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Language and Conflict in
Northern Ireland
and Canada
A Silent War
Janet Muller
© Janet Muller 2010
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-23065-1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Muller, Janet, 1957–
Language and conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada :
a silent war / Janet Muller.
p. cm.—(Palgrave studies in minority languages and communities)
ISBN978-1-349-31161-3(alk.paper)
1. Irish language – Political aspects – Northern Ireland. 2. Irish language –
Social aspects – Northern Ireland. 3. Language policy – Northern Ireland.
4. Language planning – Northern Ireland. 5. Sociolinguistics – Northern Ireland.
6. French language – Political aspects – Québec (Province) 7. Language
policy – Québec (Province) 8. Language planning – Québec (Province) I. Title.
PB1298.N67M87 2010
306.44⬘9416—dc22 2010010818
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
Contents
List of Illustrations vi
List of Abbreviations ix
Acknowledgements xi
Abstract xii
Introduction 1
1. A Silent War: Conflict Resolution and Language Policy

and Planning in the North of Ireland and Quebec / Canada 5
2. The Irish Language in the North of Ireland: Statistics 38
3. The Irish Language and the Good Friday Agreement 56
4. The Ratification and Application of the
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 77
5. Irish Language Broadcasting since the Good Friday Agreement:
Sop in áit na scuaibe? Sword or Ploughshare? 99
6. The British Government Commitment to Enact
the Irish Language Act 119
7. The Submissions of the Political Parties to the First Public
Consultation on Proposed Irish Language Legislation for NI 147
8. Submissions from Key Public Bodies and a 20 per cent Sample of
Individual Responses to the Public Consultation on the
Proposed Irish Language Legislation 168
9. Quebec v. the Rest in the Twenty-First Century:
Coming-of-Age, or Losing the Plot? 196
Conclusions 227
Notes 232
Bibliography 252
Index 269
v
Illustrations
Tables
2.1 1911 and 1991 Census: Figures and percentages of overall

population with knowledge of Irish 40
2.2 2001 Census: Knowledge and skills in Irish 41
2.3 2001 Census figures: Percentage comparison (1991–2001)
in respect of District ward areas in NI 42
2.4 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten Wards with highest
percentage of Irish indicated: Comparative figures on
those indicating knowledge of Irish and those with
ability in full skills range 43
2.5 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten Wards with lowest percentage
of Irish indicated: Comparative figures on those
indicating knowledge of Irish and those with
ability in full skills range 43
2.6 1991 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age 44
2.7 2001 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age (All persons),
Table population: All persons aged 3 and over
(and column percentages) 44
2.8 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women
and men with knowledge of Irish 45
2.9 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women
and men with knowledge of Irish according to religion 45
2.10 1991 Census: knowledge of Irish by religion,
Table population: All persons aged 3 years
and over (and column percentages) 46
2.11 2001 Census: Knowledge of Irish by religion:
Table population: All persons aged 3 years and over
(and column percentages) 46
2.12 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Figures
and percentages with knowledge of Ulster Scots
and gender breakdown 47
2.13 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey:
Knowledge of Ulster Scots by age 48
Knowledge of Ulster Scots by religion 49
Knowledge of Ulster Scots by political opinion 49
vi
Illustrations vii
2.16 2003–4 Figures relating to numbers and type of

Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of
pupil figures 51
2.17 2006–7 Figures relating to numbers and type of
Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown
of pupil figures 52
2.18 2008–9 Figures relating to numbers and type
of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown
of pupil figures 52
2.19 Number of schools and pupils in the
North by management type 54
2.20 2003–8 Figures for A level Examinations taken in
modern languages 54
4.1 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in
Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: preschool 81
Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: primary school 82
Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: secondary school 82
Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: vocational
and technical education 82
Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: university
and higher education 82
Scotland and Irish Other sub-paragraphs in Article 8 82
Scotland and Irish Administration of Justice: Article 9 83
Scotland and Irish Administrative Authorities: Article 10 84
Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 85
4.13 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic
in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 85
viii Illustrations

5.1 Total spend by hours on television and
radio for Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish 101
5.2 Comparative data on indigenous languages 102
5.3 CCG / ILBF – Hours of Irish language programming
funded over 7 funding rounds 2005–7 113
5.4 CCG / ILBF Commissions by genre and
total CCG / ILBF spend 116
6.1 Results of Two DCAL consultations on proposed
Irish language legislation 130
6.2 Figures for both consultations on proposed
Irish language legislation 131
8.1 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent
sample of individual submissions by viewpoint on
legislation and the model preferred 180
sample of individual submissions by support for
legislation in subject areas listed in DCAL
consultation paper 187
sample of submissions with comments 192
9.1 2001 and 2006, Percentage of the population of
Quebec for whom French is mother tongue 206
9.2 2001 Percentage of French mother-tongue speakers using
French only or with another language in the workplace 218
9.3 Percentage of immigrants using predominantly
French, English or another language in the workplace 218
Figure
9.1 Age structure of English and French mother tongues,

5 year age groups, Canada less Quebec, 2006 204
Maps
1.1 Map of Ireland showing border established under Government

of Ireland Act 1920 20
1.2 Outline map showing the North of Ireland with counties 21
1.3 Map showing Canada with provinces 25
1.4 Map of Quebec 27
Abbreviations
ByI /WLB Bwrdd Yr Iaith / Welsh Language Board

B&BC Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission (Canada)
BBC (NI) British Broadcasting Company (Northern Ireland)
CAJ Committee on the Administration of Justice
CCG / ILBF Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge / Irish Language
Broadcast Fund
CCEA Council for Curriculum Examination and Assessment
CCMS Council for Catholic Maintained Schools
CCR Community Relations Council
CCRF / CCDL The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms / La Charte
canadienne des droits et libertés
CFL / CLF The Charter for the French Language / La Charte de la
langue française
CnaGta Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta (The Council for Irish
Medium Education)
CNnaG Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge
COL / CLO The Commissioner of Official Languages / Commissaire
aux langues officielles
COMEX Committee of Experts (on the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages)
CR Conflict Resolution
DCAL Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (NI)
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport (UK)
DENI Department of Education (NI)
DETI Department of Enterprise, Training and Investment (NI)
DES Department for Education and Skills (UK)
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
ECRML European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
EME English Medium Education
FCFA Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes
FIE French Immersion Education
GOLI Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICIG Interdepartmental Charter Implementation Group
IME Irish Medium Education
InaG Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta (The Irish Medium
Education Trust)
LLO / OLA Loi sur les langues officielles / Official Languages Act
(Canada)
ix
x Abbreviations
LPP Language Policy and Planning

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NI Northern Ireland
NIO Northern Ireland Office
NISRA Northern Ireland Statistics and Research
NoI North of Ireland
OQLF Office québécoise de la langue française
Q/C Quebec / Canada
RGE / DFA Roinn Gnóthaí Eachtracha / Department of
Foreign Affairs (RoI)
RGPTG / DCRGA Roinn Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta /
the Department of Community, Rural
and Gaeltacht Affairs (RoI)
RML Regional or Minority Language
ROC Rest of Canada
RoI Republic of Ireland
SACHR Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights
SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party
SF Sinn Féin
UUP Ulster Unionist Party
Buíochas / Acknowledgements
My thanks to the Irish speaking community for the energy, support, infor-
mation sharing and endless good humour (in spite of everything); to my
employers, POBAL who have given me invaluable encouragement, time,
support and assistance for over ten years, and also to all my co-workers dur-
ing this whole period.
Thanks to Kevin Callaghan (McGill University, Montreal) and Linda
Cardinal (Université d’Ottawa) who helped me to establish some key net-
works in Quebec and Canada. Also to all those who agreed to be interviewed
for the book over two bouts, in 2006 and 2009. The social partnership,
Concordia NI helped me with a 2006 study visit to Canada, and although
space considerations mean that many interviews completed in 2006 have not
featured here in detail, each one contributed enormously to my understand-
ing. Continuing weaknesses in this respect are no one’s fault but mine.
Thanks to Professors Máiréad Nic Craith and Christine Bell (University
of Ulster), and Professor Colin Williams (University of Cardiff) for previous
PhD guidance.
Colin Williams (Cardiff University) gave me invaluable advice prior to
and during the writing of this book, and he and Wilson McLeod (University
of Edinburgh) commented on the Canada chapter drafts.
Grá agus buíochas / remerciements et bisous à: Sylvie Gaultier and Kat Ó
Brien in Montreal.
Thanks to Frankie Quinn for use on the book cover of his photograph,
North Belfast Peaceline 2004.
Thanks to all at Palgrave Macmillan for support and help in publishing
the book.
Some sections in Chapter 4 have been published in the Council of Europe’s
book, The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Legal Challenges
and Opportunities (2007), Eds: Dunbar, R and Parry, G. Council of Europe.
The Council of Europe holds copyright to these sections and I am grateful
for permission to reproduce some material from these sections here.
My family came to mind often whilst I was writing the book, especially
my mother (1917–1999) and my brother Chris (1948–2003).
Final and best thanks go to Karen and Éadaoin for endless encouragement.
Daoibh féin beirt atá an saothar seo, le grá is buíochas ó lán mo chroí.
Janet Muller
30 September 2009
xi
Abstract
The theme of this book is the impact of conflict and conflict resolution
(CR) on language policy and planning (LPP) in Northern Ireland and in
Quebec / Canada. The primary focus is the Irish language in the North
from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to the present (with brief ref-
erences to LPP in the Republic of Ireland). LPP in respect of the Northern
conflict has been neglected in both sociolinguistic and CR analysis. The
book seeks to address this gap and also to place both CR and LPP in the
NoI in an international context, drawing on Quebec / Canada as a mirror,
through an examination of developments in relations since the 1995 refer-
endum on Quebec secession.
Chapter 1 examines LPP formulation in the CR approaches to deep-rooted,
ethno-linguistic conflicts of hegemonic (or dominant) powers. It studies the
interplay in the North of Ireland and in Quebec / Canada of domestic and
international law, the principle of self-determination, language protection
and definitions of minority / majority rights and briefly establishes the his-
torical background to current LPP and CR.
The aim of the Irish language section of this book (Chapters 2–8) is to
contribute to the visibility of the Irish language in the North within the
field of sociolinguistics, and help to dispel misconceptions as to its specific
circumstances in the current climate. Chapter 2 gives a thumb-nail sketch
of the current state of the language through demographic information and
a brief examination of Irish in education. Chapter 3 describes LPP prior to
the 1990s and the importance of the Irish language in political negotiations
leading to the Good Friday Agreement (1998). The ratification and imple-
mentation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
is detailed in Chapter 4, drawing on UK, Committee of Experts and NGO
reports over three monitoring cycles. Irish language broadcasting provision,
legislation and funding is discussed in Chapter 5. Irish speaking community
proposals for an Irish Language Act and the commitment by the British gov-
ernment in the St Andrews Agreement (2006) to enact legislation is detailed
in Chapter 6, followed by an account of the treatment of the Irish language
in the devolved institutions established in 2007 to the present. This chap-
ter also examines two government consultations on the proposed legisla-
tion, drawing on submissions to the first consultation from Irish language
NGOs and statutory organizations. In Chapters 7 and 8, the submissions of
the NI political parties to the first consultation and those of key English-
language NGOs and public bodies are discussed. An examination of a sample
20 per cent of individual replies to the consultation is also presented.
xii
Abstract xiii
Chapter 9 contains a brief analysis of LPP and CR in Quebec and Canada

since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. There is an examination of
current federal and Quebec LPP and interviews with key figures in LPP.
The findings of the book are that the practice of CR by hegemonic states
tends to reinforce its own dominant position, and that these goals influ-
ence the formulation of LPP. Domestic and international law can be double-
edged swords, although effective legislation can be central in transforming
the position of minoritised languages. Achieving and maintaining progres-
sive LPP requires great reserves of determination and energy on the part of
minoritised language communities who must also protect their independ-
ence within the political sphere.
Introduction
Being a long-term resident of the North of Ireland (NoI), I have acquired a

particular interest in how conflict, conflict resolution (CR) and language
policy and planning (LPP) are interlinked. My professional work1 in LPP
has provided me with direct experience of the results of CR on a minori-
tised language community, and an interest in how competing demands
from different sections of society interact with historical colonial interests,
hegemonic power and particularist regimes, with minority and human
rights concerns, with international law and best international practice.
As for many concerned with LPP, the combination of personal and pro-
fessional experience has drawn my attention to Canada, to the historic
and contemporary tensions around the competing linguistic and political
groupings in Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC). In Chapter 1, there is
a discussion of the similarities as well as the differences in the situations
of NoI and Quebec / Canada (Q / C). The two situations provide a useful
contextual framework to examine how conflict, CR and LPP intermesh. In
the last chapter of the book, I shall examine both Canadian federal and
Quebec LPP from the most recent Quebec referendum on secession in 1995
to the present.
The aim of the Irish language section of this book (Chapters 2–8) is to
contribute to the visibility of the Irish language in NoI within the field
of sociolinguistics, and help to dispel misconceptions as to its specific cir-
cumstances in the current climate. This in turn may help to inform future
study on the most beneficial approaches to the development of the Irish
language throughout the island of Ireland. Although the Irish language is
the indigenous language of Ireland, since partition in the 1920s, its develop-
ment (some might say under-development) has been subject to two different
sets of LPP, one British and one Irish. I shall make reference to the current
impact of these two approaches thoughout the book. LPP in the North has
been neglected in much of the sociolinguistic study of Irish, which tend to
focus to a significant degree on the language in the South. Those contempo-
rary works which deal with the Irish language in the North contain valuable
1
2 Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada
material relevant to the current context but do not have CR as the specific
framework for their analysis.
In Chapters 2–8, I shall focus on how CR has influenced British govern-
ment LPP in NoI within the most recent decade of the NI peace process. The
1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) contains significant references to the
Irish language, but although CR in the North has been widely commented
nationally and internationally to date, paradoxically few accounts analyse
in any significant degree the importance of LPP within the process. Many
contemporary texts offering political analysis tend to refer only peripherally,
if at all, to the Irish language. The relative demographic weakness of the Irish
speaking community in the North, and its marginalised position within the
collective psyche and within legislative, social and policy frameworks are of
course contributory factors in this. However, the neglect of LPP within pol-
icy analysis belies its central importance to the North’s community of Irish
speakers (10.4 per cent of the overall population or 167,000 people2) and to
the much larger percentage of people who support and hold the language in
esteem. It would also appear to seriously underestimate the fact that, as I shall
show in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, the Irish language has featured continuously
in negotiations prior to both the GFA and the 2006 St Andrews’ Agreement
(SAA). In addition, in the period between 1998 and 2008 the Irish language
has been shown to have enormous symbolic and political importance to the
British government and to both nationalist and unionist political parties in
the NoI. This suggests that its positioning as an issue of minimal or minority
interest within mainstream commentary is a false one that ignores or mis-
interprets the reality of British government interest in ethnic and linguistic
relations in the colonial context in this part of the world. Of course, a detailed
comparison of the centrality of the issue within CR for successive Irish gov-
ernments is a worthwhile subject for study, but for reasons of space, it is one
which this book cannot undertake in depth, although I shall allude to it in
different sections of the book.
Chapter 1 examines definitions of conflict and the theory and practice
of conflict resolution (CR). In addition, it addresses the common threads
in Q / C and Irish historic experience, the impact of domestic and inter-
national legislation and the lack of clarity in relation to the principle of
self-determination and the effect this has had on LPP up to the 1995 refer-
endum on secession in the case of Quebec and the 1998 GFA in the case of
the NoI. This will set the scene for further discussion on Q / C in the final
chapter. In Chapter 2, I shall briefly cite NoI demographic information from
official sources including the 2001 Census in order to create a statistical
profile of the Irish language, Ulster Scots and ethnic minority communi-
ties in the NoI. I shall also present some information on the growth of Irish
Medium Education (IME) in the North and note current education policy
trends. In Chapter 3, I shall first identify the LPP context and relationship
of the Irish speaking community with the State in the period prior to the CR
Introduction 3
arrangements of 1998. Following this, I shall examine published and leaked

accounts of the Irish language within the CR negotiations leading up to the
GFA, and briefly assess the structure for devolved institutions established
under the GFA.
Chapter 4 examines the UK implementation of the European Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in respect of Irish, and in
Chapter 5 I shall detail Irish language broadcasting provision. Chapter 6
looks at the emergence since the GFA of a consensus among Irish speakers,
spearheaded and developed by POBAL, the umbrella non-governmental
organisation (NGO) that effective legislation in the North is a key LPP
issue. I shall then examine the British government commitment in the
SAA to enact Irish language legislation, its consultation process on the
issue and the resulting impacts, from May 2007 to late 2009, of the re-
establishment of the NI devolved institutions on LPP. In the final section
of this chapter, I analyse the responses of Irish language NGOs and state
bodies to the first governmental consultation on the proposal to enact
Irish language legislation. I shall argue that the actions of the British gov-
ernment in exacerbating division and undermining the position of the
Irish language during the political negotiations of 2006–7, shines a light
on its own role and practice within CR in the North. Chapters 7 and 8
gives further in-depth analysis of a sample of responses to the consulta-
tion process, initially from the North’s political parties, then from key
NGOs and public bodies and finally from a random sample of individual
respondents. Chapter 9 contains an analysis, albeit in abbreviated form, of
the interaction between LPP and CR in Q / C, focussing on approaches and
attitudes since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. I examine cur-
rent federal and Quebec LPP initiatives and interview key players within
language policy.
Translations, language versions and endnotes
Throughout the book, where quotations are given, they are carried in the
main text in the language in which they were made. The translation then
follows, with a note as to whether the translation is my own or from some
other source. In Chapters 2–8, where submissions or documents by Irish
speakers or Irish language organisations have been made in English, I have
not translated. Where Irish speaking respondents comment on their reasons
for writing in English, I reflect this. In some cases, public or government
bodies have translated Irish language submissions into English where pub-
lishing summaries or when making them available to the public. Where this
has been the case, I have used the English language version.
In the case of books or documents produced bilingually in Q / C or the
NoI, I have opted wherever practicable to use the French or Irish language
version first in my text, with translation following. I have decided upon this
method to ensure consistency in the presentation of quotations, but it is

not without some difficulties. A citation may, for example, appear on differ-
ent pages in each language version. Where this is the case, I have recorded
in brackets in the main text the page reference for the language version
quoted. Thus, if the quote is in Irish, the page number quoted in the main
text relates to the Irish language version of the document. I then give both
page references in an endnote.
More problematic is the fact that in the case of British government docu-
ments, or those from NoI departments, the documents all appear to have
been drafted in English and subsequently translated into Irish. At times,
the Irish language translation does not convey the same meaning as the
English. At others, part of the text given in English is missing in the Irish
language version. At still others, the grammar, syntax or spelling of Irish
used in official documents may be unconventional. This poses a dilemma.
In the case of textual interpretation, I have recorded in the endnote where
there is a discrepancy in my view, in the meaning of the English and Irish
texts, and I have similarly dealt with missing text in the two language ver-
sions. As to any other matters of grammar, spelling and style, for the most
part, I have carried the Irish language version as it appears in the official
document, without correction or comment. I should add that any imperfec-
tions in the rest of the text, in Irish, French or English, are my own alone.
Terminology and abbreviations
The naming of places and their description as countries, provinces, regions,

states etc is often part of mega-conflict. I have attempted to pick a path
through the minefield by referring to the six counties of Ireland variously
as ‘the North of Ireland’ (NoI), ‘the North’ or ‘Northern Ireland’ (NI). I refer
to the 26 counties as ‘the South of Ireland,’ ‘the South’ or the ‘Republic of
Ireland’ (RoI). I refer to Ireland (32 counties) and Canada as ‘countries’. I
use the abbreviation ROC to mean the Rest of Canada, that is, not includ-
ing Quebec. I acknowledge the position of Quebec as a province within the
Canadian federation and legal / administrative system, but I have opted to
refer to ‘federal LPP’, ‘federal government’ etc, and ‘Quebec LPP’, ‘Quebec
government’ rather than ‘Canadian’ or ‘provincial’ this, that or the other. I
refer to the people of Quebec as as ‘the Québécois’. I give a list of commonly
used abbreviations at the start of the book.
1
A Silent War: Conflict Resolution
and Language Policy and Planning
in the North of Ireland and
Quebec / Canada
The theme of this book is the impact of conflict and conflict resolution (CR)
on language policy and planning (LPP). To illustrate this interaction, I shall
examine recent developments in the North of Ireland (NoI), with linking
references to LPP in the Republic of Ireland (RoI) and in Quebec / Canada
(Q /C). My primary focus is the Irish language in the NoI from the 1998
Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to the present (with brief contextual refer-
ences where relevant to LPP in the Republic of Ireland [RoI]). LPP in respect
of the Northern conflict has been neglected in both sociolinguistic and CR
analysis. The book seeks to address this gap and also to place both CR and
LPP in the NoI in an international context, drawing on Q / C as a mir-
ror, through an examination of developments in federal – Quebec relations
since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. There are some obvious
similarities between the NoI and Q / C, as well as distinct and significant
differences. It is not my intention to make forced comparison for the sake
of illusory symmetry.
Whilst both conflicts can be defined as ethnic in origin, in the NoI, cur-
rent CR and LPP have their roots in tensions between the indigenous Irish
population and British colonial power. In Canada, it is the power relationship
between two settler colonial populations, one British and one French which
forms the context for CR and LPP. The ‘British’ population of Canada has,
from the eighteenth century contained within it a large proportion of Irish
immigrants, including at different times a significant number of Presbyterian
settlers from the North leaving Ireland at the time of the Penal laws to seek
further advancement, and in later phases, of Catholic refugees from the
famine. The interplay of these various Irish immigrant groupings and their
politico-religious networks and societies has shaped ‘British’ Canadian his-
tory. In itself, this is a rich field for study, but one for a different book.
5
Both the Q / C and NoI conflicts witnessed explosions of protest in the

late 1960s, with the resultant imposition of emergency powers. The scale
and duration of violence has been quite different in the two disputes, of
course. In the NoI, the 1969 crisis re-ignited a further forty– year phase of
armed conflict. In Canada, it led to the public acknowledgement that the
country was facing its worst crisis since confederation, and from that to CR
approaches which led to two secession referenda in Quebec. Counterpoising
the NoI with Canada facilitates a more general examination of LPP formu-
lation in the CR approaches to deep-rooted, ethno-linguistic conflicts of
hegemonic (or dominant) powers. In the history of Q / C and the NoI, there
is a common thread linking the interplay of domestic and international law,
the principle of self-determination, language protection and definitions of
minority / majority rights. In both places, consociational arrangements
have been established as part of the response to struggles for independence.
I shall examine to what extent therefore, actions ostensibly intended to
increase separation have resulted in present-day institutional arrangements
which create by their nature, greater governmental interdependency and
closer connections between opposing elites.
In looking at how all of these issues affect the relationship between law,
minority language communities and politicians in the North and in Q / C,
it is not my intention to offer definitive explanations of conflict, of theoreti-
cal LPP, of the comparative status of the Irish language North and South nor
of the historical background to the Q / C conflict, worthwhile as all of these
subjects are. Instead I shall attempt to identify the interplay of mechanisms
and approaches that have featured in the reaching of two distinct contem-
porary junctures in conflict relations. I shall examine what measure of suc-
cess has been achieved in the protection of Irish in the North and of French
in Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC) and to what extent the shape,
structure and goals of CR have harmonised with the needs of minoritised
language communities.
In the next section, therefore, I shall look briefly at definitions of con-
flict and CR approaches in order to evaluate the impact of CR on LPP.
Has the issue of LPP been neglected generally in conflict theory and if so,
what effect does this have? What particular challenges face minoritised
language communities? In the final sections of this chapter, I shall briefly
set the historical context in order to assess the impact of domestic and
international law, and the principle of self-determination on LPP in both
the NoI and Q / C. In later chapters, I shall explore key aspects of LPP and
CR in the NoI and Q / C in the last ten – fifteen years, from the signing of
the GFA by the British and Irish governments in 1998 in the first instance,
and from the most recent referendum on Quebec independence in 1995
in the second. Whilst these different events create significant punctuation
marks in the stories of both conflicts, they do not represent ‘beginnings’
nor I think, ‘endings.’ Time will tell.
A Silent War: Conflict and Language Policy 7
Conflict in society
The stabilising, centralising tendencies of today’s nation states and their

powerful, embedded processes, institutions, internal and external relation-
ships mitigate against root-and-branch change. Foucault (1982, p. 211),
Derrida (1994, p. 48) and May (2001, p. 53) argue that it is resistance that
defines both the shape of power and of dissent. Indeed, Foucault advocates
using this resistance to cast light upon power relations in order to under-
stand and define them. Gramsci (Simon 1982, p. 40) asserts that hegemonic
states work to maintain their own power through the constant shifting and
renegotiation of the system of alliances on which they are based. He warns
that if opportunities for change are not realised, the balance of power swings
back in favour of the dominant, hegemonic class, even though the alliances
upon which this domination is built may appear different. For Bourdieu
(1991, p. 45), conflict encompasses ‘la violence symbolique’ / ‘the symbolic
violence’ of the everyday interaction of political systems.
Foucault (1997, p. 16) acknowledges the influence of Clausewitz’s classic
text on warfare, stating that it is the role of politics to ‘réinscrire perpétuel-
lement ce rapport de force, par une sorte de guerre silencieuse, et de le réin-
scrire dans les institutions, dans les inégalités économiques, dans le langage,
jusque dans les corps des uns et des autres.’ / ‘perpetually re-inscribe this
power relationship, by a sort of silent war, and to re-inscribe it in the insti-
tutions, in economic inequalities, in language, right into individual human
bodies’ (Author’s translation). If politics is indeed a silent war, is the theory
of CR as it exists at present robust enough to impact significantly on the
fluid expression and methodologies of hegemonic power, and what implica-
tions does this have for linguistic communities?
LPP and conflict theory
It is [...] inevitable, therefore, as modernisation and language consciousness

both increase in a multilingual/multicultural world, and in multilingual/
multicultural nations, that the link between language status planning
and ethnicity will increase rather than decrease. Language status plan-
ning becomes a means of assuring social control and social ascendency
for those ethnically related interests that are already in power, just as it
becomes a desideratum for those ethnically related interests that seek to
increase their power or at least gain sufficient control over their own lives
to assure their intergenerational ethnocultural continuity.
Fishman (1989, p. 266)
It is not unusual for minoritised LPP to evolve within a conflict situation. In

fact, it tends to be the norm, since it is social, economic and political margin-
alisation which leads to the creation of linguistic minorities in the modern
nation state. Language diversity is not, in itself, the cause of civil discord.
Denial of language rights is often, however, a contributory cause (Fishman
1989, De Varennes 1996). However, although language is often blamed for
strife, until recently, linguistic discrimination has been ignored or misinter-
preted in many sociological works, thus creating a type of double bind for
minoritised language communities – responsible for all the problems but
absent at the shaping of solutions. Part of the neglect or misrepresentation
of language in conflict appears to be connected with its association with
ethnic struggle. Conversi (2004, p. 49) points out that ethnic conflicts are
among the commonest form of contemporary strife. Nationalism and the
issue of self-determination are often central characteristics, as is their long-
term nature. While it is now increasingly recognised that ‘minority’ nation-
alisms can be open, progressive, multicultural societies (Kymlicka 2001b,
p. 70), the dominant view of minority nationalism remains that of ‘a peri-
odic plague’ or a ‘mass psychology run amok’ (Latouche 2004, pp. 181–2).
This attitude is often transferred to minoritised languages (Fishman 1989,
p. 270) even as, or perhaps because, some sociologists emphasise the cen-
tral importance of language within ethnicity and nationalism (Snyder 1954,
Friedrich 1963). In addition, it is not uncommon to find a level of ambiva-
lence to history in the writings of CR and social science theorists and since
minoritised languages are seen as a direct link with that past, it also suffers
from dubious and anti-modern associations in the writings of some theo-
rists (Smith 1983, Blake and Moulton 1984). Tidwell (1998, p. 1190) con-
tends that, ‘History is more than a mere description of the past; it provides
insight into the deeper layers of meaning.’ Language issues, ‘tarred with
the same brush’ as ethnicity and nationalism, have been left inexplicit in
much CR theory. This increases the danger that language communities may
be ‘exploited for mobilisation purposes’ (Fishman 1989, p. 623), leading to
their political disempowerment and alienation. CR frameworks must ensure
that linguistic minorities are included in the measures adopted to build the
required new, more plural post-conflict society (May 2000).
Language survival in minoritised circumstances depends on creating
space in which the language can function (relatively) free from assimila-
tionist tendencies (Donneur 1975, Laponce 1987, Mackey 1990). Kymlicka
(2001a) notes that marginalisation occurs where the institutions of the state
all operate in another language, leaving renegotiated integration, competi-
tive ‘nation building’ or permanent marginalisation as alternatives for lin-
guistic minorities. However, once a given language ceases to be used as a
community language, it is too late to defend it (Baker and Prys Jones, 1998).
Promoting a minoritised language may lead to accusations of discrimina-
tion against the dominant one, yet minority-language decline always occurs
in situations of bilingualism or multilingualism – when languages are in
contact (May 2001). The insistence upon false equality between languages
for which the prevailing political conflict creates different contextual
circumstances can lead to a minoritised language community being doubly

disempowered – portrayed as ‘aggressor’ without the concomitant power
to effectively protect its language. Williams (2000) has pointed out that in
relation to community development policies, for government to exhort the
disadvantaged to take control of their social, political and cultural develop-
ment can be little more than the bestowing of responsibility for disposses-
sion on those who by definition lack the power to significantly affect their
own environment.
Legislation has a particularly important role to play in the ‘normalisation’ of
language issues, as the experience of Wales and Quebec demonstrates (Dunbar
2000, 2006a, 2006b, De Varennes 1996, Williams 1991, 1994, 2001a, 2001b,
Mac Giolla Chríost 2003, 2005). Legislation may be necessary to establish
the status of a minoritised language and /or to clarify the place of LPP within
the existing legislative framework, alongside anti- discrimination, public serv-
ice provision and equality laws. Additionally, it can delineate the nature and
extent of duties placed on the state, making it easier for civil servants to know
what to do and how to do it, and helping the public to understand and use its
rights and entitlements. As Dunbar (2000, 2001, 2002–3, 2005, 2006b) and
McLeod (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c) point out, the enactment of appropriate
legislation can be the most effective catalyst in the changing of attitudes, pol-
icy and practice. Theoretically, legislation can remove minoritised languages
from the political arena, protecting them from day-to-day vacillation or fac-
tionalism. As I shall note throughout this book however, legislation per se is
not free from political influence and if the goal of government or the legisla-
tive body is something less than language ‘normalisation’, this will shape the
laws it makes – or does not make – accordingly.
Cardinal (2003) argues that appropriate legislation is compensation for
the damage done to a language and should be accompanied by genuine
equality and partnership in governance. However, she and others (Dunbar
2006, McLeod 2006, De Varennes 1996, Mac Giolla Chríost 2003) have also
warned that legislation can be a blunt instrument, better adapted to the
needs of government than the sensitive process of language revitalisation.
Diglossia, a mismatch of skills, training and qualifications and a relatively
small pool of workers to draw from can combine with hostility, minimalism
and a lack of commitment to enforcement to undermine legislation in the
absence of proactive language planning mechanisms and practice. Cardinal
(2003) and P. Ó Riagáin (1997) emphasise the importance of enforcement of
language legislation to ensure compliance and respect of state institutions
for language rights. However, they contend that even where the purpose of
legislation is progressive, LPP must be closely integrated across a wide range
of trends and initiatives if it is to maximise its success.
Where legislation, or its absence, is employed against minoritised lan-
guage communities, the mainstreaming and resourcing of language ini-
tiatives by those more favourable to positive development can be of key
importance (Chevrier 2003, Keating 1997). In theory, it can provide some

security for projects and organisations and enable longer-term planning
and development. It can also establish a new framework for relationships
between government and language activists. However, this is only the case
where there exists both sympathy for the language and autonomy of action
over significant resources or service provision. In the absence of this, ‘ghet-
toisation’ is reinforced, entrenching identification of a minoritised language
with ethno-political issues and / or certain political parties, potentially
increasing factional political influence over the minoritised language com-
munity without significantly stabilising the position of the language in the
broader society. Indeed, where government refuses to mainstream services,
the tokenistic use of a minoritised language in public is unlikely to ‘have
a significant positive impact on language attitudes’ (Mac Giolla Chríost,
2003, p. 127). In addition, Williams (2000, p. 17) warns that as such nego-
tiation and concession within shifting CR play out, language communities
should be wary of ‘rule by quango.’ Independence can be lost through over-
reliance on the state playing the role of ‘a benign benefactor.’ Therefore,
since the search for an overall resolution of conflict is likely to have a signif-
icant impact on minoritised language communities, they may have to make
intense and difficult decisions during CR processes that are not directly
geared at meeting their needs.
So precarious is this task that Fishman (2005, p. 1) remarks that small
languages lacking control of state machinery ‘had it better when the iron
fist was still in fashion.’ In totalitarian times, he argues, the way forward is
more apparent, even if it is one that depends entirely on self-reliance outside
of the state apparatus. He (2005, p. 10) notes that reliance upon more per-
missive policies by states can be ‘tantamount to succumbing to slow-paced
euthanasia rather than to the firing squad.’ Minoritised language communi-
ties have much to lose within CR encompassing broader social and political
issues, and to maximise gains, these must be well-defined and achievable
within the parameters of the larger process. However, to reach even this
point requires considerable skills in analysis, negotiation and power broker-
ing, and the ability to distinguish that which is illusory from that which is
real within CR.
Conflict resolution theory and practice
The practice of peace building has been running ahead of peace building
theory.
Knight (2004, p. 355)
The chaos amongst theoreticians is even greater than the chaos in the
nation-state organisation of the world itself.
Adelman (2002, p. 14)
Those who have not been directly involved in conflict may assume that res-
olution comes when two sides decide one day that enough is enough. Like
children in the playground, they shake hands and make up. Reality, even in
the playground, is rarely so simple. There is no one definition of conflict.
Some social scientists focus on cause and cure, others on the behaviour
associated with discord (Schelling 1980, p. 3). Conflicts are said to arise
over non-negotiable issues, such basic human requirements as land, water
or food. Increasingly, there is recognition of the effects of globalisation; the
advance of multinational corporations, mass communications, the interna-
tionalisation of human rights standards; the pursuit by hegemonic powers
of their interests on a worldwide basis and the increasing recognition of the
role of economic drivers in conflict. Klein (2008) argues that corporate and
state interests have become indistinguishable in the execution of foreign
policy and Robinson (2008) states that all struggle is about the power to
determine the sharing of resources.1 For some, globalisation will lead to a
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Linklater 1998, Held 2003), others point to the
increasing pressure on language minorities from global communications
and cultural imperialism (Fishman 1991, Dunbar, 2001.) Honneth (1995,
p. 1, 161) opposes the separation of ‘interests’ from ‘the everyday web of
moral feelings’ and underlines the concept of morally motivated struggle.’
Whilst Kreisberg (1998) suggests that groups must have a sense of common
identity to engage in conflict, as noted previously, Marx (1910), Foucault
(1982) and Derrida (1994) believe that conflict defines the group identity.
Unfortunately, contemporary CR processes are as varied as the definitions
of conflict. Theorists disagree on cause and effect. Adelman (2002, p. 15)
comments that whilst universities continue to pursue ‘their medieval mis-
sion to create and set universal moral standards for society’, academics have
found it hard to agree, or to speak with authority to those with the power to
act. The gap between theory and policy appears very difficult to bridge. Are
conflict and dispute separate, with conflict occurring only where human
needs are denied and negotiable interests concerned (Burton 1990), or is
conflict better viewed as a continuum? (Tidwell 1998, p. 9) Are the funda-
mentals of CR found in management science or in international relations?
Are the best approaches found in game theory (Aumann and Maschler 1995,
Schelling 1980, Reinelt and Hewitt 2003) or in meeting the needs of all sides,
whilst simultaneously achieving mutual respect for the underlying values
and ideals of all parties? (Lederach 1995, 1997.) The wish-lists are numer-
ous and contradictory and may contribute to the view that some forms of
CR resemble ‘an industry’, misappropriating the politician’s role and selling
people products they neither understand nor want 2 and that are incapable
of meeting their needs.
Deciding to ‘resolve’ conflict is a subjective value choice (Tidwell 1998,
p. 3) and not all attempts to bring parties to the negotiating table are genu-
ine. Tidwell (1998, p. 173) suggests, ‘Talks may happen, agreements may be
struck, but while the head is in the negotiations, the heart is on the bat-
tlefield.’ On the other hand, the more powerful may systematically exclude
some parties or some issues from negotiations. This may contribute to the
definition of a conflict as unsolvable (Coy and Woehrle 2000, p. 8) and also
bring pressure to bear on one set of opponents to renounce or redefine a
particular strand of their approach to the conflict. Dispossession and the
issue of who speaks for the minority and how they prioritise the shift-
ing range of issues within a negotiation are key factors. The trust which
a minority group places in its political or broader community representa-
tives empowers since it may allow for access to elite group negotiations but
also, by its very nature, marginalises. The gap between representative and
represented may widen where the minoritised language is not the constant
identifier amongst the negotiators. Even where it is, when negotiation is
undertaken by those with party-political goals, there may be an additional
layer of organisational self-interest. Minoritised communities must con-
stantly measure shifting advantage and disadvantage occurring in milieux
to which they have little access. Not surprisingly, this presents considerable
challenges.
Measuring progress and evaluating strategies
Marginalised language communities may have the power to describe the

conflict, but not to define it. The control and dispersion of information dur-
ing conflict is crucial. Within overarching CR processes, linguistic minori-
ties must weigh approaches, filter information, decipher encoded gestures
and symbols and decide on what basis decisions can be made. What can be
conceded and when must a stand be taken? Conflict is fluid and change
similarly moves through different phases and approaches. Definitions shift,
causal links are disputed, political or pragmatic approaches may clash with
international law, best practice and common sense. In LPP, short-term gain
may lead to long-term assimilation, the dismantling of hard-won recognition
or the imposition of state-appointed quangos in place of guaranteed rights.
Apparently, minor processes or technical questions may be intimately con-
nected to the core issues. Location, format and access to negotiations may
prove key. Timing, sequencing and enforcement of agreed provisions affect
the temporary or permanent nature of measures introduced (Bloomfield
1998, p. 190). There are often tensions between ‘finely-balanced trade-offs
and ongoing bargaining’ on substantive issues (Bell, 2000, p. 7). Language
communities must interpret which of these are negotiable, which are
not, and how the community imposes its own interpretation on political
negotiators.
Judging gains made is a complex process. Parsons (1951, p. 481) proposes
distinguishing between changes to processes within the system and the
processes of change of the system. He defines the latter as occurring when
major structural relations, all basic institutions and value systems have
been drastically altered. Marx (1910) argues that this type of change, as for
instance in the end of feudalism, can only be understood by examining
the state of play within feudalism itself. Whether conflict leads to actual
change or simply to the non-functioning of the current system and the
formation of a new one depends on the rigidity of the system and its abil-
ity to resist change. The mechanisms by which the system retains control
may be malleable and flexible enough to reshape themselves under pres-
sure. Coser (1967, p. 29) points out that the rigidity of the system and the
intensity of the conflict are not divorced from each other, but that rather,
‘rigid systems which suppress the incidence of conflict exert pressure
towards the emergence of radical cleavages and violent forms of conflict.’
Alternatively, more elastic systems adjust more easily to shifting power
alliances and ‘are less likely to be menaced by basic and explosive align-
ments within their midst.’
Kriesberg (1998, p. 20) states that it is often the outcome of a conflict or
micro-conflict which has most impact upon its perceived shape and stand-
ing, that is, it is only with hindsight that one can judge what has been
achieved. Progress towards ‘victory’ for one party or another can also be
measured by comparison with the starting point of the various sides in
conflict, of course as long as ‘the starting point’ can actually be identified
and agreed upon. Definitions of what conditions existed for each side at a
given point in time may also be contested because such details are often
at the heart of the meta-conflict. What has been gained may also be open
to debate, since goals and objectives shift, leadership figures and intra-
grouping power-factions change, proposals rejected in an earlier phase of
conflict may later be embraced by those who previously denounced them.
Antagonists may appear to have irreconcilable aims made more bitter and
entrenched by the conflict. The different sides may set out with the goal of
greater freedom and independence, coupled with a higher standard of social
and linguistic justice. They may continue to voice firm belief in their objec-
tives even as their tactics change and adapt. Yet, as Kreisberg (1998, p. 20)
points out, the resultant societal and political swings may appear to produce
very different effects. As he notes,
Some conflicts are waged with one side seeking greater separation from its
adversary, for example in wars of secession or wars of national liberation.
Other conflicts are waged to gain more integration, for example in the
form of reduced segregation and free participation in governance. Even
if not an intentional goal, the outcome may entail movement toward
increased integration or increased separation.
One of the key issues in this book will be the evaluation of how such contra-
dictions are to be weighed in the case of LPP in the NoI and Canada.
Domestic and international law in protracted conflicts
It may be assumed in most cases of prolonged conflict that domestic legis-

lation has failed to resolve the key issues. Everywhere, societal structures,
including domestic law and the system for administration of justice, are
determined by the dominant interests of the state. Where there has been
long-standing discord, these structures are likely to be shaped by power rela-
tions, thus rendering them an inadequate, even inappropriate touchstone
for resolution of either political or sociolinguistic inequality. In the NoI,
this has been the case in respect of the broader civil strife whose most recent
manifestation began in the 1960s. As I shall demonstrate in Chapters 2–8,
it remains strikingly true in respect of the status and protection of the Irish
language. In Canada, as I shall outline later in this chapter, domestic law has
been used historically to copper-fasten English language dominance and in
more recent years to counter-pose two opposing forms of LPP, in order to
combat Quebec nationalism. In Quebec itself, on the other hand, provincial
law has been wielded in support of radical and effective LPP.
Where domestic law is unfit to meet demands for reform and recognition
of language and other human rights, the need for a yard stick external to
the conflict and against which progress can be measured becomes the more
compelling. The self-reinforcing compact between nation states (Adelman
2002, p. 4) has produced some institutions and a body of law and practice,
including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the United
Nations Charter and indeed the United Nations (UN) itself. Tidwell (1998,
p. 12) notes that although the UN has consistently sought to establish new
methods to resolve disagreement, it has ‘failed to provide any truly system-
atic method’ for CR, and that its own record, ‘has been so dismal that it is
arguable that the organisation has provided a model showing the alterna-
tives to be avoided.’ He states that rather than creating an alternative to
power politics, the UN has ‘provided only another method through which
power politics may be played out.’
Nonetheless, many commentators feel that international law and human
rights standards have an important role in CR. However, those seeking to
improve equality and justice in a given conflict may be accused of being
partisan or unrealistic, thus endangering peace. In some cases, attempts to
integrate international standards into negotiation have been attacked for
delaying resolution whilst delivering little discernible benefit.4 However,
such cases may be less a protest at the attempt than a complaint about the
result. There is ample evidence of fundamental weaknesses in international
law, in its scope, its enforceability, its interconnectedness to the interests of
the hegemonic power and its particular inability to function well in conflict
situations. The broadening of human rights discourse in recent decades has
occurred partly as a response to the demands for recognition of cultural
and linguistic diversity (Bell 2000, Kymlicka 2001a, May 2001). However,
pressure results in counter-pressure ad infinitum. Attempts have been made

to limit the scope of human rights through claims of cultural relativism (Bell
2000, p. 34) and more expansive interpretations of articles within interna-
tional conventions have been systematically restricted (De Varennes, 1996,
p. 276). In addition, hegemonic powers are likely to attempt to manipulate
the introduction of human rights standards for their own ends, as a ‘reso-
lution first, justice after’ approach or as a bargaining chip in negotiation.
Whilst commentators may argue that this is inappropriate (Bell 2000), there
are few examples of dominant proponents in conflict acting unilaterally to
make concessions on language or other rights.
Within nation states, civil society, trade unions, universities, language-
based groups, companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
increasingly play an important role in plugging the democratic deficit. In
particular, NGO monitoring can highlight non-implementation of interna-
tional law instruments at a sub-national, regional / provincial level, rather
than at a nation-state level, which may increase the nation state’s vulner-
ability to international criticism. However, tensions between the state or
hegemonic powers result in many challenges to the authority of civic and
community voices, especially when they touch upon issues at the core of
societal conflict. The fundamental imbalance in power between NGOs,
political parties and governments can leave NGOs exposed. They may be
accused of usurping the role of politicians.5 Those NGOs documenting fail-
ure, voicing criticism publicly and pointing out their preferred pathway to
change may find their work impaired or disrupted through withholding or
withdrawing of resources; accusations that the organisation is unaccounta-
ble, unrepresentative or guilty of mismanagement; or that its political anal-
ysis is flawed or incomplete. NGOs can also find themselves the subject of
intense political pressure, with members attacked, maligned, imprisoned or
even murdered by government or its agents (Griffin, 2009, p. 8, para 30).
‘Minority’ status: hard definitions, soft law
Thornberry (1999, p. 2) notes that during the sixties and seventies, many
European states were ‘concerned with Empire, with suppressing and then
accommodating liberation movements,’ and therefore, more interested in
‘playing the minorities card – or the indigenous suit – to beat off the ide-
ologues of decolonisation.’ In more recent decades, the resurgence of the
issue of minority rights and its interaction with the human rights discourse
has led to a changing picture in international rights law, introducing and
refining appreciation of cultural, social and economic rights. In Kymlicka’s
view (2007, p. 3), the old uni-lingual, uni-cultural nation-state model has
been increasingly replaced in recent decades with a multicultural and mul-
tilingual one because, ‘a number of countries have concluded that the older
models were not appropriate given their specific demographic or historical
circumstances.’ This rather begs the question – appropriate for what pur-
pose? Whilst Kymlicka (2007, p. 3) refers to ‘a veritable revolution’ brought
about by intense endogenous pressure, Wheatley (1999, p. 201) comments
that conflict, and by extension, conflict resolution, is, ‘a sign of the failure
of democracy in a multi-ethnic State, not of its success.’
The bestowing or acceptance of the label ‘minority’ on some communities
or groups can itself be contradictory and at times, strongly contested (Eide
1996). This indeed is the case in both Quebec, where Francophones are the
majority, although a minority within Canada, and in the NoI, where those
whose national identity is Irish are an artificial minority, in which Irish
speakers are further marginalised in spite of it being the primary indigenous
language of the Irish. One of the reasons for the controversy that surrounds
minority status is that it may effectively block access to other rights avail-
able only to majorities or ‘peoples’ as a whole. This is particularly important
in respect of the right to self-determination, which the UN has deemed to
be inapplicable to minorities (Epseill 1980, p. 9, para 56). I shall return to
the manner in which this issue has been interpreted in Q / C and in the NoI
later in this chapter.
Where linguistic groups do opt to pursue their goals through minority
rights protections, they may discover other, equally problematic issues since
minority rights law has developed largely through the same soft law or non-
legal mechanisms as the other elements of international law: declarations of
principles, codes of practice, recommendations, guidelines, standards, char-
ters, resolutions and so on. According to Bothe (1980), their ‘softness’ may be
one of the elements that encourages adoption of international instruments,
but he argues that ratification can raise expectations and create pressure for
change. Yet, De Varennes (1996), Dunbar (2000), McLeod (2006) and Eide
(1996) point out that although international legal instruments are intended
to impose a moral commitment to effective implementation, this is by no
means always the case. Eide (1996) argues that the question of enforceability
of international law is one that must be addressed.
Hadden (1999), Ní Aoláin (1995) and Fitzpatrick (1994) have all shown that
in conflict situations the potential of soft law mechanisms to effect mean-
ingful change is likely to be compromised. Indeed, Hadden (1999) argues
that central to international instruments and standards is the assumption
they will be applied in functioning liberal democracies, thus making their
effectiveness in conflict situations fundamentally flawed. In the context of
the NoI in the 1970s and 1980s, both Bell (2000) and Livingstone (1990,
p. 57) have been critical of the impact on actual law or practice of even
those instruments with the strongest enforcement mechanisms, including
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR). Bell (2000, p. 58) points out that in the twenty-five year period
1969–94, the British government was found to be in violation of the con-
vention more than any other European member state. However, in respect
of human rights violations in the North, she categorises the ECHR as

‘strikingly ineffective’ and states that it ‘repeatedly proved incapable of
significantly curbing a number of persistent patterns of abuse, including
use of plastic bullets, continuance of emergency legislation, and the use
of lethal force by security forces.’ I shall explore the issue of the effective-
ness of individual international instruments in language conflict in respect
of the implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages (ECRML) in Chapter 4. In the next section I shall examine how
the issue of self-determination has been dealt with in existing international
norms, prior to briefly detailing the historic circumstances in the NoI and
Quebec which have led to political autonomy being central in current LPP
and CR debate.
Self-determination in international law
International law traditionally recognises both the right (or faculty)

of states to safeguard their own rights through the resort to unilat-
eral measures of self-help as well as the obligation of states to settle
their own disputes by accepted and recognised diplomatic and judi-
cial methods. Both concepts are based on their own merits, which
are still valid in contemporary law.
Noortmann (2005, p. 3)
Both language rights and self-determination have been particularly poorly

served in the body of international law instruments. In spite of some sig-
nificant references in international conventions and the advent of the
language-specific ECRML, minority languages remain inadequately defined.
Whilst there is a wealth of referential material and analysis of the principle
of self-determination,6 there remains a lack of clarity since international
law now contains within it a number of contradictory principles on self-
determination. These stem from the conflicting seventeenth and eighteenth
century right to territorial integrity and the twentieth century right of self-
determination of peoples. Carley (1996, p. v) states that the controversy and
obscurity surrounding the principle of self-determination arise not from
disagreement as to whether such a right exists, but rather from the failure
‘to define exactly who is entitled to claim this right – a group, a people, or
a nation – and what exactly the right confers.’ Attempts to resolve the clash
have created intense political and scholarly debate, which because of space
constraints cannot be rehearsed in full here.
However, Eide (1996, p. 6, para 15) states, ‘For reasons of international
peace and stability, international law as it stands today gives territorial
integrity precedence over assertions of rights to secession or change of bor-
ders.’ Crucially, he notes that there are some exceptions to this practice.
These occur: a) for non-self-governing territories fulfilling the criteria of
identification contained in the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)7,

and b) in ‘exceptional cases’, where the population of the state has been
subject to consistent and systematic discrimination and when the govern-
ment of the state is not representative of that part of the population. In
this respect, it is useful to note Bell’s assertion (2000, p. 1) that, ‘where
conflicts involve claims to self-determination by an ethno-national group,
conflict resolution initiatives typically centre around attempts to redefine
state structures and access to power by the group making the claim for
self-determination, combined with systematised protection of individual
rights.’ Eide (1996, p. 6, para 16) highlights a final exception, noting that in
international law, there is no obstacle to self-determination where it can be
achieved through agreement with all parties and where such agreement is
capable of achieving the recognition of the authorities in power. This has
particular relevance in discussion of Quebec’s secession from Canada, as I
shall highlight in the final section of this chapter. In the cases of the NoI
and Q / C, I shall argue that domestic institutions, including the law, have
become associated with the problem rather than the solution. History is not
the key focus of this book, and I shall therefore simply outline some of the
salient facts in order to clarify my argument that domestic law has impacted
negatively on linguistic – and other – matters. I shall first turn to Ireland.
However, since Chapters 2–8 of this book focus in detail on the Irish lan-
guage, this section will be accordingly brief. Following it, I shall turn to a
short description of the Q / C historical relationship.
Some points of Irish history
Irish nationalists within Northern Ireland are not in a similar posi-

tion to minorities created by the independence of colonies within
colonial borders, for the colonial power is still in power.
(Bell 1999, p. 310)
Contextualising the separation of the North from the rest of Ireland, the
current actions of the British government and the highly polarised views
of nationalists8 and unionists9 to the Irish language requires a short exami-
nation of historical factors. English domination of Ireland steered a turbu-
lent and bloody path from military conquest in 1169 onwards, provoking
rebellion and uprising in every century. The imposition of the invaders’
language, coupled with the suppression of that of the conquered is pro-
posed by Spenser (1596), a practice further described by Memmi (1965)
and Freire (1972). Political, economic and legal measures were used to sup-
press the Irish language to ensure greater social, economic and political
control by the English (De Fréine 1978; Curtis 1984, 1994; Mac Síomóin
1994 and Crowley 1996, 2000, 2005). Some, including Edwards (1985) and
Comerford (2003) view linguistic shift from Irish as the result of the free
choice and self-interest of the Irish people. This view is strongly rejected by
others (Gellner 1964; De Fréine 1978; Ó Conaire 1986; Nic Craith 2002) who
emphasise the trauma and internalised self-hatred resulting from language
shift. Kiberd (1995) asserts that language shift is complex and connected
with the interaction, both ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’, of the English and Irish
psyche.
From the early 1600s, the native Irish population was dispossessed in
the plantations of Ireland. In the early 1700s, the Penal Code, a series of
discriminatory laws were imposed on Catholics, Presbyterians and non-
conformists by the Protestant minority (Mac Curtain 2008, p. 337). In
1737, the Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) was introduced,
declaring that English would be the only language permitted in the courts
of Ireland. This law is still actively implemented in the NoI today as noted
in Chapters 5 and 6. In the penal period, agricultural and economic meas-
ures intended to maximise the income of landlords created an artificial
dependency on the potato as staple food of the native population. Potato
blights of 1845–52 devastated the Irish peasant population, over one mil-
lion dying of starvation and related disease whilst the export of Irish crops
and other agricultural produce continued unabated. At least a further esti-
mated 1.5 million Irish people were forced to emigrate, with many dying
before or shortly after reaching their destinations.
Resistance to British rule continued, however. Pressure in the late nine-
teenth century for independence forced the British government to introduce
a series of Home Rule bills. Home rule was opposed by armed and organised
Protestants, most notably in the north-east of Ireland, where the Protestant
population was most numerous. Elliott (2000, p. 453) suggests that nega-
tivity towards the Irish language amongst the Protestant population stems
from the marginalised position of Catholics at this time when the language,
she argues, provided an essential link with an identity under attack. The
emergence of radical social, labour, national, Irish language and women’s
organisations during the early years of the twentieth century culminated
in the 1916 Easter Rising. The rising failed in military terms although the
execution of its remaining leaders by the British galvanised Irish public
opinion. The War of Independence lasted from January 1991 to mid-1921.
As part of its CR strategy of the time, the British government negotiated
a settlement with some of the nationalist leaders. The Treaty divided the
Irish, leading to a bloody and bitter civil war. The combined British and
pro-Treaty forces prevailed and in fulfilment of the Treaty, Ireland was parti-
tioned. Twenty-six counties became the Irish Free State (later the Republic of
Ireland) and Britain retained control of the north-eastern part of the island,
six counties of nine in the ancient province of Ulster, which they named
‘Northern Ireland’.
In the NoI, partition and the Government of Ireland Act 1920 created a
mixture of Catholic disempowerment, economic and social discrimination.
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland
Map 1.1 Map of Ireland showing border established under Government of Ireland
Act 1920
Oiled by British indifference, abusive unionist governance intensely hostile

to all expressions of Irishness prevailed (Livingstone, 1990). By the end of
the 1960s, the refusal to grant the most basic civil rights to the nationalist
population led to escalating violence. In August 1969, the British govern-
ment deployed its army on the streets of the North. By 1971, it had intro-
duced internment without trial, (overwhelmingly targeting the Catholic
population), imposed a curfew on the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast
and among other lethal military actions, shot dead 13 nationalist civilians
in Derry during a civil rights march in 1972. In the face of growing Catholic
outrage, the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act was introduced
by the British parliament, suspending the Northern parliament and impos-
ing direct rule from Westminster.
Livingstone (1990, p. 57) notes that from the 1970s onwards, there were
frequent claims of human rights abuses and says, ‘The fact that many have
either been substantiated or remain unresolved, suggests that the rule of law
is a long way from prevailing in Northern Ireland.’ In spite of the poor legal
basis for challenges and the widespread lack of confidence in the independ-
ence of the judiciary, a number of human rights cases were brought. Some
were lost, others were won but led to snail’s-pace reform rather than rapid
Derry/Londonderry
Antrim
Tyrone
Down
Fermanagh
Armagh
Map 1.2 Outline map showing the North of Ireland with counties
remedial action. Still others yielded judgments that were mired in legalese.
Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard (1975, p. 23) comment, ‘When the guarantors
of civil rights take refuge in technicalities, aggrieved complainants are more
likely to take to the streets.’10 Two Northern Irish human rights solicitors, Pat
Finucane (1989) and Rosemary Nelson (1998) have been murdered amidst
claims of collusion between loyalist11 murder gangs and state forces.
As described further in Chapter 3, many Irish speakers, doubly margin-
alised within a hostile state, directed their efforts to promote the Irish lan-
guage towards bold and unconventional self-help community initiatives.
Andrews (1991), Bardon (2000) and Mac Póilín (1993) have noted hostility
towards the Irish language from the inception of the Northern state, a situ-
ation illustrated in more recent times by Hayes (1995), Bloomfield (1994)
and Needham (1998) in their autobiographies. Elliott (2000) suggests that
the perception continues that Irish is a form of ‘Catholic code,’ whilst Foster
(1988) states that it is to be expected that nationalists see the Irish language
as an expression of identity and belonging. There has been over centuries,
he says, an overlap between opposition to the Irish language and the more
vociferous anti-nationalist / anti-Catholic elements of unionism.
Blaney (1996) has shown that the Irish language was in use by Protestant
planters to Ireland, at times in order to allow them to proselytise to the
native people in their own language. McCoy (2006, p. 151) has cast doubt
upon the expectation that the language be capable of separating itself from
the sectarianism of the state without significant action to redress its status
and context. Hepburn (1996, p. 134) has drawn similar conclusions and
Malcolm (2009) has argued that Protestants should take possession of the
Irish language as part of the North’s shared cultural wealth, an argument
that tallies with those of Ó Snodaigh (1995), Rushe (1921, pp. 25–6), de
Blácam (1935), and Mac Con Midhe (1968). These writers cast doubts on the
presumption that most planters came from English stock, suggesting that a
percentage originated in Gaelic-speaking areas of the Highlands.
As examined later in this chapter, the primacy of Westminster legisla-
tion in security matters, in the courts and the policing and justice systems
of the North, the reality of Direct British rule and the physical presence of
British troops on the streets of the North for such extensive periods in the
current phase of the conflict are direct evidence of British control over all
aspects of its governance. Before I examine the implications of these facts
for the principle of self-determination, however, I shall briefly outline some
aspects of the Quebec-Canada historical background. The historical con-
texts of Ireland and Canada share a number of features, largely because they
have in common the central importance of British influence on economic,
military and CR policies. During the Elizabethan age to the mid-nineteenth
century, both were considered ‘settler’ societies. Writing about the role of
the Protestant Irish in the settlement of Canada pre-famine, Houston &
Smyth (1990, p. 185) point out that British North America was being cre-
ated, ‘in the image of a British colony, not an independent, separate state.’
Contending that, ‘Britain’s first colony had been Ireland,’ they continue,
‘In creating the rules for life in the new environment the tried and proven
Old World models of behaviour and organisation were the prime points
of reference, the main source of inspiration – loyalty, Protestantism and
conservatism.’ Historically, as conflict escalated in Ireland and Canada, the
British adopted varying strategies of containment, in both cases yielding
some ground in order to bolster its overall dominance. In Canada, as I shall
note in the next section, this led to the eventual creation of a confederation
based theoretically on equal partnership between the French- and English-
speaking communities. The reality of modern Quebec – Canada discord has
been shaped by complex colonial interests, by inter- and intra- power rela-
tionships among immigrant groupings and by CR approaches adopted at
this time.
Some points in the history of Quebec and Canada
Federalism is a supremely difficult form of government to oper-

ate. It is not so difficult to create; the problem is in sustaining it.
One of two impulses generally prevails in the long run: the pull
of the centrifugal forces which lead in the direction of disintegra-

tion; or the pull of the integrating forces which move the coun-
try towards an increasingly centralized form of government. One
might say that the health of a federation as a federation depends
on the interplay and balance of these two opposing forces.
Cameron 1974, p. 108
In contrast with the NoI, it has been argued (Morton & Knopff, 2000) that
Canadian society is overly litigious, largely because of the over-representation
of members of the legal profession within the all spheres of political and
public life. For some, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCRF /
CCDL) has provided a framework for remodelling society through consti-
tutional law rather than political activity, whilst for others (Cardinal 2000)
it uses law as a facet of political activity. Lawyers, judges and legal interest
groups in Canada are accused of usurping the role of politics, an accusation
underlined by the upheaval at political levels and the failures of the Meech
Lake Accord in 1990 and of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 to resolve the
issue of Quebec’s position within the federation. Taylor (1993, p. 95) points
out that there is an oppositional element in the relationship of the individ-
ual with the state when that person chooses to seek legal redress on a rights
issue. The more members of a collective identity choose to go that route, the
more obvious the tensions between the majority decision and the minori-
tised group. Thus, when minority groups perceive their welfare as being
poorly defended within the state, they are more likely to pursue resolution
through the law. Be that as it may, the comparison between Canada and the
NoI highlights a stark reality. One of the reasons for the litigious basis of
LLP in Canada and Quebec is the simple fact that domestic legislation, and
particularly language legislation, has been one of the key instruments in
use by both federal and Quebec governments in the last forty years. Unlike
the minoritised Irish language community in the NoI, Quebec has had the
ability to legislate, and has done so.
In 1763, the ceding of New France to the British placed some 75,000 French
colonists in Canada under the rule of a government they saw as foreign,
and with a different dominant religion, language and legal system. In 1791,
Upper Canada was established for some 10,000 people of British descent
whilst Lower Canada was set aside for the other 150,000 of the population,
the Francophones living in the St Lawrence Valley. In July 1867, an alliance
of contrasting forces established the Dominion of Canada, a new British
colony created from the union of Upper and Lower Canada, the provinces of
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia. Chevrier (2003, p. 120) states that, ‘This new
political entity was a unique combination or empire and colony, monarchy
and democracy, federation and unitary state.’
The 1867 Constitution split governmental power between the fed-
eral and provincial levels of government. Pocock (1998) has shown that
amongst North America’s founding fathers, there were few illusions as

to the efficacy of federalism in ancient history. In addition, as Kymlicka
(2005) and McRoberts (2001) note, Canadian federalism has had the
added complexity of two different interpretations of what the found-
ing pact of 1867 means – the Canadian reading and the Quebec read-
ing. More recently, the place of the First Nations in the federation has
resulted in intense debate as to whether the 1867 pact brings together
nations, provinces or peoples (Romney 1999). Various authors have also
sought to define the principles of federalism (Wheare 1963, Elazar 1994,
Delmartino & Deschouwer 1994) whilst others highlight the relation-
ships and interaction between the federal state and federalised compo-
nents thereof (Friedrich 1974, Théret 2005). Riker (1962) points out that
the simple balance sheet approach renders less complex results than an
examination of the more fundamental issues of adoption and mainten-
ance of federal systems. WS Livingstone (1968) warns against mechanistic
or mathematical analysis that fails to take into account the social and
cultural contexts of different forms of federalism.
The establishment of the Dominion was never subjected to popular
approval. For Francophones, the 1867 British North America Act (BNAA)
afforded them equal status with Anglo-Canadians as founding peoples.
This interpretation was, however, ‘systematically rejected or ignored by
many politicians and constitutional lawyers in English Canada’ (Chevrier
2003, p. 121). In fact, as Gagné and Langlois (2002, p. 91) note, the
Constitution effectively vested power in ‘un État-providence’, a state
based upon increasing location of power within each province, and
including the shifting of political influence from the Church to the state.
MacMillan (2003, p. 81) states that the 1867 Constitution was based on
the pragmatic realisation by the British that some language rights must be
ceded to the sizeable Francophone population in order to avoid destabili-
sation. Thus, it re-affirmed the bilingualism measures in the courts that
had been in place in Quebec under British rule, extending them to the
federation. Legislation was to be adopted in both French and English, and
there was to be a guarantee that participants from a range of sectors would
have access to court proceedings through either English or French. The
Constitution also placed a duty upon Quebec to maintain both Catholic
and Protestant schools and ensured that Anglophone Québécois had con-
trol over English language schools. These same provisions were extended
to other provinces.
However, for over one hundred years, Quebec remained the only part
of Canada that made significant provision for bilingualism, in spite of
the fact that its majority population was French-speaking. Although
Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan also had bilingual duties under fed-
eral law, they did not fulfil them. Manitoba proved particularly unsympa-
thetic to the needs of Francophones, declaring English the province’s only
NORTH POLE PÔLE NORD
BOUNDARIES FRONTIÈRES ET LIMITES

International Frontière internationale
Provincial and Territorial Limite provinciale et territoriale
Dividing line (Canada/Kalaallit Nunaat) Ligne de séparation (Canada / Kalaallit Nunaat)
200-mile limit (Exclusive Economic Zone) Limite de 200 milles (Zone Économique Exclusive)
© 2007. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Natural Resources Canada.
Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada, Ressources naturelles Canada. atlas.gc.ca
YU
KO
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CANADA
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N- N-B = Nouveau-Brunswick
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PEI = Prince Edward Island km km
LE OT
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Map 1.3 Map showing Canada with provinces

Source: Reproduced with the permission of Natural Resources Canada 2010, courtesy of the Atlas of Canada
official language in 1890. Although legal challenges led by the Catholic

Archbishop of Manitoba, Langevin, forced it to concede instruction in
French in 1896, this was withdrawn twenty years later to devastating
effect. It was only in 1985 that the Supreme Court of Canada,12 ruling
on a speeding ticket issued only in English, determined that since the
province’s founding document gave equal rights to French and English,
Manitoba would have to translate existing and future legislation into
French for them to be valid.13
In 1897, Ontario made English the only language of the justice system.
In 1913, it severely restricted the teaching of French in Catholic schools14
which, unsurprisingly, Franco-Ontarians interpreted as an indicator of a
systematic policy of assimilation. Alberta was made a province in 1905,
but the Northwest Territories Act which had regulated the region before
the province’s founding was still in effect. Section 110 of the Act provided
for use of English and French in government debates. In 1987, an attempt
to address the Alberta Legislative Assembly in French was ruled out of
order. The resultant furore, including rallies for Francophone rights, raised
the profile of the issue. In February 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada15
ruled that although Section 110 was still in force in both Saskatchewan
and Alberta, the provinces’ assemblies were empowered to modify the
language rights contained within it.16 The Alberta Legislature subse-
quently allowed members to speak in French, but only after notification
and provision in advance of a written translation. In 1931, sovereignty
was granted to the Dominion of Canada by Westminster statute. London,
however, retained many legislative powers, including those which could
affect the Canadian Constitution. For a period of fifty years, between
1931 and 1982, much of the debate around constitutional reform focused
on the ‘patriation’ of the Canadian Constitution, which would restrict to
Canada alone the ability to alter its constitution. The final steps in the
patriation of the constitution were taken directly as a result of Quebec
demands for secession.
In the 1960s, the Preliminary Report of the Canadian Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&BC) identified real disadvantage
in economic and social terms suffered by Francophones in Canada. Not
only did Francophones tend to receive significantly lower wages but they
also were grossly under-represented in government employment and the
federal civil service, and they had fewer or no public services available to
them through the medium of French (Fraser 2006, p. 53). Many Quebec
language planners felt that the clear solution was for Quebec to have full
jurisdiction over language matters in its territory, and for there to be ter-
ritorial protections within Ontario and New Brunswick. Donneur (1975)
and Laponce (1987) have outlined the territorial approach to LPP in
Quebec. Instead, the B&BC called for federal government to recognise for-
mal equality of English and French throughout Canada. Chevrier (2003,
p. 123) notes that in this, ‘The report of the Commission ran counter,
Salluit Kangiqsujuaq
Ungava Bay
Kangirsuk Baie d’Ungava

Kangiqsualujjuaq
PÉNINSULE CANADA
Puvirnituq Tasiujaq
Kuujjuaq
D’UNGAVA
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Radisson Havre-Saint-Pierre Anticosti Island

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QUÉBEC Réservoir
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Sept-Îles
Île d’Anticosti
Wemindji

James Bay
Baie James
QUEBEC Port-Cartier
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Gulf of St Lawrence
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New Madeleine
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Matagami Saint-Félicien
Réservoir Saguenay du-Loup N -
Gouin
Roberval
ONT
Lebel-sur- Baie-
La Quévillon R La Saint-Paul
Sarre S t - M Tuque
ARI
Senneterre au Montmagny
Québec Lévis
Amos Parent r i c
O
Val d’Or Saint-

Rouyn- Shawinigan Thetford Georges
Noranda Mines
Mont- Trois-Rivières Victoriaville
Ville-Marie Laurier Saint-
Drummondville
Maniwaki Hyacinthe LEGEND/LÉGENDE
Sherbrooke
Ot
Témiscaming Montréal Granby Provincial capital/

w
ta
a Fort-Coulonge Saint-Jean-sur- Capitale provinciale

R / Gatineau Richelieu
R d Other populated places/
es
Ou
Salaberry-
t aouais de-Valleyfield Autres lieux habités
- U d’A International boundary/
/É
USA Frontière internationale
Provincial boundary/
Limite provinciale
http://atlas.gc.ca Scale/Échelle
© 2002. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Natural Resources Canada. 100 0 100 200 300
Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada, Ressources naturelles Canada. km km
Map 1.4 Map of Quebec

Source: Reproduced with the permission of Natural Resources Canada 2010, courtesy of the Atlas
of Canada
in its spirit, to what would become later the basis of Quebec’s linguistic
policy.’
The B&BC findings led to the enactment of the Official Languages Act
(LLO / OLA) by the federal government in 1969. With the introduction in 1976
of Quebec’s Law 101, the Charter for the French Language (CFL / CLF),
Canada had two different language planning and policy approaches. Levine
(1990) has detailed the dramatic effect of Quebec’s CFL / CLF on the linguis-
tic gateway city of Montreal. For some, the 1969 federal LLO / OLA had as its
overriding political purpose the shoring up of the power base and longevity
of Anglophone rejectionists in Quebec and of undermining Quebec national-
ism (Lacorne 2003). On the other hand, Quebec’s CFL / CLF attracts consider-
able criticism and is ‘often depicted as an unnecessary, illiberal and capricious
law that promotes, at the expense of interests viewed as fundamental rights,
the rebel language of a minority refusing to jump into the Anglo-American
continental mainstream’ (Chevrier 2003, p. 118).
Throughout the 1970s, Quebec simmered with a combination of
resentment at discrimination based on linguistic, religious and politi-
cal grounds and the energy of a society in the process of massive inter-
nal redefinition. The specifically Canadian consociational model – two
solitudes – had established structured separation and autonomy between
the two culturally distinct elements of Canadian society. However, the
Quiet Revolution saw a new, more secular and more confident middle-
class élite emerging post-World War II with a determination to defend
the French language ‘at home’ (Taylor 1965, Guindon 1990, Levine 1990)
and define the best way forward for the changing Québécois society
(Bourque et Laurin-Frenette 1972, Leslie 1977, Simard 1979). Gagné and
Langlois (2002, p. 130) characterise this new wave as one that, ‘a vécu
dans une certaine prospérité et, sensible à des courants d’idées allant de
l’existentialisme au marxisme en passant par le féminisme radical, [ elle
] a été portée par une éthique du réformisme social basé sur l’expertise
en matière de “besoins” ’ / ‘enjoyed a certain prosperity and influenced
by the flow of ideas went from existentialism to Marxism via radical
feminism, [it] was carried forward by the social reform ethic based on
the expertise in the area of “need” ’ (Author’s translation.) The Parti
québécois (PQ) was the glue that bound the two generations together
in a common vision, creating consternation in the rest of Canada
(ROC) which perceived the PQ to be ‘committed to the dismantling of
the country’ (Rotstein 1995, p. 372). Opinion continued to polarize,
fed by increasing incidents of civil unrest, some Anglophone and oth-
ers Francophone, some spontaneous, and others decidedly less so. As
noted previously, the CFL / CLF was introduced in 1976, transforming
the status of Francophones from ‘minority’ to ‘majority’ within Quebec
overnight. There was an Anglophone backlash. Hundreds of thousands
left Quebec. In 1980, the PQ set a referendum to enable it to negotiate
sovereignty for Quebec and a new political, economic and linguistic rela-
tionship with the rest of Canada. Opponents of secession argued that
a vote against separation would facilitate constitutional amendments
that could address long-standing Quebec grievance. Sixty per cent of
those who voted in the referendum opposed separation and the PQ was
dealt a severe blow. Nevertheless, the party was re-elected the following
year, albeit campaigning on Lévesque’s promise not to hold another ref-
erendum. Latouche (1986), Premdas, Samarasinghe & Anderson (1990),
Buchanan (1991, 1997a, 1997b), Corbeil & Montambault (1990) have
written about the different views on the legitimacy of Quebec secession.
In 1982, the Canadian Constitution was patriated, as noted earlier,
and the Canadian Charter for Rights and Freedoms (CCRF / CCDL)
was adopted. In 1988, it was amended to incorporate the LLO / OLA17
Freidrich (1974), Cardinal (2008) and Foucher (2008) have examined
linguistic rights within a constitutional context. The doctrine of federal
paramountcy means that in the case of conflict between provincial and
federal laws or any part thereof, federal law prevails.18 For many, the rein-
forcing of Canadian constitutional measures simply emphasise the dif-
ferent power bases of Anglo- and Franco-Canadians. Gagné and Langlois
(2002, p. 94) comment that whilst Francophone Québécois society is
undermined by such measures, Anglophone society is not. They contend,
‘Mieux: les Anglos-Québécois appartiennent à une nation qui s’est même
affirmée avec une force nouvelle dans la foulée du nation building canad-
ien impulsé par la Loi constitutionelle de 1982.’ / ‘Better yet: the Anglo-
Québécois belong to a nation that has even reaffirmed itself with new
vigour in the spurt of Canadian nation building brought about by the
1982 Constitutional Law’ (Author’s translation).
Equally significant, Canadian constitutional and LPP measures have cre-
ated or exacerbated tensions between Francophone Québécois and Acadians
and French-speaking clusters in other parts of Canada. Francophones out-
side Quebec have historically felt ‘abandoned’ or categorised as ‘cadavres
encore chauds’ (still-warm corpses).19 Nonetheless, Cardinal (2000, 2008),
Castonguay (1999, 2000, 2008) and Chevrier (2003) assert that federal
language policy, based on the portability or personality principle is inef-
fective, making provision for recognition of language rights only where
numbers warrant. This places vulnerable Francophone minorities in an
‘unhealthy’ relationship of dependence on the state and upon federal legis-
lation. Cardinal (2000) states, ‘The quid pro quo for this federal generosity
toward official-language minorities has been that they accept being used ...
as accomplices in campaigns designed to undermine Quebec’s demands on
language and other matters.’
Canada now has ten provinces and three territories in the federal sys-
tem, each of them with their own constitution. Each can regulate its own
tax system and can also enact legislation. Whilst a number of Canadian
provinces and territories have enacted language legislation, the most com-
prehensive, controversial and important of these remains that of Quebec.
New Brunswick has now adopted the status of a bilingual province. In
addition, in 2009, two pieces of new legislation were introduced to protect
and promote the endangered Inuit language, Inuktitut, in the territory of

Nunavut. The legislation adopts a territorial approach, strengthens the
position of Inuktitut as an official language of the territory and provides
for the appointment of a Language Commissioner. The Nunavut govern-
ment consulted with both the federal Official Languages Commission and
Quebec’s Office québécoise de la langue française (OQLF) in the drafting
of the legislation. They have also made representations to the Canadian
government for federal services in the territory to be delivered through
the medium of the Inuktitut language. However, as yet, no agreement has
been reached on this matter and it remains to be seen what implications
the increasing confidence of Canada’s First Nations will have for LPP for
English and French.
The interface between Quebec and the federalist system of government
in Canada has been the subject of much academic debate, both within and
without Quebec. I shall examine in detail in Chapter 9 the current discus-
sion around the nature and implications of symmetrical and asymmetrical
federalism in Canada. In the next section of this chapter, I shall examine
the impact of international law on the right of Quebec to secede from the
Canadian federation. But first, I shall address the issue of self-determination
in the NoI.
Self-determination in Northern Ireland
As noted earlier, the Government of Ireland Act 1920 provided for a

