Rule 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL: ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY

Probate Mandatory

GR 12184, Sept. 27, 1917

US v Chiu Guimco

Facts: Joaquin Cruz died in China during one of his visits there, leaving an estate worth P40,000-P50,000. He
also left a wife (Uy Cuan) and a child in China, and another wife (Maria Villafranca) in the Philippines.

Before his departure to China, he was able to execute a will before a notary public, in which he named his
brother Chiu Guimco and a certain Co-Iden as executors. Co-Iden eventually died with nothing done to
institute probate of the will. Meanwhile, Chiu Guimco managed Joaquin’s business and properties.

In exchange for certain properties, Maria agreed to relinquish any interest in the estate of Joaquin. Later,
however, Uy Cuan arrived in the Philippines to effect the settlement of her husband’s estate. Through a friend
(Ramon Contreras) who inquired about the affairs of the estate, Uy Cuan sent Chiu Guimco a letter urging him
to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings in accord therewith. He replied
through a letter denying having seen or taken possession of the will.

A complaint was filed in court charging Chiu Guimco, under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure with
failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The CFI found him guilty. Because he failed to
produce the will even after the court’s order, he was fined and committed to prison until he produces the will.

Issue: Whether it was right to commit Chiu to jail until he produces the will

Held: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that if a person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction,
after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the
court and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will. This provision can only be applied when a
court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and
where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section,
should require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action
by the court under this section appropriate.

Further, Section 628 is an ordinary criminal prosecution. To enforce the production of the will by the accused,
as provided in Section 629, would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will
by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint; and it seems
probable that this would constitute an infringement of that provision of law which says that in a criminal action
the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.

1
Guevarra vs. Guevarra
January 31, 1956 G.R. No. L-5405

FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto Guevarra and respondent Rosario Guevarra were the children of Victorino Guevarra. Prior to
his death, Victorino executed a will distributing, among others, a 259-hectare land between Ernesto and
Rosario. However, he later executed a Deed of Sale covering the southern portion of the land in favor of
Ernesto. The Deed also expressly recognized Ernesto as the owner of the northern half. Victorino and Ernesto
then sought to register the entire parcel. Fifteen prior days to issuance of the Certificate of Title, Victorino died.
In this Certificate, Ernesto Rosario is the sole owner.

Initially, Rosario brought suit against Ernesto for the recovery of half of the property as her legitime, under the
assumption that Victorino died intestate. This case however was dismissed by the Supreme Court and ordered
the parties to present Victorino’s will for probate in the proper court. Hence, this case.

Rosario commenced in the CFI of Pangasinan a petition for probate of the will of Victorino. This was opposed
by Ernesto. He filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, arguing, among others, that the will was already revoked
as alleged in the petition itself and that whatever right to probate the parties may have has already prescribed.
This is considering that the petition for probate was filed 12 years after the death of Victorino.

ISSUE
Whether probate of the will is still necessary and whether petition for probate is already barred by the statute of
limitations.

HELD
The probate of the will is necessary and the petition is not barred.

It has been held that “under Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts
and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present the will
to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions
of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the
will to the court for probate, because such suppression is contrary to law and public policy.” First, because the
law expressly provides that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court and second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem cannot be dispensed
with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law.

Consequently, the statute of limitations is not applicable to probate of wills. This is because of the danger that
the decedent’s right of testamentary disposition be conveniently subverted by mere inaction of the custodian of
the will.

2
Palacios vs. Palacios
December 24, 1959 G.R. No. L-12207

FACTS
Juan Palacios executed a last will and testament, instituting as sole heirs his natural children Antonio and
Andrea. Juan, availing of the provisions of the New Civil Code which permits the testator to petition during his
lifetime the allowance of his own will, filed before the CFI of Batangas a petition for the approval of his will.
Maria Catimbang Palacios, respondent herein, filed an opposition to the probate, alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of Juan but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her
legitime.

The lower court admitted the will to probate. Later, it set a hearing relative to the intrinsic validity of the will.
After hearing, the court issued an order declaring Maria to be the natural child of Juan and annulling the will
insofar as it impairs her legitime. Hence, this appeal by Juan.

