Marines Reorganize Infantry For High-Tech

War: Fewer Riflemen, More Drones

“Everything that Marine wears -- from their boots to their socks to their utilities
to their helmet -- is all going to be changed," the Commandant said. "We’ve got
money now to do that, and so we’ve got to make it happen now. We’ve got to
make it happen now, because I’m not going to make the assumption that that
money’s going to be there.”

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on May 04, 2018 at 1:49 PM

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A Marine fires the new M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle in training

ARLINGTON: The Marine Corps is reorganizing its infantry for future high-tech conflicts in
which troops must spread out to avoid the enemy’s precision-guided firepower.
General Robert Neller

To conduct such “distributed operations,” Commandant Robert Neller said last night, the
Marines are adding technical experts — in drones, intelligence, supply, and other specialties —
to small units so they can operate more independently of higher headquarters. The tradeoff
comes in old-fashioned firepower: Infantry squads will shrink from 13 Marines to 12, and
infantry battalions will have fewer heavy-duty support weapons such as 81 mm mortars and
TOW anti-tank missile launchers.

Not all the changes have been finalized, but pending a formal bulletin to the force, Neller
outlined the following moves to a Marine Corps Association awards banquet:

 Each rifle squad will get its own quadcopter mini-drone to scout ahead and a drone
operator to run it. But the squad will shrink from 13 Marines (three fire teams of four plus
a squad leader) to 12 (three fire teams of three plus a command team of squad leader,
assistant squad leader, and “squad systems operator”). Every rifleman will carry the new
M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR), complete with flash suppressor, instead of the
lighter and less powerful M4 or M16.
 Each rifle platoon will also get a specialist drone operator. They and the platoon
leadership will also get the M27.
 Each company headquarters will get an intelligence cell — making permanent an
improvisation from Afghanistan and Iraq — as well as drone operators for
reconnaissance, counter-drone specialists to defeat enemy reconnaissance, and
logisticians to keep the company supplied.
 Each battalion will gain a combat engineer platoon and reshuffle its weapons company.
The number of anti-tank teams with shoulder-fired Javelin missiles will increase from
eight to 12, and the Javelin’s range will increase with an upgraded control unit. But the
number of the heavier (and older) TOW missile launchers will drop by half, from eight to
four, and the number of 81 mm mortars by a quarter, from eight to six. The weapons
company will also get Polaris MRZR offroad vehicles to help haul its heavy gear. Their
personnel, however, will stick with the old M4 carbine.
“I felt like we could afford to get a little bit lighter,” Neller said of the weapons company
changes, speaking to reporters after the dinner, “because of what I anticipate to be the increased
range and lethality of weapons and because of other capabilities I think the squad platoon and
company’s going to have like Switchblade.” Switchblade is a drone that can both scout for
targets and dive on them, detonating itself (or you can think of it as a missile that can do
reconnaissance).

Launching a Switchblade drone/missile

“There’s Risk”

Even with the current generous budgets, Neller said, tradeoffs are inevitable. “There’s risk ,” he
acknowledged to reporters. “(But) remember we just added a company intel cell and a log
cell….a UAV/counter-UAV team. I just added four Javelin teams (to the weapons company).
I’ve got to pay for that.”

Some of these changes are already underway, said Neller, like issuing the M27. “We’ll start
fielding the rifle as soon as the manufacturer can get it in their hands, and then other things are
going to take longer,” he said. “Some things will be months. Some things will be longer. It’s not
like we’re going to wake up tomorrow and this will all be in place.”
Marine firing M4 carbine

The M27 is basically a heavier M16, with greater firepower, longer range, and more robust
mechanisms. (Specifically, it replaces the M16 family’s finicky gas impingement system with a
conventional piston-based recoil). It was originally bought as the rifle squad’s high-firepower
weapon, replacing the M249 SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon, essentially a light machinegun).
But now Neller will issue it to every Marine in the infantry, reconnaissance, and combat
engineers. The M4 carbines freed up this way will go to non-infantry troops. Eventually, Neller
said of the M4, “it’s going to be the weapon that we’re going to give to everybody else because
it’s a newer weapon and it’s lighter.”

The squad’s new drone operator will get the heavy-duty M27. “Right now, that Marine is still an
infantryman,” Neller said. “They’re going to have to fight…They’re part of the squad,” with the
same Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) as the other infantrymen.

In fact, Neller is issuing everyone in the rifle platoon the same weapon so enemy snipers can’t
easily pick out, say, the drone specialist or the platoon leader. “I want everybody in the platoon
to look the same. I don’t want any bad guy to go, hey this person or that person’s carrying this
weapon, so shoot them first,” he said. “When I would do a battlefield circulation in Iraq (i.e.
visiting frontline units), I always carried a carbine — and all my guys hoped to God I didn’t have
to use it — but it was camouflage.”

There’s another tradeoff here: While the M4 carbine that became standard in Iraq and
Afghanistan is significantly lighter than the M16 rifle, the M27 IAR is significantly heavier, even
before you add the now-standard flash suppressor. Add mini-drones, night vision devices, laser
designators, and other high-tech kit,
Marines train with the Javelin anti-tank missile

and the weight can wear infantry down on long marches.

