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aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory
G.R. No. 77663 April 12, 1988
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT vs. HON. EMMANUEL G. PEÑA.
 Nature of quasi-judicial function
 A body exercising quasi-judicial function is co-
equal with the RTC
 Rationale for prohibition on split jurisdiction
 The rule on prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies
FACTS:
This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, created through E.O. 1, charging it with the task
of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including the
power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all business
enterprises owned by them upon showing of a prima facie
case.
March 25, 1986 –
PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents
and records of two export garment manufacturing firms:
American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation.
June 27, 1986 –
PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as
authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of
the funds of the two corporations.
Sept. 4, 1986 –
PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the
absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the
absence of Saludo.
Feb. 3, 1987 –
Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations
previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a
Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere
tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the
memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds
from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations
for payment of the salaries of the stuff.
Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted
through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG,
the Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the
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previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO.
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yim’s prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the
subject of the case. RTC judge denied PCGG’s motion to
dismiss and granted Yim’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter
have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers
under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of
the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and
restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission.
Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14
issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding
"the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired
or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or
Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the
"exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and
all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such
cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's
exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
Powers of the PCGG
E.O. 1 created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses,
including sequestration and provisional takeover of all
business enterprises owned by them as well as conduct
investigations, require submission of evidence by subpoena,
administer oaths, punish for contempt.
Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the President to
“…recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime….”
Quasi-Judicial Function
As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions.
In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a
co-equal body with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies
have no power to control the other.” However, although under
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B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgment…of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial
bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The
Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all
such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan
which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."
Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the
Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse
in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with
exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's
decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by this Court.
Prohibition against Split Jurisdiction
The law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the
resultant multiplicity of actions. To paraphrase the leading
case of Rheem of the Phil., Inc. vs. Ferrer, et al.: to draw a
tenuous jurisdiction line is to undermine stability in litigations.
A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to
multiplicity of suits. To force the parties to shuttle from one
court to another to secure full determination of their suit is a
situation gravely prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The time lost, the effort wasted, the anxiety augmented,
additional expenses incurred, the irreparable injury to the
public interest – are considerations which weigh heavily
against split jurisdiction.
In addition, the case against PCGG and its Commissioner is
clearly barred by the immunity provision of E.O. 1, as
buttressed by section 4(b) thereof which further provides that:
“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.”
Executive Order No. 1 thus effectively withholds jurisdiction
over cases against the Commission from all lower courts,
including the Court of Appeals, except the Sandiganbayan in
whom is vested original and exclusive jurisdiction and this
Court. Early on, in special civil actions questioning challenged
acts of the Commission, its submittal that the cited Executive
Order bars such actions in this Court was given short shrift
because this Court, as the third great department of
government vested with the judicial power and as the guardian
of the Constitution, cannot be deprived of its certiorari
jurisdiction to pass upon and determine alleged violations of
the citizens' constitutional and legal rights under the Rule of
Law.
Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R.
No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988, that "(T)he
thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative
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jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an
administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a
court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment
for that of the administrative agency acting within the
perimeters of its own competence."
Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the
questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to
controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for
the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the
interjection of the claims of the predecessor of American Inter-
fashion and De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil.,
headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that are within the
primary administrative jurisdiction of the Commission that
cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court dockets
without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed
administrative remedies. The administrative procedure and
remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the
Commission are provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus,
the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed
may request the lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or
motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift
the writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may
deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and
the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the
Commission is appealable to the President of the Philippines.
The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice to the
parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset,
property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. The
Commission's order of sequestration is not final, at the proper
time, the question of ownership of the sequestered properties
shall be exclusively determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose
own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by the
Supreme Court.
It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court
in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al.,
G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized
principle that purely administrative and discretionary function
may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts
have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions
of the administrative departments of government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of
judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There should be
no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating
judicial and administrative competence, the former being
entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the
latter being limited as a result of its expertise to the
ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in
sequestration cases affected by the Commission for the
recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the
nation's very survival, in the light of the constitutional
mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be
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issued only upon showing of a prima facie case" and the settled
principle that findings by administrative or quasi-judicial
agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest
respect and are practically binding and conclusive, like the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, save where
they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported
by substantial evidence.
End….
UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA, G.R. No. 134625
August 31, 1999/ 313 SCRA 404
FACTS:
Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in
the doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman.
She already completed the units of course work required and
finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.
After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP
Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However,
respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out
of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.
UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels
indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her
disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned
Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s
name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not
reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with
plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to
her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of
the charges against her.
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the
recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate
degree.
The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to
withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the
University Council.
She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the
U.P. President, which request was denied by President
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages,
alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree
without justification and without affording her procedural due
process.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was
deprived of her right to substantive due process.
RULING:
No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was
indeed heard several times.