ISSUE
Whether Juan’s will was properly annulled by the lower court.

HELD
No, the will was improperly annulled.

An opposition as to the intrinsic validity of a will cannot be entertained in probate proceedings because the
latter’s purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the
law. Also, an opposition with a purpose to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who
allegedly has been ignored in the will cannot be raised in probate proceedings but in a separate action. This is
especially so when the testator, as in this case, is still alive.

As held in Montano vs. Suesa, “the authentication of the will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes foe the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned a being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.”

3
Fernandez vs. Dimagiba
October 12, 1967 G.R. No. L-23638

FACTS
The deceased is Benedicta de los Reyes. Ismaela Dimagiba, respondent herein, submitted to the CFI a petition
for the probate of the purported will of Benedicta. Said will instituted Dimagiba as the sole heir of Benedicta.
Petitioners herein, claiming to be heirs intestate of Benedicta, filed oppositions for the probate, on the grounds,
among others, of estoppel by laches and revocation of the will by two Deeds of Conveyance of the major
portion of the estate in favor of Benedicta to Dimagiba.

The trial court found that the will was genuine and properly executed. This decision was not appealed. Later,
the same trial court found that the will is unaffected and unrevoked by the Deeds of Sale. Petitioners appealed.
The CA held that the decree admitting the will for probate became final for lack of appeal, and that there was no
revocation of the will.

Petitioners now contend, among others, that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered as
interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation.

ISSUE
Whether an order allowing a will is interlocutory.

HELD
No, it is not.

“It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning the capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.” (Montano vs. Suesa)
As such, the probate order is final and appealable.

Since petitioners failed to appeal the decree allowing Benedicta’s will, then said decree became final and
executory.

4
Spouses Pascual vs. CA
August 15, 2003 G.R. No. 115925

FACTS
Canuto were Catalina were siblings. They were co-owners of a parcel of land together with 12 other people.
They each claim 1,335 square meters of said parcel. Canuto had the parcel surveyed and subdivided. Lot 2-A
(670sqm) and 2-E (2,000sqm) were placed under Canuto’s name.

Canuto later executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering his pro indiviso share of the parcel in favor of
his niece Consolasion Sioson, petitioner herein. Consolasion immediately took possession of Lots 2-A and 2-E.
When Canuto died, his children executed an affidavit affirming the earlier Kasulatan. This affidavit became the
basis for the issuance of a TCT in the name of Consolasion.

Nineteen years later, Remedios Eugenio-Gino, filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse for
annulment and cancellation of the TCT. Remedios claims that she is the owner of the excess of 1,335sqm of
Lots 2-A and 2-E because Catalina (Canuto’s sister and co-owner) devised these lots to her in Catalina’s last
will and testament.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It found that Remedios has no right against petitioners because
Catalina’s will from which Remedios claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate. The appellate
court reversed this decision, saying that the unprobated will does not preclude Remedios from seeking
reconveyance as the will may subsequently be admitted to probate.

ISSUE
Whether the probate of Catalina’s will is required before Remedios can file her action.

HELD
Yes, the probate of the will is necessary.

Article 838 of the Civil Code states that “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court”.

Remedios anchors her right in the in filing this suit on her being a devisee of Catalina’s las will and testament.
However, since the probate court has not admitted Catalina’s will, Remedios has not acquired any right under
the last will. Remedios is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance or to enforce and implied
trust over these lots. The Rules require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit.

5
Probate Proceedings in Rem
In re Johnson (G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918)

FACTS: Ebba Johnson (child from 1st wife) alleges that at the time of the publication, the probate court has
knowledge that she was living in the US. She argues that the court should have appointed a date for the probate
of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the her to be present either in person or by representation; and
it is said that the failure of the court to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that
provision which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.

ISSUE: W/N the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction

HELD: YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.

The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is
allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a
proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would
declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being
strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute
was unreasonably short.

There was no denial of due process.

Ebba could have applied, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had
been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no control and that
the order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed
state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a
rehearing. It is no doubt true that 6 months was a very short period of time within which to expect Ebba to
appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from
remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such application was
inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance
that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the
will to probate.