So when Neller talked to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, which experimented with a lot of
the new gear now being issued Corps-wide, “their biggest concern was the same concern I had,”
he said: “We’ve got too much stuff and it weighs too much. You can’t just keep loading stuff
on.”

The Marines are reviewing every item that foot troops carry Neller said: “We’re going to get
down to ounces.” He’s particularly optimistic about new forms of ammunition that replace metal
cartridges with lightweight materials that are consumed in the act of firing, although those aren’t
being fielded yet.

The changes announced last night are just the start. The Marines have a lot of technology in their
long-term plans:

 new long-range precision-guided missiles for the artillery, including ones capable of
killing ships at sea, a project the Marines are working on with the Army;
 miniaturized missile defenses for armored vehicles, called Active Protection Systems, to
shoot down incoming anti-tank weapons, another joint Army-Marine effort;
 a ship-launched reconnaissance drone called MUX;
 a new Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) to bring F-35-like sensor and networking
capabilities to the ground force;
 new anti-aircraft defenses, including a quick-start Other Transaction Authority (OTA)
initiative to integrate an off-the-shelf missile with existing Marine radars and command-
and-control;
 more tank companies and a new HIMARS rocket artillery battalion.

There’ll be plenty of small-scale improvements as well, Neller promised the audience at the
dinner, as long as the current funding lasts — which may not be long, given the looming return
of Budget Control Act caps in 2020.

“Everything that Marine wears — from their boots to their socks to their utilities to their helmet
— is all going to be changed,” the Commandant said. “We’ve got money now to do that, and so
we’ve got to make it happen now. We’ve got to make it happen now, because I’m not going to
make the assumption that that money’s going to be there.”

The original version of this article mistakenly said there would be multiple drone specialists at
platoon level in the new organization. There is only one.

Marines announce changes to ground combat element aimed at improving lethality and agility
May / 9 / 2018
WASHINGTON , D.C. --

The Marines are making strides to become more lethal and agile based on the threats of the
future battlefield.

Last week at the annual Ground Awards Dinner, Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert
B. Neller, offered his recent decisions to many of the Corps’ top officer and enlisted ground
combat leaders.

“We are going to change,” offered Neller. “Not that we aren’t good; we are. But we must
continually strive to get better.”

Neller added that improvements in technology, mobility, and firepower offer the Marines an
asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries, but only if they seize the opportunity.

“The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to dominate one,” Neller said. “And that is
what we are going to do.”

The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) identified the development of the future force as a
critical task and emphasizes that “superior infantry is a Marine Corps asymmetric advantage."

The infantry has always been the heart of the Marine Corps’ warfighting capability and the
Commandant wanted to ensure that Marine Corps infantry formations remain the most lethal,
agile, and adaptable in the world.

The MOC, Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF 2025), as well as the associated Sea Dragon 2025
experiments and evaluations, have informed the Commandant’s decision to make several
foundational decisions to increase the lethality, agility, and adaptability of the infantry battalion.

Reorganization of the infantry will occur over the next three-to-five years, although some of the
changes are happening now, such as the move to arm infantry Marines with the M27 Infantry
Automatic Rifle and the distribution of quadcopters.

Highlights of the announced and recent changes throughout the ground combat element:
12-Marine Rifle Squad

One of the most anticipated changes Neller announced was the structure of the Marine rifle
squad. The new 12-Marine squad reflects changes aimed at better equipping the small unit
leader with increased lethality and enhanced situational awareness. It will be organized into
three fire teams of three Marines each with two new positions added to account for an assistant
squad leader and a squad systems operator. Additional riflemen, one for each fire team, will
remain on the books (Table of Organization) as an unmanned requirement to allow the Corps to
quickly add depth to the squad, if needed.

This new squad will be implemented across all Marine infantry battalions during the next three-
to-five years. One of the key factors is that each squad leader would have 5-7 years of experience
and formal training as a squad leader. The new squad systems operator will also receive formal
training on a variety of technologies. The squad, by billet, will be organized as such:

• (1) Squad Leader (Sgt)

• (1) Assistant Squad Leader (Cpl)

• (1) Squad Systems Operator (Lance Cpl)

• (3) Fire Team Leaders (Cpls)

• (3) Grenadiers (Lance Cpls)

• (3) Automatic Riflemen (Lance Cpls)

Squad Firepower, Comms, and Optics

Neller added that every Marine in the rifle squad will be armed with an M27 Infantry Automatic
Rifle with suppressors and improved optics. The current rifle squad is built around three
automatic weapons, however, the future squad will have 12. Marines will also have improved
binocular night-vision devices, improved optics, including a thermal capability, and multiple
improved grenade launchers (M320).

Marines are fielding the Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System (MAAWS),
“Carl Gustav”, as a replacement to the Mk-153 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault
Weapon (SMAW), for additional firepower and increased rocket range and variety.

They will receive enhanced communications equipment and the Marine Corps common handheld
device that provides a digital link to close-air support, indirect fires, and adjacent units to
increase shared situational awareness.

