1
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
vs. RANDY CLOMA y CABANA, Appellant
Facts:
On 6 September 2005, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165 was filed with the RTC against Cloma.
The prosecution presented SPO1 Efren T. Ellevera (SPO1 Ellevera) and
PO2 Michael R. Daleon (PO2 Daleon), members of the buy-bust team.
According to them, on 25 August 2005, at 3:30 p.m., elements of the City
Mobile Group ("CMG") of the Cagayan de Oro City Police Office proceeded
to Isla Delta, Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an entrapment
operation against Cloma. SPO1 Ellevera was assigned as poseur-buyer.
During the operation, SPO1 Ellevera approached Cloma and negotiated for
the purchase of shabu worth five hundred pesos (₱500). SPO1 Ellevera then
handed Cloma the marked money with serial number PB789713 and the
latter handed a transparent sachet to him. The sachet contained a white
crystalline substance.
After the sale, SPO1 Ellevera introduced himself as a police officer but
Cloma resisted arrest and jumped into a nearby river. As Cloma swam
towards the Kauswagan riverbank, he was intercepted by PO2 Daleon and
PO2 Andres C. Alvarez (PO2 Alvarez). After Cloma was arrested and
informed of his rights, he was brought to the Office of the CMG at Maharlika
Headquarters, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City for booking and identification.
SPO1 Ellevera marked the sachet with the letter "A" in Isla Delta. He
surrendered the sachet to PO2 Daleon in Maharlika Headquarters where he
affixed his signature on the sachet.
The sachet was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for testing. The substance tested positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. The urine sample taken from
Cloma also tested positive for shabu.5 The Chemistry Report showing the
positive result of the substance and urine was presented during trial.6 In
addition, an affidavit of the Forensic Chemical Officer confirming the findings
in the Chemistry Report was shown.7
The defense denied all the allegations of the prosecution and presented
Cloma as sole witness. Cloma testified that there was no buy-bust operation.
He claimed he never sold any shabu and the buy-bust team violated his
rights under Republic Act No. 7438.8 Consequently, all evidence seized from
him were inadmissible for being the fruit of the poisonous tree. Lastly, he
claimed that the procedure for the handling and custody of evidence
prescribed in RA 9165 was not followed.
In its Judgment dated 19 November 2007, the RTC found Cloma guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The
RTC also found that, in the absence of ill motive, the positive testimony of
the arresting officer is stronger than the negative self-serving denial by
Cloma.
The Judgment listed the elements of the offense that were present, to wit:
The following elements of the crime of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs
were all proven:
a) The sachet of shabu (Exhibit "B") is a dangerous drug as shown by
(Exhibit "C") Chemistry Report No. [D-]259-2005 made and prepared by
Police [Senior] Inspector April G. Carbajal-Madrofio, Forensic Chemist of the
crime laboratory;
b) That the seller Randy Cloma y Cabana [had] no legal authority to make
the sale;
c) That Randy Cloma y Cabana had sold and delivered a dangerous drug to
a police poseur-buyer;
d) That at the time he had sold and delivered the sachet of shabu (Exhibit
"B") he knew that what he sold and delivered was a dangerous drug;
e) The seller and the buyer were both identified;
f) The corpus delicti (Exhibit "B") was presented in Court.9
Issue: whether or not Cloma is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds this appeal to be without
merit. Both the RTC and the CA correctly found Cloma guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
For the successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
it.13 The prosecution must establish proof that the transaction or sale actually

took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus
delicti.14
All the required elements are present in this case. SPO1 Ellevera testified
that he was the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation. He identified Cloma
as the seller of the shabu. SPO1 Ellevera confirmed the exchange of the five
hundred peso (₱500) marked money and shabu. Hence, the illegal sale of
drugs was consummated. In People v. Gaspar,15 we held that the delivery of
the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money
consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapment officers and
the accused. The crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed as
soon as the sale transaction is consummated.16
For his defense, Cloma denied the allegations of the prosecution. We find
Cloma 's defense self-serving. The defense of denial has been viewed with
disfavor for it can be easily concocted and is a common defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 17 As evidence that is
both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing
thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. 18
Next, Cloma contends that the procedure for the handling and custody of
evidence was not followed. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9165 states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. (Emphasis supplied)
2
To establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases involving
dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place be the same substance offered in court as exhibit.19 People v.
Kamad20 explained the four links of custody that must be proven by the
prosecution:
[1] The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer;
[2] The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
[3] the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and
[4] the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.21
In this case, the proper chain of custody was established.
Firstly, SPO1 Ellevera, the poseur-buyer, marked the sachet after seizure
from Cloma.
Secondly, SPO1 Ellevera turned the sachet over to PO2 Daleon and the
members of the buy-bust team.1âwphi1 The members then made a request
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for the drug dependency test of Cloma and
examination of the sachet.
Thirdly, the Forensic Chemical Officer, Police Senior Inspector April G.
Carbajal-Madroño, confirmed that the same marked sachet she received
from the buy-bust team tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Fourthly, the marked sachet was identified by SPO1 Ellevera in open court
Finally, it is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are
factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded
respect, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from
such findings.