6
Manahan v Manahan (GR No. 38050, September 22, 1933)
FACTS: 1 year and 7 months after the will was admitted to probate, Engracia file a motion for reconsideration
and a new trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will
declared null and void ab initio, on the ground, among others, that she was an interested party in the
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Engracia should be notified of the probate of the will

HELD: NO. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect
it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate
thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the
right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been
instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

2. Whether Engracia can still question the validity of the will on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof

HELD: NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity
thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceedings.
In addition, as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the
will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the
said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate; . . . .

Note: Once the court admit the will to probate, it should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the
will constitutes res judicata as to the questions of validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will in
question.

7
Alaban v CA (GR No. 156021, September 23, 2005)
FACTS: On May 30, 2001, the lower court allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the
issuance of letters testamentary to Francisco. More than 4 months later, Alaban, et al. filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent,
as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the
decedent.
Alaban claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. The RTC denied the motion. Alaban
filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA. They claimed that Francisco already
entered into a compromise agreement with them after the death of the decedent and that they learnt of the
probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings
and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC
Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N Alaban, et al. became a party to the probate proceedings
HELD: YES.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might
be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became
parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
NOTES:
1. As parties to the probate proceedings, Alaban, et al. could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or
reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said
remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
2. Alaban, et al., as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the
petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
3. Assuming arguendo that Alaban, et al. are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of
the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite.
4. The non-inclusion of Alaban, et al.’s names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the
proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented
from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

8
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBATE OF WILL

Santos v Castillo (GR No. L-45463, March 18, 1937)

FACTS: Emerita Santos, as a guardian of the minor acknowledged natural children of the deceased Nicolas
filed a petition for the probate of the will. 2 days after, Emerita filed a motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and commissioners on appraisal. The legitimate children (LCs) (Azores, et al.) of the deceased,
filed an opposition on the ground that the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case; the allegations made
in the petition are insufficient to confer jurisdiction because the petitioner did not allege that she had the custody
of the will and, therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate; and because the will that should be probated
is the original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the Emerita. Before the court decided the issue as
to lack of jurisdiction, Emerita filed an amended petition (it stated that the testator designated nobody as
custodian of his will in distributing the copies thereof and in entrusting his nephew with the presentation of a
copy of said will to the court for probate) and prayed that the LCs present immediately the copies of the will in
their possession as well as any alleged codicil claimed by them. The LCs were able to present the original will
and the codicil. The LCs prayed that Emerita’s original petition be dismissed on the ground that as the originals
of the will and codicil of the deceased Azores had been presented together with a petition for the probate
thereof, the petitioner's defective petition was unfounded. Emerita’s petition for probate was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the petition for probate.
HELD: NO.
In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the administration
of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege, in addition to the residence of the
deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is the executor in the will or is the
person who had custody of the will to be probated. The original of said document must be presented or
sufficient reasons given to justify the non-representation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or
duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these requisites had not been complied within the application filed by the
petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.

9
Perez v. Perez, et al.
G.R. No. L-12359 15 July 1959
Facts:
Bernandino Perez filed with the CFI of Iloilo a petition for the summary settlement of the testate estate of
Caridad Perez. Conrada Perez, et al. lodged an opposition to the probate of Caridad Perez’s will directly to the
Supreme Court insisting that the lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the evidence for the
allowance of the alleged will" because two heirs, Melanio Perez, Jr. and Milagros Perez, had not been notified
in advance of the hearing for the allowance of such will.
In reply to this, the Bernandino says that the persons mentioned were not entitled to notice, since they were not
forced heirs — grandnephew and niece — and had not been mentioned as legatees or devisees in the will of the
deceased. And as to Milagros Perez, Bernandino asserts that notice had been addressed to her last known
residence in this country.
Issues:
Whether the CFI of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes, the CFI of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
Such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation. At any rate the omission, if any, did not affect the
jurisdiction of the court: it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal.
Indeed, the Court has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate through
the publication of the petition in the newspapers — which in this case admittedly took place.
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not
jurisdiction requisite, so much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the
petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not advised — the decree allowing the will does not ipso
facto become void for want of jurisdiction.
The result is that the matter of "jurisdiction" discussed by Conrada, et. al. appears to be so unsubstantial as to
furnish no reason to bypass the Court of Appeals authority to appraise the factual issues in the litigation.
Needless, to add, in fine, the jurisdictional question directly appealable to the Court refers to jurisdiction over
the subject matter, not mere jurisdiction over the person.