Each squad will also have an M38 Squad Designated Marksmanship Rifle with a suppressor and
variable 2.5-8 power optic. This rifle is organizationally assigned to the rifle squad, not to a
specific billet, to provide improved identification and engagement of targets out to 600
meters. The individual employing this weapon will not be a sniper, but a Marine who is given
additional training on range estimation, scope theory and observation.

Sniper Rifle Upgrades

Mk13 Mod 7 Long Range Sniper Rifle (LRSR). The Marine Corps will field a limited number
of Mk13 Mod 7 LRSRs during FY18 to provide increased range and hit probability. The Mk13
Mod 7 LRSR is currently used by elements of U.S. Special Operations Command; it employs a
.300 Winchester Magnum round.

Unmanned Aerial Systems/Counter UAS

Each squad will have a UAS ‘quad copter’ to increase situational awareness of the squad leaders.
Beyond the squads, each platoon will have an additional UAS operator, and the rifle companies
will add a UAS/Counter-UAS section of five Marines.

More Javelins, Less TOWs and 81s…but Increased Range and Mobility

Weapons companies are going to get four additional Javelin systems bringing the total to
12. Javelins are man-portable, anti-armor missiles; Javelins will have extended range with the
command launch unit. This is to off-set the elimination of four Tube-launched, Optically-
tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles in the company, and the eventual elimination of TOWs in
the battalion. The Commandant also announced the decision to reduce the number of 81 mm.
mortar systems by two in each weapons company, as eight was a hold-over from days when we
had four rifle companies in the battalion. The six remaining will have extended ranges through
ammunition improvements, and Marines will leverage the Polaris MRZRs (all-terrain vehicles)
for enhanced mobility.

More Tanks, Rockets

2nd Tank Battalion will get an additional tank company, and the Corps is upgrading its M1A1
active protection systems and target acquisition and sensor suites.

5th Bn, 10th Marines is coming back as a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
Battalion, with plans to stand up this unit in FY23.

Marines are fielding the Light Armored Vehicle Anti-Tank Modernization (LAV-ATM)
upgrades – improved weapon systems, ability to acquire targets while on-the-move with a
precision long-range anti-armor/anti-materiel capability, using an advanced thermal sight and
guidance system.

More Information, Intel and Logistics

Each rifle company will have an Operations/Intelligence section, as well as a logistics cell and a
Small Arms Repairer (Military Occupational Specialty designation 2111). At the battalion level,
Marines are adding an Information Management Officer and an Information Environment
Operations Officer and Chief to integrate Information Warfare capabilities.

More Combat Engineers

Combat Engineer squads will increase to 13 Marines, and each infantry battalion will have an
engineer platoon aligned to it.

More FACs (Forward Air Controller)

With an additional FAC assigned to each infantry battalion, each rifle company will have an
assigned FAC.

Big changes coming to the Marine Corps’

rifle squads and scout sniper platoons
By: Shawn Snow February 13
The Corps is testing the new rifle squad structure with the “Übersquad” from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,
which is experimenting with many ideas that the Corps’ top brass is considering for the entire infantry
force, including special operations gear, fully automatic rifles and suppressors. (Lance Cpl. Justin X.
Toledo/Marine Corps)

For many years, the 13-man rifle squad has been the lynchpin of how combat power is built and
organized within a ground combat element or Marine infantry unit.

But now Marine Commandant General Robert B. Neller is considering big changes to the size
and tasking of the rifle squad, a move likely to have a major impact on the Corps’ culture and
operations.

And beyond the rifle squads, Neller also plans to add an additional eight Marines to the scout
sniper platoons that support infantry battalions, expanding the platoons up to potentially 28
Marine snipers.

Neller is considering new rifle squad configurations that include 11-man, 12-man and 14-man
options. While Neller hasn’t yet decided on the size of the rifle squad, it’s likely he will add a
drone operator.

“The 13-man rifle squad has served us very very well over time,” Brig. Gen. Christian Wortman,
the commanding officer of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, said Tuesday. “But with
new technology and new capabilities developing, there’s a recognition that there’s an
opportunity to better exploit that technology and that capability and to adapt how we structure
the rifle squad.”

Wortman spoke publicly about the changes for the first time Tuesday with reporters at the
Pentagon. The changes are based on lessons learned from a series of exercises known as Sea
Dragon 2025 involving an experimental Marine infantry unit.

The recommended changes come at a time when the Marines are rapidly trying to adapt to rising
near-peer competitors like Russia and China, which means the Corps needs a more sophisticated,
agile, mobile and tech-savvy force capable of engaging enemy forces in everything from cyber
warfare to the electromagnetic spectrum.
A Marine prepares to fire an M320 grenade launcher module mounted on an M4 rifle at simulated
enemy targets at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, June 6, 2017. (Lance Cpl. Taylor W. Cooper/Marine
Corps)

Gen. Neller has decided add a drone and electronic warfare operator at the platoon level.

The commandant has yet to make a decision on the size and organization of the rifle squad, but a
decision is pending soon, Wortman said.

The common factor among the 14-, 12-, or 11-man squad is the addition of a systems operator
capable of operating both Unmanned Aerial Systems and electronic warfare equipment.

For the 12-man option, the Marines would transition from three fire teams of four Marines into
two fire teams of five Marines, with a systems operator and squad leader.