‘Northern’ Ireland parliament modelled structurally on Westminster, but
with limited legislative powers subject also to review. Hadfield (1992) argues
that the counterpart to this government was to be a similar one in the
South, but the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 put an end
to this approach. In 1937, the Irish Free State, as the 26 counties became
known, established its Constitution, which included substantial protections
for the Irish language within the state. Through Articles 2 and 3, the new
Constitution also claimed sovereignty over the whole island.20 However,
‘pending the reintegration of the national territory’, the Constitution stated
that the parliament, Dáil Éireann, would establish the laws for the Irish Free
State alone. In 1949, the Dáil renounced its dominion status to become the
Republic of Ireland. In 1973, the British government reiterated its own posi-
tion in relation to the status of the North as a part of the United Kingdom
in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act.
Guelke (1985, p. 37) asserts that the issue fundamental to the resolu-
tion of conflict in the North has been ‘the prevailing interpretation of
the principle of self-determination and its emphasis on majority rule.’ The
European Parliament (Haggerup, 1984, p. 37) has conceded that the North is
‘a constitutional oddity’, whilst academics have questioned its international
legitimacy (Wight 1977, p. 153). The main tenets of the argument for the
application of the principle of self-determination to Northern Ireland are

its artificial creation in contrast with the integral political unit of the island
of Ireland in the centuries preceding partition;21 the drawing of bounda-
ries during partition which illegitimates ‘Northern Ireland’ by creating
an unrepresentative political and religious majority,22 the inclusion of the
North in the UK contrary to the express wishes of the majority of the Irish
people at the last all-Ireland elections in 1918, thus imposing a division on
the country constituting a direct denial of the right of self-determination of
the majority of inhabitants within the island.23
Contrasting with this view is the assertion by the UK government that
Northern Ireland is an integral part of the UK, an independent internation-
ally recognised state. Adherence to this interpretation places an obligation
on the international community under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter not to
interfere ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state.’ The opportunity to interpret the principle of self- determination
with specific reference to the contrasting positions on Northern Ireland
arose in August 1969. Escalating state violence against Civil Rights cam-
paigners and the nationalist community in the North brought demands
from within Taoiseach Jack Lynch’s Cabinet for intervention by the Irish
army. The Irish government instead requested an urgent meeting with the
UN Security Council prior to which it publicised its intention to ask the
Security Council to send a UN peace-keeping force to the North. Under
Article 2(7), the British government objected to the inclusion of the issue
on the agenda. Guelke (1985, p. 42) states, ‘The Security Council ducked
the question of whether the disturbances were a domestic matter simply by
voting to adjourn but this effectively killed the Irish initiative.’ A further
attempt by the Irish government to raise the matter through the agenda of
the General Assembly also failed.24 The Irish army did not intervene mili-
tarily in the North and no other attempts were made by the Irish govern-
ment to draw the UN into the issue. Guelke (1985, p. 42) suggests this may
have been to avoid the danger of a negative ruling. Whatever the reasons for
the lacklustre approach, the argument posed by the British government that
the North is an integral part of the UK failed to reassure unionists through-
out the period up to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), perhaps because
although it has remained the UK’s consistent position, its permanence has
not been made explicit.25
In fact, the Irish government’s timid action in 1969 can be interpreted as a
token challenge not to foreign rule in the North, but rather to Britain’s poor
conflict management practice of the time. However, the raising of govern-
ance and policing swung the Irish government into the orbit of internal and
external self-determination, perhaps rather against its wishes. Whatever the
reality, the Irish government’s approach sent out rather mixed messages to
both domestic protagonists and to the international community. On the
one hand, the Republic of Ireland, with Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution
laying claim to all the territory, the islands and the seas of the island of
Ireland had taken a step to assert its right to make representations. On the
other hand, these representations were utterly ineffective and were not
pursued; undermining the constitutionally competing claims of the UK
and Ireland and calling into question the seriousness of the Irish govern-
ment. The ambivalence of successive Irish governments in respect of NoI
has undoubtedly been a contributory factor in the uncertain international
acceptance of the North as an integral part of the UK.
Leaving the matter of military action aside, the Irish government was
arguably in a position to make a much stronger political stand, based not
simply on the historical arguments and its own Constitution but also on
the basis of a different, more expansive reading of self-determination as the
final decades of the twentieth century passed. If external self- determination
is defined as the ‘status of a people in relation to another people,’ inter-
nal self-determination focuses on the ‘relationship between a people and
“its own” state or government’ (Thornberry 1993, pp. 101–2). Internal
self- determination is viewed as a process rather than a one-off action cre-
ating independence and is intimately connected with the issues of demo-
cratic practice, fair representation and good governance (Bell 2000, p. 165,
Thornberry 1993, Crawford 1993). The Irish government and nationalists
seeking to have the principle of self-determination applied to the North had
clear grounds to argue their case. This understanding may have contributed
to the request by the Irish government for the examination of how a solu-
tion to the Northern Irish situation might be shaped using international
instruments (Eide 1996). It is necessary, however, to note that whilst the
common connection in international law instruments between equal rights
and the legitimacy of states strengthens the arguments of nationalists in
the North, Thornberry (1993, p. 118) cautions that ‘international law is not
a suicide pact for states’ and is unlikely to be applied in a manner that will
endanger hegemonic interests. Ambiguity in international law is more often
advantageous to the strong than to the weak.
Current self-determination interpretations are a conundrum which may in
part contribute to the emergence of ‘solutions’ that stop short of autonomy.
With the issue of self-determination for the NoI effectively shelved, over a
period of thirty years Irish protagonists in the conflict eventually engaged
with more partial solutions. The GFA exploits the imprecise nature of inter-
national law terminology and emphasises internal self- determination. The
devolved institutions and mechanisms put in place in establishing the
Stormont26 government and its Executive27 are similar in many aspects to
those of the short-lived 1974 Sunningdale period of shared government,
rejected by both unionists and nationalists, and brought down by the
Loyalist Workers’ Strike. The GFA disposes entirely with the broad notions
of statehood and sovereignty and instead establishes consociational govern-
mental structures. It guarantees ‘minority’ input within a devolved British
administration (Bell and Cavaunaugh 1999). The GFA makes provision for
constitutional change only with the consent of the ‘majority ‘in two sepa-
rate referenda, North and South, and only then if subsequently in a further
referendum, a majority in the North continue to agree to the change. The
Agreement, having appeared to lock in a double veto, then fudges the pre-
cise mechanism by which consent will be measured,28 an approach which,
as I shall show in the next section, shares something with the Quebec /
Canada conflict.
Self-determination in Quebec
La tâche de la Cour était de clarifier le cadre juridique dans lequel des

décisions politiques doivent être prises ‘en vertu de la Constitution’,
et non d’usurper les prérogatives des forces politiques qui agissent
à l’intérieur de ce cadre ... Dans la mesure où les questions abor-
dées au cours des négociations seraient politiques, les tribunaux,
conscients du rôle qui leur revient dans le régime constitutionnel,
n’auraient aucun rôle de surveillance à jouer.
Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 SCR 217
The task of the Court has been to clarify the legal framework within
which political decisions are to be taken ‘under the Constitution’
and not to usurp the prerogatives of the political forces that operate
within that framework ... To the extent issues addressed in the course
of negotiation are political, the courts, appreciating their proper role
in the constitutional scheme, would have no supervisory role.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217
In spite of the 1980 referendum result, the possibility that Quebec might
indeed secede in future from the Canadian federation was the single most
pressing matter in the country. Patriation provided a framework for Canada
to change its Constitution and incorporate into it a US-style Bill of Rights,
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCRF / CCDL). In 1988, the
Official Languages Act 1969 (LLO / OLA) was amended and integrated into
the CCRF / CCDL, giving constitutional status to the OLA’s approach to
language rights. The CCRF / CCDL created the possibility of legal challenge
to any and all provincial laws. It also declared that French and English must
be treated equally, in spite of the threatened circumstances of the French
language in a North American linguistic context.
In the 1994 Quebec election, Jacques Parizeau’s PQ secured a 5 per cent
increase in votes, taking 77 of the 125 seats. The date of 30 October 1995
was set for the secession referendum, with attempts by Quebec federalists
to ban it failing.29 In December 1994, the PQ presented a draft Bill incor-
porating its plan for secession should the referendum vote be won. The
ROC debated fiercely what would happen if the vote were won by separa-
tists. Some felt that without Quebec, Canada would be ‘free’ to revert to
a core English-Canadian identity (Resnick 1994). Others felt that even if
the principle of self-determination was found applicable to Quebec, other
Canadians would not accept this (Vegh 1992, Williams 1992, Finkelstein &
Coyne 1995,30 Monahan 1995). Others queried whether if Quebec was
found to have no right to unilaterally secede, should the rest of Canada
simply exclude Quebec. Ironically, it appeared that public opinion would
be rather more supportive of forcing Quebec to remain within the federa-
tion. If Quebec seceded, English Canadians would feel a ‘sense of loss or
bitterness or both.’ Clearly, the partnership arrangement would have failed
and moreover, the rest of Canada would have to deal with, ‘a new condi-
tion filled with uncertainties that most of its residents neither desired nor
anticipated’ (McRoberts 1995, pp. 406, 409).
In the event, the referendum, based on the issue of sovereignty with an
optional partnership with Canada, was lost by a tiny margin, with only 1
per cent more of the voters opting to remain part of the Canadian federa-
tion than those voting to separate. Post-vote, sovereigntists accused the fed-
eral government of financial corruption31 and vote manipulation through
the fast tracking of tens of thousands of citizenship applications in order to
counterbalance the vote for separation. The controversial manner in which
the allegations were expressed and reported by the Anglophone media cost
Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau his position.32 The referendum verdict cre-
ated a conundrum for all parties. Whilst the result was tantalisingly close,
the PQ feared the negative fallout of a further failed referendum. Federal
government was relieved that the vote had been lost, but unsure of the
way that Quebec would pursue the issue. Meanwhile, a further court chal-
lenge was lodged by Quebec lawyer, Guy Bertrand, asking that any further
referenda on sovereignty should be disbarred.33 The challenge was with-
drawn when federal Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, initiated a request for an
advisory opinion on the application of the principle of self-determination
under international law in the case of Quebec and on the province’s right
to secede unilaterally from the federation. In what Choudhry and Howse
(2000, p. 166) call, ‘a brilliant institutional wager’, Chrétian sought a ruling
on which would take precedence if there was conflict between domestic and
international law on the question of secession. His confrontational response
was viewed as a further sign of federal Canada’s unwillingness to negotiate.
Indeed, for some, the reference to the Supreme Court was ‘one of the key
elements in a series of politically calculated moves made by the Chrétien
government intended to counteract both the sovereigntist threat and the
appearance of federalist ineptitude in the face of that threat’ (Schneiderman
1999, 1). A very high percentage of Québécois had voted for separation,
yet it appeared that Chrétien had adopted an antagonistic and legalistic
approach rather than make a conciliatory gesture in the search for a con-
sensual approach (Laponce 2003, p. 303). In effect, Chrétien was interposing
the court between his government and the necessity of negotiation with
Quebec.
Predictably, since the action had been instigated by those fundamentally
opposed to secession, Quebec refused to participate in the proceedings initi-
ated by Chrétien’s government. In its ruling,34 the Court found that unilat-
eral secession would be unlawful in that it would contravene the authority
of the constitution as supreme law of Canada and would also usurp federal
powers not within the remit of provincial governments. The ruling simi-
larly rejected Quebec’s right of self-determination under international law.
Arguably, the detail of the judgment not only reveals the contradictions in
international law which I have highlighted previously, it also appears to
make use of the same conflicted arguments in order to frame any future
Quebec claim within a particular context. The ruling states,
Même s’il est certain que la majeure partie de la population du Québec

partage bon nombre des traits qui caractérisent un peuple, il n’est pas
nécessaire de trancher la question de l’existence d’un “peuple”, quelle
que soit la réponse exacte à cette question dans le contexte du Québec,
puisqu’un droit de sécession ne prend naissance en vertu du principe
de l’autodétermination des peuples en droit international que dans le
cas d’ “un peuple” gouverné en tant que partie d’un empire colonial,
dans le cas d’ “un peuple” soumis à la subjugation, à la domination ou
à l’exploitation étrangères, et aussi, peut-être, dans le cas d’ “un peuple”
empêché d’exercer utilement son droit à l’autodétermination à l’intérieur
de l’État dont il fait partie.
Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec,
[1998] 2 SCR 217 (Emphasis added)
Although much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the

characteristics of a people, it is not necessary to decide the ‘people’ issue
because, whatever may be the correct determination of this issue in the con-
text of Quebec, a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-
determination of people at international law where ‘a people’ is governed
as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is subject to alien subjuga-
tion, domination or exploitation; and possibly where ‘a people’ is denied
any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the
state of which it forms a part.
Reference [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Ofﬁcial English
language version, emphasis added)
In effect, the Court acknowledges its intention to sidestep making ‘the cor-
rect determination’ in respect of the Québécois identification as a people
by arguing that even if it were valid, the right of self-determination would
not apply. Of course, a clear ruling on the matter of the Québécois as a
people might have obviated the need for any past or future referenda. The
Supreme Court would, in effect, have decided whether or not Quebec was
indeed a distinct nation simply by dint of its ruling on the legality of any
future attempt to secede. In doing so, it would also have established a legal
precedent in respect of existing international law standards and provided
an important interpretation of the right of self-determination within the
current contradictory international framework. Of course, this may be pre-
cisely why the Court veered from this path. Instead, the ruling moved on
to rebuff Quebec secession on the basis of abuse of rights. It noted, ‘Le
Québec ne constitue pas un peuple colonisé ou opprimé, et on ne peut pas
prétendre non plus que les Québécois se voient refuser un accès réel au
gouvernement pour assurer leur développement politique, économique,
culturel et social.’ / ‘Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial
people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers
have been denied meaningful access to government to pursue their politi-
cal, economic, cultural and social development’ (Official English language
version).
Crucially, however, the court ruled that should Quebec decide by refer-
endum to secede, the members of the federation ‘n’auraient aucune raison
valable de nier au gouvernement du Québec le droit de chercher à réaliser
la secession’ / ‘would have no basis to deny the right to the government of
Quebec to pursue secession.’ This is an interesting finding which counter-
balances perfectly the assertion that unilateral secession would be unlawful
in domestic and international law. It would appear to reinforce the status of
Quebec as an entity entitled to exercise the right of self-determination under
certain circumstances, which whilst they might prove difficult to clarify
politically, are none too arduous legally. Ruling that the four fundamental
tenets of the Canadian Constitution, democracy, constitutionalism and the
rule of law, federalism and protection for minorities could not be separated
from each other, the ruling stated that in the event of a ‘une majorité claire
en réponse à une question claire’ / a clear majority on a clear question,’’ the
ROC would have to enter negotiations on the terms of Quebec independ-
ence. Neither the precise meaning of ‘une majorité claire’ / ‘a clear majority’
nor ‘une question claire’ / ‘a clear question’ was defined. Instead, the Court
specified that this would be a matter for politicians to decide. Both sup-
porters of secession and those opposed to it welcomed some aspects of the
Supreme Court ruling, although this approach may owe more to realpolitik
than considered legal or political evaluation. Schneiderman (1999, p. 6) in
fact reports some sovereigntists comparing the Court ruling to the Tower of
Pisa, that is, leaning significantly in one direction – in their view, towards
the federal position. Ten years after the Supreme Court’s opinion, Newman
(2008, p. 1) says, ‘The brilliance of the Supreme Court’s ruling (...) lies in
the Court’s having had the vision to wed the value of constitutional legality
with that of political legitimacy.’
The value of peace and the silence of war
Our society sees peace as a core value, yet finds it hard to define and harder
to achieve. Linguistic equality is a neglected area, and language is often used
as a bargaining chip in the larger processes. Bell’s assessment (2003: xiii) of
the importance of justice and fair treatment in CR is appropriate to LPP in
both Quebec and the NoI. She says that the manner in which the rights
components of a peace agreement are implemented, ‘determines the nature
and direction of transition, and whether or not that direction is towards
liberal democracy, towards a new discriminatory hegemony, or towards an
unstable limbo, which at best is less violent than what went before.’ In rela-
tion to the CR process in the NoI, Ruane (1999) has interrogated whether
the GFA represents ‘the end of history.’ In Chapters 2–8, I shall investigate
whether the GFA can indeed be termed a ‘solution’ or rather a further chap-
ter in an ongoing conflict. In respect of Quebec and Canada, ten years after
the second Quebec referendum on secession, Fraser (2006, p. 306) reiterates
the questions put to Canadians by the B&BC forty years before. He asks,
‘Can English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians live together, and
do they want to do so?’ The answer, he states, ‘will determine whether, and
how, Canada survives.’ In Chapter 9, I shall describe the current position of
LPP in federal Canada and in Quebec and examine their interaction since
the 1995 Quebec referendum on secession. Perhaps the examination of LLP
and CR in the NoI and in Q / C will enable the reader to assess the validity
of Foucault’s proposal, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that history
is nothing but the story of conflict and politics, nothing but the waging of
a kind of silent war.
2
The Irish Language in the North of
Ireland: Statistics
The Irish language is an integral part of the social, cultural and economic
identity of Ireland as a whole. As noted earlier, LPP as it affects Irish is formu-
lated in two different jurisdictions by two different governments, each with
distinct goals in relation to the language and the political, social and cultural
circumstances in which it exists, North and South. Since the 1998 Good Friday
Agreement (GFA), a changing conflict resolution (CR) context in the North
has been trumpeted and in Chapters 2–8 of this book I shall examine to what
extent, and in what manner, these changes have impacted on the protection
and promotion of Irish in the NoI. As discussed in the next chapter, the lan-
guage provisions contained in the text of the GFA focus on the British govern-
ment alone, placing no specific LPP duties on the Irish government.
Certain of the arrangements deriving from CR talks of the late 1990s sig-
nal an all-Ireland approach to LPP, of course. Most notable of these is the
establishment of an all-Ireland language body, an Foras Teanga,1 answer-
able jointly to the South’s Roinn Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta /
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (RGPTG / DCRGA)
and the North’s Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL). Foras na
Gaeilge, the Irish language component of the language board, therefore
not only carries great responsibility for effective LPP for Irish, but also its
structural relationship with the two governments makes it a two-way con-
duit whereby British / unionist influence can be exerted on LPP North and
South. Of course, Irish government policy can also flow back into the North.
However, perhaps unforeseen in the GFA negotiations, this may also have an
adverse effect. When the Irish government unilaterally cut the budget2 of
An Foras Teanga in 2002, under the agreed proportional funding formula,
the British government immediately, and unsurprisingly, followed suit.
As discussed later, there were indications in 2009 that severe cut-backs to
Irish government spending proposed by the McCarthy Commission3 might
impact directly and indirectly on Irish in the North: directly through Foras
na Gaeilge, indirectly through cuts to neighbouring Gaeltacht areas and cuts
to TG4, the Irish language television channel. As discussed in Chapter 5,
38
Irish Language in the NoI 39
TG4 is funded solely by the RoI, but its transmission in the North has been
the subject of complex negotiations since the GFA. Thus, it is not simply
‘favourable’ LPP emanating in the South that can impact on Irish speakers in
the North. Broader economic contexts, poor practice, RoI-centric approaches
combined with a lack of adequately defined LPP responsibilities in relation
to the North can all have detrimental effects. Of course, one can argue that
these are factors in LPP anywhere. However, in Ireland, the legacy of colo-
nialism and partition is an unresolved democratic deficiency. Irish speakers
in the South may impact directly on their political representatives. In the
North, this is a more complex issue.
In Chapter 6, I shall explore the effect of continuous unionist control of
the North’s DCAL throughout both periods of devolved government to date,
which as noted may be perceived to interfere in Southern LPP through the
CR structures agreed in the GFA. Undoubtedly, however it is in the North
that unionist control impacts most. Not only does it institutionalise within
the consociational devolved institutions the formulation of hostile LPP, but
in addition, it exacerbates the disenfranchising of Northern Irish speakers,
left with little effective mechanism to advance positive LPP appropriate to
their own circumstances.
To establish some statistical indicators relative to the position of Irish, in
this chapter, I shall examine evidence of growth of the Irish speaking com-
munity in NoI, with brief references to RoI census statistics also. I shall refer
to the figures from the last three NI censuses, that is, 1911, 1991 and 2001,
in which there were specific questions about the Irish language. Finally,
to facilitate understanding of the policy context that will be referred to in
later chapters, I shall comment on the statistical information in respect of
the Ulster Scots and ethnic minority language communities in the North.
In the final section of this chapter, I shall briefly explore developments in
relation to Irish in education.
Irish on the island of Ireland
The dependability and interpretation of census figures is often a subject for

debate and controversy, as I shall note in Chapter 9 in respect of Q / C. In
spite of some critical analysis, the census remains the basis for social plan-
ning on a range of areas including language. The 2006 Census in the South
of Ireland4 shows 1,656,790 people who regard themselves as having good
Irish (41.9 per cent of the total population). Of these 538,283 (32.5 per cent)
indicate that they speak Irish on a daily basis.5
The Northern Irish censuses: 1991, 2001
In 1991, for the first time since 1911, the NI census forms contained a ques-
tion on the Irish language. It asked, ‘Can the person speak, read or write
Irish?’ and allowed space to respond to each of these questions or to indi-

cate ‘Does not know Irish’. The information gathered affords useful statistics
but very limited information on fluency and frequency of use of Irish. Nic
Craith (2003, p. 85) states that the limited scope of the census questions
does not however make the results of the 1991 and 2001 Censuses unreli-
able. She notes, ‘As a minimum, these figures illustrate a very positive atti-
tude towards the language.’
Growth of the Irish speaking community in NI
The figures returned in 1991 show an increase since 1911 (see Table 2.1)
from 2.3 per cent of the population who indicate knowledge of Irish, to 9.45
per cent. A total of 142,003 people indicate in the 1991 Census that they
know Irish as opposed to 28,725 in 1911.
Comparison of the 1991–2001 Censuses
The 2001 Census forms contained an additional Irish language skills ques-
tion: Could the respondent understand Irish? The 2001 Census does not
therefore substantially increase available information, but it does make for
added complication in the direct comparison of the figures from 1991 to
2001. It is possible, however to note some trends in the 2001 figures. In
2001, 167,490 people had knowledge of Irish compared with the 1991 figure
of 142,003 (see Table 2.2). This represents 10.4 per cent of the population of
the North, a significant proportion.
McLeod (2006, p. 28) notes that ‘a density of 8 per cent minority lan-
guage speakers’ has been used ‘as a benchmark for designating a particular
district as bilingual’ in Swedish speaking areas of Sweden and has further
pointed out that the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 applies through-
out Scotland, where the density of Scottish Gaelic speakers is 1.2 per cent
(McLeod 2006, p. 28). De Varennes (1996, p. 181) comments that the Draft
Protocols to the International Convention on the Protection of National or
Ethnic Minorities or Groups has also attempted to quantify the percentage
Table 2.1 1911 and 1991 Census: Figures and percentages of overall population
with knowledge of Irish
1911 Census 1991 Census
Total population 1,250,031 1,502,385

Knowledge of Irish 28,725 142,003
Percentage (2.30%) (9.45%)
Source: Northern Ireland Statistics website: www.nisra.gov.uk

of the population required in order for official status to be given to their

preferred language. These are, in administrative or judicial districts, ‘at least
6 per cent, or in larger administrative entities, at least 5 per cent of the res-
iding population.’ Canada has a rather complex variable cross referencing
process in respect of the two Official languages (English and French).6 This
comprises either the total number or the percentage of speakers of either of
the English or French and also the type of service to be provided. Most bilin-
gual federal government services are made available when the population in
a census sub division includes 5 per cent of speakers of the official language
minority, or in the case of major cities of over 100,000 people, when the
minoritised community constitutes 5,000 individuals.
In half of the district ward areas of the North the overall percentage
of 10.4 per cent is surpassed, in some cases to a significant degree (see
Table 2.3). Magherafelt district shows 17.54 per cent, Dungannon shows
19.10 per cent and Newry and Mourne shows 20.41 per cent of the total
population of the district having knowledge of Irish. The indicative pattern
of these figures shows a consistent increase across all geographic areas of the
North in knowledge of Irish. This includes small but significant increases
in those district ward areas not traditionally associated with the language,
for example, in Ards, Castlereagh, Coleraine, Larne, Newtownards and
North Down.
There are, however, five district ward areas (Armagh, Cookstown, Derry,
Down and Dungannon) where one would expect to see the same pattern of
growth but which in fact shows a slight fall in numbers indicating know-
ledge of Irish. The NI Statistics and Research Agency have indicated that
Table 2.2 2001 Census: Knowledge and skills in Irish
Understands spoken Irish 36,479

but cannot read, write or
speak Irish
Speaks but does not read or 24,536
write Irish
Speaks and reads but does 7,183
not write Irish
Speaks, reads, writes and 75,125
understands Irish
Other combination of skills 24,167
Has knowledge 167,489 10.4%
of Irish
All persons 1,617,957 100.0%
NB: Ability to speak, read or write Irish does not imply ability to understand spoken Irish unless
stated. Persons in these categories may or may not have the ability to understand Irish.
Table 2.3 2001 Census figures: Percentage comparison (1991–2001) in respect of

District ward areas in NI
Numbers indicating knowledge of Irish as a percentage

District ward area of population
1991 2001
Antrim 6.53 7.87
Ards 2.27 3.02
Armagh 14.41 14.l7
Banbridge 5.56 6.15
Belfast 10.86 13.57
Ballymena 4.42 4.99
Ballymoney 5.31 7.03
Carrickfergus 1.58 1.95
Castlereagh 2.53 4.28
Coleraine 3.96 6.26
Cookstown 15.84 14.41
Craigavon 8.99 10.44
Derry 16.67 13.75
Down 10.12 9.79
Dungannon 23.22 19.10
Fermanagh 11.92 12.88
Larne 3.65 4.40
Limavady 7.63 10.84
Lisburn 6.08 7.84
Magherafelt 16.83 17.54
Moyle 12.03 14.37
Newtownards 2.83 4.33
Newry and Mourne 18.92 20.41
North Down 2.10 2.67
Omagh 15.41 16.19
Strabane 9.87 11.76
in its view, this is due to a specific change in data analysis between the
1991 and 2001 Census. In 1991, students were recorded at their home
addresses whilst in 2001, it was decided that as they were more likely to
draw upon services more intensively when at their term time address, they
were recorded at this address.7
Knowledge versus fluency
Belfast district area

Belfast, with an overall population of 267,716, shows the greatest concen-
tration of people indicating knowledge of Irish, with 36,317 responding
Table 2.4 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten Wards with highest percentage of Irish
indicated: Comparative figures on those indicating knowledge of Irish and those
with ability in full skills range
Belfast top ten wards People indicating People indicating they can read,
in terms of Irish knowledge of Irish write, speak and understand Irish
Andersonstown 5,605 1,669

Ardoyne 6,268 1,289
Beechmount 5,277 1,453
Botanic 9,605 2,578
Glencolin 6,769 2,052
Stranmillis 7,434 1,332
Falls Park 5,681 1,693
Ladybook 6,152 1,671
Glen Road 5,671 1,848
Clonard 4,233 1,187
Table 2.5 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten wards with lowest percentage of Irish
indicated: Comparative figures on those indicating knowledge of Irish and those
with ability in full skills range
Belfast bottom ten People indicating a People indicating they can read,
wards in terms of Irish knowledge of Irish write, speak and understand Irish
Woodvale 4,439 90
Stormont 5,370 94
Orangefield 5,294 92
Knock 4,859 83
Crumlin 4,238 92
Shankill 3,624 105
Belmont 5,801 105
Cherryvalley 5,737 118
Ballysillan 5,813 139
Blackstaff 3,827 121
positively. A breakdown of the ten wards where most people indicate know-
ledge of Irish, with a comparative figure for those indicating some compe-
tence in all four listed skills produces some interesting results (See Table 2.4).
Even in the ten areas with the lowest statistical indications of knowledge
of Irish, there are still people who indicate competence in all four listed lan-
guage skills (See Table 2.5).
Knowledge of Irish by age
The direct comparison of detailed breakdown of knowledge of Irish by age

between 1991 and 2001 is compromised by the additional category in the
later census (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). However, the 2001 Census appears to
show the ongoing results of the revival of the Irish language in the younger
age groups (see Table 2.7). It found that people aged 12–15 were the most
likely to have some knowledge of Irish, followed by people aged 16–24.
Those aged 75 and over were least likely to have some knowledge of Irish.
Excluding children aged 3–11, knowledge of Irish decreases with age, con-
firming the nature of Irish as a revitalised language.
Knowledge of Irish by gender

In common with the 1991 Census, the representation of women to men in
the 2001 figures remains slightly higher in favour of women (see Table 2.8).
Women appear to be in a slight majority in all categories and across all reli-
gious backgrounds (see Table 2.9).
Table 2.6 1991 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age
Age
3–11 12–15 16–24 25–39 40–59 60–74 + 75 All
Speak, read and 5,678 15,934 18,597 19,186 13,209 5,141 1,267 79,012
write Irish (4.5%) (12.6%) (14.7%) (15.2%) (10.4%) (4.1%) (1.0%) (100%)
Table 2.7 2001 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age (All persons), Table population: All
persons aged 3 and over (and column percentages)
Age 3–11 12–15 16–24 25–39 40–59 60–74 + 75 All
Some 13,710 25,662 33,874 39,784 36,772 12,735 4,953 167,490

knowledge (6.1%) (23.8%) (16.0%) (10.7%) (9.0%) (6.5%) (4.9%) (10.4%)
No 209,420 81,954 177,608 332,076 370,185 184,045 95,179 1,450,467
knowledge (93.9%) (76.2%) (84.0%) (89.3%) (91.0%) (93.5%) (95.1%) (89.6%)
All persons 223,130 107,616 211,482 371,860 406,957 196,780 100,132 1,617,957
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

Table 2.8 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women and men with knowl-
edge of Irish
Knowledge of Irish Speaks, reads, writes and understands Irish
Women 87,632 (10.5%) 39,860

Men 79,858 (10.1%) 35,265
Table 2.9 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women and men with knowledge
of Irish according to religion
Knowledge of Irish Catholic Protestant and other Christian
Overall figure 154,622 10,987

Women 80,679 6,136
Men 73,943 4,851
As I shall note in the next chapter, however, Donoghue (2004, p. 32)8 has
shown that in the Irish language voluntary sector in the North, women are
outnumbered on committees at a ratio of 1:5, over twice as high as the unfa-
vourable ratio in Southern Irish language voluntary organisations.
Knowledge of Irish by community background

In the North, this is a key issue in perceptions, policy and practice in rela-
tion to the Irish language. Once more, the nature of the question asked in
1991 and 2001 makes direct comparison difficult. Nonetheless, it appears
clear from both censuses that nationalists / Catholics are more likely to have
knowledge of Irish than unionists / Protestants (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11).
Thus, in examining the figures in respect of knowledge of Irish by com-
munity background, we can note that by 2001 there was an increase in
knowledge of Irish in all categories, including small increases in all of the
non-Catholic or non-religious categories (see Table 2.11).
In spite of the difficulties of interpretation of census figures over differ-
ent periods, it appears that there has been incremental growth in the Irish
speaking community, particularly in the younger age groups. In the ten-
year period between censuses there are consistent patterns suggesting small
increases in traditionally non-Irish speaking sections of the community
and geographic areas, both at District and Ward level. However, there has
been little substantial impact on the differentials between Protestants and
Catholics with knowledge of Irish. Catholics (22.2 per cent) are still more
likely to have knowledge of Irish than Protestants and ‘other Christians’
Table 2.10 1991 Census: knowledge of Irish by religion, Table population: All persons
aged 3 years and over (and column percentages)
Some knowledge Irish speakers as %

of Irish of total population
Catholic 126,626 22.15

Presbyterian Church in Ireland 1,614 0.50
Church of Ireland 2,012 0.75
Methodist Church in Ireland 296 0.52
Total other (including no 11,455 4.09
religion or none stated)
All persons 142,003 9.45
Table 2.11 2001 Census: knowledge of Irish by religion: Table population: All persons
aged 3 years and over (and column percentages)
Knowledge of Irish speakers as percentage

Irish of total population
Catholic 144,346 22.2

Presbyterian 3,608 1.1
Church in Ireland
Church of Ireland 3,146 1.3
Methodist 634 1.1
Church in Ireland
Total other (including no 15,755 4.8
religion or none stated)
(3.5 per cent); Catholics are more likely to speak Irish (29 per cent) than
Protestants (3 per cent). Nationalists (31 per cent) are more likely to speak
Irish than either unionists (2 per cent) or those classified as neither nation-
alist nor unionist (12 per cent).9 These statistics would appear to support the
need for a range of initiatives, including the teaching of Irish in Protestant
schools, led by government and involving public, private and community
sectors as well as civil society to address the historic demographic disparities
in respect of opportunity to learn and attitudes towards the Irish language.
Statistics relating to other communities in the North
The importance of the protection and promotion of the Irish language is

often counterbalanced by demands for identical measures for Ulster Scots
or by direct comparison with the need to provide access to services for

users of ethnic minority languages. Given the frequent recurrence of these
matters in a range of policy and social areas, in the next section, I shall
examine the available statistics on the Ulster Scots and ethnic language
population.
Ulster Scots
To date, the census in the North has not collected data about Ulster Scots,
although as noted in Chapter 4, this may change in 2011. At present, how-
ever, there are few official figures for Ulster Scots. As a basis for its own
policy and practice and in respect of advice given to other departments
and bodies (DCAL 2004 Guidance), the DCAL uses figures on Ulster Scots
collated from the 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey based on a
representative sample of 2,200 adults. The survey then extrapolates overall
figures, based on the small sample, and gives a calculation of some 30,000
people in the North with knowledge of Ulster Scots. As only two per cent
of respondents to this survey identified themselves as Ulster Scots speakers,
the profiles of Ulster Scots speakers used by DCAL are based therefore on 43
respondents (see Table 2.12).
The Life and Times Survey provides data for adults only, and contains
information on both Irish and Ulster Scots. Unlike the census, the survey
simply asks whether a respondent can ‘speak’ Irish or Ulster Scots. Since
we can draw on the statistically more representative information from the
census in respect of Irish, it is sufficient to note that the 1999 Life and Times
Survey reflects a high level of concurrence with 2001 Census data in rela-
tion to knowledge of Irish. For example, the 1999 Life and Times Survey
found that, broadly speaking, the younger the age group, the higher the pro-
portion of Irish speakers; the youngest age group (18–24) was the most likely
to speak Irish and people aged 65 and over were the least likely; it revealed
similar proportions of males (14 per cent) and females (13 per cent) who
could speak Irish; it showed that nationalists (31 per cent) were more likely
to speak Irish than unionists or those not categorised as either nationalist
or unionist (12 per cent).
Table 2.12 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Figures and percentages
with knowledge of Ulster Scots and gender breakdown
Speak US Total Percentage
All 43 2200 2
Gender
Men 25 940 3
Women 18 1260 1
Figures and gender

Of the 43 respondents to the Life and Times Survey who indicated that they
spoke Ulster Scots (see Table 2.12), men (3 per cent) were marginally more
likely to speak Ulster Scots than women (1 per cent).
Age
As Table 2.13 shows, people aged 65 and over were the most likely to have
knowledge of Ulster Scots (3 per cent) and the youngest group (18–24) was
the least likely (1 per cent).
As shown in Table 2.14, the Life and Times Survey also revealed that
Protestants were more likely (2 per cent) to have knowledge of Ulster
Scots than Catholics (1 per cent). The same survey did not significantly
indicate that unionists or nationalists were relatively any more or less
likely to have knowledge of Ulster Scots, although in absolute terms there
were more unionists than nationalists with knowledge of Ulster Scots (see
Table 2.15).
Given the lack of information based on a larger sample of the population,
it is difficult to give credence to the many ‘guesstimates’ made as to the
overall figures of Ulster Scots speakers in the North, which vary between
30,000 and 200,000. Falconer (2005, p. 85) suggests there are 30,000 speak-
ers. He says that his calculation is based on ‘... the c. 30,000 speakers of
“Ulster-Scots” identified by the 1999 NI Life and Times Survey, the number
of Scots-born residents according to the 2001 NI Census, and the 1996 esti-
mate by the General Register Office for Scotland that 30 per cent of Scots
residents (c. 1.5 million) are users of the language.’ At the more extreme end
of the scale, the Scotch-Irish website quotes unnamed ‘studies that were
done in the 1960s’ which ‘estimated that there were 200,000 native speak-
ers with 20,000 to 60,000 monoglot speakers and the rest bilingual.’ Since
Ulster Scots is widely seen to be on a spectrum with English, it is unclear
how the terms ‘bilingual’ and ‘monoglot’ are being used in this case.
Table 2.13 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots
by age
Age Knowledge of US Total Percentage
18–24 2 243 1
25–34 7 441 2
35–44 9 444 2
45–54 7 352 2
55–64 5 291 2
65+ 12 418 3
by religion
Religion
Catholics 10 830 1
Protestants 23 1070 2
No religion 7 207 3
by political opinion
Political opinion
Unionist 20 871 2
Nationalist 10 600 2
Neither 11 671 2
Whilst it may be expected that supporters of Ulster Scots are likely to be

generous in their calculations, it appears unusual that government policy
and practice should be based on information obtained solely from such an
exceedingly small survey sample as the 1999 Life and Times Survey. In addi-
tion, as I shall note in Chapter 5, in the absence of an officially accepted
grammar, syntax and structure for Ulster Scots and since it is generally rec-
ognised as being part of a continuum with English, there may be a need
for considerable clarification as to what constitutes an Ulster Scots speaker.
O’Connor (2002, p. 232) points out that there is a political dimension to
the discussion of the existence and status of Ulster Scots in the North. She
says, ‘Many Protestants, including some senior Unionists, are embarrassed
by official approval for a recent invention which is supposed to be a vital
part of their identity.’
Ethnic minority languages

All languages are entitled to respect. Access to public services must be pro-
vided for those from ethnic minorities who do not speak the dominant lan-
guage. However, much international practice in respect of language rights is
based upon recognition of the different circumstances and needs of indig-
enous languages, and in particular of those indigenous languages that are
under threat, as is the Irish language. In the past, the North has not attracted
a particularly high level of immigrants, undoubtedly because of the poor
economic climate and the effect of violent conflict. However, Irish political,
social and economic changes in recent years and increased immigration
from Eastern Europe have changed this to some extent in the past decade.
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA)10 report that since
2004, the overall annual rate of population increase due to migration was
approximately 7,000 per annum. However, no doubt as a result of the global
economic downturn in the late 2000s, in 2007–8, the net migration gain
was 5,700, significantly less than the reported figure of 9,800 for 2006–7.
The 2001 Census therefore reflects a low percentage (1.1 per cent) of peo-
ple from an ethnic minority background. The census forms to date have
contained no questions about languages other than Irish, although as noted
earlier and in Chapter 4, this may change in 2011. No official statistics exist
concerning what other languages ethnic minorities in the North speak, and
no information on what percentage of members of ethnic minority groups
are non-English speaking. Some further information on this point is pro-
vided however by the response to a written parliamentary question on the
comparative numbers of people in NI who on a daily basis speak Irish and
Chinese.11 Lord Rooker cites the 2001 Census figures for Irish and cites 2003
research funded by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
(OFMDFM) and the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) esti-
mating that there are around 8,000 people of Chinese origin in the North,
with around 10 per cent speaking Mandarin and around 80–90 per cent
speaking Cantonese.12 As I shall note later, however, the myth that there are
more ‘Chinese’ speakers than Irish speakers in the North is frequently cited
by opponents of the Irish language. In later chapters, I shall note examples
of the manner in which the entitlement of different language groupings
is counterbalanced in the politically charged atmosphere of the North of
Ireland.
Irish Medium Education in Ireland
Irish Medium Education (IME) in Ireland is based on immersion education,

an internationally recognised method of language learning where children
learn an additional language while being taught other subjects through
the medium of this additional language. The different LPP context for
IME North and South is illustrated by the fact that 86 per cent of the total
number of children in IME are being educated in the South. By September
2008 there were 139 primary schools and 36 post-primary schools in the
SoI (outside of the Gaeltacht areas13). This accounts for some 37,800 chil-
dren who attend IME.14 However, in 2008, a moratorium on new school
development except in designated areas of rapid expansion was imposed by
the South’s Education Minister, Bat Ó Keefe. Proposals from development
committees for seven new IME schools in the RoI, all of them in designated
rapid growth areas, were frozen in spite of significant growth in enrolment
figures up to the year 2013.15
Growth of Irish Medium Education in the North
It was not until 1998 that the Education (Northern Ireland) Order of that
year placed a statutory duty upon the Department of Education (DENI) to
encourage and facilitate the development of IME. In 1991, there were 4 Irish
Medium primary schools. By 2008–9, this has grown to 31. The number
of pre-school establishments also increased to 42 in 2006–7 and to 46 in
2008–9. The number of post-primary settings has not changed, remaining
fixed at three, only one of these being a free-standing IM school.16 Since
2005, a second free-standing IM post-primary school, Coláiste Speirín in
Dungannon, has had formal development proposals refused by both British
Direct Rule Minister Angela Smith (2005) and by devolved SF Minister
Caitríona Ruane (2008). In 2009, the school submitted its third proposal
for recognition but was forced to announce it would not re-open for the
2009–10 term due to lack of funding.
A comparison of figures for 2003–4 and 2006–7 shows steady increases in
the number of schools and pupils in the period (See Tables 2.16 and 2.17).
In addition, the figures also reflect the year by year growth of the number
of primary school pupils from previous years, with Year 7 being the eldest
pupils in primary education and Year 1 being the youngest. Thus, we can see
an increase (Year 7 in Table 2.16) from 197 pupils in IM primary education
in 1997 to 471 pupils in IM primary education in 2007 (Year 1 in Table 2.17).
However, Table 2.18 shows the breakdown of figures at May 2009, prior to
finalisation usually carried out in October of each year. These provisional
figures appear to show a consistent drop in pupil figures from Year 3 to Year
7 in 2009 over the 2007 figures. This decrease, whilst small, is significant,
Table 2.16 2003–4 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school:
With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures
School No. of No. of Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Years
type schools pupils 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8–12
Nursery 38 831 – – – – – –
Primary 28 2117 423 377 322 302 271 215 197
Post- 3 481 136 106 121 87 24 17 – 427
primary
Total 69 3429 423 377 332 302 271 215 197 427
Source: Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta August 2004

Table 2.17 2006–7 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With
Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures
Type schools Pupils 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8–12
Nursery 42 920 359 561 – – – – – –

Primary 32 2542 471 395 384 363 349 311 269
Post- 3 610 119 136 106 121 87 24 17 610
primary
Total 77 4072 471 395 384 363 349 311 269 610
Source: Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta August 2007
Table 2.18 2008–9 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With
Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures
Type schools Pupils 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8–12
Nursery 46 998 – – – – – –
Primary 31 2,745 481 453 426 369 359 335 322 –
Post- 3 633 633
primary
Total 80 4,376 481 453 426 369 359 335 322 633
Source: Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta May 2009
and should it be upheld in the verified figures to be prepared in autumn

2009, the precise cause should be identified.
The Report of the Chief Inspector (2009, p. 43) records that in recent
years there has been a ‘slow down in the growth of the IM primary sector’
but it states that this ‘has allowed for consolidation.’ However, it offers no
further information to clarify this assertion, and it is difficult therefore to
state with certainty whether a more proactive developmental approach to
the sector in the same period could have yielded similar levels of consolida-
tion whilst also allowing for an expanded rate of growth. In 2008 Review
of Irish Medium Education highlights the issue of poor schools accommo-
dation and viability criteria (DENI 2008, pp. 73–6) both of which have dis-
proportional impact on IME, particularly in rural areas and in relation to
post-primary provision (DENI 2008, pp. 77–85). Furthermore, the Review
indicates that whilst statutory pre-school provision is available in the North
to 70 per cent of children in the EM sector, this is the case for only 17 per
cent of IM children (DENI 2008, p. 59). Therefore, children in the IM sector

for whom statutory provision is not available (83 per cent) receive pre-school
provision in voluntary IM nurseries which do not receive the same level of
funding as statutory provision and cannot access support services for chil-
dren experiencing Special Needs. In respect of post-primary education, the
Review places particular emphasis on the establishment of post-primary
units within EM. Whilst free-standing IM secondary schools are not ruled
out, the rejection of development proposals from Coláiste Speirín to which
I have referred earlier is a negative sign. It illustrates that in spite of the con-
siderable advancements of the period since the 1998 Education Order, the
establishment and maintenance of IM schools in their earliest and most vul-
nerable period still fall on parents, voluntary local input and the drive and
commitment of less than a handful of non-governmental organisations.
The teaching of Irish as a subject in English Medium schools
Throughout Ireland, the vast majority of children do not have access to

IME at present. Within English Medium Education (EME) Irish as a cur-
riculum subject in the RoI has a controversial history. Observers have
often questioned its apparent limitations in revitalising every day use of
the language in the South (P. Ó Riagáin 1997, 2001) and critics have
called for its removal as a compulsory subject. In the North, there are
over 330,000 children in full-time EME. The EM sector can be divided (as
shown in Table 2.19) into school categories defined according to religious
management.
It should be noted that in general, Irish is not taught as a subject in
Protestant controlled17 schools in the North and is not consistently offered
in voluntary or integrated schools. Nor, in fact is it offered in all Catholic
maintained schools. The 1989 Education (Northern Ireland) Order states
that every grant-aided school must offer all pupils in key stages three and
four the opportunity to be taught French, German, Italian or Spanish.18
Pre-Good Friday Agreement, the Irish language was not therefore listed as
one of the modern languages that secondary schools must offer to pupils.
This position was not altered until 2006 when any official language of the
European Union (other than English, and, in Irish speaking schools, Irish)
was recognised. Previous to this, the model in which all Year 8 (first year of
post-primary) pupils learned at least two modern languages was much more
prevalent (30 per cent of schools in the North followed this model) in the
North than in the UK (10 per cent of schools in the UK). McKendry (2002,
p. 138) attributes this high prevalence solely to the provision for Irish in
the North. In NI, Irish remains the third most popular modern language
at GCSE level in spite of ‘its narrower base in the Maintained or Catholic
sector’ (McKendry 2001, p. 214).
Table 2.19 Number of schools and pupils in the North by management type
School management type Number of pupils
Controlleda 132,927
Catholic maintainedb 118,601
Other maintained Irish Mediumc 2,500
Other 439
Integrated Controlled integrated 4,522
Grant maintained 14,864
Voluntary Under Catholic management 27,479
Under other management 22,129
Non-grant aided 712
Voluntary pre-school centresd 6,110
Total 330,802
NB
a.
Includes one Irish Medium nursery school, with 69 pupils
b.
Includes 26 pupils in a nursery class in one Irish Medium school, one Irish Medium primary
school with 135 pupils and 634 pupils in Irish Medium units in 9 primary schools. Also
includes 132 pupils in Irish Medium units in 2 secondary schools.
c.
Excludes one Irish Medium Controlled school and one Irish Medium Catholic Maintained
school
d.
Figures revised on 15 May 2009 to include one voluntary play group previously omitted
Source: NI School Census 2008–9 (provisional figures) May 2009
Table 2.20 2003–8 Figures for A level Examinations taken in modern languages
Subject 2003–4 2004–5 2005–6 2006–7 2007–8
Irish 274 295 308 254 238

French 792 725 701 662 694
German 184 133 143 145 159
Italian 15 18 10 7 0
Spanish 432 402 406 458 415
Source: Adapted from DENI February 200919
Table 2.20 shows the numbers of children taking ‘A’ level (usually taken at
age 17–18) in modern languages in the North. Almost three times as many
took French as took Irish, and significantly larger numbers took Spanish.
The fact that the total number of pupils taking A level Irish in 2007–8 was
238, almost three times fewer than those taking French, and some 40 per
cent fewer than those taking Spanish appears to support the argument that
the promotion of Irish as an indigenous language, different in its meaning
and relationship to other aspects of a child’s educational life, is inadequate.
Nor has a 2007 DENI initiative to encourage language learning in primary

schools (Irish and Spanish) proved able to impact as yet upon take-up dif-
ferentials between Catholic and Protestant schools. Although 323 schools
took part in the language element in 2008–9, most chose Spanish. Only
76 schools chose to teach Irish, none of them in the controlled Protestant
sector.20
Having thus briefly sketched the demographic picture, in the next chap-
ter, I shall examine more closely the policy context for Irish in the North in
the period immediately preceding the 1998 GFA.
3
The Irish Language and the Good
Friday Agreement
Those who seek to defend a threatened language ... are obliged

to wage a total struggle. One cannot save the value of a compe-
tence unless one saves the market, in other words, the whole set
of political and social conditions of production of the producers/
consumers.
(Bourdieu 1991, p. 57)
Relationships and revitalisation
Since partition, Irish speakers in the North have operated in a hostile envi-
ronment, unable to benefit directly from Southern Constitutional protec-
tions for Irish, from Southern policy initiatives or funding for the language.
Under such circumstances, they undoubtedly recognised the totality of need
within their community. From the 1940s and for some four decades, they
focussed on small-scale, independent projects to revitalise the language and
increase incrementally their own personal Irish Medium social, employ-
ment and educational spheres. Today, observers of the language revival may
see IME as a venture of extraordinary scope and range, and arguably, there
were those involved in the establishment of Belfast’s Shaw’s Road Gaeltacht
initiative and the first IM school in 1971 that had a complete vision of
how to proceed and of what could be achieved. Even so, in general, Irish
language initiatives have grown slowly in localised, bite-sized pieces from
initially tiny, self-funded projects set up by enthusiasts. Local committees,
largely untrained and unsupported by anything other than the experience
of those who had gone before, have struggled to overcome each obstacle
as they encountered it. Irish language activists chose this path, or perhaps
had it forced upon them, by a belief that success could only be achieved
through their own, self-sustainable efforts. Attempts to impact upon, form
partnerships with statutory authorities and with government or to expand
provision through legislative approaches were so negative in this period that
56
Irish Language and the GFA 57
many Irish language activists continue to place significant emphasis on self-

sufficiency. In 2004, a newspaper article1 announcing the first contribution
of £20,000 to IME trust, Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta (InaG), from TACA,
one of its fundraising arms, contains some characteristic elements. Chief
Executive of InaG, Pilib Ó Ruanaí, comments,
This money is made up of the pennies thrown into TACA collection boxes
in shops, pubs and clubs throughout the North and from the scratch
cards bought by local customers throughout Belfast. This money can and
does make a difference. This is yet another example of the can-do atti-
tude of the Irish speaking community which does not wait on money
coming in but gets out and actively fundraises.
In the coming chapters, I shall examine the extent to which CR has

changed the relationship between the state and the Irish language com-
munity. It should be noted at this point that questions of independence and
self-sustainability have particular resonance at present. As stated, the Irish
government is currently considering cuts of €5 billion to public expendi-
ture. Proposals from the McCarthy Commission include 85 recommenda-
tions affecting Irish language provision and Gaeltacht areas in particular.
Of course, from time to time, governments are forced, or inclined, to make
such changes. However, compounding the situation has been the complex
manoevering around the status of the Department of Community, Rural
and Gaeltacht Affairs (RGPTG / DCRGA) under Minister Éamon Ó Cuív.
Although current Taoiseach, Brian Cowan2 has rejected McCarthy’s proposal
to close the RCPTG / DCRGA, the Opposition leader has endorsed it3 and the
South’s Department of Finance has attacked Ó Cuív management of govern-
ment grants.4 Ó Cuív has threatened to forcibly merge all core-funded Irish
language organisations, North and South, into one federated Dublin-based
organisation whose role is the implementation of a Twenty-Year Plan for the
Irish language, drafted by his own department and grounded exclusively
in the circumstances of the Southern state. The lack of written proposals,
discussion documents or detailed consultation materials regarding strategic
changes to LPP or the future of Irish language organisations plus a certain
fluidity of content in the Minister’s statements have increased a sense of
confusion and disempowerment. In September 2009, TG4 news5 revealed
that cuts to the Gaeltacht and Irish language organisations were discussed
between the RGPTG / DCRGA and the McCarthy Commission as early as
April 2009, and even prior to that, in January 2009, that the North South
Ministerial Council (NSMC) had agreed in principle that there was poten-
tial to ‘collapse’ the number of Irish language organisations. At the time of
writing, it is not clear to what extent Ó Cuív’s approach is his own initia-
tive or the product of political pressures from within government, North or
South. Along with the McCarthy proposals, his statements have provoked
consternation and anger, raised fears that back-room deals have already
been done without any form of consultation and called into question the
exact nature of collaboration between the RoI and the North’s devolved
institutions in respect of RoI policy.
Ambiguity and ineffectiveness in Southern LPP is not a recent phenome-
non. Gardner, Puigdevall i Serralvo & Williams (2000, p. 318) have pointed out
that, ‘Too often in the literature related to lesser-used languages, the Irish (sic)
example is quoted as a missed opportunity, or an illustration of how difficult it
is for government top-down planning to initiate processes of language revitali-
sation.’ Certainly during the 1980s and 1990s, many Northern Irish speakers,
influenced by what they saw in the South, were sceptical as to what lasting
benefits might be achieved through approaches to strengthen legislation or to
co-ordinate and collaborate with the government and public sectors.
In addition to functioning in the absence of domestic protections for Irish,
the Irish language voluntary sector in the North differs in significant ways
from that in the South. Donoghue (2004, p. 31) points out that in the North,
Irish language NGOs are smaller and younger than in the South, both in
terms of the establishment date of the groups and their membership.6 On
average, women are outnumbered 1:5 by men on voluntary committees in
the North, a far greater disparity than in the South (1:2 ratio in favour of
men).7 In the North, the groups tend to be based in urban areas and clearly
identified with and focussed upon their local Irish speaking communities.
Although smaller, organisations in the North tended to have a greater aver-
age income and less dependence upon voluntary workers. Donoghue notes
the different relationship between Irish language organisations and the
state on either side of the border. She says, (2004, p. 51)
Nuair a chuirtear i gcomparáid iad le heagraíochtaí i dTuaisceart Éireann

feictear go soiléir an seasamh atá ag eagraíochtaí i bPoblacht na hÉire-
ann ... bhí eagraíochtaí i dTuaisceart Éireann gafa le tógáil pobail i stát
eile agus, fairis sin, bhíodar ag dul i ngleic le constaicí caidrimh pobail,
áit a raibh an mothú ann gurb iad siúd an dream ‘eile’ agus go raibh gá
féiniúlacht dhearfach a chur in iúl a bheadh bunaithe air.8
A comparison with Irish language organisations in Northern Ireland
emphasises the position of Irish language organisations in the Republic of
Ireland ... Northern Irish organisations were engaged in community build-
ing in a different jurisdiction and, furthermore, within the confines of
community relations where there was a sense of being ‘other’ and of having
to assert a positive identity based on that. (Official bilingual document)
In spite of an oft-stated and apparent mistrust of government amongst many

individual Irish speakers in the North, the Irish language community sector
is a young one and the focus on survival has tended to fragment communi-
cation amongst groups focused on local objectives. Discussing the value of
an independent non-governmental sector in general, Donoghue notes that

in 2004 there appeared to be a greater awareness historically in the South
of threats to that independence from funders and government than there
was in the North. This is particularly the case amongst longer-established
groups in the South. Her report makes reference to the concerns expressed
in the South at the time of her report in respect of government policy
towards the Irish language voluntary sector.9 She (2004, p. 1) says, ‘Rud eile
is léir...ó thaobh na n-eagraíochtaí deonacha de, ná go bhfuil easpa aithean-
tais ann do neamhspleáchas na n-eagraíochtaí sin, nó fiú easpa tuisceana
nach géaga de chuid an stát atá iontu go léir.’ / ‘What is also apparent ... from
the perspective of voluntary organisations is the absence of recognition of
the independence of such organisations, or the lack of sense that they are
not necessarily arms of the state.’ (Official bilingual version). Donoghue
attributes this to a ‘teorainn dhoiléir / fuzziness’ in the boundaries between
the state and the voluntary sector in the South, which she sees as occurring
in other fields of life, and which Ó Ferrall (2000) attributes to the absence
of a philosophy of voluntary action on the part of the Irish state. Certainly,
Donoghue (2004, p. 36) reports that both in North and South, Irish lan-
guage organisations show a lack of sectoral awareness or identity, and that
in the North,
... bhí an mothú ann gurb iad na ‘leanaí úra’ iad agus go raibh orthu a
fhoghlaim conas comhchaidrimh a chur ar bun le heagraíochtaí deonacha
eile agus leis an stát-chóras...Mheas eagraíochtaí deonacha i dTuaisceart
Éireann go raibh ceangail níos láidre ag eagraíochtaí deonacha eile sa
Tuaisceart lena chéile agus leis an stát-chóras. Chuir sé sin leis an dear-
cadh aonaránach a bhí le sonrú agus iad ag cur síos orthu féin agus na
cúinsí a bhí acu.
... there was a sense of being ‘the new kids on the block’ and of having
to learn how to initiate relationships with other voluntary organisations
and with the state apparatus ... Northern Irish voluntary organisations
tended to view other voluntary organisations in Northern Ireland as
having stronger ties both with each other and with the state appara-
tus, which led to nuances of isolation in descriptions of their position.
(Official bilingual document)10
Of course, as noted in the previous chapter, the CR process of the 1990s

included certain language provisions in the GFA and the creation of an all-
Ireland governmental language funding body. Williams (1994, p. 141) states
that there is ‘a deep ambiguity’ about the dominance of government in
language revitalisation in Wales because of the tendency of institutionalisa-
tion to create dependency, severing control of language promotion from the
community. Gruffudd (2000) notes the contradictions that often become
apparent when grassroots energies become re-routed through institutions
and / or through the increasing professionalisation of language planning.

However, he states that whilst popular activism can be a key element in
language survival, ‘such actions, while achieving reasonable success in rec-
ognisable and tangible objectives, can often be severely lacking in influence
over more intricate and less easily defined domains’ (Gruffudd 2000, p. 174).
Where an expert or more nuanced approach is required as time goes on, he
asserts, ‘Simplistic youthful campaigns are no longer effective.’
The early debate around the best approaches for Irish speakers in the
North in the new atmosphere generated by the GFA and the establishment
of new devolved institutions reflects the different experience North and
South as well as common arguments from further afield. McCoy (2001,
p. 209) highlights the way in which Irish language organisations had to
decide either to work in a consensual or conflictual way. He points out
that there are dangers to both approaches. In the former, organisations
risk being co-opted by the state and isolated from their peers, in the latter,
they risk being unable to influence beyond their own constituency. McCoy
(2001, p. 212) and Ó Murchú (2000, pp. 83–4) have pointed out that some
Irish speakers had reservations about the creation of a new statutory Irish
language sector in the North. They suggest that as the board members of the
cross-border implementation body, Foras na Gaeilge are political appoint-
ees, there were fears they would tend to promote the party rather than
the language and that they would prove unaccountable to the community.
McCoy (2001, p. 209) notes that his own employer, Iontaobhas Ultach has
been accused of being ‘co-opted by the state, and even as a branch of the
NIO’ and as ‘a distant, politically servile and unaccountable quango, out-
side the language movement proper.’ Amongst the changes he points to in
the period following the GFA, he states that the relatively newly formed
umbrella organisation, POBAL was beginning on a process that would shift
the ‘rights’ discourse into the common vocabulary of grassroots non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs) in the North (McCoy 2001, p. 209). In
spite of their anxieties, Irish speakers saw the potential for positive and
unprecedented change in LPP. A new society was being built and they were
keen to test its boundaries. In the coming chapters, I shall examine their
experience in this respect in detail.
Community relations and abrasive gaels
By the 1980s, the British government was clearly aware of the efforts of
Irish language enthusiasts to revitalise the language. Meetings between
activists and government, in particular with representatives of the DENI,
had taken place from 1971 onwards, and although the importance of Irish
language initiatives in official government policy has been rather a con-
cealed one, there is no doubt that the activity on the ground provoked a
reaction. Nonetheless, there were few unsolicited ministerial statements,
little in the way of written and publicly available policy statements and
few, if any, apparent departmental strategies. By 1987, the Irish lan-
guage was being incorporated into the policy area entitled ‘Community
Relations’ which imposed, at least initially, a compulsory (and demograph-
ically rather challenging – see Chapter 2) cross community element upon
language projects if they were to be eligible for funding. More significant
in the long term was the tendency of the community relations context
to charge Irish speakers themselves with the responsibility of proving
that the Irish language was a resource for all, without adequate funding,
without the support of positive government strategies, and in the face of
ongoing official attempts to marginalise the revival as a symbol of politi-
cal and ethnic rebellion. Responsibility for the implementation of gov-
ernment policy on community relations was co-ordinated through the
Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU), whose head, Tony Canavan,
had specific responsibility for the Irish language among his other duties. I
shall return to the subject of CCRU advice on the Irish language in a later
section of this chapter.
Ministerial impacts
Richard Needham, to date Britain’s longest serving minister in the NoI under
direct rule, provides an insight into his own attitude to the Irish language
in his autobiography. He notes that whilst on the surface meetings between
the Irish and British government following the signing of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement in 1985 brought little apparent change, the situation behind the
scenes was ‘more tangled.’ In 1986, a number of proposals intended to raise
the profile of Gaelic / nationalist culture in the North were raised at the Anglo-
Irish Intergovernmental conference. Needham (1998, p. 88) comments,
One suggestion was that we should move towards using Gaelic as a second
language in government. Another was that we should produce a map of
the North using Irish place-names and that we should have street names
in both languages. The first idea was ridiculous in that virtually no-one
in the public service in the North spoke Irish, and much the same could
be said of the position in the South. Apart from the cost, the opportunities
for misunderstanding, mistranslation and mischief were endless. As far as the
map and the street names were concerned, I was not too bothered. But
as the Irish were being so unsympathetic about the declaration against
violence,11 I did not see why I should further antagonise unionists with-
out anything in return. (Author’s emphasis)
Douglas Hurd succeeded in raising the profile of the Irish language rather
more in 1989 when he withdrew funding from the west Belfast branch of
Glór na nGael under the British government policy that became known as
‘political vetting’. The Irish language organisation was the first of some 40
small community-based groups who had funding frozen on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations of supporting terrorism. The subsequent cam-
paign won broad-based support and eventually, the British government was
forced to restore funding since it was unable to make specific allegations
of mismanagement. The policy attracted a great deal of bad publicity for
the British government. In addition, however, even after all funding was
re-established the implied smear remained, increasing the real threat to the
well-being of individuals associated with certain types of community work.
Concurrent with the removal of funding from the community-based Glór na
nGael, the first Irish language organisation supported directly by the British
government, Iontaobhas Ultach / the Ultach Trust was established with an
initial grant of £50,000. The step was welcomed by some Irish speakers and
treated with scepticism by others.
Kenneth Bloomfield is deemed to have been close to the centre of politics
in the North for over 40 years. Private Secretary to three Stormont Cabinet
Ministers, head of the Stormont government’s New York office, close aide
to Terence Ó Neill, key advisor to Prime Ministers James Chichester Clark
and Brian Faulkner and later, under direct rule, to William Whitelaw. Head
of the power-sharing executive, he was eventually appointed as head of the
NI Civil Service – over 28,000 industrial and non-industrial staff – a role he
fulfilled from 1984 to 1991. His substantial autobiography, recounting his
40 years of experience in all these fields of policy and politics, refers (1994,
p. 262) to the community relations policy and its high priority rating in
government circles:
Now, in the late eighties, we came to the conclusion at Stormont Castle

that community relations, broadly defined, lay at the very heart of the
Northern Ireland problem, and could only be given a fitting priority
if pushed forward from the centre of the system, with the clout of the
Secretary of State and the influence of the head of the Northern Ireland
civil service behind it.
Bloomfield (1994, p. 262) asserts that the CCRU and the Cultural Traditions
Group (CTG) carried out ‘pioneering work in the cultural sphere,’ and
describes his own lead role within departments. However, his autobiogra-
phy makes no direct reference to the Irish language at all.
Maurice Hayes (1995), another senior figure, gives a rather more personal-
ised account of his experience within the NI Civil Service and indeed as a key
player within Community Relations. Appointed Town Clerk in Downpatrick
in 1955, he went on to fulfil roles as Chairman of the Community Relations
Commission, Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, assistant secretary to the
power-sharing Executive and permanent secretary in the Department of
Health and Social Services. His autobiography prefaces a comment on his
‘diverse and distinguished career, including holding some of the most influ-
ential posts in local administration’ with the qualification, ‘unusually for a
Catholic’. Invited in 1969 to become involved in a Ministry for Community
Relations, Hayes comments, ‘It was rather a contradiction in terms, given
their exclusivity over the previous fifty years, for a unionist government
to contemplate a Ministry of Community Relations’ (1995, p. 76). In a key
reference to the Irish language, Hayes recounts an incident from his work
as Ombudsman at the beginning of the 1980s when he received a letter
from an Irish speaker complaining that the education authorities would not
answer him when he wrote in Irish. Hayes (1995, p. 305) comments,
He was, I think, surprised when I replied in Irish, although I did take

the precaution of attaching the English version too so that other people
in the office could deal with the file. I was able to establish that govern-
ment departments had a policy, when someone wrote to them in Irish, of
having the letter translated and the matter dealt with and a reply sent in
English. Which I suppose, at the time, was better than ignoring it, as the
education board had done.
It is interesting to note that the practice described by Hayes is the same

one that the British government selected under Article 10 of Part III of the
ECRML more than 20 years later. Describing the outcome of the complaint,
Hayes says that the complainant had withdrawn his children from EME
in order to educate them at home through Irish. Given the atmosphere
at this time around IME, with parents fighting daily for the right to the
smallest recognition, Hayes’ matter-of-fact tone belies the importance of his
response. Speaking of the complainant he (Hayes 1995, p. 305) says,
He was not asking for the earth – simply some help with equipment and
some of the time of a French assistant to help with conversation. The
board seemed not to have been too assiduous in pursuing its statutory
duty to see that the children were being adequately educated at home,
and it seemed to have taken fright at the political and linguistic chal-
lenges of the case.
If Hayes’ reasoning represents a major leap of imagination and courage for

a public servant at the time, his subsequent actions were grounded in the
pragmatic approach of the civil servant. He ‘established the average amount
the board would spend on providing the services requested to children in
their own schools, and in the end it was agreed to make the complainant
a grant which would enable him to buy them for himself’ (Hayes 1995,
p. 305). Typically, Hayes notes his pleasure many years later to hear that the
children concerned had ach in turn attended university and obtained first
class degrees.
The CR process and the Irish language
The most pressing issue facing the people of Ireland and Britain, as
now appears to be agreed by all sides, is the question of a lasting
peace and how it can best be achieved.
(Hume-Adams Joint Statement, 20 November 1993)
The mode for both construction and preservation of identity in

NI is contestation: that contestation will either have to become a
game, or be otherwise decoupled from its outward manifestation
in open strife for the communities to live together. That or one
side must win: and such an aim, much more in common with the
deep history of the North’s identities than their reduction to irony
or jouissance, is unsurprisingly the aim of both Sinn Féin and the
Ulster Unionists. It may be enough on its own for a peace which
shares means but not ends, which in its turn of course depends on
how close or achievable these ends appear.
(Pittock 1999, p. 134)
From the 1990s, the almost reckless self-belief and self-help ethos of the
Irish language community was symbolised by the enormously challeng-
ing expansion of IME in some of the most deprived areas of the North;
and the blossoming out of the rubble of the conflict of Irish language
cultural and arts centres, economic projects and Irish language media.
Difficulties were still at the heart of negotiations between the state and
Irish language projects, even as the CR process unfolded around them. In
the next section of this chapter, I shall examine two contrasting views to
the background to the Irish language references in the GFA. The first is the
viewpoint as reflected in contemporaneous accounts of negotiations writ-
ten by SF president and chief negotiator, Gerry Adams. The second is the
British government viewpoint, as indicated in the internal briefing paper
mentioned above, written by Tony Canavan, senior government advisor to
the Secretary of State.
‘A different political approach’
In 1988, the two leaders of nationalism in the North, John Hume of the
SDLP12 and Gerry Adams of SF13, embarked on a series of personal meet-
ings aimed at achieving a nationalist consensus. The subsequent support
of the then Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, for this process created a
dynamic that led to a further five years of intensive, multifaceted talks
which would outlast Taoisigh, Prime Ministers, American Presidents,
Secretaries of State and senior civil servants. Writing contemporaneously,
Ruane (1999, p. 145) asserts that the CR process proved to be conten-

tious and difficult. His assertion that, ‘The goal was not just a truce, or a
temporary settlement, but a final and complete end to the centuries-old
conflict’ may be an apt illustration of Kriesberg’s comment (1998, p. 20),
noted in chapter 1, that whatever goals are set at the beginning, it is often
only with hindsight that one can judge what has been achieved in a given
CR process.
Understandably, the political parties and government representatives on
all sides used different tactics based on their very varied analysis of where
they wanted to be by the end of the talks and how they would get there. By
October 1996 the CR process was still moving at a slow pace. Gerry Adams
comments that the party’s experience of the British side was that, ‘...their
interpretation of word formulae in agreements tended towards the mini-
mal rather than the generous side ... They loved ambiguous texts which left
them wriggle room. We wanted direct, non-complicated, tied-down com-
mitments’ (Adams 2003, p. 268). To what extent this is an accurate inter-
pretation may be open to discussion, but it is clear that differences in style
and method were not unique to SF and the British Government. Early in
the process of multiparty talks, David Trimble, then leader of the Ulster
Unionist Party (UUP)14 commented that the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP) had ‘a different habit of mind, a different approach’ (Quoted in
Routledge 1997, p. 292). One of the UUP’s chief negotiators, Reg Empey felt
that difficulties arose in negotiations with the SDLP and in particular with
John Hume, because: ‘We are looking at the text, and they are looking at
the context’ (Quoted in Routledge 1997, p. 292). Not surprisingly, the UUP
had severe problems throughout the process in their dealings with SF. The
tensions took many forms, frustrating and confounding even the most sea-
soned and experienced of outside facilitators. Mallie and McKittrick (2001,
p. 261) quote ex-US Senator George Mitchell, who describes the atmosphere
when he was asked to return to Belfast to conduct a review in the autumn
of 1999. Mitchell says, ‘The first meetings were disastrous – angry, harsh
recrimination – “You’re a liar” – “Don’t call me a liar.” ’ SF negotiator, Martin
McGuinness reports an exasperated Mitchell warning him Gerry Adams, SF
President, ‘You guys have a life and this is it. I have a life and this is not it.’
In 1999, United States President, Bill Clinton, addressing a Canadian audi-
ence in 1999 caused controversy (quoted in Maillie and McKittrick 2001,
p. 261) when he said,
I spend an enormous amount of time trying to help the people in Ireland

to get over 600 years of religious fights. And every time they make an
agreement to do it, they’re like a couple of drunks walking out of a bar for
the last time. When they reach the swinging doors they just turn right
round and go back in and say – ‘just can’t quite get there.’
In late 1998, reflecting on the stage of negotiations that had resulted in the
GFA, David Trimble (quoted in Mallie and McKittrick 2001, p. 256) was to
remark to a hard-line audience of Young Unionists,
The event that has caused the greatest problems to Unionists in recent
years is the adoption by the republican movement of a different political
approach. When the republican movement was wholly involved in ter-
rorism, it was simple enough: we knew what we were dealing with, we
had lived with it year in, year out, and our response was straightforward
and simple. But then they changed their approach. Now we can discuss
it, analyse it and argue about the nature of that change. Was it just as
republicans would now represent it? Or was it a series of changes as they
adjusted to events as they happened?
On the motivation of republicans, he comments, ‘I think that they decided

that, while the campaign still had some life in it, they would try and cash
it in for political advantage – some political concessions or developments.
That basically is the origin of the so-called peace process, the Hume-
Adams process, call it what you will’ (Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick
2001, p. 256). Recognising the fundamental reality that they had neither
initiated nor foreseen the instigation of a process that had drawn them
into direct negotiation with both republicans and the Irish government,
Trimble’s comments (Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick 2001, p. 257),
intended to win over the young sceptics in his own party, rather under-
lines the fundamental problem of ideologies built on negative responses.
His speech continues,
You cannot be a spectator, you cannot be someone who deals purely with
an idealised situation or a situation as you would want it. You have to
engage with it as it is. It is not always the way you like, and you can never
be certain how it is going to work out, but you have to engage.
In September 1997, multiparty talks opened at Stormont. With it being

agreed that the talks process itself would be divided into several stages based
upon the structures that had preceded them: Constitutional Issues, Strand
One (Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland), Strand Two (North South
Ministerial Council), Strand Three (British-Irish Council), which included
the provision for the Economic, Social and Cultural Issues). It was clear by
this stage that the Irish language would feature as part of the negotiation
process.
Representatives of the Irish government were regular visitors to the North,
meeting both formally and informally with Irish speakers to discuss the
progress and shortcomings in the political talks and sound out the views
of the community on the ground regarding structures, institutions and
legislative protections as the CR negotiations continued. Throughout the

lengthy and convoluted process, Irish speakers placed emphasis on the need
for visible change, for increased legislative protection for Irish, to be accom-
panied by increased funding and new structures to take the lead on the
development of the language. The need to secure and develop the future of
IME and of particular threatened schools was a source of great concern and
determination, and the issue of increased media resources, including the
expansion of the new Irish language television station, then called Teilifís
na Gaeilge, were all recurring features of discussions.
Irish in the negotiations
Such necessities at a grassroots level were reflected in the CR process.

Adams (2003, p. 268) comments that from an early stage, ‘The British
seemed to oppose the Irish language in a completely irrational way. They
removed the issue of Irish from the draft we gave them.’ By mid-Novem-
ber, the CR talks had progressed and there was some sense of movement.
De Bréadun (2001, p. 197) states, however, that the views of the two
northern nationalist parties on the importance of the Irish language were
rather different.
There was believed to be a strong possibility of agreement on an addi-

tional North-South body to promote the Irish language. The SDLP
wanted strategic transport planning, with its potential to organise future
North-South road, rail and air links, and was irritated when Dublin let
this one go, in favour of Irish. ‘Dublin wanted to keep Trimble on board
at all costs,’ SDLP sources said later. ‘Sinn Féin fell into a unionist trap
when they were looking for Irish; the unionists were always ready to buy
Irish as a lightweight body. Dublin lost its nerve and put the pressure on
a reluctant Mallon to accept Irish instead of strategic transport planning
or tourism.’
De Bréadún’s (2001, p. 198) assertion that, ‘The unionists did not feel threat-
ened by Irish’ takes little account of the experience of Irish speakers and
does not explain his acknowledgement that they ‘insisted on adding the
little-known Ulster-Scots dialect as a responsibility of the new language
body, which SDLP sources regarded as ludicrous.’ At this stage, the UUP
and the SDLP appeared to be united on a key issue in relation to equality
and human rights, the overall category that included the Irish language.
Whilst a separate Department of Equality had been mooted, the two parties
favoured the proposal that responsibility for such issues should be located
within the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister. This would have
clear implications for the status of such issues and for ministerial control.
De Bréadún cites the d’Hondt mechanism for allocating ministries as the
rationale behind this alliance. Based upon the number of votes received, De
Bréadún (2001, p. 197) says,
... the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) would quite possibly be able to
take the equality portfolio. That wouldn’t suit the SDLP. Alternatively,
the prospect of a SF minister for Equality was enough to give unionists
the heebie-jeebies and would not necessarily delight the SDLP either.
It is interesting to note that when relationships between the parties became

particularly strained, the Irish language and its place within the dif-
ferent parties’ negotiation strategies became part of the war of words. In
December 1997, at what should have been a moment of significant progress,
conflict between the UUP and SDLP erupted. Séamus Mallon and John
Taylor both engaged in confrontational media interviews. In De Bréadun’s
(2001, p. 199) words, Taylor of the UUP, ‘taunted Mallon over rejecting a
body for the promotion of the Irish language.’ Clearly, the UUP understood
well enough the need for nationalist parties to at least appear to be promot-
ing the Irish language within the CR agenda.
Todd (1999, p. 60) has analysed the importance of the Irish language in SF’s
negotiation strategy. Discussing the dominant republican discourses appar-
ent during the talks process, she notes ‘an ideological symbiosis between the
universalisable principles and the traditional goals’. She continues,
National self determination is affirmed in two senses simultaneously.