10
De Aranz v. Galing
G.R. No. L-77047 28 May 1988
Facts:
Joaqin Infante filed a petition at the RTC of Pasig for the probate of the will of Monseratt Infante y Pola. His
petition named Joaquina R. Infante de Aranz, et al. as legatees and devisees as well as specifying their
addresses. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order for the requisite hearing and the the order was published
in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. Come hearing date,
no oppositor appeared and so the judge reset the hearing date. No oppositor made manifestation on the later
date, compelling the judge to request for the submission of evidence ex-parte. Joaquin immediately presented
evidence that same day. He called a lone witness to the stand. Two days passed and Joaquina, et al. made an
appearance contesting the probate on the ground that no notice was ever sent to them. They requested ten days
to file an opposition. Joaquina, et al. asserts that failure to notify the legatees/devisees deprives the court of
jurisdiction. Joaquin opposed the opposition and the same was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceeding despite the failure of personal notice
to the legatees/devisees.
Ruling: No, the Pasig RTC was deprived jurisdiction over the probate proceeding due to the failure of personal
notice to the legatees/devisees.
The pertinent rule follows: Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. –The court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their
places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20)
days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner
be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-
executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at
least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from Sec 4 Rule 76 ROC that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will
shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
Joaquina, et al. as legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the
will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. Despite such
knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the
law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three 3 weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of Joaquina, et al. was not known, then notice
upon them individually was not necessary. Individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only
when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In other instances, such notice is not
necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The CA’s ruling that notification was merely a matter of convenience sits in stark disregard of the law which
makes notice mandatory. Probate is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings, personal
notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The will and the alleged probate thereof
cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
11
Basa v. Mercado
G.R. No. L-42226 26 July 1935
Facts:
Judge Hermogenes Reyes, Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa. The
same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him as the only heir and closed
the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the
court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the
notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only 21 days after the date of first publication
instead of 3 full weeks. Moreover, they questioned whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was
published, was a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by the law.
Issues:
Whether there was compliance with the publication requirement
Whether Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
Yes, there was compliance with the publication requirement. The language used in Section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks
before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made
21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.
Yes, the records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation. The conclusion is made in view
of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the
publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga.

12
SCOPE OF INQUIRY OF PROBATE PROCEEDING

Maninang v. Court of Appeals

G.R.No. L-57848 19 June 1982
Facts:
Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of the holographic will of
Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. The will also provide that she does not
consider Bernardo Aseneta as his adopted son. Later on, Bernardo, claiming to be the adopted child of the
deceased and her sole heir instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated
with the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and
void because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition,
Soledad averred that the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The motion was granted. The
motion for reconsideration by Soledad was denied for lack of merit. In the same order, the court appointed
Bernardo as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust.
Soledad filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition was
filed.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the CFI-Rizal of the testate case was proper
Ruling:
No, the dismissal was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public policy.
Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the extrinsic validity which
includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of wills.
However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will may be passed upon like when
on its face there is really preterition or invalid disinheritance making the will void. The probate might become
an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Such would shorten the proceedings if the
issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings.
In the instant case, there is still doubt as to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of Benrnardo which cannot
be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further determination which can only be made if the will is
allowed to be probated.

13
ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Facts:
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the RTC of Cebu City a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary. The will provided that all
his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of
Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-
deceased Nemesio. The oppositors Virginia (respondent), a legally adopted daughter of the Nemesio and his
widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been preterited.
Issue:
Whether the probate court may pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate?
Ruling:
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the
general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute.
Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the Court ruled that, if the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that
the case will come up once again before the court on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when
on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial
court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.