The 11-man option would see the same three fire teams, but smaller in size. Each fire team
would be comprised of three Marines plus a system operator and squad leader.

The 14-man option would leave the current squad’s configuration unchanged but add an
additional Marine as a systems operator.

Lethality of grunts

The Corps is also making sweeping changes to squad-level weapon systems to boost the lethality
and range of its grunts.
Marines are planning to replacing the standard M4 carbine with the M27 Infantry Automatic
Rifle, or IAR, for most grunts in the infantry squads. The only question remaining is: “which
leaders don’t carry the IAR, but instead carry the M4?” Wortman said.

The IAR is a heavier rifle, and Wortman said the systems operator or squad leader might be
better off sticking with a lighter weapon like the M4 while simultaneously trying to operate
multiple other tech devices to include drones and tablets for command and control.

Meanwhile, the Corps is also moving to replace the Mk 153 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose
Assault Weapon with the 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle, and the M320 grenade launcher in
place of the M203. The M320 is more lethal and has longer range, Wortman said.

Lance Cpl. Jared P. Baker looks through the optical of the Carl Gustav rocket system during live fire
training at Range 7 aboard Camp Hansen, Oct. 25, 2017. (Sgt. Aaron S. Patterson/Marine Corps)

Drones will be fielded at the squad, platoon and company levels, with priority given to squads to
help “enhance situational awareness of small unit leaders,” Wortman said.

The Marines also tested “switchblade” drones at the company level. Switchblades are a
kamikaze-style drone that carry an explosive warhead and are flown directly into an enemy force
or vehicle.

The Corps also experimented with various ground robotic vehicles and electronic warfare tools.
Those pieces of tech and their future employment are still being refined.
More snipers

The commandant has already made sweeping changes at the platoon, company and battalion
levels based on recommendations from Sea Dragon 2025.

Neller is moving ahead with plans to expand scout sniper capacity in the infantry battalion.
Those changes will primarily be personnel: an additional eight Marines will be added to the
scout sniper platoon, Wortman said.

“We have always had more demand for surveillance, reconnaissance, and collections capability
than has been resident in the infantry battalion scout sniper platoon,” Wortman said. “What we
have often seen over time is infantry battalions have pursued additional capacity without it being
built into the structure of the battalion.”

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Sgt. Alexander M. Tryon scans the surrounding area for enemy forces during a vertical assault Dec. 10 at
Combat Town. (Lance Cpl. Ryan C. Mains/Marine Corps)

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The Marines have learned from previous conflicts that snipers can aid in precision fires and
reconnaissance while operating in complex urban terrain, something they would still face against
a more sophisticated adversary.

The Corps will also provide more tools and equipment to the intelligence cells within the rifle
company to boost situational awareness and precision fires.

At the battalion level, the Corps plans to enhance information operations capabilities. That
includes adding an information environment operations officer, information management officer
and an additional forward air controller.

And the Marines are still looking at more tools to aid in information operations “to be able to
support influence operations in a contested area of operations,” Wortman said.

Influence operations have been the mainstay of counterinsurgency warfare for the last 16 years in
the Middle East. The Corps will continue to need those skills sets to work with local populations
in complex urban environments, to help shape public opinion and perception of ongoing U.S.
military operations.

Enhanced NCO training

Enhanced training for noncommissioned officers has been one of the most important lessons
learned from Sea Dragon 2025 and the experimental unit known as the 3rd Battalion, 5th
Marines.

Despite all the gear and organizational changes stemming from Sea Dragon 2025, the Corps
found that enhanced military occupational specialty, or MOS, training was one of the most
important lessons learned from the yearlong effort.

“The most valuable asset we have is our noncommissioned officers and company-grade leaders,”
Wortman said.

During Sea Dragon 2025, the Marines invested heavily in advanced MOS training for its squad
leaders and fire team leaders.
Marines display the new Sea Dragon gear, which every infantryman is expected to receive by 2025.
(Lance Cpl. Michaela R. Gregory/Marine Corps)

The enhanced training resulted in “significant increases in the capability of each echelon of
command inside that infantry battalion. That can be attributed to equipment that we provided to
them, but it was a common observation that the most powerful tool was the enhanced capability
from the enhanced MOS training for our noncommissioned officers,” Wortman said.

Better training made junior leaders more capable of multitasking and incorporating technology.

Many of the changes the Corps is making to the infantry squad is technology-driven to ensure the
Marines have the tools to operate in contested environments.

About
this
Author

About Shawn Snow

Shawn Snow is the senior reporter for Marine Corps Times and a Marine Corps veteran.
Rethinking the 'Rifle' Platoon

Category:

Commentary on the Corps

Force Protection

Force Structure

Gazette

By Capt Phillip K.S. Sprincin - published April 2007

Ever since the German Army developed storm troop tactics in World War I (WWI), the effects
and employment of crew-served weapons (CSWs) have dominated infantry combat. A
distinguishing feature has been the migration of these weapons to smaller and smaller units.
Most armies started WWI with machineguns (MGs) as a regimental-level asset, but by WWII
automatic weapons were being used as the nucleus of squads and even fire teams. The Marine
Corps was a pioneer in this area when it reorganized the infantry squad into fire teams built
around an automatic weapon-the Browning automatic rifle.1 However, today CSWs do not
penetrate in a meaningful way below the company level, potentially leaving Marine units
dangerously short of firepower in a future high-intensity conflict. This article proposes
reorganizing the rifle squad and rifle platoon into infantry squad and infantry platoon and
providing each with organic CSWs.

