G.R. No.

143276 July 20, 2004

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land
situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily
acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,2 as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,3 the Land Bank of the Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the
following valuation of the property:

Acquired property Area in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19

Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36

P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the
valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet,
Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a
compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following admissions of facts: (1) the
subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries;
and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.5

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.6

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00
and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The
court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal,
for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED."7

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in another case pending
before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the following formula:

For the coconut land

1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under Republic Act No.
38448 )

For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the formula
under Executive Order No. 2289 )

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series of
1994)

Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.

On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision10 affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court. The
Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's valuation of the
land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.

To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged "primarily" with "the
determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer
to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement…" For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation
and compensation by the Landbank.12

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner.13 If the landowner accepts the
offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply
thereto, the DAR adjudicator15 conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land
by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land.16 These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as
amended, which provides:

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court19 and, on its own initiative or at the instance
of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute,
including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x." 20 In determining just compensation, the
RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the
tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation."

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object
and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = MV x 2"

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in determining just
compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;

3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5. the assessment made by government assessors;

6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the
property; and
 7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein the contending
parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of
the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:

"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined the average
gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.,
filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland
situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed
therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the
instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per
year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We
cannot also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average
production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud,
Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross
production. In the Rodriguezcase, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60
cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to
the case at bar.

xxx xxx xxx

"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken under CARP is 5.4730
hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by
Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both
cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the
average gross production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per
kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.

"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income of the coconut land is
1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net
income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just
compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.

"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area of .7600 hectare. If in
the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year,
then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans
x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22

"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on the
compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33
cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. 24 They may only do so "in the
absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"25 which are not obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
 "SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request
of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon.

"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case." (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as
amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person
who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold
relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.

As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does
not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228
whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents
have been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the subject land. Thus, we
deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective
evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the
land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte,
for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in
determining the proper valuation of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @

"Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS,
NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH,
JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE
MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also pending before it, does not
affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and
overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the
bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.

The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and
10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were
filed 1 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin
Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for
kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill
the person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4 and for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer of the
City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976
which was being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario 6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga
City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until
February 2, 1989, the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to
herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise alleged identical
facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of
threats and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP,
take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No.
10065] 7 a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being
present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie
Manuel. 8

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On
April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court renders its
judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the
eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless detained for some
other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA

and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed men who
insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and pursuant to Art.
267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No.
10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping
not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of [k]idnapping

and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5) imprisonments,

ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS
of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1 0064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina
Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are,
therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in the five
charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve five
imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS
AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders "convicted of an offense
punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of
which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais
and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
 Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced further to
return the following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or
their value in money, their liability being solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00

One Bracelet P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00

Cash P 200.00

To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

One Necklace P 300.00

One Calculator P 295.00

Eyeglasses P 500.00

One Steel Tape P 250.00

To Edilberto S. Perez:

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00

One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00

Cash P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara:

One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

 The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be extended to those
sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. "Commander
Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their
arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED. 9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed
their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais,
withdrew their appeal because of their application for "amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted
their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. 11

The Facts

The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies, organized
themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the
Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office
and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of its
classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not
able to reach the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed
their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal belongings.
They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced
himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).

While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused
their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with
his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their captivity, the
victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the
kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a
ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15,
TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were informed that they would
be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At around
12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon
received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same
was reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)

. . . 12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves: Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 13

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan,
Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a
place where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already
detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan
were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8)
accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were
joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the captivity of Carlos
Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their
will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with
Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other
errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to
bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months,
while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her
guard was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January
29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen years old at
the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was
kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed
with him for less than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping
errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her escape during an encounter between the
group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she
took a "bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan,
Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was harvesting
palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where
there was an army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time
except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan,

Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her
husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were
being arrested, neither were they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six
by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army
battalion and placed them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the
civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan,
Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were
brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga
City where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to
the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with his
wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the
 ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the
present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a
woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life imprisonment." It also found
him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The
trial court ratiocinated as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and their version of what had
happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives
credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and
convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution
witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only
because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual
testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28
and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were
keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the captivity of the
five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan;
(4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk Alah.
These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as conspirators as
charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the
kidnapping group to which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band
for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established
communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their
hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs,
giving them material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap
victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.

xxx xxx xxx

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court
holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-
accused, these male accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by
fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in
guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as
among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is supported by the
rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may
be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to
the purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common
design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People
vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
 (2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between
the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all
equally responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).) 14

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly
captured the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their
right to cross-examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial
court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and
contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as
accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the
benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were minors at the
time of the commission of the offense. 15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the
third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues
pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of
the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the
penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony
given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that
captured him and his purported cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a
material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be used
against him. 17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant
Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not
denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap
victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to
meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of
Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor
substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with
the group?