TAKE NOTE IN THIS CASE:
 For the successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the following
elements must be proven:
1) The identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and
2) The delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
 The four links of custody that must be proven by the prosecution:
1) The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
2) The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3) The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
4) The turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
3
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION v. NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, GR No. 181683, 2015-10-07
Facts:
Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and operator of the commercial vessel MV
Lorcon Luzon.[8] National Power Corporation is the owner of Power Barge
104, "a non-propelled power plant barge."[9]
On March 20, 1993, Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed at the
Makar Wharf in General Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and
rammed Power Barge 104."
Following this incident, Nelson Homena, Plant Manager of Power Barge 104,
filed a Marine Protest before the Board of Marine Inquiry. Captain Villarias
also filed his own Marine Protest. For his part, Captain Yape filed a Marine
Accident Report. The Board of Marine Inquiry... conducted joint hearings on
the Marine Protests and Captain Yape's report.
To forestall the prescription of its cause of action for damages, National
Power Corporation filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court a
Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo Shipping.[19] In this Complaint,
National Power Corporation recalled the... damage resulting from the
ramming
The Regional Trial Court issued the Decision[27] dated February 18, 2002
absolving Lorenzo Shipping of liability.
Nevertheless, as Lorenzo Shipping supposedly exercised due diligence in its
selection and supervision of Captain Villarias, no liability could be attributed
to it.
The Court of Appeals rendered the Decision[29] dated September 14, 2007
reversing and setting aside the February 18, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court and entering another judgment ordering Lorenzo Shipping to pay
National Power Corporatio
Issues:
 4

Regarding the "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair," which was
National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F" before the Regional Trial Court,
Lorenzo Shipping underscored that when the Regional Trial Court ruled on
National Power Corporation's Formal Offer of Evidence, it... denied the
admission of Exhibit "F" for not having been identified nor authenticated.
It emphasized that no witness came forward to attest to its authenticity and
due execution, let alone allowed himself or herself to be cross-examined on
these points.
TAKE NOTE IN THIS CASE:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover
actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but
must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount
thereof.

Ruling:

It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be considered

unless duly admitted by the court before which it is presented. Just as basic
is that a private document offered as authentic evidence shall not be
admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are... established in the
manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence

Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with
Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the standard of competency. Consistent
with this, reliance on National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F" and its
contents, so as to establish the extent of National

Power Corporation's pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted,

Exhibit "F" does not form part of the body of evidence worthy of judicial
consideration.

Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document

offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the

maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is

claimed to be.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BAIDA SALAK y BANGKULAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 21, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
July 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01740,
which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
103, of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100879. The RTC found
Baida Salak y Bangkulas guilty of illegal sale of a regulated drug in
violation of Section 15,4 Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.5
The Information dated May 25, 2001 filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of May, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true
names, identities and personal circumstances have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized
by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug,
did, then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 305.4604
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is a regulated
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
On September 25, 2001, following the failure of prosecution witnesses to
attend scheduled hearings for the fifth consecutive time despite the
issuance of subpoenas, the trial court orally ordered the provisional
dismissal of the case.7 Shortly after the order was given, however, the
prosecution witnesses from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Special Investigators Edgardo Kawada, Sr. and Raoul Manguerra, arrived.
Hence, the order was recalled.8 Trial then ensued.
5
The prosecution presented two witnesses: NBI Special Investigator
Kawada, who acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, and
Supervising Agent Dominador Villanueva III, who acted as backup during
the NBI operation. Their version of facts is as follows:
In the morning of May 23, 2001, the NBI Special Task Force (STF)
received information from one of their assets that a certain "Baida" is
engaged in selling shabu at Litex Market in Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City. Immediately, NBI-STF agents formed a team composed of
Atty. Cesar Bacani, Supervising Agents Rommel Vallejo and Dominador
Villanueva III, Special Investigators Raoul Manguerra, Job Gayas,
Charlemagne Veloso, Eric Isidro, Eduardo Villa, Rolan Fernandez and
Edgardo Kawada, Sr. to conduct a surveillance operation.9 A briefing was
held at around 12:00 noon10 before the team proceeded to Litex Market. At
2:00 p.m., they arrived thereat.11
There, the NBI agents waited in strategic locations so they could see their
asset while the latter talked with appellant. After a brief conversation with
appellant, the asset informed the NBI team that appellant was in
possession of shabu and was willing to make a transaction.12 Thus, a
clearance to conduct a buy-bust operation was issued by the Chief of the
NBI-STF, Atty. Max Salvador, and a poseur-buyer was designated in the
person of Special Investigator Kawada.
The asset then told appellant that he has a buyer. Appellant instructed the
asset to go to Greenwich Pizza Parlor in Fairview, Quezon City with the
buyer.13 As instructed, the asset and Kawada, followed by the rest of the
team, drove to Greenwich Pizza, but appellant later called the asset on the
latter’s cellular phone and instructed the latter to go instead to McDonald’s
restaurant, which was just across Greenwich Pizza. Kawada and the asset
obliged.14 After an hour, appellant arrived, accompanied by two men,
whom she later introduced to Kawada and the asset as her husband,
Karim Salak, and a certain Boy Life.15
The asset introduced Kawada to appellant and the two discussed the
terms of the transaction. Kawada agreed to pay ₱60,000 per 100 grams
of shabu, or a total of ₱180,000 for the 300 grams which appellant will
supply. Kawada suggested that the exchange be made at the parking lot of
Ever Gotesco Mall along Commonwealth Avenue, but appellant insisted
that the venue be at Litex Market.16 Kawada agreed so appellant boarded
his vehicle with the NBI asset, and the three proceeded to Litex Market.