Integration of CSWs and their use in combined arms is a basic principle of current infantry
doctrine. Infantry units have three types of CSWs: MGs that provide a high volume of fire to
suppress targets, indirect fire weapons that provide extended range and the ability to engage
targets in defilade, and assault/antiarmor weapons (rockets and missiles) that provide destructive
high-explosive force against point targets. Organizationally the pattern is for three maneuver
units to be paired with a weapons unit containing each of these three weapon types. Thus the
company weapons platoon has M240G general-purpose MGs (GPMGs), M224 60mm mortars,
and Mk153 shoulder-launched multipurpose weapons (SMAWs) while the battalion weapons
company has M2 .50 caliber and Mk19 heavy MGs (HMGs), M242 81 mm mortars, and TOW
and Javelin antitank guided missiles. Combined arms integration is also advertised as belonging
to the infantry squad-and even fire teams-using the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), the
M203 grenade launcher, and M136 AT-4 rockets.

There is, however, a significant gap in this pattern. The rifle platoon and squad possess no
organic CSW assets.2 The trend for the last 100 years has been for combat to become more
decentralized and for CSWs to be used by smaller units. Today the focus is on operations
conducted by platoon- and squadsized units, yet there are no CSWs to pair with them. In some
ways this makes us less tactically/organizationally advanced than the Wehrmacht of WWII who
built their squads around a full-sized GPMG, the excellent MG38/42.3 As a practical matter,
many company commanders resolve this issue by atracking MGs, particularly SMAWs, from
their weapons platoon to their rifle platoons. This strategy, however, robs the company
commander of weapons with which he can influence his fight and does nothing to increase the
number of CSWs or trained operators. Also, the probable replacement of the M249 SAW by an
"infantry automatic rifle" (IAR) (with reduced sustained fire ability due to a smaller 100-round
magazine and no belt feed, no specified quick change barrel, and no requirement to mount on a
tripod4) will only serve to reduce further the organic firepower of the platoon.

The Infantry Platoon

The recommended solution is to reorganize the rifle platoon into an infantry platoon. Each rifle
squad would become an infantry squad with a rifle team, an MG team, and a rocket team.
Additionally, a mortar team would be attached to the platoon headquarters. The result would be a
balanced combined arms team at the levels in which we currently operate the most-the squad and
platoon. The following organization assumes that the IAR replaces the SAW and that the M4 is
available for issue as an individual weapon.

The first team in the infantry squad would be a rifle team. (See Figure 1.) It would be organized
very similar to the current fire team. The IAR replaces the SAW in the hands of the automatic
rifleman, and it is proposed that the grenadier carry the new M32 multishot grenade launcher
(MGL) derived from the Milkor MGL-140. The M32 is currently being fielded to units in Iraq.
Although the M32's range is approximately the same as the M203, it can provide heavy
firepower (six shots in 3 seconds) or sustained suppression (six shots without reloading) better
than the M203. It also can accept longer rounds than the M203, providing greater lethality and
flexibility (heavier rounds, longer illumination, less lethals, etc.). Additionally, the rifle team
would possess a designated marksman (DM) equipped with whatever appropriate weapon the
Marine Corps decides upon. He would replace the current assistant automatic rifleman who is
not needed given the SAWs current and IARs projected employment as an individual not a CSW.
The value of a DM was demonstrated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I with the early arrival of
M16A4 rifles with advanced combat optical gunsights (ACOGs). Some units received just one
rifle and optic per squad, yet the capability provided by a trained Marine with an optic made a
huge difference. The DM should be a table of organization (T/O) member of any reorganized
infantry squad.

The Infantry Squad

The second team would have three

0331 machinegunners and an 0311 infantryman. One 0331 would be the team leader, one the
gunner, and one the ammo man for an MG. There are several possibilities for what weapon they
carry. One is simply the M249 SAW, but with the express intent of using it as a light MG (as it is
defined in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-15.1, Machine Guns and Machine Gunnery
5) rather than an automatic rifle. Light MG means that it is operated by a crew of trained
machinegunners to provide sustained suppression from a base of fire using belt feed and a spare
barrel. It is not just another weapon a Marine carries while rushing. The 5.56 x 45mm round is
underpowered for this task though. Thus, the preferred options are to equip this team with the
Mk48 mod 0, a 7.62mm version of the M249 SAW without a magazine feed option, or the
M240B.6 The Mk48 mod 0 weapon remains relatively lightweight (3 pounds more than the
M249) while adding the greater range, penetration, and lethality of the 7.62 x 51mm round. The
M240B incurs a large weight penalty, but the reliability and firepower of the weapon is
unmatched. A promising development is the testing of the M240E6, which has a titanium
receiver.7 The primary mode for any of these weapons would be to fire from the bipod, but
tripods, flex mounts, and spare barrels should be stock list 3 for each weapon (even if not carried
normally) to make full use of each weapons capabilities, especially in the defense. The rifleman
who rounds out the team would carry an M203 grenade launcher to balance the direct fire
capability of the MG and keep some of the current fire team flexibility of an automatic and an
indirect fire weapon.

