G.R. No.

L-9274 February 1, 1957

RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondent.
Isidro A. Vera and Eulalio F. Legaspi for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padila, Assistant Solicitor General Ramon L. Avanceña and Solicitor
Felicisimo R. Rosete for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioner appellant Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. is appealing from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing
its appeal from a decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, assessing additional fees on petitioner
for a certain importation of wire netting. The facts are simple and undisputed. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire
netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the
importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were
released. Subsequently, however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional
customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a
reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax
Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125,
creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us, seeking a reversal of said
resolution of dismissal.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125 relied upon by the Tax Court and
the Solicitor General, as well as Section 11 of the same Act invoked by the petitioner:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided —
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals in case involving the assessment and
taxation of real property or other matters arising under the assessment Law, including rules and regulations
relative thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation adversely by a decision
or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of
Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such
decision or ruling.
No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue or the
Collector of the Customs shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the
taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by existing law: Provided, however, that when in
the opinion of the Court the collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs
may jeopardize the interests of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the proceeding
may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a
surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is really a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11 above reproduced. Section 7 provides that the Court of Tax
Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs and decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals on cases
mentioned in said section. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Republic Act in listing and enumerating the
persons and entities who may appeal as well as the effect of said appeal, mentions those affected by a decision or
ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or City Board of Assessment
Appeals, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. Taken literally, a person affected by a decision of the
Collector of Customs may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals; and since no mention is made about decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs, a person affected by said decision may not appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. However,
section 7 of the Act above reproduced specially provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. That legal provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Court
of Tax Appeals to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs would be empty, meaningless, and unenforceable
because under Section 11, no person affected by the decision of the Commissioner of customs may appeal to the Tax
Court. These two meaningless, and unenforceable because under Section 11, should be harmonized and reconciled if
possible, in order to give effect to the whole Act.
We are in entire accord with the Tax Court and the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in section 11,
mentioning therein the Collector of Customs. It should be, as it was meant to be, the Commissioner of Customs. There
are several reasons in support of this view. Under the Customs Law, found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Commissioner of Customs (Insular Collector of Customs) is the Chief of the Bureau of
Customs and has jurisdiction over the whole country as regards the enforcement of the Customs Law, whereas, there
are about sixteen Collectors of Customs for the sixteen collection districts and principal parts of entry into which the
Philippines has been divided. These Collectors of Customs are subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over
whom he has supervision and control (section 1152, Revised Administrative Code). Pursuant to said supervision and
control, under section 1405 of the Revised Administrative Code, when any new or unsettled question shall be
determined by the Collector of Customs, he shall, if matter is not otherwise carried upon for review in ordinary
course, notify the Commissioner of his decision, submitting an adequate statement of acts involved. What is more
important is the provision of section 1380, which reproduce below:
SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs in
any matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen days after
notification in writing by the collector of his action or decision, give written notice to the collector signifying
his desore to have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner.
Thereupon, the Collector of Customs shall forthwith transmit all the papers in the cause to the Commissioner,
who shall approve, modify, or reverse the action of his subordinate and shall take such steps and make such
order or orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision.
Under this section, any person affected or aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal the
decision to the Commissioner of Customs. From all this, it is clear if we followed the literal meaning and wording of
section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, in the sense that persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may
appeal directly tot he Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his
Collector of Customs, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said
decision would, not only be gravely affected, but even destroyed. We cannot believe that was the intention of the
Legislature in passing Republic Act No. 1125. It is more reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act,
the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs in the first
paragraph and the first part of the second paragraph of said section. In thus holding, the Court are not exactly
indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the
wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the Legislature. This the Courts
should and can validly do. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the spirit of the law
and intention of the Legislature that is important and which matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to
the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would contravene the clear
purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary,
the latter of the law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of the terms, for that which
is clearly within the intention of the Legislature in enacting the law is as much within the statute as if it were within
the latter. Here the error (clerical and misprint) is plain and obvious. It is within the province of the courts to correct
said error. This is not to correct the act of the Legislature, but rather to carry out and give due course to the true
intention of said Legislature. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp. 66-67; 157-158.).
Furthermore, section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may well be regarded as a mere complement or implementation of
section 7. Since section 7 provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector
of Internal Revenue. decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, and decisions of provincial or city Boards of
Assessment Appeals, so section 11 naturally provides that persons adversely affected by said decisions may appeal to
the Tax Court. However, in enumerating the governmental bodies or agencies rendering said decisions that may be
appealed, it erroneously listed the Collector instead of the Commissioner, of Customs. The error is plain.
As a matter of fact, the Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of dismissal of May 23, 1955 cites in support thereof a
resolution promulgated by it on January 22, 1955 in C.T.A. Case No. 17, entitled "Acting Collector of
Customs vs.Acting Commissioner of Customs", wherein it said:
The phrase "Collector of Customs" appearing in the above-mentioned provision (section 11) of Republic Act
No. 1125 is clearly an oversight on the part of Congress. It should read "Commissioner of Customs" to make
the provision conform with section 7 of the said Republic Act section 1380 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 should be adopted in the sense that
the Court of Tax Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over Appeals from decisions
of Collectors of Customs, so that a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs is given the
choice of appealing the said decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax Appeals. We find
contention unteable. In the first place, the two remedies suggested are entirely different, one from the other; an appeal
to the Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly
judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should
first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in confusion because
a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy,
whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to
decide because, if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the
Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal
said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review
the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his
appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he may yet appeal therefrom to the
Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs
took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the petitioner, under the literal meaning of
section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that under
section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7
clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the
Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The appealed
order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the
principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro,
and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said
petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which
Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had
conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and
Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if
administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the
post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and
distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties
with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after
deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as
follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she
was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed
3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate
succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF
(1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are involved. The first,
raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second,
raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when
the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where
such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which
provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower shall be entitled to
one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow
the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child
1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged
inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child,
inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the
chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to
support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the
ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision
on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty
sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only
article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having
expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the
estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share
equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the
law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to
include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children,"
therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied,
thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas
intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.