As a democratic principle of self-determination on the island free from
British interference, it belongs with the first principles ... . But now Irish
unity can be achieved incrementally. Thus, the second level aims, –
cultural equality including for the Irish language, radical reform of the
police, total demilitarisation of British army presence and posts, and of
the legally as well as illegally held weapons in the North, and strong
North-South linkages which would open the possibility of an eventual
united Irish nation state – are at once an application of the first principles
and stages necessary to move towards the goal.
By the end of December 1997, the format had been established and the North-
South body. An Foras Teanga was one of six implementation bodies, includ-
ing trade and business development and special European programmes. The
three others were those proposed by the UUP – inland waterways, aquac-
ulture and food safety. Further difficulties, including the exclusion of SF
from the CR process for a period of weeks followed, but a Joint Statement
from the British and Irish governments issued on 5 March commented, ‘The
Conference15 agreed on the importance of steps to promote the Irish lan-
guage and discussed a number of options which the British Government is
actively considering.’
There had been considerable difficulties over the issue of North-South

Bodies, the British government was still being pressed by SF for changes to
its Constitution and the Irish government had reached the stage of agree-
ing to the removal of Articles 2 and 3 of its own Constitution. As I have
noted in Chapter 1, these articles gave constitutional expression to the Irish
nation and its territory. However, arguments continued about the legislative
basis for the North South Ministerial Council and the unionists were press-
ing for North-South structures to be incorporated in a structure covering
relations between Britain and Ireland, rather than in the establishment of
stand-alone, all-Ireland bodies. Relationships in the final phase of intensive
all-night negotiations that preceded the GFA deteriorated further. Adams
(2001, p. 54) states,
There were also intensive talks about the status and the resourcing of
the Irish language. Irish had no official status in the North. We were
determined to change this and for months had been putting pressure on
the British government to sign up to the European Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages ... . At Castle Buildings we continued to push
the Irish government and the British on the equality agenda, the Irish
language and on the demilitarisation and policing issues in advance of
agreed papers being submitted by them to Senator Mitchell.
Also in this period, Adams (quoted in Adams 2001, p. 53) writes in his col-
umn for the American newspaper, The Irish Voice, ‘We began to get a clearer
sense of positions agreed between the Irish and British governments on
issues of equality and demilitarisation, including policing, rights, justice
and the Irish language. We continued to push hard for improvements on
this range of issues.’ According to the SF president’s account of the negotia-
tions, therefore, (Adams 2001, p. 55) the Irish language remained a key issue
for negotiation until the very last moment.
On Monday 6 April, we held a major review of all the issues under negoti-
ation. On the basis of this, we decided to have a series of focused engage-
ments with the two governments, urging them to improve their position
on a number of matters, including the Irish language, prisoners, policing
and the equality agenda.
On Thursday 9 April, with Strand One still unresolved, Adams (2001, p. 57)
notes the need to continue to push the British government on the Irish lan-
guage and equality issues, ‘Two phone calls between myself and President
Clinton underlined our need for movement on these issues.’ Of course, one
must take into account the subjectivity of any one participant in any event,
and this is doubly so for those engaged in complex CR negotiations like
the North’s talks process. What is apparent from Adams’ contemporaneous
accounts is that the Irish language was one of a number of key equality
issues under discussion from the beginning to the end of the negotiation
process that resulted in the GFA. The importance of Irish, not simply to the
NI CR settlement, but to the formulation of broader British government pol-
icy in relation to devolution in Scotland and Wales is illustrated in an offi-
cial British government document that I shall examine in the next section.
A British government view
Having examined some comments relating to the role of the Irish language
in the talks process by those involved in negotiations, I shall now look at
the way in which a document16 drafted during the talks process by Tony
Canavan, Head of the Central Community Relations Unit and senior civil
servant charged with responsibility for the Irish language, casts light on
the background to the interactions from the British government side. It
was only after the signing by all parties of the GFA on 10 April 1998, that
Canavan’s document came to light. Canavan’s document, a submission for
the then Minister, forewarning him of ‘forthcoming Cabinet level corre-
spondence’ (Canavan 1998, p. 1, para 1) on the subject of the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was leaked to the
press on 22 April by the then Belfast City Councillor, Nelson McCausland
of the DUP.17
That the implications of the CR process had broader ramifications to UK
LPP is reflected in his text. Both the Scottish and Welsh Offices were in
favour of early ratification of the ECRML for Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh
in Wales respectively. Canavan (1998, p. 4, para 8) notes, however,
In all previous dealings with the Welsh Office and other Departments
on the Charter, it was widely accepted that the Northern Ireland Peace
Process was of considerably greater importance than the signature of the
Charter. Other Departments were always ready to make allowances for
any problems which might be created in Northern Ireland.
Interestingly, Canavan (1998, p. 5, para 9) comments that ‘the only real

pressure for signing the Charter within Northern Ireland has come from
Irish language organisations and political parties which support them.’ He
(1998, p. 5, para 10) says,
Of the specific objectives and principles set out in Part II, most are unex-
ceptionable (sic) and coincide with existing government policy. One or
two might be cited by Irish language organisations as involving a com-
mitment to greater efforts on behalf of Irish, eg ‘resolute action to pro-
mote’, ‘facilitation and/or encouragement ... in public and private life’.
What these worthy sentiments might mean in practice is a matter of
interpretation and we could argue that our interpretation is as valid as

anyone else’s.
He (1998, p. 5 para 10) characterises the potential for controversy should the
British fail to energetically implement the ECRML as follows, ‘We can expect
a three-sided correspondence on this between Government, the Committee
of Experts and local Irish language groups when the periodic reports on the
UK’s performance under the Charter is considered ... ‘ Clearly, not a matter
of undue concern to Mr. Canavan. Nor does he (1998, p. 5, para 11) foresee
any major legislative problems in the ratification of Part II,
With the repeal in 1995 of the old Stormont legislation on street names,
the main discrimination against Irish on the statute book has been
removed. There remains one possibly relevant law applying in Northern
Ireland, which is not the responsibility of the Secretary of State, but of
the Lord Chancellor. This is the Administration of Justice (Language) Act
(Ireland) 1737, an antiquated statute which declares that the language of
the Courts shall be English but which apparently was not really directed
at Irish but at medieval survivals in legal language. The Act bears little
relation to the current practice in Courts where interpreting facilities are
available for people who cannot speak English. The removal of this Act
should not imply any form of bilingualism in the Courts.
Illustrating the viewpoint of SF leader, Gerry Adams that the British like to
keep things vague, Canavan comments, ‘If agreement can be reached on its
repeal, an undertaking to do so at some point in the future would be suffi-
cient to enable us to accept Part II of the Charter.’ As discussed in Chapter 4,
the second monitoring report of the Committee of Experts (COMEX 2007,
p. 17, para 148) on the UK implementation of the ECRML notes that the
1737 Act is still in operation and calls for the removal of obstacles to the
protection and promotion of Irish. The 2008–9 Judicial Review of the 1737
Act, taken ten years after the writing of Canavan’s document, saw the
British government vigorously defend the Act’s continuing application in
the North. The judge ruled in favour of the British government.18
If acceptance of ‘the worthy sentiments’ of Part II appear to cause Canavan
little concern, his attitude to Part III is rather different. This he writes (1998,
p. 6, para 12), ‘would be much more difficult for Northern Ireland, without
a quantum leap in the Government’s approach to the language ... . I estimate
that, on current policies, we could meet the requirements of 20–5 of the
paragraphs in Part III, falling well short of the threshold of 35.’
Canavan does not foresee rapid change, ‘Any narrowing of the gap would
need to be achieved gradually, taking account of resource and political
implications.’ (1998, p. 6, para 12). He (Canavan 1998, p. 6, para 12) is not
inclined to urge radical action, ‘Short of a major development in the context
of the Talks process, it is not realistic to expect that Irish could be specified,
along with Welsh, at the time of ratification as meeting Part III require-
ments, nor could it be added in the short to medium term.’ As senior civil
servant with responsibility for the Irish language, it is clear that Canavan’s
advice closely reflects the British government position. Politicians, however,
may remark that it is the role of civil servants to be cautious, even con-
servative, to counterbalance the tendency of politicians to come up with
the creative – though not always practical – solution. Whatever the reality
in this case, Canavan’s advice on the ratification of Part III of the ECRML
was not followed. Whether through a commitment to more rapid progress
or as a result of the political pressures brought to bear by Irish language
organisations and supportive political parties in the CR process, it is some-
thing that can perhaps be best assessed through an examination of the sub-
sequent implementation of the commitments made in the GFA, a matter I
shall address in the coming chapters.
At the time of Canavan’s advice to the British government, Adams (2001,
p. 55) characterises the attitude of unionism thus, ‘...the unionists were
opposed to the establishment of the North-South Council and its implemen-
tation bodies by legislation in Westminster and Leinster House, and they
also wanted it to function after, rather than simultaneously with, a Northern
Assembly.’ Whilst nationalist parties pressed for recognition of the Irish lan-
guage, some unionists were also raising a new matter. Canavan (1998, p. 6,
para 13) notes that there is a new factor to bear in mind in the CR process,
In Northern Ireland, Unionists have demanded parity of treatment

between Ulster-Scots and Irish. In terms of Part III obligations, this does
not present a problem, if we rule out specifying Irish. However, the
Ulster-Scots movement would claim that the more general declaratory
provisions of Part II should also apply to them. We would therefore need,
in close conjunction with the Scottish Office, to make a firm decision on
whether Ulster-Scots is to be regarded as a regional/minority language
entitled to whatever benefits derive from Part II.
The other major issue at the time of writing the document was, according
to Canavan, the CR process itself. He says, ‘The Irish language is given
particular importance by the Irish government, the SDLP and above all,
SF. Though it is unlikely to make or break the process, concessions on Irish
could help make a settlement package more attractive to Nationalists’ (1998,
p. 6, para 14). A decision to ratify, and its announcement,
... could be presented at an early stage as a confidence building measure

for Nationalists; it could be retained as a possibly relatively minor con-
cession at a later point in negotiations; or Part III status for Irish could
be held out as a substantive development of Government policy on Irish
and a concession of real weight. The views of NIO colleagues on this

point would be particularly welcome. (Canavan 1998, p. 7 para 14)
On the choice of languages that would be specified at the time of ratifica-

tion, Canavan (1998, p. 7, para 15) points out that this is not an issue of
concern to the north of Ireland alone.
Welsh will clearly be specified. Mr Wilson19 ... is keen to specify Gaelic

also at the time of ratification. This could present serious problems for us.
If Irish was the only Celtic indigenous minority language not to be speci-
fied, Nationalists and Irish language supporters would be critical ... . Our
preference should be therefore for Irish and Scottish (sic) to be unspeci-
fied, at least at the time of ratification. The Scottish Office, at official
level, is aware of the Northern Ireland concerns and it may be necessary
to broker a bilateral deal with Scottish Ministers on how to play the issue
of ratification.
In conclusion, he (1998, p. 7, para 15) notes,
One possibility might be a commitment to keep the matter of Irish and

Gaelic under review, perhaps with the objective of ratification at some point
in the future. It would seem to make good tactical sense to keep along simi-
lar lines to Scotland in the approach to Irish, as well as to Ulster-Scots.
The finalised Good Friday Agreement: Resolution?
The GFA was signed on 10 April 1998. It is an international treaty entered

into by all parties except the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)20 in the North
and then ratified by the British and Irish governments. A substantial docu-
ment, with detailed sections outlining agreement on a number of key areas,
the GFA makes significant references to linguistic diversity, and, in particu-
lar, to the Irish language, under its section, Rights, Safeguards and Equality
of Opportunity: Economic, Social and Cultural Issues. The first point in this
section relates to a commitment by the British government, pending devolu-
tion, to pursue ‘broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability
in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in par-
ticular, community development and the advancement of women in public
life’ (GFA 1998). Point two commits the British government to move quickly
on the establishment of a new regional strategy geared towards tackling
the particular problems of ‘a divided society’, a new economic development
strategy and measures on employment equality as set out in the White Paper
‘Partnership for Equality’. Point three states, ‘All participants recognise the
importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguis-
tic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots
and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part
of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. Point four outlines a number
of specific commitments to the Irish language. It says,
In the context of active consideration currently being given to the

UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages, the British government will in particular in relation to the
Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it:
● take resolute action to promote the language

● facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing
in public and private life where there is appropriate demand
● seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage
or work against the maintenance or development of the language;
● make provision for liaising with the Irish language community,
representing their views to public authorities and investigating
complaints;
● place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage
and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision
for integrated education;
● explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-
operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achiev-
ing more widespread availability of Teilifís na Gaeilge in Northern
Ireland;
● seek more efficient ways to encourage and provide financial support
for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland;
and
● encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will
be sustained by the new Assembly in a way which takes account of
the desires and sensitivities of the community.
The detailed and specific references to the Irish language are in contrast to the
more general references to linguistic diversity that precede them. The first two
bullet points above are taken directly from Part II of the ECRML, (although,
as detailed in Chapter 4, the first point in the GFA is a somewhat abridged ver-
sion) whilst others more clearly relate to specific issues in provision. Clearly,
now British LPP in respect of Irish had been subsumed into the CR process
itself, and the future context of the Irish language within the Northern state
would be influenced by the success or failure of the power-sharing arrange-
ments conceived under the GFA. It is significant, however, that whilst other
parts of the GFA outline actions to be taken by the Irish government,21 none of
these creates explicit agreed duties in respect of LPP for Irish, North or South
The basis of the CR accord of 1998 is the establishment of a conso-

ciational government, a model often attributed to Arend Lijphart. Both
the Northern Irish arrangements and the interworkings of the Canadian
federation are often referred to as models of consociationalism. Political
stability, survival of power-sharing government between deeply divided
segments of society and the absence of political violence are its basic goals.
However, consociationalism has been criticised since it tends to fossilise
division within new power-sharing structures. In addition, whilst it facili-
tates the coming together of elites within an agreed and regulated con-
text, it does not address division elsewhere in society, mitigating against
deep-rooted change and potentially contributing to the marginalisation
of some minorities, such as linguistic groups, since only members of elites
have direct systemic inter-elite access. In effect, in spite of endorsement of
culturally sensitive policies and laws within Lijphart’s model, the possibil-
ity of minorities bringing this about depends entirely on their ability to
influence the elites.
Ó Leary (2001, p. 58), whilst critical of the model chosen for the North’s
new Assembly, has referred to the GFA’s ‘double protection model’ which
he says is ‘...designed to withstand major demographic and electoral
change’ and to develop equivalent legal protections of collective and indi-
vidual rights in both the North and South of Ireland. He says, ‘In effect,
the Agreement promised protection to Northern Irish nationalists now
on the same terms that they would be given to Ulster unionists should
they ever become a minority in a unified Ireland.’ In the Agreement (GFA
1998), and the devolved structures established under it, the two govern-
ments affirm,
... the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction (in the North)
shall be exercised with rigourous impartiality on behalf of all the people
in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded
on the principles of full respect for and equality of, civil, political, social
and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and
of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos
and aspirations of both communities.
However, Lijphart’s proposition depends upon the ability of internal CR

arrangements to equalise the power of the elites, free from external inter-
ference in favour of one pillar or another. In addition, his assertion that
a key characteristic of consociationalism, the ‘mutual veto’ will enhance
the progression of government business (since each side will seek to avoid
deadlock) depends entirely on the will of the elite pillars to actually make
the arrangement ‘work’. Elites whose goal is linked to the continuation of
hegemony, albeit perhaps in a more flexible guise, are unlikely to adhere to
such rules. As Noel (2001, p. 222) points out, power-sharing is about more
than constitutions and written contracts. He says,
What it is about is developing a politics of accommodation, and that

requires a willingness on the part of politicians from the different com-
munities to meet as equals, to bargain in good faith, to think in the short
term as well as the long term, and to settle for outcomes that they regard
as less than ideal but that on balance are of greater benefit to the people
they represent than any likely alternative.
Ruane (1999, p. 157) comments, ‘... it is a relatively easy matter to give

financial support to the Irish language, to grant the right to fly the Irish
flag, or even to re-route Orange marches. It will be much more difficult
to rid the culture of the stock of epithets and assumptions which devalue
nationalists and Irish culture.’ In the coming chapters I shall examine the
extent to which the commitments and institutions established under the
GFA have been capable of bringing about and maintaining positive change
to British and RoI LPP as it impacts on Irish in the North.
4
The Ratification and Application of
the European Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages
In December 1999, the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly was established

at Stormont Buildings in East Belfast under the CR provisions of the GFA.
The ECRML was ratified by the British government in June 2001 (Charter,
Strasbourg, 5.XI.1992). The contemporary CR context was particularly trou-
bled. In July 2001 the British government moved unilaterally to suspend
the operations of the Assembly in the face of unionist opposition to the
agreed power-sharing arrangements. The Irish government acquiesced.
The Assembly was further temporarily suspended in August and again in
September 2001. Finally, in October 2002, it was suspended once again.
This time the suspension was to last for five years. During this period, Direct
Rule by British Ministers elected at Westminster was administered. As I shall
discuss in the next chapter, it was not until May 2007 that devolution was
re-established under the provisions of the St Andrews’ Agreement (SAA).
In this chapter, I shall briefly comment on the nature of language protec-
tions within human rights legislation before detailing the background and
structure of the ECRML. I shall then examine key parts of the UK ratifica-
tion instrument. Following this, in three further sections, there will be a
discussion on the implementation of the ECRML in respect of Irish in the
three monitoring cycles to date, drawing on UK periodical reports, on the
findings of the Council of Europe (CoE) Committee of Experts (COMEX)
and on monitoring reports from the Irish language NGO, POBAL. In rela-
tion to the third monitoring cycle (2005–8), I shall discuss the implications
of the late submission by the UK government of an incomplete periodical
report. Having outlined its contents, I shall draw on the findings of the
key watchdog NGO, POBAL in respect of implementation in this period. At
the time of writing, the response of the COMEX to the 2005–8 monitoring
cycle is not available. At the end of the chapter I shall make some general
comments about the ability of the ECRML to identify and help progress
77
fundamental issues of LPP in a CR situation. I shall also analyse some issues

which impact on the interface between NGOs and the monitoring process.
I am grateful to the Council of Europe for permission to reproduce some
sections of this chapter, which can also be found in the Council of Europe’s
publication, The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Legal
Challenges and Opportunities (2007), Eds. Dunbar, R. & Parry, G. Council of
Europe (Muller 2007).
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
The aims and application of the Charter

The ECRML, drafted within the Council of Europe, was adopted by the
Council on 5 November 1992 and entered into force on 1 March 1998. It
is the first international instrument directed solely at linguistic minorities
and focuses solely on those autochtonous languages of long standing in
European states. Cardinal (2003) has argued that since language legislation
is intended to stem the damage already done to minoritised languages, it is
in itself a sign of historic and existing disadvantage. The ECRML preamble
echoes this view, stating that languages must be promoted in a range of
areas of life because, ‘Only in this way can such languages be compensated,
where necessary, for unfavourable conditions in the past and preserved and
developed as a living facet of Europe’s cultural identity’ (Charter Part I). The
connection between the ECRML and CR processes is specifically outlined
in the preamble,
While the Charter is not concerned with the problem of nationalities

who aspire after independence or alterations to frontiers, it may be
expected to help, in a measured and realistic fashion, to assuage the
problem of minorities whose language is their distinguishing feature,
by enabling them to feel at ease in the state in which history has placed
them. Far from reinforcing disintegrating tendencies, the enhancement
of the possibility to use regional or minority languages in the various
spheres of life can only encourage the groups who speak them to put
behind them the resentments of the past which prevented them from
accepting their place in the country in which they live and in Europe
as a whole.
(ECRML, Explanatory Report, pt. 13)
Recognising that there may be more than one indigenous threatened lan-
guage in a specific territory, the ECRML proposes the establishment of ‘a
proper place’ for each RML. How this ‘proper place’ may be determined in
reality may prove more problematic, since in CR, the treatment of different
languages may be subject to manipulation by hegemonic forces. Within the
ECRML, the defining of appropriate treatment for each language depends
Ratification and Application of the ECRML 79
primarily upon abstract terminology relating to ‘sufficient numbers’ and

‘demand’.
Protection under Parts II and III

Clearly the ECRML is intended to allow initial flexibility by a number of
different states, selecting provision for given languages in a range of cir-
cumstances. Parts II and III of the Charter, in particular, afford very differ-
ent protections, with Part II establishing ‘a common core of principles’ that
apply to all RMLs in ratifying states, whilst Part III contains specific provi-
sions, many comprising options of different degrees of stringency. States
must apply one of these, ‘according to the situation of each language.’ The
ECRML preamble adds, ‘ The role of the states will be, not to choose arbi-
trarily between these alternatives, but to seek for each regional or minority
language the wording which best fits the characteristics and state of devel-
opment of that language.’
Under Part III, states are required to commit themselves to at least 35
specific measures out of a list of some 100 clauses, broken down into dif-
ferent articles. Whilst the ECRML preamble illustrates the potential for clear
and unequivocal interpretation, it does not ensure that states do indeed
tailor their commitments in any objective fashion to meet the needs of
each language community concerned. States have great flexibility in how
and why they select given clauses within Part III, with little or no appar-
ent mechanism available for the users of given languages to challenge this
selection except through representation to the same state. Nor is the selec-
tion of clauses the only source of difficulty. As Dunbar (2000, p. 69) states,
the ECRML ‘... articulates no coherent theory of language rights nor does it
clearly evidence any coherent linguistic or sociological theory of minority
language maintenance and development.’ Perhaps ominously for the Irish
language, he concludes, ‘While some States have arguably used the Charter
creatively and in a principled way in the development of minority language
policy and practice, there is nothing in the Charter which guarantees such
an outcome.’
Part IV of the Charter: Monitoring and enforcing

Where the ECRML is not incorporated into domestic law it remains unen-
forceable through the courts. Therefore, the ECRML relies entirely upon
the desire of governments to be seen to be fulfilling the obligations they
have themselves selected. Each ratifying state commits to provide a report
to a CoE COMEX at the end of the first year following ratification, and at
three yearly intervals thereafter. The COMEX is selected through appoint-
ment of individuals with appropriate expertise, chosen by the government
of countries that are signatories of the ECRML. As Bucci (1998) reports,
the composition of the COMEX has been the subject of some controversy,
with the original proposal for ‘independent’ experts, that is, chosen by the
CoE Committee of Ministers, being rejected by the Congress of Local and

Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) in 1987. He states that this triggered
a change of direction, with controls geared towards strong protections for
languages being put aside in favour of the establishment of a committee
of experts chosen by ratifying states. These individuals were to be deemed
people of the highest integrity, in that they would not take instructions
from their respective governments. Acknowledging that the COMEX is still
evolving, Emyr Lewis (2004, Belfast) its UK representative, points out that
members are not full-time and that, ‘The volume of work increases every
time a new state ratifies the Charter.’
The ratification instrument of the ECRML

In his analysis of the ECRML, Grin (2003, p. 41) argues that its ratification by
States implies an obligation not simply to act, but to act effectively. Pointing
to Article 7 of the ECRML as an example, he notes that in the phrases ‘the
need for resolute action to promote regional or minority languages in order
to safeguard them’ and ‘the facilitation and / or encouragement of the use of
regional or minority languages’ the ECRML, ‘... goes beyond positive rights,
and calls for actual results’ (Grin 2003, p. 85, Grin’s emphasis). It is of inter-
est to note that the examples cited by Grin are among those written into the
text of the GFA in relation to the Irish language. However, in the GFA, the
words that Grin emphasises, ‘in order to safeguard them’, have been omit-
ted. Whilst this has no impact upon the ratification of the ECRML itself,
it could be argued that it displays a particular mindset at the level of the
British government.
In respect of the issue of selection of appropriate clauses by ratifying
states, Grin (2003, p. 11) has noted that the ECRML ‘is an instrument of
great originality and cunning design, yet it raises problems of choice, which
have to be solved.’ The selection of clauses for Irish in the North provide an
interesting illustration of this observation. McAlister1 (2003) reports that
the clauses were selected by a working group of departmental officials, rep-
resentatives of the NIO and the NI Courts Service with advice from special
counselor, Dónall Ó Riagáin. McAlister (2003, p. 47) says that the common
themes to emerge across departments included, ‘the low level of activity,
the desire of officials for detailed advice on meeting Charter commitments,
concern at resource implications if there were a significant rise in demand
for Irish language services, the need for staff training and for translation
and interpreting services.’ If there was, however, a more rigorous system of
assessment and evaluation in place, McAlister gives no indication of it. She
(2003, p. 48) asserts, ‘The fact of the matter was of course that the Charter
gives no leeway. Only those provisions where activity is underway at the
time of coming into force of the Charter can be applied.’
This represents a problematic and singularly unambitious reading of
an international instrument that aims to promote, protect and safeguard
languages. Where deep-rooted conflict has resulted in only the lowest level
of provision for an RML, establishing this low level as a benchmark fossilises
conflict LPP. In this case, the ECRML may be perceived, at least initially, as
a hindrance rather than a help. Dunbar (2000, p. 69) makes the point that it
is the structure of Part III of the ECRML itself that has allowed a minimalist
UK ratification, ‘rather than encouraging the UK to think in a coherent and
principled way about how the Charter might be used to enhance (the) lin-
guistic security and vitality.’ He suggests (2000, p. 69) that the UK seems to
be ‘driven in significant measure by political expediency’ and he contends
that at least in the case of Britain the ECRML can be seen as ‘a political
document rather than a minority rights document.’
The UK Part III languages and copperfastening disparity
In 2001, the British government ratified the ECRML for the whole of the
UK. Under the general protections of Part II, recognition was given to Welsh
in Wales and to Gaelic and Scots in Scotland. In the North of Ireland, it
was given to the Irish language and Ulster Scots. 2 Under Part III, the British
government selected 52 paragraphs for Welsh in Wales,3 39 for Gaelic in
Scotland4 and 36 paragraphs for Irish in the North. Of these, 305 paragraphs
relate to matters that are the responsibility of the devolved administra-
tion in the North, and six relate to reserved and excepted matters.6 It is
significant that apart from the low number of provisions selected for Irish,
the UK government has in a number of cases adopted the ‘weakest’ of the
options available. In the next section, I shall compare the UK ratification
of Part III Articles 8 (Education), 9 (Judicial Authorities), 10 (Administrative
Authorities) and 11 (The Media) for Welsh in Wales, for Gaelic in Scotland
and for Irish in the North.
Article 8 Education
An examination of the clauses for education ratified for Irish in compari-
son with those ratified for Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh in Wales shows
that there is a consistent pattern of selection of weaker clauses for the Irish
language in Article 8. It is a measure of the minimalism of the ratification
throughout the other articles of the Charter, that Article 8 is nonetheless
the most significant in terms of the ratification for Irish.
Table 4.1 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in

Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: preschool
Sub-para 1a i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish


Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: primary school
Sub-para 1b i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish

Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: secondary school
Sub-para 1c i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish

Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: vocational and technical
education
Sub-para 1d i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Table 4.5 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic

in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: university and higher
education
Sub-para 1e i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish

Scotland and Irish Other sub-paragraphs in Article 8
Welsh 1f(ii) 1g 1h 1i
Gaelic 1f(iii) 1g 1h 1i 2
Irish 2
Table 4.7 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish
Administration of Justice: Article 9
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Other Sub-para
Welsh 1d 2b
Gaelic
Irish 3
Article 9 Administration of Justice

As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, the selection of para-
graphs in Article 9 has been the subject of some commentary by the COMEX.
Although the ratification for Gaelic in Scotland is also weak, it is significant
that Sub-paragraph 1b (iii) allows for the limited use of Gaelic in the admin-
istration of justice in Scotland. The UK government has selected only one
paragraph for Irish, relating to the translation of legal texts (see Table 4.7).
The minimalism of this choice is compounded by the failure to date to
repeal the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland), which
prohibits the use of languages other than English in the North’s courts.
The regular facilitation in the courts of ethnic minority languages through
interpretation means that the retention of the Act on statute impacts dis-
proportionately on the Irish language. This apparent contravention of the
ECRML is noted in the 1998 leaked advice (Canavan 1998, p. 5, para 11) from
a senior civil servant to the British government to which I have referred in
Chapter 3. I shall further discuss the 1737 Act in a later section, as well refer-
ring to it in Chapter 6.
Article 10 Administrative Authorities

The most notable omission in this Article is the failure to place an obliga-
tion upon government departments and public bodies to respond to cor-
respondence received in Irish in the same language, an option ratified for
both Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland (see Table 4.8).
Administrative Authorities: Article 10
Sub-para 1a i Ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Sub-para 1b i Ii iii iv
Welsh 1b
Gaelic
Irish
Sub-para 1c i Ii iii iv
Welsh 1c
Gaelic 1c
Irish 1c
Other paragraphs and sub-paragraphs in Article 10
Welsh 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 3a, 4a, 4b, 5
Gaelic 2a, 2b, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 5
Irish 2b, 2e, 2f, 2g, 3c, 4a, 5
Article 11 The Media

Broadcasting in Welsh in Wales and in Gaelic in Scotland are the subject
of domestic legislative protections in addition to the ECRML. The weak
ratification for Irish in relation to broadcasting (see Tables 4.9–4.15) is com-
pounded by the lack of any such domestic legislative protections for Irish.
It is possible to interpret the UK ratification instrument as providing great-
est levels of protection under the ECRML to those RMLs in the ‘strongest’
position. However, as I have pointed out, census figures show more people
with knowledge of Irish in the North than with knowledge of Gaelic in
Scotland, although because of historical factors, a greater number of the
latter are native speakers. In both Wales and Scotland, however, a certain
proportion of those who appear in statistics are likely to be adult or child
learners over the age of 3, just as in the North. These proportions appear
likely to increase in future. Indeed, successful LPP relies upon it. However,
current UK-wide LPP appears to be based upon fewer and ‘weaker’ provision
for non-native speakers, at least in the case of Irish in the North. The exten-
sion of this approach to Welsh and Gaelic as its population of non-native
speakers increases could have serious repercussions for these languages. In
turn, the decision not to extend it might imply that a different set of value
criteria are in use for Irish speakers in the North.
Media: Article 11
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Media: Article 11
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Media: Article 11
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Media: Article 11
Sub-para 1d
Welsh 1d
Gaelic 1d
Irish
Media: Article 11
Sub-para 1e i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Media: Article 11
Sub-para 1f i ii iii iv
Welsh
Gaelic
Irish
Media: Article 11
Sub-para 1g Sub-para 2 Sub-para 3

Welsh Welsh Welsh
Gaelic 1g Gaelic Gaelic
Irish Irish Irish
Ulster Scots in the ECRML ratification
I shall examine in detail the application of the ECRML in respect of Irish

in the coming sections of this chapter. Before doing so, it is necessary to
discuss why the announcement by the British government that it had rati-
fied the ECRML up to Part II for Ulster Scots created some controversy. Pre-
ratification, Ulster Scots, in as much as it was deemed to exist at all, was
felt to be a dialect, rather than a language and suffered from a poor public
image. Walker (2003, p. 37) attributes the adverse attention given to the
UK ratification to innate anti-unionist/Protestant prejudice, although other
commentators read the roots of the contemporary power balance rather dif-
ferently. O’Gallagher (2005, p. 238) notes frequent examples of anti-Irish
sentiment in some key examples of early twentieth century Scots literature.
He (2005, p. 239) states that, ‘For many, fears about the future of the Scots
language were part of a wider fear for the future of the Scots race, Irish
immigration was seen as a threat to both and as such lent momentum to
the Scots-language revival and influenced the future directions that move-
ment would later assume.’ It is implicit in O’Gallagher that the elements
of sectarianism related to the historical relationship with Ireland and the
localised racial tensions deriving from contemporary waves of immigra-
tion from Ireland (and particularly from the recently partitioned North) fed
upon each other.
Leonard (1990, p. 50) quotes Grant’s introduction to the Scottish
National Dictionary (Grant 1931, xxvii), which blames the ‘influx of Irish
and foreign immigrants’ into Glasgow for the fact that ‘the dialect has
become hopelessly corrupt.’ Herbison (2005, p. 82) also attributes upsurges
in interest in Scots / Ulster Scots as intimately related to the loss of politi-
cal power of unionism / Protestantism in both Scotland during the Unions
of 1707 and 1800 and the North of Ireland due to ‘the loss of Stormont
in 1972.’ He asserts (2005, p. 82) that for Protestants, ‘While the sense of
Britishness still functions as a political identity, it is no longer sufficiently
cohesive or distinctive to sustain allegiance as a cultural identity.’
The GFA does not specifically refer to Ulster Scots as a language.7 In the
legislation enacted to establish An Foras Teanga,8 the all-Ireland Language
Board that comprises two parts, Foras na Gaeilge and the Ulster Scots
Agency, the role of the Ulster-Scots Agency is defined as ‘promotion of
greater awareness and use of Ullans and of Ulster-Scots cultural issues, both
within Northern Ireland and throughout the island.’ Ulster Scots cultural
issues are defined as those which relate to the cultural traditions of the
section of the population of the North and the border counties who are
of Scottish ancestry. The 1999 North/South Co-operation (Implementation
Bodies) (Northern Ireland) Order states that ‘Ullans is to be understood as
the variety of the Scots language traditionally found in parts of Northern
Ireland and Donegal.’ The 2000 ratification of the ECRML says that the UK
government ‘... recognises that Scots and Ulster Scots meet the Charter’s def-
inition of a regional or minority language.’ Falconer (2005, p. 84) notes that
the word ‘language’ is in the singular, and asserts, ‘The legislative framework
for the promotion of Ulster Scots is vague and apparently contradictory ... .
The charter declaration seems to overturn the implementation body’s defi-
nition of Ulster Scots by treating it as an independent language. If “Ullans”
is a “variety of the Scots language” ... why should it be necessary to mention
it separately?’ This, he says (2005, p. 84), may be evidence of ‘bureaucratic
reasons’ on the part of the British government, or as a result of recognition
for Scots, or ‘... it could be interpreted as indicating a general weakening of
the criteria for languageness.’
In Falconer’s view, Scots is a language and Ulster Scots is a dialect of it.
Like Herbison (2005), Falconer sees CR-related political and party-political
motivation as the rationale for the way in which Ulster Scots is currently
promoted. He (2005, p. 84) says, ‘the band of those who believe Ulster Scots
a separate and independent language is overwhelmingly limited to NI and
to the Protestant and Unionist communities,’ adding in a footnote (2005,
83/35) that ‘[s]ome observers might even claim that promoters of Ulster Scots
as an independent language are not merely Unionist but exhibit a bias –
declared or undeclared – towards the “no” camp in their attitude to the
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.9 Whatever the reality of this, the promo-
tion of Ulster Scots within British LPP and CR appears consistently to pivot
on its use to counterbalance the Irish language. The Observer newspaper,
reporting a leaked Northern Ireland Office (NIO) memo, records that ‘[i]n
every concession to republicans, such as more money for the Irish language,
the comments section advises that there be a reciprocal amount of largesse
for unionist causes.’10 Shortly after ratification of the ECRML, D. Ó Riagáin
(2001, p. 54) asserts, ‘One of the problems bedeviling reform in Northern
Ireland is that any change in policy can be interpreted by one community
as being a concession to the other.’ However, this implies that both com-
munities in the North have an equal ability to impact on the nature of such
‘reform’ whereas, as I shall argue in a later section, the de facto extension to
Ulster Scots of some Part III provisions of the ECRML appears to suggest an
imbalance in objective criteria concerning LPP.
In the coming sections of this chapter, I shall examine the findings of
COMEX and the UK government as well as from the NGO POBAL during the
first two ECRML monitoring cycles, 2001–2 and 2002–5. Following this, I shall
discuss the third monitoring cycle, still underway at the time of writing.
The first monitoring cycle of the European Charter 2001–2
In July 2002, the British government submitted its first report on the
implementation of the ECRML. The subsequent COMEX report com-
ments on the, ‘... differences in approach and commitment’ to RMLs in
different parts of the UK; calls for improved co-ordination (COMEX 2004,
p. 57, para B) and flags up the failure to enact the ECRML into domestic
legislation. In addition, it makes detailed comments on a variety of areas
including the paucity of resources and materials for Irish Medium schools
(COMEX 2004, pp. 46–7, paras 304, 305, 312; 2004, p. 57, para G). It also
‘encourages’ the authorities to investigate the need for higher education
through Irish (COMEX 2004, p. 48, para 318). In relation to arts and cul-
ture, the Experts call for ‘concrete policies’ instead of ‘ad hoc provision’
(COMEX 2004, p. 55, paras 369, 370) and in the case of the newspaper, Lá,
they place emphasis on the need for adequate funding to be made available
to ensure the paper’s continuance (COMEX 2004, p. 53, para 361). Further
comments include the use of Irish in the courts (COMEX 2004, p. 58, para
1); concerns about the adequacy of the voicemail facility for verbal requests
from Irish speakers (COMEX 2004, p. 50, para 335) and strategic policy co-
ordination at all levels. The Committee of Ministers recommend that the
British government should improve and increase Irish language television
broadcasting immediately, and encourage private radio stations to broad-
cast in Irish (RecChL (2004)1). The tone of the COMEX report in general is
positive in spite of their finding that in the case of 11 of the clauses ratified
for Irish, almost a third, the British government has either failed to fulfil
their commitment or only partly fulfilled it, or else have given insuffi-
cient information. In the case of Article 10, the use of Irish in government
departments, councils and public bodies, only half of the clauses ratified
have been fulfilled. Emyr Lewis describes implementation of this Article as
‘patchy and inconsistent, depending on which administration, what serv-
ices and where.’ (Lewis 2004, Belfast).
There are areas of the report where the finding of compliance might be
deemed surprising. In seven clear examples, (COMEX 2004, paras 307, 312,
319, 325, 330, 369, 377) the Experts make findings of fulfillment whilst
simultaneously acknowledging evidence or community concerns to the
contrary.
The Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure

Guidance on the Charter
More than 3 years after ratification, and 2 months before public release of the
first COMEX report, the North’s Interdepartmental Charter Implementation
Group (ICIG) issued a circular, Guidance on Meeting UK Government

Commitments in Respect of Irish and Ulster Scots. The Guidance, in spite
of its title, provides detailed direction only on Article 10 of Part III of the
ECRML, thus adding to potential confusion on the actual range of govern-
ment obligations. There is a lack of clarity in the document around the
different protections provided under Part II, which applies to both Irish
and Ulster Scots and the Part III protections that apply to Irish alone. The
Guidance advises that the Article 10 provisions be applied to Ulster Scots.
The particular interpretation of LPP in the North prompted DCAL special
advisor Dónall Ó Riagáin (2004, Belfast) to comment ‘the quid pro quo con-
cept, although understandable politically, is bad for language planning.’ He
goes on to express the hope that in future, the ECRML would be applied
more objectively. I shall return to this issue in the later sections and again
in Chapter 6. The overall implementation and monitoring of the ECRML in
the first cycle supports Grin’s (2003, p. 11) assertion that there is a need for
‘a compass to help decision-makers navigate these issues and make coherent
choices in the context of the Charter’ for where such an instrument is left
entirely open to interpretation by government, it may prove to be to the
detriment of the ECRML’s own aims.
The second ECRML monitoring cycle 2002–5
Rather than detecting progression in the implementation of the ECRML

since its ratification, the 2007 COMEX report identifies many of the weak-
nesses previously noted. These include an ongoing lack of co-ordination and
strategic direction in the UK implementation in respect of Irish (COMEX
2007, p. 62, point A). In its December 2005 submission, POBAL notes that,
in contrast with legislative developments in Wales and the enactment in
Scotland of the Gaelic Language Act 2005, there had been no progress in the
intervening period in respect of domestic legislation for Irish in the North.
The organisation calls on the COMEX to support an Irish language Act.
In respect of education, the 2007 COMEX report makes several unequiv-
ocal statements. Thus, in relation to refusal to fund five Irish language pre-
schools, the COMEX notes that this cannot be justified by overprovision
in EME (COMEX 2007, p. 48, para 420). They comment also on the need
for greater flexibility in enrolment criteria (COMEX 2007, p. 48, para 422),
on the failure to recognise five new primary schools (COMEX 2007, p. 48,
para 425), on concerns relating to support for newly qualified teachers,
special needs provision, curriculum support and funding cuts (COMEX
2007, p. 49, para 428), the eligibility criteria for secondary schools and
the unsuitability of Irish language units attached to EM schools (COMEX
2007, p. 49, para 430), resources, shortages of qualified teachers for cer-
tain subjects, travelling distances and failure to cover pupil transport costs
(COMEX 2007, p. 49, para 433). However, as in the first report, the COMEX
tends to find each undertaking fulfilled. This appears to be particularly

contradictory in the light of the report’s findings (2007, p. 62, para G)
highlighting concerns, ‘with regard to teaching materials, teacher train-
ing and mentoring’ and the warning that, ‘the lack of continuity from
primary to secondary education is of considerable concern for all Part III
languages.’ On Higher and Further Education (HFE), the COMEX raises sig-
nificant concerns regarding funding, communication, the level of infor-
mation available to the COMEX itself, post-primary regulations which
place an additional burden on Irish Medium schools, lack of resources
etc (COMEX 2007, p.50, paras 436, 437, 438, 439, 440 respectively). The
COMEX asks for further information on the number of pupils enrolling in
Irish Medium courses, but in common with the previous section, find the
undertaking fulfilled. On higher education, the Experts express ‘serious
concern’ at the rejection by the DENI of requests increase teacher training
numbers (COMEX 200, p. 51, para 447). In the light of this, it finds this
undertaking ‘partly fulfilled’.
In response to comments by COMEX in its first report, the UK gave a
commitment to consider the scope of Article 9 with a view to ratifying fur-
ther clauses from it. (COMEX 2004, Appendix II, Comments by UK Govt).
However, with no further action taken in the interim, the 2007 COMEX
report notes under the examination of the Part II obligations, that there is
a need to remove the ‘contradiction between the 1737 Language Act and
the Good Friday Agreement regarding the use of Irish in the courts.’ This
paragraph concludes with the Experts encouraging the removal of obstacles
to the use of Irish in the administration of justice (COMEX 2007, p. 17,
para 148). Concerning administrative authorities, COMEX notes continu-
ing complaints about the use of a voicemail facility to field telephone calls
in Irish, and the need for a better service regarding written applications
(COMEX 2007, p. 52, paras 451,452, 468). It comments, ‘Although certain
administrative authorities accept submissions in Irish, the service is in need
of improvement’ (COMEX 2007, p. 63, point H). This leads them to con-
clude that the undertaking is only partly fulfilled. Monitoring by POBAL
(2002; 2005) has shown that 19 out of 26 local councils accept applications
in Irish whilst others have refused or simply do not publicise the availability
of any such service. The COMEX reports, ‘The authorities claimed that it
was at each local authority’s discretion to provide an Irish language service.
The Committee of Experts gained the impression that there is a need for
more direction from the authorities on this matter’ (COMEX 2007, p. 52,
para 460). The Experts then note poor advertising of Irish language version
of documents (COMEX 2007, p. 52, para 455), but consider this undertaking
fulfilled.
In relation to the encouragement of the use of Irish in local assemblies,
COMEX asks for evidence and subsequently form no conclusion in respect
of this undertaking (COMEX 2007: 53, para 463). POBAL’s report notes the
reluctance of several local councils to facilitate the erection of Irish lan-

guage street names and suggests that the 1995 Local Government Order
be replaced with stronger legislation. In its second report, the Committee
of Experts notes that the authorities should comment on this issue in their
next periodical report (COMEX 2007, p. 53, para 465).
As I shall describe in Chapter 5, the broadcasting regulator Ofcom (2005,
p. 100) highlights both the need for further provision for Irish language
programming and the historic differential in expenditure on Irish in com-
parison with Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland. In 2005–6, the BBC
broadcast 524 hours of Welsh language programming for S4C in contrast
with 21 hours of Irish language programming11 The COMEX finding, there-
fore, that ‘the shortcomings in ... Irish broadcasting ... observed in the last
report are in the process of being overcome’ is surprising (COMEX 2007,
p. 63 para I). COMEX notes public advertising revenue (approx £17.2 million
in 2004) is not available to the Irish language print media (COMEX 2007, p.
56, para 489). The CoM recommend increased support for the print media
in Irish and Scottish Gaelic (RecChL (2007)2, para 4). Later in this chapter,
I shall examine the subsequent closure of Lá12 in 2009 in the light of this
recommendation.
The failure to establish an adequate mechanism to roll out improved pro-
vision leads to the recommendation by the Committee of Ministers that
a comprehensive Irish language policy should be developed, including
progression in IME (RecChL (2007)2, para 2). However, the finding of the
Committee of Experts, in respect of the overall UK approach, that ‘signifi-
cant measures in the form of new legislation, funding, policies, guidelines
and planned activities have been undertaken since the last monitoring
round’ (COMEX 2007, p. 62, point B) can only highlight the absence of
any clear statement by them in respect of Irish language legislation. The
reference welcoming ‘consultation’ and ‘ongoing dialogue’ (COMEX 2007,
p. 62, point B) is unfortunate given the widespread perception that the UK
government manipulated consultation on proposed legislation for political
ends. I shall examine this further in Chapter 6.
During the second monitoring cycle, the lack of an agreed official defini-
tion of what constitutes Ulster Scots, continued to lead to policy confusion. In
2007, the NI Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) published draft changes
to questions for the 2011 Census, including the proposal that respondents
be asked if they could read, write, speak or understand Ulster Scots.13 In the
same period, the BBC Audience Council asserts that peak viewing Irish lan-
guage programming displaces the English language, but that Ulster Scots can
be mainstreamed. Their submission to the BBC Trust (May 2007, p. 8, point E)
states, ‘Ulster-Scots is largely accessible to mainstream audiences, except at the
highly differentiated end of the linguistic spectrum.’ If one accepts the BBC’s
assertion, there are considerable challenges facing the census agency in the
interpretation of the data on Ulster Scots that they propose to collect in 2011.
The tendency to link Irish and Ulster Scots in an inappropriate and dis-
advantageous way for the Irish language is noted in 2007 by the COMEX
(2007, p. 7, para 32)
In Northern Ireland, representatives of Irish speakers reported practi-

cal problems of language promotion due to calls for parity of treatment
with Ulster Scots. The Committee of Experts were informed that in a
number of instances, the request for action appropriate to the Irish lan-
guage therefore led to the result that no measures were taken, since it
was not practically possible to apply identical measures to Ulster Scots.
The Committee of Experts wishes to underline that each regional or
minority language should be protected and promoted according to its
own situation.
The third monitoring cycle 2005–8
The UK government was expected to provide its third periodical report

on 1 July 2008. However, it was not until 26 May 2009 that it submitted
a document to the CoE, some eleven months delay. Extraordinarily, the
UK government states that the 364-page report provides no information
about the implementation of the ECRML relating to 30 paragraphs and
sub-paragraphs relating to devolved matters in the North, suggesting that
this central information will be provided in a ‘supplementary report to
follow’ from the NI Executive. In the interim, the UK government con-
fines its reporting to 6 paragraphs and sub-paragraphs relating to reserved
matters under its direct control. Correspondence14 to the NGO POBAL
acknowledges that the missing information has not been included, ‘de barr
nár aontaíodh go fóill é’ / ‘as it has not yet been agreed.’ Consociational
arrangements pertaining to Lijphart’s ‘mutual veto’ model to which I have
referred in Chapter 3, requires agreement on all Executive matters between
the two dominant Assembly parties as represented through the Office of
the First and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). SF told Irish language
NGO POBAL15 that in the party’s view, the CAL draft report on ECRML
implementation was incomplete, misrepresented the relative development
of Irish and Ulster Scots and gave insufficient information on the ongo-
ing failure to enact the Irish language Act, and the funding position of
the Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge / Irish language Broadcast Fund (CCG /
ILBF). On 15 May 2009, in response to a SF question in the Assembly, CAL
Minister Gregory Campbell16 acknowledges that his department’s report
did not include, ‘Issues that were not taken forward ...’ in the period con-
cerned. This implies that where a specific governmental commitment is
made but not fulfilled, the failure has no relevance to monitoring duties.
DCAL subsequently rejected SF amendments put forward. SF consequently
refused to sign off on the report. The NGO POBAL contends that the
log jam is indicative of the depth of the crisis in the protection of the
Irish language since the UK failure to enact the Irish language Act and
the re-establishment of devolution.17 To date, there is no indication that
agreement will be reached within OFMDFM on the contents of the DCAL
report.
The third UK periodical report on the ECRML
POBAL states that the third monitoring cycle has been a period of unprec-
edented attacks on the Irish language. According to the NGO, ‘devolved
government has proven to be detrimental to the Irish language’ since the
failure to fulfil the British commitment to enact the Irish language Act has
signalled the vulnerability of the language to hostile political forces. POBAL
states that a two-tier system is in place within devolved government with
approaches to the Irish language depending on the party-political stance of
the Minister. The draft report18 says that this ‘adds to the ghettoisation and
politicisation of the Irish language and of the ECRML.’ The report further
notes that DCAL, which has core responsibility for RMLs and the ECRML, is
under the control of a Minister whose party is hostile to the Irish language
(POBAL 2009). However, the changed context for Irish in the North is not
referred to in the third UK report. Whilst acknowledging the St Andrews’
Agreement commitment to enact the Irish Language Act (UK 2009, p. 16),
the UK report fails to account for the failure to date to introduce such leg-
islation at Westminster or at the devolved Assembly. Nor does it refer to
any strategy to ensure that the obligation is fulfilled in future. Required
to list policies or provisions (UK 2009, p. 22) considered ‘essential’ to the
implementation of the ECRML, the UK lists none whatsoever for the Irish
language. Asked for recent relevant case law, it cites none, thereby omitting
the victory at appeal in the case of Máire Nic an Bhaird,19 and the granting
in April 2008 of a Judicial Review of the continuing operation of the 1737
Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland).20 In response to all other
questions in the preliminary report, the UK says ‘supplementary report to
follow’.
The UK government (UK 2009, p. 96) states that, it ‘does not believe that
there are any unjustified distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences
relating to the use of Irish.’ However, under Article 7, relating to policies,
legislation and practice, POBAL’s monitoring report highlights previous
criticism by the COMEX concerning the continuing operation of the 1737
Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) and calls for its repeal. It
further notes the failure of the UK to enact the ECRML into domestic law and
cites the stern reiteration of the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations (UNESC 2009 E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, para 13) that, ‘irrespective of the
system through which international law is incorporated in the domestic
legal order (monism or dualism), following ratification of an international
instrument, the State party is under a legal obligation to comply with such
an instrument and to give it full effect in its domestic legal order.’ POBAL
pinpoints legislative disparities between Part III languages acknowledged
by the UK in previous monitoring rounds. It calls for the enactment of the
Irish Language Act as specified in the St Andrews’ Agreement, citing a fur-
ther recommendation of the UNESC (2009, para 37) that either, ‘the State
party or the devolved administration in Northern Ireland, adopt an Irish
Language Act.’ POBAL points to the ongoing exclusion of provision for Irish
language broadcasting from UK legislation, to the uncertain position of TG4
following digital switchover (the only broadcasting issue referred to in this
section of the UK report (UK 2009, p. 53) and to the threat to continued
funding for the CCG / ILBF. I shall examine the issues relating to broadcast-
ing in Chapter 5.
Summarising its achievements in respect of the 2007 CoM recommenda-
tions, the UK notes the 2006 St Andrews Act which places a duty on the
Executive to adopt a strategy for the Irish language, but refers to the ‘sup-
plementary report to follow’ for further information on this and the need
for further support for the print media (UK 2009, p.45). In its monitor-
ing report, POBAL states that by the end of the third monitoring period,
no strategy to enhance the development of the Irish language had been
published. In addition, it points out that two successive CAL Ministers,
the DUP’s Edwin Poots and Gregory Campbell, had both indicated that no
additional funding would be made available for any such strategy and that
it will formally link the Irish language with Ulster Scots, thus contravening
the advice of the COMEX in 2007 (POBAL 2009). In respect of the print
media, POBAL’s report highlights the Foras na Gaeilge 2008 decision to end
funding for the Irish language newspaper Lá Nua. It points out that inad-
equate support from the funding body and the refusal to include the Irish
language print media in the Review of Public Advertising, noted by the
COMEX in 2007, resulted in a series of financial crises for the newspaper
throughout 2007–8. POBAL states that the ending of funding contravenes
Article 11(ii) of the ECRML as ratified.21 In addition, the report contin-
ues, the decision, ‘means that Foras na Gaeilge is in contravention of the
domestic legislation under which it was established, since this requires it to
promote the use of the Irish language in both written and spoken forms in
Northern Ireland in the context of the ECRML’ (POBAL 2009). Lá Nua was
forced to close down in December 2008 with the loss of 8 posts.22 I shall
briefly refer to both the Irish language strategy and the closure of Lá Nua
in the next chapter.
The UK government report refers to the establishment of An Foras Teanga/
The Language Board (UK 2009, p. 94, 103), but notes that its duties fall
under the NI Executive and that it cannot therefore offer further informa-
tion pending the ‘supplementary report’. It states (UK 2009, p. 69) that the
NIO, HM Revenue and Customs and the NI Courts Service all have Codes
of Courtesy23 in relation to Irish, although, unsurprisingly, it does not men-

tion that in the latter case, Irish may not be used within the courts. The
UK reports (UK 2009, p. 70) that the Police Service of NI (PSNI) held one
public meeting (7 days before the submission of the UK report) during the 3
year period with interpretation from Irish and that the Office of the Police
Ombudsman (OPONI) allows for complaints to be made in Irish (UK 2009,
p. 69). In addition, the NI Prison Service (NIPS), it states, employs two part-
time teachers of Irish ‘at its main prison establishment’ (UK 2009, p. 81). In
all other sections of its response to Article 7, the UK refers the COMEX to
the absent ‘supplementary paper’. In the UK report, of 64 pages relating to
Part II, less than 1 page relates to the Irish language, plus 3 pages of census
tables.
Part III of the UK report is similarly lightweight. Under Article 8
(Education) only paragraph 2 is discussed, with rather bald assertions
that Irish is available as a GCSE, A level and university level in the UK.
No information is given as to where precisely this is the case, nor as to
rates or patterns of take-up (UK 2009, p. 118). In the matter of the other
provisions for education, and for Article 9 (Judicial Authorities), 24 the
UK government advises that there is a ‘supplementary report to fol-
low.’ It does the same for Article 10 (Administrative Authorities), but
repeats the information given earlier in respect of Codes of Courtesy
in 3 UK-wide government Departments. This section notes that the
law governing street names is a devolved matter and thereby refers
the reader to the ‘supplementary report’ (UK 2009, p. 118). POBAL’s
monitoring report contains detailed information on the tendency for
some local councils to delay the erection of bilingual signs, to refuse
the naming of new estates in Irish or to devise policies in a way that
mitigates against Irish language signage. As in 2005, the NGO (POBAL
2007, p. 71) calls for the replacement of the 1995 Local Government
Act in favour of more proactive legislation promoting the use of Irish
in street signage. In relation to the voicemail facility, the UK report
notes that the NI Courts Service operates a translation service for docu-
ments and that ‘no requests have been received for translations into
Irish in the past three years’ (UK 2009, p. 119). However, in POBAL’s
monitoring report, the NGO details contact between DCAL, DENI and
an individual Irish speaker seeking a copy in Irish of the Education
Order 1998. The translated copy, once located, had not been proofed. 25
This took a further seven days prior to being sent to the applicant with
a note stating that the English version was the authoritative one. 26 In
addition to the apparently unreliable completion of translation of even
a minimal number of legal texts, it is clear that neither the public nor
government bodies are made aware of how to access the three available
texts in Irish. The UK’s reference to lack of demand for translated texts
appears mischievous, and rather ironic given the effective blanket ban
on the use of Irish in the courts which clearly curtails the demand for
legal translation.
Under Article 11 (The Media) the UK report acknowledges that, ‘there is
no statutory requirement for broadcasters in NI to deliver Irish language
programming’ (UK 2009, p. 119). Interestingly, the UK go on to say that
the lack of statutory requirements for Irish language broadcasting arises
from the GFA Intergovernmental Agreement (2 March 2005) when theo-
retical access to TG4 was extended to the North. 27 In Chapter 5, I shall
discuss at greater length the lack of provision for Irish in UK domestic
broadcasting legislation. At this juncture, I shall simply note that the UK’s
assertion is rather surprising since the UK Communications Act, minus
provision for Irish, was enacted two years before the intergovernmen-
tal conference referred to in the UK report. Also legislative provision for
Welsh language broadcasting in Wales and Gaelic language broadcasting
in Scotland pre-dates the 2003 Act by many years but has not prevented
inclusion of provisions for both these languages in the Act. The boosting
of the signal from the Divis transmitter in order to facilitate reception of
TG4 is also mentioned (UK 2009, p. 120), although as I shall discuss in
Chapter 5, the technical problems associated with improved and extended
reception of TG4 throughout the North have not been resolved. Given
that this has been a consistent concern for several years, the UK’s assertion
(UK 2009, p. 120) that work, ‘on the best technical solution to ensure the
continued widespread availability (sic) of TG4 after the Digital Switchover
in 2012 is ongoing’ does not reassure. It is noticeable that no commit-
ment to ensuring widespread availability is made. This section of the UK
report also refers to additional funding from the BBC for Irish language
broadcasting, to which I shall refer in further detail in Chapter 5, and to
the commitment of BBC radio to ‘maintaining dedicated slots’ for Irish
language programming. Again, as I shall note in the next chapter, Irish
speakers were disappointed in 2006 at the halving of the popular Irish lan-
guage radio Caschlár programme, half of the air-time then being allocated
to Ulster Scots.
The provisions of Article 11 relating to the print media and training
of journalists, those relating to Articles 12 (Cultural Activities) and 13
(Social and Economic Life) will be contained, the report says, in the ‘sup-
plementary report to follow.’ On Article 14, (Transfrontier Exchanges),
the UK government makes passing reference to the existence of Foras na
Gaeilge and to its own participation in the British-Irish Council, whose
indigenous and minority languages work-stream, ‘facilitates co-oper-
ation and understanding across the UK and Ireland on issues relating
to all minority languages’ (UK 2009, p. 121). Sadly, the report fails to
elucidate further on these UK-wide improvements in co-operation and
understanding.
In Chapter 1, I have referred to the view of some commentators (Bell,

2000; Livingstone, 1990) that international human rights instruments
prove particularly inadequate in conflict situations. The UK’s third peri-
odical report on the ECRML brings this into sharp focus. Of itself, the
report’s inability to provide information on devolved matters is indicative
of the deep malaise in effective LPP in the North. It raises questions as to
how the COMEX will respond through the monitoring report structure,
and how the influence of the British government at European member
state level will affect the findings of the Committee of Ministers and the
Council of Europe. To date, the overall limitations of the ECRML have
been illustrated by the NI experience, where weak ratification, failure
to adopt the ECRML provisions into domestic legislation and manipula-
tion of protections in respect of RMLs at different levels of development
have impacted adversely on the Irish language. Following the develop-
ments during the third monitoring cycle, it appears that the issue of Irish
in the North of Ireland is set to be a litmus test for the application of
the ECRML.
The ECRML must improve its ability to protect and promote RMLs; by
encouraging the consistent application of transparent standards in legisla-
tion, policy and funding by ratifying states in respect of Part III languages.
The Council of Europe places importance on the input of NGOs. However,
this can be undermined if key issues, clearly identified by the grassroots
community, are inadequately dealt with during the monitoring and report-
ing cycles. The mechanisms for overall recommendations must be adequate
to deal with sensitive or difficult issues. The detailed reporting on para-
graphs and sub-paragraphs must not distract from a realistic appraisal of the
overall circumstances of a given language. Unhelpful ambiguity is created
when findings in respect of the fulfilment of undertakings appear at odds
with the commentary. Clear, challenging guidelines and benchmarks for
implementation of Part II and Part III should be developed to increase trans-
parency. There is a need to develop and secure appropriate sources of con-
sistent, independent technical advice for both states and NGOs. Concordats
or service provision agreements between NGOs and state-sponsored lan-
guage agencies should be developed to secure continuity and quality in
NGO monitoring. A three-pronged approach should be developed, includ-
ing: studies of existing ratification instruments, research geared towards
detailed analysis of best practice and further development of key NGO
networks. These measures alone, however, are not sufficient to maximise
the potential of the ECRML in the development of consistent, appropriate
and transparent language planning. As noted previously, the enforceability
of soft law mechanisms must be urgently addressed, and further sustained
efforts are needed to ensure rigourous impartiality coupled with robust and
effective challenge to state tokenism and obfuscation.
In Chapters 6–8, I shall examine in detail the campaign for legislation to

protect the Irish language and analyse the consultation processes of 2006–7,
relating to the British government commitment to enact the Irish language
Act. Following this, I shall briefly outline some key aspects in the treat-
ment of the Irish language since the re-establishment of the devolved NI
Assembly in May 2007 to September 2009.
5
Irish Language Broadcasting
since the Good Friday Agreement:
Sop in áit na scuaibe?
Sword or Ploughshare?
The Agreement provides the opportunity to wrest the Irish lan-

guage from the grip of strife. If it is allowed to do so, its provisions
will demonstrate that the language is not a sword. It is a plough-
share.
(Anderson 1999, p. 19)
In this chapter, I shall examine LPP in respect of Irish language broadcast-

ing in the North. Broadcasting is one of a number of matters which the
British government ‘reserves’ to Westminster control. Therefore, although
some of the events that I shall describe in the coming sections of this
chapter relate to periods of British Direct Rule and others to the two sep-
arate periods of devolved government in Northern Ireland, (2000–2 and
2007 ongoing), during the whole of this time, responsibility for broad-
casting has remained consistently and solely that of the British govern-
ment. In this chapter, I shall discuss the disparity in British government
treatment of Welsh- and Gaelic language broadcasting in comparison
with Irish language broadcasting. The central role of the UK’s main pub-
lic service broadcaster (PSB), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
and the South’s Irish language television station, TG4 will be highlighted,
as will the historical relationship between the BBC and Irish speakers. I
shall discuss public consultations on the 2003 UK Communications Act
and the 2005 Review of the BBC’s Royal Charter. Following this, I shall
analyse the 2007–8 consultation by the BBC Audience Council regard-
ing minority language broadcasting in NoI and the position in respect of
reception of TG4 in homes in the North. I shall then outline issues con-
cerning the Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge / Irish Language Broadcast Fund
(CCG / ILBF) and its future funding.
99
Since the establishment of Mercator Media Forum in 1995 and the

inclusion of media provisions in recent language legislation, including
the ECRML, there has been an increase in research and debate on broad-
casting in minority languages, with a number of studies looking at the
issue in both general and specific terms (for example: Cormack 1995, 1998,
2006, Hourigan 2001, Watson 2002.) This has increased recognition of
complex issues around broadcasting, and highlighted its role in enhanc-
ing the status of and access to marginalised languages. Fishman (1991,
2001) however gives it less priority in language transmission than the
use of the language in the home or community, in education or the work
place (Fishman 1991, p. 395). Browne (1996), Cormack (1999) and Dunbar
(2001, 2006b) have also raised concerns about the degree of energy and
resourcing sometimes directed towards broadcasting. Dunbar (2001: 251)
argues that this can lead to a dearth of development in other areas key to
minoritised languages. Along with Williams (1994, p. 127), Dunbar (2001,
p. 251) highlights the importance of the integration of broadcasting into a
holistic approach to LPP.
Like other areas of service provision available to the users of the dominant
language, broadcasting can assume an additional importance when it is with-
held, or appears to be withheld, by the state. In such circumstances, the minori-
tised language community feels a sense of injustice and exclusion. However,
the majority community is also affected by the relative invisibility of the
minoritised language since it reinforces the view that the minoritised language
is unacceptable, controversial or dangerous. In the next section, I shall exam-
ine evidence of differential treatment for broadcasting in Welsh in Wales and
Gaelic in Scotland in comparison with broadcasting in Irish in the North.
Disparities in broadcasting provision for Welsh in Wales, for

Gaelic in Scotland, and for Irish in the North
Whilst long-standing legislative commitments exist for broadcasting in

Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland, no such statutory provision exists
for Irish, a situation explored in further detail later in this chapter and sub-
sequently in Chapter 4 on the ECRML and in Chapters 6–8 in respect of the
2006–7 proposed Irish language legislation for NoI. Broadcasting in indi-
genous languages is one of the few forms of Public Service Broadcasting
(PSB) in direct receipt of government funding. However, Ofcom, the inde-
pendent UK communications regulator, (2005, p. 100.) notes, ‘Historically,
the BBC has spent less per head on serving its Irish-speaking audience than
on the Gaelic and Welsh-speaking populations.’ It reiterates the point in
2007, (Ofcom 2007, p. 83 para 5.80) stating that, ‘The nature and amount of
funding for each language varies considerably, as does the source.’ In add-
ition, since the BBC may contribute to the costs of programming in some
regions, the result is that, ‘there is a different model in use for broadcasting
Irish Language Broadcasting since GFA 101
Table 5.1 Total spend by hours on television and radio for Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland
and Irish
Television 2003–4 Radio 2003–4
Total spend Total hours Total spend Total hours
Wales £20.3m/S4C 521 £9m/Radio Cymru 7528

Scotland £2.065m1including 36 £2.95ma Raidió 2782
online nan Gaidheal
NI £424,000 8.24 £238,000 256.04
Note: a Not including Gaelic Media Service spend

Source: Response to Freedom of Information request submitted by POBAL, from Mark Adair,
Secretary and Head of Public Policy, BBC NI, 22 February 2005
for each of the languages.’ (Ofcom 2007, p. 83, para 5.82) Table 5.1 shows the
situation for the UK’s three primary indigenous languages in 2003–4.
From 2005 onwards, the BBC changed the manner in which it calculated
its spend figures, from cost per hour averages to actual spend. This makes
direct comparison of figures between 2003 and 2009 problematic. Ofcom
(2007, p. 8) notes that the Welsh station S4C spent £65m in 2005 on a broad
range of genres for Welsh speakers whilst the BBC funded from the licence
fee an additional ten hours of Welsh language output per week. In Scotland,
the Gaelic Media Service disposed of a commissioning fund of some £7 mil-
lion in 2005–6 to facilitate the production of Gaelic language output on the
BBC and on ITV1. In this period, preparations were underway for a Gaelic
digital channel. As explored later in this chapter, 2005 was the first year in
which the CCG / ILBF in NoI accessed its four-year budget of £3 million per
annum for Irish language programming. Table 5.2 presents some compara-
tive data on the combination of public funding and input from the BBC for
Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish in NI, the three languages in
the UK recognised under Part III of the ECRML, with side notes on Ulster
Scots, recognised under Part II only of the ECRML along with Scots, Manx
and Cornish.
In a report to the United Nations (UK to UNESC 2009, p. 44, para 296,
297), the British government confirms that for the financial year 2008–9,
Wales’ S4C received from it a grant, ‘estimated to be £98 million’. In
September 2008, BBC Alba, the Gaelic digital channel, was awarded £11.9
million per annum by the Scottish Executive with a further £2.5 million
per annum cash and in-kind support provided by the BBC itself. In com-
parison with this, the British government provided a time-limited grant
of £3 million per annum for four years (2005–9) for the CCG / ILBF, with
a further £6 million for the period up to March 2011 allocated in 2009,
after considerable community and political pressure. I shall discuss the
Table 5.2 Comparative data on indigenous languages
Welsh Gaelic Irisha Ulster Scots
European Part III of ECRML (specific broadcasting requirements) Part II b (general

status requirement only)
UK status Welsh language Act 1993 Gaelic Language (Scotland) Good Friday Agreement 1998 (broadcasting GFA 1998 (no
(Westminster) Act 2005 commitments) broadcasting
commitments
undertaken)
Census 580,000 speakers 92,000 speakers (2 %) 167,000 knowledge (10.4 %); 75,000 with No official statistics.
statistics (20.8 %) 4 skills. 2006 Census in RoI, 1.6 m (42%) Projection from 1999
NI Life and Times
Survey (sample size of
2,000 people) 30,000
(2%)
Public £94m (DCMS to S4C) £12m – Scottish government to £3m via DCAL to CCG / ILBF until 2009. Ulster Scots Agency
funding p.a MG Alba (formerly GMS) From UK government 2009–2011. supports some short-
term RSLs
BBC/ PSB c. 520 hrs of content to £9.7 m in funding content £950,000 of content from BBCNI from £400,000 of content
input p.a. S4C (value £22.5 m) 2009 (365hrs from RTE to TG4 in RoI) from BBCNI from
2009
Channel S4C analogue: S4C BBC Alba (from Sept 2008) on dig. BBCNI-all platforms TG4 and RTE from RoI BBCNI-all platforms
availability Digidol/S4C2 on all sat, dig. cab. and FreeSat TeleG- available in NI on analogue spillover, dig. and BBC Radio Ulster
platforms DTT BBC Scotland/stv-all platforms sat and dig cab TG4 also analogue boost
from Divis
Ofcom The Future of DTT proposed making space on PSB mix for S4C in Wales, GDS (BBC Alba) and TG4 in NI
Content S4C- 6 hrs daily BBC Alba – up to 7 hrs daily BBC NI – 12 hrs for whole of 2007 BBCNI 5 hrs for 2007
S4C Digidol – 12 hrs daily TeleG 30 – 60 mins per day TG4 6 hrs min. daily
S4C2 Welsh Assembly Stv – 2 hrs per week
Note: a Irish is also an Official language of the European Union and the First Official Language of the South of Ireland.
b
All languages ratified under Part III of the ECRML are also protected under the general requirements of Part II.
Source: Adapted from Ofcom’s Second PSB Review, Phase 2: Preparing for the Digital Future, consultation document, 25th September 2008.
CCG / ILBF later in this chapter. In 2008, Ofcom states that the short-
term nature of funding for broadcasting in Irish was raised by ‘many
respondents’ to the regulator’s PSB consultation. Ofcom (2008, p. 85, para
5.88) notes the ‘lack of equity in the funding arrangements ... whether on
the part of the government or the BBC.’ Although the regulator suggests
(Ofcom 2008, p. 85, para 5.94) that there is now better quality broadcast-
ing content than in the past, it also notes, ‘there is perceived concern at
the lack of consistency and equity, and sometimes certainty, in the cur-
rent arrangements for funding and delivery which are in place in differ-
ent parts of the UK.’
The Irish language and BBC NI
The historical attitude of the BBC to Irish language

broadcasting in the North
PSB in Britain and Ireland is financed by a range of direct and indirect
public subsidies, which in turn place obligations on PSB broadcasters.
The communications market has altered fundamentally since the intro-
duction of the UK Communications Act in 2003, with digital television,
Freeview and access to broadband services all contributing dramatically
to expanded public service content. However, in Britain and the NoI,1 the
BBC has privileged access to public funding and free broadcasting spec-
trum in return for its well-recognised PS duties. The BBC also enjoys spe-
cial status and freedom from some forms of legislative regulation through
its Royal Charter, granted once every ten years, most recently in 2005.
In addition, of course, the BBC is the only UK broadcaster to dispose of a
licence fee. 2
The BBC began regionally based broadcasting in the North in 1924,
two years after the partition of Ireland. Bardon (2000) has documented
the history of the BBC’s struggle with cultural and linguistic inclusiv-
ity in the North. He notes repeated examples of the effects of the close
structural links with unionism and the BBC’s apparent unwillingness to
provoke even the risk of unionist disapproval. It is not surprising that
Bardon notes (2000, p. 16), ‘the Corporation shied away from Irish lan-
guage broadcasts’ and in 57 years of regional broadcasting up till 1981, the
BBC broadcast only one series of Irish language programmes. During the
1980s and 1990s, although the Irish language fared somewhat better on
radio, with some 4 hours per week, television programming through Irish
was rare. Mac Póilin (2003, p. 88) characterises radio provision during the
1980s as hovering, ‘somewhere in the no-man’s-land between minimalist
and undetectable.’ Television broadcasts in the 1990s were restricted to an
average of one per year, at unpredictable intervals and times, or according
to Mac Póilin (2003, p. 88), ‘blink-and you’ve missed it’ programming.
In addition to heated meetings between the BBC and Irish speakers, and
well-publicised occasional campaigns by individual Irish speakers refusing
to pay their BBC Licence fee due to ongoing failure to provide a service to
Irish speakers, a series of more formal approaches included the publication
in 1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999 by Iontaobhas Ultach (IU) of four differ-
ent reports (De Napier 1990; Andrews and Mac Póilin 1993; Mac Póilin
1997; Anderson 1999), proposing an Irish language television training and
production fund in NI and access in the North to a comprehensive Irish
language television service. By 2003, the BBC was still being described
as, ‘primarily, and overwhelmingly, an English language service, and has
rarely broadcast Irish language programming during peak hours’ (Eirug
2003, p. 35).
Irish language broadcasting in the CR talks

The GFA, signed by both the British and Irish governments, contains spe-
cific reference to the need to improve Irish language broadcasting. As
well as committing the British government to ‘seek more effective ways
to provide financial support for Irish language film and television pro-
duction in Northern Ireland’, it binds it to ‘provide more extensive access
to Teilifís na Gaeilge.’3 With the ratification of the ECRML, discussed in
detail in Chapter 4, the UK government selected an obligation to ‘make
adequate provision so that broadcasters offer programmes (in the Irish
language).’4
The consultation process that followed the White Paper on the
Communications Bill5 attracted significant input from supporters of Irish
language broadcasting. Official feedback notes, ‘We received over 300
responses to the consultation plus 590 postcard responses from support-
ers of Irish language broadcasting in Northern Ireland’ (DTIUK/DCMSUK
2002). Indeed, it acknowledges that there were twice as many responses
relating to Irish than to all of the other issues in the draft document. The
Putnam Committee, which published its report a week before the end of
the consultative period, also acknowledges responses from Irish speak-
ers (Putnam 2002, Vol 1: 93, para 363). However, whilst Irish language
groups were lobbying strongly for inclusion of Irish in the legislative pro-
cess as part of their commitments under the GFA, the British government6
were insisting that they were in compliance with their commitments
under Article 11 of Part III of the ECRML7 by ‘offering Irish language pro-
grammes on a daily basis on Radio Ulster and occasionally transmitting
programmes on television’ (Author’s emphasis). Instead of honouring the
GFA commitment to establish a film and television broadcasting fund,
the British government announced in 2002 the start of a two-year Irish
language TV and film production training scheme. Many Irish speakers
welcomed provision for training but were not convinced that it fulfilled
the GFA engagement.
An editorial in Dublin-based newspaper8 The Irish Times took the British

government to task,
The disregard shown by the British government towards the Irish lan-
guage in its Communications Bill is disheartening. The Bill will determine
the future of broadcasting for Celtic languages in Britain and Northern
Ireland for the foreseeable future ... . By failing to mention Irish language
broadcasting in the Bill, the British government has sent out the wrong
signal – that the language has no part to play in Northern society. This is
unacceptable and inaccurate.
Subsequently, the Putnam Committee report on the consultation made

no concrete recommendations on Irish language broadcasting, although it
did make strong proposals in relation to both Welsh in Wales and Gaelic
in Scotland. The final version of the Bill contains no reference whatsoever
to the Irish Language. Representations to the British government by the
Irish government, Northern political parties and proponents of Irish lan-
guage broadcasting were met with a range of responses from civil servants
in the DCMS. An internal Irish government document (Irish Gov: DFA 2003
Briefing paper) characterises the responses thus:
‘The DCMS civil servants say that:
● It’s too late to change the Bill;

● It’s not necessary to change it;
● They have no intention of changing it.’
Political parties North and South seized upon what they saw as British
government bad faith and maintained consistent pressure for legislative
change. The Irish government argued for an amendment to the Bill based
upon the text of provisions for Gaelic in Scotland in the Broadcasting
Act of 1990, some twelve years previously. It also adopted a fall-back pos-
ition of demanding that the British government bring forward a Northern
Ireland Order that would provide for its commitments under the GFA. The
Irish government maintained pressure at a high political level through
the personal interventions of Brian Cowen, then Minister for Foreign
Affairs.9 At the same time, however, it had set itself non-legislative goals.
An Irish government briefing paper states, ‘The main thrust of these tac-
tics is to ensure that funding is made available. It will be less easy to put
pressure on the Government after the Bill becomes law’ (Irish Gov: DFA
2003 Briefing paper).
In April 2003, following many months of set-backs to the CR process in
the North, the British and Irish governments issued a Joint Declaration (UK
and Irish Govs: 2003, Joint Declaration, point 30) which included refer-
ences to the establishment of a film and television production fund and
to improved access to TG4. By this time, unionist politicians had politic-

ally linked the broadcasting fund to demands for equal funding for Ulster
Scots. The Joint Declaration therefore also notes the allocation of substan-
tial funding for an Ulster Scots Academy.
The BBC Charter Review 2005