The Infantry Platoon

Provision of organic MGs to the platoon and squad is long overdue. As already noted, this was a
principal feature of German Army organization in WWII. Light infantry formations in the Army
have platoons with a fourth squad manning two or three MGs.8 All advanced field exercises at
The Basic School (TBS) involve a rifle platoon with an MG squad attached. This includes
convoy and urban operations exercises and is done even when platoons are understrength and
manning the two M240Gs requires smaller rifle squads. A unit with recent combat experience in
Afghanistan always carried M240Gs when its platoons patrolled in the mountains, despite the
weight, because only the 7.62mm round had the reach to engage the enemy from mountaintop to
mountaintop.9 Units in Iraq frequently break up their MG sections so that one squad of two guns
is attached to each platoon. It is also common for those squads to be split up so that two squads
would each receive an MG. MG fire was much more responsive and effective when directed at
the squad level, particularly during urban operations, such as Operation AL FAJR in Fallujah. If
our instruction at TBS and our experience in combat recognizes the need for MGs at the platoon
and squad levels, why don't we organize appropriately?

The final team would be a rocket team with three 0351s (assaultmen) and an 0311. Again, one
0351 would be the team leader, and the other two would man a SMAW. The SMAW,
particularly with the thermobaric round, has proven to be one of the most effective weapons used
during urban combat in Iraq. Many observers have pointed them out as one of if not the key
infantry weapon during the battle of Fallujah in November 2004 and have recommended that
their numbers be increased or that one be provided in support of each squad.10 Due to the range
and employment of SMAWs, the company assault section is almost always attached to rifle
platoons rather than employed in a unit. Providing each squad with its own SMAWs is a natural
step that vastly increases the platoon's firepower. The presence of 0351 Marines would also give
each squad resident knowledge in preparing basic demolitions for breaching. Again, the 0311
would balance the team by carrying an IAR to complement the direct firepower of the SMAW.

The proposed T/O for reorganizing the rifle platoon for distributed operations (DO) involves
reducing the rifle squad to 12 Marines and moving a rifleman from each squad to the platoon
headquarters. The squad leader would take charge of a command and control team in the rifle
squad. It would be necessary to have a larger platoon headquarters with alpha and bravo
command groups to control squads operating independently and carry a more robust platoon
communications suite.11 For the infantry squad, however, a squad leader, separate from the fire
teams, needs to be retained. Whether employing all of its CSW assets in a combined arms assault
or operating as three separate fire teams on patrol, the squad will have too much going on to not
have a dedicated leader. The squad leader should not be dual-hatted as a team leader as well.

The DO experiments still saw a

definite need for a larger platoon headquarters to control independent squads and should not be
discounted. Also, while the infantry squad has limited indirect fire capability with grenade
launchers, they do not match the capability of MGs and the SMAW. The solution is to place a
three-man mortar team in the platoon headquarters. (See Figure 2.) This T/O would also fill the
need for a larger platoon headquarters without eliminating valuable squad leaders. The
mortarmen would carry a 60mm mortar for use as an assault gun in the handheld mode. The
current M225 cannon with the M8 base plate would do fine, but a South African company,
Denel, makes a small mortar, the M4 Mk1, optimized for handheld use that weighs slightly less
and is another option.12

Providing an organic mortar to the platoon is also overdue. The 60mm mortar is the most
versatile weapon in a rifle company. Its destructive power is beaten only by the SMAW, and
even when limited to handheld fire, it outranges everything except an M240. Its ability to engage
targets with overhead cover and in defilade is unmatched, and it can provide numerous support
functions, such as illumination, marking, and obscuration. The Army eliminated company 60mm
mortars after Korea as "outmoded," but at least one enterprising Army platoon in Vietnam saw
their utility and bought one on the black market.13 The Army later rein traduced them into light
infantry units. More recently during Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan, one company
commander "had chosen to leave his 60mm mortars behind to make room for more riflemen. It
was a decision he'd regret. . . ."14 Under heavy fire from al-Qaeda and Taliban mortars only one
company commander brought his own 60mm mortars with him and could effectively respond. A
rifle company commander in Ramadi broke up his weapons platoon and attached it equally to his
rifle platoons because after several initial battles "[t]he two times I needed mortars I didn't have
them."15 The lessons of these experiences should not be lost and neither should mortars at the
company level. The answer is to give each platoon its own mortar.

The T/O described above points the way but may not be ideal. A DM usually operates best from
a position of overwatch. MGs often do as well; perhaps the DM should be a member of the MG
team supplying precision fire to supplement or complement the area fire of the MG. The M32 is
much heavier than the M203 and might not be best suited for the rifle team, the "maneuver"
element of the squad. Maybe it should go in the rocket team as another means of supplying high-
explosive firepower. Or maybe the M79 grenade launcher should be brought back as a lighter
and more accurate way of supplying short-range indirect fire. Maybe every member of the MG
and rocket teams should be 0331s and 0351s. Note that the organization of the infantry squad
neatly matches organization into an assault (rifle team), support (rocket team), and security (MG
team) layout.