Upon arriving at Litex Market, appellant alighted and left to retrieve the
drugs. She returned 30 minutes later, followed by Karim and Boy Life, this
time carrying a plastic bag. Appellant entered Kawada’s car, while her two
companions stood guard outside.17
Inside the car, appellant showed Kawada three small heat-sealed plastic
sachets packed inside a bigger plastic bag. Appellant gave the plastic bag
containing the three heat-sealed sachets to Kawada who, in turn, gave
₱180,000 in genuine bills18 to the former. The money was mixed with three
one-hundred peso bills earlier marked with "ECK 5/23/01"19 representing
Kawada’s initials and the date of the entrapment operation. While appellant
was busy counting the money, Kawada identified himself as an NBI
operative and arrested appellant. Meanwhile, outside Kawada’s vehicle,
appellant’s two male companions, perhaps sensing that something was
amiss, instantly took off and mingled with the crowd at Litex Market as
other NBI agents rushed towards the location of Kawada’s vehicle. 20
Appellant was brought to the NBI office,21 while the three heat-sealed
plastic sachets, marked as "REM 1," "REM 2," and "REM 3," were
submitted by NBI Agent Raoul Manguerra, upon Kawada’s endorsement,
to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division for chemical analysis at 7:15 in the
morning of the following day, May 24, 2001.22
A Certification23 dated May 24, 2001 was issued by NBI Forensic Chemist
II Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum stating that the white substance contained in the
three heat-sealed plastic sachets, marked "REM 1," "REM 2" and "REM 3,"
with a total weight of 305.4604 grams, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.24
The defense, for its part, denied the charges and presented the following
version of facts:
In the morning of May 23, 2001, while appellant and her husband Zaldy
Pinorac were busy tending their stall at Manggahan Market in
Commonwealth Avenue corner Litex Road, Quezon City, an acquaintance
named Mila arrived. Mila was accompanied by two companions, one of
whom was introduced as Aminola Kawada. The group talked to Zaldy while
appellant busied herself in their store. Thereafter, Zaldy asked appellant if
she could accompany Mila’s group to McDonald’s in Fairview as Mila’s
group wanted to buy VCD from Boy Life,25 who, according to appellant, is
her second cousin and whose real name is Karim Salak.26 Appellant
complied.
6
At McDonald’s restaurant, appellant found Boy Life already waiting for
them as Zaldy notified Boy Life over the phone. Appellant introduced Mila’s
group to Boy Life, and was asked to order some food. Appellant ate with
the group and thereafter excused herself and returned to their store.27
At the store, Zaldy told her that Boy Life called him on the cell phone and
disclosed that he sold 100 grams of shabuto Mila and her companions.
Appellant claims that she got angry with Zaldy for putting her in such a
precarious situation.28
Around seven o’clock that evening, Boy Life dropped by appellant’s store,
but appellant ignored him. An hour later, she heard a gunfire. She looked
outside her store and saw Boy Life being chased by two men. When the
men failed to apprehend Boy Life, they went to her stall accompanied by
Aminola Kawada. Aminola Kawada’s group grabbed Zaldy, but Zaldy
resisted and ran. He was chased by Aminola Kawada’s group but the latter
also failed to arrest him so they returned to appellant’s store and forcibly
took her. Mangayao Angne, a fellow vendor who tried to intervene and help
appellant, was also arrested. They were both brought to the NBI office in
Taft Avenue, Manila,29 but Angne was released the following day.30
Zaldy testified that he returned to their store almost an hour after the
incident and learned from his fellow vendors that his wife and Angne were
arrested. On May 24, 2001, he received a call from Aminola Kawada
demanding information about Boy Life’s whereabouts. Kawada also
allegedly asked for ₱300,000 in exchange for his wife’s release, but when
he told Aminola that he does not have that much money, Aminola reduced
the amount to ₱100,000.31
Two more witnesses, Mangrose Ampaso and Macapintal Angne
corroborated appellant’s testimony. Both men also own market stalls at
Litex Market and claimed that they were present near the vicinity of
appellant’s store when the NBI operatives nabbed her on the night of May
23, 2001.
On October 11, 2001, the defense filed a motion requesting for a
quantitative or purity analysis on the shabuspecimen allegedly confiscated
from the appellant.32 The RTC granted the said motion and directed NBI
Forensic Chemist Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum to conduct the necessary
tests.33 A Certification, albeit dated August 1, 2001, was thereafter issued
by NBI Forensic Chemist Gelacio-Mahilum stating:

THIS CERTIFIES that representative samples taken from DD-01-480
specimen marked "REM-1", "REM-2" and "REM-3", when subjected to
quantitative analysis using HIGH PRESSURE LIQUID
CHROMATOGRAPHY (HPLC) gave the following result:
NET WEIGHT % PURITY
"REM-1" = 114.5932 grams 84.38%
"REM-2" = 97.0434 grams 95.90%
"REM-3" = 93.8238 grams 83.71%
Total Net weight of specimen = 305.4604 grams
Average % Purity = 87.99%34
On February 18, 2002, the RTC promulgated its decision finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding BAIDA SALAK OR
SADAK, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the sale of
methylamphetahmine (sic) hydrochloride or shabu weighing 305.4604
grams[,] in violation of RA 6425 as charged, and she is sentenced to suffer
a jail term of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Cost
versus accused.
SO ORDERED.35
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC
decision in toto.36 The CA also denied appellant’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.37 Hence this appeal.
Appellant alleges that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED WHEN THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE
PROCESS WAS VIOLATED; AND
7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN
THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
COMPLY WITH THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY LAW
FOR A CONVICTION AND WHEN THE EVIDENCES OF THE
PROSECUTION WERE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO COMMON
HUMAN EXPERIENCE.38
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant assails the continuation of the trial against her notwithstanding
the order of provisional dismissal earlier issued by the trial court following
the repeated failure of the prosecution witnesses to attend scheduled
hearings. Specifically, appellant argues that the case should not have been
revived without the proper motion from the prosecution.
Appellant’s contention is without merit. A careful perusal of the records
shows that the provisional dismissal, which was declared in open court by
the judge on September 25, 2001, was never reduced into writing after
Special Investigators Kawada and Manguerra appeared at the last minute
of the said hearing.39 Moreover, it appears that the said issue was brought
up by appellant’s counsel in the next hearing and was settled when the trial
court judge issued an order, again in open court, recalling and setting
aside the September 25, 2001 order provisionally dismissing the case.40
It bears emphasizing that an oral order has no juridical existence until and
unless it had been reduced into writing and promulgated, i.e. delivered by
the judge to the clerk of court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation.41 In fact, even if it had been written and promulgated, or
even if it had already been properly served on the parties, it is still plainly
within the power of the judge to recall it and set it aside because every
court has the inherent power, among others, to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.42
Appellant likewise faults the trial court in convicting her despite the
prosecution’s alleged failure to establish the integrity of
the shabu confiscated from her and presented in court. She points out that
the NBI-STF team did not comply with the requirement that a physical
inventory and photograph of the confiscated drugs be taken, 43 as provided
in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended
by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. Neither did
the prosecution present the buy-bust money. These shortcomings,
according to her, create reasonable doubt.

The Office of the Solicitor General, meanwhile, counters that the failure of
the NBI-STF operatives to comply with the documentation and reportorial
requirement, even if true, does not affect the actual conduct and regularity
of the buy-bust operation itself because of the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions which should be upheld here in the
absence of evidence militating against its application. 44
Appellant’s assertion fails.
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990 reads:
Subject: Amendment of Board Regulation No. 7, series of 1974,
prescribing the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated
drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles specially designed for the
use thereof.
SECTION 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses
and articles specially designed for the use thereof when unlawfully used or
found in the possession of any person not authorized to have control and
disposition of the same, or when found secreted or abandoned, shall be
seized or confiscated by any national, provincial or local law enforcement
agency. Any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said
drugs and[/or] paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in
the presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative,
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. Thereafter the seized drugs and paraphernalia shall be
immediately brought to a properly equipped government laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination.
The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours from the
seizure inform the Dangerous Drugs Board by telegram of said seizure, the
nature and quantity thereof, and who has present custody of the same, and
(b) submit to the Board a copy of the mission investigation report within
fifteen (15) days from completion of the investigation.45
The records do not show that the NBI-STF team complied with the
aforementioned procedure.1awphil Nevertheless, such failure is insufficient
ground to acquit appellant.
8
In People v. Gonzaga,46 wherein the very same issue was raised, we
explained that:
While it appears that the buy-bust team failed to comply strictly with the
procedure outlined above, the same does not overturn the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duty. A violation of the regulation is a
matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting
officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case since
the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is
considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and
the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the arresting officers’ inability
to conform to the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Further, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered with.47
Moreover, non-compliance with the said regulation is not fatal to the
prosecution as it does not render appellant’s arrest illegal or the seized
items inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
herein appellant.48
A thorough review of the records of this case shows that despite the NBI-
STF’s non-compliance with said regulation, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs was nonetheless preserved. Evidence
shows that the three heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu, after being
confiscated from appellant on the night
of May 23, 2001, were duly marked by poseur-buyer Kawada as "REM-1,"
"REM-2" and "REM-3" using his own codename.49 That same night, at the
NBI-STF office, Kawada prepared the disposition form with file number
DD-010480 indicating the transmittal of the same three heat-sealed
sachets of shabu for laboratory examination. The said disposition form was
duly noted by NBI-STF Chief Atty. Max Salvador.50 The following day, the
confiscated drugs including the disposition form Kawada prepared, were
delivered and submitted by Agent Raoul Manguerra to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Division at 7:15 in the morning and were duly received by NBI
Forensic Chemist Gelacio-Mahilum.51 As indicated in her Certification
dated May 24, 2001, the three plastic sachets marked "REM-1," "REM-2,"
and "REM-3" were still heat-sealed when she received them. She also