In 2005, the British government published its Green Paper on the Review of
the BBC’s Royal Charter, which takes place only every ten years. The Green
Paper recommends increased provision in Welsh through SC4, and floats
the idea of a dedicated channel for Gaelic in Scotland to bring about ‘a sus-
tainable strategy for Gaelic television.’ The BBC has, says the Green Paper,
‘a crucial role to play in safeguarding Gaelic cultural heritage’ (UK Green
Paper 2005, p. 42). This role, however, is clearly limited to Scotland. The
Green Paper makes no reference whatsoever to the Irish Language in the
NoI.
Iontaobhas Ultach (IU) finds the omission of Irish ‘regrettable’, accusing
the British government of failing to recognise its commitments under the
GFA and the ECRML, points also taken up by Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG) and
the non-governmental organisation POBAL. In its submission to the Green
Paper, Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta (CnaGta, 30 January 2006) the statu-
tory Council for Irish Medium Education, comments that as the representa-
tives of parents of Irish speaking children, it
... can only interpret this omission as a calculated insult to them and
to their language by the British Government ... . There is no doubt that
the failure to include Irish in the Green Paper is deliberate, given that
Northern Ireland is mentioned in the context of ‘provisions in indigen-
ous minority languages’ and in the ‘devolved nations’ on Page 41 of the
Paper, and ignored in the following section.
In spite of the flurry of submissions and protests, the BBC Charter was
subsequently renewed at Westminster, without any reference to the Irish
language.
DCAL consultation paper on proposed Irish language

legislation 2006–7 and the BBC Audience Council
Consultation on the Review of Indigenous
Minority Languages, March 2007
As noted in the next chapter, the British government makes no propos-

als in respect of broadcasting in Irish in the 2006–7 DCAL consultation
papers arising from the St Andrews Agreement (SAA) commitment on pro-
posed Irish language legislation. Instead, in March 2007, the BBC Audience
Council (BBCAC), on behalf of the BBC Trust, commenced a two-stage

consultation process on BBC output on radio and television for minority
indigenous languages. The BBC received 28 written submissions (plus a
further 18 which it judged to have arrived after the deadline, but which it
passed on for consideration by the BBC Trust.) In addition, it hosted two
‘accountability’ breakfasts – one in respect of the Irish language and the
other in respect of Ulster Scots. The Audience Council released its own
submission to the BBC Trust based on the first part of the consultation in
May 2006.
Analysis of the submissions
Sixteen of the submissions, along with Ofcom’s 2005 review of broadcast-

ing of Indigenous Minority Languages10 are contained in a BBC Audience
Council document11, Responses to Audience Council NI Review of Indigenous
Minority Languages (2007c)12 The Ofcom Review of Broadcasting (2005) con-
stitutes 33 of 106 pages of the BBC’s Responses document. 14 of the subse-
quent 16 submissions that follow are from Irish language organisations or
Irish speaking individuals. Two further submissions do not state whether the
respondents speak Irish or not. One calls for improved Irish language broad-
casting. Both are critical of the Ulster Scots lobby in relation to broadcasting.
As noted previously, the conclusions in the Ofcom Review (2005) recognise
the historical under-provision for the Irish language and the programming
and funding disparity between Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish
in the North. It highlights the importance of improved reception of TG4,
but pinpoints the anomaly of British government reliance on an RoI broad-
caster for provision to Irish speakers in the North. The Ofcom statement
also comments that it received no consultation submissions in relation to
Ulster Scots, although representatives of Ulster Scots groups attended a con-
sultation meeting. Ofcom (2007c, p.33 in BBC Responses document) records
that these representatives of Ulster Scots acknowledge that it is ‘at a differ-
ent stage of development to Irish’ and that ‘... a sense of Ulster Scots identity
is based on music, heritage and other cultural factors, as well as linguistic
difference.’
Of the 16 other submissions carried in the document, 15 state that current BBC
television programming for Irish is inadequate, although several comment that
the small amount of programmes produced are of good quality. The submission
from An Droichead (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 40), a Belfast Irish language centre,
calls the level of progamming ‘disgracefully low’, whilst FnaG (BBC Responses,
2007c, p.42) states that it is ‘totally inadequate’. The submission from An Tobar
(BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 52), an independent television production company,
calls it ‘grossly inadequate’. IU (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 63) note that an adequate
Irish language service is an entitlement. It states, ‘It is not a matter of grace and
favour.’ IU (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 65) proposes that Irish language television
provision should be built up by incremental stages, to 50 hours per annum by
2009–10, 100 hours by 2012–13 and to 150 hours per annum by 2016–17.
Radio provision attracts less criticism, although several respondents note
the increasing use of English in Irish language programming (BBC Responses,
2007c: Mac Ruairí, p. 2; McKendry, p. 60). An Tobar, FnaG and IU recommend
200 hours of radio programming for 2009–10, rising to 250 by 2011–12 and to
300 by 2012–13. An Tobar and POBAL complain of the halving of the popular
Radio Ulster Irish language programme CasChlár, and the replacement of the
second half of the programme with Ulster Scots. An Tobar (BBC Responses,
2007c, p. 56) notes that the Ulster Scots programming could be broadcast in
another time slot, and states, ‘It is high time the BBC stopped pitching Irish
language provision against Ulster Scots.’ Online provision is deemed by all
those who comment on it to be inadequate. Several respondents place par-
ticular emphasis on the provision of a wide range of educational materials
online (BBC Responses, 2007c: IU, p. 66; FnaG, p. 44; An Tobar, p. 55).
Asked to comment on what criteria should inform the BBC’s commit-
ment to the indigenous minority language services, POBAL (BBC Responses,
2007c, p. 35) notes that the BBC’s obligations in relation to Irish should be
enshrined in Westminster legislation. In common with Foras na Gaeilge, it
also notes obligations under the ECRML and the GFA. The submissions from
CnaGta and IU also place considerable emphasis on the legislative frame-
work, recalling their submissions to the 2003 UK Communications Bill and
the Review of the BBC Charter in 2005. Others refer to the demographics of
the Irish speaking community (BBC Responses, 2007c: An Droichead, p. 41;
An Tobar, p. 53), to the particular richness and value of the Irish language
(BBC Responses, 2007c: FnaG, p. 44) and to its importance to community
development and the history of local communities (BBC Responses, 2007c:
An Carn, p. 101).
The disparity in expenditure and programming for Irish in the North and
that for Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland is frequently highlighted.
(POBAL, IU, FnaG, An Tobar, An Carn and CnaGta). POBAL (BBC Responses,
2007c, p. 36) notes that Irish, Welsh and Gaelic were all recognised in the
UK ratification of Part III of the ECRML, but that only Irish is not subject
to domestic legislative protections in relation to broadcasting. CnaGta (BBC
Responses, 2007c, p. 51) notes that the BBC could play as significant a role
in supporting the Irish language as it does for Welsh in Wales and for Gaelic
in Scotland. The submission states, ‘The fact that it has chosen not to is at
best a dereliction of its duty as a Public Service Broadcaster and at worst dis-
crimination against Irish speakers in the UK.’
Asked to comment on whether there should be an equivalence in expend-
iture on Irish and Ulster Scots, all respondents reply that there should not.
IU (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 68) comments that ‘direct comparisons are
not helpful as the needs of each community are very different,’ and states
(BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 63), ‘[we] regret that some of the questions asked
imply a potential competition for resources between supporters of Irish
and Ulster Scots.’ POBAL (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 36) points out that the
stage of development of the Irish speaking community and of the language
itself requires a different level of support, citing also Part III recognition for
Irish in the ECRML and the SAA commitment by the British government
to enact Irish language legislation. An Tobar (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 55)
points out that, ‘... there are no Ulster Scots schools, there is no tangible
Ulster Scots speaking community, there is little demand for Ulster Scots
“language” programming ... . The current provision creates the myth that
both situations are similar with a similar demand’ (Respondent’s own use
of inverted commas.). Others (BBC Responses, 2007c: FnaG, p. 45; IU, p. 68)
contend that the Irish speaking community is younger and has a greater
presence in urban areas than the rural and more elderly profile for Ulster
Scots. In common with others, (BBC Responses, 2007c: McKendry, p. 61;
An Tobar, p. 55) it points out that Ulster Scots is comprehensible to most
English speakers and that those with an interest in Ulster Scots appear to
express this more readily through music, dance and other cultural means.
One respondent, R. Cuan (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 96) from Co. Antrim,
expresses strong support for increased Irish language broadcasting, noting
that it is ‘about time the BBC carried out its duty in relation to properly serv-
ing the needs of the North’s Irish speakers.’ The submission goes on to note,
‘As an Ulster Scots speaker I would regret if the BBC, along with some polit-
ical elements, called for Ullans to be treated on an equal footing with Irish
Gaelic. There is no comparison between the situation of the two tongues.’ The
final submission, from H. Thompson, Co. Down, challenges the term ‘indi-
genous’ in respect of Ulster Scots and asserts that many of the writer’s friends
switch off BBC radio between 6.30 – 7.00 because of ‘the insertion of Irish lan-
guage programmes’ and instead now listen to RTÉ, the Southern-based state
radio station.13 In addition, H. Thompson notes that subtitles should be used
on Irish language television programmes, but not for Ulster Scots, ‘... since
anyone who can speak English is able to follow Ulster-Scots without much
difficulty, supposin they hae a mine tae dae so (which incidentally, is of itself
sufficient to settle any argument about whether “Ulster-Scots” is a separate
language, or simply a dialect of English)’ (BBC Responses, 2007c: Thompson,
p. 104, Respondent’s own emphasis; brackets; inverted commas).
The findings of the BBC Audience Council
In June 2007, the BBC Audience Council released its findings in the form of its
own submission to the BBC Trust. The submission notes that the BBC’s own
Licence Fee payer research, although based on a small sample, shows a high
level of dissatisfaction with language programming. The survey measures
the gap between the level of importance a respondent attaches to an issue
and how well the BBC performs. In connection with languages, the research
shows a large gap of 37 points in NoI between importance and performance,14
a much higher level of dissatisfaction than in Scotland or Wales. The docu-
ment places some emphasis on the shortcomings of the BBC NI in respect of
indigenous language programming and notes unfavourable comparisons with
expenditure and programming hours in Scotland and Wales. There is, how-
ever, a noticeable and unfortunate tendency within the document to blur the
distinctions between Irish and Ulster Scots and the legal commitments made
to them. Thus, the document (BBCAC 2007b, p. 3) states, ‘Council notes the
significant disparities in the volume of hours of output between Irish and
Ulster Scots on the one hand and Welsh and Scottish Gaelic (the other Part III
languages under the European Charter) on the other.’
The statement seems to imply that both Irish and Ulster Scots are Part
III languages of the ECRML along with Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in
Scotland, when in fact only Irish has been included under Part III to date.
The document continues this obfuscation even as it claims to seek fairer
distribution of resources and programming than has been the historic case
for Irish. Notably, the BBCAC (2007b, p. 4) states, ‘Ulster-Scots is at a par-
ticular stage of development whereby it needs programmes and content to
raise awareness which will in turn stimulate demand and provide greater
public value.’ Given the historic exclusion of the Irish language from BBC
broadcasting, such support appears exceptional. There is no similar state-
ment for Irish. The report (2007b, p.4) offers as rationale, ‘There was an
acknowledgement ... that if there were going to be programmes in Irish,
there should also be programmes for the Ulster-Scots community.’
Stating that the BBC ‘has a unique role to play in supporting indigenous
minority languages’ (2007b, p. 1) the report notes nonetheless that Irish lan-
guage programming on television during peak times causes ‘displacement’
for those who do not speak Irish. It states, (2007b, p.8), ‘Ulster-Scots is largely
accessible to mainstream audiences, except at the highly differentiated end
of the linguistic spectrum and so this is much less of an issue.’15 Asserting
the need for additional funding for the BBCNI to provide ‘incremental
enhancements’ in provision for Irish and Ulster Scots, the AC (2007b, p. 8)
urges ‘greater parity of spend between Irish and Ulster-Scots.’ It also calls
for a reduction in the gap in spend with Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh, but
fails to clarify whether this recommendation is intended to encompass both
Irish and Ulster Scots or whether a similar comparison for expenditure on
Scots and Ulster Scots is intended.
A response to a POBAL query under the Freedom of Information Act16
details the manner in which BBC Scotland approach the issue of volume of
programming and amount of expenditure on Scots,
... there is no obligation on BBC Scotland to specifically produce

radio and television programmes reflecting the Scots language. This
means that it is entirely BBC Scotland’s choice whether to produce any

programmes relating to the Scots language and if so, to decide how
many programmes it will produce and what form these programmes
will take.
The BBC announced in April 2008 that additional funding of £950,000 per
annum would be made available for Irish language output across a televi-
sion, radio and online services and £400,000 for a similar range of Ulster
Scots programming.
Reception of TG4
Digital provision and Ofcom proposals

It is difficult to assess whether all of the parties involved in the GFA antici-
pated with any accuracy the difficulties and delays that would be involved
in realising the commitment to improve reception of TG4 throughout the
North. Whilst different sources (Anderson, 2003; Irish Government DFA
2003) express a belief that poor reception was in part due to a British block-
ing signal, there seems to have been genuine perplexity at the delays and
problems that have dogged improved reception to TG4 throughout the NoI.
Initial negotiations on how best to improve the signal were protracted and
technical. However, by 2002, the then Secretary of State, John Reid, was
asserting that the British government had agreed to ‘a unique arrangement’
intended to increase transmission power from the Clermont Carn trans-
mitter in the RoI, even though this action had also required ‘complex con-
sequential work at other UK sites.’17 Whilst claiming that this action had
increased TG4 coverage from around 30 per cent to 65–70 per cent of the
North, Reid nonetheless acknowledges that ‘analogue terrestrial TG4 ser-
vices are still not available to a significant number of the population.’ By
2003, Anderson (2003, p. 9) was noting that, ‘Tá deireadh sroichte maidir
leis an obair seo mar gheall ar chúinsí teicneolaíochta agus tír-raon.’ /
‘enhancing legally acceptable overspill from terrestrial transmitters’ had
progressed as far ‘as the technology and the terrain will allow’ (Official
bilingual document).
The problem of the physical signal from transmitters had by this time
been matched by a further issue, that of international copyright conven-
tions and protocols. Further protracted and complex maneuvering took
place over a period of time, and further solutions, including cable or digital
services, and satellite free-to-air digital service without encryption were
mooted. By 2004, the British government was continuing to announce
power increases in transmitters closer to the target audience in the North,
this time at Divis Mountain overlooking Belfast. In private, this may
have given rise to some consternation, in the light of the British govern-
ment briefing paper (UK Government 2003, Note to the Irish Side, Agenda
Item 2 – TG4) dated a full year previously, in which it is noted, in relation

to the Divis transmitter,
Frequency availability in the area is poor; even if a frequency could be

identified, coverage is likely to be limited and there may be problems
from interference with a number of home VCRs, which would have to be
retuned at a significant cost to the broadcaster (the ITC estimate between
5,000 and 17,000 homes could be affected). The theoretical coverage ben-
efits could be in the order of 100,000 homes.
In response to queries from residents seeking better reception following the

boosting of the Divis power, DCAL referred residents to Ofcom, although
they did acknowledge that to benefit from the enhanced signal, it was
necessary to acquire a new aerial, to retune one’s television set and risk
losing access to RTÉ 1 and 2 in the process. Ofcom acknowledges that the
difficulties surrounding widespread reception of TG4 in the North remain.
NI Director of Ofcom, Wolinski says,18
If powers were increased, interference would potentially be caused to

transmitters using the same frequency elsewhere in Northern Ireland, as
well as to others in Scotland, Wales and Northern England. Therefore it
is not technically possible to provide coverage of TG4 in analogue form
throughout all of Northern Ireland as there are not enough clear frequen-
cies to do so.
In 2008, Ofcom proposed that in order to accommodate Channel Five, S4C,

TG4 and GDS after the digital switchover, these services should be included
on Multiplex 2. The issue of post-analogue access to TG4 is likely to pre-
occupy Irish speakers in the coming period as discussed in Chapter 4.
As noted earlier, the McCarthy proposals in 2009 for cuts in Irish gov-
ernment expenditure19 include reforming the funding of TG4 with partial
contribution directly from the TV Licence, leading to reciprocal savings to
the Irish Exchequer. The report does not recommend any increase in the
licence fee paid by the public. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen
which of the McCarthy proposals will be implemented, and what their
effect will be on the Irish language all over the island. Whilst Irish speak-
ers across the country have decried the McCarthy proposals, the nature of
the CR structures put in place for the North have allowed the responsibility
of the British government for Irish language broadcasting to be diverted to
the Irish government, whilst simultaneously offering no guarantees that
the specific needs of the NoI’s Irish speakers will be taken into account by
the Irish government.
The Irish language film and television production fund
As noted in an earlier section, the progress towards establishment of the GFA-

promised fund for Irish language film and television was slow. Throughout
2004 and much of 2005, the Commission of the European Union raised
questions regarding the level of subsidy available from the Fund to pro-
grammes to be broadcast potentially on mainstream stations such as the
BBC, TG4 and RTÉ. Compromises had to be reached, including in the level
of funding for a given production, and the percentage of productions that
could be funded. It was not until June 2005 that the Fund, now called An
Ciste Craoltóireacht Gaeilge / The Irish Language Broadcasting Fund (CCG /
ILBF), received a firm indication that it would be able to distribute funding
to the companies to whom it had already promised grant aid in its first com-
missioning bout in April 2005.
The apparent progress that the European decision represented was some-
what obscured by the furore around the first bout of commissioning in
2005. Questions were raised by some applicants as to the Fund’s consist-
ency, expertise in television production and decision-making processes.
The perceived lack of emphasis on support for the Northern independent
production sector and the centrality of the BBC within the Fund caused
concern. Mac Póilin (2003, p. 99) comments, ‘The overwhelming instinct
of Irish speakers in Northern Ireland is that the Corporation should not be
allowed within an ass’s roar of any new fund until it has proved its commit-
ment, from within its own considerable resources, by at least equalling the
Gaelic service of BBC Scotland.’
Table 5.3 CCG / ILBF – Hours of Irish language programming funded over 7 funding
rounds 2005–7
Year Funding round Minutes funded Hours funded
2005–6 2005 Round 1 1200 20.00

2005 Round 2 2040 34.00
2005 Round 3 540 9.00
2006 Round 1 2568 42.80
Total for period 6348 105.80
2006–7 2006 Round 2 1804 30.07
2006 Round 3 640 10.67
2007 Round 1 1980 33.00
Total for period 4424 73.73
Overall total (7 funding rounds) 10772 179.53
Source: CCG / ILBF Programme data (Quoted in Deloitte 2007, p. 82)

In the first year following its inception, CCG / ILBF funded 27.50 hours
of Irish language programming, falling far short of its target of 70 hours
per annum set by government. However, by 2006–7, CCG / ILBF had over-
come its slow start, funding 75.57 broadcast hours. Between the four fund-
ing rounds from 2005–6, the CCG / ILBF funded over 105 hours of Irish
language programming, over 50 per cent higher than the target figure (see
Table 5.3).
Targets on audience development and satisfaction
By December 2008, CCG / ILBF was to develop an audience of 25,000 viewers

each week for Irish language programming. This is challenging given that
CCG / ILBF-funded programming is unlikely to be available on a weekly basis.
Neither are any measures in place for the Broadcasters Audience Research
Board (BARB) or Nielsen, which provides figures for viewing in the North
of RTÉ and TG4, to extrapolate accurate figures for Irish language viewers
(Deloitte 2007, p. 32). However, a baseline (representative sample, size 1013
adults) and benchmarking survey (representative sample, size 1029 adults)20
shows that between April 2006 and April 2007, the segment of the popu-
lation of the North who watched Irish language programming remained
constant at 10 per cent, with an increasing number of people with little or
no knowledge of the language watching Irish language programming. As
well as showing an increase in the sample itself of adults understanding
the Irish language (from 9 per cent in 2006 to 17 per cent in 2007), the
2007 benchmark survey shows that almost half (47 per cent) of the sample
with knowledge of Irish watch Irish language television output with varying
degrees of regularity compared to over a third (39 per cent) in the previous
wave. Over half (54 per cent) of those who watch Irish language television
output rate it as good compared to 45 per cent in the previous wave. In both
surveys, a quarter (26 per cent) of those who watch Irish language television
output state that it encouraged their interest in the Irish language. Deloitte
(2007, p. 42) states that available information indicates that CCG / ILBF has
successfully met its targets in relation to audience development.
Measuring audience satisfaction has also proved problematic. At its incep-
tion, the CCG / ILBF was charged with achieving a 60 per cent level of audi-
ence satisfaction. Deloitte (2007, p. 41) initiated a stakeholder survey which
highlights that since 72.4 per cent of all CCG / ILBF-funded programming is
broadcast on TG4, access to the Irish language station, discussed previously,
impacts crucially on audience development. Only 15.9 per cent of CCG /
ILBF-funded programming is broadcast by BBC NI and 4.6 per cent by RTÉ,
low percentages remarked upon, according to Deloitte (2007, p. 41), by ‘many’
in the stakeholder survey. Significantly, it notes that all-Ireland broadcast-
ers (presumably TG4 and RTÉ21) acknowledge some difficulty in the brief of
the CCG / ILBF, which prioritises development of the NoI production sector
and of content relevant to the NoI audience. Deloitte (2007, p. 41, footnote
28) records that one broadcaster defines this as ‘limiting the appeal’ of the
programming. Deloitte further notes the comment that ‘the primary audi-
ence for TG4 is composed primarily of fluent Irish speakers living in the
west of Ireland.’ Whilst Deloitte finds that the CCG / ILBF programming
has achieved a ‘substantial’ increase in Northern Irish storylines, content
and accents particularly on TG4, it is clear that this comes from a very low
baseline. Several consultees highlight the dearth of Northern Irish news
coverage in Irish on TG4 and RTÉ, and the fact that there is none at all on
BBC NI. Other key stakeholder comments concern the need for consistency
in quality and broadcast time-slots, and the view that at this early stage in
sectoral development, capacity building should be given priority ahead of
simple numerical accounts of audience development.
Funding and sectoral development
In relation to the independent production sector in the North, the CCG /

ILBF sought to increase the volume of programming by the sector from an
average of five productions by the sector pre-CCG / ILBF, to an average of 15
per annum; to improve quality, in the first year of the CCG / ILBF; to increase
from five to 15 those employed on a freelance basis and in each subsequent
year to increase this to 20. In addition, CCG / ILBF sought to achieve 70
per cent spend in the North in all productions in which it invested 75 per
cent in the overall production costs. Where CCG / ILBF investment was
lower, Northern Irish spend was set at the same proportionality. In its rela-
tions with the sector, CCG / ILBF sought 60 per cent satisfaction within the
sector.
Over 4 funding rounds in 2005–6, 33 commissions were awarded, 29 of
which were for productions and 4 for developmental work. A further 21
commissions were made in the following 3 funding rounds of 2006–7, 15
productions and 6 for development. These awards amounted to £6,751,039
million, and levered in a further £2,225,000 to the sector. 22 In terms of the
range of programming, a key factor in sectoral development, the most com-
mon genre funded was that of factual entertainment series, with series for
children following in second place. Table 5.4 shows the breakdown of com-
missions by genre.
Between 2005 and March 2007, CCG / ILBF awards were made to 23 dif-
ferent production companies, 2 of which received funding in connection
with training schemes. Stirling Productions was the most successful of these
companies, receiving ten commissions and £1,379,549. Prior to the establish-
ment of the CCG / ILBF, there were four companies in receipt of program-
ming support, rising to ten by 2006–7. Of these, three (Aisling Ghéar, An
Tobar, Sonas23) were new, predominantly or all Irish language production
companies located and driven from within the North. A number of others,
Table 5.4 CCG / ILBF Commissions by genre and total CCG / ILBF spend
Number of commissions Total CCG / ILBF/ILBF spend (in £)
Genre Developments Productions Total Developments Productions Total
Children’s series 3 7 10 20,400 1,313,289 1,333,689

Documentary 0 6 6 0 273,145 273,145
Documentary series 0 2 2 0 252,268 252,268
Drama 2 1 3 32,500 154,224 154,224
Drama series 0 5 5 0 1,672,217 1,672,217
Factual entertainment series 1 11 12 4,000 158,426 1,162,426
Light entertainment series 3 2 5 20,000 427,516 447,516
Music programme 0 1 1 0 63,359 63,359
Music series 0 3 3 0 558,433 558,433
New media 1 0 1 11,350 0 11,350
Reversioned animation 0 3 3 0 296,877 296,877
Youth series 0 3 3 0 525,535 525,535
Total 10 44 54 88,250 6,662,789 6,751,039
Source: CCG / ILBF Programme data, adapted from DCAL 2007, p. 46

including some of the most successful applicants to the CCG / ILBF (Stirling,
Westway, Waddell Media, Green Inc) were Northern-based, predominantly
English language companies. Others, such as Magma, were established com-
panies originating from and working predominantly in the South.
In terms of the target for proportional Northern Irish spend, of 24 projects
delivered by the end of the 2006–7 financial year, 18 (75 per cent) were in
compliance. Most significant of the factors noted for the failure to deliver
this target would seem to be the preference of some companies for working
with crews from the RoI. Since Deloitte offers little additional information
on this point, it is difficult to judge whether this highlights a training fail-
ure or skills gap in the North, or whether it is a tendency amongst those
companies established in the South to use Southern-based crews. Whilst
CCG / ILBF states that its preference would be to fund wholly Northern
Irish companies, it suggests that the newness and relative inexperience of
the sector makes this problematic. New Northern companies tend to be
effectively excluded from accessing funding for larger productions, includ-
ing drama, and there is a clear trade-off between quality productions and
the encouraging of newer and smaller companies.
Between its inception and the first round of funding in 2007, the CCG /
ILBF commissioned 44 Irish language productions and 10 Irish language
development projects; assisted in the development of an independent Irish
language production sector in the North, overseeing a ten-fold increase in
turnover and providing a range of support to over 21 different production
companies, although, as noted, its approach in this respect has not been
without pitfalls. Deloitte (2007, p. 89) states that by the end of March 2007,
the CCG / ILBF had levered spend of over £4 million into the economy of
the North and had created employment for 539 Irish speakers in a mixture
of long-term and freelance employment.
Between 2005–6, CCG / ILBF provided 81 people with training. Whilst
cost per minute of Irish language programming over the 46 productions
broadcast by March 2007 failed to meet the set target (£583 per minute)
in 67 per cent of cases, the average cost of £623 per minute can arguably
be counterbalanced by non-monetary factors. Examination of costs per
minute of programming by the Gaelic Media Service in Scotland (£1,296 per
minute) and the South of Ireland (£1,400 per minute) shows much higher
averages, although direct comparison is problematic given the different cir-
cumstances, administration and monitoring processes in place.
Future funding for the CCG / ILBF
With new CEO Áine Walsh appointed in November 2007, the CCG / ILBF
succeeded in further stabilising its relationship with the North’s independ-
ent production sector. However, in December 2007, there was consternation
on the publication of the NI Assembly’s draft budget. The three-year budget
projections, approved by all political parties, contained no reference to

renewal of funding to CCG / ILBF after its original end date of March 2009.
The perceived nonchalance of nationalist politicians towards securing the
future of the CCG / ILBF caused comment, especially following so rapidly
on the heels of British and unionist refusal to honour the SAA commitment
on Irish language legislation, outlined in greater detail in Chapters 6, 7 and
8. Irish speakers responded angrily to the threatened demise of the CCG /
ILBF, with independent TV producer, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil writing in Lá
Nua that if the CCG / ILBF disappeared, votes would follow.24
Over a matter of a few short weeks during Christmas / New Year, pres-
sure built up to secure commitments to continued funding for the CCG /
ILBF. However, on 21 January 2008 the NI Assembly Executive passed the
three-year budget with no amendments. Lá Nua headlined with ‘Tost na
náire faoi Chiste’ / ‘The Silence of Shame about the Fund’ (Author’s transla-
tion). In the interim, tensions between the largest party in the Assembly, the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the second largest party, the nation-
alist Sinn Féin (SF), had been increasing. Accusations were traded regarding
commitments relating to the timescale for devolution of Policing and Justice
Powers and other issues and by mid-March, SF ceased attending business
meetings of the Executive, creating the impression that the Assembly was
teetering on the edge once more. In March 2008, at a meeting with POBAL,
SF acknowledged the considerable difficulties in the CR process and stated
that the party intended to place a series of demands before British Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown. Although SF acknowledged that its first priority
was Policing and Justice, it asserted that the Irish Language Act was the sec-
ond, with a contested sports stadium proposal and CCG / ILBF funding also
being priorities.25 Following immediately on a meeting in Downing Street,
SF returned to full Assembly business. On 10 June 2008, DCAL Minister
Poots was replaced in a Ministerial reshuffle by another hard-line DUP col-
league, Gregory Campbell. On 18 June 2008, SF announced that Gordon
Brown had agreed to allocate a further two years funding to the CCG / ILBF,
totalling £6 million. Responding to the allocation, the newly appointed
second DUP Minister for CAL, Gregory Campbell told the media that he
welcomed the decision and was looking forward to ensuring equal funding
between Irish and Ulster Scots.26 His DUP colleague27 culture spokesperson,
Nelson McCausland said that the £6 million agreed was ‘a fig-leaf’ for Sinn
Féin to cover the failure to secure the Irish Language Act which, he said, ‘the
DUP has vetoed.’28
6
The British Government
Commitment to Enact the
Irish Language Act
The previous chapters in this book have dealt with the Irish language con-
text in the period preceding the 1998 GFA, the establishment of the devolved
Assembly in 1999 and its five-year suspension from 2002. This suspension
period was characterised by fragmented stop-start CR talks culminating in
October 2006 with the St Andrews Agreement (SAA) which outlined agreed
measures designed to re-establish devolution. In the SAA, the British gov-
ernment committed itself to enacting an Irish language Act. The British
and Irish governments set a deadline of 26 March 2007 for devolution
and warned that if the two key parties, Sinn Féin (SF) and the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) had not entered power-sharing arrangements by then,
they faced prolonged direct rule and the dissolving of the devolved institu-
tions for the foreseeable future.
The period 2002–7 witnessed a major shift in the power bases of the
four key unionist / nationalist parties. Whereas the Ulster Unionist Party
(UUP)1 under former leader David Trimble and the SDLP2 under former
leader John Hume, wielded the key electoral power in the early period of the
first Assembly, (Ian Paisley’s DUP3 refused to take up their seats in the first
Executive) the suspension period from 2002–7 saw increasing polarisation
and a categoric swing, on the unionist side to the DUP and on the nationalist
side, to SF4 under Gerry Adams.5 Immediately post SAA, nationalist-unionist
electoral division consolidated as the smaller SDLP and UUP parties vied for
votes with their more powerful political rivals in SF and the DUP. In the case
of the UUP, this led to a more openly confrontational stance on the Irish
language than between 1998–2002. From 2007 on, as well as some spo-
radic political violence, internal dissention within both the DUP and SF has
seen resignations from both parties, including, as noted later, that of then
DUP European MP, Jim Allister. He now leads Traditional Unionist Voice
(TUV). TUV ate into DUP support in a 2008 by-election,6 and although not
returned as MEP in the 2009 European elections, Allister split the unionist
119
vote, taking 13.7 per cent of first preference votes and receiving 70,481 votes
in total.
Contemporaneous with the most significant shifts in political and CR
processes since the Millenium, the mobilisation in favour of legislation,
of the Irish speaking community by a small NGO, POBAL was entering
a new phase. I shall now describe the events surrounding the demand
for the Irish language Act. Following this, I shall present an overview of
two government consultations on Irish language legislation promised in
the SAA, and then briefly assess the consequences of British CR and its
affect on Irish in the NoI from the re-establishment of devolution up to
July 2009, encompassing some elements of Irish government reaction. In
the second section of this chapter, and in Chapters 7 and 8, I shall detail
a range of submissions to the first consultation on proposed legislation
in 2006–7.7
Overview of current protections for Irish
In the RoI, Irish is recognised in the Constitution as first Official

language. It is also subject to the protection of the Official Languages
Act 2003. These do not apply in the North. By 2006, with the exception
of one clause of the Education Order (NI) 1998, and the references in the
GFA, the ECRML was still the only source of protection for Irish in the
NoI, as discussed in Chapter 4. With the status of the Irish language in
the North insecure, from 2002, the umbrella organisation for the Irish
speaking community, POBAL initiated community education, informa-
tion and consultation on the issue of Irish language legislation. Based
on the findings of an international conference in 2004, the NGO issued
detailed draft proposals. Further public consultation followed, including
sectoral meetings with trade unionists and human rights organisations,
with political parties, with Irish language organisations North and South,
complemented by a series of public meetings throughout the North. The
final POBAL document Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI,8
contains commentary on the rationale behind the recommendations, fol-
lowed by the detailed legislative proposals, drafted according to feedback
during consultation with expert advice and support from Robert Dunbar
(Aberdeen University) and Wilson McLeod (University of Edinburgh).
Fernand de Varennes (Murdock University, Australia) and Colin Williams
(University of Cardiff) also contributed chapters to the final document.
It proposes that a rights-based Act should be introduced at Westminster
to establish Official status for Irish and provide for a wide range of public
services in the fields of broadcasting, education, political institutions, the
courts and economic life. To oversee the implementation and enforce-
ment of the Act, the document proposes the establishment of two new
bodies, the Office of the Irish Language Commissioner, Coimisinéir na
UK Government Commitment to Legislate 121
Gaeilge TÉ, and Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge. Further, a

Schedule would be attached to the Act in which the government and
public bodies with greatest responsibility for the provision of services
through the medium of Irish would be listed. Other bodies, not on the
Schedule, would work with the Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge
to prepare clearly defined Language Plans to outline what services they
would provide and when.
The St Andrews’ Agreement and proposed

Irish language legislation
From February 2006, POBAL undertook an intense period of informa-

tion and lobbying work on the legislative proposals. It also established
an all-Ireland Co-ordinating Group to assist it. In October 2006, a series
of protracted and tense political talks geared at re-establishing devolu-
tion culminated in the publication by the UK and Irish governments of
their agreed document, the St Andrews’ Agreement (SAA). In it (UK and
Irish Governments, 13 October 2006), the UK government makes the fol-
lowing commitment, ‘The Government will introduce an Irish Language
Act reflecting on the experience of Wales and Ireland and work with the
incoming Executive to enhance and protect the development of the Irish
Language.’
Whilst the commitment was welcomed by human rights and Irish lan-
guage organisations, it provoked fury from unionists. Jim Allister, then
DUP MEP 9 said that protection for Irish would ‘sanitise the British identity’
in the North; the UUP’s Michael McGimpsey10 accused the DUP of being
weak in its opposition to Irish during the St Andrews’ CR talks, noting
that he had himself been ‘a unionist Minister for Culture’ during the first
Assembly (2000–2) and had exercised a veto over the development of the
Irish language. UUP member, Roy Garland, stated in a regular newspaper
column11 that promoting the Irish language was ‘raising unionist hack-
les.’ Nationalist politicians, including Seán Farren of the SDLP called upon
their unionist counterparts to stop ‘using the Irish language as a politi-
cal football.’ Farren12 stated that unionist party attacks ‘have little to do
with the Irish Language Act and a lot to do with (the) negative political
positioning.’
Amending legislation13 arising from the SAA was passed at Westminster
in November 2006. To the disappointment of Irish speakers, it makes no
mention of an Irish Language Act, but it places a duty upon the NI Assembly
Executive to adopt strategies ‘to enhance and protect the development of
the Irish language, and ‘to enhance and develop the Ulster Scots language,
heritage and culture’, the other clause in the SAA relating to language. In
spite of recognition14 by Direct Rule CAL Minister, Maria Eagle, for the
POBAL proposals (‘Aithním gur cuimsitheach agus gur mionsonraithe
moltaí POBAL agus go raibh cuid mhór oibre agus saineolas bainte leo’ /
‘I recognise that POBAL’s proposals are comprehensive and detailed, and
that a great deal of work and expertise has been involved.’ (Official DCAL
English language version of bilingual letter) she declined to use them as
the basis of a consultation document on proposed legislation. Instead the
POBAL model was one of four (including the Welsh, Scottish and RoI mod-
els) outlined in the DCAL consultation document, which finally appeared
in December 2006.
The foreword (DCAL 2006, p. 3) asserts that the consultation will ensure,
‘gur féidir reachtaíocht a thabhairt chun tosaigh go gasta ina dhiaidh sin,
de réir Chomhaontú Chill Rímhinn’/ ‘that legislation can be taken for-
ward quickly thereafter in line with the St Andrews Agreement’ (Official
English language version). For legislation to be enacted at Westminster,
however, the UK government stated that it must introduce the Act by
19 March 2007 to beat the deadline for re-establishment of devolution set
by itself and the Irish government. This was a position challenged by Irish
language organisations both in face-to-face meetings15 between POBAL
and the Minister, in correspondence16 and in submissions during the first
consultation process, discussed in detail later in this chapter. Peter Hain,
Secretary of State for NI reinforced the British government’s stand at NI
Question Time at Westminster, when in response to a question from DUP
MP Peter Robinson, he stated that should the devolved Assembly be re-
established before Irish language legislation was passed at Westminster,
the responsibility for any such legislation would pass to the Assembly.17
This was highly significant, given the stated aim of unionists in the media
to block any such legislation.18 By the February 2007 elections, the DUP
had listed the destruction of the Irish language Act in election manifes-
tos, along with the assertion that, ‘Irish and Gaelic culture should not be
allowed to dominate funding.’19
The DCAL consultation document 13 December 2006
The body of the document itself comprises some 59 pages with a further 54
pages of annexes. The annexes include a Financial Impact Assessment, an
Equality Impact Assessment, three annexes relating respectively to the GFA,
the ECRML and ‘Current government activity’ in respect of the Irish lan-
guage. Two further annexes give some information on developments in IME
and training, and the final annex is a short, descriptive section dealing with
provision for the media in Scottish Gaelic, Welsh and Irish. This annex con-
tains the only references in the document to broadcasting and the media.
Following the Ministerial Foreword by Maria Eagle, an introductory chap-
ter and state-of-provision description in Chapter 2, four further chapters
list proposals and invite comments regarding: the status of Irish; imple-
mentation and enforcement of the legislation, capacity issues and then,
under Further Areas for Consideration, the status of Irish, Education, the NI
Assembly, Courts and Tribunals and Streetnames.
The Ministerial Foreword
Maria Eagle restates that failure to enact legislation prior to devolution

would remove the issue from Westminster responsibility. As noted, this
produced responses in a number of submissions, including POBAL, (2007,
p. 4) and Iontaobhas Ultach (IU) who state (2007 Submission)20 that it is
imperative to enact the legislation at Westminster to ensure ‘adequate sup-
port for Irish language broadcasting, a matter reserved to Westminster.’
In addition, it points out that the Act ‘was promised by, and only by, the
British government’ and that the North ‘is currently in an unstable politi-
cal state, and a new assembly, on the past records of such Assemblies, will
be taken up more with shadow boxing and posturing than with developing
new legislation.’
The Introduction
The introduction (DCAL 2006, p. 6) contains a number of comments jux-

taposing ‘bailíocht an éilimh ar reachtaíocht Ghaeilge’ / ‘the validity of the
desire for Irish language legislation’, with, ‘réimse d’íogaireachtaí polaitiúla
is gá a chur san áireamh go cúramach agus moltaí á dtabhairt chun tosaigh
maidir le reachtaíocht Ghaeilge i dTuaisceart Éireann’ / ‘a range of political
sensitivities that need to be fully considered in bringing forward proposals
for Irish language legislation in Northern Ireland.’ It states,
Agus an comhairliúchán seo á thabhairt chun tosaigh, aithníonn an

Rialtas go mb’fhéidir, i gcás casta Thuaisceart Éireann, go mbeadh mia-
naidhmeanna dlisteanacha pobail amháin (cearta na nGaeilgeoirí ar
aitheantas oifigiúil agus ar chosaint don teanga) ina gcúiseanna imní
macánta ag pobal eile (buaireamh an phobail Aontachtaigh go bhféadfaí
baint dá bhféiniúlacht Bhriotanach).
In bringing forward this consultation, Government acknowledges that,
in the complex situation in Northern Ireland, the legitimate aspirations
of one community (the rights of Irish speakers to official recognition and
protection of the language) may be the genuinely held fears of another
(the concern of the Unionist community that their British identity may
be undermined). (DCAL’s Official English language version)
It (DCAL 2006, p. 6) concludes, ‘Is ceann d’aidhmeanna pholasaí Gaeilge

an Rialtais é, mar sin, go dtabharfaí aghaidh ar na híogaireachtaí polaitiúla
sa dóigh gurbh fhéidir buntáistí cultúrtha agus teangeolaíocha na teanga a
roinnt arís i measc na bpobal i dTuaisceart Éireann.’ / ‘One of the aims of
Government’s Irish language policy is, therefore, to address the political

sensitivities, so that the cultural and linguistic benefits of the language
can once more be shared across the communities in Northern Ireland’
(DCAL Official English language version.) Among those to challenge the
juxtaposition of rights with ‘sensitivities’ were POBAL, Comhaltas Uladh
(CU) and the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ). POBAL
(2007, p. 12) notes that DCAL’s position encourages a view that Irish can-
not be a shared language and must therefore give way before the aspira-
tions to Britishness of unionists. It further notes that where consensus is
not anticipated, the argument for a rights-based approach for legislation is
further enhanced.
The proposals and feedback on the DCAL consultation paper
Four chapters describe specific issues, and in most cases, put forward some
limited views on the manner in which the four models (legislative models
in Wales, Scotland and the RoI and the POBAL proposals) deal with them:
This approach, however, is not a consistent one. For example there is little
reference to capacity building experience from other jurisdictions, and as
noted later, CAJ (2007, p. 2 para C) points out that the POBAL model ‘is the
least explored in the consultation paper.’ DCAL asserts (2006, p. 30) that
demand for public services in Irish is ‘relatively modest’21 though it notes
this may be due to ‘the level of services available’ through Irish. It contin-
ues, ‘D’fhéadfadh sé go mbeadh de thoradh ar reachtaíocht ... go n-ardódh
an leibhéal éilimh ar sheirbhísí poiblí trí Ghaeilge’ / ‘Legislation ... could
have the effect of raising the level of demand for public services in Irish’.
In the next section (DCAL 2006, p. 30) it appears to show partiality in
possible approaches to increased demand, saying it will show, ‘na bealaí
a bhféadfadh scéim teanga cur chuige incriminteach’ / ‘the potential for
a language scheme to facilitate an incremental approach’, whilst a rights-
based approach, ‘a bhionn níos indibhidiúlaíche ina nádúr’ / ‘being more
individualistic in nature’ could create ‘ceangal díréireach ... do chomhlachtaí
poiblí.’ / ‘a disproportionate requirement on public bodies.’ Schemes allow
for ‘solúbthacht’ / ‘flexiblity,’ (DCAL 2006, p. 41), and for developing ‘go
hincriminteach’ / ‘incrementally,’22 but a rights-based approach is termed
disadvantageous (DCAL 2006, p. 40). The ECRML approach is referred to
as ‘incriminteach’ / ‘incremental’, ‘céimnithe’ / ‘graduated’ and ‘níba thom-
haiste’ / ‘more measured.’ (DCAL 2006, p. 54). POBAL (2007, p. 6) rejects
this interpretation which it calls, ‘míchruinn agus ar an chuid is measa de,
baineann sé drochúsáid as an Chairt’ / ‘inaccurate and at worst a misuse of
the Charter.’
Other organisations (Conradh na Gaeilge, Stádas, CAJ) highlight further
important inaccuracies and omissions in the DCAL document, as shall be
detailed later. In its submission, Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG) are among a number
of organisations (POBAL, Conradh na Gaeilge, Comhdháil Náisiúnta na
Gaeilge, Glór na nGael, Comhaltas Uladh, CAJ) who express concern at the
omission of broadcasting from the document. FnaG (2007, p. 3) states, ‘Níl
aon cheist ach go bhfuil ról lárnach ag an chraoltóireacht i dtodhchaí na
teanga agus sa phróiseas normalaithe. Gan freastal a bheith á dhéanamh ó
thaobh craoltóireachta de ní féidir a rá go bhfuil freastal mar is cuí á dhéan-
amh ar phobal labhartha na Gaeilge.’ / ‘Broadcasting is undoubtedly central
to the future of the language and the normalisation process. A failure to
cater for the Irish-speaking community in terms of broadcasting must be
seen as a failure to cater adequately for them.’ (FnaG’s English language ver-
sion of submission).
A Financial Impact Assessment23 consisting of 7 annexes, including an
initial Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA), required under the North’s
Equality legislation, Section 75, closes the consultation document (DCAL
2006, p. 68) saying,
Is é dearcadh RCEF go bhféadfadh tionchar dearfach a bheith ag an pho-

lasaí Bille Gaeilge a thabhairt isteach ar chainteoirí Gaeilge agus dá réir
sin go hindíreach ar Chaitlicigh, ar náisiúnaithe agus ar dhaoine óga, i.e.
na grúpaí ar dóiche go mbeadh Gaeilge acu. I dtaca leis an Mheasúnú
Tionchair Chomhionannais (MTC) a cuireadh i gcrích, is é cinneadh
RCEF nach bhfuil aon tionchair díobhálacha ann.24
It is DCAL’s view that the policy to introduce an Irish Language Bill
can have a positive impact on Irish speakers and therefore indirectly on
Roman Catholics, nationalists and younger people, which are the groups
most likely to speak Irish. In relation to the Equality Impact Assessment
carried out to date, DCAL has found no adverse impacts. (DCAL Official
English Language version)
In spite of its positive conclusion, the DCAL document states that a fur-
ther EQIA will be carried out in January 2007, during the first consultation
(DCAL EQIA 2007). This later EQIA upholds the finding of no adverse impact
in respect of the political institutions (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 10 para 6.13),
and does not rule out any of the models in respect of the courts (although
it details at length concerns about delays in proceedings25). However, it is
in the area of education that the EQIA departs completely from the earlier
finding. It (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 9, para 6.12.8) asserts,
D’fhéadfadh tionchar diúltach a bheith ag cur chuige bunaithe ar chearta

i dtaca le soláthar Gaelscolaíochta de ar an chomhionannas ar an ábhar
go bhfuil cur chun cinn na Gaelscolaíochta chomh dlúthcheangailte
le cleamhnú polaitiúil agus reiligiúnach i dTÉ. D’fhéadfaí dearcadh ar
chéim le ceart ar leith a thabhairt don tuairim aonarach seo ar oideachas

mar chóir fhabhrach do ghrúpa reiligiúnach (nó polaitiúil) seachas
grúpaí eile.26
To extend a rights based approach to the provision of Irish Medium edu-
cation could impact adversely on equality since the promotion of Irish
Medium education is so closely aligned to political and religious affilia-
tion in NI. A step to accord a particular right to this single view of educa-
tion could be viewed as one religious (or political) grouping being treated
more favourably than others. (Official DCAL English language version)
Further, it states (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 9 para 6.12.9) that a schemes-based

approach would have less potential for adverse impacts because the placing
of a statutory duty on a public body does not create a statutory right to a
service. This strikingly controversial finding is challenged in several sub-
missions, as noted later. Once again, the rights of Irish speakers are juxta-
posed against the ‘sensitivities’ of those opposed to the language and its use
in public. The document (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 20, para 7.1) says,
Measann RCEF go bhful sé d’acmhainn ag tabhairt isteach Bille Gaeilge

caidreamh maith a fheabhsú, nó beidh sé d’acmhainn aige ardán níos
inrochtana ag gach cuid den phobal a thabhairt don Ghaeilge. Os a
choinne sin, tá íogaireacht sna pobail Aontachta / Phrotastúnacha i
dtaobh úsáid na Gaeilge i ngnó poiblí agus is gá sin a chur san áireamh.
DCAL considers that the introduction of an Irish Language Bill has the
potential to improve good relations, as it will potentially give the Irish
language a more accessible platform for all sections of the community.
On the other hand, there is a sensitivity in the Unionist / Protestant
communities to the use of Irish in public business that needs to be taken
account of. (Official English language version)
A summary of responses to the January EQIA, (DCAL EQIA Summary 2007)

records criticism from the Equality Commission that DCAL had not pro-
vided ‘... any quantitative or qualitative evidence to support the idea put for-
ward ... that the Unionist community had concerns that its British identity
may be undermined by Irish language legislation’ (DCAL EQIA Summary
2007, p.17, para 6.6). DCAL quotes (EQIA Summary, 2007, p. 3, para 1.5) the
following from the Equality Commission’s submission,
The notion that providing equality or protection for one group limits
their availability for another is both unfounded in itself and acts to the
detriment of all who seek to live in a society that is fair and equitable and
should be avoided in the drafting of public policy.
The government response to the consultation results
While several thousand Irish speakers marched into Belfast city centre
in support of the POBAL proposals, DCAL published the draft indicative
clauses and consultation results, accounting for submissions in a rather dif-
ferent way than they were to do later, as I shall detail. DCAL states that it
received 668 substantive replies to the consultation document plus some
5000 names on various petitions. It (DCAL March 2007, p. 6) comments,
Astu siúd a chuir fhreagra isteach, bhí tromlach thar na bearta (93 %) ar
son reachtaíocht Ghaeilge a thabhairt isteach; agus bhí mionlach beag
daoine nár aontaigh leis an mholadh ar chor ar bith. Luaigh na daoine a
bhí ina éadan (7 %) cúrsaí costais agus d’aithin siad go mbeadh reachtaío-
cht ina hábhar deighilte go polaitiúil. (See endnote on translation)
This reflects a significant level of interest in the issues raised in the
paper. Of those who responded, the overwhelming majority (93 per cent)
favoured the adoption of Irish language legislation; while a small minor-
ity of respondents strongly disagreed with the proposal. Those in favour
preferred a rights-based approach. Those against (7 per cent) cited cost
issues and the perception that legislation would be politically divisive.
(Official DCAL English language version, see endnote on translation)27
In spite of the overwhelmingly positive response to the consultation, the UK

Government did not enact the legislation as promised. Instead, on 13 March
2007, it announced a further 12-week consultation, which would therefore
over run the deadline for the re-establishment of devolution. Responsibility
for the proposed legislation would thereby pass to an Assembly whose two
unionist parties had stated their intention to destroy it. POBAL accused
Downing Street of acting in ‘extreme bad faith’,28 whilst Irish News column-
ist, Robert McMillen commented that in spite of the overwhelming sup-
port for the proposed legislation, ‘46 submissions decided that Irish speakers
shouldn’t have rights and so the diligent work by the many was scuppered
by the few.’29 The SDLP accused the British government of ‘pandering’ to
‘the virulent anti-Irish lobby in the DUP’ and called on Downing Street
to ‘stand by its commitment, abandon further consultation and begin the
process of enacting legislation.’30 SF, meanwhile, called for street protest in
support of the legislation.
POBAL wrote to British Prime Minister, Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach
Bertie Ahern. In correspondence on Blair’s behalf from Maria Eagle, by this
time Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for NI, Eagle reiterates the SAA
commitment, states that two consultations were undertaken and that the
matter now lies with the Assembly.31 There is, she states no reason why the
Assembly could not legislate on ‘reserved’ matters with the consent of the
Secretary of State. Correspondence from Dermot Ahern, Irish Minister for

Foreign Affairs to Éamon Ó Cuív,32 in turn reiterates the relevant section of
the SAA, notes that departmental officials have met with nationalist politi-
cal parties and says that they will also meet with ‘their British counterparts
and with POBAL ... in the near future.’ In spite of the anger of the Irish speak-
ing community, however, the failure to fulfil the SAA did not appear to be
sufficiently central to the Irish government or to either Northern nation-
alist party to endanger their participation in a re-established Assembly.
Nonetheless, the Irish language Act remained in use as a bargaining chip
in the CR negotiations, as shown by a statement from Secretary of State,
Peter Hain.33 In it, Hain tells the leaders of the DUP and SF that if they do
not act on the deadline for re-establishment of the Assembly, then, ‘The
Assembly will close down, the salaries will stop, the allowances will stop...
The Irish language legislation will be taken forward at Westminster.’ DUP
spokesperson on Culture, Nelson McCausland, 34 a staunch opponent of
Irish language legislation, notes, ‘The message is that if unionists go into an
executive and the assembly is operational the Irish language act will become
a devolved matter and unionists can veto it. Once again Downing Street and
the Northern Ireland Office have politicised the Irish language.’35
When a date was subsequently agreed for the entry into a new Assembly,
Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, and newly nominated First Minister for the
North, said, ‘The claim that an Irish language Act will be forced upon us is
now gone forever ... . No Assembly the DUP lead will pass such an act.’36
The second DCAL consultation document
The second DCAL consultation document (13 March 2007)37 reports the
results of the first consultation and contains draft indicative legislative
clauses. It is a 28-page document in the English language version (31 pages in
Irish), with a Ministerial Foreword, Introduction, Overview of the Indicative
clauses and finally, the Indicative clauses themselves.
The first paragraph of its Foreword acknowledges the high level of
response to the first consultation and the overwhelmingly positive support
for rights-based legislation. It (DCAL 2007, p. 3) asserts that government
supports the desire of Irish speakers to use the language but, ‘Aithnímid,
ag an am chéanna, áfach, go bhfuil éagsúlacht shuntasach leathan tuair-
imí ann laistigh de Thuaisceart Éireann maidir le ról na Gaeilge sa saol
poiblí.’ / ‘At the same time, however, we recognise that there is a pro-
nounced divergence of views within in Northern Ireland with respect to
the role of the Irish language in public life’ (Official DCAL English lan-
guage version)..
The document, which contains no proposals in respect of education,
broadcasting, the use of Irish in the political institutions or the status of the
Irish language purports to represent a ‘middle-ground’ approach to the issue
and to draw heavily on the experience of Wales and the South of Ireland.
Both of these assertions are rejected by all of the key Irish language organi-
sations and the two nationalist parties, SF and the SDLP. With elections
for the proposed new Assembly over, unionist politicians focused on rally-
ing opposition to the legislation through the media.38 The UUP called for
united action against the Act39 whilst the DUP invited the public to call
in to its offices and sign a letter stating that the legislation, ‘offends our
community.’40 DUP Culture spokesperson, Nelson McCausland stated that
Irish was a SF ‘cultural weapon ... that will not be decommissioned. Indeed,
one might well regard their demand for an Irish language Act as part of their
cultural rearmament.’41
The proposed legislation and the new Assembly
On Monday 2 April 2007, the new ministerial portfolios were shared out as
stipulated in the GFA, using the D’Hondt mechanism. This is a mathemati-
cal formula which reflects the strength of a party’s total support, based on
its share of votes in relation to seats won. Irish speakers watched anxiously
to see which party would appoint the Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure
with core responsibility for language issues. SF had three opportunities
to select the Ministry, whilst the SDLP had one. Both nationalist parties
bypassed the portfolio. Culture, Arts and Leisure was the last Ministry to be
allocated, claimed finally by the DUP.
The period following the re-establishment of devolution on 8 May 2007
saw unprecedented attacks from unionist politicians on the Irish language,
both in the media and in the Assembly chamber. In addition to bitter, ugly
contributions to debates on IME (18 September 2007; 13 November 2007,
14 January 2008, 13 May 2008), the UUP proposed a formal motion42 to ban
the use of spoken and written Irish within the Assembly (9 October 2007)
and announced43 the reversal (1 October 2007) of the limited but positive
Department of Health Irish language advertising and publicity policy intro-
duced in 2000 by the then Minister.44 Once devolution was restored, DUP
politicians began to brief the media of their intention to put an end to the
Irish language Act.45 On 16 October 2007, Edwin Poots, the first of three
DUP Culture Ministers to date, duly published the results of the second
DCAL consultation on the Irish language Act in an official statement to
the Assembly. Rather than dividing the responses according to ‘substantive
submissions’ and petitions as in the first process, the long-awaited results
simply state (DCAL October 2007, p. 4, point. 2) that of 11,629 responses
received, 7,500 (68 per cent) supported Irish language legislation and 3,500
were opposed to legislation of any kind. DCAL (October 2007, p. 4, point
5) says that ‘approximately’ 170 organisations made submissions. It further
states (DCAL October 2007, p. 4, point 3) that ‘approximately’ 80 per cent
of responses were in the form of templates, but gives no information as to
Table 6.1 Results of Two DCAL consultations on Proposed Irish language

legislation
Number of first consultation responses Number of second consultation

(Dec 2006–March 2007) responses (March–June 2007)
Total no. of responses 668 Total no of responses 11,000

Petitions, postcards 4,566 Petitions 629
and advertisement
Revised total 5,234 Revised total 11,629
For legislation 5,187 99% For legislation 7,500 65%a
Against legislation 47 1% Against legislation 4,129 35%b
Note: a This is the figure given in tabular form in the DCAL Summary. However, in the written
analysis (p. 4, point 2) the figure is given as 68 per cent
b
This is the figure given in tabular form in the DCAL Summary. However, in the written analy-
sis, (p. 4, point 2) the figure is given as 32 per cent
Source: DCAL Summary of Responses to 2nd Consultation October 2007
what percentage of these either supported or opposed legislation (DCAL Oct

2007, p. 5). The DCAL Summary presents the figures in relation to each of
the two consultations, as shown in Table 6.1.
As noted above, the DCAL Summary (October 2007) contains contra-
dictory figures in tabular and written form. Also, the tabular figures relat-
ing to the first consultation differ from those given in the second DCAL
consultation paper (13 March 2007), in that the DCAL Summary (October
2007) cites 99 per cent of respondents to the first consultation as supporting
the legislation, as opposed to the 93 per cent previously stated. The DCAL
Summary (October 2007) lists some of the points made by respondents to
the second consultation but uses vague and unquantifiable terminology, ‘a
large number of responses,’ ‘a common comment’ (October 2007, p. 5, point
8); ‘some respondents’ (October 2007, p. 5, point 9); ‘a number of respond-
ents’ (October 2007, p. 5, point 11); ‘some organisations felt’ (October 2007,
p. 6, point 17). The submissions to the second consultation have not them-
selves been made public. DCAL presents the overall results of the consulta-
tions as shown in Table 6.2.
According to the DCAL Summary (October 2007, p. 7, point 14), Irish lan-
guage organisations preferred a rights-based approach, whilst government
and public sector bodies tended to emphasise a language schemes approach.
This appears to indicate that these bodies did not oppose the proposed leg-
islation in principle. When the results of the first and second consultations
are combined, DCAL’s figures show 75 per cent of respondents in favour
of the legislation, and 25 per cent opposed (see Table 6.2). In spite of these
findings, the DUP Minister declared himself ‘unpersuaded that there is a
compelling case for bringing forward Irish language legislation’,46 citing the
Table 6.2 Figures for both consultations on proposed Irish language legislation
Overall total number of responses (1st and 2nd 16,863

consultation)
In favour of legislation 12,687 75%
Against legislation 4,176 25%
Source: DCAL Summary of Responses to 2nd Consultation October 2007
‘divisive’ nature of the proposal and the high cost of legislation. The nation-
alist parties, although eager to condemn the announcement, did not appear
to have any strategy for challenging it.
Following Poots’ announcement, there was a unionist-led media storm47
when Monica McWilliams, Chief Commissioner of the NI Human Rights
Commission (NIHRC)48 wrote to new Secretary of State, Shaun Woodward
to ask how he now intended to ensure compliance with international human
rights standards on minoritised languages. Woodward reiterated the British
government position, that the Irish language legislation was now a matter
for the devolved government. McWilliams contended that refusal by the
devolved institutions to meet commitments did not release Britain from its
international treaty obligations, a point reiterated by the NIHRC in its 2009
submission to the Committee of Experts on the ECRML.49
Having met with representatives of POBAL in 2007, the Advisory Group
on the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities took
up the issue (2007, para 190), urging the British government to, ‘ensure that
the process of adopting the Irish language Act is not dominated by political
considerations, and reflects as far as possible the needs of the Irish-speaking
population as set out in the responses submitted to the Government’s pub-
lic consultation process.’50 As noted in Chapter 4, following representa-
tions from POBAL, supported by the NIHRC and CAJ, the United Nations
Economic and Social Committee (UNESC) noted the disparity in legislative
protections for Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish in the North
and recommended that, ‘the State party or the devolved administration in
Northern Ireland, adopt an Irish language Act’.51
Irish language issues: Attack, react, attack
In addition to incessant negative references and debates around Irish

in the Assembly chamber, in December 2007, as noted in Chapter 5, the
CAL Minister announced that under the draft budget, agreed by all par-
ties, funding for the CCG / Irish Language Film Board would end in March
2009. The apparent unwillingness of nationalist parties to take a stand on
Irish language issues created initial confusion and then anger. In January
2008, the Irish language newspaper, Lá Nua, published a front page article
with pictures of the six SF and SDLP ministers and junior minister, and
the headline, ‘Cá raibh na hAirí seo le linn sceanairt Poots?’ / 'Where were
these Ministers during Poots’ hatchet job?’ On the inside pages, there is a
further half page column piece by veteran reporter, Eoghan Ó Neill enti-
tled, ‘Cá raibh sibh, a chairde sa chúirt?’ / ‘Where were you, our friends
on the inside?’52 (Author’s translations.) The following day, the paper pub-
lished a lengthy letter from independent television producer, Pilib Mac
Cathmhaoil,53 warning that nationalist parties would lose votes if they did
not defend funding for the CCG / ILBF. The same day carried an edito-
rial entitled, ‘Na cairde nár tháinig i gcabhair ... go fóill’ / ‘The friends who
have not come to our aid ... yet’54 (Author’s translation). The addition of the
qualification ‘go fóill’ / ‘yet’ of course, implies the opportunity for national-
ist politicians to redeem themselves. Perhaps it may also reflect the double
bind in which many minoritised language communities find themselves.
How far can they go in criticising the parties most likely to act in a positive
manner on their behalf?
Funding to Lá Nua was ended by Foras na Gaeilge in 2008 resulting in
the loss of eight posts, as noted in Chapter 4. SF members of Foras’s Board55
defended the decision, although the party’s president, Gerry Adams later
commended the newspaper. One of Lá Nua’s former editors states that the
paper was closed because of its criticism of SF and ‘the way the Irish language
was being treated in the “new dispensation” between SF and the DUP.’56
Since the announcement of Poots’ decision on the Irish Language Act,
DUP spokespersons have repeatedly cited this, and increased provision for
Ulster Scots, as proof of the party’s effectiveness. Poots himself praised his
party’s entry into the devolved Assembly since it had enabled it to put an
end to the Irish language Act.57 At the same time, The Irish News reported
that in the finalised NI budget 2008–11, for the first time funding for Ulster
Scots for each of the three years would exceed that of funding for Irish.58
The CAL Minister’s fellow party member, Jimmy Spratt59 congratulated
Poots for ‘rubbishing the Irish language Act’ and noted, ‘For the first time,
funding to Ulster-Scots will be greater than funding to the Irish sector. This
money can be used for capacity building in order to increase community
activity within the Unionist and Protestant family.’ On 11 March, prospec-
tive DUP party leader, Nigel Dodds noted during a BBC radio interview that
there had been an end to the Irish language Act, ‘courtesy of the DUP.’ Ian
Paisley signalling his resignation as First Minister, noted in March 2008 that
without his party entering devolved government, ‘there would have been
that language change.’
On 3 March, Poots acknowledged that since his appointment nine
months earlier, he had accepted no invitations to Irish language events,
but had attended five Ulster Scots events as Minister in the same period.
Poots defended his decision by saying that since he did not speak Irish he
would have little to offer.60 Asked by The Irish News if he therefore spoke
Ulster Scots, his department replied that he did not but that this did not
matter since no Ulster Scots had been used at any of the ‘Ulster Scots’
events.61
In April 2008, Gregory Campbell was appointed as the new DUP CAL
Minister, charged with progressing the Assembly’s duty to develop two strat-
egies, one for Irish language and one for Ulster Scots. Campbell announced
that there would in fact be a single strategy. Acknowledging that Irish is
more developed than Ulster Scots, he states, ‘I am adamant that I will look
at a strategy that narrows or eliminates the disparity.’62 Questioned as to
when he would introduce the Irish language Act, he stated, ‘I do not intend
to do so.’63 Shortly before the end of his period as CAL Minister, Campbell
awarded £250,000 to the Ulster Scots Agency to employ six additional work-
ers.64 In June 2009, Campbell was replaced as CAL Minister by DUP col-
league, Nelson McCausland, described in the media as, ‘at the forefront of
the DUP policy of investing in the Ulster-Scots sector to help it catch up
with the large Irish language sector.’65
The NI Assembly has ten departments plus the Office of the First Minister
and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). As well as the SF Deputy First
Minister,66 nationalists hold four ministries in the Assembly.67 There are posi-
tive examples of engagement with the Irish language in nationalist-controlled
departments. However, it can be argued that these simply underline the
existence of a dual system within devolved government, which further
marginalises the language and discourages Irish speakers from engaging
with the institution as a whole. Of the four nationalist ministers, SF’s
Minister for Education, Caitríona Ruane arguably has greatest day-to-
day responsibility for the Irish language. Ruane acted rapidly upon tak-
ing office to approve the development proposals by three Irish Medium
schools, one of them by Gaelscoil Éanna, whose funding had previously
been refused in 2006 by the British Direct Rule Minister, Maria Eagle.
The SF Minister has made consistent positive public statements about
the importance of IME and in 2009 she introduced an Irish language
administrative policy into the DENI. However, the DENI’s Review of Irish
Medium Education published in December 2008, begun under Direct Rule,
controversially states that IM primary schools should be federated with
EM schools and that post-primary IME should be progressed through the
establishment of units / streams in EM schools. Ruane has refused devel-
opment proposals from the small free-standing IM Coláiste Speirín in
Tyrone (one of only two free-standing post-primary IM schools in the
North), arguing that the school has insufficient numbers to meet viabil-
ity criteria of 50 pupils in first year enrolment over 3 consequtive years.
Many IME supporters argue that the criteria are too high and that by
the time they are reached in the case of Coláiste Speirín, in excess of
400 children will have already gone through local IM primary schools
without the opportunity to continue in secondary IME. In August 2009,
Coláiste Speirín announced it would be unable to open for the 2009–10

term. Its pupils must now either enroll in EM schools locally or travel
considerable distances to Belfast or into the RoI for IM education. At the
time of writing, it appears that overall demand and community unease at
the direction of DENI policy on IME may force DENI to consider a second
free-standing IM school in the near future, although it does not appear
that this will be in the Sperrins area.
Conor Murphy, SF Minister for Regional Development (DRD) has con-
firmed that he will take some ‘céimeanna beaga, praiticiúla’ (‘small, practical
steps’)68 to improve basic Irish language administrative services within his
Department including an increased use of Irish on the website (along with
Ulster Scots and a range of ethnic minority languages). With his encourage-
ment, the North’s public transport company, Translink, has produced some
limited Irish language materials and introduced an element of bilingual sig-
nage in a new train station in Newry. Murphy has drafted a policy69 regard-
ing some use of bilingual road signage in town / village place names; certain
supplementary plates to standard warning signs, for example, schools; and
signs funded by owners of private premises relating to tourist destinations,
churches and certain commercial premises. Bilingual signs will only be
placed where a local council has requested them, is willing to pay for them,
can show local support and has undertaken a full equality (EQIA) and other
statutory appraisals. The policy appears somewhat limited in scope and its
proposed application seems rather indirect and complicated. In addition,
the DRD states that since the policy has ‘cross-cutting’ implications, it will
require the approval of the Assembly Executive. Based on current experience,
it appears unlikely that any proposal with positive implications for the status
of the Irish language, however limited, will survive such a requirement.
The one SDLP Minister, Margaret Ritchie (Department of Social
Development) appears less engaged with Irish language issues. In December
2008, SDLP MLA Dominic Bradley stated his intention to introduce an
Assembly Private Members Bill regarding Irish language legislation. The
draft bill, identical to the POBAL proposals in all but name70 is due to go
forward in coming months, although leadership changes within the SDLP
may impact on this.71 Whether the Bill will get beyond the earliest stages of
debate remains to be seen.
LPP in the North is now influenced by British government actions, by
unionist control of core language responsibilities in the NI Assembly and
by LPP in the RoI. In contrast with some of the rhetoric around all-Ireland
approaches, since the GFA no sustained attempts have been undertaken to
agree all-Ireland LPP strategy in consultation with the Irish speaking commu-
nity, in spite of the establishment of two separate bodies theoretically capable
of doing so. In addition to Foras na Gaeilge, in July 2004 the RGPTG / DCRGA
set up Fóram na Gaeilge, made up of all-Ireland party-political nominees and
independent of the CR structures. Although both bodies discussed strategic
proposals, RGPTG / DCRGA Minister, Éamon Ó Cuív referred the 20-year

plan to his own Department, thus confining its scope to the RoI alone. In
December 2006, the Irish government published a statement on the Irish
language unequivocally focusing its vision on the South.72 In 2008, con-
sultation meetings were held in the South alone on Ó Cuív’s draft 20-year
plan.73 Ó Cuív acknowledges that the 20-year ‘national’ plan for the Irish
Language is confined to the 26 counties, and that intervening in LPP in the
North is beyond his authority.74 The draft plan will depend on an analysis
grounded exclusively in Constitutional, legislative and demographic cir-
cumstances applicable only in the South. Attempts to implement elements
of such a plan in the North risk being mismatched, ad hoc and dependent
upon that rare commodity, good will. Meanwhile, the North appears little
closer to the adoption of favourable LPP. As noted, at a time of unprecedented
economic pressure, Taoiseach Brian Cowan75 has rejected the proposed clos-
ure of the RGPTG / DCRGA, commiting himself to support the Gaeltacht.
But Opposition leader, Enda Kenny has said if Fine Gael wins what is likely
to be a close next election, he will implement McCarthy’s cuts. Leaked min-
utes of a Southern government meeting also reveal a long-standing North
South Ministerial Council (NSMC) agreement in principle ‘to collapse’ the
Irish language organisations.76 Without formal documentation or prior con-
sultation, in December 2009, the NSMC further ordered the reconfiguring of
Foras na Gaeilge support to 19 core-funded Irish language NGOs. From 2010,
applications will only be accepted from one, or a limited number of serv-
ice-providing advocacy organisations or from integrated local area projects
(NSMC 2 Dec 2009, point 10), clearly endangering future funding of a sig-
nificant number of the 19 organisations. The absence of transparency and
accountability77 reinforces the democratic deficit and undermines fair treat-
ment, independence and good governance. The precise relationship between
cuts, forced mergers and increasing political influence over Irish language
NGOs is as yet unclear. It is therefore difficult to fully assess what drives the
threat to core-funded organisations. The role and aims of a hostile Northern
CAL Minister in shaping future funding raises considerable doubts. However
the ending of funding to any given organisation cannot proceed unless the
North’s nationalist parties are either ineffective or complicit.78
At the time of writing, it is difficult to make definitive statements about
what the future holds. In addition to threatened closure or hostile merger,
recent experience in relation to the Irish language print media indicates
a top-down trend towards competitive tendering, which can force fund-
ing below subsistence levels, disempower and divide. Tendering, initially
limited to several ill-fated newspapers, may prove to have knock-on effects
for all. As a result of these latest developments, the North’s Irish speaking
community as a whole may soon find that its hard-fought gains, specific
expertise and, crucially, its valued independence have all been eroded in
ways that will have far-reaching implications.
The submissions to the consultation process on proposed Irish

language legislation from Irish language organisations
In this section, I shall examine submissions to the first DCAL consultation

on proposed Irish language legislation from seven Irish language NGOs;
POBAL, who spearheaded the work on the Irish language Act, Comhaltas
Uladh, the Northern section of Conradh na Gaeilge.; Comhdháil Náisiúnta
na Gaeilge, Conradh na Gaeilge, Gael Linn and Glór na nGael, as well as
the campaign umbrella group, Stádas. These submissions were selected
because these NGOs carry out work in the NoI or have specific experience
on legislation in the RoI. Section three will examine submissions from the
North’s Irish language statutory sector; Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta / the
Council for Irish Medium Education (CnaGta), from the language board,
Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG) and from Iontaobhas Ultach / The Ultach Trust
(IU). In Chapters 7 and 8, I shall examine submissions from the five main
political parties in the North and then the responses of several key public
sector and non-Irish language NGOs, before analysing a 20 per cent sam-
ple of responses from individuals. In Chapter 9, I shall examine in greater
detail LPP within CR in Q / C, prior to making my overall conclusions.
In the first part of this section, I shall examine initially the POBAL pro-
posals published in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI (February
2006)79 and POBAL’s own submission. I shall then study submissions from
the six other NGOs, and shall organise their comments according to the
layout and format of the DCAL paper to which the submissions respond.
POBAL was established in 1998 to develop expertise, strategies and lead-
ership for the embryonic sector in the North and to promote the status of
Irish. Comhaltas Uladh (CU) was founded in 1926 to carry out the work of
Conradh na Gaeilge (CnaG) in the ten counties of Ulster and Louth, with
the objective of encouraging the speaking of Irish. It runs classes and under-
takes publication work. Conradh na Gaeilge (CnaG) has branches through-
out the country, and others worldwide. Its members work on a voluntary
basis. Established in 1943, Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge (CNnaG) is the
Dublin-based central council of voluntary sector Irish language NGOs. It
works primarily in the SoI. Gael Linn (GL) has been active for over 50 years.
Its aims are to promote the Irish language and its heritage throughout the
country in different ways, through music, song, debating and courses in
schools and outside and through sport. Founded in 1962, Glór na nGael
(GnanG) was established as a competition between communities in the pro-
motion of the Irish language. Stádas is an RoI-based umbrella campaign
formed in 2004 to promote Irish as an Official language of the European
Union, a status achieved in January 2007. The organisation now monitors
its implementation.
The submissions vary in length from 2 pages in total to POBAL’s 38 pages
with the document Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI (POBAL
2006a) attached as an appendix. All seven NGOs support the POBAL model
for rights-based legislation. Three of the submissions, from POBAL, CU
and CNnaG, detail the reasons for each NGOs support for this particular
approach, citing the contested circumstances of the North; the unlikeli-
hood of achieving all-party support for legislation; and the consensus
achieved during POBAL’s community consultation and drafting process
(POBAL 2007, p. 5). CU notes that DCAL is ambiguous when it asserts that
there are disadvantages to a rights-based approach. The organisation says,
‘Má is mí-bhuntáistí iad, ní hé do lucht na Gaeilge, atá ag iarraidh an
Achta, atá siad mí-bhuntáisteach’ / ‘If they are disadvantageous, they
are not disadvantageous to the Irish speaking community, the commu-
nity which is asking for the Act’ (CU’s use of bold for emphasis; CU’s own
English language version of submission).80
CNnaG’s submission is 10 pages long, and includes a resolution passed in
support of POBAL at a one-day conference in Dublin.81 CNnaG (2007, p. 3)
cites experience with the Official Languages Act (2003) in the RoI and the
trend in Wales towards new rights-based legislation.
Status of the Irish language
All seven of the NGO submissions call for Official status for Irish, with
specific references made to the creation of rights to give shape and form to
this status82; the need for political as well as economic, social and cultural
rights (CnaG 2007, p. 2), and inaccurate and overly narrow DCAL interpre-
tation of the implications of EU Official status for Irish (Stádas 2007, p. 1).
Education
Six of the seven submissions refer to the creation of rights in education.
POBAL rejects the assertion in the January 19 DCAL Equality Impact
Assessment that the creation of rights in education would give rise to ine-
quality. The group notes, ‘Is é a mhaítear anseo gur oideachas stáit amháin,
trí mheán an Bhéarla, atá ina cheart. Seasann sé seo an reachtaíocht chom-
hionannais ar a cloigeann.’ / ‘The implications are that only state education
through the medium of English is a right. This turns equality legislation on
its head’ (POBAL’s English language version of submission).83 POBAL makes
detailed proposals for IME and children who have received primary educa-
tion through Irish. It notes that the DCAL document contains no proposals
for the Irish language outside IME. It calls for adequate funding for teaching
of Irish in EME, and the right for all parents who wish to to have their chil-
dren learn Irish as a school subject. Resourcing, teacher training, curricu-
lum support and development are also raised. POBAL highlights the lack of
significant references to further and higher education (FHE) in the DCAL
document, thus neglecting the needs of fluent adults and learners and
impacting upon capacity building. POBAL proposes the placing of a duty
upon the DEL and on third level institutions to devise adequate courses to
meet the needs of the community and to train those who will deliver serv-
ices under the Act.84
CU, CNnaG and CnaG all agree with a rights-based approach to IME,
to teaching of Irish in EME and to provision of FHE courses and training.
CNnaG (2007, p. 8) and CnaG (2007, pp. 7–9) quote the POBAL propos-
als in detail. Specific issues raised include: the teaching of Irish in primary
schools,85 the recurring issue of Irish as a subject in EME in the RoI (CNnaG
2007, p. 8); IME primary children for whom there is no IM post-primary
provision; IM digital curriculum services, cross sectoral issues, like health
(CnaG 2007, p. 6); an all-Ireland strategy with universities on teacher train-
ing, and training for other professionals, and provision of support and
teaching materials (GnanG 2007, p. 4).
The use of Irish in the courts