Disadvantages

Making this change would not come without cost or possible disadvantages. The two most
immediate are adding three Marines to each platoon for the mortar team and the cost of
purchasing additional CSWs. (The issue of where to source the additional three Marines will be
addressed in another article.) Of greater concern to most would be the loss of 0311 riflemen in
each squad and platoon. Many will argue that we are destroying the heart of the infantry by
reducing the number of riflemen. However, while the credo, "every marine a rifleman," is a
strong statement of the Marine Corps' willingness to fight, the fact is that the rifle has not been a
dominant weapon on the battlefield since the turn of the last century-that is since the widespread
introduction of MGs during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Despite our obsolete retention
of the terms "rifle" platoon and squad, not even these small units are going to base their
operations around the capability of the M16A4 (or any other rifle) except under the most limited
combat or restrictive rules of engagement. While the rifle combat optic (RCO, also know as
ACOG) has greatly increased the capability of the rifle, the firepower of even the smallest unit
comes from MGs, indirect fire, and especially assault/antiarmor weapons like the SMAW.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the increased capability provided by the RCO reduces the
need for as many riflemen, freeing up Marines to man more powerful CSWs.

Some will say that we will be overburdening our squads and platoons with the weight of heavier
weapons. The "soldier's load" is a concern but not an enormous one. Units fighting in Iraq today
(and the mountains of Afghanistan no less!) often carry and use these weapons at the platoon
level and manage the weight. So too did the Germans in WWII; the MG42 they used so
effectively at the squad and platoon levels weighed only 2 pounds less than an M240G. Being
tightly integrated with the squad, all members are available to share the ammunition burden, not
just the designated gunners and ammo men. Finally, if modern infantry combat requires the use
of these weapons then our Marines have to have diem, regardless of weight. At that point the
focus has to be on technical ways to reduce the weight of CSWs, like the titanium M240E6, not
on leaving CSWs behind.
Of concern to others is the usefulness of this organization to counterinsurgency operations, such
as those underway in Iraq. This argument is that engagement with the local community by
patrols of riflemen is more important than firepower. This premise is correct, and reorganization
into the infantry platoon and squad will not directly affect counterinsurgency operations. Neither
will the addition of CSWs. Yet there is still a need for the proposed reorganization. First, the
intensity of combat at the tactical level in an insurgency can be as high as in conventional
operations. Many people misinterpret the notion of a "three block war" and state that
conventional operations are a block three environment while counterinsurgency is block two.
They miss the point of the three block war, which is that all three blocks exist simultaneously at
different places or in the same place at different times. Even conflicts that are largely
counterinsurgency or unconventional will have situations where combat is as intense and
conventional as the assault on Normandy. Witness the current experience in Fallujah and Ramadi
with insurgents attacking using HMGs, mortars and, of course, the ubiquitous rocket propelled
grenade (RPG). Operation ANACONDA was another conventional fight in an unconventional
campaign where al-Qaeda and Taliban forces dominated the Shah-i-khot valley and "pounded"
U.S. troops "with an arsenal of crew-served weapons."16 Even in The Village, the
counterinsurgency classic about the combined action program in Vietnam, the squad in question
faced a conventional nighttime attack led by enemy sappers.17 In these situations CSWs
continue to reign supreme. The compound in The Village was saved by its MG, while the respect
given to the RPG (and its integration by insurgents into the smallest teams) should be all the
argument needed about the importance of CSWs in a counterinsurgency fight.

Furthermore, for stability and support or peacekeeping operations, the infantry squad and platoon
can always be utilized as a pure rifle unit. The proposed T/O is close enough to the current rifle
squad to allow easy transition to that role. Every Marine carries an M16A4 or an M4, and the
distribution of IARs and M203s for balanced fire teams has already been mentioned. Carrying a
CSW could be overly intimidating when trying to connect with the local populace, so in an
environment that does not pose a high-intensity threat, CSWs can always be staged at an outpost
in favor of rifles and carbines.