A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four
days.

Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?

A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we

came to know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some
food.

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of
you?

A Yes.

Q And to whom were you assigned?

A To Ila Abdurasa.

Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to,
who else did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
Falcasantos — Mating and Janira — another brother in-law of Commander
Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really
came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see
the[m] again?

A Yes, ma'am.
 Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you
mentioned are here?

A Yes, they are here.

Q Some of them are here?

A Some of them are here.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine
armed men who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his
name as JAILON KULAIS.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you
alight, what else was he doing while you were in their captivity?

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong.

xxx xxx xxx 19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

xxx xxx xxx

Q And what happened then?

A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to]
g[i]ve food to us.

Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember
how he looks like?

A Yes.

Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and
his wife are here?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

 A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself]
as Jailon Kulais.

Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?

A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.

Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril
was one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not
mention Tangkong?

A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell
you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?

A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx 20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Who else?

A The last man.

Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified
himself as Jailon Kulais.)

Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

A The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.

Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way
from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?

A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

Q They did not fire any shots?

A But they were pointing their guns at us.

 Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga
Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?

A Yes.

Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?

A Yes.

Q Will you please identify?

A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified
himself as Jailon Kulais.)

xxx xxx xxx

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:

Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word
Tangkong.

ATTY. FABIAN

Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours
another will be on duty guarding us.

Q Where did you meet Tangkong?

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx xxx xxx 21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or detention did take
place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989.
It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and
that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives
credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping

for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent from the
testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the circumstances
surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these
meetings for possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by
this? What were you supposed to negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. 22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander
Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for
your ransom?

A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Q Why will you able to identify the same?

A Because I was the one who wrote it.

Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

A Yes.

Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable
City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there are five letters all handwritten.

COURT:

Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Original, your Honor.

Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the
ones you were asked to write.

A (Witness going over [letters])

This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.

Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what
else will make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A And over it is a signature.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

A Yes, there is the other signature.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando
Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did
you come up to know who signed this one?

A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic].

Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the
signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?

A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the portion
here which says the terms? . . .

A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga
P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23

xxx xxx xxx

INTERPRETER (Translation):

This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00
in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21,
1988. 24 Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21, 1988 and
the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

Q January 21, 1989?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

Please go over this.

A (Going over the letter)

Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)

Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7

colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large
size. 25

xxx xxx xxx

INTERPRETER:

They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors,
marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed
by your companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you
know only.

A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to
inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already — I
was asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof
that all of us are alive. 26 [sic]
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto Perez. 28 The
receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon
payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 having been
sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this
Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of

Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the government
monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not
able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by
Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.

That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter. In People vs.
Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his parents received the
ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was
involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious
illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy,
was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding
that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any
manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant was charged and
convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important,
but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is immaterial. The
clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra
worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping
occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed was not kidnapping
under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old
victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became
suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of
evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the victims were detained,
albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was
a member of the armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses'
positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses
than to the negative testimonies of the defense. 39 Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of
truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies
were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was
found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him head on. His
testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant
did not explain where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he
rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping
with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when
the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a
definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. 41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in
three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is
sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to
three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra
and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal
effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of
P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which
denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and
Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through its
Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of
employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21,
1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month
probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective
January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment,
which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight, committed a noise
violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
 Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched
the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt.
Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at Aeroformacion,
Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff
was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of
the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38,
Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains
in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently,
defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
(Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel
(t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were
found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be
paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not
uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all
possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant
moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the
court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and
in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of
his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a complaint are the
natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil
dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the
complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the
consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and
further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has
no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against defendant
Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of —
 SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as
and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of payment; and
the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination,
estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on
January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS

EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE

EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because
of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.4

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. 5 On this matter,
respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which
is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of
the appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded
that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn,
then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of
the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.