All seven of the submissions call for a rights-based approach to the use of
Irish in the administration of justice. POBAL (2007, p. 36) calls for the repeal
of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) to which I
have referred in Chapter 4, and the creation of guaranteed rights for any
person to use Irish in hearings before any court or tribunal. POBAL (2007, p.
36), CNnaG (2007, p. 9) and GnanG (2007, p. 3) state that there should be no
disadvantage or financial charge to the individual and a right to documen-
tation in Irish relating to or issuing from the courts. POBAL, GnanG (2007,
pp. 3–4) and CNnaG (2007, p. 9) call for certain documentation in Irish,
including passports, visas, birth, death, marriage and civil partnership cer-
tificates and for marriage and civil partnership services through Irish. There
are challenges to the accuracy of the DCAL paper: CnaG (2007, p. 11) cites Ó
Beoláin v. Fahy (2001, 2 I.R. 279) as evidence of the right to use Irish in RoI
courts, Stádas (2007, p. 1) states that Article 9(2) of the OLA 2003 is generally
viewed as conveying a right to receive correspondence in Irish, and POBAL
(2007, p. 5) challenges DCAL’s interpretation of a ‘graduated approach’ in
respect of Article 9(1) of the ECRML.86
The political institutions

Five of the submissions from NGOs make reference to the use of Irish in the
political institutions. POBAL proposes the right to use and the duty to facili-
tate Irish language in debates and any other proceedings, in committees or
other bodies. POBAL also refers to accurate recording of the use of Irish in
official records, with translations included afterwards; simultaneous publi-
cation of Assembly enactments in Irish and English and a five-year review
after five years of one-way simultaneous translation.87
Furthermore, the POBAL proposals contain a number of clauses spe-
cifically outlining the public services, which public bodies including the
Assembly and council will provide. These include the use, and encouraging
and promoting the use of Irish in all internal operations and the provision
of public services through Irish ‘to the maximum extent possible’. POBAL’s
document provides for the attachment to the Act of a Schedule of public
bodies with the greatest responsibility to provide Irish language services
and the proposals go on to describe what ‘to the maximum extent possible’
means in the context of these public bodies through inclusion of a com-
prehensive list of duties.88 In relation to the DCAL consultation document,
POBAL points out that the limited range of public services outlined is inap-
propriate, but the view that both the NI Assembly and local councils should
be bound to provide similar provision, as long as that provision provides for
a significant range of appropriate services.89
CU (2007, p 6), GnanG (2007, pp. 1–2) and POBAL call for Official status
for Irish in the NI Assembly and in local councils; for official records of pro-
ceedings to reflect use of Irish; for its use to be facilitated through simulta-
neous translation in debates and committees; for its use in correspondence;
and for signage. CNnaG states that the OLA 2003 sets a minimum standard.
With CnaG, it proposes the POBAL model for the North.90
Broadcasting
POBAL (2007, p. 37, Annex G) deplores the absence of references to broad-
casting in the DCAL document. GnanG (2007, p. 5) points out that as broad-
casting is a reserved matter, Westminster legislation will be required. With
CnaG, it supports the POBAL proposals. POBAL, CnaG (2007, pp.16–17)
and CU (2007, p. 6) propose the Act creates a duty to promote television
and radio through Irish, POBAL calls for availability of Irish language
broadcasts from RoI, supports an Irish language broadcasting fund; an Irish
language radio station reflecting regional input and interests; and adequate
provision in Irish by all broadcasters. On the print media, POBAL and CU
call for continued publication and financial support for at least one daily
newspaper in Irish.91
Enforcement of the Act

POBAL’s proposals call for the creation of two new and separate bodies
to deal with the administration and enforcement of the Act, the office of
Coimisinéir na Gaeilge, and a planning and rights body, Bord Um Chearta
agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge (BCPG). The latter is intended to work with public
bodies not listed on the Act’s Schedule in the preparation of schemes cover-
ing a wide range of public services in Irish. The Irish language Commissioner,
Coimisinéir na Gaeilge, is to be appointed by the Secretary of State. POBAL
notes that only someone fluent in Irish may be appointed and that the office
must be independent and adequately resourced. The organisation proposes
the Commissioner’s Office has a three-fold role: to take all necessary actions
and measures within its authority to ensure implementation of the Act; to
carry out investigations on its own initiative or in respect of a complaint; to
review any regulations / directives under the Act itself, or any other legisla-
tion impacting the Act and comment on this in an Annual Report presented
to the Assembly and Parliament. The POBAL proposals also call for close
liaison between the Office, the South’s Language Commissioner, Foras na
Gaeilge and the Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge.
The POBAL proposals detail the powers of the Commissioner in respect of
investigations, recommendations regarding action to be taken and setting
of timescales. Failure to act on the recommendations within a reasonable
delay may then result in the findings of the Commissioner being reported
to the Secretary of State. POBAL proposes a Court Remedy and compen-
sation scheme and power for the Commissioner to apply to the court on
behalf of a complainant.92
Five submissions93 support the establishment of a Commissioner’s Office
with full powers to set timescales for completion of duties and obligations;
four explicitly support the creation of a second institution, (referred to by
POBAL as the BCPG) to oversee the preparation of schemes by public bodies
not listed in the Act’s Schedule. CNnaG (2007, pp. 4–6) stresses the impor-
tance of independence from government, and like CnaG (2007, pp. 4–6) and
GL (2007, p.1) it calls for compensation in the case of non-compliance and
quotes the POBAL proposals.
Streetnames
The POBAL document contains detailed recommendations in respect of
public signage. Although the Welsh Language Act and the OLA 2003 in the
RoI, upon which the proposed legislation is supposed to be based provide for
a wide range of public signage including streetnames, place names, organi-
sational and direction signs etc DCAL makes reference only to streetnames.
It focuses on what percentage of residents in favour of Irish language street
signs should be required before signs are erected.
POBAL (2007, p. 35), CU (2007, p. 3) and CnaG (2007, pp 10–11) believe
the DCAL section on signage is too narrow and the discussion of percentages
is ‘a distraction’. POBAL (2007, p. 37) asserts, ‘Caithfidh an Ghaeilge bheith
le feiceáil sa saol poiblí i réimse leathan áiteanna agus ní faoi réir shocruithe
mí-oiriúnacha mar gheall ar dhoicheall forasach’ / ‘The Irish language must
be visible in public life in a wide range of places and not subject to inap-
propriate decisions because of institutional hostility’ (POBAL’s English lan-
guage version). GL (2007, p. 1) feels that signage requires significant duties
upon public bodies. GnanG (2007, p. 4) and CnaG (2007, pp. 10–11) note
that Irish forms of addresses must be recognised in all documentation.
Commentary on other issues

All of the submissions raise a number of issues in addition to the title head-
ings in the DCAL consultation document. The POBAL submission is the
most comprehensive in respect of this, providing background to its proposals
and highlighting omissions, gaps and inaccuracies in the DCAL document.
POBAL (2007, p. 4) challenges the timescale for Westminster legislation estab-

lished by the British government, pointing out that it has given an unequiv-
ocal commitment to enact the legislation. As noted, it challenges the finding
of the second EQIA (EQIA 19 January 2007) in respect of education, and,
along with CNnaG (2007, p. 11) criticises the unusual inclusion of a Financial
Impact Assessment in the DCAL paper. POBAL declares itself disappointed at
the emphasis in the DCAL document, ‘B’oiriúnaí ag an pháipéar dul i láthair
na reachtaíochta ó dhearcadh an chustaiméara seachas ó dhearcadh an fho-
rais nó an chomhlachta rialtais/phoiblí.’ / ‘It would be more appropriate for
the paper to approach the issue of legislation from the view point of the
customer rather than from the view point of the institution or government
/ public body’ (POBAL’s English language version).94 POBAL and CU (2007,
p. 6) propose Irish language rights in the workplace, and CU calls upon the
British government to apologise for historic damage done to the Irish lan-
guage. CnaG highlights a rights-based approach to capacity building, stating
that this is a training and development issue, not an excuse for inaction.
Gael Linn (2007, p. 2) says, ‘Chinnteodh Acht na Gaeilge stádas don teanga
agus in áit go mbeadh ar dhaoine bheith ag síor-achainí, bheadh dualgas
ar an státchóras freastal ar rogha teanga an phobail.’ / ‘The Irish Language
Act would ensure status for the language and instead of people continually
petitioning, the state system would have the responsibility of the people’s
language choice’ (Gael Linn’s English language version).
The submissions from the Irish language NGOs show a high level of agree-
ment around core issues in respect of the legislation. It is apparent that
the proposals published by POBAL have been absorbed by all of the key
Irish language NGOs, who show a detailed understanding of the proposals
themselves and their implications. The submissions also show considerable
engagement with the DCAL document, with significant challenges made to
the accuracy of information contained in it. Of course, NGOs have, by defi-
nition a degree of independence from the state. It could be argued, therefore,
that Irish language NGOs are likely to be more radical in their proposals and
more critical than others in their assessment of the government’s position
document. The views therefore of the statutory Irish language sector on the
consultation will now be examined to determine what level of agreement
exists across the whole of the Irish language sector.
Submissions from Irish language state sector organisations
In this section, I shall examine the submissions from the North’s small statu-
tory Irish language sector, Iontaobhas Ultach / Ultach Trust (IU), Comhairle
na Gaelscolaíochta / The Council for Irish Medium Education (CnaGta)
and Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG), the Irish language part of the Cross Border
Implementation body, to establish what level of consensus there is between
these statutory organisations on the proposed legislation, and to what extent
their views diverge from those of the non-governmental sector.
As noted in Chapter 3, IU was the first Irish language organisation directly

established by the state in the North, followed in 2000 by CnaGta with core-
funding from DENI. CnaGta’s submission (2007, p. 4) contends, ‘nach leor
cur chuige bunaithe ar scéimeanna amháin i gcomhthéacs thuaisceart na
hÉireann, ach gur féidir le scéimeanna cur go mór le cur i gcrích reachtaío-
chta atá bunaithe ar chearta.’ / ‘an approach based soley on schemes is not
enough in NI, but that schemes can go a long way to implement legislation
based on rights’ (DCAL English language version). CnaGta supports detailed
obligations to build capacity, in line with legislation in Wales and Scotland,
but warns that if legislation is limited by demand, it can be an excuse to
do little. The submission proposes that rights be established to ensure bod-
ies develop the use of Irish in external and internal operations, and duties
imposed regarding development schemes for Irish and further schemes for
services. It states that a rights-based approach is not problematic if reasona-
bleness and practicality are qualified properly.
An Foras Teanga was established in 1999 under the GFA. An all-Ireland
body, it is divided into FnaG, the Irish language body, and the Ulster Scots
Agency. FnaG describes its function as advising both administrations, public
bodies and the voluntary sector, and distributing funding to Irish language
groups. FnaG supports proposed legislation to build on existing limited serv-
ices and to cater to the Irish speaking community. It proposes a combined
approach of rights and schemes, co-operation to build capacity and public
/ government sector staff audits to ascertain current skills. It says schemes
should include Irish language forms, correspondence, addresses, verbal con-
tact, Executive summaries in Irish of Annual Reports of education and health
institutions, local councils in areas with a high percentage of Irish speakers
etc. It calls for timescales for service delivery (Fna G, 2007, p. 5).
Like CnaGta, IU (2007, p. 2) calls for a combined approach, with rights in
the key areas of IME and teaching of Irish in EME. IU recommends adop-
tion of relevant ECRML paragraphs on public and private life, use of Irish
forms of names and the creation of rolling duties, subject to regular review.
Education, culture, media and economic development bodies should be
obliged to provide ‘services which will enable the language community to
develop to its fullest extent’ (IU 2007, p. 3). DCAL and the Arts Council
should develop schemes, which, it states is not ‘a soft option’ or ‘a volun-
tary option’. The duties of public bodies ‘to support coherent language plan-
ning initiatives should be laid out in the legislation’ IU (2007, p. 4) supports
the call for Westminster legislation and notes significant gaps in the DCAL
paper, including broadcasting; opportunities to learn the language at all
levels of education, signage and key documentation.
The status of the Irish language
Both FnaG (2007, p. 7) and CnaGta (2007, p. 7) support Official status.

CnaGta sees this as a strong statement of goodwill by government whilst
FnaG says every citizen has an inalienable right to use Irish in public and
private life. IU (2007, p. 4) appears equivocal on Official status, recom-
mending that ‘at the very least’ the Irish language should be recognised as
an ‘...indigenous, living language ... an important part of the cultural herit-
age of our society ... valued by the state, and which the state is committed to
maintaining and developing. There is no particular reason why Irish cannot
be recognised as an official minority (or lesser-used) language.’
Education
CnaGta (2007, p. 8) criticises inaccuracies in the DCAL document, chal-
lenging the statement that IM schools are funded if they meet the cri-
terion regarding number of pupils, since this is not guaranteed. It calls
for a demand-based right to IME, with inclusion as of right to adequate
accommodation, resources, access and Special Needs provision. CnaGta
(2007, pp. 8–10) emphasises the developmental role of the legislation, and
lists duties including curriculum, examination and assessment develop-
ment and support for students and teachers. Obligations should be placed
on education, health agencies and departments. School transport should
be guaranteed for IM pupils and Irish taught as a subject in EME where
there is demand.
FnaG (2007, pp. 7–10) says that it is a ‘slight’ on pupils in EME that Irish as
a subject is not mentioned by DCAL. It calls for heritage and culture belong-
ing to the Irish language to be taught in all schools. It calls for a right to
primary IME based on the current viability criteria. Since post-primary cri-
teria are too high, it calls for post-primary units within EME. It deplores lack
of provision in HFE for life-long learning, for schools leavers, or in respect
of careers advice for young Irish speakers. FnaG (2007, pp. 7–10) states that
the ECRML has proved inadequate and that a planned approach is needed,
which would oblige DEL to prepare a scheme for Irish language use in inter-
nal and external operations.
IU (2007, p. 4) supports the POBAL proposals on education, saying, ‘it is
the area in which most emphasis should be put on the rights approach.’ It
states: the current lack of opportunity for children outside the Catholic edu-
cation sector to learn Irish is ‘deplorable’ (IU 2007, p. 5); IME viability cri-
teria in rural areas are unreasonable; and IME at pre-school / nursery level,
infrastructural support and Special Needs provision should be supported
in the legislation. The North, it states, ‘has a bilingual statutory education
system that thinks it is monolingual.’ It proposes Irish Language Impact
Assessments on all policies.
Courts
CnaGta (2007, pp. 12–13) supports Official status for Irish in the courts and
use of Irish to be allowed where reasonable and feasible, with the onus on
the courts service to explain why this might not be the case. FnaG and
IU call for the repeal of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act
(Ireland). FnaG (2007, p. 15) calls for lessons to be learnt from Wales; addi-
tional training; a pool of interpreters for all levels of the courts service; ter-
minology development through Coiste na Téarmaíochta / The Terminology
Committee95; relevant paragraphs of the ECRML to be integrated into the
legislation,96 for the use of spoken Irish and for the admissibility and prepa-
ration of documentation in Irish. IU (2007, p. 5) says that use of Irish should
become a ‘matter of judicial discretion’ and states, ‘a language scheme will
become both desirable and necessary.’
NI Assembly
CnaGta (2007, p. 10) calls for Irish to be an Official language of the Assembly
and local councils, used in their internal operations and public services. It
proposes simultaneous translation during debates, bilingual signage and sta-
tionery, and that an obligation be made to increase Irish language services.
Also required is two-way correspondence in Irish and the continual devel-
opment in the duty to facilitate, develop and promote the language in all
its aspects. The Assembly should prepare a developmental scheme: to create
opportunities for the use of Irish in specific occasions; in the deliberations of
committees discussing language itself; when a significant number of the audi-
ence or the speakers in a debate or meeting have Irish. But, Irish should not
be used in committees unless requested in advance and does not add to costs;
only documents of special interest to Irish speakers should be bilingual.
FnaG (2007, pp. 10–11) refers to signage in Irish in relation to its status.
In the Assembly, use of Irish initially should be subject to prior notice for
members of three days and of five days for the public. Failure to provide
notice would result in the requirement to self-translate. In local councils,
the provision of notice extends to five days notice for members and to seven
days for the public. FnaG supports staff skills audits.
IU (2007, p. 5) notes that the use of Irish in the Assembly increases the
status of the language, since, ‘such high profile use can have a positive effect
on how communities value the language.’ Simultaneous translation should
be made available in debates with prior notice, they assert, although they
feel that Committee proceedings are less important. It concurs (2007, p. 6)
with POBAL that the learning of the language be encouraged amongst staff,
and it refers to the use of bilingual or multilingual signage, and bilingual or
multilingual headed paper.
Broadcasting
CnaGta (2007, p. 16) states that the British and Irish governments should
work to provide a radio and television service for the North. Adequate fund-
ing is needed for the print media. FnaG (200, p. 15) makes no reference to
broadcasting, but in its final section it lists a series of nine recommenda-
tions for action, one of which concerns broadcasting. IU (2007, p. 6) notes
the absence of DCAL references to broadcasting and states that this is an
area in which rights must be created. Surprisingly perhaps, given the Trust’s
interest in broadcasting matters noted in chapter 5, the submission makes
no detailed comments on this area.
Regulation and enforcement

CnaGta (2007, pp. 5–6) favours the establishment of the Office of the Irish
Language Commissioner but it should have a limited role in implementing
legislation; a strong role in helping and advising bodies in relation to the
Act; a strong advisory role in respect of the public; a strong monitoring role;
and a key role in creating and implementing language policy. The Minister
would issue instructions as a last resort in cases of failure to implement the
legislation, and the power to make binding recommendations and to oper-
ate compensation.
FnaG (2007, p. 6) favours the establishment of a Commissioner, proposing
the Office be divided into two, one side to oversee preparation of schemes
by public and government bodies, and the other to monitor their imple-
mentation. The OFMDFM and the Secretary of State should establish the
Office, and in case of failure to prepare or to put into effect a scheme, the
Commissioner should give ‘agreed guidance’ to impose agreed binding direc-
tion, and compensation. The submission does not make it clear who this
guidance, binding direction or compensation should be agreed with, but it
does appear to limit the power of the Commissioner to act independently.
IU (2007, p. 6) supports the creation of a Commissioner, calls for a min-
isterial role in instructing bodies on their obligations and sanctions in the
event of non-compliance. It stresses the importance of the independence of
the office.
Streetnames
CnaGta (2007, p. 14) and IU (2007, p. 7) express concern that DCAL lim-
its signage to streetnames. CnaGta calls for the DoE to develop a scheme
for bilingual roadsigns over a period of time; Ordnance Survey to pre-
pare a scheme to make available official Irish Language versions of every
road, street, town, region, administration area and electoral constituency.
Bilingual streetnames should be the norm, with an opt-out clause where 50
per cent do not want it. Irish language versions of addresses should be valid
on all forms of official documentation.
FnaG (2007, p. 14) notes that the full Irish language version of addresses,
and not simply the streetname, should be valid in all forms of documenta-
tion, regardless of whether the Irish language version is displayed on a street
sign or not. On the percentage required for erection of bilingual streetsigns,
FnaG says that 60% of residents in a street should be adequate for the erection
of signs.
IU (2007, p. 7) states that the Irish language version alone of addresses
should be permissible in correspondence; where there is majority support
for bilingual signage, it should be mandatory; where 80 per cent of residents

so demand, monolingual Irish language signs should be erected. The state
has a poor record on tourist signage, including information plaques, bound-
aries to townlands, rivers etc and this should be addressed in legislation.
Other issues raised in the submissions

Both CnaGta and IU raise capacity building and costs. CnaGta (2007, p. 6)
accuses the DCAL document of presenting, ‘cur síos claonta’ / ‘a biased
account’ failing to recognise past neglect and the need for investment to
build capacity. CnaGta (2007, p.7) advises weighting of competing priori-
ties, questioning whether language is to be compared with heritage/culture
issues; with arts, sport and leisure; or with overall budget issues such as the
education, health and environment. It says that increased services do not
necessarily require substantial additional costs. Human resource issues can
be resolved at recruitment if Irish is stipulated or training provided, but
workers must not find themselves disadvantaged in terms of promotion or
their workload. Incentives for Irish speakers should be offered in recognition
of the added value their skills bring. In addition, in terms of costs, it must be
taken into account that when Irish speaking workers are not dealing with
other Irish speakers, they will be dealing with English speaking members of
the public. The cost, therefore, is for the service, not the language.
IU (2007, p. 3) raises the DCAL comments on capacity building and
finance, pointing out that, ‘it is expressed in entirely negative terms, and
could be a charter for inaction and foot-dragging.’ IU says it is disappointed
at the lack of references to state responsibility to ‘maintain, promote and
develop’ the Irish language and to the duty in respect of the ECRML. It sug-
gests that (2007, p. 3) the act should be linked to ‘developmental milestones
that would act as trigger mechanisms for a review’ and with a preamble
outlining the state’s commitment to support the further development of the
Irish language community.
The Irish language state sector organisations show unanimous support for
the enactment of comprehensive legislation and make similar criticisms to
the NGOs of certain sections of the DCAL document. The state sector tends
to be more conservative in its proposals than the NGOs. Nonetheless, it is
clear that during the consultation, there was significant support from all
Irish language sectors for the proposals arising from the POBAL grassroots-
led campaign for legislation.
In the next chapter of the research, I shall examine the responses to the
consultation of the five main political parties in the North. Following this, I
shall study submissions from key public sector and non-governmental, non-
Irish language organisations before analysing a sample section of individual
responses. I shall then turn to an examination of LPP in Canada.
7
The Submissions of the Political
Parties to the First Public
Consultation on proposed Irish
language legislation for NI
As discussed in the previous chapter, the October 2006 St Andrews’

Agreement (SAA) contained a British government commitment to enact
Irish language legislation reflecting the experience of Wales and the RoI
(UK and Irish Govt, 13 October 2006). The first consultation paper on the
proposed legislation was published in December 2006 by the Department
of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL 2006), under the direction of Maria
Eagle, Direct Rule Minister. Following a 12-week consultation, DCAL
announced that it had received 668 substantive replies to the document,
1376 postcards, a newspaper advertisement with 800 signatures and a 2500
name petition, all supporting legislation based on the POBAL proposals.
DCAL notes the high level of interest in the issue and the fact that over
93 per cent of respondents supported Irish language legislation and the
POBAL rights-based model, although as noted, figures provided by DCAL
in October 2007 show an even higher level of support. It says that the
small number (7 per cent) of responses opposing the legislation cited cost
issues and ‘the perception that the legislation would be divisive’ (DCAL
March 2007, p. 6).
The key substantive submissions from Irish language NGOs as well as from
statutory Irish language organisations are detailed in the previous chapter.
In this chapter, I shall analyse the submissions made by the North’s main
political parties. Following this, in Chapter 8, there will be an examination
of submissions from key public bodies and non-Irish language NGOs, and
finally, an analysis of a random 20 per cent sample of individual responses
posted on the DCAL website. As noted in Chapter 6, although a second
consultation was held in 2007, the submissions to this second process were
never made public and therefore cannot be subject to the same analysis.
During the second consultation, there is evidence that unionist parties
147
sought to mobilise against the legislation. Figures published by DCAL none-

theless show 68 per cent of all responses to the second consultation sup-
ported the Irish language Act.
Responses of the political parties and political representatives

to the first public consultation on proposed Irish language
legislation for NI
As noted, the period during which the first consultation on proposed

Irish language legislation took place (13 December 2006–2 March 2007)
included the active electioneering period prior to the 7 March Assembly
elections. On the nationalist side, the SDLP and Sinn Féin (SF) were
competing for votes, and on the unionist side, there was intense rivalry
between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist
Party (UUP). In general, it has to be noted that whilst polarised views
emerge in the submissions, this is not uncharacteristic of the usual stances
of the various political parties. The second consultation on the legisla-
tion took place post-election, and unionist parties appear to have focused
more effort on counteracting the overwhelmingly positive response to
the first process, resulting in more negative replies. However, in the sec-
ond consultation, DCAL treated petitions or one-line responses on the
same basis as substantive submissions. None of the responses have been
made public.
In this chapter, there will be an in-depth analysis of the submissions made
by the five main political parties in the North, the nationalist SDLP and SF
and the unionist DUP, UUP and Alliance.1 The DUP submission notes that
it is presenting a formal party response (DUP 2007) but that in addition, it
recognises a separate submission from the party’s then elected Member of
the European Parliament, Jim Allister.2 As discussed later, the Allister sub-
mission is the lengthier, although both are very similar in the points they
make, and at times, in the terminology they use. I have felt it important
however to include the Allister submission since it appears characteristic
of oppositional attitudes to legislation. As noted, Allister now leads the
Traditional Unionist Vote (TVU) widely seen to be in competition with the
DUP for hard-line unionist votes.
The party-political submissions

SF received the second largest percentage of the vote at the March 2007
election, with 26.16 per cent. SF Ard Chomhairle’s (Executive Committee)
13-page submission in Irish was marked as confidential and therefore was
not initially placed on the DCAL website. Both the SF and SDLP submis-
sions address the consultation document in a concise, detailed manner,
with little discussion of the political or historical context of the Irish
language.
Political Parties’ Submissions to Consultation 149
The SDLP took 15.22 per cent of the vote in the March 2007 elections.
The party’s submission carries the name of SDLP Newry and Mourne MLA
Spokesperson on Culture, Dominic Bradley (Dominic Ó Brolcháin). It is a
10½-page submission, which, in common with the SF submission, focuses
on the specific questions put in the consultation paper. The submission has
no preamble or conclusions section.
The DUP received the largest percentage of the vote (30.09 per cent) in
the March 2007 elections. As noted earlier, its submission is similar to
that of the party’s then MEP, Jim Allister, and refers to the Allister sub-
mission. This is rather unusual and it may be that separation between
the two submissions is reflective of some political distance between
Allister and the main DUP party on issues other than the proposed Irish
language legislation. It may also reflect a desire by the party to achieve
additional impact through the submission of two separate documents.
Whatever the reality Allister, a senior party member and practising
Queen’s Counsel, resigned from the DUP on 27 March 2007 as a result of
the entry by his former party into government with SF. He now leads the
TUV. In 2009, he lost his seat as a member of the European parliament,
but split the DUP vote. His submission is 37 pages long plus annexes. It
is written in the third person plural, although it is signed in Allister’s
name alone.
The UUP took 14.94 per cent of the vote in the March 2007 elections. The
submission from the Policy Unit of the Ulster Unionist Party is a little over
two pages long. It starts with some general comments regarding the party’s
commitment ‘to working for a stable and peaceful NI within the Union ...,’
and states that the UUP, ‘... respects cultural diversity as a key foundation for
a stable, peaceful, pluralist society’ (UUP 2007, p. 1).
The Alliance Party took seven seats in the Assembly elections of March
2007. It is the smallest of the five ‘main’ political parties. Its submission,
signed by party General Secretary, Stephen Farry, consists of a five-page
introduction, ranging through arguments from the intrinsic value of lan-
guage, to its ‘natural’ demise and language shift provoked in part, they
acknowledge, by repressive policy but in the main by the ‘benefits and
advantages’ of switching to dominant languages; via the ‘shared’ cultural
heritage of the North, which appears at one point to be a shared Gaelic
heritage and at another one Irish and one Scots language heritage. The sub-
mission concludes with 3 pages of direct commentary on the text of the
consultation document.
The attitude of the political parties to the proposed

Irish language legislation
SF’s submission begins by placing the SAA and its commitment to enact
Irish language legislation in the context of the party’s understanding of the
political relationship with the British government in respect of the North
(SF 2007, p. 3). SF say they will evaluate the best proposed approach to the
legislation according to four basic principles: that the British government
must fulfil its SAA commitment; that the rights of Irish speakers should
be at the heart of the Act; that the Act should be resourced at Westminster
and that an Irish Language Commissioner, with appropriate powers and
resources be appointed.3
SF states that the DCAL consultation document, specifying that the legis-
lation will deal only with the public and government sectors and not with
the business or private sectors, is in contravention of the GFA which con-
tains specific provision in relation to the use of Irish in private life (SF 2007,
p. 5). Crucially, the second point relates to the enactment at Westminster,
in accordance with the St Andrews commitment. ‘Tá muid buartha nach
rithfear an reachtaíocht fríd Westminster. Ní bheadh sin inghlactha.’ / ‘We
are concerned that the legislation will not be passed at Westminster. This
would be unacceptable’ (Author’s translation).
The SDLP submission states that, ‘The rights-based approach put for-
ward by POBAL ... is the approach we feel to be the most suitable’ (SDLP
2007, p. 1). Like SF, they believe that the legislation should be passed at
Westminster because this is the only place where legislation relating to
‘reserved matters’ can be passed, and also, because, ‘... a number of aspects
of Irish Language development in the North are already regulated to a
certain extent by cross-border institutions, and only the UK Government
has the authority to deal with the Republic of Ireland in respect of such
matters’ (SDLP 2007, p. 1).
Both the DUP and Allister submissions state that they had no knowl-
edge of the proposal to enact an Irish language Act in the SAA until the
detail of the Agreement was published. There follows a substantial sec-
tion on the Equality Impact Assessment carried out in relation to the pro-
posal (DCAL EQIA 2007) and on the consultation process itself. The DUP,
echoing the Allister submission, notes that requests under the Freedom
of Information Act show that there was no documentation regarding
Irish language legislation prior to 6 Oct 2006 (DUP 2007, p. 1), and that
this ‘... clearly shows that there had been no thought given within
Government for such an Act and that the proposals are politically driven
to meet demands by republicans’ (DUP 2007, p. 2). Therefore, like Allister’s
submission, the party argues that the whole process is flawed and that the
DCAL finding that there will be ‘no adverse impacts’ from legislation shows
that, ‘... pre-determined outcomes were reached by the Department’ (DUP
2007, p. 2). It calls for the consultation document to be immediately with-
drawn. The party criticises the 12-week consultation period for the Irish
language legislation as being too short and refers to other longer consulta-
tions undertaken by DCAL (DUP 2007, p. 2).4 Since the party believes the
proposal to legislate for the Irish language has been politically driven, it
notes that it is therefore open to challenge through Judicial Review. This

section, and the following one, is very similar to the Allister submission, as
I shall note later.
In a further section, entitled, ‘The Need for an Irish Language Act’, the sub-
mission notes, ‘...in the event of devolution being restored that the DUP
would require the introduction of an Irish Language Act to be passed
by cross-community consent.’ Following devolution, the party says, ‘The
DUP would not support the introduction of any Irish Language Act in
these circumstances’ (DUP 2007, p. 3, DUP use of bold type for emphasis).
Further clarification follows, ‘The Democratic Unionist Party does not sup-
port the introduction of any Irish Language Act into Northern Ireland. We
believe that the proposal ... has already proven to be very politically divisive
and any Act would increase division and community tensions.’ The DUP’s
opposition to Irish language legislation, is because, ‘... the Irish language
has been used as a political tool by Irish nationalists and republicans in an
attempt to alienate unionists’ (DUP 2007, p. 3). This echoes Allister’s sub-
mission (Allister 2007, p. 16), in which he says, ‘All matters pertaining to
the promotion and development of the Irish language should be left solely
to the NI Assembly to determine’. Allister (2007, p. 17) then gives an insight
into the view that the proposed legislation is being used as a negotiating
tool in CR talks. He says,
Whereas in the St Andrews Agreement, ‘concessions’ such as water rates

and the retention of academic selection were made conditional on the
return of devolution at Stormont, the Irish Language Act will proceed
without devolution ... Indeed, the threat of an Irish language Act is
still being used as a ‘stick’ to compel Unionists into devolution. In
the interests of even-handedness we oppose any legislation touching
upon the Irish Language until devolution is restored.’ (Respondent’s
use of bold and italics)
The DUP and Allister’s submissions are of one mind also regarding compari-
son between protections for the Irish language and ‘attempts to promote
minority languages in other areas of Europe or around the world’ (DUP
2007, p. 3). The Irish language is, the DUP say, a specific case because it is
‘tightly linked’ to nationalism in the North and ‘it serves no purpose in
communication, but simply the promotion of a political cause.’ This is dif-
ferent from elsewhere, the DUP submission asserts because, ‘In other parts
of the world, regional languages are widely spoken and used in daily life but
this is clearly not the case with the Irish language.’ Allister (2007, p. 31) is
emphatic, ‘Some foolish people try to compare the promotion of Irish with
steps taken elsewhere in Europe in regard to living minority languages ...’
however, according to Allister, the promotion of minoritised languages ‘in
countries such as Spain and Finland have no political strings or baggage.’

This appears a rather surprising assertion.
The DUP (2007, p. 4) states,
... none of the options set out in the consultation document are either
necessary or acceptable. We do not accept that there is a need for an Irish
Language Act to be introduced. No-one in Northern Ireland uses Irish as
a first language and if money is to be spent aiding minority languages
then it would be better spent helping some people from minority ethnic
communities who find real difficulties integrating into life here because
of language difficulties.
However, failing the above alternative, the party reverts to support for Ulster
Scots. Having argued that Irish should not get support, the party nonethe-
less notes that, ‘Government is not giving similar priority to Ulster Scots’
and complains about what it sees as a disparity in funding. They argue,
‘Instead of further increasing the level of support for the Irish language,
we believe that the Government should be reviewing the levels of support
for the Ulster Scots language and culture and bringing these into line with
Irish’ (DUP 2007, p. 4).
Both the DUP and Allister challenge the census figures for Irish speak-
ers in the North. Allister (2007, p. 12) ‘is not satisfied that sufficient
demand ... exists,’ whilst the DUP state that the figure of 10.4 per cent of
people indicating knowledge of Irish is too low to justify legislative pro-
tection.5 At times, the vocabulary and terminology of Jim Allister’s sub-
mission are rather emphatic. Allister (2007, p. 6) refers, for example, to the
DCAL EQIA document as, ‘pathetic in its composition and conclusion.’ Its
approach is ‘slapdash and appalling,’ and ‘hasty and patently inadequate’
and it puts forward ‘premature and unwarranted conclusions.’ The process,
he says is ‘flawed’ and ‘tainted’ (2007, p. 32). The ‘ill-conceived’ proposal to
legislate for Irish would elevate the language to a place that is ‘unmerited
and totally unnecessary’ (2007, p. 13).
He claims ‘with certainty’ that Irish has been in use from the nineteenth
century to express anti-British feeling (2007, p. 9). He asserts there can
be ‘no question whatsoever’ of Official status for Irish (2007, p. 17). In
response to a question in the DCAL consultation paper to whether a new
body is required to regulate the legislation, he replies, ‘no, it is not’ (2007,
p. 15). As to what functions it should have, he replies, ‘none’ (2007, p. 15).
In respect of what kind of Irish language services should be provided, he
replies variously, ‘none’ (2007, p. 18), and ‘no special provision’ (2007, p.
18). He says that the idea that the use of Irish in the courts could improve
community relations is ‘preposterous’ and ‘inane’ (2007, p. 36). The proc-
ess of consultation has been ‘farcical and partisan’ and the consultation
paper is ‘irredeemably flawed’ and ‘delivers a deficient product’ (2007,
p. 37). Allister further claims, ‘No reasonable person today could attempt
to claim that nationalist politics and the promotion of the Irish language
are two divisible aims. They are clearly two sides of the same coin’ (2007,
p. 11). In common with the DUP’s submission, Allister (2007, p. 8) states,
‘If devolution is not established, this legislation should not be formulated
or brought forward.’ The submission continues with three pages of back-
ground, including some of the same quotes used by the DUP in their sub-
mission, through which Allister seeks to illustrate the political nature of
the Irish language.
Allister argues that instead of asking what type of legislation should be
introduced, emphasis should be on whether or not the Act is needed at all
(2007, p. 12). He notes that all the approaches described, ‘... have massive
public resource implications ... and in our opinion will deliver such a mini-
mal return and will ferment undesirable divisions that we do not find our-
selves in a position to support any of them. We regret the failure to properly
cost these options (2007, p. 12). There appears a contradiction here in that
in the same paragraph Allister pinpoints what he sees as a lack of authori-
tative information on costs and yet feels able to assert that they will be
‘massive’ (2007, p. 12).
The UUP comments on the referendum held on the GFA and says, ‘In
this context, the decision at St Andrews to introduce an Irish Language
Act is profoundly unsettling, with potentially very damaging implications
for community relations and respect for cultural diversity’ (UUP 2007, p.
1). The commitment given in the SAA to enact legislation reflecting the
experience of Wales and “Ireland” (sic) are, according to the party ‘... at
best disingenuous’. The Irish language, say the UUP, has political associa-
tions and ‘cannot be viewed as a “neutral” form of cultural expression,
having no impact on community relations’ (UUP 2007, p. 1). Nor is there
the same percentage of the population of the North with knowledge of the
Irish language as those in Wales or the RoI with knowledge of Welsh and
Irish. The UUP are ‘... strongly of the view that there is no case for or merit
in seeking to undermine the 1998 arrangements with the introduction
of an Act based on irrelevant experiences from other jurisdictions’ (UUP
2007, p. 2).
The Alliance Party submission starts by welcoming the consultation but
notes, ‘However, we have major reservations over these proposals’ (2007,
p. 1). The submission rejects a rights-based approach as being ‘most prob-
lematic’. ‘It would create entitlements and associated duties/burdens on
public bodies out of all proportion to need’ (2007, p. 6). Rights-based legis-
lation would, it says, ‘invite opportunities for litigious individuals to make
vexatious demands on public bodies’ (2007, p. 7). The Alliance submission,
whilst on the whole opposed to proposed legislation at all, nonetheless
comments that a language scheme approach would be preferable, because
of ‘... the greater scope for flexibility in terms of the provision of services,
and ... (the) greater regard to need and available resources.’ Specifically, the
submission states that schemes ‘could address Irish, Ulster Scots and other
languages’ (2007, p. 7).
The Alliance submission then includes a lengthy and rather confused
discussion around the ‘sensitive’ issue of language, the complexity of
language maintenance and the ‘natural’ loss of languages through ‘evo-
lution’ (2007, p. 1). The Irish language is contextualised as a valuable,
but doomed, resource through repeated references to the impossibility
of its protection. Alliance (2007, p. 2) next states that, ‘Change is in the
nature of human existence’ and follows up this assertion with reference
to the disappearance of many languages previously in common use on
the island of Ireland. The submission describes the current situation,
saying, ‘There are no longer any monoglot adult or teenage speakers of
Irish in NI.’ This is an interesting statement. It appears to imply that the
author of the comment may be aware of the existence of monoglot Irish
speaking children. If this is the case, it is significant in that it appears to
indicate an awareness that does not inform the rest of the submission.
The first reference to Irish Medium schools is one that sets them in the
context of children with English speaking parents. It then makes a sur-
prising comparison, ‘Those who choose to learn and speak Irish do so by
personal choice; just as many millions of our forebears chose to move to
speaking English. The benefits were obvious and attractive’ (2007, p. 2).
Unfortunately, the writer does not detail what those benefits may have
been for native Irish speakers or why the English language is deemed
to have appeared so attractive. This comment echoes a later one in the
submission6 which also appears to place language shift and decline in a
neutral context, without consideration of the systematic social, political
and economic policies that bring it about.
At the end of this paragraph, having mooted the point that Irish is essen-
tially a valuable but no longer living component of cultural life in the North,
and that change is natural, inevitable and desirable (as long as we curate the
concomitant linguistic losses), the submission (2007, p. 2) notes:
The question that the consultation paper poses for Northern Ireland soci-
ety is whether, and to what extent, the public sector should be required
to provide facilities in the Irish language for these members of our com-
munity (who choose to learn and speak Irish)
The use of the word ‘whether’ in this context is retrograde, supposing a

return to the period pre-dating the internationally binding obligations to
take resolute action to protect and promote the Irish language contained in
the ECRML and the GFA. Having asserted that ‘one international language’
would be ‘highly desirable’ (2007, p. 2), the Alliance submission moves on
to a discussion of ethnic minority languages and the issues faced by the
recent increased immigration into the North. With so many languages in

our ‘modern international life’, the writer (2007, p. 3) says,
... we feel bound to question whether the particular effort to achieve

fluency in Irish or Scots is more valuable than a similar effort to become
fluent in one of the major international languages which would allow us
direct access to one or more of the major international language groups
with hundreds of millions of speakers such as: Mandarin, Spanish, Hindi
or Arabic.
The approach the legislation should take

SF (2007, p. 6) states that Westminster legislation is the best way to establish
a legal basis for Irish in the North. It is also the best way to place specific
duties upon the Executive once re-established, to strengthen the develop-
ment and protection for the language, they believe. As noted, the SDLP sup-
ports POBAL’s rights-based approach (2007, p. 1).
The DUP (2007, p. 8) states that it does not support any type of Irish
language legislation and that the consultation is flawed. It says, ‘There is
no doubt that the process should be halted and if there is viewed to be a
need to bring it forward in the future that the normal processes should be
followed.’ They propose that in this case, the matter should then be settled
by the Assembly.
Jim Allister is not satisfied that the detailed legislative proposals from
the Irish speaking community themselves reflect appropriate demand, ‘it
is apparent that POBAL, an organisation which in our view meets the defi-
nition of a small but dedicated interest group, have had a direct and dis-
proportionate influence on the formation of the Department’s discussion
document’ (2007, p. 13). This, of course, is a viewpoint he shares with both
the DUP and the Alliance Party, the Alliance noting that it ‘is concerned
that this consultation is giving such regard to the proposals from one sec-
tional NGO’ (Alliance 2007, p. 7). Jim Allister (2007, p. 13). feels that there
is ‘no need whatsoever’ for ‘such draconian and heavy-handed legislation’
because, ‘English is the every-day language of almost everyone in Northern
Ireland; it is absurd and unnecessarily costly therefore to accommodate the
demands of a small minority of enthusiasts in this way.’ Allister clarifies
his position, ‘Furthermore, we reject wholesale, the very notion which lies
at the heart of this proposed legislation, namely, “the enhancement and
protection of the development of the Irish language is an important and
significant matter for Northern Ireland.” ’7
In relation to the adoption of a combined approach to the legislation, the
then MEP reiterates once more his rejectionist stance, ‘... We oppose any
scheme which places any legal responsibility on any public body to commu-
nicate in Irish. We oppose the creation of an Irish Language Commissioner
whose job it would be to force public bodies and statutory agencies to com-
municate in Irish’ (Allister 2007, p. 15). Public money should not be spent
on a regulatory body because the Irish language, Allister asserts, already
receives significant funding, ‘in stark contrast to the paltry levels of funding
awarded to the Ulster Scots sector’ (2007, p. 15). In this particular section,
however, he does not appear to support service provision in Ulster Scots
either, ‘Public sector bodies and statutory agencies conduct their business
perfectly adequately through the medium of the English language; forcing
them to do otherwise in order to pander to a blatantly political agenda is
unacceptable.’
In contradiction with its promotion of a schemes-based approach, the
Alliance warns that models from other parts of the ‘British Isles’ should
not be copied because the ‘context in which Irish is used in Northern
Ireland is different from that of Welsh in Wales, Scots Gaelic in Scotland
and Irish itself in the Republic of Ireland.’ (2007, p. 6). The paper goes on
to comment, ‘The rationale that there is one section of the population who
require official recognition of the Irish language, and there is another sec-
tion that ought to tolerate this reinforces the sectarian approach taken to
this issue.’
Regulation and enforcement

SF (2007, p. 7) supports the POBAL proposal for the Office of the Irish
Language Commissioner which should, they say, be ‘láidir, neamhspleách
go hiomlán ar rialtas’ / ‘strong, completely independent of government’
(Author’s translation) and which should produce an independent report
on the progress made in implementing the Act. The report should be pre-
sented annually to the Assembly through the Office of the First Minister
and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), or in the absence of this, through
the office of the relevant Minister. SF however departs at this point from
the POBAL recommendations, proposing instead that the Commissioner’s
office should itself be split into two parts.
In relation to the establishment of a new regulatory body, the SDLP
submission expresses support for the POBAL proposals for the establish-
ment and in relation to the powers of two new bodies, the Coimisinéir na
Gaeilge and the Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge (BUCPG), since
they state that, ‘These two agencies carry out two different roles and both
are needed’ (2007, p. 2). The submission gives little detail on the func-
tions of these bodies, or on who should appoint them, but it specifically
supports the attaching of a Schedule to the Act which would list those
bodies with greatest responsibility for providing Irish language services,
leaving other bodies to work with the BUCPG in drawing up schemes. In
the case of failure to agree or enact a scheme, the BUCPG should ‘have the
power to approve a Plan as submitted (or with its own modifications) or
to make a Plan for the public body which would be binding in law,’ and
furthermore, the SDLP (2007, p. 2) submission supports the creation of a
compensation scheme to be applied upon advice from the Irish Language

Commissioner.
The DUP make no specific references to enforcement and regulation of
the legislation. In response to the question, ‘Should enforcement powers be
included?’ Jim Allister unwittingly highlights the need for such. He says,
‘No. Statutory agencies and public sector bodies should be free to imple-
ment their own policy in relation to the Irish language’ (2007, p. 17). He
adds, ‘... There can be no question of public sector bodies being bound by a
Minister or the courts to implement a bilingual policy.’
On Implementation and Enforcement, Alliance is opposed to any enforce-
ment mechanism that allows individuals to go to court. The submis-
sion, however, does concede that some external regulatory body ‘either a
Government-appointed Board or Commissioner’ could regulate schemes.
The party resolutely opposes any financial compensation for those whose
rights have been breached (2007, p. 7).
The status of the Irish language
On enhancing the status of Irish, in common with the POBAL proposals, SF

calls for Official status in the title and text of the Act. They also state (2007,
p. 8) that the Act should contain a clear statement ‘... gur ceart dochlóite i
ceart saoránaigh an dlinse an Ghaeilge a úsáid sa saol poiblí agus príobhái-
deach.’ / ‘... that the use of the Irish language in public and private life is
an inalienable right’ (Author’s translation). The SDLP (2007, p. 3) support
Official status for the Irish language in both the text and title of the Act and
state that, ‘The guaranteed rights created in the Act must reflect the official
status of the language.’
In relation to the best approach to enhancing the status of Irish, Allister
(2007, p. 17) says, ‘As the Irish language movement is so closely bound with
political nationalism there can be no question whatsoever of Irish becom-
ing an official language in Northern Ireland.’ Adequate legal protections
already exist, he argues, ‘... the recognition afforded under the European
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages is perfectly sufficient,’ in
fact, ‘... under the Charter immense promotion of Irish has already taken
place ... . New legislation is not necessary at this stage’ (2007, p. 18). It is
unclear from the submission at what stage Allister considers that new legis-
lation would be necessary.
Alliance (2007, p. 3) states that Irish should not have Official, or indeed
‘equal’ status (it does not say what with). Rather it should be recognised as
an ‘historic’, ‘traditional’, ‘minority’ or ‘indigenous’ language, in line with
the ECRML terminology
Education
On Education, the SF submission reflects the points made by POBAL, includ-
ing the NGO’s criticism of the limited remit of the consultation paper, which
gives no consideration to aspects of education outside IME. Again, in com-

mon with POBAL and the SDLP submissions, SF highlights the consultation
paper’s failure to propose the creation of a right for parents to choose to have
their children taught Irish at primary and secondary level (2007, p. 8). The
party notes, not completely accurately, that Higher and Further Education is
relegated to an annex in the document and that this diminishes its impor-
tance. SF then refers to two of the clauses from the POBAL document in
relation to encouraging, funding and facilitating HFE, but proposes that the
best way for these duties to be fulfilled is through a Language Scheme to be
agreed by the Commissioner. The party makes similar proposals in relation
to the POBAL clause that Queens’ University Belfast and the University of
Ulster should take appropriate steps in relation to the development of higher
education through the medium of Irish and in the teaching of Irish, ‘agus
chun scéim forbartha agus pleanála Gaeilge maidir leis na hábhair seo, aon-
taithe leis an choimisinéir Gaeilge, a cur le chéile agus a fheidhmiú.’ / ‘And
to put together and operate a development and planning scheme in relation
to these issues, agreed with the Irish Language Commissioner’ (SF 2007, p.
8. Author’s translation).
On IME, SF (2007, p. 8) states that the legislation should clarify the role
and duties of the Department of Education (DENI) and of bodies such as
Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta and Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta. The
party then calls for the adoption of the POBAL proposals on IME and car-
ries in full 15 clauses from the POBAL document (2007, pp. 9–12).
The SDLP submission (2007, p. 3) states in its section on education that
this part of the DCAL document takes a minimalist and grudging approach
to IME. In particular, it points out (2007, p. 3) that there are no provisions
mooted in relation to,
... teacher training, resourcing, curriculum development or materials for

the sector. Nor is there any recognition in this section of the need for
cross sectoral services and collaboration or for joined-up thinking in rela-
tion to the interfaces between education and health services or the new
digital curriculum to be provided by the BBC.
In relation to the approach to education in the legislation, the SDLP, like

SF, supports the POBAL proposals, noting that the consultation document
makes no reference to education outside IME. Like SF, it supports the crea-
tion of the right for ‘all parents in Northern Ireland to have their children
taught the Irish language at all stages of primary and post-primary school
education’ (SDLP 2007, p. 4) and call upon the DENI and the UK Department
for Education and Skills to take,
... resolute action to encourage, facilitate and provide adequate funding

for the teaching of Irish as a subject in English-medium primary and
secondary schools, including adequate measures for the teaching of Irish

as a subject to secondary pupils who received some or all of their primary
education through the medium of Irish.
The SDLP, like SF, calls upon government to implement the POBAL propos-
als for education, and they carry these proposals in full. They also empha-
sise that duties should be placed upon the DENI to include ‘development
and adequate provision of Irish-language educational books, software and
audio-visual and web-based teaching material, and of the development and
provision of a curriculum appropriate to the needs of pupils learning Irish
in English-medium schools’ (SDLP 2007, pp. 4–7). The submission goes on
to give support to a further six clauses of the POBAL document, dealing
with education sector issues including transport, developmental funding
for preschools, health care and materials, funding for further and higher
vocational training and teaching of Irish, and specific training and educa-
tional requirements for both Queen’s University Belfast and the University
of Ulster in relation to teaching of Irish and development of higher
education (2007, p. 8).
The DUP outline its objections to the inclusion of education in the pro-
posed legislation. According to the DUP submission, IME is already pro-
vided for by government and in a manner that discriminates against
state-controlled schools. In addition, it says, there are political reasons
for opposing IME, because, ‘Irish Medium schools also play a part in the
politicisation of the Irish Language’ (DUP 2007, p. 5). In a shortened quota-
tion from Maguire’s 1991 research into the formation of the Shaw’s Road
Bunscoil, the DUP (2007, p. 5) asserts that political motivations were shown
to be prime. In fact, Maguire finds that nationalism was not the primary
rationale. Quality of education was placed first, with Irish identity, cultural
awareness, the benefit for a child in acquiring a second language and the
survival of the language itself following. Only after these advantages are fac-
tors relating to nationalist or republican tradition listed, rated on a par with
parental involvement in IME 8.
The DUP state that money destined for IME should instead be diverted to
‘delivery of front-line services,’ although presumably only through English.
The submission equates IME, or educational services through Irish with
‘unnecessary services’ and implies that such services are a threat to, ‘... small
schools which are vital to the community life of many rural areas.’ Once
more, it can only be assumed that the reference is to small English Medium
rural schools. Intriguingly, (2007, p. 4) it says, ‘There is nothing which pre-
vents any parent having their child educated through the medium of the
Irish Language. However, it should not be necessary for this to be funded
by the tax payer. Within mainstream education if any student wishes to
learn Irish then it can be studied as an academic subject like any other.’ It is
unclear whether this assertion springs from a lack of awareness of the nature
of the model of immersion education common in the North, whereby all

subjects are taught through the medium of the Irish language, quite dif-
ferent than the inclusion of the language as one of a number of subjects
on a curriculum taught through the medium of English. A further irony is
the general absence of Irish as a curriculum subject in the vast majority of
Protestant schools in the North, noted in Chapter 2.
In his submission, Allister (2007, p. 18) states that there should be no spe-
cial provision for IME. Such schools, he says, are closing for lack of demand,
a statement at odds with his earlier assertion that IME has been on the
increase since the Anglo-Irish Agreement.9
Alliance is ‘happy for Irish to be offered as an option within the curricu-
lum,’ although it is not clear if they would support this within Protestant
Maintained schools. They oppose it becoming a compulsory subject, or
requiring teachers to ‘have a knowledge of Irish’. In fact, the party feels that
the Irish government should remove any such Irish language requirement in
the South ‘to break down barriers obstructing better understanding’ (2007,
p. 7, Author’s emphasis).
The Assembly
SF refers only to the internal workings of the Assembly, in which it reflects
the POBAL proposals. However it makes no reference to services through
Irish for members of the public. It states that the same rights that are pro-
posed for the Assembly should also apply to local councils as a consequence
of the Official Status for the language that they feel should be included in
the Act (2007, p. 12).
The SDLP submission refers again to the POBAL proposals in relation to
both the Assembly and local councils, calling for guaranteed rights not just
in relation to the internal working of these institutions, but also in relation
to service provision (2007, p. 8).
The DUP oppose the use of Irish in the Assembly, referring to exist-
ing translation services within the suspended Assembly for any members
who wish to speak Irish or Ulster Scots during debates. The submission
notes, ‘These services are not necessary for the efficient operation of the
Assembly and only lead to a further burden on the Northern Ireland tax-
payer’ (2007, p. 5).
In relation to the Assembly, Allister appears to be of the view that its
smooth and effective running can only be assured by the sole use of
English. The consultation paper, he says, gives no consideration of the,
‘hugely expensive translation service’ (2007, p. 34). As a then-serving MEP,
he makes the following comment, ‘One need only look at the European
Parliament to see the stultifying impact of multi-language on debate ... the
Assembly itself would be the loser if the Irish language was introduced as
anticipated and thereby the entirety of the people of NI would be denied a
parliamentary chamber of vibrancy and effect.’ His concern, however, is not
about translation. The adverse impact, ‘... comes from the alignment of Irish
to a particular religious and political affiliation. English on the other hand
is cross-party and cross-community and thus unaligned to any political or
religious affiliation and thereby incapable of impacting adversely on equal-
ity’ (2007, p. 35, Author’s emphasis).
Alliance feels that the matter should be left to the discretion of standing
orders. ‘...the current regime is more than sufficient’. The ‘current system’
as it is described, of course allows only for translation to the Speaker of the
house in Assembly debates. MLAs wishing to use Irish in Assembly debates
must self-translate for the benefit of other members, thus severely limit-
ing their time allowance in some debates or Question Time sessions. Again,
Alliance states its opposition to official status for Irish in the Assembly, this
time linking this with their opposition to the use of Irish ‘on corporate
materials alongside English’ (2007, p. 8).
Courts and tribunals

SF state that the use of Irish in the courts, without disadvantage to the
user should be enshrined in the Act. It also calls for the repeal of the 1737
Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland).10 Guaranteed rights are
called for in relation to the courts in the SDLP submission and the POBAL
proposals are cited and quoted in some detail (2007, p. 8).
The DUP submission (2007, p. 5) makes an all-encompassing assessment
of this section of the consultation paper,
There are none of the proposals for the use of Irish in Court and
Tribunal proceedings which are either necessary or acceptable to the
DUP ... . We do not believe that there is any need to specify Irish as a
language to be provided for. There is no-one taking part in these pro-
ceedings who requires the use of Irish in order for them to understand
what is going on and the proposal to introduce their use is simply for
political reasons.
There follows a series of assertions detailing objections to the concept of

Irish language services in the administration of justice, from the rather
broad statement that ‘any Act would fundamentally damage the possibility
of justice being served in many cases,’ to more specific concerns related to
the undermining of cross examination, giving witnesses time ‘... to evade
questions and dodge the issue’. It concludes, ‘It would seem that DCAL does
not care if its introduction could lead to these huge and fundamental prob-
lems within the justice system.’ Again, the issue of costs is raised, with the
proposal that any such monies ‘... should be diverted towards services which
actually benefit the public’ (2007, p. 5).
The use of Irish in the courts will slow down a service already subject to
long delays, the DUP state. They note that the consultation document refers
to proposals aimed at preventing this but dismisses them without explana-

tion, saying it is, ‘unlikely that these will succeed’ (2007, p. 6).
Of the statement in the DCAL EQIA 2007 that use of Irish in the courts
could improve community relations, Allister says, ‘What nonsense!’ Himself
a Queen’s Counsel, Allister raises a number of issues concerning the impact
of Irish on cross examination and delay, which as we have seen are echoed
in the DUP’s submission also.
In common with the DUP and UUP, Alliance expresses the view, not
reflected in the consultation paper, ‘that there would be significant finan-
cial impact’ of an Irish language Act and laments the failure to provide esti-
mates of costs so that other priorities could be considered (2007, p. 8).
Streetnames
Only the two nationalist parties comment on the DCAL proposal in respect
of street names. SF criticises the lack of discussion in the consultation paper
of public signage other than in relation to street names. Instead, it notes that
the Act should contain clauses that ‘normalise’ rather than limit public sig-
nage. A universal standard should be set across all council areas, whereby if
50 per cent of residents in any street agree, bilingual signs should be erected
upon request from a resident (2007, p. 13). Its proposal that, ‘ba chóir fosta
scéim aontaithe maidir le forbairt comharthaíocht poiblí bheith curtha le
chéile ag Coimisinéir na Gaeilge agus curtha i gcrích ag an údarás cuí fríd
treoir ceangailteacht más gá’ / ‘there should also be an agreed scheme in
relation to public signage put together by the Irish Language Commissioner
and implemented by the relevant authority through binding direction if
necessary’ (Author’s translation) points again to a schemes-based approach
on this issue rather than a rights-based one.
In relation to signage, the SDLP notes, ‘The Irish language must be visible
in public life in a wide variety of places and not subject to inappropriate
decisions because of institutional hostility’ (2007, p. 9). It refers to the situa-
tion in relation to signage in Wales and the South and points out that this is
a broader issue than the limited section on street signs in the consultation
document implies. Like the DUP, Alliance ‘is content for local authorities to
have the power to create dual-language street names’ (2007, p. 6).
Costs and capacity

The SDLP rejects the section of the DCAL document outlining a financial
assessment of the proposed legislation, and points out that the primary costs
of services are staffing costs which would have to be met even if the service
were only provided in English (2007, p. 10).
The DUP is highly critical of the lack of financial projections for the costs
of an Irish language Act. The DUP is, however, clear that they see no ben-
efits to such legislation. All the four options outlined in the consultation
paper will lead to increased expenditure, it contends amidst references to tax
payers, ‘facing massive increases in their domestic rates bill and the prospect
of water charges being introduced.’11 The DUP say that it is therefore reso-
lutely opposed to Irish language legislation, although there is an indication
that the party is able to accept a small number of street signs under current
practice within the local Councils. The party reiterates its opposition to the
Irish language receiving funding that is not available to Ulster Scots. The
submission returns to its earlier point, saying, ‘Instead of pouring further
money into the Irish language there should be a focus on not just Ulster
Scots but those minority languages which are actually the first language of
some of our minority ethnic communities in Northern Ireland (2007, p. 6).
The UUP (2007, p. 3) notes that the document does not provide detailed
costings, and asserts that legislation cannot be mooted without the inclu-
sion of costs. This would be, it states, ‘... neglect of government’s duty to
promote fiscal responsibility and accountability.’
Alliance (2007, p. 4) warns that, ‘There is a legitimate question as to how
far the population as a whole should subsidise the sectional demands of one
section of society.’ This implies that only services for the majority should be
funded from the public purse, a proposal that would have serious repercus-
sions for all minority groups, including carers, the disabled and the ethnic
minorities whose interests Alliance purports to support. The submission
further notes that language may be a low priority for training within public
bodies. The party does not appear to feel that this is an issue that could or
should be addressed. Furthermore, ‘Consideration also needs to be given to
those wishing to engage through the medium of Irish with the public bod-
ies in question, taking into account vexatious individuals’ (2007, p. 7, Author’s
emphasis).
Other issues raised in the party-political submissions

SF (2007, p. 5) calls for a right for all citizens to use their full address in
Irish in relation to all official documents, and also points out the omission
of broadcasting from the consultation paper. ‘Caithfear cearta sonraithe a
lua in aon Acht a chruthaíonn cearta i dtaca le craoltóireacht tri mheán
na Gaeilge’ / ‘Significant rights must be mentioned in any Act that creates
rights in relation to broadcasting through the medium of Irish’ (Author’s
translation). The SDLP also criticises the exclusion of broadcasting from all
but an annex of the document. It (2007, p. 10) says that the failure to include
this issue centrally in the proposed legislative models is unacceptable.
Allister’s submission (2007, p. 24) contains a substantial section on the
ECRML. Although he has strenuously opposed funding for RMLs, Allister
does not appear averse to using an instrument intended to protect both Irish
and Ulster Scots to belittle the Irish language. He quotes the 2004 monitor-
ing report of the CoE COMEX on the implementation of the ECRML, not-
ing the experts’ comment that the Irish speaking community in the North
is a revivalist movement, whilst the Ulster Scots movement ‘involves both
native speakers and revivalists. The Ulster Scots language is still actively spo-
ken ...’ (Respondent’s use of bold and italics). This Introductory remark by
the COMEX is proof, states Allister, that the commitment to enact Irish lan-
guage legislation, ‘... is not being implemented out of necessity but to satisfy
another agenda, namely that of the Republican movement.’ Unionists, he
says have not campaigned for Official status for Ulster Scots, ‘... understand-
ing only too well the costs and implications of advancing such a language.’
Allister (2007, p. 30) draws on the UK’s own reports on ECRML imple-
mentation and on the general findings of the 2004 COMEX report to indi-
cate that the approach of the UK government meets with approval. In fact,
as explored in Chapter 4, in its first report (24 March 2004) the COMEX
raises a number of areas for immediate action by the UK government. It
also raises a number of significant question marks in almost one third of
all the clauses ratified for Irish by the British government. In the case of 11
of the clauses, the report finds that the British government has either failed
to fulfil its commitment or only partly fulfilled it, or else the Experts say
they have not been given enough information. In the case of Article 10,
which relates to the use of Irish in the Assembly, in Councils and in public
bodies, only half of the clauses ratified were deemed to have been fulfilled.
Whilst Allister’s argument is clearly partial, this section of his submission
illustrates some of the weaknesses in the ECRML reporting mechanism
that have been noted in Chapter 4 and again in Chapter 6 in relation to
the Judicial Review of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act
(Ireland). Noting that at the time of writing his submission, the second
COMEX report was not available, Allister says, ‘No doubt, as in the past
the Government will be swift to act on any recommendations: further con-
firming the lack of need for an Irish language Act.’
The UUP (2007, p. 3) state that the Equality Impact Assessment (DCAL
EQIA 2007) considerations are ‘... worryingly divorced from reality’. The
experience of the SoI, it says proves that there is an equality element to
language skills. The submission gives no explanation of this assertion.
The submission says, ‘The negative equality impact in terms of a potential
requirement or expectation that public servants have knowledge of the Irish
language is deeply disturbing and would rightly be interpreted as contra-
dicting the principle of parity of esteem.’ However, the DCAL consultation
paper does not propose in any of its sections that such a requirement be
introduced in the North. Nor is there any such proposal in the POBAL docu-
ment, Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI.
Echoing the stance of the UUP and DUP, Alliance (2007, p. 3) says that
the proposed legislation is a political concession ‘rather (than) any objective
assessment of the overall legislation requirements with respect to language
matters for NI.’ Ironically, the submission then asserts that Irish should
not be the subject of legislation without all other languages being included
also. Having referred to the ECRML designations of different categories
of language a few lines previously, the Alliance (2007, p. 3) now moves to

regarding languages as competing interests,
While there may well be more speakers of Irish in Northern Ireland than
any other language, there are more people who speak other languages
as their first language. Furthermore there are more speakers of other
languages who have difficulty in communicating in English than Irish
speakers who experience such problems.
This argument would appear to mitigate against protections for any indig-
enous language where intergeneration transmission has been broken, or
where there is a high percentage of learners. Bilingualism is in effect to lead
to the loss of language rights. This position has no basis in either domestic
or international law. Alliance (2007, p. 4) continues,
Priority in language policy should be given to ensuring that those speak-

ers of non-indigenous languages whether they be ethnic minorities or
first or second generation immigrants from Europe or further afield. It is
such persons who suffer most disadvantage in their dealings with public
bodies.
It is interesting to note that in the above comment, Alliance now argues that
the language needs of first and second generation ethnic minorities should
be prioritised. Continuing in the same voice, the submission notes that une-
ven provision for the users of ethnic minority languages suggests clear scope
for ‘creating standard statutory rights and duties in this regard’. Many would
agree with this point but note that this does not mitigate against an Irish
language Act. Alliance (2007, p. 5) appears to disagree and notes as its final
comment in this section of the paper,
It is ironic that the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages

(sic) only deals with indigenous languages. It is not flexible to deal with
changing demographic patterns. Even in its limited scope, there is a dan-
ger of its terms being misapplied to Northern Ireland.
Given the broadness of the allegation against the use of the ECRML, it is
unfortunate that Alliance does not detail evidence behind this assertion.
The submission simply ends on this statement before making specific com-
ments on the consultation document.
Community relations
In respect of the community relations, Allister (2007, p. 32) notes, ‘Lest
there be any doubt, we say there are very definitive (sic) adverse impacts for
the majority community in NI in the introduction of an Irish Language Act,
irrespective of which approach, or model, is adopted.’ Nor does he under-

stand the finding of the DCAL EQIA 2007 that a rights-based approach to
education would create adverse impacts since, ‘... by the same token, the pro-
motion of the Irish language itself could have the same impact because it is
every bit as much aligned to religious and political affiliation as is education
through that medium’ (2007, p. 34). Nor does he accept that schemes would
ensure that the ‘adverse impact is likely to be less’.
A language scheme which inevitably promotes the Irish language, ines-

capably causes an adverse impact on equality because of the close align-
ment to political and religious affiliation. Statutory duties on public
bodies, which are inspired by a desire to promote something, manifestly
translate into benefit, adverse to the interest of others, for those ben-
efited. It is fatuous to pretend otherwise.
The UUP (2007, p. 3), ‘entirely rejects the proposed Irish Language Act as
profoundly harmful to community relations.’ Quoting the section of the
GFA, the party notes, without trace of irony, that, ‘... “The importance of
respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity” will
be fundamentally undermined by the proposed Act.’ Although the UUP do
not deny that there may be community relations benefits of legislation to
protect and promote the Irish language, it asserts that such benefits cannot
be elevated to the same level as the ‘sensitivities’ of the Unionist commu-
nity. Any attempt to do so, ‘demonstrates a willful ignorance of the views of
a wide range of political and community stakeholders in NI.’
Alliance says that the DCAL consultation paper has a number of ‘major
flaws’. The consultation ‘often works on the premise that the Irish language
is a matter for the nationalist/Catholic tradition when the historical evi-
dence would suggest otherwise,’ (2007, p. 3) but the submission does not
develop this point. The proposals it says should be screened for their impact
upon good relations and the submission then notes, ‘It almost goes without
saying that people have the right to use whatever language they wish in
their private affairs.’ Almost but not quite. Although no reasons are given,
Alliance (2007, p. 8) disputes the conclusion in the DCAL document that
the proposals would have a positive impact on good relations and states that
the impacts on people of neither unionist nor nationalist identity have not
been considered.
Conclusions on the political party submissions
The submissions are divided along sectarian lines, with the nationalist par-
ties focusing on practical issues in relation to the legislation, whilst the
unionist parties, including the Alliance, appear to be struggling to come to
terms with a number of basic human and language rights issues. The tone of
the submissions from the main unionist parties, the UUP and DUP, and the
submission from former DUP MEP Jim Allister is emphatic and rejectionist,
not simply in relation to the models put forward, but also in terms of any
protection for the Irish language. It is interesting to note the comments
regarding the ECRML in the unionist submissions. Whilst there are attempts
to use this international instrument to assert that all is well with LPP in the
North, there are also clear indications that some of the parties would like
to reverse existing obligations. Nonetheless, in all cases the ECRML is spo-
ken of in terms of a fait accompli. Such acceptance would suggest that had
Irish language legislation been introduced, within a relatively short period
of time the debate could have shifted in a similar manner.
8
Submissions from Key Public
Bodies and a 20 per cent Sample of
Individual Responses to the Public
Consultation on the Proposed Irish
Language Legislation
In the first part of this chapter, I shall consider eight submissions to the first
DCAL consultation on Proposed Irish Language Legislation by key govern-
mental, public and voluntary sector organisations. First, I shall examine the
submissions of the public sector bodies, the Community Relations Council
(CRC), Ofcom, the Lord Chief Justice’s Office (LCJO), HM Revenue and
Customs (HMRC) and the NI Prison Service (NIPS). Following this, I shall
examine the submissions made by the Committee on the Administration of
Justice (CAJ), the Welsh Language Board (ByI / WLB) and the Grand Orange
Lodge of Ireland (GOLI). In the second part of this Chapter I shall analyse a
random 20 per cent sample of individual submissions to the consultation, prior
to drawing some conclusions on the overall response to the consultation.
Submission by the Community Relations Council
The response from CRC is a significant 3½-page submission which states

that the CRC views Irish ‘... as an integral element of a rich cultural tapestry
which we all share’ (CRC 2007, p. 1). It notes that whilst the census and the
figures in the consultation document reflect a larger percentage of Catholics
with an interest and knowledge of Irish, there have been initiatives taken
to promote the Irish language in the Protestant community, and this work
should be developed (2007, p. 2).
CRC (2007, p. 2) calls for ‘a new approach’ to language in order that soci-
ety can move towards ‘inclusion.’ It continues,
The task of political leadership in divided societies is to turn issues pre-

viously understood as the property of one side into opportunities to
168
Key Public Bodies’ and Individual Submissions 169
establish new links, partnerships and new appreciations for the entire
community. The quid pro quo of rights in this area is that our languages
are understood as the possession of the whole community, without vio-
lence and aggression or particular political connotation, and that steps
to embed rights should be accompanied by active efforts to ensure real
opportunities to participate in language activities for all.
The submission proposes that the ECRML and the Framework Convention
on the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) should guide any new
legislation. It notes (2007, pp. 2–3) that as progress made in LPP since the
GFA represents political consensus, ‘such agreements that were reached
under the St Andrews Agreement should be endorsed.’
CRC suggests that Irish in the North ‘... should not be treated in a manner
less favourable than the treatment accorded to Gaelic in Scotland or Welsh
in Wales.’ It points out that, ‘In neither case is there any evidence that legal
support for these languages has further segregated society, nor impacted on
access to the economy’ (2007, p. 3). The submission calls for provision in
education, government and broadcasting, but notes that signage may prove
more difficult. However, fears of controversy must not ‘justify inaction or
timidity’. It urges an approach by government that will create ‘a warm house
for all’ through the principles of equity, diversity and interdependence, and
‘a clear commitment to public education aimed at people who are currently
not using the language.’
This is a highly significant submission in the context of the CRC’s specific
role and expertise and the emphasis of the DCAL consultation paper on
promoting good community relations.
Submission by Ofcom
In what appears to be an oblique reference to the lack of legislative protec-

tions for Irish, Ofcom, the independent Office of Communications, states
that it has experience in meeting consumer expectations, ‘as far as Welsh
and Scots Gaelic are concerned and would endeavour to act in a similar way
in relation to Irish should it be required to do so.’1
Ofcom’s submission consists of links to a press release2 and a June 2005
Statement on Programming for the Nations and Regions (‘The Statement’).3
The Statement notes the need for improvements in both access and con-
tent for Irish speakers in the North, and points out that the BBC broadcast
five hours of Irish language programming on television during 2004–5, a
decrease from 7 hours in 2003–4 (Ofcom 2007, p. 24, para 4.54). With refer-
ence to the accessibility of TG4, the Statement refers to improved reception
of TG4 from the transmitter at Divis Mountain in Belfast, and the satel-
lite availability from April 2005 of TG4 on the Sky platform. Ofcom (2007,
p. 24, para 4.57) states that TG4 is the ‘obvious vehicle’ for, ‘a dedicated
digital service’ for Irish speakers, but points out that primary funding from
the RoI alone is not, ‘appropriate’ and that the NI audience has, ‘distinct
needs that may not be met by TG4 programming alone.’
Ofcom recommends further work on ‘an appropriate and properly funded
service in a digital environment (2007, p. 24, para 4.56). Following a brief
reference to the role of the BBC in the then newly established CCG / ILBF
(2007, p. 24, paras 4.43, 4.54), the Statement highlights the legislative
disparity between Irish, Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh in Wales noted in
Chapter 5. In addition, Ofcom (2007, p. 24, para 4.59). reports that this
disparity, the ‘absence of statutory provision and of sufficient funding’ and
lack of appropriate programming were the most common complaints dur-
ing its first PSB consultation.
Perhaps most significantly, the final paragraph in the Statement (2007,
p. 24, para 4.63) in respect of Irish notes that, ‘it is for Government to pro-
vide the enabling framework which will address the particular needs of
audiences in NI who wish to receive Irish language programming.’ Whilst it
is not possible to assert the exact reasons behind the recycling of materials
previously issued by Ofcom as the bulk of their submission, the repetition
of proposals made two years prior to the consultation on Irish language
legislation highlights the lack of progress made in the intervening period in
respect of broadcasting and the Irish language.
Submission by the Lord Chief Justice’s Office
This is a detailed four-page submission, which sets out the views of the Lord
Chief Justice’s Office (LCJO) on the use of Irish in the courts, ‘following
consultation with the judiciary of Northern Ireland’ (2007, p. 1).
LCJO states that the judiciary’s key concern is ensuring justice and fair
treatment for all in the courts, avoiding undue delays or ‘adding complex-
ity’ in the administration of justice. Among the issues considered are: the
availability of accredited translation services capable of providing adequate
court services; the impact on resources; availability of necessary technology;
costs; and whether services would be restricted to some types of proceeding
or some parts of proceedings. The letter notes that without answers to such
questions and clear indications of demand it is not possible to assess the full
impact of proposed legislation (2007, p. 1).
It asserts, ‘The test in any case where a party is seeking to have a case
conducted in whole, or in part, in a language other than English should be
whether it is in the interests of justice that a case should be so conducted’
(2007, p. 1, LCJO use of bold type for emphasis). It continues, noting that
‘the concept of justice involves many facets including the requirement for
a fair trial for all involved’ (2007, p. 1, LCJO use of bold type for emphasis).
It cites the example of a witness or expert wishing to use Irish and the need
to balance this against the rights of the defendant or victim to monitor the
way in which the evidence is given. ‘Defendants or victims may feel they
are being disadvantaged or excluded by hearing the witness’s evidence “sec-
ond hand” ’ (2007, pp. 1–2). Child victims or ‘vulnerable’ witnesses being
cross examined in two languages, time spent on the witness stand, and the
requirement for an Irish speaking jury, which it states would have logistical
problems ‘as well as being contrary to the policy of widening the jury pool’
(2007, p. 2) are raised.
The submission recommends notice of desire to use Irish be given, and
a fine imposed in the case of failure. However, it then asserts that ‘flexibil-
ity’ should be employed as to a right to use Irish ‘where the defendant (or
whoever has made the request that the proceedings be conducted in Irish)
can speak English’ (2007, p. 2). This should most particularly be applied
where proceedings may be organised at short notice, and they go on to give
a significant list including, ‘first remands, bail hearings, Saturday courts
and extensions ... care proceedings ...’ (2007, p. 2). Concerns are expressed
about simultaneous translation, cancellation of cases, delay in translating
documents, especially where there is a considerable volume, where they are
complex or where disclosure from third parties is required, quality control
and confidentiality (2007, pp. 2–3). LCJO proposes that there should a ‘pool
of translators available for private litigants’ and recommend an audit be
carried out to establish how many translators are available. Considerable
emphasis is placed on the capacity of the translator to assure the credibility
of the evidence is assuring through inflexion, pace and intonation.
The final area of concern is that ‘... it is vital that the cost of ... the use
of Irish does not come from existing judicial and courts budgets.’ It lists
the type of costs that might be incurred (2007, p. 3). The submissions con-
cludes with the point that no rights or duties should commence until, ‘... the
necessary arrangements have been put in place ... an appropriate translation
service, training for those who require it, and installation of translation
equipment’ (2007, p. 4).
Whilst there are, at times, indications of a lack of emphasis on the justice
and rights issues as they affect Irish speakers in this submission, it is none-
theless a practical and relatively measured response to the consultation.
Submission by HM Revenue and Customs
This is a short submission, a little over one page, which focuses on areas
where there is a perceived impact of the proposed legislation on the work of
the body itself.
The submission states that HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) favours a
schemes-based approach, because this would enable it to understand and
meet needs, would entail a phased implementation and give the oppor-
tunity to build capacity. HMRC favours the creation of a new regulatory
body, and refers to the model of the Equality Commission, which combines
enforcement with advice-giving and facilitation. It states that since HMRC

does not have the capacity to provide for bilingualism, they oppose offi-
cial status for Irish as it would, ‘... create unrealistic expectations of bilin-
gualism.’ In relation to the courts, HMRC ‘strongly’ advocates measures to
ensure that delays do not occur (2007, p. 1).
It is difficult in such a short submission to weigh the arguments of the
HMRC in relation to a rights-based approach and in relation to Official
Status. The tendency to make unsupported statements about the implica-
tions of each of these issues is unfortunate, although rather more detail is
given in relation to the body’s desire to move forward in an incremental
manner, suggesting a cautious, but not overtly hostile attitude.
Submission by NI Prison Service
This is a one and a half page submission containing comments from the
NI Prison Service (NIPS). The initial point made is that, ‘the way forward
must surely take account of financial constraints across the entire public
sector, as they may apply not just to the promotion of the Irish language,
but also to Ulster Scots’ (2007, p. 1). It recommends the schemes-based
approach in use principally in ‘the three other jurisdictions,’ although it
casts some doubt on the evidence in Wales and Scotland, ‘of the value that
is added through having for example documents provided in more than
one language’ (2007, p. 1).
The submission notes that a rights-based approach ‘would create a dispro-
portionate requirement on public bodies.’ However, it also rejects detailed
duties (2007, p. 1). Oddly, given the often quoted impact of the learning
of Irish in the prisons in the North during the 70s, 80s and 90s, the sub-
mission takes a shorter view of history and notes, ‘It may be instructive
to consider the use that is currently made of provisions for teaching the
Irish language in NI prisons. This facility is primarily provided through
the education department in Maghaberry Prison, where not more than ten
individuals have been enrolled at any time’ (2007, p. 2). Again, the submis-
sion refers to costs, and again it makes the assertion that Ulster Scots would
also have to be included, and that as a consequence there would be ‘a reduc-
tion in the quality of provision for other prisoners, their families and their
representatives’ (2007, p. 2).
This is the most negative of the submissions by public and state bodies
and may reflect the political and religious make-up of the NIPS, and its spe-
cific role in the recent history of the North.
The submissions from the five public sector organisations show a variety
of responses to the legislation. In spite of the different opinions, all the sub-
missions show a high level of acceptance of the proposal to legislate for the
Irish language, and an ability to apply issues arising from this proposal to
the practical functions of the respondent organisation.
Submissions from the Committee of the