certified that the three sachets have a total weight of 305.4604 grams and
gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.52When
presented during the trial, these specimens were also positively identified
by Kawada as the very same sachets which were handed to him by the
appellant.53
It is also worthy to note that appellant never alleged that the drugs
presented during the trial have been tampered with. Neither did appellant
challenge the admissibility of the seized items when these were formally
offered as evidence. In the course of the trial, the seized shabu were duly
marked, made the subject of examination and cross-examination, and
eventually offered as evidence, yet at no instance did the appellant
manifest or even hint that there were lapses in the safekeeping of the
seized items as to affect their admissibility, integrity and evidentiary
value. It was only during her appeal that she raised the issue of non-
compliance with the said regulation. Settled is the rule that objections to
the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.54
It should also be noted that appellant failed to present evidence to show
that the NBI-STF team was impelled by improper motives to testify against
her. She merely gave the bare assertion that she was arrested by the NBI
operatives to be used as leverage in pressuring her husband to divulge the
whereabouts of alias Boy Life.
It must be stressed that the shabu confiscated from appellant weighed
305.4604 grams with 87.99% average purity. To the Court, the difficulty
and enormous risk of obtaining such huge amount of regulated drugs, with
a street value of at least ₱180,000, only for the purpose of incriminating
and extorting money from an individual who was not shown to be of good
financial standing and business importance, renders the allegation highly
improbable.55 If the NBI-STF operatives indeed wanted to frame-up
appellant and extort money from her or her relatives, a small quantity
of shabu would have been sufficient to cause her arrest.
Finally, as to appellant’s argument that she should have been acquitted
since the prosecution failed to present the buy-bust money used during the
operation, again, the argument is without merit. Failure to present the buy-
bust money is not indispensable in drug cases since it is merely
corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof does not create a hiatus
9
in the evidence for the prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented
before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of
any money used in the buy-bust operation.56
In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be
satisfied:
(1) identities of the buyer, the seller, the object and the consideration, and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. 57 These elements
were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
through testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented during
the trial.
TAKE NOTE IN THIS CASE:
Records show that despite the NBI-STF’s non-compliance with said
regulation, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs was
nonetheless preserved.
The 3 heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu, after being confiscated, were
duly marked by Kawada as "REM-1," "REM-2" and "REM-3" using his own
codename. That same night, at the NBI-STF office, Kawada prepared the
disposition form with file number DD-010480 indicating the transmittal of
the same 3 heat-sealed sachets of shabu for laboratory examination, and
duly noted by NBI-STF Chief Atty. Max Salvador. The following morning,
the confiscated drugs including the disposition form, were delivered and
submitted by Agent Manguerra to the NBI Forensic Chemistry and were
duly received by NBI Forensic Chemist Mahilum. As indicated in her
Certification, the 3 plastic sachets marked "REM-1," "REM-2," and "REM-
3" were still heat-sealed when she received them. She also certified that
the 3 sachets have a total weight of 305.4604 grams and gave positive
results shabu. When presented during the trial, Kawada positively
identified the same as the very same sachets that were handed to him by
Salak.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela
Cruz, from the Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution 2 dated 2 February
2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15,
Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February
2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and
qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police
Office, after having beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as "Shabu",
the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty
to the charge. The records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise
charged for extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
10
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January
2006, the agents and special investigators of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI,
received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido
(Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel
Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was
picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for
allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants,
and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed
to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In
the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them
₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a
complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities.
While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven received calls supposedly from
"James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages
received by the complainants.1âwphi1 A team was immediately formed to
implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee
branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The
officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill
dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount
demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought
to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination
was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required
to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result
labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated
16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the
charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was
arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI
Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused
saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He
also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its
Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six
(6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug
Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result
of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the
lack of legal basis for itsadmission. First, he alleges that the forensic
laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he
was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack
of sufficient basis to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA
overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug testing
conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would violate a person’s right to
privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns
as errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the
questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment,6 saying that "petitioner’s arguments cannot be the subject of a
petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve questions of
facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no
longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the
proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct evidence;
and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was
grounded on a valid and existing law.
THE ISSUE
11
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on
the issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is
legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon
any existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him
to submit clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was charged with use of
dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which
reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested,
who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a
confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous
drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (₱200,000.00): Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in
which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following
elements of Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2)
the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows
that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the
evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his
right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is
already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent
affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested
for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A.
9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime.The phrase must be read in context
and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of
the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or
arrested for, among others, the "importation,"9 "sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation", 10"manufacture"11 and
"possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or
meetings"13 ; being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal chemical diversion
of controlled precursors and essential chemicals" 16 ; "manufacture or
delivery"17 or "possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription
thereof; "cultivation or culture of plantsclassified as dangerous drugs or are
sources thereof";22 and "maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled precursors and essential
chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the
alleged act of extortion.
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the
intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the
unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of
other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more
clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of
R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This
12
Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in
cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is
only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping
withthe intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to
rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a positive
confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum penalty
under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue
isimprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15
for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation
in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of
residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug
users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance
at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form
of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive
for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence
obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers
should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of
dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under
Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who
shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment
of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the
possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima
facieevidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this
Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases
to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of
dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs.In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the
filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only
be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than
mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in
Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in
Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful
acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a
mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any
crime. To overextend the application of thisprovision would run counter to
our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if
that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this
case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing
whatever defect may have attended his arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the
allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial
compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
13
hand ofcounsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The
essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People
vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455
[1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held
that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
[1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his
mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of
his foot traced todetermine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas,
25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred
when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug
testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In
Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested
in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A
PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also
asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use
of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may
be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was
sought tobe examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:
 14

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
meant to unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug
and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which
they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo the arrest is being made.
a drug test.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are vigorously track down offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the pervasive
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must,
replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority,
evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its
the crimes charged. lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the
protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the force.
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was
arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine.
Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the
crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for
extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine
sample was the only available evidencethat was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and

tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because
he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman - Visayas.
The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito
Escobido that Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and Charito
was picked up by unknown male persons believed to be police
officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a
number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the
number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo
Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the
said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them
P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release
of Ariel. The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified
the text messages received by the complainants. A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation,
which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen.
Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. Petitioner was
required to submit his urine for drug testing.
It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs
as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as
15
Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) . The version of the defense
stated otherwise, petitioner claims that when he is in the NBI
Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination,
but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI.
His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be
allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample,
to no avail.
Ruling of the RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its
Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A.
9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory
rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the
Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug
Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.
Ruling of the CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
Issue
WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is illegal
and does it violate the petitioner right against self-incrimination
Ruling of the SC
 16

Yes. We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and
well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on right against self-incrimination.
three counts.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision
arrested in the alleged act of extortion. dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the
Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R.
compulsion. The constitutional right of an accused against self- No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not SO ORDERED.
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance
and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act.