xxx xxx xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is
settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for
the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now
Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261
SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money claims arising
from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282,
294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due
to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January
8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and
which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it
has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the
commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that
the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals
when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the same is perfected,
the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee
accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
 others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months salary.
Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a
signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he
applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the
aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply supported by evidence and
it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down
in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had
no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and
reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination from employment
was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No
error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division
dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the
COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10
May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21
April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy
Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating
that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15
February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado
is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act
of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit
of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US
citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind
eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a
passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance
and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a
repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he
used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or
benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion
of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and
ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not
later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no
law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,
et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural
born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict
conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a
natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the
progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all
fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine
passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This
then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him
for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one
of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be
lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said
principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a
citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should
be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The
latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous
renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine
citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements
regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of votes
does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a
candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not
make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to
breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite
his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado
is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified
is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing
a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the
event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed
as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition
as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of
the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed
the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath
of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had
therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued
to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using
his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the
next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily
and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until
14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would
be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents
himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a
Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It
was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his
foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that
a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in
that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election
absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that
a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is
quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after
an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the
board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board
of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so
tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter
case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding
power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense
of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of
the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to
try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in
that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold
the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring
in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and
that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision
is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent
statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots
and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the
next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could
not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.
When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to
occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency
is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that
while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance
for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around
the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make
an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that
sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the
petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data
wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will
cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and
win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects
the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules
are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as
an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce
any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more
so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice.
The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are
allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set
in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of
notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate
of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to
the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect
of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the
office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an
American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed
even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from
running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a.
Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The
latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky – of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to
reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).

Statement of Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its
Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were
about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus.
The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on
the bus together, the two sat away from each other – one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of
the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were
reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter
looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more
concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more
certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at
Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in
front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would
get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters
to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the
bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two
passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went
back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours
after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion,
the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and
warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after the
incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the
network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television
interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor
identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on
the evening of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah
Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does" – were then charged
with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the
other accused remain at-large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a
plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477),
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the
pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the following:

1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing one another before February
14, 2005.

3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus was plying
the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.

4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to make
explosive devices.

5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14 bombing incident.

6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus
which left four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
 7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24 each gave separate interviews
to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of these
cases.

8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes, because they were guilt-stricken
after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had entered.

9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a television news interview in which
he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which
resulted in the filing of these charges.

10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the Abu Sayyaf.1

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to
changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and
Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.2

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004,
Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were
told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in
malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.

As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman
and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he
knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him
for a total of 4 kilos of TNT – that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime
in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.

Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT
from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home
or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes
later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from
accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said,
"Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."

Assignment of Errors

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.

II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.4

First Assignment of Error

Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had
changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-
arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed upon during the last
hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr.
Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then
earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain… [I]s that not inconsistent considering the
stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to have caused
the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under the
circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this matter with your clients?

………

Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven’t conferred with them about this with regard to
the multiple murder case.

………

Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused because if they are interested in
withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.

Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.

(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)

I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the
plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their
pleas.

Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?

Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder case, then they are now
changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.

………

INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a clearer way and asked both
accused what their pleas are).

Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.

COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and
changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at
pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and accommodate…5

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges … must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of
an inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence
in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court
noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty."7 According to the Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is
imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have
misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the
defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in
open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his
counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9

We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions;
or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and
mandatory.11

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The
Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we
deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-
arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
consideration.12

Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with,
"[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera,
the Court stated:

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)

In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They
pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that
which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer
Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the
two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati
ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali
testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of
the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their
respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they
both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day bombing. 15 Accordingly, the
Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali.
Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutor’s direct examination of state-witness
Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:

Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to
assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to
be trained to make an explosive, sir.

Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?

A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two weeks.

………

Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission
that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?

………

A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila, sir.16

The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.

Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad
and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?

A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.

Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?

A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.

………

Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by Trinidad?

A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

………

Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date, December 29, 2004? Will you
kindly tell us the reason why?

………

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate a bomb

………

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to the taking of the
explosives from you?

A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?

A : He told me that "this is your first mission."

Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?

A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.

………

Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb explode?

A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was caught,
because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus,
which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive
for you, Mr. witness?

………

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

………

Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?

A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

A : No, sir.

Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which were taken from you by
Trinidad and Tapay?

………

A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to leave the house
because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.

………

Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

………

A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he took exploded already, sir.

Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu
Solaiman and Trinidad?

A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the bombing in General Santos.

………

A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime in February 2005.

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing exploded in Makati, any other
call?

………

A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

………

A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
 ………

Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called you up the following
day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to you, Mr. witness,
if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission,
which have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?

A : They are connected, sir.

Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war to the
forest, but also wage our battles in the city.

Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

A : The government, sir.17

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila,
so that they could show their "anger towards the Christians."18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and
Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine’s Day bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained
Asali and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to
plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December
2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first
mission."19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the
Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group
announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future.
Asali then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."20

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:

Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on "principal by inducement." The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs – coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat’s confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from
Asali as part of their mission – prove the finding that Rohmat’s co-inducement was the determining cause of the
commission of the crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have
materialized."22lawphi1

Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because
Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was
rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.

The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat.
Conspiracy was clearly established from the "collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the judicial admissions
freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between
and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis
by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter’s participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators’ criminal design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353
SCRA 643).25

In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the defendants therein were
engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other
performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments."26

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true
that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court,
his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.27 Thus,
in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:

… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given
in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-
examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-
accused is competent evidence against the latter.28

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification
by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR.,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside the February 7, 2002
resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).

THE ANTECEDENTS

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of
Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose
Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized,
beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4

Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa,
was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009.5

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No. 0130.7 The present respondents
were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

I. Civil Case No. 0130

In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected.
Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors
was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8

Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5,
1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:

[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered
shares in the special stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer,
employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9

During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that
since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI," 10especially in the
election of the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of
[ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."11

In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on Friday, November 27,
1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court,
through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their
proxies may vote their corresponding shares.

The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final judicial resolution of the
question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the underlying assets of the corporation
concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 10778913(PCGG’s
petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of
ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its
assailed resolution.
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130,
among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.15

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very Urgent Petition for
Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock"
(Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence and immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17

In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-
trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the
respondents18 – on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul
General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Bane without leave of
court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the
deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit 19 x x x so as to prove the ownership
issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A
stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in
evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he
cross-examined Bane.

On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGG (i) "to cause the
holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and
(ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as
previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was "unanimously
approved."23 From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No.
147214 (Africa’s petition).

We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:

This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of directors), the
Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the articles of incorporation to increase
the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes
cast by the PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with
no other choice but to remand these questions to it for proper determination.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to
determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is
an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of
Directors and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of
ETPI.

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution and in conformity
herewith.

II. Civil Case No. 0009

Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997 that the
first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25

In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following witnesses:

WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES

(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized.
 xxxx

(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x

(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x

(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x

(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x

(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x

(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x

IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition

At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that –

1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130, 0146 28 the
following witnesses were presented therein:

a. Cesar O.V. Parlade

b. Maurice Bane

c. Evelyn Singson

d. Leonorio Martinez

e. Ricardo Castro; and

f. Rolando Gapud

2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the documentary exhibits
presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to
prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].

3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine them.

The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed a Common Reply30 to
these Oppositions.

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 1st motion, as
follows:

Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V.
Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents
according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents].
(emphasis added)

2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as plaintiff prays therein to
adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro
and documentary exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject
to the following conditions :

1. xxx

2. xxx

3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-examined on their particular
testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December
14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the
alternative prayer that:

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same for trial any day in April 2000
for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane
deposition] which already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;

2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established by the [Bane
deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours]

On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 2nd motion:

Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently, this provision refers to the
Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in
resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is
upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something
which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.

On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the
defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic)
129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]

On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the
Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).

IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of

Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)

On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the Bane deposition. 38 On
February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the
assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:

But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case as to obviate the
further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-appearing defendants are deemed to have
waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed,
We do not see any need to dwell on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which
already denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure
to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the
resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s
disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only in February of 2000
that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s
deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the
deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is
inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has
attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be
a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]

The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion:
 I.

x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.

II.

x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS ALREADY ADMITTED

AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S
EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).

III.

x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF EVIDENCE FOR

THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order; thus, the petitioner’s
failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a character of "finality" so long as the main case remains
pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally
taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this
relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent"
case.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan should not have
denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:

1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be used as evidence in
Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be
deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up.

2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its allegation that the
respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the government.

3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed and the voluminous
records that the present case has generated.43

THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY

In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 200245 ), they claim that the present
petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.46 This assertion proceeds from the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions
earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit
that the petitioner’s 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s
1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the
petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a
character of "finality."

The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a supplemental offer of evidence
requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound
discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the
[petitioner] and available to [it] before [it] rested its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of the
petitioner’s 3rd motion – i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right to cross-examine the
deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the petitioner never questioned this
recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because
the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may opt to wait out and
collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it
filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane
deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in
considering the petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the
dictates of substantial justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.

The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of evidence. A party
normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he formally offered; before then, he still has the
opportunity to present further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered
evidence.50

The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is sufficient for the
admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by
our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now
Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the
notice of the deposition-taking.

