MENDOZA, JURIS RENIER C.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
LLB-3 THURSDAY 7:30-9:30PM

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REYES VS. ROSENSTOCK AND BPI VS. CONCEPCION

TITLE: REYES vs. ROSENSTOCK

CITATION: 47 Phil. 784

FACTS: Plaintiff Vicente Reyes obtained a judgment against Henry Elser who was still living, for a
sum of P64,242.69 and for the foreclosure of a certain real estate mortgage on a property located in
Manila and its sale thereof to satisfy the judgment. Three months later, Elser died and Rosenstock was
appointed as the executor of the former’s estate. A few days prior to the death of Elser, a sale of the
mortgaged property was confirmed and no appeal was taken from the confirmation. Commissioners
were then appointed by the court to act as the committee of claims and before them, Reyes filed his
proof of claim, to which the defendant objected. The plaintiff’s claim was allowed by the said
committee in full as the claim against the estate. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the claim against the estate of Elser falls squarely within the definition of a
contingent claim?

RULING: No. Jurisprudence provides that a 'contingent claim,' is a claim against a decedent, not
absolute or certain, but depending upon some event after the death of
the testator or intestate which may or may not happen. A subsisting demand against the estate of a
deceased person which had matured and was capable of being enforced during the lifetime of the
deceased is not a contingent claim. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased person secured by
mortgage or other collateral security may rely upon his security and institute an ordinary action based
thereon without abandoning his right to present his claim to the committee should the security not be
sufficient to pay the debt. In this case, The defendant has filed an able and exhaustive brief, but has
overlooked the fundamental fact that the original judgment in this case was personally rendered against
the deceased while he was still living.

TITLE: BPI vs CONCEPCION

CITATION: 53 Phil. 84

FACTS: Defendants Concepcion executed a promissory note in favor of BPI and as a security, they
deposited 700 shares of PNB as collateral and also a mortgaged lot. The defendants defaulted in their
payment, forcing the bank to initiate a foreclosure sale. Shortly thereafter, Henry Elser entered into
negotiations with the Concepcions and offered to take over the mortgaged property and assume
mortgage debt. To this, the Concepcions agreed that they would be relief from liability. Elser sent a
series of letters to the bank the latter didn’t make any response. Later on, Elser entered into an
agreement with the Concepcions in a form of bilateral sale of the land.

Elser died on June 18, 1923, and on January 4, 1924, the plaintiff suggested the death of the defendant
Elser, and asked that the administrator of the estate, C. W. Rosenstock, be substituted in his place as
defendant, and that the action be continued against Rosenstock in that capacity, on the ground that this
action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage. There were opposition to the appointment of Rosenstock
however the trial court rendered a decision appointing the latter as the administrator of Elser’s Estate.
However, Rosenstock contended that Elser could not have assumed the obligations of the Concepcions
because at the time he made such assumption, he was of unsound mind.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim on the mortgaged party is to be considered as a contingent claim
against the estate of Elser?

RULiNG: Yes. In the foreclosure of a mortgage on property pertaining to the estate of a deceased
person, the amount of the deficiency cannot be determined before the foreclosure sale is made, and the
demand for its payment is a contingent claim within the meaning of sections 746-749 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The-claim for the deficiency must be presented to the committee on claims and
appraisals within the period fixed by sections 689 and 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the court,
from the report of the committee or from the proofs exhibited to it, is satisfied that the contingent claim
is valid, the executor or administrator may be required to retain in his possession sufficient assets to
pay the claim when it becomes absolute.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:
In the case of Reyes vs. Rosenstock, the claim against the estate of Elser was not considered as a
contingent claim since there was already a claim arising from the judgment against Elser prior to his
death and which was enforced already during his lifetime. A subsisting demand against the estate of a
deceased person which had matured and was capable of being enforced during the lifetime of the
deceased is not a contingent claim. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased person secured by
mortgage or other collateral security may rely upon his security and institute an ordinary action based
thereon without abandoning his right to present his claim to the committee should the security not be
sufficient to pay the debt.

On the other hand, in the case of BPI vs. Concepcion, the amount of the deficiency was still to be
determined before the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property can be made, hence, such was in a
nature of a contingent claim within the meaning of sections 746-749 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The demand for its payment would now become as a contingent claim which can be made against the
estate of Elser.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BAUTISTA VS TIONGSON AND ALBANO VS AGTARAP

TITLE: BAUTISTA vs. TIONGSON

CITATION: G.R. No. 4232, November 07, 1908

FACTS: Ciriaco Tiongson and Aquilina Tiongson were the joint owners of five parcels of land located
in Bulacan. When Ciriaco died, Felix Bautista was appointed as the administrator of the estate of the
former where he instituted a partition of the estate of the deceased. However, the defendants in this case
alleged that there was only one plot of land held jointly by the spouses and the rest of the plots were
owned exclusively by the defendants. Defendants also averred that Bautista lacked the capacity to bring
the action for partition because the legal administration of the property of Ciriaco pertained to his
widow and the they prayed before the trial court that the appointment of administration of Bautista be
annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista has the authority to institute an action for partition being an
administrator of the estate of Ciriaco Tiongson.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that The proceedings instituted by Felix Bautista as
administrator of the intestate estate of Ciriaco Tiongson, wherein he asks for the partition of certain
lands which the said deceased and his sister, Aquilina Tiongson, inherited from their late father,
Emeterio Tiongson, and which they possessed pro indiviso, are governed by sections 181 to 196 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

No provision of the said sections authorizes an administrator of the property of an intestate to bring an
action demanding the partition of real estate owned pro indiviso by the deceased, whose property he is
administering, and by another person.

In the above cited sections, the law refers to a coparcener, coheir, or other person interested in the
undivided property held, because any one of such persons is a real party concerned in the partition. In
cases like the present, where the property is held by a person, not as a coheir but as the exclusive
owner, the right of action for partition, which supposes joint ownership or community of property,
pertains only to the heirs of the late Ciriaco Tiongson, not to the administrator who, when claiming the
division of real estate not included in the inventory, or which he did not take charge of on commencing
to exercise office, but which is alleged to belong to the estate, is not authorized to represent the
intestate succession of the property administered by him; neither is he authorized to represent the heirs,
because the latter, as successors to the deceased, are the only parties who may maintain such an action
for partition of real estate held pro indiviso by coheirs or owners in common.