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could

be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."

Margarita Ambre y Cayuni vs.People of the Philippines,
G. R. No. 191532 August 15, 2012
Mendoza, J:
Doctrine:
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription.
One of the recognized exception established by jurisprudence is
search incident to a lawful arrest. In this exception, the law requires that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings.
Facts:
On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-
Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from
a police informant that a certain Abdullah Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was
engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in
Caloocan City; that buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a
certain Moctar Tagoranao; that Sultan run away from the scene of the
entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued
him; that in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his
house; that inside the house, he police operatives found Ambre, Castro and
Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre in particular, was caught sniffing
what was suspected to be a shabu in a rolled up alumni foil; and that PO3
Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre,
Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were
illegal because no offense was being committed at the time and the police
operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling of
Sultan. That Ambre is inside the residential compound to buy a Malong. She
argues that the alleged “hot pursuit” on Sultan which ended in the latter's
house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a pot
session, was more imaginary than real. That the police officer just barged in
and arrested her.
17
Rosete testified that after she left Ambre inside along with the vendors and
buyers of malong. She returned and found out that the policemen arrested
the people inside the compound.
The RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to
establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre. CA affirmed the decision of RTC
Issues:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of
her person was valid?
2. Whether or not the items seized are inadmissible in evidence?
3. Whether or not chain of custody of evidence was broken?
Held:
1. Yes, the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person
was valid.
2. Yes, the items seized are admissible in evidence.
3. No, the chain of custody of evidence was not broken.
Ratio:
1. The Court held that the arrest and search done against the
petitioner is valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest
may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of
a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment
he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
 18

Futhermore, Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest shabu; and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police
for not raising them before entering her plea station, PO3 Moran turned over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who
immediately marked them in the presence of the former.

2. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be
excluded. for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. But this rule does not
apply in an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful
arrest.
The testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral
certainty the commission of the crime charged in the information and the
identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. It upholds the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains because the
defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an
improper motive.
TAKE NOTE IN THIS CASE:

Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent
search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. Thus, the
evidence sized are admissible.
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that Ambre, together with Castro and Mendoza, were
illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from them were found
positive for the presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science Report
No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent
search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a
legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer
with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.

3. The chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is

not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.
The preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.

In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been
compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia
with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the items
seized from her inadmissible. Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre
with Castro and Mendoza, the following items were confiscated from them:
one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) strip of
rolled up aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece
of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also believed to be

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833
The Anti-Wiretapping Act makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
Also, RA 4200 does not make any distinctions whether the conversation be
public or private.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation
in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
19
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6,
1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S.
Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing
the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the
trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the
facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
20
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or
by third persons.
he unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the
above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as
a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of

sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note,
because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions
the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-
recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear
and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
21
G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City,
dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months, and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the
heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged —
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the
nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a member of the
Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters,
where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the
discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in
the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the
said victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete
pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan
suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly
caused his death.

The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of
February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan,
who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City,
together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City
following reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After the
three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a
scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a
strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out
his camera and took a picture.2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security
guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know
why he took a picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job."4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the
table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.5 When
Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out
of the joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report
the matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including petitioner
Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they
asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena
declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report
the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with
them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.8Afterwards, petitioner
Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to
him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni
Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?"9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled
out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of
Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?"10
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro:
"Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am
here to mediate."11 Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press,
press, mag-sampu pa kayo."12 He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo
22
and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and
Lingan.13
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo
diyan"14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."15 The
two then had a heated exchange.16 Finally, Lingan said:
"Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan
na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"18
As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with
the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the
floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but
petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which
floored him.19
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha,
buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon."20 He said to
Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco
at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon."21 He then
poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign
his name on the blotter.22 Jalbuena could not affix his signature.
His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in
print.23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner
Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy,
Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to
the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.24
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on
tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.25 The
following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.

Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the
problem. I'm out of the problem.
xxx xxx xxx
Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .
Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley,
dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here
to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm
the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. .
..
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag
na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan: I'm brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala
ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang
ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka
dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang
minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi
lang ikaw!
23
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo!
Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan!
Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang
baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan,
hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon
ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot
nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako.
Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan.
Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who
tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both
times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice,
each time hitting his head on the concrete.26
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial
court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court
finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more
credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral
certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is
criminally responsible.

The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial
could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of
the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more
particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make
false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or
cause accusation of one who had neither brought him
harm or injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report
issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed
account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan
sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of
Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that
the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the
latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid
disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting
versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and
we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better
and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself
a victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the
probative worth of his positive and logical account of the
incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon
Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted,
clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his
capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation
24
that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked
him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for
Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged to a
fist fight.
1âw phi 1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan
was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It
is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location
of Lingan's injuries as shown in thepost-mortem report
(Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times
when he was outbalanced in the course of boxing the
appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in
his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right
eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of
the head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries could not
have been resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING
BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR
CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE;
IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS
JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID
OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.