A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or
should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the
same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not
included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the
following articles:
ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants ... .
ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate ... .
ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... .
(See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when they argue from
the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The
inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not
"child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one
child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is
applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She
or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by
testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish
Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where
the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower
survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called upon to discuss — but it is
the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
G.R. No. L-39518 November 2, 1982
AGRICULTURAL & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, INC., AMON TRADING CORPORATION and
FELIXBERTO C. AZICATE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO S. REBUENO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur (Branch IV), REMIGIO G. DIZON, Judge of the Municipal Court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
and FELIX A. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
Rolando N. Velsco for petitioners.
Prila, Fuentebella, and Associates for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1974 in CA-G.R.
No. SP-03269 which dismissed petitioners' petition for review under Republic Act 6031 for being filed late. The
petition was denied for lack of merit in the resolution of this Court dated November 18, 1974, 1 but on motion for
reconsideration, was given due course as per resolution dated January 17, 1975. 2
Records show that this case originated in the Municipal Court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent judge
Remigio Dizon, as Civil Case No. 288, arising from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent Felix A.
Fuentebella against the herein petitioners for an alleged breach of warranty on a "DEUTZ" diesel electric generating
set which private respondent bought from petitioner Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. For failure of herein
petitioners to appears during the initial hearing of the case on February 28, 1973, and upon motion of private
respondent, the former were declared in default. A decision was rendered by respondent judge Dizon on May, 1973 in
favor of private respondent Fuentebella and against petitioners.
Petitioners appealed the municipal court's decision of default to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur presided
by respondent judge Alfredo S. Rebueno, docketed as Civil Case No. T-522. After considering private respondent's
motion to dismiss appeal and petitioners' opposition thereto, an order dated March 28, 1974 was issued by respondent
judge Rebueno dismissing petitioners' appeal on the ground that defendants (petitioners herein) having been declared
in default in the Municipal Court of Tigaon, and having failed to file a motion to set aside the order of default,
petitioners have not regained their lost standing in court and consequently, have no right to appeal.
From the order of respondent judge Rebueno denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order of March 28,
1974, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1974, on a petition for review under Republic Act 6031
since the case was originally cognizable by the municipal court. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a resolution on
August 21, 1974 dismissing the petition for review on the ground that "it was filed eight (8) days late."
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but the same was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated September 30, 1974. Hence, this present recourse, petitioners alleging that although they admit that
the late filing of the petition for review was their (petitioners) error, nevertheless in exceptionally meritorious cases,
the court can suspend its own rules in order to sub serve the interest of substantial justice. Petitioners have cited the
following considerations which allegedly constitute strong compelling reasons to warrant this Court's suspension of its
rules to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice, namely:
a) the judgment by default of respondent judge included Amon Trading Corporation and Felixberto
C. Azicate, when they are not even parties to the alleged breach of warranty.
b) the generating set which was the subject of private respondent's complaint in the municipal court
of Tigaon had already been repaired and placed in operating condition; and
c) the judgment by default of the municipal court of Tigaon was predicated on a null and void order
of default, the latter order having been prematurely issued in view of the pendency of petitioners'
motion to dismiss which had been left unresolved in spite of its having been filed on time.
None of the above considerations appears substantiated in the record before Us. Nor are they sufficient to warrant
deviating from the rule as to the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance becoming final upon the expiration of
the period to appeal or file a petition for review without the appeal having been perfected, or the petition for review
having been filed within said period. More specifically, petitioners' third consideration to the effect that they cannot be
declared in default because there was a timely motion to dismiss filed still to be resolved, deserves scant
consideration. As admitted by petitioners, 3 said motion to dismiss did not contain any notice of time and place of
hearing, and the notice of hearing was directed to the Clerk of Court of Municipal Court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
and merely states that the same be submitted for resolution of the Honorable Court upon receipt hereof. For failing to
comply with the requirement of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, 4 the motion is fatally defective.
It is a mere scrap of paper which should not be accepted for filing, and even if filed, it is not entitled to judicial
cognizance, for it presents no question or matter which the Court can decide or consider. 5
Petitioners having categorically admitted to have failed to timely file a petition for review, for purposes of appeal, to
respondent Court of Appeals, from the Adverse decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the Court of
Appeals committed no error in dismissing petitioners' petition for review. It is beyond question that the perfection of
an appeal, or the filing of petition for review, within the statutory or reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional; and that failure to so perfect an appeal renders final and executory the questioned decision and deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 6 The lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, and the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution,
and for the court, it becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of judgment.
This doctrine is based upon a fundamental public policy that litigants should know exactly when they may obtain
execution and consider the case terminated and hence, a strict observance of the reglementary period within which to
exercise the statutory right of appeal has been considered as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. 7
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals of August 21, 1974 is affirmed and the instant petition for
review by way of certiorari is hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.