There should be advantages to the infantry platoon reorganization for the blocks one and two
portions of the fight. Counterinsurgency operations, like most others, are focused on platoon- and
squad-sized operations. The proposed T/O directly supports this focus by explicitly making these
units the smallest combined arms formations, with all possible infantry assets at their disposal. It
should be advantageous in counterinsurgency to have squad leaders with the mindset that they
conduct their own fight. There is also the practical advantage of squads and platoons being
armed enough to safely operate independently. (Remember the squad in The Village and the MG
that saved its compound.) Also, squads and platoons with their own CSWs should be better
prepared to make decisions about the appropriate level of force and not as dependent on more
powerful and less accurate fire support agencies, such as artillery and aircraft. Finally, the three
platoon mortarmen, even if they never employ a mortar tube, provide a base for an expanded
platoon headquarters, as proposed by the DO program, supporting control of an independent
platoon area of operations and greater intelligence gathering. None of the above advantages will
be decisive in a counterinsurgency fight, but can be used in conjunction with effective tactics,
such as integration with the population.
Another possible disadvantage is losing the ability to mass CSWs where they will be most
effective. A platoon in a support by fire position might not have much use for its SMAWs but
could usefully employ the mortar attached to the platoon in the assault. There are two responses
to this criticism. One is that the majority of operations in the future will be platoon and squad
engagements, not full-sized company battles. This will likely be true in conventional fights as
well as counterinsurgency operations. Thus the CSWs need to be integrated at the level where
tactical decisions will be made-the platoon and squad levels. The company commander will still
possess CSW assets in the company weapons platoon that he can use to weight or reinforce his
subordinates as appropriate. As mentioned above, in practice, weapons platoon assets are often
diluted and spread among the platoons due to the necessity of CSWs to small unit combat.
Making CSWs organic to the rifle platoon will enhance the ability of the company commander to
mass those CSW assets under his direct control.

Some might question how this reorganization fits into the DO concept. DO sees maneuver units,
including platoons and squads, acting in "disaggregated fashion . . . dispersed beyond the range
of mutually supporting organic fires" yet still possessing "significant combat power."18 Yet the
combat power of the current rifle platoon and squad is insufficient by the standards of 1945,
when all such German units had organic MGs. DO intend supporting arms to allow units to act
with greater separation,19 but supporting arms are never reliable enough for this greater
separation. During Operation ANACONDA, despite being the only action in Afghanistan at the
time, close air support was not as responsive as needed, artillery wasn't even available, and there
was a blue-on-blue incident involving an AC-130.20 Dispersed squads and platoons must have
the high-volume and high-explosive firepower provided by CSWs to close with and destroy the
enemy while dispersed. In fact, one of the lessons of a recent experiment with a tentative DO
platoon was that the current rifle platoon T/O was insufficient to protect squads operating outside
the range of battalion 81 mm mortars and with only limited air support from a Marine
expeditionary unit. (A DO platoon operating as part of an expeditionary strike group with an
aircraft carrier would be in better shape, but weather can still shut down air support.) MGs and
mortars organic to the platoon were seen as a possible solution.21 The proposed reorganization is
not only compatible with DO, but it might be vital for the concept to work. DO is described as
enhanced capabilities available to units with traditional command structure and organization able
to conduct the full range of infantry operations.22 Thus, whatever model is used for DO, it
should be based on what is most effective in high-intensity conventional combat. That is, it
should be an infantry platoon with organic CSWs.

The last disadvantage would be in training. The infantry platoon commander would be faced
with having to train four disparate sets of techniques and procedures. Also the MG, mortar, and
assault teams would be very small, reducing the likelihood that each platoon would have
experienced gunners to build expert weapons handling. The solution would likely be for the
platoon commander to outsource some of his CSW training to the company-level or division-
level schools. On the other hand, exposure of 0311 riflemen to the employment of CSWs would
improve dramatically, and platoon tactical training would advance because it would be forced to
always include CSWs. Based on many after-action reports from Iraq, increased CSW training is
something that all infantry and most other units need during their workups.
The final considerations are second and third order effects. Clearly the number of Marines
trained in the weapons military occupational specialties (0331, 0341, 0351) would increase,
requiring a restructuring of the Schools of Infantry. However, if we redefine the infantry squad to
include CSWs, it would affect other training and organization. It was already noted that student
platoons at TBS train with an attached MG squad as a matter of course; they would now have to
also include SMAWs, MGLs, and mortars. (Currently SMAWs are only used during military
operations on urbanized terrain training, and mortars are fired at one range but not by students.)
This requirement affects the individual training lieutenants would receive, equipment allocation,
design of ranges and training scenarios, and ammunition allotments. TBS is in the process of
rewriting its program of instruction, and greater emphasis on CSWs is already planned, but much
more would need to be done. The same logic applies to units expected to function as infantry in
provisional or emergency situations. Reconnaissance battalions, military police units, artillery,
combat engineers, and security units of the Marine logistics groups and Marine aircraft wings
would all need significant change in how they are equipped and organized for combat if the basic
squad formation has an MG and SMAW. The combat engineer squad is already well placed in
this regard with an organic M240G and SMAW.

Conclusion

Rifle marksmanship and the concept of every Marine a rifleman are heavily ingrained in the
Marine Corps ethos. CSWs have dominated infantry combat for over a century, however, and
continuing to field rifle platoons is an anachronism. The infantry squad should be reorganized
around an MG and SMAW, and a handheld mortar should be added to the infantry platoon. The
result would be Marine infantry units that are both stronger and better organized for independent
small unit combat. Many would argue that the threat faced today fighting insurgencies
emphasizes the rifleman and not CSWs. However, small unit combat is intense at any level, and
our enemies make extensive use of CSWs. If we expect our small units, platoons, and squads to
swiftly close with and defeat elusive small teams of enemy then they must have the firepower to
win without waiting for reinforcements or calling in destructive supporting arms. They must be
reorganized with organic CSWs as infantry squads and platoons. Given the history of infantry
combat in the 20th century and recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, this reorganization is
long overdue.