Administration of Justice, the Welsh Language
Board and the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland
The three submissions in this section are from very different organisations
which all represent key viewpoints. CAJ is the key human rights NGO in
the NoI. The Welsh Language Board (ByI / WLB) has a particular signifi-
cance because of the centrality of the Welsh experience to the SAA com-
mitment to legislate. The Grand Orange Order of Ireland submission can
be deemed to be broadly representative of the views of the Orange Lodges4
and although negative responses to the consultation represented only 7 per
cent of the overall submissions received, it was felt important to include this
view point in the analysis.
Submission by the Committee on the Administration of Justice

CAJ is a cross community independent human rights group working in
the North. The submission is five pages long with a further nine pages of
annexes attached, detailing a number of case studies where CAJ deem the
rights of Irish speakers have been infringed in the workplace. CAJ state that
they have, ‘... no particular expertise in questions of language, and our con-
tribution to the debate on Irish language legislation is premised on concern
to protect and promote language rights and minority rights more generally’
(2007, p. 1). The submission refers to the commitments made in the GFA,
the ECRML and the SAA before making some introductory remarks (2007,
p. 1) on the consultation document and the historical use of Irish. The sub-
mission states, ‘... it is presumably uncontested that the Irish language was
actively discriminated against in the past, and that its large-scale destruc-
tion as the majority language is not merely the incidental result of rapid
industrialisation? Yet the current text implies otherwise’ (2007: 1, para a).
The submission goes on to point out that accuracy on the historical context
‘is important to understanding some of the political sensitivities that may
surround the language’ and because, ‘... there are unfortunately modern-day
experiences of people experiencing discrimination on grounds of their use
of the Irish language, and the passage of an Irish Language Act is important
in addressing this reality on the ground’ (2007, pp. 1–2, para a).
Regarding the financial impact assessment included with the DCAL con-
sultation document, the submission notes that CAJ has no objection in
principle to this. However, it states that it has never before seen such an
assessment in a consultation document (2007, p. 3, para d). It continues, ‘it
is quite unacceptable for public bodies to indicate the costs of translation
of texts, when they disregard the costs of producing and publishing the
material in English.’ Turning to the DCAL consultation paper itself, CAJ
supports a rights-based approach to the legislation and cites the case his-
tory appendices attached to the submission as proof that, ‘this debate is not
an esoteric one’ (2007, p. 3). Furthermore, the submission challenges some

of the characterisations of a rights-based approach set down in the DCAL
paper. CAJ points out that in supporting a rights-based approach for the
proposed legislation, it does not intend to argue that any language rights
are absolute. It does however believe, ‘that the international commitments
of the government must be complied with, and that there be a duty on gov-
ernment to seek to extend the ability of Irish language speakers to exercise
their rights fully in all private and public spheres’ (2007, p. 3).
Referring to the broad-based consultation and international expertise
associated with the POBAL proposals, CAJ (2007, p. 2, para c) ‘finds it highly
unfortunate that government did not take the POBAL proposals as a starting
point for the discussions and indicate in what ways it agreed with, or disa-
greed with, the carefully considered proposals already on the table. In the
view of CAJ, ‘... the approach to Irish language legislative provision should
be rights-based, but that this is best done by a mixture of rights, duties, and
language schemes’ (2007, p. 4). The submission states, however, ‘This option
is the least explored in the consultation paper, so it is difficult to comment
in much more detail.’
CAJ challenges the assertion that a rights-based approach to Irish Medium
Education could impact adversely on equality because of the correlation
made by DCAL between language interests and community affiliation. The
submission (2007, p. 4, para 6.12.8) points out that the DCAL document
does not explain, ‘... why this adverse impact would derive from the rights-
based approach per se, rather than simply the provision of IME for any rea-
son whatsoever.’ CAJ asserts (2007, p. 4, para 6.12.8, Respondent’s emphasis)
that provision of education to any group,
... because of a rights-based approach would assist in countering any

negative connotations. Education provided on the basis of rights, and
in compliance with government’s international commitments to pro-
mote minority languages and minority rights, cannot be portrayed as
arising on the basis of merely who shouts loudest, or who has money, or
who is politically popular at any particular time. As such, a rights based
approach should assist policy makers transcend partisan interests.
In respect of the use of Irish in the courts as dealt with in the DCAL EQIA,
CAJ note that the document could usefully have referred, ‘... to the fact
that the courts and tribunals will have a duty to provide Article 6 rights
(fair trial) in the context of Article 14 (non-discrimination on grounds of,
amongst other things, language)’ (2007, p. 4, para 8.3). CAJ goes on to note
the lack of discussion in the DCAL document on the impact on recruitment,
training and organisational culture that greater use of languages other than
English would have (2007, p. 5). The submission notes the encouragement
that this could provide for more Irish speakers to seek posts within the civil
service and public bodies, and therefore reduce perceived or real obstacles to
the recruitment of those with Irish language skills.
The annexes to the submission detail a court case involving the dismissal
of a security guard from his employment in Belfast for using Irish, 5 a care
worker refused support by the Department of Social Development to study
Irish,6 an individual worker with the Social Security Agency who was told
not to speak Irish in a private telephone conversation,7 the insistence that
an advert for a fluent Irish speaker be only produced in English.8
This is an expert and thorough submission from the leading human rights
NGO in the North.
Submission by the Welsh Language Board
This is a one and a half page submission on behalf of the Bwrdd Yr Iaith /
Welsh Language Board (ByI / WLB) which starts by offering the Board’s sup-
port to the ‘principle of introducing Irish language legislation in NI’ (ByI /
WLB 2007, p. 1).
It notes that the paper makes several references to the position of Welsh
in Wales and to legislation there. They feel the references are ‘all pertinent
to the arguments in favour of legislating’ (2007, p. 1). The ByI /WLB say they
prefer not to offer detailed comments on the specific issues in the consulta-
tion but make the offer of ‘detailed assistance at a future stage on the basis
of our extensive experience’ (2007, p. 1) once it has been decided what type
of legislation will be introduced. They note, nonetheless, that the legisla-
tion should ‘above all else, facilitate the process of enabling those who wish
to use Irish in their dealings with the public sector in NI to do so with the
greatest ease and the least hindrance’ (2007, p. 1). It states unequivocally
that this does not affect or diminish the rights of those who wish to use
English instead. As goals for the legislation, it proposes (2007, p. 1) three
issues above all else,
Firstly, the rights of those who wish to use Irish must be set out in it and
protected by it. Secondly, the responsibilities of public bodies to provide
services must also be clearly set out in the legislation and be capable of
being practically and reasonably delivered (if necessary, on a staged basis,
in view of the capacity considerations to which the consultation paper
alludes). Thirdly, it must be declared at the very least that anything done
in Irish within the context of the legislation is equally valid as if it had
been done in English.
Noting that the Welsh Language Act has made significant contributions
to the position of Welsh, the submission (2007, p. 2). nonetheless makes
the point that the legislation has shortcomings, including, ‘it does not
effectively protect the rights of those who wish to use Welsh; it only places
responsibilities on public bodies to implement the (highly laudable) princi-

ple that Welsh and English should be treated on a basis of equality. In the
second place, it does not contain sufficient sanctions to ensure compliance
by public bodies.’ It notes also several recent occasions when the Board has
itself ‘pressed the Welsh Assembly Government to secure a firm legislative
basis for protecting the Welsh language in future.’
Given the wording of the commitment in the SAA, this is a highly sig-
nificant submission. It expresses support for the legislation and sets out a
number of key goals. In addition, it refers, obliquely, to contemporary work
to improve language legislation in Wales, and offers practical support and
expertise.
Submission by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland

This is a three and a half page submission from the Grand Orange Lodge
of Ireland (GOLI) with accompanying letter acknowledging the extension
granted to the Order for its submission, ‘which allowed this matter to be
more fully discussed at our Central Committee and with Grand Lodge
Officers.’9 The submission begins with the statement that Grand Lodge
‘views with deep concern and alarm the thrust of the document’ which
they say could have ‘long-term and damaging repercussions in relation to
community relations’ (2007, p. 1).
The submission notes the ‘bona fides’ of ‘the many genuine and dedi-
cated Irish language enthusiasts ...’ However, it opposes the use of Irish ‘by
some’ as a political weapon,’... this extends to speaking in Irish, writing in
Irish, erecting street signs in Irish, and so on’ (2007, p. 1). It would appear
that this does not leave many ‘non-political’ options for the ‘genuine’ Irish
speaker. The submission complains of the inability of militant republicans
to accept other viewpoints and states that the Grand Lodge believes ‘that
they would attempt to use any new legislation to try and legally change the
face of Northern Ireland.’ The submission gives no further information on
what this means, or why Irish language legislation would be required to do
it. Instead, it simply states that an Irish language Act would have ‘the most
serious repercussions and create the greatest damage imaginable to commu-
nity relations’ (2007, p. 1). Grand Lodge disagrees that the legislation would
have a positive effect on community relations, declaring itself ‘amazed’.
The submission next opposes the creation of rights in respect of use of
Irish in a variety of fields on the grounds that as well as creating tensions, it
would also ‘... portray us as a backwards society to others seeking to invest’
(2007, p. 1). It is not clear whether it is the association with the creation
of rights that would have this impact, or the association with the Irish
language. The Grand Lodge is concerned about costs and notes Foras na
Gaeilge’s number of employees and budget in comparison with that avail-
able to Ulster Scots.10 Noting the percentage of the populations of Wales
(21 per cent), the RoI (43 per cent) and Scotland (1.16 per cent) that speak
Welsh, Irish and Gaelic respectively, in comparison with the North’s

10 per cent of Irish speakers, they advise an amount of funding ‘much less
than accorded in Wales, or in the Republic of Ireland ...’ yet in an apparent
sudden departure from the proportionality argument, ‘on a basis of parity
with funding for Ulster Scots’ (2007, p. 1).
In respect of the consultation paper, they make the following points:
first, that legislation for Irish is not appropriate, but if it is to go ahead,
they would favour ‘the least intrusive option,’ language schemes. In rela-
tion to the Commissioner, they twice state that they do not support the
creation of a new regulatory body, which would not have ‘the approval of
the Grand Orange Lodge.’ Any appointments, however, should be made
by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and there
should be no Ministerial power to ‘make binding directions and/or a power
to make a compensation scheme.’ In addition, Irish should be ‘a matter
of personal preference and funded by those interested in it’ (2007, p. 2).
Furthermore, the Grand Lodge, ‘could never agree to a status which would
place a minority language on the same basis as English.’ Should such an
action be taken, it states, the same must apply to Ulster Scots, Mandarin
and Polish. However, such a development would be ‘a charter for bilingual-
ism and multilingualism’. It asserts that this would be ‘... contrary to the
idea of developing a strong shared future.’ Instead it suggests, in common
with the Alliance Party, that Irish could perhaps be recognised as a historic
or minority language, in line with the terminology in the ECRML, as this
would not ‘amount to official or equal status.’ It concludes this section with
the words, ‘This is as much as the Grand Orange Lodge feels its members
could accept’ (2007, p. 2).
On education, it asserts that IME is not as popular as claimed and that
any further provision should be scheme- and demand-based and achieved
within existing budgets. In particular, it must not impinge on Protestant
Maintained schools. The submission states, ‘To allow minimal numbers to
engage in study of Irish, which is clearly not a major world language, is to
ignore the realities of the opportunities that our education system needs
to provide for young people’ (2007, p. 2).
In the political institutions, it opposes any ‘further’ (sic) language leg-
islation in the Assembly, the creation of any rights, or furthermore, the
adoption of a scheme. This is because, ‘the use of the Irish language from
those representing the minority community will be divisive and increase
costs and duties at the Assembly.’ In addition, local authorities should not
be ‘forced to adopt Irish language measures’ (2007, p. 2). In relation to the
courts, there should be no provision for the use of Irish if: the person con-
cerned can speak English, and or if the same provision is not made for Ulster
Scots. The use of Irish will be used, it contends, ‘... as a political weapon
and statement, and given the removal of the Royal Coat of Arms from the
courtrooms, will further add to the sense of alienation among the majority
of the people of Northern Ireland’ (2007, p. 3). Furthermore, the use of Irish
in the courts ‘... will also increase lack of respect for the law and legal system
among young Protestants’ (2007, p. 3). This seems a curious assertion, since,
by the logic of the GOLI, it appears unlikely that ‘young Protestants’ would
request to have their cases heard in Irish. On the other hand, the fact that
the refusal of the right to be heard in Irish might impact on the views of
young Irish speakers is not considered.
On street names, the GOLI ‘would oppose any provision of street names
in Irish.’ To adopt such signs where a percentage of people in the street
were in favour of it would create, they say, ‘... a very dangerous situation
in our view.’ In an extraordinary paragraph, it asserts, ‘Those who have
shown they are prepared to resort to violence could sway opinions through
intimidation and the threat of violence. This would be providing a weapon
for those engaged in “cultural warfare” and would greatly assist those who
have a fascist approach to their culture’ (2007, p. 3). It reinforces its message
by stating, ‘... No one should be able to use Irish in correspondence. No one
should be able to use Irish street names in official documents. Public bod-
ies should not be required to use an Irish street name in correspondence’
(2007, p. 3).
Examination of the points made by the Grand Lodge show that underly-
ing their submission appears to be the view that, with the exception of IME,
which should not be allowed to develop further, all Irish language services,
including streetnames in Irish should be opposed.
The submissions from the above organisations indicate the depth of pene-
tration of the issue of Irish language legislation into the broad human rights
agenda and the work of international language organisations including the
Welsh Language Board, which like Foras na Gaeilge (whose submission is
examined along with those of other statutory Irish language organisations
in a different section) is a statutory Language Board with particular exper-
tise in the field. The significance of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland sub-
mission is two-fold. It is representative of a small number of negative replies
(7 per cent or 46 submissions out of 668, according to DCAL’s Summary of
Responses) to the consultation. It also indicates an attitude of rejectionism
common to the negative submissions. In the next part of this chapter, I
shall analyse a random 20 per cent sample of individual submissions to
the consultation document, prior to drawing some conclusions about the
overall response.
A random 20 per cent sample of individual

responses to the consultation
In addition to the responses attributed by DCAL to organisations, 205

numbered individual submissions were also posted on the departmental
website. In each case, the name and address of the contributor has been
removed from these submissions by DCAL. In this part of the chapter, I

shall attempt to give a snap shot of these individual responses, by analys-
ing and commenting on a 20 per cent random sample. The sample was
made by selecting the first and every fifth submission as numbered on the
DCAL website, a total of 42 responses categorised by the Department itself
as individual submissions. One submission (no. 15 on the website) failed
to open after repeated attempts and this failure was simply recorded as
part of the sample. In this part of the chapter, I shall attribute comments
from quoted submissions in the main text, except where a large number
of submissions are involved. In these cases, the references will be car-
ried as endnotes. To assist in a clear analysis of what is a relatively large
number of submissions, I include information in tabular form in Tables
8.1, 8.2 and 8.3.
Of the 42 responses sampled, 40 were supportive of Irish language legisla-
tion. One was opposed to legislation of any kind for Irish, and 1 submission,
as noted earlier, failed to download from the DCAL website.
The responses supporting proposed legislation
Fourteen of the submissions are written in Irish, with a further two consist-
ing of a lead section in Irish and the body of the submission in English.
One further submission, written primarily in English, makes specific refer-
ence to the respondent’s concern that there may be no-one in DCAL able
to understand a submission in Irish, and one other submission states the
respondent’s support for the legislation in Irish, then adds a translation
of this specific phrase in English in brackets, before continuing in Irish.
One submission consists of a bilingual email covering letter, with bilingual
attachment. The responses vary in format and length. Six are handwritten.
Two of these are short A5 letters, four are over one and a half A4 pages and
the lengthiest is two and a half handwritten A4 pages. Eleven submissions
are in the form of emails and range from a few lines to one page. Nine of
the typed submissions are over one and a half pages in length. One typed
submission is three and a half pages.
In nine of the submissions, there is some reference to the personal cir-
cumstances of the respondent. One submission is made by a person learn-
ing the language, one by a pensioner with a large extended family of Irish
speakers and grandchildren in IME, one by a fifth year school student and
one by the parents of two children being raised with Irish as the language
of the home (no. 40, no. 150, no. 160 and no. 195 respectively). Six sepa-
rate submissions make reference to the respondents being the parent(s) of
children in IME (no. 45, no. 50, no. 85), or to them being concerned that
children should have the right to IME, (no. 65, no. 145) and one refers to
the respondent having a child of school age (no. 170). One submission states
that IME is not available in the respondent’s locality and points out the loss
Table 8.1 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of individual submissions by viewpoint on legislation and the
model preferred
No. on DCAL Language of Personal details given Support for Support for a rights- Reference to POBAL
website submission Length about respondent proposed Act? based approach? proposals by name?
1 English 1pg Yes Yes Yes

handwritten
5 English 1 ½ pg Yes as part of POBAL Yes
proposals
10 English 1 ½ pg Yes Yes Yes
15 Submission
did not
180
download
20 English 1 pg Yes as part of POBAL Yes
handwritten proposals
25 English 12 lines No
30 Irish 1 ½ pg Yes Yes Yes
35 English 20 line Yes Schemes-based
e mail
40 English 1 ½ pg Learner Yes as part of POBAL Yes
model
45 English 1 pg Parent with child in Yes Yes Refers to 4 postcard
IM points (See Note A.)
50 English 1 ½ pg Mother of child in IM, Yes Yes Yes
and learner
55 English 1 full pg Yes Yes Yes
60 English 14 line email Yes Yes Yes
65 English 2 lines ref to child having Yes Yes

right to IM
70 English 3 line e mail Yes
handwritten POBAL has a central
role
80 English 12 lines Yes Yes Yes
85 English 1 pg Parent of child in IM Yes Yes Refers to 4 postcard
points (See Note A)
90 English 1 ½ pg Yes Yes Because of POBAL’s
expertise
95 English 1 ½ pg Yes Yes, Knowledge of
181
the community;
consultation done
100 Irish 1½ Yes Yes Yes, agreed after
handwritten long and complex
consultation
105 English 4 lines Yes Yes Yes
110 Irish 12 lines Yes Welsh model
115 Irish 1 page Yes Yes Yes
120 Irish 1 ½ page Yes Yes Yes because of
community input
125 English 6 lines Yes
Continued
Table 8.1 Continued
No. on DCAL Language of Personal details given Support for Support for a rights- Reference to POBAL
website submission Length about respondent proposed Act? based approach? proposals by name?
130 Irish 7 lines Yes Yes Yes

135 Bilingual (See 3 lines Yes
Note C)
140 English 5 lines Yes Yes Yes, POBAL worked
very hard and it’s
time for this Act
145 English 6 lines Children will have the Yes Yes Yes
182
right to IM
150 English 1 pg Pensioner, children Yes Yes Yes
and grandchildren
with Irish
155 Irish 1 ½ pg Yes Yes Yes, POBAL carried
out consultation
160 English 1 pg 5th year pupil Yes Yes Yes
handwritten
170 English 1 ½ pg Parent of school age Yes Yes
children
175 Bilingual (see 1 page Yes Yes Yes

Note B) e mail
180 English 2 pg hand Yes Duties also
written mentions rights
185 Irish 16 lines Yes
190 English 20 lines Yes Yes Painstaking, wide
e mail ranging consultation
195 Bilingual (see 3 ½ pages Parents of 2 children Yes Rights and schemes
Note D) being raised with Irish
200 English 11 line Yes Yes Yes
e mail
205 English 20 line Written by one of the Yes Yes Yes, painstaking
e mail academics involved work based on
in drafting and international
consultation on standards
POBAL proposals
Note: A Postcard13 supporting the Irish Language Act contains the following four points: Keep to the time-frame and spirit of the St Andrews commitment;
183
place Irish speakers’ rights at the heart of the Act; make available adequate resources to implement the Act; appoint an Irish Language Commissioner.
B
Submission written in English, but preceded by note in Irish ‘Ar eagla na heagla nach bhfuil Gaeilge agat, seo é mo thuairim i mBéarla’ (‘In case you don’t
speak Irish, here is my opinion in English’ – Author’s translation.)
C
Submission written in Irish, with English translation of one line in brackets ‘(I am in favour of the Irish language Act.)’
D
Submission consists of bilingual email, with bilingual submission attached
this represents to local children (no. 170). One of these submissions also
notes that the respondent is learning the language (no 50).
Of the 40 submissions supporting legislation, 32 propose a rights-based
approach; 29 of these make specific reference to rights-based legislation.
One further submission refers to a mixture of rights and schemes and
another refers to rights and duties. Another prefers the Welsh model, and
one other calls for a schemes-based approach and refers to ‘Wales, Scotland
and the Republic of Ireland’ (no. 195, no. 180, no. 110, no. 35). Two submis-
sions refer to four demands including the principle of a rights-based Act,
resourced and enacted by Westminster (no. 45, no. 85). Three submissions
make no reference to the legislative model but are supportive of legislation
(no. 70, no. 135, no. 185).
Twenty nine of the submissions make specific reference to their full sup-
port for the implementation of the POBAL proposals, and several make addi-
tional explanatory comments. These include, ‘I think (the POBAL document)
is a reasonable document and I am impressed by the experts who have lent
their name to it. I doubt the British government could find better qualified
people,’ (no. 40) and, ‘Is é POBAL an scáthghrúpa Gaeilge i dTÉ é. Tugann
POBAL treoir agus éisteacht dúinn mar Ghaeilgeoirí – tá a ról lárnach i saol
an Ghaeilgeora i dTÉ.’ / ‘POBAL is the Irish language umbrella group in NI.
POBAL gives guidance to Irish speakers and listens to them – their role is
central to the Irish speaker’s life in NI’ (DCAL translation attached to sub-
mission on website, respondent’s own emphasis).11 Also, ‘I think the POBAL
proposals should be given full weight because they have been put together
well and based on expert knowledge’ (no. 90).
Several submissions refer to the community consultation and input of
Irish speakers into the POBAL proposals, ‘I think POBAL’s ideas are best
because they know the community and what people need. Government
departments often talk about consultation and this was carried out by
POBAL when they went round to talk to people about the Irish language
Act before’ (no. 95). And (no. 100), ‘Aontaím leis na moltaí atá á ndéanamh
ag an eagraíocht “Pobal” moltaí a tháinig ann dóibh tar éis próiseas fada
cuimsitheach comhairliúcháin le pobal na Gaeilge ó thuaidh.’ / I agree with
the proposals which the organisation “Pobal” are making, proposals which
have come about after a long and comprehensive consultation process with
the Irish speaking community in the North’ (attached DCAL translation).
In addition (no. 120), ‘Thug POBAL an deis do phobal na Gaeilge ionchur
a bheith acu ar dhréachtú Acht Gaeilge agus tacaím le cáipéis s’acu,’ /
‘POBAL gave the Irish language community the opportunity to provide
input into the drafting of the Irish Language Act and I support their docu-
ment’ (attached DCAL translation) and (no. 155), ‘Sílim go bhfuil obair níos
fearr déanta ar Acht na Gaeilge ag an phobal féin. Ba cheart moltaí com-
haontaithe POBAL a chur i gcrích mar go gclúdaíonn siad réimse leathan de
phointí a aontaíodh ag cruinnithe níos mó ná bliain ó shin,’ / ‘I think that
better work has been done on Acht na Gaeilge by the people themselves.
The recommendations of POBAL should be accepted and acted on as they
cover a broader range of points that were agreed in meetings more than a
year ago.’ (attached DCAL translation) and, ‘The POBAL approach has the
merit of being based on a painstaking and wide-ranging consultation with
the Irish language community in Northern Ireland. It is coherent, practical
and reasonable’ (no. 190).
Eight of the submissions state that Irish should have Official status in the
legislation.12 One submission calls for status for Irish in the North on a par
with the status of Irish in the SoI (no. 195). Another states that Irish should
have equal status with English (no. 125).
Thirteen respondents refer specifically to the need for provision for educa-
tion to be included in the legislation.14 Three refer to funding difficulties for
a Belfast Gaelscoil.15 One other calls for support services and school trans-
port for IM schools to be included in the Act. A further respondent calls for
provision for adult learners of the language.
In respect of the use of Irish in the courts, six respondents make spe-
cific reference to this (nos. 5, 10, 40, 50, 55, 90) with one noting the case
of Máire Níc An Bhaird to which I have referred in Chapter 4 (no. 90).
Nine respondents make comments on the use of Irish in the political
institutions16 with one specific reference to the duty imposed on the Irish
speaking former Minister of Health, Bairbre de Brún to self-translate at
Ministers’ Question Time, without any increase in time allowed for each
response (no. 5).
Fourteen submissions refer to broadcasting and the media17 and several
make specific comments, with one respondent noting that broadcasting
in the Irish language is ‘crucial’ (no. 170), a further respondent stat-
ing that the scope of legislation should be broad enough to encompass,
‘réimsí mar chraolachán agus chánachas’ / ‘areas like broadcasting and
taxation’ and other reserved matters,18 and another stating that they have
themselves undertaken an Irish language television production training
course (no. 120).
Fourteen submissions specifically comment on the need to appoint an
Irish Language Commissioner,19 with five of these also stating that a fur-
ther Board would be needed to ensure that there was clarity in the regula-
tory roles (nos, 75, 90, 115, 120, 155). Two respondents refer to the need to
ensure liaison with An Coimisinéir Teanga / The Language Commissioner
in the RoI (nos. 95, 195), with submission 195 proposing that the duty of
the Southern Commissioner should simply be extended to the North also.
Other comments relate to acceptance of the need for Commissioners in
other human rights areas, the importance of the neutrality or independ-
ence of the Commissioner and the need for an Annual Report instead of the
proposed three-yearly report mentioned in the DCAL consultation paper
(nos. 100, 175, 155 respectively).
The issue of streetnames in the DCAL consultation document generates

commentary from eight respondents,20 six of whom specifically note the
need for provision to extend to signage issues beyond street names to include
townland and place names, personal and organisational names and signage
in general (nos. 10, 55, 60, 90, 170, 175). The present perceived difficulty of
getting bilingual street signage is referred to, as is the scarcity of Irish lan-
guage signage. ‘At the moment, it is rare to see the language in public unless
it is surrounded by 30 other languages. I think Irish has a specific place in
the North and this should be recognised’ (nos. 95 and 90 respectively).
Table 8.2 indicates respondents who make specific comments in their sub-
missions relating to one or more of the issues raised in the consultation
document. It can be understood that those respondents expressing support
for the POBAL proposals are also giving their support to all of the specific
matters listed on the grid (and any others contained in the POBAL propos-
als) unless stated otherwise.
Many of the submissions raise other detailed issues also, including
health services through Irish; adequate resourcing to enable the legisla-
tion, a timetable for implementation; the need for Westminster legislation
and provision from Crown bodies; Irish language rights in the workplace;
the importance of the GFA in respect of Irish; the need for rights in the
business sector; commentaries on the Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA)
on the consultation; the need to ensure that the emphasis is on the practi-
cal delivery of services; the importance of basic documentation like birth
certificates, passports etc; the perceived key role that British policy and law
has played in the decline of the Irish language; the damage done to the lan-
guage by unionist hostility; the shared nature of the language as a resource
for all; the need to remove the Irish language from the political arena and
the opportunity which the legislation presents for government to do this;
that the ECRML has not been adequate to protect the rights of Irish speak-
ers; the need to build capacity within the Irish speaking community and
the opportunity that the legislation represents to do this. 21
Several submissions reveal a range of concerns in relation to language
legislation. One of these (no. 190) notes that the Act, ‘will provide a bench-
mark to guide the wider community’ and makes comparison with the ban
on smoking and the wearing of seatbelts to modify behaviour. However, the
respondent highlights the danger of creating, ‘a legalistic approach’ rather
than the much-needed, ‘liberal, altruistic spirit’. The submission concludes,
‘However, this is a risk that has to be taken,’ adding that over time, ‘a more
relaxed, positive and ultimately nourishing attitude to the language will
emerge.’ The submission goes on to support the POBAL proposals as the
basis of the legislation.
A further submission (no. 180) recognises the crucial importance of leg-
islation for the Irish language, but notes, ‘... that the final legislation could
go a different direction and set in motion years of significant energy being
Table 8.2 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of individual submissions by support for legislation in subject
areas listed in DCAL consultation paper
Support
No. on for POBAL Use
DCAL proposals by in the Political
website name Status Education Courts institutions Broadcasting Commissioner Street names
1 Yes
5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 Yes Official Yes, also Yes Yes Signage in
refers to general
Gaelscoil
Éanna
15 Submission did
not download
187
20 Yes
25
30 Yes Yes, also Yes Yes
refers to
Gaelscoil
Éanna
35
40 Yes Official Yes Yes Yes Yes
45 Refers to 4
postcard points
(See Note A)
50 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continued
Table 8.2 Continued
Support
55 Yes Official Yes Yes Yes Yes Signage, place

names, personal
names
60 Yes Official Yes Place names,
addresses
valid in all
correspond-ance,
personal names
65 Yes
188
70
75 Yes Yes Yes, and Bord um
Chearta agus
Pleanáil na Gaeilge
80 Yes Yes, BBC
must be more
representative
85 Refers to 4 Yes
postcard points
(See Note A)
90 Yes Official Yes, also Yes Yes and Bord um Signage generally
refers to Chearta agus appropriate to
Gaelscoil Pleanáil the primary
Éanna na Gaeilge indigenous
language
95 Yes Official Yes, also Yes Yes Yes, to liaise Make it easier
refers to with south to change street
rights names
for adult
learners
100 Yes Yes Yes Commissioners
appointed in
other human
rights areas
105 Yes Yes
110
115 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes and Bord
120 Yes Yes, did training Yes and Bord
course in TV
production
189
125 Equal with
English
130 Yes
135
140 Yes
145 Yes Yes
150 Yes Yes
155 Yes Yes, and Bord too,

independence,
annual report
160 Yes
Continued
Table 8.2 Continued
Support
165 Yes
170 Yes, and Yes, crucial Roadsigns too
with
transport
175 Yes Official status on Yes Neutral Place names,
par with Welsh Commissioner townlands,
and Gaelic in personal and
Scotland organisation
190
names
180 Equal /official Yes Yes Yes, ombudsman Yes
status
185
190 Yes
195 Parity with Yes, as well as Yes, but extended Signage: lack of
status in south all reserved from south, not visibility of Irish
matters two separate noticeable when
Commissioners crossing between
north and south
200 Yes Yes
205 Yes
deployed to bring the legislation back to placing the Irish language on an

equal basis with English.’ The respondent goes on to outline the require-
ments of legislation to minimise this risk and notes, ‘Legislation that moves
our society forward on an equal basis or parity of esteem, can only enhance
civilisation.’
One submission (no. 35) strikes a rather less sympathetic tone, but none-
theless supports legislation. The respondent places emphasis on value for
money, and calls for expenditure instead on services for ethnic minorities.
On this basis, the appointment of an Irish Language Commissioner, accord-
ing to the respondent, would be, ‘a completely nonsensical waste of money.’
The submission opposes a rights-based approach stating that spending, ‘vast
amounts of money on translations will only increase hostility towards use
of the language as it will be seen, rightly, as a sop to political interests.’
Instead of a rights-based act, the submission calls for an act based on the
ECRML ‘or the Scottish model’. The next paragraph again refers to schemes-
based approaches in Wales, Scotland and the RoI’ (no. 35).
The response opposing the proposed legislation
Out of 42 sampled submissions, one of which was inaccessible, there was

one response opposed to proposed Irish language legislation (no. 25). It
is written in English and takes the form of a half page letter. The submis-
sion opposes legislation because the proposal ‘fails totally and absolutely to
give equality of opportunity to the vast majority of the community who
do not speak Irish nor wish to speak it.’ In terminology reminiscent of
the DUP and Jim Allister submissions, which I have discussed in Chapter
7, the respondent notes that the DCAL EQIA is ‘fatally flawed’. Since the
document ‘completely ignores’ the ‘sensitivities’ of the unionist commu-
nity, the respondent states that the majority of this community, ‘would
find this proposed act grossly offensive and discriminatory.’ An Irish lan-
guage Act will, in the eyes of the respondent, lead to ‘further division in
the community’ (no. 25).
The extremely high proportion of the 20 per cent sample supportive of
legislation appears to supports the overall pattern of submissions to the
consultation. The sample indicates a great degree of penetration of ideas
and awareness of language legislation into the general community. For the
most part, the submissions show a high level of individuality which rein-
forces the strong consensus that emerges. To a large extent, there appears
to be a distillation amongst respondents of certain principles behind the
legislative models under discussion. There is a high level of awareness of
the issues and overwhelming support for the POBAL proposals, includ-
ing a rights-based approach, provision on broadcasting, education, sig-
nage, in the political institutions and the courts all of which are referred
to directly in a significant number of submissions without them being
Table 8.3 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of

submissions with comments
No. on Support for a Reference to

DCAL rights-based POBAL proposals Other specific comments
website approach by name? made by respondent
1 Yes Yes
5 as part of POBAL Yes Asks for anonymity, and states that
proposals his / her concern is further proof of
the need for the legislation.
10 Yes Yes Wide range of public services needed,
including in Health. ECRML has not
been adequate
15 Submission did
not download
20 as part of POBAL Yes Resources and timescale
proposals
25
30 Yes Yes Westminster legislation needed,
Crown bodies
35 Schemes-based
40 as part of POBAL Yes Westminster legislation needed; rights
model in workplace
45 Yes Good Friday Agreement; use in
business or private life
50 Yes Yes EQIA poorly publicised and unfair
55 Yes Yes Emphasis should be on practical
service delivery not documents
60 Yes Yes Westminster legislation needed for
broadcasting provision
65 Yes
70
75 Yes Yes Adequate resourcing needed; no
mention of British policies as reason
for decline of Irish; taxpayers; 10% of
population have Irish
80 Yes Yes Westminster
85 Yes Good Friday Agreement, use of Irish in
private and business life
90 Yes Yes
95 Yes Yes
100 Yes Yes
105 Yes Yes Westminster legislation needed
110 Welsh model Westminster, help for learners,
defence for rights of Irish speakers in
all aspects of life
115 Yes Yes No confidence in NI minister
Continued
Table 8.3 Continued
No. on Support for a Reference to

DCAL rights-based POBAL proposals Other specific comments
website approach by name? made by respondent
125 Ancient language that must survive
130 Yes Yes Adequate resources; this is a litmus

test of UK government commitment
to equality
135 Language is for everyone
140 Yes Yes Driving licence, passport, birth
certificate and other documents
145 Yes Yes
150 Yes Yes Good Friday Agreement, private and
business
155 Yes Yes European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages has not been
enough
160 Yes Yes
165 Yes Yes Westminster; emphasis on influence
of British policy and of relationship
with unionism
170 Yes Opportunity for UK government to
de-politicise language
175 Yes Yes Act will help in skills building;
hostility to language has damaged it;
debt to repay; Westminster legislation
and adequately resourced
180 Duties also Weak legislation could do damage and
mentions rights involve Irish speakers in many years
of struggle to achieve what is really
needed in Irish language legislation
185 Westminster: comments on Glens of
Antrim history and importance of the
language
190 Yes Yes Rights-based legislation can have
disadvantages but this is what is
needed in current context
195 Rights and Private and public life; rights as Irish
schemes citizen; Westminster legislation; lack
of faith in hostile politicians in future
Assembly
200 Yes Yes Westminster legislation
205 Yes Yes Unusually distinct circumstances
in north; Prompt introduction of
Westminster legislation based on
POBAL proposals is needed
formulaic. The impacts that the legislation could have on the day-to-day
experience of Irish speakers, particular children and learners, feature in
a number of the submissions, showing the ability of the community at
large to concretise the concepts involved. The sole negative response in
the sample takes a rejectionist position common to the other 45 negative
responses received during the consultation.
Overview of the consultation responses
The first consultation on Proposed Irish language Legislation attracted a

very high level of interest and reaction within the Irish speaking commu-
nity, amongst human rights bodies and those who are favourable to the
protection and promotion of the language. There is a high level of cohesion
and engagement with the complex issues under discussion. The variety of
responses, both in terms of their form and content, serve to highlight a high
degree of agreement around core principles, including the need for a rights-
based approach. There is also considerable evidence of a widespread sense of
ownership of the POBAL proposals.
The consultation also attracted a number of highly significant submis-
sions from public sector agencies and bodies including key organisations
involved at the highest levels in broadcasting, the administration of justice
and community relations. CAJ makes a comprehensive and sympathetic sub-
mission to the consultation, whilst the input of the Equality Commission,
advising that the provision of equality for one social group does not limit
its availability to another is endorsed in DCAL’s own Summary of Responses
to the EQIA.
The submissions from the five main political parties in the North reflect
divisions between nationalism and unionism. Whilst the nationalist par-
ties present more concise, direct responses to the consultation paper, the
unionist submissions, including the Alliance Party submission, display a
lack of focus and understanding of indigenous minority issues and of cur-
rent practice and trends in respect of their protection. The submissions from
the DUP (based on a response by then MEP Jim Allister who is no longer a
party member) and UUP tend to the emphatic rejection of any protection or
provision for the Irish language.
As discussed, before and during the consultation, the reaction of unionist
political parties to the proposed legislation was consistently and voluably
one of intense opposition. As noted, during the second consultation, freed
from the pressures of electioneering, the unionist parties organised a rejec-
tionist campaign. However, even though this increased the number of nega-
tive responses to the second consultation, 68 per cent of submissions still
favoured the legislation, with 75 per cent over two consultations calling for
its enactment. The low level of individual negative responses may suggest
that even with the catalyst of an organised party-political campaign, Irish
language legislation arouses less grassroots hostility than claimed. Certainly,

had the British government wished to fulfil its SAA commitment, the une-
quivocal results of the first consultation gave it ample rationale for doing so.
Equally, such a high level of public support for the legislation from a range
of sources should have galvanised the Irish government and both national-
ist political parties into taking a firmer stance when the British government
reneged on its obligation. SF is the stronger nationalist party electorally, and
therefore its lacklustre response appears the more striking, especially since
it is credited with putting forward the proposal at St Andrews. Whether the
party drastically overestimated its ability to achieve implementation of the
commitment or whether it simply looked on it as an optional extra that
could be left aside if difficulties arose is open to debate. Some may argue
that the prospect of a devolved Assembly after five years of uncertainty
would have been too great a price to pay for an Irish language Act.
Even so, it cannot be ignored that on re-establishment of devolution, the
failure of SF and the SDLP to select the portfolio for Culture, Arts and Leisure
has compounded negative LPP. Since under D’Hondt, SF had three ministries
to the SDLP’s one, its failure may be deemed to be the more telling. To date,
neither party has made a commitment to secure the Ministry in future. As
noted earlier, an SDLP’s Private Member’s Bill based on the POBAL proposals
may succeed in raising the issue of legislation once more, but it remains to
be seen whether it can reshape current policy approaches. Successive DUP
CAL ministers in the North have adopted a dual LPP strategy, impeding
progress for Irish whilst simultaneously promoting Ulster Scots beyond any
objective criteria. At present, the Irish government appears to be ready to
impose drastic cut-backs, many targeted on Irish language provision and
impacting North and South. In addition, there is now the question of the
role of Nationalist parties in 2009 in intergovernmental proposals to ‘col-
lapse’ Irish language bodies as noted in Chapter 6. To date, the promise,
implicit in the GFA, the 2003 Joint Statement and the 2006 St Andrews’
Agreement that consociational arrangements would be good for the Irish
language and good for governance appears to have failed on both counts.
9
Quebec v. the Rest in the Twenty-First
Century: Coming-of-Age, or Losing
the Plot?
The focus of this chapter will be on the current conflict interfaces between
sovereignty and LPP in Canada, with primary emphasis on parallel pro-
vincial LPP in Quebec and federal LPP in the rest of Canada (ROC) in
the period following the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession up to the
present. As I have noted in Chapter 1, control and interpretation of infor-
mation is an important factor in conflict, and I shall therefore briefly
examine the controversy around the interpretation of census and other
statistical information in Canada and the impact this has on LPP. I shall
then contextualise the current ‘linguistic peace’ through a brief examina-
tion of recent incidents of linguistic tension, current LPP policy, including
the Roadmap for Linguistic Duality 2008–13, preparations prior to the
2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver, and implications for the application
of Part VII of the LLO / OLA of the FCFA and Desrochers cases. Following
this, in a section focusing on Quebec LPP, I shall examine the current
application of Law 101, the Charter for the French Language (CFL / CLF)
in respect of Bill 104 and recent initiatives in respect of the francisation of
companies. This albeit truncated analysis will provide a language policy
context for assessment of current political and social trends in CR both
internal to Quebec and between the federal and Quebec governments.
In the aftermath of the 1995 Quebec referendum on secession, there have
been two main and differing political approaches to CR within federal gov-
ernment. The hard line of Prime Minister Chrétien, referred to in Chapter 1,
contrasted somewhat with the less aggressive attitude of his successor Paul
Martin. Martin’s Liberals lost support during the sponsorship scandal,1
however, and this along with the perception that their leader tended to
dither thereafter over key decisions contributed to the election in 2006 of
the Conservatives under Stephen Harper. In the next section, I shall exam-
ine to what extent Harper’s strategy to date has focussed on the same goal as
that of Chrétien and previous federal leaders – Canadian national unity. As
196
Quebec v. the Rest 197
I have noted in the first chapter in relation to Canada, and in Chapters 2–8
on the NoI, demands apparently unequivocally geared towards complete
and formal self-determination may be satisfied – or re-defined – by much
less far-reaching CR measures.
In Canada and Quebec since the start of the new millennium, debate
has revolved around the ability of asymmetrical federalism to fulfil
Quebec’s aspirations to greater independence and control of its affairs
through a more flexible approach to federal-provincial interaction.
Following an earlier accord in 2004, the then federal Prime Minister Paul
Martin’s minority Liberal government announced a non-constitutional
health accord with the provinces. 2 The 2004 agreement ratified a new
type of asymmetrical federalism, more significant potentially than that
already in place between the federal government and other provinces.
Theoretically, it would deliver a process more responsive to the needs of
the different partners in the federation, and allow for greater policy vari-
ation from province to province. High-profile Quebec Liberals, including
Benoît Pelletier (2005, quoted in Cardinal 2008, p. 21), Quebec Minister
for Intergovernmental Affairs, welcomed the initiative, which according
to him, would permit the key players, ‘d’augmenter la confiance mutuelle
et d’améliorer de façon durable les rapports entre le Québec et le reste
du Canada’ / ‘to augment mutual confidence and to improve in a dura-
ble manner relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada’ (Author’s
translation). Some Canadian federalists (Joyal 20043; Roberts 2005) reso-
lutely opposed compromise and decentralisation of federal power as a
threat to Canadian sovereignty whilst advocates of the ‘Calgary School’
promoted asymmetry within a pro-West of Canada agenda (Bercuson &
Cooper 1994, Brodie 2002, Morton 2004).
Sceptical Quebec researchers pointed out that since the accord applied to
all provinces equally it compromised Quebec’s much-reclaimed ‘distinct’
status. In addition, it was argued that a non-enforceable accord was of lit-
tle real value, especially since its definition of asymmetry was vague. Such
obscurity meant its outworking would lie in the political sphere, not the
legal or constitutional one (Seymour 2008). Believing on the one hand that
the federal government lacked sincerity and on the other that Quebec’s
Liberal government lacked radical drive, Graefe (2008, p. 150–1) suggests
that Quebec might derive slight short-term advantage from accords like the
one on health, but that, ‘sans veto ni reconnaissance, cette situation com-
porte plusieurs dangers évidents’ / ‘without either a veto or recognition,
this situation holds several obvious dangers’ (Author’s translation). The
following year, the signing of the Entente sur les congés parentaux / the
Agreement on Parental Leave4 appeared to offer Quebec power to withdraw
from federal programmes whilst receiving financial compensation. The
‘power’, however, would only exist where the Quebec government took on
the responsibility for the same programme, and appears to follow the same
path as the earlier Entente-cadre sur l’union sociale / Framework Agreement

on Social Union.5
As noted previously, in January 2006, Harper’s Conservatives, with
unprecedented support from Quebec voters, crushed the Liberal Party in
federal elections to take power. In the aftermath of the elections, and fol-
lowing earlier propositions that Quebec be formally recognised as a nation
within Canada,6 Harper initially denied that this was the ‘real question.’7
His reluctance was pounced upon by the electorally battered federal
Liberals, including Stéphane Dion, Bob Rae and current Prime Ministerial
challenger, Michael Ignatieff, an outspoken critic of Quebec national-
ism and LPP in the past. Bloc québécois leader, Gilles Duceppe proposed
a House of Commons motion demanding recognition of the Quebec
nation.8 Harper cut a deal with the federal Liberals and the NDP, propos-
ing a reworded motion to recognise the ‘Québécois’ as a nation within a
united Canada. Thus the status of geo-political Quebec is side-stepped in
favour of that more nebulous constitutional entity, the ‘Québécois’. For
some students of semantics, the use of the term in French in the English
language version of the proposal may imply that nation status is confined
conceptually to the traditional Québécois ‘de souche’ rather than to the
modern, multi-ethnic Francophone Quebec. The motion was passed by
266 votes to 16. It awakened hopes in some of a new beginning in inter-
governmental relations, and in others the suspicion of ongoing political
fancy footwork.
Quebec federalists have been constantly critical of the search for inde-
pendence, accusing sovereigntists of abusing the terminology of imperi-
alism and ignoring the reality that limitation of the power of Quebec to
determine its own policies is similar to the position of other provinces. For
them, the failure to recognise the legitimacy of the federal government con-
signs Quebec politicians to the role of cannon-fodder in a political war and
condemns the population to eternal disappointment (Leclair 2008, p. 59).
Benoît Pelletier, a member of Quebec’s ruling PLQ, defines as fundamental
the right of the Quebec electorate to choose whether or not it wishes to
remain within the federation. Nonetheless, his own government supports
federalism, arguing that strides have been made in recent years towards
asymmetrical federalism, greater participation by Quebec in inter-provincial
affairs, and in improved relations with the rest of Canadian francophonie.
Where Quebec’s interests are not served by federalism, Pelletier advises that
it should simply opt out. He says, ‘le Québec favorise la collaboration avec
ses partenaires fédératifs lorsque celle-ci est possible et opportune. Elle ne l’est
pas toujours’ / ‘Quebec favours collaboration with its federalist partners
when this is possible and opportune. It is not always so’ (2006, p. 538; Author’s
translation. Pelletier’s emphasis).
The shifting nature of debate in Quebec is something Létourneau (2006,
p. 129) celebrates, lauding the flexibility of spirit of the Québécois, ‘la
nation pragmatiste’ / ‘the pragmatic nation.’ Whilst she characterises it

as, ‘réaliste, inventive et astucieuse’ / ‘realistic, inventive and resourceful,’
she recognises (2006, p. 134) that for some, these same qualities are, ‘un
signe de déchéance, d’aliénation, de servitude et de somnolence’ / ‘a sign
of failure, of alienation, of servitude and of somnolence’ (Author’s transla-
tions). She concludes, nonetheless, that Quebec should remain ambiguous
in its identification with the Quebec nation as its primary focus, but within
a permanent relationship with federal Canada. Whilst Pelletier (2006,
p. 536) proclaims the establishment of the Conseil de la fédération / The
Federation Council, other analysts denounce what they see as a particu-
larly diluted form of asymmetrical federalism. Seymour (2006) states une-
quivocally that reform of the federal system will fail, that fiscal inequality,
the issue of provincial power or the international ambitions of Quebec to
representation at UNESCO will also be unlikely to achieve positive results.
Although it is widely debated that asymmetrical federalism might in theory
be capable of resolving the issue of Quebec secession, Seymour is convinced
that Quebec is being led further away from any satisfactory solution, a view
in which he is supported by Facal (2006), former Canadian Minister for
Intergovernmental Affairs. Facal argues (2006) that initiatives to transform
the Canadian political system have two main aims: the adaptation of the
Canadian federal system into one better suited to dealing with increasing
globalisation, and the minimising of the possibility of Quebec’s secession
in future.
Harper was brought to power in 2006 in part by the election in Quebec
of 10 Conservative Francophone MPs, and a further 3 MPs from the ROC
whose seats also depended upon Francophone votes. Characterised by
Graham Fraser, Official Languages Commissioner9 as, ‘a Prime Minister
who learns’, Harper’s government is currently under threat and may not
survive another term. To date, however, he has maintained a strong bilin-
gual political persona both in Canada and abroad. Whilst his government
has come under considerable pressure in recent times, its 3 MPs dependent
on Francophone votes have all been re-elected and two new seats with
important Francophone minorities were gained in October 2007. Fraser
is of the opinion that the Harper government exploits the relative calm
around language issues at present and also ‘the thickness of the language
barrier’ to adopt a range of positive actions on Official Languages but
without trumpeting them to the Anglophone media. Nonetheless, there
appears to be a lack of transparency in funding allocation and motivation,
as discussed later in relation to the FCFA case on Part VII of the LLO / OLA.
Such practice can create extreme difficulties for minorities, not wishing to
‘rock the boat’ by asking too many questions, but constantly aware that if
the prevailing wind changes direction they may be left stranded. Harper’s
tendency towards relative obscurity of policy and funding decisions at a
federal level is likely to be one capable of raising Quebec hackles due to
the long-standing and bitter dispute about financial relations with the
federal government. Various commentators have argued that whilst the
1990s were dominated by discord on constitutional matters, it is unequal
financial decisions in respect of provincial payments and receipts that
has dominated in more recent years. They warn that whilst Harper talks
of open government, his practice is somewhat detrimental to democracy
(Noël 2006; Caron, Laforest et Vaillières-Roland 2006).
Others believe that new opportunities exist to break the mould. Fraser10
assesses current Quebec psychology following the poor performance of the
Parti Québécois (PQ) in the 2007 election thus, ‘A whole chunk of the politi-
cal class in Quebec had psychologically been in the departure lounge for
another country and that election announced that the flight had been can-
celled.’ He believes that the reappraisal of Québécois Francophone identity
has also introduced,
a whole series of strategic, small ‘p’ political questions for the federal
government that are very different from ‘how do we stop them from leav-
ing?’ It becomes, ‘how do we respond to their staying?’ And I think the
ability of the federal government to respond to that is absolutely critical
and language is a big part of that.
He rejects the view that since sovereignty does not appear to be an immedi-
ate option, Quebec has lost negotiating power in relation to LPP and other
issues. He states,11
The reverse is true. The presence of a sovereignist government enabled

the federal government to reflexively say no to Quebec without thinking
about it ... . Quebec is more engaged with the federal government and the
rest of Canada than it has been for years.
Having to deal with a sovereigntist movement in Quebec, ‘whether directly

when the PQ is in power or indirectly when the Liberals have tried to man-
age nationalist pressures,’12 had created problems for successive federal gov-
ernments. Fraser cites Quebec’s resistance to interference in the application
of the CFL /CLF in respect of public signage as the cause of much resentment
in the ROC, and states that it had resulted in a reluctance by some provinces
to make provision for their Francophone minorities, ‘when they perceived
that there was a threat of Quebec independence.’ In order to strengthen
intergovernmental relations Fraser proposes, ‘more recognition of the needs
of the Quebec English-speaking community, both by the federal govern-
ment and the Quebec government.’ Although he has highlighted13 the fact
that the LLO / OLA does not make any direct reference to the existence of
Quebec at all, he states that he is ‘reluctant to see explicit formal recognition
of the CFL / CLF in the Constitution when other provinces are making quiet
progress towards providing more French-language services to their French-

speaking minorities.’
Fraser’s responses highlight the question of what role asymmetrical
federalism should play in the disentangling of Canada’s two types of
LPP. As shown, federal LPP was devised to neutralise Quebec national-
ism. Inevitably, federal LPP counterpoints Francophone communities in
the ROC with Quebec’s French speaking population. Quebec as a radi-
cal, focused spokesperson for a united Canadian community of French
speakers is a prospect that sent shivers through the federal government in
previous decades. Drawing an apparently more compliant PLQ-led Quebec
government into a form of partnership of the dispossessed could possi-
bly now prove a greater attraction to Canadian federalists, however, since
it could serve to dilute Quebec’s latent sovereigntist aspirations. Clearly,
Francophone minorities in the ROC would seek a CR resolution with supe-
rior ability to defend their interests than Quebec’s sovereignty proposi-
tion has previously demonstrated. It is often assumed that smaller, more
isolated Francophone communities in the ROC have borne the brunt of
provincial and Anglophone media backlash in the face of Quebec’s sepa-
ratist agenda. It is clear, however, that Quebec Francophones themselves
have also internalised the threat. Cazabon (2007, p. 265) states, ‘Ce n’est
pas le bien-fondé de l’indépendance qui s’assoit mal dans nos têtes, mais
la peur des représailles. La francophonie canadienne hors Québec devi-
ent une monnaie d’échange.’ / ‘It is not the validity of independence
that sits uncomfortable in our minds, but the fear of reprisals. Canadian
Francophones outside Quebec are becoming a bartering token’ (Author’s
translation).
It appears unlikely that the current asymmetrical model being pro-
moted by federal government and the PLQ, having no recourse to specific
constitutional force, can guarantee the transformation of Francophone
relations. However, given genuine political will, it could provide a frame-
work for productive joint Francophone action. ROC Francophone com-
munities recognise that moves towards rapprochement with Quebec
Francophonie is currently dependent on the continuing political influ-
ence of the PLQ in the province. In addition, the expectation that Quebec
will take the lead, the divergent interests of Francophone organisations
outside Quebec, and the development of appropriate modi vivendi are
all codas cited by Rioux and Brady (2008, p.402) in respect of any such
undertaking. There are many factors which militate against the success of
continuing undertakings and it appears that if a genuine will to positively
reshape Francophone interaction indeed exists within federal Canada at
present, it would be helpful to signpost and structure this more clearly.
The Canadian judiciary has played a key role in shaping majority-minority
relationships and minority language rights, and continues to be a crucial
factor in this respect (Cardinal 2000; Foucher 2008, p. 279, 284). Clearly,
one of the key strategies being adopted by Quebec federalism in respect of

the interface with federal LPP may be to circumnavigate the more obvious
political paths, engaging instead more directly with the Francophone popu-
lation in the ROC. Whether this is designed to strengthen Francophones
politically or to further neutralise radicalism in Quebec is a matter of con-
jecture at this stage. A number of initiatives have been undertaken to date,
including Pelletier’s Centre de la francophonie des Amériques.14 The success
of such undertakings must depend upon the continuing success of Quebec’s
own LPP in addressing Francophone assimilation, however, and I shall
examine in more detail the application of Quebec’s language laws in a later
section of this chapter.
Outside Canada, Gerotto (2008) has shown that asymmetrical federal-
ism has not guaranteed protection or provision appropriate to Italy’s vari-
ous linguistic minorities, however, and whilst the relationship between
the NoI’s devolved institutions and the Irish and British governments has
not as yet been formally defined as ‘federal’,15 current unilateral arrange-
ments offer ample evidence of capacity to manipulate constitutional and
international legal arrangements to the detriment of the North’s linguistic
‘minority’ of Irish speakers. As Foucher (2008, p. 284) points out, ‘Le con-
cept juridique d’égalité, répétons-le, ne signifie pas le traitement identique
sans égard à la situation sociale réelle; il représente une aspiration à faire
plus et mieux pour garantir le redressement des inégalités.’ / ‘The judicial
concept of equality, let’s say it again, does not signify identical treatment
without regard to the actual social situation; it represents an aspiration to
do more and better to guarantee the redressing of inequalities’ (Author’s
translation). It remains to be seen whether greater equity is the driving
force behind Harper’s asymmetrical initiatives, or whether his motivation
lies elsewhere.
In the next sections of this chapter, I shall examine the issue of LPP in
respect of statistics and official figures for the ROC and Quebec. Following
this, I shall briefly explore some aspects of federal LPP in respect of minority
Francophone communities in the ROC. Then I shall turn to a similar exami-
nation of LPP and political developments in Quebec, before drawing some
conclusions on intergovernmental relations between federal and Quebec
government in the last ten years.
Measuring position and progress: Language

statistics in Canada
As noted in Chapter 1, the control and interpretation of information is an

important factor in conflict. Census figures and other official statistics pro-
vide a common basis for LPP (and indeed other forms of social and policy
planning), and as such they are a key element in determining ‘where we
are, how we are doing, what now needs to be done and by whom?’ Perhaps
because of their centrality in the planning process, official figures are often
the cause of controversy and dispute, as discussed in Chapter 2. Confusion
becomes particularly widespread when statistical information is challenged
at a sustained and expert level. In such cases, the answers to the ‘simple’
questions outlined earlier become a matter of political interpretation and
choosing the correct way forward to bolster a threatened language becomes
extremely challenging and potentially divisive. Intra-community relation-
ships, as well as those with the state or with a dominant political party,
are called into question. Chronic lack of certainty regarding strategies dis-
empowers and discourages, favouring the dominant power faction and its
interests. Such fundamental questions over the use of official statistics in
some instances pose a dilemma for an author of a book of this kind, since
it is common to quote such figures in order to establish a ‘factual’ over-
view of the linguistic situation. In the next section, I shall indeed refer
briefly to some commonly cited federal and Quebec governmental figures.
However, I shall also refer to challenges to the accuracy of this information.
Readers will, I am afraid, have to make up their mind as to the validity of
the arguments.
Statistics on official languages in the ROC
In Canada, unlike the NoI, there is a wealth of statistical data and analysis
concerning language. According to the federal agency, Statistics Canada,
the 2006 Census indicates over 18 million Anglophones in Canada, com-
pared with some 6.9 million Francophones. 98 per cent of the popula-
tion of Canada can speak one or both of the country’s official languages.
94 per cent of Canadians speak French or English at home regularly or
even more frequently. For 89 per cent of the population, English or French
is spoken most often at home, sometimes in combination with another,
non-official language. There is a sizeable and growing allophone (those
for whom neither English nor French is the mother tongue) population.
Between 2001 and 2006, Statistics Canada reports that the Anglophone
population increased by 3 per cent, but the Francophone population by only
1.6 per cent. In both cases, the increase is slightly larger than in the preced-
ing five-year period. In all the provinces in the ROC, and indeed in Quebec,
there are indications of ongoing assimilation of Francophones, even given
the small increases in the numbers continuing to speak French regularly
at home after switching the main home language to English. In 2006,
17.4 per cent of Canadians report ability to conduct a conversation in
English and French, a slight decrease (from 17.7 per cent) in the 2001 figures.
Statistics Canada states that the decrease is ‘mainly due’ to a decrease over-
all in the Francophone mother-tongue population. In addition, it alleges a
campaign encouraging Francophones to under-report bilingualism (amidst
fears that it would lead to cut-backs to French language services) and states
that because of these factors, it ‘didn’t want to place the emphasis on that
decrease in our analysis’.16
A mere 7.5 per cent of Anglophones living outside Quebec report them-
selves as bilinguals. Compared with an extremely high 83.6 per cent for
Francophones in the ROC, this clearly suggests that of the two official
language communities, it is Francophones outside Quebec who are forced
to switch language to conduct their business. The age structure of the
Anglophone and Francophone populations in the ROC shows that there
are considerably fewer young people among Francophones than among
Anglophones. As shown in Figure 9.1, the greater numbers of Anglophones
in the various age groups continues up to 34 years. In the group aged
35 to 39 years, the numbers for Francophones and Anglophones equalise,
and then, from the age group 40 to 44 years and onwards, the age structure
is inverted.
In spite of sustained use of both official languages in the home, lan-
guage shift to English amongst Francophones has risen steadily since 1971.
In 2006, 39 per cent of Francophones used English most often at home,
compared with 38 per cent in 2001, 35 per cent in 1991 and just under
30 per cent in 1971. For most provinces and territories, this proportion was
also higher in 2006 than in 2001. Immigration of Francophones from other
80 years and over French

75 to 79 English
70 to 74
65 to 69
60 to 64
55 to 59
50 to 54
45 to 49
40 to 44
35 to 39
30 to 34
25 to 29
20 to 24
15 to 19
10 to 14
5 to 9
0 to 4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
percentage
Figure 9.1 Age structure of English and French mother tongues, 5 year age groups,
Canada less Quebec 2006
Source: Statistics Canada, Language, 2006 Census catalogue 97–555, Released 4 December 2007.
countries is widely cited as a key element in the viability of Canada’s LPP.

In the ROC Francophones comprise 5 per cent of immigrants (as opposed to
19 per cent who are Anglophone mother-tongue users). Castonguay (2008,
p. 75) has argued that the levels of immigration are too low, and insuffi-
ciently targeted geographically to adequately impact on assimilation rates
and that the attractive force of English impacts negatively on Francophone
immigrants to areas with weak service provision through French.
Castonguay (1993, 1999, 2002, 2008) has further accused both federal
and Quebec governments of consistently interpreting figures in such a way
as to downplay the failures existing in both LPP processes. In the period
since the 1995 referendum, he has warned (Castonguay, 1999) that federal
government is at best deluded about the imminent risk of Francophone
assimilation as signposted in the 1996 figures, and at worst, dishonest about
the failure of its LPP. He accuses (1999, p. 43) federal officials of empha-
sising falling fertility rates among Francophones rather than addressing
increasing rates of assimilation, and of ignoring the implications of the
growing imbalances in the proportions of young Francophones and young
Anglophones. He argues (1999, p. 50) that the portability approach is
‘inherently assimilationist’ and ‘no more than a subtle manner of securing
the slow but sure Anglicization of French Canada so firmly recommended
by Lord Durham.’ Cardinal (2008, p. 63) concurs with Castonguay’s view
that federal interpretations of statistics tend towards the rose-tinted, and
she identifies two specific points of note in the 2006 figures: ‘the growth
of inequality between the official language groups and the rise of non-
official languages.’ Like Castonguay ten years before, she highlights the
lost ground in New Brunswick and Ontario (where 11.2 per cent and
41.8 per cent respectively of Francophone mothers used English most often
at home) and states that Ontario Francophones have reached a critical point
at which their language behaviour closely resembles that of allophone
immigrants or Francophones living in much less favourable demographic
situations in other provinces.
Statistics on official languages in Quebec
In Quebec, Statistics Canada indicate that the 2006 Census shows that the
population is almost 7.5 million people, with some 6 million of these indi-
cating that of the two official languages, French is their mother tongue.
Only one tenth of this number indicates that their mother tongue is English.
However, for the first time since 1976, the number of Anglophones in Quebec
increased in 2006, with the growth rate of the Anglophone population
(2.7 per cent) being higher than that of the Francophone population
(2.0 per cent). Over 4 million people have knowledge only of French.
Over 3 million have knowledge of both federal official languages. Only
around 70,000 have knowledge of neither French nor English, although
more than half of the English mother-tongue speakers state that they have
knowledge of English only. French remains the language most frequently
spoken at home. However, the number of people using English most fre-
quently at home is higher than those using a non-official language. In
terms of immigration since 2001 to Quebec, 75 per cent of recent arriv-
als were allophones, 20 per cent were Francophones and the remaining
5 per cent were Anglophones. On the Island of Montreal only 50 per cent of
the population were mother-tongue French speakers, representing a decline
of some 69,470 people on the previous figures. Whilst Quebec remains a
majority Francophone society, both the relative proportions of those who
have French as their mother tongue and those who use French most fre-
quently as the language of the home fell in the five years between 2001 and
2006, throughout the province as a whole and in the key census areas of
Metropolitan Montreal and the Island of Montreal.
The Office québécoise de la langue française (OQLF) synopsis (Synthèse,
p. 5) of the 2006 Census acknowledges that whilst figures may show a con-
sistent pattern of rise and fall over a period of years, in 2006, for the first
time, the percentage of those with French as their mother tongue dipped
under 80 per cent throughout the province of Quebec.
Quebec uses both federal statistics and its own research analysis,
carried out under the auspices of the OQLF. In the period 1971–2001,
The OQLF concludes that French has shown renewed vigour. However,
Castonguay (2005, p. 33) states that in both absolute and relative terms,
the English language has made greater progress and shown greater vital-
ity. As one of those tasked17 by the Quebec government in 2002 with
presenting a comprehensive five-year report of the linguistic position
in Quebec, Castonguay accuses the OQLF of obscuring the committee’s
findings through undue delay and the publication of amalgams of pre-
vious research statistics without adequate analysis or conclusions. Some
of Castonguay’s criticisms have been challenged by others,18 the result,
according to Catonguay himself, of a mixture of self-interest and fear of
Table 9.1 2001 and 2006, Percentage of the population of Quebec for whom French
is mother tongue
Montreal metropolitan Island of Montreal census

Year Quebec (in %) census region (MMCR) (in %) region (IMCR) (in %)
2001 81.4 68.3 53.2

2006 79.6 65.7 49.8
Source: Statistics Canada, Language, 2006 Census, catalogue 97–555, Released 4 December
2007.
the culture of government denigration of those who speak out on current

LPP in Quebec.
For Castonguay (2008, p. 98), the massaging of figures he alleges in
Quebec is attributable to appeasement, ‘Tout pour conforter les Québécois
dans l’inaction’ / ‘All in order to comfort the Québécois in their inaction’
(Author’s translation). Nor is he alone in his assessment. Mario Beaulieu,19
President of Montreal’s oldest non-governmental Francophone Association,
the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec (SSJBQ) also believes that the
Quebec government conceals the reality of threats to the French language,
delays and obscures unfavourable research studies and has embarked on
an LPP approach which favours bilingualism above the promotion of the
French language as the majority and public language of Quebec. I shall
examine Quebec LPP in more detail in a later section of this chapter. Given
the very different attitudes towards federal official figures and the applica-
tion of federal LPP, I shall now study some examples of provision, initiatives
and controversies in respect of federal provision for Francophone communi-
ties in the ROC.
The federal framework for provision in the ROC
The majority of Francophones in the ROC live within relative proxim-

ity to Quebec, along the New Brunswick / Ontario axis. Other, smaller
Francophone communities are dispersed throughout Canada, and their
ability to access services through French is largely dependent upon
the protections for the language put in place in provincial legislation.
Provision varies, with some communities benefiting from full education,
health or justice systems through French whilst others have no access
at all. In recent years, following the introduction of an Access to Justice
programme, 20 some significant gains have been made in respect of the use
of French in the courts. The Canadian Criminal Code grants an accused
the right to a trial in the official language of his or her choice, regardless
of where in Canada the trial is held, and in front of a judge or jury that
understands the official language of the accused without the use of trans-
lation or simultaneous interpretation. Laws and policies in this area have
been adopted in many provinces and territories, although they vary con-
siderably in terms of the rights they recognise. Amongst the most signifi-
cant are New Brunswick’s Official Languages Act and Ontario’s Courts of
Justice Act. An initiative by the government of Manitoba 21 has established
a bilingual provincial circuit court and in-depth work has been carried
out in Nova Scotia 22 to provide for fuller provision for the Francophone
community. 23 In 2008, the Criminal Code was amended, clarifying lan-
guage rights within the courts both in respect of the accused and in
respect of the language of proceedings. The Code now requires judges
in criminal proceedings throughout Canada to advise all accused of this
right, regardless of whether they are represented by counsel. Nonetheless,

there are significant operational difficulties involved in the application
of these initiatives and laws, including a lack of adequately trained bilin-
gual personnel at all levels to enable the exercising of these rights in full
confidence.
Following its three-year term, the federal government’s Action Plan, the
cornerstone of its LPP, was replaced in 2008 by a new five-year plan, Feuille
de route pour la dualité linguistique canadienne 2008–2013: agir pour l’avenir.
The Roadmap is a slim document, a bare 18 pages in each language ver-
sion, including 3 pages of maps and tables. It lists five key areas for action
including: valuing linguistic duality, youth, access to services, economic
benefits and governance. However, it does not lay out any new vision for
the future. Whilst an apparently substantial budget increase accompanies
the Roadmap (from $750 million for the three-year Action Plan, to $1.1 bil-
lion per year for the five-year Roadmap), in his annual report for 2008–9,
COL / CLO Graham Fraser states that these increases, ‘ne suffiront pas à
relever l’ensemble des nouveaux défis auxquels les communautés devront
faire face d’ici 2013.’ / ‘will not be sufficient to meet all the new challenges
that communities will face between now and 2013.’24 He is critical of the
failure to establish targets and goals for federal agencies within the plan,
and deplores changes in governance structures that have weakened good
practice. Efforts by federal agencies to promote bilingualism and the LLO /
OLA betray signs of ‘la stagnation’ or have ‘plateaued.’25 Nonetheless, Fraser
states that in respect of federal government’s approach, ‘I can hardly argue
that this is a linguistic apocalypse.’26
Clearly, Canadian bilingualism could hardly have a broader national
and international audience for its achievements and failures than the 2010
Olympics. COL / CLO Graham Fraser warns that the place afforded to bilin-
gualism in the Games, ‘témoignera certainement de la mesure dans laquelle
le gouvernement fédéral saura harmoniser ces approches pour faire valoir le
caractère bilingue du pays. ‘ / ‘The place of bilingualism at the Vancouver
2010 Olympic Games will certainly attest to the federal government’s abil-
ity to harmonise these approaches in order to promote the country’s bilin-
gual character.’27 Fraser confirms28 that the weaknesses initially identified
by the Commission include, ‘translation, interpretation, signage, welcom-
ing of visitors by volunteers, and French-language content in the ceremo-
nies.’ Asked how he would define ‘failure’ in respect of federal LPP and the
Games, he states,
At the one-year countdown event, there was an embarrassing lack of