Several committees and meetings had been formed to
investigate the charge that private respondent had committed
plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy
or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to
present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied
due process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges
against her and given opportunities to answer them. She was
asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited.
She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of
the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she
sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her
position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was
entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is
noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance
of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of
the Board of Regents.
End….
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, G.R. No. 96681, 1991
PRINCIPLES: (1) The grant of investigatory power
does not imply the grant of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
(2) Matters relating to discipline of teachers are under
the original Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, and may
be appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and lastly to the
Supreme Court (Note: Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, appeals from the Civil Service Commission must first
go through the Court of Appeals).
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public
school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
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Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as
"mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter's attention. The teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of
the Secretary of Education (Hon. Isidro Cariño) to return to
work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
the days that followed.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private respondents) were administratively
charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807" (the Civil Service Decree) and temporarily replaced.
The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Secretary Cariño, which
was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court
on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded
on the alleged violation of the striking teachers’ right to due
process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445,
supra. After their petitions were denied, respondent teachers
thereafter submitted sworn statements dated September 27,
1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for reasons completely
unknown to them. The Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on
October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño
requiring his attendance therein. Otherwise, the Commission
will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants'
evidence.
The Commission on Human Rights had earlier made clear its
position that it does not feel bound by the Supreme Court's
joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, making plain its
intention to hear and resolve the case on the merits. Hence,
this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Where a particular subject-matter is placed
by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government
agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may
the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same
subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
RULING: No. The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
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The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function the Commission does not have.
It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge.
"Investigate," means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation,
of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
"Adjudicate," means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle, to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try
and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are
matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education
had already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them,
and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even
this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. The
Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this
scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the
jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the
Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the
same ground traversed by the latter and making its own
judgment on the questions involved.
Reversal can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and
lastly by the Supreme Court. The only thing the Commission
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to
refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or
tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Petition GRANTED; CHR Order ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent CHR and the Chairman and Members thereof
PROHIBITED from hearing and resolving the case (Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES,
INC. VS. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 135992, JAN. 31, 2006
FACTS:
The Court has promulgated a decision wherein it required
respondent to make 20% escrow deposit and to post 10%
performance bond. Respondent asks for partial
reconsideration of those portions further claiming that Section
27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 pertains only to applications filed
under the E.O. No. 109 and not to applications voluntary filed.
In it’s Manifestation to support the motion for partial
reconsideration, respondent attached letter from Deputy
Commissioner OIC (officer in charge Heceta of NTC stating that
xxxxx escrow deposit and performance bond were required to
public telecommunications entities to ensure that the
mandated installation of local exchange lines are installed
within three (3) years pursuant to EO 109 and RA 7925. Since
your company has already complied with its obligation by the
installation of more than 300,000 lines in Quezon City,
Malabon City and Valenzuela City in the National Capital
Region and Region V in early 1997, the escrow deposit and
performance bond were not required in your subsequent
authorizations xxxxxxx
In a resolution, Court required petitioners and NTC to file
their comments on the motion, Subsequently the OSG in
behalf of NTC, declared that it fully agrees with respondent
that escrow deposits and performance bond are not required
in subsequent authorizations for additional/ new areas outside
its original roll out obligation under the Service Area Scheme
of E.O. no. 109.
Petitioner did not file any comment it was only after the
Court issued a show cause and compliance Resolution on Oct,
2005 that petitioners manifested in their Entry of Special
Appearance, Manifestation and Compliance that they have not
further comments on the motion for partial recon.
ISSUE: WON interpretation of the NTC (Sec. 27 of NTC MC No.
11-9-93) regarding the escrow deposit and performance bond
shall pertain only to original roll-out obligation under E.O. no
109?
HELD: YES. The Court holds that the interpretation of the NTC
that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 regarding the escrow
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deposit and performance bond shall pertain only to a local
exchange operator's original roll-out obligation under E.O. No.
109, and not to roll-out obligations made under subsequent or
voluntary applications outside E.O. No. 109, should be
sustained.
The Court has observed in its Decision that Section 27 of
NTC MC No. 11-9- 93 is silent as to whether the posting of an
escrow deposit and performance bond is a condition sine qua
non for the grant of a provisional authority.
The OSG agreed with respondent's stance that since the
provisional authority in this case involves a voluntary
application not covered by the original service areas created
by the NTC under E.O. No. 109, then it is not subject to the
posting of an escrow deposit and performance bond as
required by E.O. No. 109, but only to the conditions provided
in the provisional authority.
The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under its special and technical
forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to
implement its objectives,is in the best position to interpret its
own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has
consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the
interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules
unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
the letter and spirit of the law.
The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be
given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of
the law it is merely tasked to administer. Thus, in cases where
the dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency of its
own rules, one should apply only these standards: “Whether
the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was
within that delegation; and if so, whether it was a reasonable
regulation under a due process test.”