso and Leoncia denied knowing the children and alleged that their older brother
Gavino died in 1935 single and without issue in their parents’ residence in Cebu.
The children presented as witnesses the following: (1) Priscilo Y. Trazo (former mayor) who knew
their parents as married with children; and (2) Matias Pogoy (family friend) who attended their
parents’ wedding and even carried Catalina’s wedding dress on said wedding day, and made the
coffin of Gavino who, in fact, died in his wife’s presence and not at his parent’s house.
Meanwhile, Catalina Ubas testified that she and Gavino lived together and had three children
during their marriage. The children likewise produced a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar
that the Register of Marriages did not have record of the marriage and no record of birth of
Ramonito.
The Trial Court found for the children and ordered Leoncia and Gaudioso to render an accounting,
to partition the estate of Gavino, and deliver 1/3 of the estate of their grandparents (Basilio and
Genoveva). The Court of Appeals held that Leoncia and Gaudioso failed to overcome the
presumption that a man and a woman claiming to be husband and wife are in fact married, and that
a child is presumed legitimate.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Gavino and Catalina Ubas are lawful husband and wife
Held:
1. Yes, the law favors validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation
of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.
Leoncia and Gaudioso invoke Articles 53 and 54 of the 1889 Civil Code, but the Court held that
Articles 42 of 107 of the 1889 Civil Code did not take effect in the Philippines because the Governor
General suspended them.
The marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights and the rules on
evidence. The Rules of Court state that a man and woman claiming to be married are presumed
married.
Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. Here, Gavino and Catalina’s marriage was proven through testimonial evidence.
Page 40 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
As stated in Adong vs. Cheng Seng Gee, the basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter- presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order to society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is “that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio—Always presume marriage. (U.S.
vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil.
Neither can Leoncia and Gaudioso argue the non-existence of the marriage and its presumption
because there was no showing that Gavino and Catalino exchanged wedding vows. An exchange of
vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a
wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital
commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the
police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.
Page 41 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
EUGENIO, SR. VS. VELEZ

G.R. No. 85140, 17 May 1990
Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood siblings filed on 27
September 1988 a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC in Cagayan de Oro, alleging that 25-
year-old Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. The RTC issued the writ of habeas corpus, but it was returned unsatisfied.
Eugenio refused to return the body of Vitaliano who had died, reasoning that a corpse cannot be
subject of habeas corpus proceedings, besides, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
Department of Health for a burial at the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, where he is the
Supreme President and Founder. He claimed Vtaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in his residence and that as her common law husband, he has the legal custody of her
body.
The siblings amended their petition and claimed to be the legal custodians of their late sister’s dead
body as per Article 305 and 308 of the Civil Code. The trial court held that as per Article 294 of the
Civil Code, the siblings have a better right since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants, or
descendants. The siblings were preferred over Eugenio who is merely a common law spouse and
actually legally married to another woman.
Eugenio claims he is the spouse contemplated under Article 294 of the Civil Code because such
provision does not qualify the term “spouse.” The siblings contended that Philippine law does not
recognize common law marriages.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Eugenio has the right to Vitaliana’s dead body as the spouse contemplated
under Article 294 of the Civil Code.
Held:
1. No, the term “spouse” under the Civil Code contemplates a lawfully wedded spouse.
Eugenio and Vitaliana were not lawfully wedded; in fact he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.
In any case, Eugenio has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
disqualifying him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
“married” in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters,
as per Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code: duty of burial shall devolve upon nearest of
kin if the deceased is an unmarried man or woman.
Page 42 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721, 30 September 1994
Solemnizing illegal marriage by a judge; no marriage license (Art.
Facts:
Four complainants, who work as Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server at
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, filed an administrative complaint with the
Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy (Clerk of Court II)
with illegal solemnization of marriage, among others.
Complainants allege that Judge Palaypayon solemnized marriages without the requisite marriage
license by simply paying the marriage fees to Nelia Baroy. Consequently, their marriage certificate
reflected no marriage license number. Neither did Judge Palaypayon sign their marriage contracts
nor indicate the date of solemnization, giving the excuse that he had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties several days after the ceremony. These marriage contracts were not
filed with the local civil registrar.
Judge Palaypayon contended that the marriage between Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin is
exempt from a marriage license under Article 34 of the Civil Code. He added the five other
marriages he solemnized were not illegal because the marriage contracts were not signed and they
did not contain the date and place of the marriage.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Judge Palaypayon is administratively liable for solemnizing illegal
marriages.
Held:
1. Yes, the Family Code provides that the formal requisites of marriage include a valid
marriage license, except in cases provided for therein. Any absence of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio, and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively
liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that “(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law.” This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
With respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that Judge
Palaypayon had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law’s concern for the institution of
marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the
other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of
misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a
higher penalty. He is fined P20,000 and warned that any repetition will be severely dealt with.
Page 43 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
WASSMER VS. VELEZ