First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony
of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a
grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an
interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason
alone, unreliable.27 Trial courts, which have the opportunity
observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a
witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his
or her testimony should be given credence.28 In the instant case,
petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in
according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording
had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view
of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in
the affirmative. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or
dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record,
or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act
in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or
any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
25
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act
shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording
of private communications.29 Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording
is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice
recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that
he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played
in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on
the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.30 In
the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the
voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner
Navarro and Lingan.33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1)
that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against
him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred
involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the
worst of it.

Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on
the body of Lingan, issued the medical certificate,34 dated
February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral
eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between
the left & right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth,
forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamato testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this
findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?
26
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a
hard object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No.
1.?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping
on a concrete floor?
A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling
under your findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt
of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A Same cause, sir.
 27

Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound? A May be, sir.

A Same thing sir. FISCAL:

Q How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and Which of these two more likely, to cause death?
toes, what could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Shock, sir.
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term
FISCAL: shock?

In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said
death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, earlier sir.
will you explain it?
xxx xxx xxx
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or
jarring of the brain, sir. FISCAL:

Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of
the deceased?
Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete
floor have caused shock?
WITNESS:
Possible, sir.
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A Possible, sir.35
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that
petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above
the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.

Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in
favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable
of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone.36 The provocation must be
sufficient and should immediately precede the act.37 To be
sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the
wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.38 And
it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no
interval between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime by the accused.39
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately
preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation.
In People v. Macaso,40 we appreciated this mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a
motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant
words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered
in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should
also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic
exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was
Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the
latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into
account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on
petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance
is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.41 In People
v.Castro,42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of
the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
28
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime
in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner
Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the
police station where policemen were discharging their public
functions.43
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two
mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstances, the
penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.44 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower degree, i.e., prision
mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.45
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with the current
jurisprudence.46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 1âw phi 1.nêt
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

TAKE NOTE IN THIS CASE:
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. In this case, the exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any
question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by
the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the conversation;
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to
belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that
the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.
29
ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Hadji
Homar (petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364. These assailed CA rulings affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 259 in
Criminal Case No. 02-0986 which convicted the petitioner for violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II2 of RA 9165.
The Information states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was
found to possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03
grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.3
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in
the RTC decision, he testified that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the
evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and
civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing,
Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter,
they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas
Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the
pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to
frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted
a thorough search on the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a
plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan
executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.4
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.5 He testified that on
August 20, 2002, he was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling

imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked
him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being
a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the
kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for
alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was criminally
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for
the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted. 6
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy
were presumed to have performed their duties regularly in arresting and
conducting a search on the petitioner. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric
Tan was straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not show any ill
motive in arresting the petitioner.7
The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of denial and ruled that
it is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous
drugs cases. This defense is weak especially when it is not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence as in this case.8
The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA's ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's findings.
According to the CA, Section 5, paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a
warrantless arrest is legal, valid, and proper. One of these is when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or a private person.
In the present case, the petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of
PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest for jaywalking was
lawful.9
Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner's
body which produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest
allowed under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
30
Procedure.10
The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan11 clearly showed that the petitioner was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession of shabu.12
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
CA.13 Hence, this appeal.
The Petitioner's Position
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is
inadmissible as evidence because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful
arrest and in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The petitioner has not committed, was not committing and was not
attempting to commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact, no report or
criminal charge was filed against him for the alleged jaywalking. 14
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest,
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a
search that is directed only upon dangerous weapons or "anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a warrant." In the present case, the offense, for which the petitioner
was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto, is jaywalking. The alleged
confiscated drug has nothing to do with the offense of jaywalking. 15
Finally, the non-presentation of Tangcoy, who allegedly recovered
the shabu from the petitioner, renders the prosecution's evidence weak and
uncorroborated. Consequently, the sole testimony of Tan cannot sustain the
petitioner's conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Respondent's Position
In his Comment, the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was
conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. 16 He reiterates that the
warrantless frisking and search on the petitioner's body was an incident to a
lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking.17 The non-filing of a criminal charge
of jaywalking against the petitioner does not render his arrest invalid. 18

The respondent also assails the petitioner's defense that the shabu is
inadmissible as evidence. According to the respondent, the petitioner can no
longer question his arrest after voluntarily submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea of not guilty and when
he testified in court.19
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the
search conducted on the petitioner's body.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of these rights shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the exercise of
this power and the implementation of the law should not violate the
constitutional rights of the citizens.20
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful.21 There must be a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must
precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed.22
Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
the only occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a
warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner's
warrantless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante
delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of
the arresting officer.24
31
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless
arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime - shabu - was obtained. For,
without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of
the shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner's body is
surely a violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as
evidence against him.
On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by
the CA in its decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to
establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were
complied with. Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner
was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner
allegedly crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the
street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing." Aside
from this conclusion, the respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas
Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area.
The petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of
evidence that could have supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner
was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the subsequent arrest
and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to
prove this in the present case.
We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition
precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal
charge against an accused, the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to
prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
save the prosecution's lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and
search. This presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional
rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is
the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every
accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt; and the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
rests upon the prosecution.25cralawred
It may not be amiss to point out also the contrary observation of the Court as
regards the findings of the RTC when it held, rather hastily, that in the