To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their respective comments on the
petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these
comments and to consider this petition submitted for decision.

THE ISSUES

On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:

1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –

i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;

ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for reconsideration;

iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane deposition to the petitioner’s
cause; and

iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior consolidation of Civil Case No.
0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.

3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -

i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; and

ii. The principle of judicial notice.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

I. Preliminary Considerations

I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.

In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must
first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must
preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature.

Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of
the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely,
or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the
order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits
of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:

As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term
"final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no
further questions or directions for future determination.

On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in
connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its
application.54 (emphasis supplied)

Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of
the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the
presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to
be done to achieve this end.

We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the
merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution – which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition
as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 – could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order
resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56

I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.

We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually second) motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the arguments
already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the
rules as a prohibited motion.57

I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or final order which
completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares to be appealable. While this provision
prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order
through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the
assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.

On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the 60-day period for filing a
petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue
that since this ruling had long been rendered by the court, the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually
a devious attempt to resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly
argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been
immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely
on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the
existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of
the injurious effects of the order complained of.59

We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded the presentation of its
evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari to question the admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the
plain remedy available to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the
admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence
in its formal offer61 – as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.

Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the denial of the 1st motion could
not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.

II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not constitute grave
abuse of discretion

In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling,
but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action
was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction.62Without this showing, the
Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a
grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the unique circumstances of this
case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case,
by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter of public concern.63 In other words, we
opt to resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of
completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.

Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it from an
overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of presentation of a

party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Rule
30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have
rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some
measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.67

In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed
and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the
face of these categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist on the
introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case could not have
been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is
the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer
of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.

The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the petitioner had firmly denied
having rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.

Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to the corrective writ
of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action. The petitioner’s non-observance of the
proper procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its
case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without
seeking reconsideration of the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its case.
This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer
of evidence.

More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case. In resolving the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane
deposition has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the
Bane deposition as evidence (considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt to adopt
the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless,
the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its
case, the petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its
attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition.
Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested its case and insisting on the
introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to
the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions, ironically,
even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner
should have realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence
consisting of the Bane deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been prevented
from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.

On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to reopen its case before
the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to
allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate
purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the
prism of the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing,
"marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had
acted with grave abuse of discretion.

III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of
introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition

The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:

Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise
directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:

xxxx

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the
furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]

Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies
upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious
surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.76

A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from introducing further
evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the
burden of evidence from one party to the other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly
discovered evidence,79 the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved
party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends
on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the
interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner
must show that the lower court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this
term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.81 Grave abuse of
discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond
allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83

In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has
been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally,
additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence
on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations
omitted; emphases ours)

Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is
permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an
eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant
has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the
defendant and affecting his case injuriously."

These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil
Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the
furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger
when one considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and
action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of
violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in
support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:

However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is
allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87

Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case. Instead
of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition,
the Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion
"redundant." This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent
to an act outside the contemplation of law.

It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even
presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s
introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial
justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of the Bane deposition.

On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state of the parties’
submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious
course of action. At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane
deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete resolution.
Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after
remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition

IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites of
admissibility

In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing
the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation
of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule
130 speaks of no longer exists.

Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were consolidated –
provided that:

Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance

Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)

Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that
the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To
promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the
consolidation of issues within those cases.95

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is completely silent on the
effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence
presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or
trial, or to order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even
synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the
different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.

These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically a function given to the court,
the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved,
the parties affected, and the court’s capability and resources vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among other
things) what "consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.

To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient premise that the
deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the
silence of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel
this Court to determine the kind of "consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.

In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:97

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial
is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98
 (2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a
single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same
parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the
parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100

Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at all provide a hint on the
extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this
procedural device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to look deeper
into the voluminous records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest that
the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have
been no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger
actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take judicial notice of the
same.

Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for trial. 103Accordingly,
despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the
petitioner’s 1st Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are
not available for cross-examination in" the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so
that the respondents can cross-examine them.

These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of consolidation had actually resulted in
the complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in
these consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without
objection.104

Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the fact that in the present
case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not
parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within
ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidationand, together with the parties
affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the
evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in another action – must find support in the proceedings held below.
This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the
respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court,
jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned
considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioner’s right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially
where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon
oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on
evidence.

We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is, before the deposition
was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any
reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30,
1996,109 the petitioner even made a representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.

IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section 47, Rule 130

Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case, the admissibility of
the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court –
the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues
that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of
the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident cases drew individual
oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the
provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The
petitioner’s about-face two years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to treat the
Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.

Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse) provides for the
circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of
a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:

xxxx

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1)
that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place
of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4)
that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon
application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be
used[.] [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may
be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the Bane deposition can be
admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility,
compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation,
the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be
consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane
deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be
considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a
witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.

A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is
their mutual reference to depositions.

A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of
disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for
trial.114 Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the
relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally,
the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules
on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in
open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open
court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party had or has no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination
was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must
normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or
hearing of a case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.117

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or depositionappears
under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is
not universally conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility
of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the
deponent in the prior proceeding.

This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an adverse party in usual trials
regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the
requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition
is sought to be introduced.

Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there
is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an
opportunity to do so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings
should be the same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former
testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122)

These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be
confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the
petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.

Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this very
same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane
deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to
those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the
use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule
23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the
requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the
latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition
given at a former case or proceeding.

1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;

3. Involving the same parties;

4. Relating to the same matter;

5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the
admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now
examine and resolve.

IV (c). Unavailability of witness

For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply requires, inter
alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken
during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify
dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the
deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as follows:

(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126

The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to
appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the
Philippines," which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the
petitioner’s excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same
rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the
deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in
evidence.129

Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between the parties to a case on
trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced
in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a
witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.

Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor
of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the
Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously
allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or
proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane
deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the
admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous condition or
conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in court.132

IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of parties; and identity of subject
matter

The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on direct
examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and
completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the
party against whom a witness may be called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on
the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for
the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present
adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination
is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.

In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been satisfied, we have to consider
first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the admission of the Bane deposition to whom the
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such
opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first proceeding must be the same
as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is not required; substantial identity136 or identity of
interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior
proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the
same rights of property.138

In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at
most, the deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed
as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the
respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between them for purposes of
binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration
of their shares does not result in the integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and
personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139

IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver

The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the deponent for their failure
to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to them.140

In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996,141 the petitioner originally
intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr.
Bane’s deposition, the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral
Examination where it likewise moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.

The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended deposition of Maurice
Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition 143to the
petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice.
While the Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down
on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145

It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral examination is not simply based
on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -

The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the authority
to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not
arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always
see to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Moran:

. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against abuses that may be
committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying
into another person's affairs — prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is
not to be such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to
litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)

In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s Opposition (which is equally
applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more
so) non-parties,147 and to ensure that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the
petitioner’s assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns – e.g.,
reasonability of the notice; and the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed
as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.

In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the
effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically,
they cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-
examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the
admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of
parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its
action was premised on Africa’s status as a party in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.

Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5 which provides:

Effect of substitution of parties. — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and,
when an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same
parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action
may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]

In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived their right to cross-examination
when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right
to cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this right.

Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Section 15 of this rule
reads:

Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon
oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and
place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not
known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of
any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.

Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the individual notices it sent to the
respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to
begin with, they were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking,
conspicuously absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear
at the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the
respondents to raise their objections at the appropriate time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were
we to hold that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of interest with any of the
parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a notice .
Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the respondents’ mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite
notice sent by the petitioner.

Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil Case No. 0009 – the principal
action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was still here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the
Philippines was no longer under the Marcos administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil
Case No. 0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice
Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati,
Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have been taken - without compromising the respondents’ right to cross-
examine a witness against them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery.
These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the
gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.

After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the least that the
petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately
upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the
respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-
taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-
parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI
stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only express dismay on why the
petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his deposition despite having knowledge already of the
substance of what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s
case against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case
(instead of the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.

V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice

The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case
No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts
are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional
evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters
which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent
probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of
evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court
to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines," 155or gives the
court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions."156 On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may
allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved. 157 In the present case, after
the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their
corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in
its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, andabsent an objection
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending.159

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of
the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.160

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the
applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the
concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children"
cases – Civil Case 0130 – as evidence in the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases." 161 To the
petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.

We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve
only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly
procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve
issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion
by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in
another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to
properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty
on the court. We invite the petitioner’s attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164

Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in trying a case sees
only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced
judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent
upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)

We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we should take judicial notice of the
Bane deposition.