L-20098, 26 December 1964
Breach of Promise to Marry; Exception; (
Facts:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer were set to wed on 4 September 1954. But on 2 September
1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be, saying that they will have to postpone the wedding
because his mother opposes it. He left that day, but wrote on 3 September that nothing had changed,
rest assured he would return soon. Alas, Velez did not appear nor heard from again.
Wassmer sued for damages. Velez through counsel manifested the possibility for amicable
settlement. Twice this was asked for, but twice Velez failed to appear. The RTC ultimately ordered
Velez to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages, based on the evidence Wassmer presented to
the clerk of court as commissioner.
Velez motioned for new trial and reconsideration and argued that there is no provision in the Civil
Code authorizing an action for a breach of promise to marry.
Issue(s)
1. Whether or not Velez is liable for damages for not going through with the marriage to
Wassmer.
Held:
1. Yes, the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that “any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
The record shows that on 23 August 1954, the couple applied for a license to contract marriage
which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for 4 September 1954. Invitations were
printed, the bride’s gown, party dresses, and other apparel were purchased, including dresses for
the entourage, and a matrimonial bed.
And then Velez simply left a note saying his mother opposes the wedding. This is not a mere breach
of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, but to formally set
a wedding and walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is different. This is
contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held liable as per Article 21.
Page 44 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
NAVARRO V. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, 19 July 1996
Authority of Judges to solemnize marriage (Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code)
Facts:
Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Domagtoy of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court for gross misconduct and ignorance of the law.
Navarro alleged that Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga despite knowing that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Navarro also alleged
that Judge Domagtoy solemnized a marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in
Dapa, which is 40 kilometers outside his court’s jurisdiction in Sta. Monica-Burgos.
Judge Domagtoy countered that he relied on the affidavit of Gaspar Tagadan issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge confirming that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost 7
years. He also countered that he did not violate Article 7(1) of the Family Code by solemnizing the
second marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction because Article 8 applies.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Judge Domagtoy is liable for gross ignorance of the law in solemnizing the
two marriages.
Held:
1. Yes, the marriage between Tagadan and Borgda is bigamous and void. The marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario is valid despite the irregularity of solemnization
outside Judge Domagtoy’s jurisdiction, but he is administratively liable.
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous,
and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, “The following marriage shall be
void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41.”
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court’s jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
“Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the

judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.”
Page 45 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
Judge Domagtoy invokes Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court’s jurisdiction.
Article 8 provides that a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or
(3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense
that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma
del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the
solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability
Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. Clearly, Judge Domagtoy again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles
of civil law. He is therefore suspended for 6 months and given a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Page 46 of 47
1st Sem, SY 2017-2018
ARANAS VS. JUDGE OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, 11 April 2002
Authority of Judges to solemnize marriage; citing Navarro vs. Domagtoy (Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code)
Facts:
Mercedita Aranes charged Judge Occiano, presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, with gross ignorance of the law via a sworn Letter-Complaint. Aranes alleged that
Judge Occiano solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador Orobia with the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur, outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Aranes and Orobia lived together as husband and wife until Orobia passed away. However, since
the marriage was a nullity, Aranes’s right to inherit Orobia’s estate was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Judge Occiano then countered that he agreed out of human compassion to wed the couple in Nabua
on 17 February 2000 because Orobia had difficulty walking 25 kilometers to Balatan due to a stroke
and that the parties requested to go through with the marriage despite the absence of a marriage
license due to the influx of visitors and delivery of provisions for the occasion. He added that the
couple assured they would give the license to him, but they failed to comply. Aranes then filed an
Affidavit of Desistance out of conscience because she realized she filed said administrative case out
of rage and in fact failed to submit the marriage license to Judge Occiano despite their reassurances.
It appears that the couple filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000, but no one
claimed it. Likewise, there is no record of their marriage hence the Local Civil Registrar cannot issue
any certification of their marriage.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Judge Occiano is administratively liable for solemnizing the marriage
without the marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Held:
1. Yes, Judge Occiano is liable.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and
had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgbs. In
the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge is grossly ignorant for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. Marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner.
Page 47 of 47

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PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS DIGESTS

Atty. Charlton Jules Romero

TANADA VS. TUVERA

DE ROY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

NUEVA ECIJA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

MILLAROSA V. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

Pursuant to PD 293, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan inscribed a Memorandum on Carmel

CUI VS. ARELLANO

FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

TAYUG RURAL BANK VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO

REPUBLIC VS. OBRECIDO

BAYOT VS COURT OF APPEALS

Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca’s recognition as a Filipino citizen

LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF LUNA

GARCIA VS. RECIO

Recio became an Australian citizen on 29 June 1992 as shown by a Certificate of Australian

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO

GONZALEZ VS. GONZALEZ

Article 9 thereof reads as follows:

And Article 11, the last part of which reads:

DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM

2. Yes, he can be held criminally liable under RA 9262.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

BELLIS VS. BELLIS

MO YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

GOITIA VS. CAMPO-RUEDA

EUGENIO, SR. VS. VELEZ

COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

WASSMER VS. VELEZ

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the

ARANAS VS. JUDGE OCCIANO

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