French-language cultural content; a similar absence at the Opening and
Closing ceremonies would be a failure ... . If Francophone visitors have
difficulty getting the information they need, that would be a failure. The
implications would be embarrassment, nationally and internationally,
for the government and for the Games.29
Furthermore, there has been an unresolved broadcast and media issue at

the heart of the 2010 Olympics, given the federal government’s decision
that the OLA does not require free universal access to broadcasts, thus
effectively ruling out access to French television coverage of the Games for
those Francophones throughout Canada not equipped with digital, cable
or satellite television (Canada 2007, p. 13). In addition, the different market
position of the Francophone print media has discouraged the organising
committee for the Games from adopting similar sponsorship agreements to
those signed with the Globe and Mail and with Canwest publishing in 2008.
Fraser has pointed out that failure to resolve the media issue will mean that
the two official language groups, ‘ne sont pas, dans ce cas, traités de façon
égale’ / ‘are not in this case being treated equally.’30
Linguistic peace: Waiting for the spark
In recent years, whilst the period has been described as one of relative calm,
there have been continual skirmishes on language rights throughout the
Canadian provinces. Department of Justice Head of Official Languages Law
Group, Marc Tremblay31 notes that whilst it is true that linguistic issues are
now approached with a greater maturity in Canada, linguistic peace is a
relative matter and, ‘On ne sait jamais d’où viendra la prochaine crise, mini-
crise, plus grande-crise, c’est toujours un peu difficile à en juger.‘ / ‘One
never knows where the next crisis, mini-crisis, bigger crisis will come from,
it’s always a bit difficult to judge.’32 The courts may themselves be the source
of friction, he states, ‘autant l’étincelle pourrait venir du fait qu’on n’a pas eu
de réponses à certaines questions, autant elle pourrait revenir parce qu’on
a des réponses.’ / ‘the spark might come from the fact that we do not have
answers to certain questions, or equally, it might come from the fact that
we do have answers.’
Examples of recent community tensions include those generated in June
2008 by an initiative in Russell, eastern Ontario to introduce additional
commercial signage in French, which resulted in public confrontation on
the main street between Anglophones and Francophones armed with plac-
ards; the Ontario electoral candidate for the Progressive Conservative party
who campaigned in March 2009 on a platform to reduce French language
services and remove Toronto’s designation under the LLO / OLA33; the
injunction sought in June 2009 by residents of Windsor, Ontario against
CBC’s decision to terminate local radio news in French34; the divisions in
the New Brunswick Francophone population itself over proposed changes
to the provision of health services in French, and the attempt in 2008 in
the same province to end access to French immersion education, resulting
instead after a hard-fought campaign, in its restriction at certain levels.35
In a development which may prove to be more significant than any other,
the Alberta case of Gilles Caron, served with a traffic ticket in English
only, and subsequently presented with a bill for interpretation when he
requested a court hearing in French, has the potential to impact on earlier

court rulings in respect of the ability of provincial governments to over-
ride federal statute. Understandably, given the Alberta Supreme Court’s
ruling in 198836 in respect of Section 110 of the Northwest Territories Act,
to which I have briefly referred in Chapter 1, this is a case that is drawing
close attention.
As discussed later in this section, Cardinal (2000) asserts that the judi-
cisation of LPP in Canada has been brought about by a deliberate policy
decision of Trudeau’s Executive. It is interesting to note that Tremblay feels
that the deliberate, slow pace of change within the legal system can have a
calming influence on what might otherwise be contentious and damaging
engagements either between linguistic minorities, or between them and
the federal government. In his opinion, ‘Ça maintient certains acquis de
société, et le changement se fait de façon progressive.’ / ‘This maintains
certain social gains, and change is made in a progressive manner.’ He com-
ments that the law has, ‘... un rythme déterminé, ça ouvre la place à la dis-
cussion ... On a l’occasion de prendre des décisions qui vont mieux aménager
le paysage linguistique.’ / ‘... a defined rhythm which opens up space for
discussion. ... This gives the opportunity to develop the linguistic land-
scape better’ (Author’s translations).37 However, at a community level, the
extremely slow progress in defining laws which in some cases have been on
the statute book for 40 years leads to great frustration. To date, successive
COL / CLO have been reluctant to call upon government to introduce regu-
lation. In Fraser’s view, regulation can lead to limitation of possibilities, the
creation of a ‘ceiling’ to provision rather than a firm basis. To combat this
tendency he says, ‘I really want as many different innovations and initia-
tives to have taken place first so that the regulation is written to encourage
and not to limit.’ To this end, he has set no firm timetable for drafting of
regulation to the LLO / OLA.
In the coming period, Francophone communities themselves in the ROC,
caught like so many minorities at the interfaces between politics, policy and
provision face certain new challenges. Rioux and Brady note (2008, p. 405)
that Francophones must ensure not only that their priorities are incorpo-
rated into those of government, but that they themselves have a voice in
negotiations between federal and provincial governments in respect of serv-
ice agreements. The danger in this approach is that it, ‘requiert un temps
énorme’ / ‘requires an enormous amount of time’ (Author’s translation) and
may lead to the neglect of community mobilisation and service provision
by Francophone communities themselves. In addition, the question of who
is entitled to speak for communities and what structures are best-suited is a
recurring one, and given past experience, the possibility of federal govern-
ment opposing Quebec’s interests with those of francophonie in the ROC
remains a key concern.
Part VII of the OLA
Part VII (Section 41) of the 1988 LLO / OLA makes a link between commu-
nity vitality and the provisions of the constitution. However, from 199638
onwards, a series of federal government sponsored reports highlighted defi-
ciencies of the most fundamental type in the application of Part VII. In spite
of this, federal government consistently argued that Section 41 commit-
ments were of a policy nature, binding on federal agencies, but creating no
enforceable rights,39 a view at odds with that of successive COL / CLOs and
of the Francophone community itself.40 Finally, after four previous attempts,
on 25 November 2005, Law S-341 was passed, reinforcing and concretising
the positive measures federal bodies must employ in the implementation of
Section 41, providing a regulatory framework, and finally making Part VII
justicible in the courts.
Ironically, the first test of Law S-3 came after a bout of funding cuts
in October 2006 which terminated the Court Challenges Programme /
Programme de contestation judiciare (CCP / PCJ), a federal initiative estab-
lished in 1978 initially around language rights and broadened after 1982 to
include other discrimination and equality issues under the CCRF / CCDL.
Cardinal (2000, p. 55) has argued that the CCP / PCJ was deliberately cre-
ated by the federal Executive as a judicial buffer zone between Quebec LPP
and Trudeau’s drive for national unity. Since the basis of federal LPP is the
equality of both OLs, decisions in favour of minority Francophone rights
in the ROC bolstered the rights of the Anglophone minority in Quebec.
Thus, between 1994 and 2006, the CCP funded 160 language rights cases,
around 30 per cent of the total number of cases funded under the pro-
gramme. It has been said that the CCP / PCJ, ‘a joué un rôle dans presque
toutes les décisions d’importance rendues par des tribunaux depuis 1994
sur des questions relatives aux droits des minorités de langue officielle au
Canada.’ / ‘has played a role in almost all the decisions of importance given
by tribunals since 1994 on matters relative to the rights of official language
minorities in Canada.’42 Nonetheless, the CCP / PCJ had a chequered his-
tory.43 It was criticised for a structural lack of transparency, and attacked by
social conservatives as being little more than ‘a slush-fund for left-leaning
groups to circumvent the will of elected legislators by challenging them in
court.’44
Progressive NGOs45 criticised the cut to the programme. The Fédération
des communautés francophones et acadiennes du Canada (FCFA) filed a chal-
lenge, providing the first opportunity for Canadian courts to rule on the scope
of Part VII of the Act as amended in 2005. Marc Tremblay46 lists three key
reasons for the importance of the FCFA case. First of all, because it gave rise to
the belief ‘qu’il y a aura éventuellement une considération par les tribunaux
de ce que toute cette nouvelle Partie VII pouvait signifier, cette obligation de
prendre des mesures positives’ / ‘that there would eventually be a considera-

tion by the courts of what this new Part VII, this obligation to take positive
measures, might signify’ (Author’s translation).47 Second, since the evidence
was presented in detailed written form, by the FCFA, by the Official Languages
Commissioner and by the Procurator-General, the case would be founded upon
‘un débat assez bien développé ‘ / ‘a fairly well developed debate.’ Finally, the
FCFA’s arguments were orientated towards a definition not simply of the need
to consult, but of the participatory role of communities in decision-making on
federal measures affecting minority language communities.
Several days before the judgement was to be made by the court, fed-
eral government proposed the Language Rights Programme, with the
single focus of access to funding for court challenges grounded in the
LLO / OLA, a much narrower equality focus than the previous CCP /
PCJ. It offered a tripled budget, from some $2 million to $5.5 million,
and agreed a degree of flexibility within the different programme budget
lines. Tremblay contends that the rationale for exclusion was that since
the FCFA litigation focussed on Article 16, the language rights clause,
the settlement did the same. Graham Fraser, COL / CLO, however, com-
ments48 that he had been privately assured by MPs and other govern-
ment figures that the CCP /PCJ had been cut initially in order to restrict
access to funding not to linguistic minorities, but rather to gay, lesbian
and transgender groups. He acknowledges some doubts about the narrow
focus of the settlement on offer, but decided, ‘My mandate covers lan-
guage. That is the lens through which I am going to look at this.’ On his
opinion on the offer, he comments,
My conclusion after our legal people looked at this was that this was an
appropriate way to go. I have occasionally had second thoughts since ... .
At some point we have got a rendezvous with the Supreme Court to define
the scope of Part VII of the Act. At that moment, I wasn’t sure that this was
the best case to pursue for the subsequent good five years that it would
take to go through the court process.
The decision, however, he stresses, lay with the FCFA. ‘It was a decision
that caused a fair amount of dissension within the Executive of the FCFA.
There were people who felt that the government couldn’t be trusted, that
any progress they had made had been through court decision, not govern-
ment decisions.’ Stormy scenes followed, with New Brunswick MP and FCFA
Executive member, Yvon Cadet, accusing the COL / CLO of overstepping his
brief and accepting a ‘half a loaf’ decision. Fraser rejects the accusation, but
acknowledges, ‘If the program in support of language rights turns out to be
ineffective, he will be right. But hindsight is always 20–20 and you have to
make your decisions based on what you know.’ Indications are now that the
Language Rights Programme will be established by the end of 2009. Fraser
notes the importance of underlining its independence, saying, ‘The key

thing, and it will be pretty clear from the outset I think, is the organisation
being set up to be effective? Or to appear to be effective, but not to be?’
Within a year of the out-of-court FCFA settlement, the Desrochers case,49
with intervention from the OL Commissioner, had brought Part VII back
into the courts, this time terminating in a court ruling which, whilst find-
ing against the plaintiff, opened the way to a redefinition of the intercon-
nected nature of obligations under Part VII. Tremblay comments, ‘Et ça,
c’est nouveau’ / ‘And that, that’s new.50‘
LLP and CR in Quebec
Parmi l’oeuvre durable de tous les hommes politiques contempo-

rains, celle de Camille Laurin est une des plus essentielles ... S’il
n’avait pas eu l’intelligence et le courage de mettre de l’avant la loi
101, de la défendre et de la faire approuver, ce n’est pas certain que
la résilience québécoise serait encore possible.51
Among the lasting work of all contemporary politicians, that of
Camille Laurin is one the most essential. If he had not had the
intelligence and the courage to put Law 101 to the fore, to defend
it and to get it approved, it is not certain that Québécois resilience
would still be possible (Author’s translation).
Bernand Landry, former Prime Minister of Quebec (2009)
While the Québécois population is reassured by the remarkable

progress French has made in the last generation, its political and
intellectual elites are aware of the fragility of these gains. If I am
right, then it follows that the Québécois will not achieve independ-
ence: too many feel too secure to want it now and they will be too
weak to have it – or even want it – later.
Laponce 2003, p. 302
In this section, I shall briefly outline some of the dominant and deeply
contrasting views from within Quebec of current LPP in the period after
the 1995 referendum on secession to the present. I have noted in Chapter 1
that Quebec, as a ‘settler’ society having a majority Francophone popula-
tion of some 6 million people, fits somewhat oddly (though not uniquely
in linguistic terms52) into the category of ‘minority.’ I have also attempted
to show how federal approaches to CR over 40 years have established a
legislative and policy framework that affects both Quebec’s internal and
external relationships as well as its LPP. Minority ‘status’ in conflict car-
ries with it many complexities; the underlying questioning of self-worth,
hidden anger and mistrust and their partial counterparts, the aggression
and narrow focus borne of insecurity; great courage and drive for change
co-existent with frustration and boredom at apparently endless repetition

of the same scenarios. Space limitations in this book curtail the in-depth
investigation of many important trends affecting Quebec (and Canadian)
society. At this juncture, it is appropriate nonetheless to note that discussion
of LPP in Quebec takes place in the context of intense ongoing debate on the
nature of Québécois identity, on contrasting arguments around ethnicity
and modernisation; on the use of French as the common language of public
life, and on the accommodations appropriate for Quebec society to make in
respect of its growing immigrant population.53
The application of the CFL / CLF, Quebec’s Loi 101
As noted in Chapter 1, the introduction in 1976 of Law 101, the Charter

for the French Language (CFL / CLF), in Quebec was a defining moment
in Canadian LPP. Not only does Quebec’s territorial approach to LPP
run counter to the personality approach of federal LPP, since 1988
when sections of the federal OLA were incorporated into the Canadian
Constitution, the CFL / CLF has clashed in some key respects with the
Canadian Constitution, most notably in the cases of public signage, edu-
cation, and in respect of Article 133 of the CCRF / CCDL, which declares
that both English and French are official languages throughout Canada.
Since 1995, the CFL / CLF has been modified three times, in 1997, to
facilitate administrative arrangements, 54 and to ensure that all software
available in French elsewhere was also marketed in Quebec; in 2000, to
define when a municipal organisation could use bilingual signage; and
in 2002, when Bill 104 was unanimously adopted by the Quebec parlia-
ment, to improve the use and quality of French in colleges and univer-
sities, to close a loophole whereby the better-off could purchase a year
of English Medium private education, thus gaining access to English
Medium Quebec-state funded education thereafter and passing on the
right to English Medium Education to the next generation in the fam-
ily. Additionally, Bill 104 sought to improve trade union representation
in francisation committees in the workplace, provides for training and
monitoring of francisation agreements.
Bill 104 was immediately subject to court challenge on the basis that it
contravened the CCRF / CCDL. Anglophone activist and lawyer, Brent Tyler,
acting on behalf of 25 families, defended the right of some 57 children to
access Quebec government-funded English Medium education on the basis
of having been enrolled in private English Medium schools the previous year.
In August 2007, two of three Quebec Appeal Court judges ruled in favour
of the challenge, arousing strong reaction in Quebec,55 not least because
of the well-established former links of one of the judges, Allan Hilton with
Anglophone pressure group, Alliance Quebec.56 The Quebec government
immediately applied for the ruling to be suspended pending challenge in
a higher court. In December 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada heard

the cases.57 Quebec’s government defended the constitutionality of Bill 104,
and was supported by the Procurator General of Canada in the Nguyen case.
The federal COL / CLO, Graham Fraser, intervened, stating in support of
the challenge to Bill 104 that the interpretation adopted by the Court in
relation to Section 23(2)58 of the CCRF / CCDL had potentially significant
repercussions for the Anglophone minority in Quebec. The Supreme Court
is expected to give its judgement in the case by the end of 2009.
In terms of modifications to the CFL / CLF over a period of years,
Counsellor and spokeswoman for the Secrétariat de la politique linguis-
tique (SPL), Gisèle Delage, 59 agrees that the law has been weakened, but
she believes that it remains, ‘une loi qui nous permet de montrer la valeur
de vivre en français ... La Charte a eu des effets très positifs. Ce qu’on a
perdu de la Charte, c’était peut-être inévitable’ / ‘a law which permits us
to demonstrate the value of living through the French language ... The
Charter has had some very positive effects. What we have lost from the
Charter [text] was perhaps inevitable’ (Author’s translation). 60 Further,
she points out that a number of the amendments made to the CFL / CLF
were necessary to update the legislation in order to encompass new tech-
nology and other changes in public life over 30 years. The high percent-
age of complaints successfully resolved by the Office québécoise de la
langue française (OQLF) without recourse to the courts is an indication
for the SPL of the efficacy of the approach of the CFL / CLF61 but it is
also clear that the SPL prefers negotiation and mediation over the courts.
Delage’s comments may imply a certain defensiveness in Quebec society
on language issues. She says of the CFL / CLF, ‘On avait besoin de cette
loi-là. On veut tellement la préserver que l’on cherche toujours la paix
linguistique pour protéger la loi.’ / ‘We needed this Act. We want to pre-
serve it so much that we always seek linguistic peace in order to protect
the Act’ (Author’s translation).
Quebec Policy on provision of services

through the French language
The SPL notes in its 2005 strategic plan the need to strengthen the French
language in the workplace, in the business and commercial sectors; to pro-
mote and develop the quality of the French language in use in Quebec and
to consolidate Quebec’s LPP. However in 2008, Robert Dutrisac, a jour-
nalist with Le Devoir newspaper, denounced the approach of the Quebec
government,62 alleging that over 75 per cent of immigrants were receiving
provincial services in English. He also established that having once asked
to use English with Quebec government institutions, immigrants could
then receive all correspondence and services from the Quebec government
in English in perpetuity. Amidst public consternation, Quebec minister
responsible for the CFL / CLF, Christine Saint-Pierre quickly declared that,
‘Les services en anglais aux immigrants Anglophones ne seront plus per-
manents.’ / ‘Services in English to English-speaking immigrants will no
longer be permanent.’ Meanwhile, Le Devoir was demanding that a parlia-
mentary commission be appointed to examine the application of the CFL /
CLF by government bodies,63 pointing out that some government bodies
themselves communicate in English with companies in Quebec,64 and use
more English than French on websites.65 In a strongly worded response to
the media storm, the government body with ultimate responsibility for the
CFL / CLF, the Conseil supérieur de la langue française (CSLF), stated that
Prime Minister Charest should intervene to ensure that immigrants com-
menced receiving services in French at an early juncture after arrival and
that the practice of government departments in Quebec communicating in
English with companies stop immediately.66
Following broad public consultation, the Quebec government launched
a ministerial action plan, drafted in conjunction with the SPL. Réussir
ensemble en français dovetails with a five-year initiative launched in
October 2008 by Quebec’s Prime Minister, Jean Charest, and Isabelle
Hudon, the director of Montreal’s Chamber of Commerce.67 For Jacques
Gosselin, Director of the SPL,68 the initiative represents part of ‘un vaste
plan’ / ‘a vast plan’ by the government of Quebec to reinforce the fran-
cisation of immigrants and to underline the position of French as the
province’s official language, and as, ‘une des valeurs communes fon-
damentales de la société québécoise’ / ‘one of the fundamental shared
values of Quebec society’ (Author’s translation). Other commentators
remain sceptical. Castonguay asserts (2008 p. 75), ‘Pendant que les uns
et les autres se félicitent de l’effet de la loi 101 sur la francisation des
allophones à l’étranger, à Montréal l’anglais continue d’assimiler une pro-
portion démesurée d’allophones de même qu’un nombre non négligeable
de Francophones.’ / ‘Whilst this one and that one congratulate them-
selves on the effect of Law 101 on the francisation of allophones abroad,
in Montreal the English language continues to assimilate a dispropor-
tionate number of allophones as well as a less than negligible number of
Francophones’ (Author’s translation).
Mario Beaulieu,69 President of the SSJB is also highly critical of the role
of the current Quebec government in the application of the CFL / CLF, and
says that in recent years,
On est revenu à un bilinguisme institutionnel. La loi 101 essentiellement

avait dit, c’est le français la langue de l’état, la langue officielle, avec des
mesures d’exception pour la minorité historique anglophone. Ce qui est
arrivé, c’est qu’on est revenu à un bilinguisme officiel pour tout le monde,
ou a peu près.
We have returned to an institutional bilingualism. Law 101 essentially

had said that French is the language of the state, the Official language,
with exceptional measures for the historic Anglophone minority. What
has happened is that we have come back to an official bilingualism for
almost everyone, or more or less. (Author’s translation)
Beaulieu deplores the reluctance of the Quebec government to challenge the

ongoing federal practice of hearing in English court cases in Quebec falling
under the remit of federal institutions (as for example in the case of immi-
gration appeals);70 the failure to francisise higher and third level education;
the ongoing funding imbalance in favour of Quebec’s English language uni-
versities; and the increasingly common use of bilingual public information
signage by government itself.
Francisation of companies
Francisation satisfies both the federalists and the separatists. For the
federalists, if the Charter [CFL / CLF] succeeds, it helps French speak-
ers to accept that they can live in Canada and be culturally sovereign.
For sovereigntists, they believe that the success of the Charter will make
Québec so French that in the long term people will choose sovereignty...
The language issue can’t be separated from the political fabric of Canada.
It comes back again and again. Any politician who tries to be indiffer-
ent to it will be reminded very quickly. It is part of the political fibre in
Quebec especially. (Gérald Paquette, 200671)
In the 1970s, there was intense opposition from Anglophone business soci-
ety to the articles of the CFL / CLF dedicated to changing the language
of the Quebec workplace from English to French. This led to significant
modifications in the original version of the law.72 Francisation provides
for the negotiation between the Quebec state and a given company of an
agreed timescale for use of French as the predominant language of work
and internal communication, in the firm’s written documents and in com-
munication with clientele, suppliers and the general public; in advertising
and recruitment. In turn, it provides for the establishment of francisa-
tion committees in the workplace and gives protection for workers using
French in the workplace. The legislation itself applies only to companies
employing more than 50 people, but as noted earlier, a new voluntary
initiative for companies employing between 11 and 49 workers was intro-
duced in 2008.
The OQLF contends that between 1991 and 2001 the French mother-
tongue population was the most active (64.9 per cent) within the Quebec
workforce overall, compared with 63.1 per cent of the English mother-
tongue population and 59.6 per cent of the allophone mother-tongue
population active in the workplace.73 However, as noted, the overwhelm-

ingly Francophone nature of Quebec may obscure patterns of change in
more linguistically vulnerable areas when information is recorded in this
manner. As noted earlier in this chapter, Castonguay (2008) has been
highly critical of the statistical work of the OQLF, asserting that it does
not reveal what language is most commonly in use by Francophones when
addressing Anglophone colleagues on work matters, and that it attempts
to disguise the increasing power of English in the workplace in Montreal.
Indeed, the OQLF concedes that the use of the French language in the
workplace appears to be falling in the Montreal region in both govern-
ment and non-governmental employment and that this is most noticeable
on the Island of Montreal.
Statistics quoted in relation to language of use in the workplace in the
Montreal Metropolitan Region and on the Island of Montreal also show sig-
nificant differences, as shown in Table 9.2.
Conversely, 69 per cent of mother-tongue English speakers are reported
to use English only or mainly in the workplace within the MMR, rising to
73.6 per cent on the Island of Montreal; 41 per cent of allophones in both the
MMR and the Island areas use French only or mainly in the workplace, whilst
38 per cent use English only or mainly. The fall in use of French by recent
immigrants gives cause for concern, showing that in the MMR, 49.4 per cent
of immigrants in the period 1971–90 used French in the workplace, compared
Table 9.2 2001 Percentage of French mother-tongue speakers using French only or
with another language in the workplace
Outside Montreal Within Montreal Island of

Metropolitan Region Metropolitan Region Montreal
% of French mother 96.2 88.1 84.4

tongue using French
Source: Quebec government, Synthèse p. 25
Table 9.3 Percentage of immigrants using predominantly French, English or another

language in the workplace
Language of workplace Percentage
French only / mainly 48.5

No French at all 22.2
English only / mainly 32.8
French and English equally 12.8
Other language (s) 2.2
with 45 per cent of those arriving since 1991. By 2001, the workplace language
of immigrants to Quebec is said to be very varied, as shown in Table 9.3.
To implement the CFL / CFL, there is a list of companies in Quebec
employing more than 50 employees who are obliged to comply with a proc-
ess of francisation overseen by the OQLF. However, not all the companies
that employ such numbers fall within the remit of the CFL / CLF. With
estimates of the overall number of companies in Quebec reaching as many
as 50,000, only some 5640 of these are bound by the legislation at present.
Those that are found to be compliant are awarded a Certificat de francisation.
In recent years, a three-year renewal of certification has been introduced to
ensure permanent and ongoing change. Any listed company which fails to
meet its obligations can be subject to a modest fine, although it appears that
this is a relatively rare phenomenon, with 98 per cent of such cases being
settled before they reach court. For the incorrigible, however, Paragraph 22
of the CFL / CLF prevents businesses not in compliance from receiving gov-
ernment subsidies or contracts, a potentially more powerful persuader. Of
the 5640 companies that fall under the CFL / CLF, 4551 have complied with
the law and been certified. Of 2155 public service networks in the health,
social services, municipal and education fields, 1917 are compliant. Most
government bodies under the CFL / CLF (139 of 163) have complied with
their obligations.74
Martin Bergeron, Public Relations Officer and OQLF spokesperson75 notes
that in recent years a loophole in the CFL / CLF has been identified which
allowed companies to display no signage other than their registered trade-
mark, which may not be in French, thus impacting on the French ‘face’ of
Quebec. The OQLF has adjusted its policy to ensure that any such trademark
is officially registered, and now further requires the company to add descrip-
tion in French to its signage. Bergeron emphasises the softly, softly approach
of OQLF counsellors in francisation work, but acknowledges, ‘C’est certain
qu’au bout de la line, la loi doit être respectée.’ / ‘It’s certain that at the end
of the day the law must be respected’ (Author’s translation). In spite of the
CFL / CLF stipulation that francisation be completed by 1983, it is in fact
a work in progress, Bergeron states, due to new company registration and
three yearly visits to ensure compliance. He emphasises that the OQLF is
committed to the task.
On the 2008 government / SPL policy voluntary initiative in respect of
companies of fewer than 50 employees, he cites the availability of financial
support for some of the costs of francisation as the key incentive for small
companies to register for such a scheme. He states,
Peut-être qu’ils prévoient, ces entreprises-là, justement à un moment

donné, avoir cinquante employés ou plus, et donc qu’ils seront obligés
de se franciser. Alors, les entreprises qui voient long-terme se disent, je
vais le faire tout de suite parce que je peux avoir une contribution finan-
cière de la part de l’Office. Alors, je vais m’inscrire volontairement et

l’Office défraie 50 pour cent des coûts de ce qui concerne la technologie
de l’information.76
Perhaps these companies foresee at a given moment having 50 employ-
ees or more, and therefore that they will be obliged to francisise. So, the
companies with a long-term view say, I am going to do that straight away
because I can get a financial contribution from l’Office, so I am going to
join voluntarily and l’Office will defray 50 per cent of the costs involved
with information technology. (Author’s translation)
Less far-sighted companies, however, or those that do not envisage having

more than 50 employees in the near future, may have less reason to volun-
teer for inspection. The success of this initiative will no doubt be tested over
time, but international experience shows that compliance with voluntary
initiatives is rarely as effective as legal obligation.
The price of language peace
Hostility from some of the Anglophone media as well as some in the

Anglophone community within Quebec creates a negative aspect to the
French language context which impacts in a variety of ways. Nonetheless,
Paquette (OQLF) says that open, active opposition to the protection and pro-
motion of the French language in Quebec is restricted to a few ‘die-hards’,
The resistance comes from older people and they may be the kind of peo-
ple who also resist changes in weights and measures and won’t accept the
change to kilometres and so on. They were at ease before, and happy like
that and now they resist all social change.
Asked about the attitude of the public at large in 2009, Bergeron notes that
in the current period,
Nous avons l’impression que peut-être les jeunes connaissent un peu

moins la Charte [CFL / CLF], connaissent un peu moins l’Office [OQLF].
Pourquoi? Parce qu’ils n’ont pas, eux, connu les guerres linguistiques des
années 1970s. Ils ont été habitués de vivre dans ce que certains appel-
lent la paix linguistique, alors ils ont appris à vivre à travers ça. Donc, ils
sentent peut-être moins le besoin de se plaindre. Ils connaissent peut-être
moins leurs droits, non plus.77
We have the impression that perhaps young people are less aware of the
Charter, less aware of the Office. Why? Because they themselves have
not gone through the linguistic wars of the 1970s. They are perhaps used
to living under what certain people call linguistic peace. So they have
learned to live through this and so they perhaps feel less the need to
complain. They are less aware of their rights, too (Author’s translation.)
He refers to the detrimental effect of some of the Anglophone media and

cites the example of the application of the 1997 amendment to the CFL /
CFL in respect of video games, referred to earlier. In 2007, the OQLF signed
an entente with the Association canadien du logiciel (ACL), suspending for
two years complaints regarding video games in English to allow the associa-
tion to develop new French language distribution systems. However, on 1
April 2009, the day that French language games finally became available,
a Toronto newspaper78 headlined that video games in English had been
banned in Quebec. Bergeron remarks,
Ça, c’est répandu très rapidement au Canada anglais, aux États Unis et
même ailleurs alors que nous, notre moyen de diffusion, c’est surtout
au Québec. Mais on a vraiment voulu essayer de rattraper la nouvelle.
Mais avec l’internet, ça va tellement vite qu’on n’en est pas capable.
Heureusement, les membres de l’Association (ACL) se sont tournés vers
l’Association pour demander, ‘Est-ce qu’il y a quelque chose de nouveau
là ou est-ce que ça, c’est vraiment l’entente?’ L’Association a pu rassurer
tout le monde. Nous ici, on rassurait les gens qui nous appelaient pour
leur expliquer l’entente. Des investisseurs étrangers, ils vont souvent nous
appeler parce que, justement, ils entendent des histoires et ils veulent
vérifier avant de venir. Lorsqu’ils vérifient, ils sont souvent très soulagés
de voir la différence entre ce qu’ils ont entendu et la réalité.
Now that, that spread very quickly through English Canada, to the
United States and even beyond, whereas for us, our information net-
works are mainly in Quebec. But we really wanted to try to catch back the
news story. But with the internet, it moves so fast that we are not able to.
Fortunately, members of the Association (ACL) turned to the Association
to ask, ‘Is there something new there, or is that, is it really the accord?’
The Association was able to reassure everyone. We too, we reassured peo-
ple who called us for our explanation of the accord. Foreign investors
often call us, precisely because they hear stories and they want to check
before they come. When they check, they are often very relieved to see
the difference between what they have heard and the reality (Author’s
translation.)
Mario Beaulieu of the SSJBQ is also highly aware of the value of informa-
tion in the communications war. He feels that the Québécois mindset has
been limited to a great degree by the constant stream of negative reporting
in the Anglophone media. He points out that the failure to equalise fund-
ing for Francophone and Anglophone higher and third level institutions
would be easy to resolve and would require no legislative action. He notes,
however, that such an initiative would provoke the Anglophone media and,
‘c’est ça qui terrorise un peu les souverainistes – les gens – tout ce pouvoir
médiatique-là du côté anglophone.’ / ‘That’s what terrorises a bit the sov-
ereigntists – the people – all that media power that the Anglophones have’
(Author’s translation).
LPP, mass movement and political parties
In spite of being ‘humbled’79 in the 2007 election and being overtaken in

some electoral areas by the right-wing Action démocratique du Québec
(ADQ), in the December 2008 elections, the PQ rallied. With commen-
tators predicting a comfortable victory for the Parti libéral du Québec
(PLQ), the turnout for the provincial elections in Quebec fell to a low of
57.33 per cent. The Liberals took the overall victory, but by a much closer mar-
gin than had been predicted, 66 seats and 42 per cent of the vote to the PQ’s
51 seats and 35 per cent. It appeared that less than two years since their poor
showing in the previous provincial election, PQ leader Pauline Marois had
guided the party back to Official Opposition status, in so doing becoming
Quebec’s first woman leader of the Opposition. At the same time, projected
support for ADQ was not reflected in the results, with its total of elected
representatives dropping from 41 in 2007 to a mere 7, forcing the retirement
of its party leader.
If the PQ itself might have wished for even more significant shows
of support, Radio Canada dubbed the party’s performance, ‘éclatante’ /
‘dazzling’80 and CBC commented that Marois had, ‘rebuilt a venerable
Quebec political institution.’81 In turn, Marois celebrated the new surge
of energy amongst the younger electorate which she attributed to a fresh
commitment to the sovereigntist position of her party.82 This point was
vigourously rebutted by newly elected Premier Jean Charest, who stated,
‘Les électeurs n’ont pas donné le mandat à Pauline Marois de ramener la
souveraineté à l’avant-plan du débat public.’ / ‘The electorate have not
given Pauline Marois a mandate to bring sovereignty back to the fore-
front of political debate’ (Author’s translation). 83 Rather, he asserted, the
electorate sought a resolution of the economic downturn and he accused
Marois of having made no reference to sovereignty during several previ-
ous elections. His complaint84 that Marois’ speech owed more to election-
night enthusiasm than active party policy will be judged in the coming
period, but his characterisation of sovereignty as ‘Pandora’s box’ speaks
volumes.
Another referendum?
If intergovernmental relations remain the subject of debate in Quebec so

does the probability – and indeed, the desirability – of another referendum
on independence. Having studied extensively opinion polls in the period

preceding and following the 1995 referendum, Gagné and Langlois (2002)
conclude that the segment of the Quebec population most likely to vote in
favour of secession in any future referendum encompasses all sections of
the population, and are characterised by an interest in and commitment to
a changed future. They state (2002, p. 9) that,
Un référendum sur la souveraineté du Québec ... porte quant à lui sur

l’avenir, sur un projet de société, et il met donc en cause chez les citoy-
ens la capacité de se projeter dans cet avenir. La capacité de lui donner
un sens et d’en imaginer les implications pour eux-mêmes, à plus forte
raison si ce projet implique une part de risques – risques réels ou perçus
comme réels.
A referendum on Quebec sovereignty ... deals in itself with the future,
with a social project, and so it brings into question the capacity of its
citizens to project themselves into that future. The capacity to give it a
sense and to imagine its implications for themselves, all the more so if
this project carries with it some risks, risks that are real or perceived as
real. (Author’s translation)
Thus, they state that the key supporters for any future attempt to achieve
independence will be in the 18–55 age group, Francophones, immigrants
and others active in the labour market (although they may be students
or temporarily unemployed people) and people having the resources to
meet their needs. Gagné and Langlois (2002, p.28) state that these groups
all consider, ‘la société québécoise comme un état de fait, et c’est la rai-
son pour laquelle ils réclament pour elle un état de droit’ / ‘Quebec soci-
ety as a state in fact, and this is why they demand for it a state in law’
(Author’s translation). Whilst there has been much stereotyping of who
would or would not vote either way in any given referendum, they chal-
lenge the notion that women per se, or immigrants per se tend to vote
against independence. Those groups or intra-groupings who perceive that
they have least to gain from change are most inclined to oppose it, with
Gagné and Langlois citing in particular retired people, women working in
the home, older Francophones and Anglophones. Support for sovereignty,
they aver (2002, p. 128), is not due to unchangeable historic conviction,
but rather, ‘elle fluctue plutôt comme une prise de position en faveur d’un
objet d’État sur lequel ces électeurs portent des jugements sensibles au con-
texte.’ / ‘it fluctuates rather like a stance in favour of a State objective on
which the voters make their judgements according to context’ (Author’s
translation).
It is clear that the issue of Quebec independence is still very much a living
issue, albeit one that will require a significant gear-shift in order to move it
away from its current stasis. However, the current ‘sovereignty movement’
appears fractured and disempowered, with the spontaneity and diversity
of political viewpoint that characterises broad mass action having been
lost. Nor is there a clear leadership from the political elite, which, drawn
from within the movement in the 1970s, coalesced into today’s PQ. Now a
part of Quebec’s establishment for over 33 years, the PQ has been accused
of promoting itself at the expense of the issues and of belonging to the
social groupings who have gained most from institutional change. Gagné
and Langlois (2002, p. 136) assert that not only have party members for-
saken political progress for personal gain but also they no longer know the
difference.
As noted in the previous section, Mario Beaulieu, President of SSJBQ, is
also concerned that fatigue, disillusion and a lack of leadership threaten
Quebec’s LPP. He states that current PLQ government policy is in default
of Quebec’s CFL / CLF and that there is a malaise within LPP, brought
about by lack of commitment to fundamental issues. In spite of the 2008
election result, he is highly critical of the PQ’s ability to move forward
in opposition either on the issue of linguistic rights or on sovereignty.
He points out that the party appears unsure of itself, tokenistic in sup-
port of linguistic rights and sovereignty and reluctant to be branded
‘extremist’. Instead, the party is endorsing more ‘liberal’ policies in
respect of multiculturalism and citizenship whilst maintaining a super-
ficial allegiance to more traditional party values of language, identity
and sovereignty. In his view the party appears to lack ability and direc-
tion. He states, ‘En ce moment les députés du Parti québécois ne seraient
pas capable de se défendre vraiment. Ils ne connaissent pas les dossiers,
ils ne comprennent pas, ils ne savent pas pourquoi la Loi 101 est là.’ /
‘At the moment, the PQ’s elected representatives would not really be
capable of defending themselves. They don’t know the documentation,
they don’t understand, they don’t know why Law 101 is there’ (Author’s
translation).
There is clearly a question mark as to whether or not the PQ will show
itself capable of adequate transformation in future. In the meantime,
Beaulieu believes that social change will come, but that it may not be as
dramatic as in the past. There is a growing unease in the population about
LPP, he says. ‘Je ne dirais pas nécessairement une crise, mais une évolu-
tion’ / ‘I would not say necessarily a crisis, but an evolution.’ He asserts,
‘Il faut se remobiliser, redescendre dans la rue ... Au niveau politique, c’est
bloqué ... Donc, en ce moment il n’y a pas vraiment d’alternative poli-
tique, donc on mobilise la société civile.’ / ‘We have to remobilise, get
out onto the street again. At the political level, it’s blocked ... So, at the
moment, there is really no political alternative, so we mobilise civil soci-
ety’ (Author’s translations).
Some conclusions on Quebec / Canada
At the heart of the matters addressed in the above chapter, there is the ques-
tion of intergovernmental relations between federal government and Quebec.
In the period since the last secession referendum in Quebec, federal LPP has
continued to walk the same path, in spite of changes of government: renew-
ing programmes, continuing with funding, committing to a bilingual face,
but also missing opportunities, tending towards protectionist secrecy and
lacking somewhat in vision and scope. Quebec LPP, having achieved enviable
success in redressing some key aspects of language behaviour, appears mori-
bund. It is unclear why there should be a lack of determination within gov-
ernment to drive LPP forward into areas like higher and further education, to
ensure delivery of federal services through French, or to ensure that Quebec
government practice itself consistently captures best practice. The result of
the 1995 referendum, the fluctuating fortunes of the various political parties
and the constant high-frequency multifaceted challenges to Quebec LPP are
clearly all contributory factors. At the present time, Quebec LPP appears to
lean towards the bilingualism that will dismantle its fundamental tenets,
since for Francophones, the gaining of a second language means the loss of
their first. Quebec political life is currently dominated by the PLQ, and its
Francophone community exhibits the strain of constantly fighting against
the tide in terms of language assimilation and the broader political issues.
Quebec society is relatively prosperous and peaceful, if deeply preoccupied
with issues of common identity for a highly ethnically and culturally mixed
population. The adoption of the CLF / CFL dramatically changed the posi-
tion of Quebec Francophones from a ‘minority’ to a ‘majority’ in provincial
linguistic matters. However, the imbalance in power between English and
French in North America means that merely maintaining the status quo
for French will always result in a diminution of its influence and further
assimilation. The investment of intellectual, physical and emotional energy
required to mount a continuing language battle should not be underesti-
mated. Interestingly, both in Quebec and in the ROC, those questioning the
effectiveness of current LPP are met universally by officialdom with the same
epithets in both official languages – ‘pessimiste’, ‘depressing’, ‘noir’. In spite
of the wealth of commentary on LPP, there is an apparent reluctance at both
provincial and federal governmental levels to engage with negative analysis
of the effectiveness of each of the two different language policies.
It appears unlikely that were the constitutional conflict between
Quebec and the ROC to be resolved by some radical initiative, its origins
would be in a Conservative government. The underlying aim of Canadian
unity, defined and reinforced very specifically by Trudeau’s Liberals and
their use of federal LPP in the 1980s to counterbalance Quebec national-
ism, is deeply embedded in the Canadian mindset. There appears little
sign that Harper’s government intends to move away from the pursuit
of nation-statism. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that Canada’s
reputation as a place that has acquired great theoretical and practical lan-
guage expertise is well-deserved, both at a federal level and in Quebec
LPP. Although many challenges have been identified and debated, there
is measurable and enviable achievement as well as awareness and com-
mitment at government, academic and community levels. Organisations
and individuals carry out laudable and effective work. The symbolic sta-
tus of two official languages has been balanced by federal government,
contributing to relatively high levels of bilingualism amongst the domi-
nant language grouping, the Anglophones. This is notable particularly
since, worldwide, English-speakers tend to be notoriously monolingual,
and since in a North American context, they overwhelmingly outnumber
any other linguistic grouping. In Quebec, radical, far-reaching legislation
to protect the French language has been in force for some 25 years. The
English appearance of Montreal was transformed, the status of French
as the common language of Quebec has been established. Challenges
remain in Quebec, but as Guy Boutillier states,85 LPP in Quebec, ‘n’est
certainement pas un échec’ / ‘is certainly not a failure’ (Author’s transla-
tion). It is important and relatively easy to note the successes of federal
and Quebec LPP. However, what the observer must ascertain is whether
in today’s climate the two different LPP approaches are capable of com-
plementary interaction, or whether they remain oppositional in fact as
well as in intention. As noted in Chapter 1, for those living with strug-
gle, at certain political stages, when the situation quietens or when the
paths of erstwhile antagonists converge for a time, the litany of ‘reasons
to be cheerful’ delivered by politicians and their spin doctors through the
media, and through selected community voices can be hard to disentan-
gle from less self-interested analysis. Mass communications for a given
political aim can stifle all but the most strident of dissenters, marginalis-
ing discordant notes and preventing valid and progressive criticism from
bringing about the degree, range and type of change necessary for minor-
ity groups to flourish. On one hand, the need for security and safety is
hard-wired into the human system. Most of us do not want conflict, we
want peace. On the other hand, as noted previously, dominant societal
systems are often flexible enough to protect their power whilst appear-
ing to change. The challenge for minoritised language communities is
to decide whether the fundamental conflict has been resolved to their
satisfaction, and if not, how they should act.
Conclusions
Languages may be minoritised as part of deep-rooted and long-lasting

power conflicts, often colonial, ethnic or nationalist in nature. Definitions
of conflict are fluid, and the theory and practice of conflict resolution con-
tains within it contradictions and inconsistencies. Where struggle has been
ongoing over a period of years, evaluating the success of any given CR proc-
ess is influenced by changing values and political priorities as well as the
moulding of relationships among the conflict parties. Domestic law is often
part of the arsenal of the state in maintaining its dominance. Since World
War II, the international ‘club’ of nation states has devised self-protecting
approaches to conflict resolution geared towards the maintenance of stabil-
ity within individual member states and at a broader international level.
Mechanisms to protect human, minority and, to a lesser extent, linguistic
rights have grown from this context. Soft law has been criticised for par-
ticular failure in conflict situations. It remains unjusticiable in domestic
courts. In the case of self-determination, the shifting goals of nation states
in different centuries have created an ongoing confusion in the law which
disadvantages the less powerful in nationalist conflicts. Language rights are
currently poorly served in soft law instruments, contributing to the mar-
ginalisation of minoritised language communities within the broader anti-
discrimination, equality and human rights debate.
The goal of minoritised language communities is to seek to promote and
protect their languages through effective action. The nature of linguistic
assimilation means that revitalisation requires the instigation and manage-
ment of change in societal behaviour. Whilst many gains can be made at
an individual, family and community level, the treatment of minoritised
languages at the interface between State and speaker impacts deeply on lan-
guage maintenance. It affects the perceived and real status of a language, its
use in various spheres of life and therefore corpus development, funding,
human resourcing and integration into other areas of state policy. Whereas
state LPP should comprise a set of discrete proposals geared to language
promotion and protection, it may in fact more closely resemble domination
227
politics in another guise. In this way, even where the policy of the state is to
have no policy, this approach is in fact its LPP. It is inevitable therefore, that
evaluating how best to relate to the state is a constant concern for minori-
tised language communities.
As noted in Chapter 1, the experience of the Francophone linguistic
minority in Canada and that of the Irish speaking community in Ireland has
some similarities. Both situations share themes including: British colonial
influence and impacts on constitutional, administration and domestic and
international legal matters; institutionalised power and linguistic imbal-
ances between ethnic groups, in favour of the pro-British settler group; con-
sociational CR arrangements, and evidence of LPP devised by the dominant
power to achieve broader political aims. However, whilst Quebec provides
an internationally important example of LPP which has effectively changed
language behaviour in favour of the minoritised French language, as noted
in Chapters 2 and 3, the Irish experience, post-partition, has been far less
successful. Successive Irish governments have been criticised for failing to
revitalise the Irish language in line with its constitutional status of ‘first
official language’ of the RoI. The GFA has not provided a sufficiently robust
mechanism to ensure the development of positive LPP in the North, or to
encourage effective, appropriate all-Ireland approaches to LPP grounded in
the realities of the two jurisdictions. Therefore the CR arrangements put in
place in the later 1990s contain within them the seed of current difficulties:
ongoing management of the CR process in British and Unionist interests,
marginalisation of the Irish speaking community within the ‘nationalist’
elite pillar of the consociational structures, the locked-in double veto of the
two main elites, failure to engender genuine all-Ireland LPP.
The ability of international instruments to impact in conflict situations is
examined in Chapter 4 in which the UK application of the ECRML to date
is outlined. The British government has selected the least number of para-
graphs and ‘weakest’ options for Irish. There is a disparity in treatment of
Irish in the North in comparison with the other two languages recognised
under Part III, Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland. Application of the
provisions for Irish to date has been unfocussed and lacklustre. In addition,
whilst the ECRML has proven inadequate to protect the Irish language, it
has been used to provide a framework for the persistent linking of Irish lan-
guage provisions with Ulster Scots, in spite of advice from the COMEX that
this is inappropriate. In fact, this practice has increasingly driven devolved
LPP since 2007, as noted in Chapter 6. The failure of the UK government to
deliver an agreed report for the Council of Europe during the third monitor-
ing cycle of the ECRML has highlighted the increasingly conflictual context
in which the Irish language exists in the North. The response of the COMEX
to this phase in monitoring will prove most significant, not simply for its
application in the UK, but in terms of its future credibility as a instrument
to structure and measure positive LPP.
Conclusions 229
In spite of the GFA and the ECRML, the British government has continued
to exclude the Irish language from UK broadcasting legislation. Chapter 5
describes the consultation and background to the UK Communications
Act 2003 and the BBC Royal Charter 2005. The historic suspicion of the
BBC towards Irish still impacts Irish language provision from the main PSB
broadcaster, and is now increasingly linked to Ulster Scots programming,
in spite of apparent confusion as to what exactly this is. The technical dif-
ficulties surrounding access to TG4 throughout the North and the inad-
equacy of transferring responsibility for Irish language programming solely
to an Irish state broadcaster are discussed, in the light of attitudes within
TG4 as to who is its primary audience and of the 2009 proposals McCarthy
Commission for cuts to TG4’s budget. The fact that the positive performance
of the CCG / ILBF has not led to a secure funding future shows that small
gains made post-GFA have not become mainstreamed.
There is impressive vitality and cohesion in the Irish speaking community
in the NoI. Efforts by the Irish language community to favourably influence
British LLP in the period following the GFA culminated in well-developed
proposals for Irish language legislation and a commitment within the SAA,
a joint British-Irish government accord, that the British government would
enact an Irish Language Act. Chapter 6 outlines the manner in which the
overwhelmingly supportive response to the proposed legislation was side-
lined to allow the British government to use the Irish language as a bartering
tool. Arguably, this outcome is advertised in the governmental consulta-
tion documents themselves which place emphasis throughout on ‘union-
ist sensitivities’, incorporate unusual features including a Financial Impact
Assessment, and encompass two separate Equality Impact Assessments, one
finding no adverse outcomes to Irish language legislation, and the other
making the bizarre assertion that a rights-based approach to Irish Medium
Education would be discriminatory, whereas a schemes-based approach
would not. The failure to date of the Irish government and the North’s
nationalist parties to challenge effectively the broken British promise has
reinforced the use of the Irish language as a political football within the
devolved institutions. In addition, the decision by both Northern nation-
alist parties to allow the ministry responsible for LPP, Culture, Arts and
Leisure to be taken by the party most hostile to the Irish language, the DUP,
has further marginalised the Irish speaking community within the political
process and the consociational institutions at the present time. Perceived
political protectionism, secrecy and ineffectiveness in the nationalist par-
ties have eroded confidence.
Chapters 7 and 8 seek to uncover and examine societal, sectoral and
organisational attitudes to the proposed Irish language legislation, as shown
in responses to the first governmental consultation in 2006–7. The responses
from a wide range of submissions show that prior to the re-establishment of
devolution in the North, there was a relative openness of attitude towards
Irish language legislation within society in general. However, a narrow band

of political unionism holds rejectionist views, and it was these that were
used by the British government to reinforce arguments for unionist partici-
pation in devolution.
There is a dilemma for minoritised language communities in their deal-
ings with political forces, a dilemma illustrated both in the North and in
Quebec as illustrated in Chapters 6 and 9. Effective LPP can fundamentally
alter the language behaviour of a society, but in conflict situations, domi-
nant political and linguistic forces will view both CR and LPP as instru-
ments to be wielded and moulded to protect hegemonic / majority interests.
Minoritised language communities face many difficult and challenging
decisions, particularly where their LPP goals are part of a wider conflict and
where they may find themselves at arm’s length from CR talks, negotiating
through political parties or movements which have priorities other than
language. Seeking the means to set benchmarks, to secure targets and cre-
ate objective standards to counteract the fluctuating interests of political
parties often orients minoritised language communities towards legal pro-
tections. Quebec’s CLF / CFL illustrates how central comprehensive, rights-
based legislation can be in effective LPP. However, where hegemonic powers
control domestic legislation, it is likely to be drafted, enacted and imple-
mented according to their aims, rather than those of minoritised language
communities. In contrast to Quebec LPP, federal LPP in Canada co-opts the
needs of Official language communities for the united Canada project. It
crystalises and systematises division on linguistic power lines, pitching the
powerful Anglophone minority in Montreal in opposition to the CLF / CFL
and contributing to divisions between Quebec and isolated Francophone
communities elsewhere. In the South of Ireland, LPP has been found want-
ing in spite of the apparent freedom of the state over 85 years to devise and
implement effective strategies. The level of ambiguity towards LPP in the
RoI impacts disproportionately on the North, where Irish government inter-
vention in support of the minoritised language community has not always
been consistent, strategic or effective, a situation unlikely to be resolved by
a 20-year plan entirely focused on southern conditions. In the NoI, British
government LPP has been implemented entirely in accordance with British
political interests, clearly delineated in the period since the GFA by mini-
malism in the protection, promotion or development of the Irish language,
and disproportional generosity in the promotion of Ulster Scots.
In both Quebec and the NoI, those with a specific language promotion
agenda express disillusion at the ability of political parties to move the
LPP agenda forward. In turn, this leads to a degree of deep-seated instabil-
ity within intra- and inter-group political relations. As Tremblay remarks
in Chapter 9, there is no knowing which spark will start a blaze. Former
advocates of independence, now seemingly supporting institutions which
reinforce interlocking relations may experience unease and insecurity. In
Conclusions 231
turn, this may result in defensive / aggressive action to stifle criticism in the
media and in the community; to vilify analytical commentators as ‘nega-
tive’; to sideline particular NGOs; to withdraw funding and so on. Such
apparently punitive action leads to a cycle of reaction, which may culmi-
nate in the transfer of sufficient electoral support to change the intra-group
balances in power. However, the consociational model tends to fossilise rela-
tionships, making vote transfer outside each pillar rather unlikely. This nar-
rows the options and minoritised language communities may be faced with
a choice of those by whom they feel let down, or those who have previously
been less radical or less active on language issues. If the dichotomy becomes
one of ‘be used or be ignored’, it can only lead to deep disillusion and fur-
ther division detrimental to the minoritised language community and the
broader struggle against hegemonic power. Of course, new political parties
may spring up, although the extent to which a single party may be able to
unpick a complex CR structure developed over a period of time is doubtful.
The ousting of one-time popular leaders or entire parties by ‘new Turks’ is a
repetitive cycle unlikely to resolve the roots of conflict.
In Q / C and Ireland, North and South, it appears that for the moment
anyway, power relations have become stabilised within a CR context favour-
ing the interests of the dominant power. However, the Quebec experience
suggests that even in these circumstances, effective LPP can bring about
positive change within an overall conflict situation, as long as its implemen-
tation can be delineated and protected by those who support its discrete
language-based goals. It is unclear at the time of writing whether such cir-
cumstances can be created in the North, but the Irish speaking community
is determined and active. Developments in Quebec also shows however, that
to maintain LPP gains and to expand them exponentially into increasing
areas of life over time requires great resolve and focus, enormous reserves of
energy, a clear united vision and the ability to withstand the constant nega-
tive attention of the majority power. In Ireland and Quebec, independent
community voices are a vital part of the process to build effective LPP for a
stable, peaceful and forward-looking future.
Notes
Introduction
1. The author has been Chief Executive of the Irish language non-governmental
organisation POBAL since 1999. POBAL means ‘community’.
2. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Census 2001.
1 A Silent War: Conflict Resolution and Language Policy and

Planning in the North of Ireland and Quebec / Canada
1. ‘The struggle for human rights is inevitably a struggle for power, and one
that is generally tied to resources.’ Mary Robinson, Human Rights: A Global
Perspective, UN Global Compact U.S. Network Meeting, ‘Business and Human
Rights’ 28 April 2008, Harvard Business School.
2. Henry Patterson, Truth and Reconciliation in NI? Not much hope of either,
Parliamentary Brief, 9 February 2009, http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/
articles/2/new/truth-and-969_67_0.html, downloaded on 18/02/2009.
3. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.
pdf?OpenElement.downloaded 24/02/09.
4. Anonymous (1996, p. 258) Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, Human Rights
Quarterly 18, pp. 249–258.
5. Henry Patterson, Truth and Reconciliation in NI? Not much hope of either,
Parliamentary Brief, 9 February 2009, http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/
articles/2/new/truth-and-969_67_0.html, downloaded on 18/02/2009.
6. See for example Buchanan (1991, 1997a, 1997b), Cassese (1998), Copp (1997,
1999), Epseill (1980).
7. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), http://daccessdds.un.org/
doc/R ESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/152/88/IMG/NR015288.pdf?OpenElement,
downloaded 01/03/09.
8. The term ‘nationalist’ in the context of the north’s political parties implies support
for an all-Ireland political framework. Nationalists tend to be Catholic and regard
themselves as Irish. They are a significant minority of the population of NI, 43.8
per cent of the overall population of 1,685,267 according to the 2001 Census.
9. Unionism is the term applied to support for a full constitutional and institu-
tional relationship between Ireland and Great Britain, based on the Act of Union
1800, which sought to merge both countries into the UK. Following Partition,
in 1922, only the six north-eastern counties of Ireland (‘Northern Ireland’)
remain under UK jurisdiction. Unionists tend generally to be Protestant and
regard themselves as British. They are the majority section of the population in
NI, 53.1 per cent of the overall population of 1,685,267 according to the 2001
Census.
10. For an analysis of this period, see Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard (1975).
11. Loyalist is the term used to describe those who support and / or engage in mili-
tant paramilitary methods as their primary means to oppose the reunification
of Ireland. Members of loyalist organisations tend to be overwhelmingly
232
Notes 233
Protestant and are generally regarded as being of a working-class background.

During the CR process in the 1990s, two main loyalist paramilitary organisa-
tions, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) established legally constituted political parties, the Ulster Democratic
Party (UDP) and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), respectively. Due
to disagreement between the UDA and the UDP regarding power-sharing,
the UDP dissolved in 2001. Its former role is now carried out mainly by the
Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG), which has no elected representatives.
The PUP won one Assembly seat in the 2007 elections. Both the UDA and
the UVF have publically resisted decommissioning of their arsenals. In
2009, the Independent Monitoring Committee (IMC) stated that the UVF had
put some arms beyond use.
12. Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
13. CBC News, 13 June 1985, 4,000 Manitoba laws declared invalid http://archives.cbc.
ca/politics/provincial_territorial_politics/clips/13460/, downloaded 01/03/09.
14. Regulation 17, July 1912, amended 1913. An Ontario Ministry of Education regu-
lation it restricted French as language of instruction after the first year of school
and banned its teaching after the fourth year.
15. R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234.
16. I shall refer to the 2007 Caron v. Alberta case in relation to this earlier ruling in
Chapter 9.
17. It was also amended in 2005, as I shall examine in the final chapter.
18. Prior to the 1960s, federal law prevailed even in cases where there was no con-
flict. The now well-established practice of adopting a more flexible interpre-
tation of paramountcy is seen in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Smith v. The Queen [1960] S.C.R. 776, and in Multiple Access v. McCutcheon. [1982]
2 S.C.R. 161 and the Law Society of British Columbia v. Magat [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113.
19. Attributed to Novelist Yves Beauchemin, cited in Dubé P. (1994) ‘Je est un
autre ... et l’autre est moi. Essai sur l’identité albertaine.’ Dir. Létourneau, J. &
Bernard, R., La question identitaire au Canada francophone. Récits, parcours, enjeux,
hors-lieux, Québec. pp. 79–99.
20. This situation was to pertain until the period of the Good Friday Agreement
which revised these two Articles by means of the 19th Amendment announced
by David Andrews, the South’s Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2 December 1999.
The amended Articles, accepted by Referendum, affords the right to all those
born on the island of Ireland the right to be ‘part of the Irish Nation.’ They
allow for the unification of the island subject to the consent of all the people
living there, although the exact mechanism and choreography of determining
this consent has never been made explicit.
21. New Ireland Forum Report, Stationery Office, Dublin 1984, p. 8.
22. Ibid, p. 44.
23. Ibid, p. 17.
24. Everyman’s United Nations, pp. 66–67.
25. At present, unionism remains divided as to whether the current arrangements
secure the future of the North within the UK for all time, or undermine it fatally.
The Democratic Unionist Party, now the largest party in the consociational NI
Assembly have never accepted the Good Friday Agreement.
26. The devolved government sits at Stormont in East Belfast.
27. The Executive consists of the First and Deputy First Ministers and the ten
Departmental Ministers in the devolved government. During the first period of
234 Notes
devolution 2000–2, the two Democratic Unionist Party members boycotted the
Executive in protest at power-sharing.
28. For a more detailed analysis of the GFA, see Bell (2000, pp. 172–176).
29. Bertrand v. AG Quebec (1995), 127 D.L.R. (4th) 408.
30. Coyne, A. (1995) ‘It’s no “narrow” legalism to ask if Quebeckers want a law-based
state, The Globe and Mail’, 23 January 1995, A15.
31. The federal government’s sponsorship programme was established to highlight
federal investment in Quebec and combat Parti québécois initiatives. It ran from
1993–2006. Amid widespread allegations of political corruption, it was investi-
gated by the Gomery Commission, itself accused of political bias in favour of
the Canadian Liberal Party. Gomery, J. (2005) Who is Responsible? Phase 1 Report,
Public Works and Government Services Canada, Ottawa.
32. Parizeau urged Quebec, and particularly those in favour of separation, not to lose
heart since the vote had been very close and could be won in future. He stated
that the vote had only been narrowly lost because of ‘l’argent et puis des votes
ethniques’ / ‘money and then some ethnic votes’. The remarks were reported in
the media as ‘money and the ethnic vote’.
33. Bertrand v. AG Quebec (1996), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 481.
34. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
2 The Irish Language in the North of Ireland Statistics

1. An Foras Teanga consists of two parts, Foras na Gaeilge and the Ulster Scots
Agency.
2. The Irish government announced a unilateral cut of 1.5 million euros in
November 2002, sparking protests in the North by Irish language groups who
saw it as an attack on hard-won GFA provisions.
3. In 2008, the Irish government tasked University College Dublin economist Colm
McCarthy with heading an expert team to prepare proposals on public expendi-
ture. The McCarthy Commission on Taxation (also known as An Bord Snip)
devised cuts of 5 billion euros to health, education and welfare and so on. The
report includes 85 recommendations affecting Irish language provision and the
Gaeltacht.
4. These statistics do not include Northern Ireland.
5. Source: An Phríomh-Oifig Staidrimh / Central Statistics Office, Census 2006,
Volume 9, Irish language, http://www.cso.ie/census/census2006results/volume_9/
volume_9_irish_language_entire_volume.pdf, downloaded 18/08/2009.
6. Canada Official Languages: Regulations 1991 SOR/92–48.
7. E-mail correspondence 13 June 2003, from Carrie Doole, Customer Services,
Census Office for NI, Belfast to author.
8. Donoghue, F. (2004) p. 32 in Irish language versions, p. 33 in English language
version.
9. Statistics in brackets from DCAL EQIA (January 2007) Reachtaíocht atá Molta i
dTaobh na Gaeilge: Comhairliúcháin ar Mheasúnú Tionchair ar an Chomhionannas,
19 Eanáir / Proposed Irish Language Legislation : Consultation on Equality Impact
Assessment, 19 January, p.5, points 6.4, 6.5.
10. NISRA, 27 August 2009, Statistics Press Notice, Migration Estimates NI (2008–9),
http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/demography/population/migration/Migration_
PR(2008).pdf, downloaded 7/09/2009.
11. Hansard WA218 (HL2717) 22 March 2007.
Notes 235
12. Hansard WA219, 22 March 2007.

13. Areas where the Irish language is the first language of the population, as desig-
nated by the Irish government.
14. Statistics from the organisation Gaelscoileanna 2009.
15. Press release from Gaelscoileanna, May 2009, Gaelscolaíocht Séanta ar an Céadta
Tuismitheoirí dá bPáistí / Hundreds of Parents Denied Irish Medium Education http://
w w w.gaelscoileanna.ie/index.php?page=news&action=view_item&news_
id=117, downloaded 13 September 2009.
16. Coláiste Feirste in Belfast.
17. The terminology ‘controlled’ and ‘maintained’ schools is used by the
Department of Education to denote the funding package relationship between
the school sector and the state. ‘Maintained’ schools in general receive a
smaller percentage grant than controlled schools, particularly in respect of
maintenance and capital expenditure. They are under the direction of the
Catholic Church.
18. Education Order Article 5(5) 1989.
19. DENI 4 February 2009, Statistics provided in written answer AQW 4474/09 from
Education Minister Caitríona Ruane to MLA Dominic Bradley (Ó Brolcháin).
20. The Irish News, 7 September 2009, Simon Doyle, Scheme to push language ‘ignored’.
3 The Irish Language and the Good Friday Agreement

1. The Irish News, 7 January 2004, Irish language schools get funding.
2. Nuacht TG4, 25 September 2009.
3. Nuacht TG4, 25 September 2009, Fine Gael’s Enda Kenny said if in government
his party would close the RGPTG / DCRGA. He also criticised Ó Cuív year-long
delay in publishing the Plan for the Irish language.
4. The Sunday Tribune, 6 September 2009, by Martin Frawley, Ó Cuív attacked as
Finance opens fire on Gaeltacht department.
5. Nuacht TG4, 15 September 2009, revealed minutes of a meeting on 9 April 2009
between the McCarthy Commission and the RGPTG / DCRGA at which cuts were
discussed. The minutes were obtained by TG4 under a Freedom of Information
request.
6. Donoghue, F. (2004) p. 31 in Irish language version, p. 32 in English language
version.
7. Donoghue, F. (2004) ibid, p. 32 in Irish language version, p. 33 in English
language version.
8. Donoghue, F. (2004) ibid, p. 51 in Irish language version, p. 53 in English
language version.
9. An Roinn Ealaíon, Cultúir agus Gaeltachta 1997, Treo 2000.
10. Donoghue, F. (2004) ibid, p. 36 in Irish version, p. 37 in English language
version.
11. The proposed requirement that all elected representatives of political parties
should sign a Declaration against Violence before being allowed to take up their
seats in local councils in the North. Sinn Féin said it was intended to exclude
them from taking their seats since ‘violence’ was narrowly defined as the actions
of the Irish Republican Army.
12. The Social Democratic and Labour Party, led during this period by John Hume
and subsequently by Mark Durkan, supports the reunification of Ireland and the
Good Friday Agreement. For thirty years, it was the largest nationalist party in
236 Notes
the north in terms of electoral support, until overtaken in 2003 by Sinn Féin.
The changed position was reinforced in the 2007 elections.
13. Sinn Féin, led by Gerry Adams, supports the reunification of Ireland and the
Good Friday Agreement.
14. The Ulster Unionist Party, led by David Trimble and subsequently by Reg Empey,
supports the union of Britain and the north of Ireland. It supports the Good
Friday Agreement. It was the largest unionist party in the north in terms of
electoral support until 2003, when it was overtaken by the DUP. The changed
position of the two parties was reinforced in the 2007 elections.
15. Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (5 March 1998), Joint Statement,
Dublin.
16. Canavan, J.A. (1998) Submission for the Minister on the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages and Other Irish Language Issues, leaked to the
media on 22 April, 1998 by Democratic Unionist Party representative, Nelson
McCausland.
17. Nelson McCausland was named by the DUP as Minister for Culture, Arts and
Leisure in 2009.
18. In the Matter of an Application by Caoimhín Mac Giolla Catháin for Judicial
Review and in the matter of a decision by the NI Court Service and in the mat-
ter of the Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) 1737, Ref: TRE7587,
Belfast High Court, 8 July 2009.
19. Brian Wilson, then Scottish Office Minister responsible for Gaelic and the
Islands. Canavan’s text continues, in brackets ‘(Other Scottish Office Ministers
have not yet considered this issue).’
20. The DUP are now the largest party in the NI Assembly, as I shall discuss further
in Chapter 6.
21. For example, the amending of Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution; the co-
agreement of certain political principles including freedom of political thought,
religious observance, political or constitutional change by democratic means, equal-
ity of opportunity and non-discrimination on the basis of class, creed, gender, dis-
ability or ethnicity (NB language is not mentioned); the establishment of an Irish
Human Rights Commission and Joint Human Rights Committee; the ratification of
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and so on.
4 The Ratification and Application of the European Charter

for Regional or Minority Languages
1. Former head of the Linguistic Diversity Unit in the North’s Department of
Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL).
2. Manx and Cornish were later added to the ratifying instrument.
3. The Part III clauses ratified for Welsh are:
Article 8: Education, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1b (i) 1c (i) 1d(iv) 1e (iii) 1f (ii) 1g 1h 1i, Total: 9.
Article 9: Judicial authorities, Paragraphs 1a (ii) 1a (iii) 1b (ii) 1b (iii) 1c (ii) 1c (iii)
1d 2b, Total: 8
Article 10: Administrative authorities and public services, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1b 1c
2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 2g 3a 4a 4b 5, Total: 14
Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1d 1e (i) 1f (ii) 2 3, Total: 6
Article 12: Cultural activities and facilities, Paragraphs 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 1g 1h 2
3, Total: 10.
Article 13: Economic and social life, Paragraphs 1a 1c 2b 2c 2e, Total: 5.
Notes 237
4. The 39 Part III clauses for Gaelic in Scotland are:

Article 8: Education, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1b (i) 1c (i) 1d(iv) 1e (iii) 1f (iii) 1g 1h 1i 2,
Total: 10.
Article 9: Judicial authorities, Paragraph 1b (iii), Total: 1.
Article 10: Administrative authorities and public services, Paragraphs 1c 2a 2b 2d
2e 2f 2g 5, Total: 8.
Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1a (ii) 1b (ii) 1c (ii) 1d 1e (ii) 1f (ii) 1g 2, Total: 8.
Article 12: Cultural activities and facilities, Paragraphs 1a 1d 1e 1f 1g 1h 2 3,
Total: 8.
Article 13: Economic and social life, Paragraphs 1a 1c, Total: 2.
Article 14: Transfrontier exchanges, Paragraphs a b, Total: 2.
5. The 30 Part III clauses relating to Irish, and which are the responsibility of the
devolved administration are:
Article 8: Education, Paragraphs 1a (iii) 1b (iv) 1c (iv) 1d(iv) 1e (iii) 1f (ii) 1g 1h,
Total: 8.
Article 9: Judicial authorities, Paragraph 3 Total: 1.
Article 10: Administrative authorities and public services, Paragraphs 1a (iv) 1c
2b 2e 2f 2g 3c 4a 5 Total: 9.
Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1d 1e (i) 1f (ii) 1g , Total: 4.
Article 12: Cultural activities and facilities, Paragraphs 1a 1d 1e 1f 1h 2 3, Total: 7.
Article 13: Economic and social life, Paragraph 1d, Total: 1
6. The 6 paragraphs relating to matters which are the responsibility of the UK gov-
ernment in the north are:
Article 8: Education, Paragraph 2, Total: 1.
Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1a (iii) 1b (ii) 2, Total: 3.
Article 14: Transfrontier exchanges, Paragraphs a b, Total: 2.
7. However, as we shall see in the next section, the word ‘language’ has now been
used in connection with Ulster Scots in legislation passed at Westminster in
November 2006 (St Andrews Act 2006).
8. The Language Body was established under the British-Irish Agreement Act 1999
and the North-South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Northern Ireland)
Order 1999.
9. The DUP refused to sign the GFA and were prominent in broader unionist cam-
paigns to vote ‘no’ in the referendum on its provisions.
10. The Observer, 16 January 2005, reporting on the UK government memo, Iceberg
Watch 2004.
11. BBC (2007) Annual Report and Accounts 2006–7, pp. 63–64. The report contains
no comparative listings for Gaelic programming in Scotland, but in June 2007,
plans for a new Gaelic digital television station were announced.
12. The newspaper was renamed Lá Nua in 2007.
13. The 1991 and 2001 Censuses contained similar questions in relation to Irish
alone.
14. Correspondence 2 May 2009, from CAL Minister Gregory Campbell, to the
author as CEO of POBAL.
15. Briefing for Irish language groups by Sinn Féin advisors, Ciarán Quinn, Séanna
Breathnach, Rosie McCorlaigh, 5 May 2009, Stormont.
16. NI Assembly Hansard, AQW7502/09.
17. The Andersonstown News, 30 May, 2009, Irish group criticise government.
18. Finalised print copy of report not available at time of writing, therefore no final-
ised page numbers available.
238 Notes
19. Máire Nic an Bhaird, 26 February 2007 was initially found guilty of disorderly
conduct and fined £100 following an incident in May 2006 in Belfast. Her
defense team argued she had been arrested for speaking Irish to companions in
the street. She was acquitted on appeal on 14 September 2007.
20. The Judicial Review was heard in October 2008, and judgement given on 8 July
2009. Judge Treasey found in favour of the NIO. He comments in his judgement
that he will not rule on whether or not the continuing operation of the Act
contravenes the ECRML. An appeal has been launched.
21. This requires the UK government, ‘To encourage and / or facilitate the crea-
tion and /or maintenance of at least one newspaper in the regional or minority
language.’
22. In August 2009, Foras na Gaeilge also refused additional funding to the
Conamara-based Irish language newspaper, Foinse, which was subsequently also
forced to close.
23. The Codes of Courtesy for Irish and Ulster Scots are part of the 2004 Guidance
on the ECRML document to which I have referred earlier.
24. Although the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) concern-
ing the use of languages other than English in the NI courts is a ‘reserved’ mat-
ter, the UK government’s ratification of Article 9 only commits it to translation
of key legal texts.
25. Phone call from Hilda Emerson, Management Support Unit, DENI to member of
public, 8 April 2008.
26. Note, signed ‘Kim’ on behalf of Hilda Emerson DENI with copy of translated
text, 15 April 2008.
27. Joint Communiqué – British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, Iveagh House,
Dublin, 2 March 2005. ‘TG4 Reception: The Conference was pleased that all
issues relating to increasing TG4 reception had now been addressed, and the two
Joint Chairs signed an Intergovernmental Agreement granting authority for TG4
to use a UK frequency to broadcast in Northern Ireland.’
5 Irish Language Broadcasting since the Good Friday

Agreement: Sop in áit na scuaibe? Sword or Ploughshare?
1. In fact, the BBC channels are also widely available in the RoI although there
is no formal intergovernmental arrangement regarding this, in contrast
with those concerning access from the North to TG4, the Irish language
channel.
2. In the RoI, RTÉ receives a licence fee.
3. Now called TG4.
4. ECRML, Part III, Article 11, 1a (iii).
5. UK government, White Paper A New Future for Communications, December
2000.
6. Correspondence 18 April 2002, from Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State, Department
of Culture, Media and Sport, to POBAL.
7. The British government ratified clauses 1a(iii), b(ii), d, e (i), f(ii) and g of
Article 11 – Media of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
in June 2001.
8. The Irish Times, 20 August 2002, Editorial Preserving Irish.
9. Brian Cowan was appointed Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in May 2008.
Notes 239
10. Conducted as part of the Ofcom review of Nations and Regions’ programming in
2005.
11. Throughout this section, I quote from submissions contained in the document
Responses to Audience Council NI Review of Indigenous Minority Languages (2007c).
Each reference is attributed to the organisation or individual making it, whilst
page numbers pertain to the Responses document.
12. BBC Audience Council (2007c) Responses to Review. One further submission
was directed to the BBC Trust’s consultation on Purpose Remits, which includes
indigenous minority languages in its scope, and was not included in the BBC’s
summary. Another was withheld under the Data Protection Act 1998. The BBC
state in a response to a Freedom of Information request (BBC, July 2007, FoI
RF12007000536) that they withheld the further 9 submissions received subject
to permission from their respondents to make them public. It should be noted
that although some, if not all of the submissions contained in this document
were written in Irish or bilingually, the Audience Council’s document is in
English alone.
13. RTÉ broadcast primarily in English, with Southern state Irish language radio
programming being predominantly on Raidió na Gaeltachta and television pro-
gramming on TG4.
14. BBC Trust Purpose Remit Consultation: Licence Fee Payer Quantitative Research
(BMRB). Sample size for the north was 59.
15. Audience Council NI, ibid, p. 8. The implications of this statement, that those
who do not have Ulster Scots can usually understand it nonetheless, are dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 on the implementation of the European Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages and in connection with a proposed new question on
Ulster Scots for the 2011 Census.
16. BBC Freedom of Information (8 August 2007) RF12007000526 to the author
as CEO of POBAL, from Andrea Chard, Advisor, BBC Information Policy and
Compliance.
17. Correspondence 9 May 2002, from John Reid, Secretary of State for NI, to Gerry
Adams, SF MP for West Belfast.
18. Correspondence 10 November 2005, from Denis Wolinski, NI Director, Ofcom
to POBAL.
19. Made by the McCarthy Commission, refered to earlier.
20. Millward, Brown, Ulster Baseline Survey (April 2006) and Benchmark Survey
(April 2007).
21. Although as noted, the vast majority of programming is on TG4.
22. CCG / ILBF Programme data.
23. For different reasons, only one of these companies is actively engaged in pro-
gramme making or preparation in the 2008–9 period.
24. Lá Nua, 29 January 2008, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil, Litir oscailte ar son Ciste
Craoltóireachta na Gaeilge ó Léiritheoir, ‘Má imíonn an Ciste Craoltóireachta go buan,
leanfaidh na vótaí é...’
25. Meeting between Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams and POBAL’s Co-ordinating Group on
the Irish Language Act, on 29 May 2008 in SF offices, Sevastopol Street, Belfast.
26. Lá Nua, 18 June 2008, Colm Ó Broin, Tarrtháil déanta ar Chiste Craoltóireachta go
2010.
27. Now also Campbell’s successor as DUP Minister for CAL. Nelson McCausland
replaced him in 2009.
28. BBC NI Newsline, 17 June 2008, Reporter, Martina Purdy.
240 Notes
6 The British Government Commitment to Enact the

Irish Language Act
1. The Ulster Unionist Party, formerly led by David Trimble, supports the union of
Britain and the north of Ireland. The party supported the GFA and is now led by
Sir Reg Empey. The largest unionist party in the north since the imposition of
partition, the party was overtaken by the DUP in the 2003 and 2007 elections.
In 2007, the UUP received 14.94 per cent of the vote in the Assembly elections
and took 18 seats, a decrease of 9 seats from the 2003 election.
2. The Social Democratic and Labour Party formerly led by John Hume, supports
the reunification of Ireland. The party supported the GFA and is now led by Mark
Durkan. The largest nationalist party in NI for 30 years, it was overtaken by Sinn
Féin in the 2003 and 2007 elections. In the 2007 Assembly elections, the SDLP
received 15.22 per cent of the vote and took 16 seats, a decrease in 2 seats since
the 2003 elections.
3. The Democratic Unionist Party, led by Ian Paisley, supports the union of Britain
and the north of Ireland. It opposed the GFA and is now led by Peter Robinson.
It is the largest of the unionist parties in NI, and took 30.09 per cent of the vote
at the 2007 Assembly elections, giving it 36 seats, an increase of 6 seats from
the 2003 elections. It is currently the largest party in the NI Assembly. First Ian
Paisley and now Peter Robinson hold the position of First Minister.
4. Sinn Féin, led by Gerry Adams, supports the reunification of Ireland. The party
supported the GFA. In the 2007 Assembly elections the party took 28 seats, an
increase of 4 from the previous election, receiving 26.16 per cent of the vote. It is
currently the second largest party in the NI Assembly. Martin McGuinness holds
the position of Deputy First Minister.
5. The Alliance Party took 7 seats, an increase of 1 from the previous election,
receiving 5.24 per cent of the vote. The Green Party and the Progressive Unionist
Party took 1 seat each, as did Independent candidate, Kieran Deeney.
6. 14 February 2008, the Dromore by-election was won by the UUP, but the TUV,
in its first election, took almost 20 per cent of the first preference votes, fin-
ishing third, and their transfers to the UUP ended up eliminating the DUP
candidate.
7. As I shall note later, the substantive responses to the first consultation were placed
on the DCAL website. Although the same process was promised prior to the sec-
ond consultation, submissions subsequently received were not made public.
8. POBAL 2006, Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI is available on www.
pobal.org, downloaded 10/09/2009.
9. As noted, Allister resigned from the DUP on 27 March 2007 in protest against
power sharing in the NI Assembly. He now leads the Traditional Unionist Voice
(TUV) party and although not re-elected to the European parliament as TUV
candidate in 2009, he received over 70,000 votes.
10. BBC Radio Ulster, 25 October 2006, McGimpsey, Michael, Senior UUP
Negotiator, South Belfast MLA and former Minister for Culture, Arts and
Leisure in the NI Assembly 1999–2002, re-broadcast on Radio Ulster Irish lan-
guage programme, Blas.
11. The Irish News, 24 October 2006, Roy Garland, Changing Times Signals the End for
the Rhetoric.
12. Farren, S. 24 October 2006, Press release from senior SDLP negotiator and North
Antrim MLA.
Notes 241
13. (NI [St Andrews Agreement Bill] 2006).