VI. Summation

To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – the Motion to Admit
Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of
discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion; and (3) notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is
not admissible under the rules of evidence.165

VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent

At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His covering note states:

I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the public will understand what
the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)

In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.

First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in this case – i.e.,
the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence,
whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the
relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness") is
not an issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent evidence.

Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine Jurisprudence, the consolidation of
cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente
J. Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position, which we
will restate here for emphasis:

In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:

The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated into a single action, in
the same manner as if the different causes of actions involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of
consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is
vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue
of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court
may direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action
(1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).

At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Secundum, the following caveat
appears:

The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are combined into one and lose their
separate identity and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several
actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several
actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
The failure to distinguish between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking,
not being consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1
C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).

In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term "consolidation" is used in three
different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement out of context. As it is, the issue
of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter that requires the approach we did in the majority’s
discussion on consolidation.167

Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of consolidation – to
"expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases" and "the simplification of the proceedings."
It argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.

It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily addressed to the court
concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court
should have a say on what consolidation would actually bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have
become relatively complex). In the present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the
Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint
hearing or trial. Why should this Court – which is not a trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal
grounds?

Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only resulted in a joint hearing or
trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition considering that they were given notice of the deposition-
taking." The issue here boils down to one of due process – the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected
to the rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence – especially when read in light
of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.

Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the reasonableness thereof – an
issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s
omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of
right and, thus, failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous statement of
the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa,
are the parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due process.

Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the Sandiganbayan "granted" the
request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly
asserted that the deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these
consolidated cases have reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness
demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling
thereon (including the opposition filed by respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning
omission and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty of violating
the constitutional guarantee of due process.

Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, are
not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality
that technical rules deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding
discussions show. They involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent
Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed
to be those of the Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which we
cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking the disorder that
these rules have sought to avert in the course of their evolution.
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a conclusive decision because of a tie
vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the
ponencia is deemed sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya
ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong
magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"

Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala
siyang sino mang tinitingnan.

"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta kung wala na akong saka?"

Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha
na sa kanila.

- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant
negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken
their own produce.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution 3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft. 6

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 7 The Information
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod,
Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once
inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca
fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her
damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00), Philippine
currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate,
SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate. 10

According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak,
Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men,
including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero
and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3)
unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca.
Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police. 11

On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the condition of the plantation.
They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas. 12

On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police Station. 13Ligtas admitted to
harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. 14

The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his
wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since
1993.16 Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case. 17

Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997." 18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest. 19 However, he
could not remember the exact amount anymore. 20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around
15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate. 21

Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas
prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land. 22

Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero and
Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting
happened.23

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod,
Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. 24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB
rendered the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. 26

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records
are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court 27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any
objection on the part of the People of the Philippines. 29

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to prove the elements of
theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest
sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any witness." 31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification ... by prosecution witnesses." 32

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this
court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
 1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days as minimum
to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum;cralawlawlibrary

2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:

a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca stole[n];cralawlawlibrary

b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary

c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. 34 According to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the
tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. 36

The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . .
land is irrelevant in the case at bar":37

Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a
tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to
be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the tenancy relation. 39

The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership. "He claims that the parcel of land
owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based merely on the
testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify parcels of land." 40

More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's
plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's consent. 42 "The subject of the
crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order to consummate the crime of theft." 43

Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal property under the meaning of Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code was erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was "capable of
appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to another." 45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were already harvested. 46 Hence, all the elements of theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from criminal liability. 47 His alibi was
doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of
culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny." 48
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper. 49 He failed to show that the case was initiated only through
Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land. 50

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . . August 16,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding
accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on February 2, 2012.54

II

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. 55 This court required
People of the Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice. 56

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court;cralawlawlibrary

Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by private
complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be
taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and

Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas
for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Petition is meritorious.

III

Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for being
"conclusions without citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the claim
of petitioner [as] tenant."57

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 58 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 60 This court has
differentiated between a question of law and question of fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress
from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review
under Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in
making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the
acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 63 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain material facts and
circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that
they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal." 64

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of fact. 65 To be precise,
however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory
elements of tenancy.66

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the essential elements of the
crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land
from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable
resolution.

IV

Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated by ill will and revenge. 68 The charges
were designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as tenant. 69 Telling is the fact that petitioner
filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8,
2000.70

Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant's tenant. 71 The DARAB Decision is
entitled to respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency vested with primary
jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy relationship. 72

The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence. 73 To require petitioner to prove tenancy
relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes
beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence. 74

Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private complainant did not file an appeal.
The DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision. 76 The trial
court could not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge.77(Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship
between him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca hemp. 78Nevertheless, respondent maintains that
petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship between him and private complainant. 79 Private
complainant did not consent to the alleged tenancy relationship. 80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any
sharing of harvest between the parties.81

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported
by substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of
cases that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act.