14
PROOF REQUIRED ON PROBATE HEARING

GAN vs. YAP

Facts:

Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the
Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to
establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes,
Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez.

Issue:

Whether a holographic will can be probated upon the mere testimony of the witnesses who allegedly
seen it even without the production of such will?

Ruling:

No. he execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of
the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In
fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, the court think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to
measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

15
RODELAS vs. ARANZA
Facts:

Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla opposed the petition on
the following grounds:

1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty
days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; 2.the copy of the
alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect
after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement
of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent; 3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills
cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. 4.the deceased did not leave any will,
holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. The CFI dismissed the petition for the
probate of the will stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in
the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material
proof of authenticity of said wills.”And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962
while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution
of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to
that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.

Issue:

Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic
copy.

Ruling:

Yes. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that
there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made by the
probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the
authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.

16
RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE THEREUNDER

LEON & GHEZZI vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO

Facts:
Basil Gordon Butler died leaving a will which was duly probated in New York. Pursuant to a provision
in his will giving discretion to his executors to purchase an annuity in favor of his universal heir Mercedes de
Leon, the appointed trustee James Madison Ross bought an annuity from respondent insurance company,
Manufactures Life Insurance. After a few months of receiving monthly allowance however, Mercedes presented
the will for probate in the CFI of Manila.

Issue: Whether Mercedes has disposition of the funds covered by the contract of annuity.

Ruling:

No. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of a
decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state
or country has no power over property in another state or country. The general rule universally recognized is
that administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or
country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the
probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country,
Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of
the company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the
annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds
have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.

17
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY vs. In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE
B. SUNTAY, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954

Facts:

Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province,
Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien
province, China, nine children by the first marriage, and a child by the second marriage with Maria Natividad
Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
and Federico C. Suntay, one of his children by the first marriage, was appointed administrator of the estate.
Subsequently, however, the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines by the late Jose
B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will.

After the Pacific War, Silvino Suntay, the decedent’s child by the second marriage, claimed that he had found
among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed
and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy
district court, Province of Fookien, China. He then filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the will executed in the Philippines in November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China, on 4 January 1931.

Issue:

May the will allegedly executed by the deceased in China be allowed in the Philippines?

Ruling:

No. Under the Rules, the fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court and the law of
China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of
a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these
points. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese
law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The
evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.

Furthermore, the order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow the
will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held
in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded
by a competent court of this country.

18
VDA. DE PEREZ vs. TOLETE, G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

Facts:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a
successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and
testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated” and in the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children
and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will
and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn
P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her
husband.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their
home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April
7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed
with the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings
in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased
couple. The RTC issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of
petitioner. After submission of evidence, the judge to which the reprobate case was reassigned held that "that
the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and
personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal
and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied
with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said
that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills. The
petitioner then filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law, which was granted by
the judge. However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled
that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate
probate proceedings for each of the testator". Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the
evidence offered at the hearing sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills,
and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.

Issues:

1. Did the petitioner conform with the formalities required for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines?
2. Should the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses be probated jointly?

Ruling:

1. No. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with Art. 816 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states both wills
should conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws. Under the
Philippine Rules, the evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with
19
 the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3)
the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. The petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence, except for the first and last requirements. The Supreme Court ordered
the Respondent Judge to allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for
the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

2. Yes. What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate
wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate.

20
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON, G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006

Facts:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided
in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle. On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a
will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s
Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor and also named Atty. Alonzo
Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator. In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children. On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the
following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located in Makati (Makati
property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for
his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to
probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed
as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.Petitioner also
filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ of all of Audrey’s
properties, and Kyle, the remaining ¼ thereof. The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by
the trial court.

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator of Richard’s estate also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of
Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were
allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the
State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject
of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
Respondent is now claiming that petitioner breached his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s
estate.

Issue:

Did Atty. Ancheta breach his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate?

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the
court.

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce
in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.

21
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of
Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a
judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a
result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as
to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances.

22