14. At meetings with Maria Eagle, Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure and
researcher as CEO of POBAL on Monday 30 October 2006 and again on Monday
4 December 2006, Stormont Buildings.
15. Video link meeting Stormont-Westminster, 6 December 2006, POBAL and CAL
Minister, Maria Eagle.
16. Correspondence 1 November 2006, from POBAL to Maria Eagle, Minister for
Culture, Arts and Leisure.
17. Hansard 100588, Column 531, 22 November 2006, under the heading Sewel
Convention, Secretary of State, Peter Hain in response to question from DUP MP,
Peter Robinson.
18. See for example, The Irish News, 24 October 2006, Roy Garland, Changing Times
signals the end for the Rhetoric; The News Letter, 14 November 2006, Scepticism
over Government Offer on Ulster Scots; The News Letter, 17 November 2006, The
Trojan Threat of the Irish Language Act; The News Letter, 20 December 2006, Allister
broadside attack on Irish language Bill document.
19. DUP Manifesto 2007, Getting it Right.
20. Bracketed references in the coming sections of this chapter, and in Chapters 7
and 8, refer to the written submissions made by various organisations in response
to the first DCAL consultation documents (referred to throughout as DCAL 2006
and DCAL EQIA 2007) on proposed Irish language legislation. To avoid repeti-
tion of the consultation phase or submission title each time, in each case the
name of the organisation making the submission is followed by the date 2007
and a section or page number, where this applies.
21. DCAL 2006, p. 30 in both language versions. NB the term ‘relatively modest’ in
English is rendered as ‘réasúnta’ in Irish, which means literally ‘reasonable’. The
two language versions do not therefore necessarily convey the same meaning.
22. DCAL 2006, p. 42 in Irish language version, p. 43 in English language version.
23. The Department of Finance and Personnel, 8 February 2007 (FoI 12163) con-
firmed to POBAL that of seven consultation documents issued by them in
2006, none contained an FIA. The unusual nature of the inclusion of an FIA
in the DCAL paper was taken up by various respondents including POBAL
and CAJ.
24. DCAL 2006, Point 6.12, p. 70 in English language version, p. 68 in Irish language
version.
25. DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 18 para 6.14.4; also 2007, p. 19 para 6.14.5.
26. DCAL EQIA 2007, ibid p. 9, para 6.12.8 in both language versions.
27. DCAL 13 March 2007, Introduction, p. 6, NB: The two language versions dif-
fer, with the English language version containing two phrases not in the Irish
language version. These sentences are: ‘This reflects a significant level of interest
in the issues raised in the paper’, and ‘Those in favour preferred a rights-based
approach.’
28. POBAL, BBC News 24, 15 March 2007.
29. The Irish News, 4 March 2007, Robert McMillen, ‘Minister Strangles Irish Language
Act’.
30. The News Letter, 14 March, 2007a, Irish Language Act in Assembly’s Hands.
31. Correspondence 19 June 2007, from Maria Eagle, Under-Secretary of State for NI
to POBAL.
32. Correspondence 2 April 2007, from Dermot Ahern to Éamon Ó Cuív, Minister for
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs and forwarded to POBAL.
242 Notes
33. Hain, P., 20 March 2007, Press release from Secretary of State’s office.
34. Nelson McCausland was made third DUP Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure
in June 2009.
35. The News Letter, 14 March 2007b, Act is a shillelagh to coerce unionists into Stormont,
article by Nelson McCausland, DUP spokesperson on Culture.
36. The New Letter, 2 April 2007, Paisley.
37. The second consultation document was published the day before the
long-expected release of the second COMEX monitoring report on the ECRML.
38. News Letter, Wednesday 14 March 2007, Irish language Act in Assembly’s Hands;
and News Letter, same edition, article by Nelson McCausland, Act is a Shillelagh to
Coerce unionists into Stormont.
39. News Letter, Monday 4 June 2007, letter from David McNarry, UUP Chief Whip
and Deputy chair of Assembly Committee on CAL, Unite against Language Act.
40. News Letter, Thursday 31 May 2007, Letter from DUP MLA, Jim Shannon, Don’t
throw good money away on Irish Language Act.
41. News Letter, 13 June 2007, letter from Nelson McCausland, SF has turned Irish
Language into a Weapon.
42. David McNarry, UUP proposed this motion which triggered a Petition of
Concern or cross-community vote, whereby all parties are required to desig-
nate themselves either ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’. The house then divides into
these two sides to vote. To be carried, a motion then requires a majority of
both ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ votes. McNarry’s motion received a major-
ity of unionist votes, but fell because ‘nationalists’ voted against it. A similar
Petition of Concern was again used on 13 May 2008 when the DUP’s Lord
Morrow and Arlene Foster proposed a motion to end funding to an IM school
in Dungannon. The motion was passed by the unionist block, but rejected by
the nationalist one.
43. Michael McGimpsey, UUP Minister for Health, Social Services and Public Safety.
During five years of Direct rule by the British government, this policy had
remained in place.
44. Bairbre de Brún, SF was Minister for HSSPS from 2000–2.
45. The Irish Times, 15 August 2007, Paisley to block Irish language Act; News Letter, 10
October 2007, Stephen Dempster, Poots ‘to scrap Irish Language Act plan’.
46. NI Assembly Hansard, 16 October 2007.
47. Irish News, 18 October 2007, Human Rights Commission enters Irish language Row.
48. BBC Radio Ulster, Newsline, 18 October 2007.
49. NIHRC, September 2009, ECRML, Parallel Report to the COMEX on the Third
Periodical Report of the UK.
50. Council of Europe, Second Opinion on the UK, ACFC/OP/II(2007)003, adopted
6 June 2007, para 190.
51. United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 22 May 2009,
ibid, para 37.
52. Lá Nua, 28 January 2008.
53. Lá Nua, 29 January 2008, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil, Litir oscailte ar son Ciste
Craoltóireachta na Gaeilge ó Léiritheoir, ‘Má imíonn an Ciste Craoltóireachta go buan,
leanfaidh na vótaí é...’ also noted in Chapter 5.
54. Lá Nua, 29 January 2008.
55. All appointees to the Board of An Foras Teanga / The Language Board are nomi-
nated by political parties North and South, the number of nominations per party
being set according to the D’Hondt mechanism. Foras na Gaeilge has 16 Board
Notes 243
members, 4 of whom are nominated by SF. Two SF nominees, Marcas Mac Ruairí
and Eoghan Mac Cormaic defended Foras na Gaeilge’s decision.
56. The Irish News, 17 December 2008, Lá Nua a victim of ‘dispensation of power-
sharing’ says former editor, Concubhar Ó Liathain.
57. BBC NI Hearts and Minds, 14 February 2008, Edwin Poots.
58. DUP press release, 14 February 2008, Nelson McCausland, the DUP culture
spokesperson congratulated his colleague for ending the funding being ‘lavished
on the Irish language.’
59. DUP press release, 25 February 2008, Spratt, J.
60. NI Assembly Hansard, 3 March 2008, Ref: AQW 4300/08.
61. The Irish News, 4 March 2008, by Diana Rusk, Poots Tongue-Tied over Irish Events.
62. NI Assembly Hansard, 4 December 2008, NI Assembly Committee for Culture,
Arts and Leisure, Language Strategy.
63. NI Assembly Hansard, 4 December 2008, NI Assembly, ibid.
64. Nuacht 24, 21 August 2009, Maoin Ultaise.
65. Belfast Telegraph, 23 June 2009, Stephen McCaffrey, Greens and Irish language
activists hope for change in DUP direction.
66. Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness.
67. Sinn Féin Ministers are Caitríona Ruane (Education), Conor Murphy (Regional
Development) and Michelle Gildernew (Agriculture). The SDLP Minister is
Margaret Ritchie (Social Development).
68. Correspondence 2 April 2008 from Conor Murphy to the researcher as CEO of
POBAL. Author’s translation.
69. Correspondence 17 September 2007 from G.W. Allister Acting CEO, NI Road
Services Division to Tomaí Ó Conghaile, Lá Nua. The Minister’s commitment
to enact this legislation was confirmed at a meeting with POBAL on 6 February
2008 and again in email correspondence on 8 September 2009.
70. The POBAL proposals relating to broadcasting and other reserved matters have
also been removed from the draft since it is intended for the NI Assembly.
71. On 21 September, current SDLP leader, Mark Durkan announced that he will
stand down as party leader in February 2010.
72. Rialtas na hÉireann (2006) Ráiteas i Leith na Gaeilge / The Government of
Ireland (2006) Statement on the Irish Language. The only reference to an
all-Ireland approach is an oblique one, on p. 18, ‘Leanfar leis an tacaíocht a
thugann an Stát d’Fhoras na Gaeilge de réir an Achta um Chomhaontú na
Breataine-na hÉireann 1999.’ / ‘The State will continue to support Foras
naGaeilge in the context of the British-Irish Agreement Act 1999.’ http://www.
pobail.ie/en/IrishLanguage/StatementontheIrishLanguage2006/file,7802,en.
pdf, downloaded 09/09/2009.
73. The Plan has not been subject to public consultation outside of the RoI.
74. Nuacht 24, 15 May 2009, by Eoghan Ó Neill, Soiscéal Éamoin.
75. Nuacht TG4, 25 September 2009.
76. Meeting of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs with
Special Group on Expenditure Control, 8 April 2009. In relation to a query about
Irish language organisations funded by Foras an Gaeilge, the minutes state, ‘At
NSMC it was decided that there was potential for collapsing the number.’
77. Minutes of the North South Ministerial Council are not made available and
although a request for disclosure was made by POBAL, a response from DCAL on
8 July 2009 stated that the minutes and other documentation were to be with-
held under Section 27 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
244 Notes
78. NMSC 23 January 2009, 10 NoI delegates: 4 DUP, 6 nationalist. SF: McGuinness
(Deputy First Minister), Gildernew (Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development),
Ruane (Minister for Education), Murphy (Minister for Regional Development),
Kelly (Junior Minister). SDLP: Ritchie (Minister for Social Development). Full list,
see http://www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/index/publications/joint-
communiques/plenary-jc/plenary_jc_ 23_january_ 2009.htm, downloaded
20 September 2009.
Also NMSC Language Sectoral meeting, 2 December 2009, DCAL Minister
McCausland and DGPTG / DCRGA Minister Ó Cuív, with SF Minister for Regional
Development, Conor Murphy, attended. See http://www. northsouthministeri-
alcouncil.org/351_02_12_2009.pdf, downloaded 20/12/09
79. Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act (POBAL 2006a) is available on POBAL’s
website, www.pobal.org, downloaded 10/09/2009.
80. Comhaltas Uladh 2007, p. 4 in Irish language version, p. 3 (not numbered) in
DCAL translation.
81. Conference An Ghaeilge is do Vóta / The Irish Language and Your Vote, organised by
Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge, 25 February 2007, Dublin.
82. POBAL 2007 Submission, p. 32 in Irish language version, p. 33 in English lan-
guage version.
83. POBAL 2007, p. 33 in Irish language version and p. 34 in English language
version.
84. POBAL 2007 pp. 33–34 in Irish, pp. 34–35 in English.
85. Comhaltas Uladh, 2007 p. 5 in the Irish language version, p. 6 in English lan-
guage version (un-numbered pages).
86. Article 9(1) has not been ratified for the Irish language. As discussed in Chapter 4,
the only provision made in respect of the courts in the UK ratification of the
ECRML is Article 9(3), which commits the UK government to, ‘make available ...
the most important national statutory texts ...’ in Irish.
87. POBAL 2007, p. 36, also clauses 22–27 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language
Act NI.
88. POBAL 2007, p. 37, also clauses 7–12, 13–21, 28–38 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The
Irish Language Act NI.
89. POBAL 2007, p. 34 in Irish language version, p. 35 in English language
version.
90. Comdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge 2007, the submission goes on to quote in full
clauses 31–33 and 33–34 of the POBAL proposals from the document Acht na
Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI.
91. POBAL 2007, p. 36 in Irish, p. 37 in English language version, also clauses 57–58
in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI.
92. POBAL 2007, p. 17, 23–24, 26–27, also clauses 59–88 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The
Irish Language Act NI.
93. CNnaG, pp. 4–6; CnaG, p. 5; GL, p. 1; CU, p. 4; GL, p. 1.
94. POBAL 2007, p. 7 in Irish language version, p. 8 in English language
version.
95. Under the remit of Foras na Gaeilge.
96. The submission calls for the adoption under Article 9(1) of clauses,
a) in criminal proceedings (ii), (iii), (iv)

b) civil, (ii), (iii)
c) Administration, (i), (ii)
d) No additional expense
Notes 245
7 Submissions of the Political Parties to the

First Public Consultation on Proposed
Irish Language Legislation for NI
1. It should be noted that the Alliance Party’s policy on Irish Language legis-
lation has changed since it made the submission discussed in this chapter.
The party adopted a resolution at its party conference in 2008 in support
of limited Irish language legislation since this commitment was given in
the SAA. However, party spokesperson on Education, Trevor Lunn has said
that the Act must come, ‘at no expense to the public purse and serve to
promote rather than politicise the language.’ Alliance Party Press Release,
25 November 2008.
2. As noted previously, Allister resigned from membership of the DUP on 27 March
2007 when the party announced that it would enter into government with Sinn
Féin from 8 May 2007.
3. These are the same points made on a number of pre-printed postcards submitted
to the first consultation.
4. Whatever one’s view of the optimum consultation period, 12 weeks is
common. The DUP has itself used the 12-week period for subsequent con-
sultations on key policy matters. On 12 June, 2007, Peter Robinson, DUP
Minister for Finance and Personal in the newly re-established Assembly
announced a 12-week consultation on Water Charges, a key electoral issue
and bargaining point for the DUP during the political talks preceding and
after the SAA.
5. As noted in Chapter 2, this percentage is higher than in many countries here
legislation already exists for RMLs.
6. Alliance Party 2007, p. 3, ‘Centralised, Anglophone Governments have certainly
been biased in favour of their dominant English language. But it is also true to say
that the enormous advantages of using English have consistently recommended
its use to generations of our ancestors over recent centuries. Government pres-
sured local people into speaking English; but the advantages of doing so were
also obvious to those people.’
7. J. Allister 2007, p. 13, the quotation refers to p. 3 of the DCAL consultation
paper.
8. Maguire, G. (1991). Her findings are echoed in O’Hagan, K. (2000) Cultural
Competence in the Caring Professions, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London.
9. J. Allister submission, ibid p. 11, Allister quotes Goldenburg’s paper, The
Symbolic Significance of the Irish Language in the NI Conflict and states that,
‘Since 1990, Irish medium schools have been opening at a rate of six to seven
per year.’
10. As examined previously, the Administration of Justice (Ireland) Act 1737 cur-
rently prevents the use of Irish in the courts.
11. Expenditure to date on Irish language translation and interpretation has been
rather modest. The DCAL consultation document quotes less than £100,000
throughout all government departments for the period 2004–5, with a number
of departments recording no expenditure whatsoever on the Irish language.
Other expenditure, often attributed to ‘Irish language costs’ should be attrib-
uted to service provision, the costs of which, to the same or similar degree,
would have to be met regardless of the language in which the service was pro-
vided.
246 Notes
8 Submissions from Key Public Bodies and a 20 per cent

Sample of Individual Responses to the Public
Consultation on the Proposed Irish Language Legislation
1. Ofcom 2007, p. 1 (that is, in accompanying email letter).
2. Ofcom, 9 June 2005, Press statement, Ofcom publishes statements on programming
for the Nations and Regions and ITV Networking Arrangements, http://www.ofcom.
org.uk/consult/condocs/psb3/statement and http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/
news/2005/06/nr_20050609, downloaded 10/08/2009.
3. Ofcom, 9 June 2005, Statement on Programming for the Nations and Regions.
4. As noted in the DCAL Summary of Responses document, June 2007, 9 Orange.
lodges made submissions to the consultation process. They are all similar.
5. Aodhan Ó Connolly v. Botanic Inns Ltd. A settlement was reached on 2 March 2006
regarding Connolly’s dismissal. CAJ note that the use of other languages than
Irish with tourists and patrons of the bar was not discouraged.
6. Support was refused to a care worker who applied to study Irish (in line with
Civil Service Circular 29/91) although others in similar posts had been granted
permission to study other languages (specific case of study of Russian is cited).
In September 2004, almost two years after his initial appeal, he was granted sup-
port, but too late to apply for the course in 2004–5.
7. The individual was recognised by the Agency as someone able to deal with Irish
speaking customers on their behalf. After a complaint was made by another
member of staff about his use of Irish in a conversation with his young son in
Irish, he was told not to speak in Irish again. The case highlighted multiple con-
fusion from a variety of agencies as to the meaning of ‘a neutral working envi-
ronment’ and the prohibition of languages other than English in the workplace.
The case was resolved, but the worker moved to another office because he felt
uncomfortable in speaking Irish.
8. 2003 POBAL and the Department of Employment and Learning. POBAL com-
plained that they were not allowed to place an advertisement for a vacancy
requiring fluent Irish unless it was placed in English also. The annex notes that
this is an ongoing problem.
9. Correspondence 8 March 2007 from David Hume, Director of Services, Grand
Orange Lodge of Ireland to Margaret Ó Keeffe, DCAL.
10. GOLI submission, ibid p. 1 Foras na Gaeilge is one part of the Cross-Border
Implementation body (Language). The other part is the Ulster Scots Agency.
Funding and staffing levels are set by agreement between the British and Irish
governments, based on the proportions of users of the Irish language and Ulster
Scots in Ireland, North and South.
11. Submission no.75; Note that the emphatic use of ‘an scáthghrúpa’, ‘the umbrella
group’ has escaped the translator. It appears to be a reference to the characterisa-
tion in the DCAL document of POBAL as ‘an umbrella group’.
12. Submission no. 10, no. 40, no. 55, no. 60, no. 90, no. 95, no. 105, no. 180.
13. Postcards issued by campaign sub group Acht. The four points are similar to
those in Sinn Féin’s submission.
14. Submission no. 10, no. 30, no. 40, no. 50, no. 55, no. 65, no. 90, no. 95, no. 105,
no. 115, no. 145, no.170, no. 180.
15. A development proposal for Gaelscoil Éanna in Glengormley just outside Belfast
was turned down in 2007 in spite of the school meeting all DENI criteria.
16. Submission no. 5, no. 10, no. 40, no. 50, no. 55, no. 75, no. 80, no. 95, no. 115.
Notes 247
no. 170, no. 175, no. 180, no. 195, no. 200.
18. Submission no. 195, Respondent’s own translation, included with submission.
no. 150, no. 155, no. 175, no. 180, no. 195.
20. Submission no. 10, no. 55, no. 60, no. 90, no. 95, no. 170, no. 175, no. 180.
no. 75, no. 80, no. 85, no. 105, no. 110, no. 115, no. 120, no. 125, no. 130, no. 135,
no. 140, no. 150, no. 155, no. 165, no. 170, no. 175, no. 180, no. 185, no. 190,
no. 195, no. 200, no. 205.
9 Quebec v. the Rest in the Twenty-First Century:

Coming-of-Age or Losing the Plot?
1. Refered to in Chapter 1.
2. The ten-year accord between Canada’s Prime Minister and Provincial and
Territorial Premiers, 16 September 2004 agreed that in return for $41.2 billion in
long-term federal funding, the provinces and territories will report to taxpayers
on health-care services.
3. Joyal, S. (2004) La Presse, 22 October 2004, Le fédéralisme asymétrique : une solution
gagnant-gagnant?, p. A20.
4. Congés parentaux: entente entre le Canada et le Québec sur le Régime québécois
d’assurance parentale, signed by the Canada and Quebec governments, 1 March,
2005.
5. The 1996 Social Union Framework Agreement concentrated the efforts of federal
and provincial governments to modernise Canadian social policy.
6. Put forward at various times by the Bloc québécois (BQ), the New Democratic
Party (NDP) and the federal Liberals in Quebec.
7. Le Devoir, Antoine Robitaille, 24 June 2006, Harper dit non à la nation québé-
coise.
8. La Presse, Joël-Denis Bellavance, 1 November 2006, Le Bloc sauté dans la mêlée.
9. Interviewed by the author, 14 May 2009.
10. Interview with author, 14 May 2009.
11. Graham Fraser, in response to follow-up written questions, answers received by
email 29 May 2009.
12. Graham Fraser, written responses, ibid.
13. Graham Fraser, 12 March 2009, Towards Equality: Canada’s Language Policies after
40 Years of the Official Languages Act, Speech at the 4th Symposium on Official
Language Minorities in Canada, Gatineau.
14. Benoît Pelletier, ‘Notes pour une allocution du ministre délégué aux Affaires
intergouvernementales canadiennes et aux Affaires autochtones devant la
Faculté de droit de l’Université de Moncton et l’Institut canadien de recherche
sur les minorités linguistiques,’ Moncton, 13 October, 2004.
15. Federal solutions to Ireland’s British problem were rejected in the 1970s, but
resurfaced in 2009 Sinn Féin meetings in the USA examining a United Ireland.
Brendan Ó Leary proposed a federal solution.
16. Email correspondence, 2 September between author and Patrick Thibeault, Data
Diffusion Officer and 9 September 2009, and Jean-Francois Lepage, Sociologist /
analyst, Language Statistics Section, Statistics, Canada.
17. Comité de suivi de la situation linguistique entre 2003 et 2007.
248 Notes
18. On 5 March 2008, researcher Michel Paillé accused the Comité de suivi, and
Castonguay personally of delaying the publication of the final dozen documents
needed for the publication of the progress report.
19. Interview with the author, 19 May 2009.
20. Interview by the author with Andrée Duchesne, Avocate-conseil et gestionnaire,
Justice en Langues Officielles /Senior Counsel and Manager, Justice in Official
Languages, Department of Justice Canada, 16 June 2006.
21. Strategic Plan 2005–6 to 2008–9 Canada-Manitoba Agreement on French
Language Services, http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/lo-ol/entente-agreement/services/
mb/05–09-PlanServices-Manitoba-eng.cfm, downloaded 20/09/09.
22. Nova Scotia Department of Justice French Language Services Plan 2009–10,
http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/publications/docs/FLS%20Plan%20English%20
Final%202009%2004%2029.pdf, downloaded 20/09/09.
23. Interview by the author with Annette Boucher, Registrar / Pronothaire, Cour
Supreme de la Nouvelle Écosse / Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 3 August 2006.
24. Feuille de route pour la dualité linguistique canadienne 2008–2013 : agir pour l’avenir,
p. 66 in French version, page 62 in English version.
25. CLO, Rapport annuel 2008–9 : Deux langues officielles, un espace commun :
40 e anniversaire de la Loi sur les langues officielles. Ministre des Travaux publics
et des Services gouvernementaux Canada 2009. OCOL Annual Report, 2008–9,
Two Official Languages, One Common Space: 40th anniversary of the Official
Languages Act. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada
2009. p. II.
26. In Interview with the researcher, 14 May 2009, Ottawa.
27. CLO Rapport Annuel 2008–9, p. 39 in English language version, p. 43 in French
version.
28. Graham Fraser, 28 May 2009, written email response to the researcher’s addi-
tional questions following interview, 14 May 2009 in Ottawa.
29. Graham Fraser, written answers to follow-up email questions, 29 May 2009.
30. CLO, Une occasion en or, p. 38 / OCOL Raising our Game p. 37.
31. In June 2009, Marc Tremblay was appointed to a new position.
32. Marc Tremblay, in interview with the author, 12 May 2009, Ottawa.
33. Radio Canada, 30 March 2009, Deux candidats dans la course, Candidate Randy
Hillier opposes French language services.
34. The Globe and Mail, Friday 19 June, 2009, Guy Dixon, Windsor residents seek
injunction against CBC.
35. CBC, Tuesday August 5 2008, NB revamps changes to French Language Education,
The Canadian Press.
36. R. v Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234.
37. Tremblay, interview with the author, 12 May, 2009.
38. Un tracé pour agir: La mise en oeuvre de la partie VII de la Loi sur les langues officielles
de 1988 – février 1996, Rapport du Commissaire aux langues officielles sur la mise
en oeuvre par le gouvernement fédéral de la partie VII de la loi sur les langues
officielles, 1996.
39. http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/stu_etu_021996_f.php, downloaded 28/03/2009.
40. A Blueprint for Action: Implementing Part VII of the Official Languages Act
1988-February 1996, Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages on the
Federal Government’s Implementation of Part VII of the Official Languages Act,
1996, p. 73, http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/stu_etu_021996_e.php#CONC,
downloaded 28/03/1009; Savoie (1998), Collectivités minoritaires de langues
Notes 249
officielles : promouvoir un objectif gouvernemental ; Fontaine, Yvon et al.,

(1999) Maintenir le cap: la dualité linguistique au défi des transformations gou-
vernementales, Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les transformations gou-
vernementales et les langues officielles, Conseil du Trésor du Canada, Ottawa;
Canada (2003) Le prochain Acte: Un nouvel élan pour la dualité linguistique
canadienne. Le plan d’action pour les languages officielles / The Next Act: A
new momentum for Canada’s linguistic duality. The Action Plan for Official
Languages.
41. See the Official Languages Accountability and Coordination Framework (Action Plan
for Official Languages), 2003, section 16. Also see Forum des maires de la péninsule
acadienne v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2003 F.C.1048, sections 45 and 46.
Lastly, see Commissioner of Official Languages v. Canada (Department of Justice),
2001 FCT 239, section 55.
42. The FCFA’s appearance before the Standing Committee on Official Languages
of the House of Commons, 16 June 2005, 38th Parliament, 1st session, no. 39
(0910).
43. An Act to amend the Official Languages Act (promotion of English and French).
44. OCOL Rapport Annuel 2007–8, ‘was linked to virtually all major court decisions
on minority language rights in Canada since 1994.’ Official English language
version, p. 97.
45. It was expanded by Premier Brian Mulroney in 1985 following the enactment
of the equality section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; had its
funding withdrawn controversially by the same Brian Mulroney in 1992 and was
re-established by Premier Jean Chretien in 1994.
46. CanWest News Service, 7 September 2006, Funding for minority groups to chal-
lenge federal laws under review, CanWest Media Publications Inc, http://www.
canada.com/topics/news/politics/story.html?id=ec0f ba5e-7399– 4431-8e5f-
1ec6b13838df&k=23441, downloaded 21/06/09.
47. Conseil des Canadiens avec déficiences / Council of Canadians with
Disabilities, Annual Report 2007–8, http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/about/
board/annualreports/2008, downloaded 21/06/09 ; CCD, Soutien au fonds
de défense juridique des droits des personnes handicapées, http://www.
ccdonline.ca/fr/donate, downloaded 21/06/09 ; Press release, FAFIA / AFAI,
‘Les droits à l’égalité n’ont aucune signification au Canada si les femmes,
et d’autres Canadiens qui sont victimes de discrimination, ne peuvent les
utiliser,’ / ‘Equality rights have no meaning in Canada if women, and other
Canadians who face discrimination, cannot use them.’ Organisation’s trans-
lation, FAFIA /AFAI, Des coupures à condition féminine Canada et au programme
de contestation judiciaire sapent l’engagement du gouvernement envers l’égalité des
femmes / http://www.fafia-afai.org/fr/des_coupures_a_condition_feminine_
canada _et_ au_programme_de_contestation_judiciaire_ sapent _ lengage-
ment_du_gouvernement_envers_le
48. Cuts to status of Women and Court Challenges program Undermine Government’s
Commitment to Women’s Equality, 25 September 2006, http://www.fafia-afai.org/
en/node/361, downloaded 21/06/09.
49. Interview with Marc Tremblay, 12 May 2009.
50. Ibid, Marc Tremblay, 12 May 2009.
51. Interview between Graham Fraser and the author, 14 May 2009.
52. Desrochers c. Canada (Industrie), 2009 CSC 8, February 2009.
53. Tremblay, 12 May 2009. Author’s translation.
250 Notes
54. Le Devoir, 21 / 22 March 2009, Aléxandre Shields, Hommage à Camille Laurin –

Landry craint une brèche dans la loi 10.
55. Catalan is just one further example of a ‘minority’ language spoken by several
million people, although it does not benefit, as French does, from the existence
of a separate nation state in which the language is in common use for all state
and private purposes, nor from its use as the dominant language in many former
colonies.
56. For further information on the issue of accommodation, see Bouchard, G. &
Taylor, C. (2008) Fonder l’avenir.Le temps de conciliation / Building the Future: A Time
for Reconciliation, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodation
reliées aux différences culturelles, Québec.
57. The amendment restored the Commission de la protection de la langue
française.
58. Press release, 24 August 2007, Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec, Montréal,
La SSJB de Québec : le jugement sur la loi 104 met en danger la paix linguistique au
Québec.
59. The Gazette, Saturday 22 March 2008, Don MacPherson, Bill 104 isn’t the English
boards’ biggest problem.
60. Québec (Ministre de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport) v. Nguyen, case no. 32229,
appeal heard by the Supreme Court of Canada 15 December, 2008.
61. Québec (Ministre de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport) v. Bindra, case no. 32319,
appeal heard by the Supreme Court of Canada 15 December, 2008.
62. Section 23(2) says, ‘[l]es citoyens canadiens dont un enfant a reçu ou reçoit
son instruction, au niveau primaire ou secondaire, en français ou en anglais
au Canada ont le droit de faire instruire tous leurs enfants, aux niveaux
primaire et secondaire, dans la langue de cette instruction.’ / ‘[c]itizens of
Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary
school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all
their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same
language.’
63. 21 Commissioner of Official Languages, Factum of the Intervenor, Commissioner of
Official Languages for Canada.
64. Interview with the author, Tuesday 11 July 2006, Gisèle Delage, Counsellor et
Normand Maillet, Counsellor, Secrétariat de la politique française, Department
of Culture and Communication, Bloc A, 225 Grande Allée Est, Québec.
65. Ibid, Delage, 11 July 2006.
66. In its report, Étude des crédits alloués au dossier linguistique pour l’année 2006–2007,
the Secretariat notes that its relevant branch, the Office québécois de la langue
francaise, received 3,652 complaints in the period 2005–6, a slight increase (+ 80
complaints) on the previous year. 51.5 per cent of complaints had been dealt with
within 6 months and 89.5 per cent resolved without recourse to the courts (the
Procureur general). http://www.spl.gouv.qc.ca/secretariat/d_credits2006_2007.
html, downloaded 06/06/2009.
67. Le Devoir, 8 April, 2008 Robert Dutrisac, ‘Québec s’adresse en anglais aux trois
quarts des immigrants allophones’.
68. Le Devoir, 17 April 2008, Editorial, Bernard Descoteaux.
69. Including the Commission de l’équité salariale.
70. However, other governmental websites do display more French than English,
even when, as in the case of the Ministère de développement économique, de
l’innovation et de l’exportation, their work encompasses contact with more com-
panies outside than within Quebec.
Notes 251
71. Le Devoir, Robert Dutrisac, 19 / 20 April 2008, ‘Les communications en anglais entre
l’État et les entreprises du Québec – Il faut que cela cesse, dit le CSLF’.
72. Le français, c’est notre affaire à tous. Stratégie commune d’intervention pour Montréal
2008–2013, Gouvernement du Québec.
73. Jacques Gosselin, Director, Secrétariat à la politique linguistique, email response
to author’s written questions, 10 June 2009.
74. Mario Beaulieu, in interview with the author, 19 May 2009, Montreal.
75. Journal SSJBQ, April 2009.
76. Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006, in Montreal (Interview conducted in
English).
77. Levine (1990) describes in detail the demarche of the francisation programme
during this period.
78. Rapport sur l’évolution de la situation linguistique au Québec 2002–2007,
Synthèse, Gouvernement du Québec , no publication date, p. 23.
79. Rapport sur l’évolution de la situation linguistique au Québec 2002–2007, Synthèse,
Gouvernement du Québec , no publication date, p. 23.
80. Bergeron, (Chargé des relations publiques et porte-parole) Interviewed by the
author on 19 May 2009.
81. Bergeron, 19 May 2009.
82. Bergeron, 19 May 2009.
83. The Toronto Star, 1April 2009, New Quebec law turns Lara Croft into Francophone.
Sale of English-only video games prohibited if French version exists.
84. CBC news, 8 Friday June, 2007, PQ humbled, finishes third.
85. Radio Canada, 9 December 2008, L’espoir ravivé.
86. http://elections.radio-canada.ca/elections/quebec2008/2008/12/09/014-marois-
lendemain.shtml, downloaded 19/04/09.
87. CBS News, Daniel McHardie, 9 December, 2008, PQ gains help Marois rebuild party
from disastrous 2007 election.
88. http://www.cbc.ca/news/quebecvotes2008/story/2008/12/08/qv-marois-pq.html,
downloaded 19/04/09.
89 Radio Canada, 9 December 2008, L’espoir ravivé, ibid.
90. Radio Canada, 9 December 2008, Fermer la boite de Pandore, Jean Charest.
91. http://elections.radio-canada.ca/elections/quebec2008/2008/12/09/024-charest-
marois-souv.shtml, downloaded 19/04/09.
92. Radio Canada, Fermer la boite de Pandore, ibid, ‘C’est le scénario type du soir de
l’élection: il n’est pas question de souveraineté et de référendum pendant toute la
campagne, puis le soir de l’élection, c’est comme si c’était la seule chose dont on
avait parlé.’ / ‘It’s an election results-night scenario : sovereignty and referendum
have not been an issue during the whole campaign, then on election night, it’s
as if it’s the only thing we have talked about’ (Author’s translation).
93. Guy Boutillier in interview with the author, 12 June 2006, in Montreal.
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Index
Entries in this index are listed in letter-by-letter order, except for legislative acts,
listed chronologically. Bold print indicates principle references. The letter t following
a page number denotes a table, the letter m denotes a map, the letter f denotes a fig-
ure. Endnotes are referred to by page, the letter n (nn for more than one consecutive
endnote) followed by the endnote number.
1737 Administration of Justice 1999 North/South Co-operation

(Language) Act (Ireland), 19, (Implementation Bodies)
71, 83, 90, 93, 138, 143, 161, (Northern Ireland) Act, see under
164, 236n18, 238n20, 238n24, An Foras Teanga
245n10, see also Irish in the 2003 Acht na dTeangacha Oifigiúla
courts also 2003 Official Languages Act
1867 British North America Act, 24 (RoI), 120, 137, 138, 140
1875 North-West Territories Act, Section 2003 UK Communications Act, 96, 99,
26, 110, 210 103–4, 229, see also broadcasting,
1920 Government of Ireland Act, 1, 19, 2003 Joint Declaration, 105–6
30, 20m1.1, 30, 31, 56, 86, 103, disparity, Wales and Scotland, 96, 105
228, 232n9, see also partition Putnam Report, 104–5
1969 Official Languages Act (Canada) White Paper, 104, 238n5
also 1969 Loi sur les langues 2005 BBC Royal Charter, 103, 106, 229,
officielles, 27, 28–9, 33, 120, see also broadcasting
196, 199, 200, 208–10, 211–13, 2006 St Andrews’ Act, 94, 121, 241n13,
214, 247n13, 248n38–40, 243n63
249n43
1972 Northern Ireland, Temporary Adams, G. 64–72, 119, 132, 236n13,
Provisions Act, 20, see also 239n17, 239n25, 240n4, see also
direct rule Sinn Féin
1976 Charter for the French Language Alberta, 24, 25m1.3, 26, 209–10,
also Charte de la langue française, 233n16,see also Caron, G.
28, 196, 200, 214–22, 224, Alliance Party, 148, 149, 153, 154–6,
250nn58–62 157, 160–6, 240n5, 245n1, 245n6,
1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Allister, J. 119, 121, 148, 149, 150–65,
Freedoms, also Charte canadienne 167, 191, 194, 240n9, 240n18,
des droits et des libertés, 23, 29, 245n2, 245n7, 245n9, see also
33, 211, 214–15 Traditional Unionist Voice
1995 Framework Convention for the All-Ireland, 31, 38, 59, 69, 86, 114, 121,
Protection of National Minorities, 134–5, 137, 142, 228, 232n8,
113, 169, 236n21 243n73–4
1995 Local Government Order, 61, 71, An Bord Snip see under McCarthy
91, 95, 134, 140, 162, 178, 186, Commission
187–90t, see also signage An Foras Teanga / The Language Board,
1998 Education Order Northern Ireland, 38, 68, 86, 94, 142, 234n1,
53, 95, 120 243n56, see also Foras na Gaeilge
269
270 Index
Anglo-Irish Agreement, 61, 134, 160 Mac Ruairí, M. 108

Assembly, see under NI Assembly, see POBAL, 108, 109
also consociational, Good Friday Thompson, H. 109
Agreement BBC Audience Council, consultation
assimilation, 8, 12, 26, 202, 203, findings submitted to BBC Trust,
205, 225 109–11
asymmetrical federalism, 198–202 see British Constitution, 69, influence
also federal, -ism on Ireland and Canada 26,
228, see also Irish-, Canadian-
bargaining chip also political football, Constitution
15, 37, 121, 128, 229, 193t8.3, British-Irish Council, 66, 96
245n1, see also politicised broadcasting, in general, 3, 74, 84, 88,
Beaulieu, M. 207, 216, 217, 221, 224, 91, 94, 96, 99, 100, 139, 142, 144,
251n74, see also Société 145, 163, 169, 170, 185, 187–90t,
Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec 191, 192t, 194, 229, 243n71,
Bell, C. 12, 15, 16, 18, 32, 33, 37, 97, see also BBC, BBC Audience
234n28 Council, BBC Trust, TG4, Ciste
Bergeron, M. 219–21, 251n80, see also Craoltóireacht Gaeilge
Office québécoise de la langue disparity, Wales and Scotland, 99,
française, and Paquette, G. 100–3, 107, 108, 131, 170
bilingualism 8, 24, 71, 165, 172, 177, Iontaobhas Ultach, 104
203, 207, 208, 216, 217, 225, 226 RTÉ, 102t, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115,
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Royal 238n2, 239n13, 239n21
Commission 26, 27, 37 see also 2003 UK Communications
Bill 104, see 1976 Charter for the French Act, 2005 BBC Royal Charter
Language / Charte de la langue
française Campbell, G. 92, 94, 118, 133, 237n14,
boundaries, 25m, 31, 59, 60, 146 239n27, see also DCAL Ministers,
Boutillier, G. 226, 251n93, see also Société Democratic Unionist Party
Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec Canada, history and language,
Bradley, D. see under Ó Brolcháin, D. 6, 22–8
BBC, 91, 96, 99, 100–6, 101t, 102t, see Canadian Constitution, in general, 23,
also broadcasting, BBC Audience 24, 197, see also British-, Irish-
Council, BBC Trust Constitution
BBC Audience Council, 91, 99, 239n15, federal paramountcy, doctrine of, 29
see also broadcasting, BBC Trust language rights, 33, 212–4
BBC Alba see also disparity, 101, 102t patriation, 26, 29, 33
BBC Scotland also Scots, 102t, 110, provincial, 29
111, 113 Quebec, effect on; language laws,
Review of Indigenous Minority conflict with 24, 33, 211, 214–215
Languages, consultation, 106–9, secession, 26, 28, 29, 33–6, 225
238–9nn11–12 Canavan, T. 61, 64, 70–3, 83, 236n16,
An Carn, 108 236n19, see also ratification of
An Droichead, 107, 108 ECRML
An Tobar, 107, 108, 109 Cardinal, L. 9, 23, 29, 78, 197, 201, 205
Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta, 108 Caron, G. 209, 233n16, see also Supreme
Cuan, R. 109 Court, Alberta
Foras na Gaeilge, 107, 108 Castonguay, C. 29, 205–7, 216, 218,
Iontaobas Ultach, 107, 108, 109 248n18
McKendry, E. 108, 109 Cazabon, B. 201
Index 271
Census, in general 39, see also demand compensation, 9, 78, 140, 145,
40–1, controversy in NI 152, in 157, 177, 197
Canada 196, 202–3 concession, in general, 10, 15, 64, 66
North, compare 1911 (all Ireland) with ECRML, 72–3
1991, 2001 (NI), 39–42 Irish language Act, 151, 164
questions, in NI Census, Irish 39–40, quid pro quo, 29, 87, 89, 169
Ulster Scots, 91 conflict, in general, 1, 2, 4, 5–7
South, 2006 (RoI), 39 assessing progress, 12–13
Charlottetown Accord, 23 causes and definitions, 11–12
Chevrier, M. 10, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29 containment, see also hegemony,
Chrétien, J. see also Prime Minister, 6, 7, 11, 22, 37, 75, 78,
34–5, 97, 196, 249n45, 230–1
Ciste Craoltóireachta na Gaeilge also domestic law, 14–15
Irish Language Broadcast Fund, international instruments, see also
in general, 92, 94, 99, 101, 102t, ECRML, 14–15, 16–17, 32
113–18, 132, 170, 229 language, and, 7–10, 16
budget, 117–18 nationalism, and, 8
fig-leaf, 118 Congress of Local and Regional
Lá Nua, reporting in, 117, 118, 132 Authorities of Europe, 80
Ulster Scots, equal funding for, 106 consensual, also conflictual, 34, 60
west of Ireland, primary audience, 115 consociation, see also Good Friday
civil rights, 20, 21, 31 Agreement, Assembly,
Clausewitz C. Von, 7 devolution, 6, 28, 32, 39,
Clinton, B. 65 74–75, 195, 228, 229,
Codes of Courtesy 95, 238n23, see also 233n25
Guidance on ECRML 47, 88–9 double-, mutual-veto, 33, 75, 92,
collapsing, see under North South 228, see also cross-community
Ministerial Council consent, 151, 242n43
colony, -isation 22, 23, 35 also fossilise, 231
decolonisation 15 Lijphart, A. 74–75, 92
COMEX reports, 71, 77, 80, 83, 88–95, constitution, -al 23, 76, 232n9, see
242n39, see also ECRML also British-, Irish-, Canadian
2004 recommendations, 88 Constitution, Good Friday
2007 recommendations, 91, 94 Agreement
Commissioner, in general 30, 185 change, 33, 66
An Coimisinéir Teanga, RoI, 185 competing aims, 32
Irish Language Act, proposal for, 120, oddity, 30
139–40, 145, 150, 155, 156, 157, consultations see under BBC Audience
158, 162, 183t, 185, Council, Irish Language Act
187–90t, 191 corruption, see also Gomery
Official languages, Canada 199–201, Commission, 34, 234n31
208–9, 210, 212, 213, 215, Court Challenges Programme also
247nn10–13, 248nn38–40, Programme de contestation
249n41, see also Fraser, G. judiciaire, Canada, 211–13,
see also NIHRC, 131 see also Fédération des
Community Relations, also – Council, communautés francophones
Central Community Relations et acadiennes
Unit see also Canavan, T. 58, court remedy, also compensation, 140,
60–3, 70, 152, 153, 162, 165, 166, 145, 157, 177, 197, see also courts,
168–9, 176, 194, 203 Irish in the courts
272 Index
courts, 22, 79, 227, see also 1737 Act, Ulster Scots, and, 87, 92, 94, 106, 118,
Supreme Court of Canada 122, 132, 133, 152, 156, 160, 163,
Canada, in, 207, 209, 211, 213 164, 195, 243n65
North, in, 22, 80, 88, 94–6, 120, 123, veto, 118, 122
125, 138, 143, 152, 157, 161, 162, Department of Community, Rural
170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 178, 185, and Gaeltacht Affairs, also Roinn
187t, 191 Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus
Quebec, in, 24, 33, 215, 250n66 Gaeltachta, 38, 57, 134, 135,
cross-community consent, 151, 242n43, 235nn2–5
see also double-, mutual-veto DCRG Minister, 57, 128, 135, 235n5,
Crowley, T. 18 241n33, see also Ó Cuív, É.
cultural imperialism, 11 Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure
cultural relativism, 15 ECRML, UK reporting failure, 92–3,
cultural weapon, 129, 176, 177, 178 93, 94, 95, 96
Guidance on ECRML, 47, 88–9, see
Dáil Éireann, also Leinster House, 30, 72 also codes of courtesy, 95, 238n23
De Brún, B. 185, 242n45, see also Ministers, Culture, Arts and Leisure
Sinn Féin Campbell, G. 92, 94, 118, 133,
Delage, G. 215, 250n64, see also 237n14, 239n27
Secrétariat de la politique Eagle, M. 121, 122, 123, 127, 133,
linguistique, and Gosselin, J. 147, 241nn14–5, 241n16, 241n32,
Delmartino, F. & Deschouwer, K. 24 see also direct rule
demand, see also Census, 40–1, Irish McCausland, N. (prior to
language Act, for services, 124 appointment), 70, 118, 128, 129,
democratic deficit, -iency, 15, 39, 135 236n16, 239n27, 214n37, 242n36,
Democratic Unionist Party, 118, 236n14, 242n42, 243n59, (as Minister),
236n20, 240n6, 244n79, 245n2, 133, 236n17, 242n35
see also Dodds, N, Paisley, I., McGimpsey, M. 121, 240n10, 242n44
Robinson, P. and First Ministers Poots, E. 94, 118, 129, 131, 132,
Culture, Arts and Leisure, Minister 242nn46–7, 243n58, 243n62
for, 94, 118, 129–31, 132, 133, see also Irish language Act,
195, 229, 236n17, 239n27, consultations
242n35, see also DCAL Ministers Deputy First Minister see also First Minister
ECRML, attitude to, 70 Mallon, S. (prior to appointment), 67, 68
Good Friday Agreement, 68, 70, 73, McGuinness, M. (prior to
119, 128, 237n9, 240n3, 240n9, appointment), 65, 243n67,
see also power-sharing 244n79, 249n4
Irish Language Act, and, 118, 127, Desrochers c. Canada (Industrie) 2009
128, 129–31, 132, 133, 148, 149, CSC, 8, 196, 213, 249n52, see also
150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, enforcement LLO/OLA Section VII
159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, De Varennes, F. 8, 9, 15, 16, 40, 120
191, 194, 241n17, 242n36–7, devolution, -ed, in general, 70, 73,
242n39, 242nn41–3, 242nn46–7, 77, 93, 118, 233nn26–7, see also
242n49, 243nn58–65, 243n66, consociational, Assembly, Good
245n4 Friday Agreement
manifesto, 122, 241n19 Irish language Act, effect on, 93,
Traditional Unionist Voice, and, 119, 121–31, 151, 153, 155, 229–30,
121, 148, 149, 150–65, 167, 191, 245n4
194, 240n9, 240n18, 245n2, re-establishment of, implications 77,
245n7, 245n9, see also Allister, J. 93, 98, 119–21, 129, 195
Index 273
devolved matters, 92, 95, 97, 122, Eide, A. 16, 17, 18, 32
127, 128, 241nn16–17, see also Eirug, A. 104, see also broadcasting
reserved, excepted matters elections,
D’Hondt mechanism, 67, 195, 243n56, All-Ireland, 31
portfolio, ministerial, 129, 229, Canada, 198
see also consociationalism European, 119, 149
digital switchover, see under Ofcom, TG4 Irish language Act, and, 122, 129, 148
direct rule, 20, 51, 61, 62, 77, 99, 119, North of Ireland, 119, 122, 149,
121, 133, 147, 242n44, see also, 233n11, 235n12, 236n14, 240n1,
Eagle M., DCAL Ministers 240nn2–6
discrimination, anti-, dispossession, 8, Quebec, 222, 251n84, 251n85–92
9, 12, 18, 19, 28, 39, 57, 71, 75, South of Ireland, 135, 235n3
108, 173, 174, 211, 227, 236n21, enforcement, in general, 9, 12
249n47 International instruments, ECRML of,
disparity, 81, see also parity, ECRML, 16, 79
broadcasting Irish language Act, mechanisms, 120,
Dodds, N. 132 122, 139, 145, 156, 157, 172
domestic legislation, in general, 2, 14, LLO / OLA, Canada,
18, 31, 227, 230 2005 Law S-3, 211–13
Canada / Quebec, 6, 23, 31, 34, Article, 133, 214
36, 228 Quebec, 197, 215–16, 217, 219–20
North of Ireland, 6, 31, 58, 79, 84, 88, Section VII, 196, 211–13
89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 108, 165, 228 Section 23(2), 215, see also 1976
Donneur, A.P. 8, 26 Charter for the French language
Dunbar, R. 9, 11, 16, 78, 79, 81, 100, 120 ethnic, – minorities, – languages,
Durkan, M. 235n12, 240n2, 243n72 -interests,
Census, NI, 39, 40, 47, 49–50
Eagle, M. 121, 122, 123, 127, 133, 147, conflict, 5, 7, 8, 16, 227, 228
241nn14–15, 241n16, 241n32, see Irish immigrants, 5, 86
also direct rule, DCAL Ministers Irish language Act, and 152, 154, 163,
Education, in general, 100, 172 165, 191
Canada, French Medium, French Quebec and Canada immigration,
Immersion, 207, 209, 233n14, impact on language, 205, 215–16,
248n35, 218, 250n67–8
ECRML, COMEX reports, 81, Quebec identity, and, 198, 214, 223, 225
82t4.2–6, 88, 89, 90, 95, Quebec referenda, and, 234n32
236nn3–5 European Charter for Regional or
North of Ireland, 39, 55, 56, 63, 74, Minority Languages, in
235nn17–18, 243n6, 244n79 general, 78
Quebec, English Medium, 214–15, conflict situations, effectiveness in,
250nn58–63, see also 1976 17, 79, 81, 97
Charter for the French Language Preamble, Parts II and III, 78–9
Quebec French Medium, 217, Ratification instrument, 80
219, 225 European Charter for Regional or Minority
South of Ireland, 234n3 Languages, UK ratification, 3
see also Irish in the curriculum Irish, background to, 77, 80
see also Irish Medium education, Irish ratification, prior to, 63, 70–3
Medium schools Ulster Scots, 86–8
Education Order (NI) 1998, 53, 95, 120, UK ratification instrument, 81–3
235n18 Welsh, Gaelic, Irish, 81–6
274 Index
ECRML Committee of Experts, 79–80 government funding of, 33, 243n73,

2004 COMEX report, 88 see also McCarthy Commission
2007 COMEX report, 89–92 Irish language Act, consultation, 125,
POBAL, and, 77, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 136, 139, 141, 142, 176, 178
94, 95 Lá Nua, and, 94, 132, 238n22, 243n56
Third monitoring cycle, UK report, Foucault, M. 7, 11, 37
92, 93–6 Foucher, P. 29, 201, 202
see also Lewis, E. francisation, 196, 214, 216, 220, 221,
European Convention on Human Rights 222, 251n77, of companies,
and Fundamental Freedoms, 16, 17 217–20
European parliament, 30, 148, Francophones
149, – debates, 160 in Quebec, 28, 203, 206, 209, 210
outside Quebec, 24, 26, 29, 203, 204,
Facal, J. 199 205, 207, 209, 210, 211
false equality, 8, see also parity, Ulster relationships between, 29, 202
Scots Fraser, G. 26, 37, 199, 200, 201, 208,
federal, -ism, -ist, 22, 24, 30, 36, 197, 209, 210, 212, 215, 247nn9–13,
198, 199, 201, 202, 247n3, see also 248n28–9, 249n51, see also
asymmetrical federalism Commissioner, LLO/OLA
Fédération des communautés
francophones et acadiennes, 196, Gagné, G. & Langlois, S. 24, 28, 29,
199, 211–13, 249n42, see also 223–4
enforcement, LLO/OLA Good Friday Agreement, 31, 32–3, 37,
Section VII 38, 39, 55, 59, 60, 66, 69, 70, 72,
Feuille de route pour la dualité 77, 119, 120, 129, 134, 135, 195,
linguistique canadienne see also 228, 234n28, 237n9, 240nn1–4,
Roadmap for Canada’s linguistic see also consociational, NI
duality, 208, 248n24 Assembly
financial, see under corruption broadcasting, 96, 102t, 104, 105, 106,
First Ministers see also under individual 108, 111, 113, 229
names consociational model, 75–6
Paisley, I. (prior to appointment), Irish language Act, consultation, 122,
119, (as First Minister), 128, 132, 150, 153, 154, 166, 169, 173, 186
240n3, 242n37, 242n46 language provisions, 2, 3, 4, 6, 64,
Robinson, P. 122, 240n3, 241n17, 73–4, 80, 86, 120, 134, 135, 195,
245n4, (as First Minister), 240n3 228, 230, 234n2
Trimble, D. 119, 236n14, (as First North-South bodies, 69, 142, see also
Minister), 65, 66, 67, 236n14, An Foras Teanga, Foras na Gaeilge
240n1 Gomery report, see under corruption
Fishman, J.A. 7, 8, 10, 11, 100 Gosselin, J. 216, 251n73, see also
flawed, 15, 16, 150, 152, 155, 191 Secrétariat de la politique
Foinse, 238n22 linguistique, and Delage, G.
Fóram na Gaeilge, 134 Graefe, P. 197
Foras na Gaeilge, 38, 60, 86, 96, 134, Grin, F. 80, 89
136, 142, 234n1, 238n22, 243n73, guaranteed rights, 12, 138, 157, 160, 161
243n77, 244n96, 246n10, see also Guelke, A. 30, 31
An Foras Teanga guerre linguistique, language war, 220,
broadcasting, and, 106, 108 also war of words, 68
funding provided, 243nn77, guerre silencieuse, silent war, 7, 37, see
244nn78–9 also Foucault
Index 275
Hain, P. 122, 241n17, see also Secretary DCAL Second consultation document,
of State 128–9
Hayes, M. 21, 62, 63 EQIAs, positive impact, 162, 164,
hegemony, -ic states, 1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 174, 186, 191, 192–3t8.3, 194,
32, 37, 75, 78, 230, 231 241nn26–7
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), legislative models, 122, 155
see under Irish language Act political sensitivities, legitimate
consultations aspirations, 74, 123–4, 126, 154,
hostile, -lity, 9, 20, 21, 39, 56, 93, 135, 166, 173, 191, 229,
140, 162, 172, 186, 191, 193t, 195, results, of consultations, 127–8, 129–31
220, 229 Irish language Act, submissions
Hume, J. 64, 65, 66, 119, 235n12, political parties, from, 147–67
240n2, see also SDLP Irish language NGOs, from, 135–41
Hurd, D. 61, see also Secretary of State Comhaltas Uladh, 135, 136, 137,
139, 140, 141, 244n94
integration, re-, dis-, 8, 13, 23, 30, 100, Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge,
227 see also, separation 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140,
Inter Departmental Charter 244n82, 244n91, 244n94
Implementation Group (ICIG), 89 Conradh na Gaeilge, 124, 135, 136,
international law, also human rights 137, 138, 139, 140, 244n94
standards, instruments 15–17, 32, Gael-Linn, 135, 136, 141
97, 131, 227, 228 Glór na nGael, 135, 136, 138,
Inuktitut, 30 139, 140
Ireland, history and language, 18–19 POBAL, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 134,
Irish Constitution, 30, 32 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141,
Articles 1 & 2, in, 31–2, 69, 236n21 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 155, 156,
language rights, in, 56, 120, 135, 228 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 164, 174,
Irish Free State, 19, 30 180–3t, 184, 185, 186, 187–90t,
Irish government, see also Dáil Éireann, 191, 192–3t, 194, 195, 241n14–15,
2, 6, 31–2, 38, 57, 66, 68, 69, 72, 241n16, 241n29, 241nn32–3,
73, 74, 77, 104, 105, 111, 112, 243n71, 244nn88–93, 246n8,
119, 120, 121, 122, 128, 135, 246n11, see also individual
144, 160, 195, 228, 229, 230, organisational heading
234nn2–3, 235n14, Stádas, 124, 135, 136, 137, 138
243–4nn77–9, 246n10 Irish language state sector, from,
Irish in the courts, 71, 83, 90, 93, Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta,
164, 238n24, see also 1737 Foras na Gaeilge, Iontaobhas
Administration of Justice Ultach, 141–6
(Language) Act (Ireland) English language state sector, key
Irish in the curriculum submissions, 168–72
North, 53–5 Community Relations Council,
South, 160 168–9
Irish language Act, consultations see also HM Revenue and Customs, 171–2
Irish language Act submissions Lord Chief Justice’s Office, 170–1
cost, of, 127, 131, 144, 146, 147, 150, NI Prison Service, 172
153, 154, 155, 161, 162, 163, 164, Ofcom, 169–70
170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 177, 183t, non-governmental sector, key
184, 186, 192t, 245n11 submissions
DCAL first consultation document, Committee on the Administration
121–4 of Justice, 173–5
276 Index
Irish language Act, submissions – Irish language Act, reporting on, 132,
continued 139, 144, 242n53
Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, language policy and planning, in
176–8 general, 1, 5, 99, 100, 227–8, 230
Welsh Language Board, 175–6 Canada, 24–8, 29–30, 136, 146, 196,
individuals, submissions from, 200–11, 225–6, 230, 248n24
178–94 North, 18–20, 56–60, 60–4, 67–73,
Irish Language Broadcast Fund, see 97, 134, 135, 167, 169, 195, 228–9,
under Ciste Craoltóireachta 244nn78–9
Gaeilge Quebec, 28–9, 198, 200, 213, 214–24,
Irish Medium Education see also 225–6, 230, 231
Education South, 57, 58, 128, 135, 230,
consolidation v. expansion, 52 235nn2–5, 243–4nn73–9
Irish language Act, consultation, 120, language war, guerre linguistique, 220,
123, 125, 126, 128, 137, 140, 142, also, war of words, 68
143, 146, 157–60, 166, 169, 174, Laponce, J. 8, 34, 213
177, 185, 187t, 191, 229, 245n1 Latouche, D. 8, 29
North, 2, 50, 51–3, 56, 106, 108, legislation, in general, 2, 3, 9, 14, 17, 22,
133, 134 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 58, 71, 72, 77,
Review of Irish Medium Education, 78, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96,
52, 133 97, 98, 100, 229–31
South, 50, 235nn15–16 ability to legislate, 23
Irish Medium schools and IM bodies litigation, litigious, vexatious, 23,
Coláiste Speirín, 51, 53, 134 153, 212
Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta, 51, 52, see under individual acts
106, 135, 136, 141, 158 Letourneau, J. 198
Gaelscoil Éanna, 133, 187t, 188t, Lévèsque, R. 29
246n15 Levine, M.V. 28, 251n77
Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta, Lewis, E. 80, 88, see also ECRML
57, 158 Committee of Experts
iron fist, 10 Liberal Party of Canada, 196–7, 198,
210, 211, 225, 234n31, see also
joint statement Trudeau, P.
British-Irish, 68, 195, 236n15 Liberal Party of Quebec, see under Parti
Hume-Adams, 64 libéral du Québec
judicial review, see under 1737 Lijphart, A. see under consociationalism
Administration of Justice linguistic shift, 18, 19, 149, 154, 204
(Language)Act (Ireland) litmus test, 97, 193t
judicisation, 210, 211 Livingstone, S. 20, 97
Kymlicka, W. 8, 14, 15, 16, 24 Mac Giolla Catháin, C. see under

1737 Administration of Justice
Lacorne, D. 28 (Language) Act (Ireland)
Lá / Lá Nua, 94, 237n12, see also Manitoba, 24, 25m, 26, 207,
ECRML, Foras, Irish language Act 233nn12–13, 248n21
broadcasting, reporting on 118, marginalisation, 7, 8, 75, 227, 228, also
239n24, 239n26, 242nn53–4 ghetto, -isation, 10, 93
ECRML, in, 91, 94 Marois, P. 222, 251nn85–92, see also
Foras na Gaeilge, and, 94, 132, Parti québécois
242–3nn55–7 May, S. 7, 8, 14
Index 277
McCarthy Commission, 38, 57, 112, NI Census, see under Census

135, 229, 234nn3–5, 239n19, NI Human Rights Commission, 131
243nn77 NI Life and Times Survey (1999), 47–9,
McCausland, N. 70, 118, 128, 129, 102t, see also Ulster Scots
236n16, 239n27, 242n36, 242n39, NI Office, 87, 128
242n42, 243n59, (as Minister), NI Statistics and Research Agency
133, 236n17, 242n35, see also (NISRA), 41–6tt, 50, 91,
DCAL Ministers 234n11
McLeod, W. 9, 16, 40, 120 North South Ministerial Council, see
McRoberts, K. 24, 34 also collapsing, 57, 135,
Meech Lake Accord, 23 243–4nn77–9
members’ club, compact, 14, 227 North-South bodies, see under An Foras
minority status, 15–16 Teanga, Foras na Gaeilge
Mitchell, G. 65
Murphy, C. 134, 243nn68–70, 244n79, Ó Brolcháin, D. 134, 149, 235n19, see
see also Sinn Féin also SDLP
Ó Cuív, É. 57, 128, 135, 235nn3–5,
nation-state, 7, 10, 14, 15, 68, 227, 241n33, see also Department
250n55 of Community, Rural and
New Brunswick, 23, 25m, 26, 29, 205, Gaeltacht Affairs / Roinn
207, 209, 212 Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus
Nic An Bhaird, M. 93, 185, 238n19, see Gaeltachta
also courts Ofcom NI
non-governmental organisation, 3, 15, digital switchover, 112
58, 60, 77, 78, 87, 92, 93, 95, 97, Irish language Act, 168, 169–70,
120, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 146, 246nn1–3
147, 155, 157, 173, 175, 211, 231 TG4, reception of, 112, 239n18
normalisation, 9, 125, 162 Ulster Scots, broadcasting, 107
NI Assembly, in general, 72, 98, Wales and Scotland, disparity of
232n11, 233nn26–7, 236n20, provision, 91, 100–1, 102t, 103,
240n1, 240nn2–6, 240n9, see 107, 239n10
also consociation, Good Friday Office of the First Minister and Deputy
Agreement, First Minister, 50, 92, 93, 133,
Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge, budget 145, 156, see also First Minister
and, 117–18 and Deputy First Minister
ECRML, 92–3, 164, 237n16 Office québécoise de la langue française,
Irish language Act, consultation, 30, 206–7, 215–21
121–31, 144, 148, 149, 151, 153, Official status, in general, 41, 69
155, 156, 160–1, 164, 177, 193t, Irish language act, consultation, 120,
229–30, 241n31, 242nn34–7, 137, 139, 142, 143, 152, 157, 160,
242nn39–40, 245n4 161, 172, 185, 190t
Irish language Act, decision, 121, Ulster Scots, consultation, 164
122, 123, 129, 195, devolved Official Unionist Party (Ulster Unionist
matter, 127, 128, refusal, 129–30, Party), 65, 119, 148, 149, 236n14,
242nn45–8, 243nn58–61, 240n1, see also Trimble, D. and
243nn63–4, 243n71, 245n4 McGimpsey, M.
model, 74–5, 233n25 Olympic Games, 196, 208–9, see also
re-establishment, 77, 93, 98, 119, Vancouver
120, 128 Ontario, 25m, 26, 27m, 205, 207,
suspension, 77, 119 233n14
278 Index
Paisley, I. 119, 128, 132, 240n3, 242n37, 243nn69–70, 243n71, 244n80,

242n46, see also First Minister, 244nn82–5, 244nn88–94,
Democratic Unionist Party 244n95, 246n8, 246n11, see also
paix linguistique, 215, 220, 250n58 Irish language Act consultation
Paquette, G. 217, 220, see also Office political parties, see under individual
québécoise de la langue française, party names
Bergeron, M. political vetting, 62
parity, in general, 75, 190t, 191, see also politicised, 93, 127, 128, 152, 153, 156,
disparity 159, 176, 177, 246n7, see also
Irish and Ulster Scots, between, 72, 92, bargaining chip, political football
110, 133, 152, 164, 171, 177, 228 Poots, E. 94, 118, 129, 131, 132,
Parizeau, J. 33, 34, 234n32, see also 242nn46–7, 243n58, 243n62, see
Prime Minister also DCAL Ministers
Parti libéral du Québec, 197, 200, 201, power-relations, 5, 7, 14, 231
222, 224, 225 Prime Minister
Parti québécois, 28, 200, 222, 224, Britain, Blair, T. 127, Brown, G. 118
234n31, 251n84, 251nn85–92, see Canada, Chrétien, J. 34–5, 196,
also Marois, P. 249n45
partition, 1, 19, 31, 39, 56, 86, 103, 228, Harper, S. 196, 198, 199, 200, 202,
232n9, 240n1 226, 247n7
partnership, 9, 22, 34, 56, 73, 138, Martin, P. 196, 197
169, 201 Trudeau, P. 29, 205, 210, 211, 214, 225
patriation see under Constitution (Canada) Quebec, Charest, J. 216, 222, 251n90,
peace, language and, 215, 220, 250n58 Parizeau, J. 33, 34, 234n32
peace process, 2, 66, 70 print media, 209, see also Lá / Lá Nua,
Pelletier, B. 198, 199, 202, 247n14 Foinse
people(s), 16, 17, 24, 32, 35, 36, see also Public Service Broadcasting, see
self determination, secession broadcasting
personality (portability) approach, 29, public services, 26, 49, 120, 124, 138,
205, 214, see also Trudeau, P., 139, 144, 192t, 236nn3–4, 237n5
territorial approach
planters see under settlers, – society quango, 10, 12, 60
POBAL, in general, 232n1 Quiet Revolution, 28
broadcasting, 101, 106, 108, 109, 110,
118, 238n6, 239n16, 239n18, radio see also broadcasting
239n25 BBC Radio Ulster, 102t, 103, 104, 107,
discourse, rights, 60 108, 109, 110, 240n10, 242n49
ECRML, monitoring and ECRML, 88, 96, 101t
implementation, 77, 87, 89, 90, RTÉ, 109
92, 93, 94, 95 Ulster Scots, 96, 111
influence of, 122, 124, 155 Windsor, Canada, 209
Irish language Act, 3, 120, 121, 122, RTÉ, see also broadcasting, radio, 102t,
123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 134, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 238n2,
135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 239n13, 239n21
143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 155, 156, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998]
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 164, 174, 2, SCR, 217, also Renvoi relative a
180–3t, 184, 185, 186, 187–90t, la sécession du Québec [1988], 2,
191, 192–3t, 194, 195, 237n14, SRC, 217, 33, 35, 36, 234n34, see
240n8, 241n14–15, 241n16, also secession, Supreme Court of
241n24, 241n29, 241nn32–3, Canada
Index 279
Referendum, -a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and

North, 2, 33, 36, 37, 153, 237n9 Biculturalism, 26, 27, 37, see also
Quebec, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 28–9, 33–5, 37, bilingualism
196, 205, 213, 222, 223, 225, Ruane, C. 51, 133, 235nn19–20, 243n68,
251n92 244n79, see also Sinn Féin,
South, 33, 233n20 education
rejectionist, 28, 155, 167, 178, 194, rubbished, 132
220, 230
Renvoi relative a la sécession du St. Andrews’ Agreement, in general, 2,
Québec [1988], 2, SRC, 217, 33, 77, 119, 195
35, 36, 234n34, also Reference Irish language Act, 93, 94, 106, 109,
re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 118, 120, 121–2, 127, 128, 147,
2, SCR, 217, see also secession, 149, 150, 151, 153, 169, 173, 176,
Supreme Court of Canada 183t, 195, 229, 245n1, 245n4
Republic of Ireland also South, 1, 4, language strategies, 94, 133, 237n7
5, 6, 19, 20m, 30, 31, 33, 38–9, St Andrews’ Act 2006, 94, 121,
45, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57–60, 61, 66, 240n13, 243n63
67, 68, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 87, 99, Saskatchewan, 24, 25m, 26
102t, 105, 107, 109, 111, 117, 120, schemes-based, 126, 156, 162, 171,
122, 124, 129, 134–5, 136, 137, 172, 180t, 184, 192t, 229, see also
138, 139, 140, 147, 150, 153, 156, rights-based
160, 162, 170, 176–7, 184–5, secession, in general see also self-
189t, 190t, 191, 195, 228, determination, 2, 8, 13, 16,
230, 231, 233n20, 238nn1–2, 17, 197
243nn73–4, 244n79 internal and external, 32, 223,
reserved, excepted matters, 81, 92, 123, 225, see also consociational,
127, 139, 150, 185, 190t, 238n24, asymmetrical
243n71, see also devolved matters international law, in, 17–18, 227
resistance, 7, 19, 200, 220 Quebec, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 26–9, 33–6,
resources, 80, 88, 89, 90, 109, 110, 113, 37, 196, 199, 213, 234nn29–34
139, 143, 199, 223, 232n1 Secrétariat de la politique linguistique,
Irish language Act, consultation, 150, 215, 250n66, 251n73, see also
153, 154, 170, 183t, 184, 186, Delage, G., Gosselin, J.
192t, see also ILA cost Secretary of State, see also under
Review of Public Advertising, 91, 94, see individual names
also Lá / Lá Nua Hain, P. 122, 128, 241n17, 242n34
rights-based approach, 124, 126, 127, Hurd, D. 61
136, 137, 138, 142, 150, 153, 155, Needham, R. 21, 61
166, 172, 173, 174, 184, 191, 192t, Whitelaw, W. 62
229, 241n28, rights discourse, Woodward, S. 131
14, 15, 60, see also schemes-based self-determination, in general, 2, 8, 13,
approach, Irish language Act 16, 17, 197, see also secession
Ritchie, M. 134, 243n68, 244n79 internal and external, 32, 223,
see also SDLP 225, see also consociational,
Roadmap for Canada’s Linguistic asymmetrical
Duality, see also Feuille de route international law, in, 17–18, 227
pour la dualité linguistique North of Ireland, and, 6, 19–22,
canadienne 196, 208, 248n24 30–3, 68
Robinson, P. 122, 240n3, 241n17, Quebec, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 26–9, 33–6,
245n4, see also First Minister 196, 199, 213, 234nn29–34
280 Index
separation, 6, 11, 13, 18, 25m, 28–9, 34, see also enforcement LLO / OLA,
149, 234n32, see also integration, Section
re-, dis-, 8, 13, 23, 30, 100, 227 see also Renvoi/Reference, secession
settlers, – society, 5, 21, 22, 213, 228 see under Alberta, Manitoba,
Sewel Convention, 122, 128, 241n17, Saskatchewan
242n34, see also Secretary of
State, and Hain, P. Taoiseach, Irish,
Seymour, M. 197, 199 Lynch, J. 31
Shaws Road Gaeltacht, 56, 159 Ahern, B. 127
signage, streetnames Cowan, B. 57, 135, 238n9
North, in, 95, 123, 134, 139, 140, 142, TG4, 34, 38, 57, 94, 96, 99, 102t, 106,
144, 145, 146, 162, 169, 178, 186, 107, 111–12, 113, 114, 115,
187–90t, 191, 243n70 169–70, 229, 235nn2–3, 235n5,
Quebec, in, 200, 208, 209, 214, 217, 219 238n1, 238n3, 238n5, 238n27,
silent war, guerre silencieuse, 7, 37, see 239n13, 239n21, 243n76
also Foucault territorial approach, 26, 30, 214, see
Sinn Féin, 51, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, also Trudeau, P. and personality
72, 92, 118, 119, 127, 128, 129, approach
132, 133, 134, 148, 149, 150, 155, Traditional Unionist Voice, see also
156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, Allister, J. 119, 121, 148,
163, 195, 235nn11–13, 237n15, 149, 150–65, 167, 191, 194,
239n17, 239n25, 240n2, 240n4, 240n9, 240n18, 245n2, 245n7,
242n41, 242n44, 242nn55, 245n9
243n56, 243nn66–9, 244n78, Tremblay, M. 209, 210, 211, 212,
245nn2–3, 246n13, 247n15, 213, 230, 248nn31–2, 248n37,
see also Adams, A., De Brún, B., 249n49–50, 249n53
McGuinness, M., Murphy, C., Trimble, D. 65, 66, 67, 119, 236n14,
Ruane, C. 240n1, see also First Minister,
Social Democratic and Labour Party, 64, Official Unionist Party
65, 67, 68, 72, 119, 121, 127, 129, Trudeau, P. 29, 205, 210, 211, 214, 225,
132, 134, 148, 149, 150, 155, 156, see also Canadian Constitution,
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, Liberal Party (Canada),
195, 240n2, 240n12, 243n68, personality approach
243n72, 244n79, two solitudes, 28
see also Durkan, M., Hume, J.,
Mallon, S., Ó Brolcháin, D., Ulster Scots Agency, 38, 86, 243n56,
Ritchie, M. 102t, 133, 142, 234n1, 246n10, see
Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, also an Foras Teanga
207, 250n58, 251n75, see also Ulster Scots
Beaulieu, M. 207, 216, 217, 221, Academy, 106
224, 251n74 dialect/language, 49, 67, 86, 87, 91,
Special Educational Needs, 53, 107, 109, 110, 132
89, 143 ECRML, in, 81, 86, 87, 89, 92, 101,
sponsorship scandal, Gomery report, see 102t, 163–4, 228
under corruption GFA, in, 86
streetnames, see under signage identical treatment, de facto, 46, 49,
Stormont, see under consociational, NI 67, 72, 73, 87, 89, 91, 94, 96,
Assembly 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
Supreme Court of Canada, 233n18 118, 132, 152, 154, 156, 163, 172,
Bill 104, Quebec, 196, 214–15, 176, 177, 195, 229, 230, see also
250nn58–62 parity
Index 281
Ulster Scots – continued hostility to Irish, and, 18, 20, 21, 38,
Irish language Act, consultation, 152, 140, 162, 186, 191, 193, 195
154, 163, 160, 166 Irish language Act, consultation and,
sectarianism, 86, 87, 132 2, 118, 119, 120–9, 131, 132,
statistical information, lack of, 2, 134, 147, 148, 149, 151, 164, 166,
39, 47–9 167, 191, 194, 229, 240nn10–11,
strategy, for, 121 242nn35–7, 242nn39–40,
Ulster Unionist Party, see under Official 242nn41–4
Unionist Party, also David quid pro quo, 61, 89, 169
Trimble Ulster Scots, and, 49, 87, 132, 164
UK ratification, see under European Universal Declaration of Human
Charter for Regional or Minority Rights, 14
Languages usurping power, 15, 23
UK reports on ECRML, see under
European Charter for Regional or Vancouver Olympic Games, 196, 208–9,
Minority Languages see also Olympic Games
United Nations veto, double veto, 33, 75, 92, 118,
Charter, 14, 31 121, 128, 197, 228, see also
General Assembly Resolution 1514 consociation
(XV), 18, 232n7 victory, 13, 93, 222
Security Council and NI, 31
UN Economic and Social Council, 93, Westminster, general, 20, 22, 26, 30, 72
94, 101, 131, 242n52 broadcasting, and, 99, 102t, 106, 108
UNESCO, 199 ECRML, and, 77, 93
unionist,-ism, in general, 21, 31, 45–9, Irish language Act, and, 120, 121, 122,
63, 72, 86, 193, 232n9, 233n11, 123, 128, 139, 141, 142, 150, 155,
235n17, 236n14, 240n1, 240n3, 184, 186, 192t, 237n7, 241n15
240nn5, 240n9 Whitelaw, W. 62, see also Secretary of
broadcasting, and, 103, 106, 118, State
119, 120 Williams, C.H. 9, 10, 34, 58, 59, 100, 120
devolution, and, 32, 38, 39, 63, 64, Woodward, S. 131, see also Secretary of
65–73, 87, 119, 134, 228, 230, State
233n25, 233n27, 237n9 workplace, 141, 173, 186, 192t, 214–19,
electoral shift, and, 119–20, 245nn5–6, 246nn7–8
240n6
ECRML, and, 77, 86, 87, 230 yard stick, 14

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Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities

Series Editor: Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, University of Bristol, UK

Worldwide migration and unprecedented economic, political and social integration in

Nancy H. Hornberger (editor)

Máiréad Nic Craith

Máiréad Nic Craith (editor)

Anne Pauwels, Joanne Winter and Joseph Lo Bianco (editors)

Susanna Pertot, Tom M. S. Priestly and Colin H. Williams (editors)

Maya Khemlani David, Vanithamani Saravanan and Peter Sercombe (editors)

Vanessa Pupavac (editor)

Graham Hodson Turner

Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities

1. A Silent War: Conflict Resolution and Language Policy

2.1 1911 and 1991 Census: Figures and percentages of overall

2.16 2003–4 Figures relating to numbers and type of

4.15 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic

9.1 Age structure of English and French mother tongues,

1.1 Map of Ireland showing border established under Government

ByI /WLB Bwrdd Yr Iaith / Welsh Language Board

LPP Language Policy and Planning

Chapter 9 contains a brief analysis of LPP and CR in Quebec and Canada

Being a long-term resident of the North of Ireland (NoI), I have acquired a

arrangements of 1998. Following this, I shall examine published and leaked

Translations, language versions and endnotes

method to ensure consistency in the presentation of quotations, but it is

Terminology and abbreviations

The naming of places and their description as countries, provinces, regions,

Both the Q / C and NoI conflicts witnessed explosions of protest in the

The stabilising, centralising tendencies of today’s nation states and their

LPP and conflict theory

It is [...] inevitable, therefore, as modernisation and language consciousness

It is not unusual for minoritised LPP to evolve within a conflict situation. In

circumstances can lead to a minoritised language community being doubly

importance (Chevrier 2003, Keating 1997). In theory, it can provide some

Conflict resolution theory and practice

Measuring progress and evaluating strategies

Marginalised language communities may have the power to describe the

Domestic and international law in protracted conflicts

It may be assumed in most cases of prolonged conflict that domestic legis-

pressure results in counter-pressure ad infinitum. Attempts have been made

‘Minority’ status: hard definitions, soft law

of human rights violations in the North, she categorises the ECHR as

Self-determination in international law

International law traditionally recognises both the right (or faculty)

Both language rights and self-determination have been particularly poorly

identification contained in the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)7,

Some points of Irish history

Irish nationalists within Northern Ireland are not in a similar posi-

Oiled by British indifference, abusive unionist governance intensely hostile

Some points in the history of Quebec and Canada

Federalism is a supremely difficult form of government to oper-

of the centrifugal forces which lead in the direction of disintegra-

amongst North America’s founding fathers, there were few illusions as

BOUNDARIES FRONTIÈRES ET LIMITES

ONTARIO N B NB = New Brunswick

300 0 300 600 900

Map 1.3 Map showing Canada with provinces

official language in 1890. Although legal challenges led by the Catholic

Waskaganish Matane Îles de la

Chibougamau Forestville Rimouski

Val d’Or Saint-

Témiscaming Montréal Granby Provincial capital/

a Fort-Coulonge Saint-Jean-sur- Capitale provinciale

Map 1.4 Map of Quebec