....

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. 82 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal
proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-
319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the
tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.

In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in the above-quoted Supreme
Court ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not
controverted by any evidence submitted by the respondent.

In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as such is entitled to a security
of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landowner except for any of the
causes provided by law and only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized
by the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.] 83 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bonafide
tenant of the land subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and ordering
as follows, to wit:
 1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful
possession of the land in dispute;cralawlawlibrary

2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR
Cluster to call the parties and assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the land in
dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call of the said MARO in compliance with the
legal mandate.

3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos representing
the expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses incurred in this
litigation.

Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.

No cost.

SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported
by substantial evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."86

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy
relationship between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body." 88 Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include
controversies relating to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes,
which includes the relationship between landowners and tenants. 91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on
courts when supported by substantial evidence. 92 This court ruled that administrative res judicata exists in that
case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB
Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of
petitioner's status as a tenant of respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of
courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as
to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final
adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable
by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said
to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably
 circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those
purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the
facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based
thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the
parties.95 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment.
In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and
differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as
to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies
will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior
judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. 97 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the parties. 99 As in this case, the DARAB Decision 100 in Martillano
attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the Decision. 101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res
judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its
adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and
controversies on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides
that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no appeal was
interposed therefrom by any of the parties.

In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no appeal
interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant
farmer and the validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer open
to doubt and controversy.

....

We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation
patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to
withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering
that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no
strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB
Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.

The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant in
the case before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before
the Court of Appeals.

The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability of the
doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been litigated in a
final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of
res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same issue in another
action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between the same parties as long
as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence,
the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since said issue had
already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness
of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal
cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-
remittance of Social Security System contributions. 105 This court upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission in a separate case, which declared the absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained
finality.106 This court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public
policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious
principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the
premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the course of
a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a Court's
final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely
 burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy
that could be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy relationship must
be duly proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The principal
factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.109 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were
proven by petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as tenant of the land. 111 In
rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. 112 It was
convinced by petitioner's evidence, which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was
installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the
produce after harvest.114 However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest. 115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's
share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29,
2000.116

We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her
and refused to attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private
complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already shown her intention not to
participate the proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her;cralawlawlibrary

That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in the
proceedings of the case;cralawlawlibrary

That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to withdraw as he is now
withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases
that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. 119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings
on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the
Court of Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al. 121

In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar and
rice and who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication
Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold
the land to respondents, respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas
Omaña.122

Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated
and resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator. 124

The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy relationship [that] existed between the
parties."125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy
cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package. 126

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy
between the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were entitled to security of
tenure.127

The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there
was no substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of
tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be upheld. 128

This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the
existence of a tenancy relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there was
personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what was
established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the landholding for more than 30
years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the
previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced. Such
claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of
petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with
substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of
the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The
same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving
his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....

Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a
tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence
is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests. The
only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship.

We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the
testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was
tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may
be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of this Court
that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling
holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as herein shown, were not able
to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of tenancy. 130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional and, thus, not
binding on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the Department of
Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on
whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.

In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that
the Decision has long lapsed into finality. 131 It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial stages
of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties.
We cannot collaterally review the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists
creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.

VI

According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were not established since he was
a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that
he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's land]." 134 This shows that petitioner had no
criminal intent.

As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without the consent of the owner—petitioner
argues that this, too, was negated by his status as private complainant's tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is
misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the
produce of the landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled
him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or until his eviction is
authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory. 135 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather,
we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law."136 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or
to its owner;cralawlawlibrary

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs
to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits,
cereals, or other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking
was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of the person or force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm households —
cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price
certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. 138 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner's share in the
produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner's
consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant negates
the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that
petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of
theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of reasonable
doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part. 141 It failed to clearly identify "the
person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging
to him."142 There were doubts as to whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot
when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent to it. 143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
property belonged to private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas believing them
to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had a criminal intent." 144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the
land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. 145 "[I]t
is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person." 146Thus, courts must consider "[e]very
circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]" 147 Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two
interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt and should be acquitted."148

In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised
by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated
February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any
other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.