process of accosting the petitioner for jaywalking, Tangcoy recovered from
his possession a knife and a small plastic sachet containing shabu26 The
testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision, and the findings of the RTC,
cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to arrest the petitioner
for jaywalking.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint,
nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.27
The pertinent testimony28 of Tan, as quoted by the CA, is as follows:
Q: What happened after you obeyed the order of your immediate superior?
A: At 8:50 in the evening of August 20, 2002, we saw a male person
crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for
crossing.
Q: What did you do when you saw this person crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing?
A: We accosted him.
Q: How did you accost that person?
A: We accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing.
Pero napansin namin siya na parang may kinukuha, so he was
frisked by Ronald Tangcoy and a knife was recovered from his
possession.
Q: After a knife was recovered by your companions (sic) from that person
who allegedly crossed the wrong side of the street, what happened after
that?
A: After recovering the knife, nakaalalay lang ako and he was frisked
again by Tangcoy and a plastic sachet was recovered from his
possession.
32
Q: Did you know the contents of that plastic sachet which your companion
recovered from that person who crossed the wrong side of the street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the contents?
A: Suspected shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: After the drug was recovered from the possession of that man,
what did you do?
A: We brought him to our precinct and informed him of his
constitutional rights and brought him to the Parañaque Community
Hospital and the suspected shabu or methylamphetamine was
brought to the PNP Crime Lab at Fort Bonifacio.
Q: Did you come to know the name of that person whom you arrested in the
morning of August 20, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is his name?
A: Ongcoma Hadji Omar, sir.
Q: Is he the same Ongcoma Hadji Omar y Para, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When
Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest
him but accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact,
according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and
told him to cross [at] the designated area."29
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to
restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact
that there was no criminal charge that was filed against the petitioner for
crossing a "no jaywalking" area.
 33

From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they
allegedly confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed
him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police station.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the
Philippines.30 The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in
that case was inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged
him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court,
due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This
is notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in flagrante
delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.
In the light of the discussion above, the respondent's argument that there
was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking
appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search
conducted on the person of the petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the search
for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately
after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial
search resulted in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan,
Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the petitioner resulting
in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be
secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting
police officers.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In
addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
TAKE NOTE IN THIS CASE:
To determine the admissibility of drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to
ascertain WON the search was lawful. There must be a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which
must precede the search. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and
(2) Such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the
arresting officer.
For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu
resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner’s body is surely a
violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against
him.
The prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
It failed to specifically identify the area where Homar allegedly crossed. Tan
merely stated that Homar "crossed the street of Roxas Blvd, in a place not
designated for crossing." Also, it failed to prove that the portion where he
crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. More so, Homar was not
charged of jaywalking.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction
of the court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 32

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as
evidence precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.

People v. Rolando delos Reyes, G.R. No. 174774, August 31, 2011
The in flagrante arrest done by the arresting officers is not valid. Without the
valid justification of the in flagrante delicto arrest, the search of their person,
and eventual seizure of the shabu are all considered unlawful and is a fruit of a
poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti of the crime charged, the acquittal of
accused- appellants is proper.
Admissibility of Evidence
Requisites:
1. the evidence is relevant
2. the evidence is not excluded by the rules (competent)
1. Admissibility of Evidence vs. Probative value
Admissibility – refers to the question of whether or not the
evidence is to be considered at all; depends on its relevance and
competence
Probative Value – refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue; pertains to its tendency to convince or persuade.
34
2. Admissibility of Evidence vs. Credibility of Evidence
Admissibility – evidence of such a character that the court is
bound to receive Credibility – refers to worthiness of belief
3. Substantive and Procedural Requisites
a. Relevance
 Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non- existence. 
 Relevance is a matter of relationship between the evidence and the
fact in issue. 
 Evidence adduced should be directed to the matter in dispute and any
evidence which has 
neither direct nor indirect relationship to such matters must be set
aside as irrelevant. 
b. Competence
Competent evidence is one that is not excluded by law or rules in a particular
case. o In general, refers to the eligibility of an evidence to be received as such.
o When applied to witness, refers to the qualifications of the witness.
Electronic Evidence is competent and is admissible of it complies with the
rules in admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws.
c. Authentication
 Preliminary step in showing the admissibility of an evidence. 
 The requirement for authentication of evidence discloses the
existence, on the legal system, of 
a legal presumption that is not, however, directly written in statutes
or procedural rules but is 
necessarily implied therein. 
 35

 An evidence presented in court is not presumed authentic. It is or vice versa;

incumbent upon the proponent  ex: evidence of a person’s bad general reputation for
truth, honesty or integrity is objectionable if offered to
prove that he committed the crime charged but it may
of the evidence to prove its authenticity. 
be admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness. 

d. Offer
evidence may also be admissible against one party but not against another.
ex: an extrajudicial statement of a robbery suspect is not admissible against his
 The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule but may be admissible against the
offered.  declarant himself.
 Offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest
its findings of fact and  c. Curative

judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. 
 Allows a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to
answer the opposing party’s previous introduction of inadmissible
Admissibility v Enforceability evidence. 
 A party who first introduces either irrelevant or incompetent
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by evidence into the trial cannot complain of the subsequent admission
the law of these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which of similar evidence from the adverse party relating to the same
excludes the admissibility of a void document. Hence, a void document is subject matter. 
admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to
ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the When to determine the admissibility of evidence? 
document itself.
1. At the time it is offered in court;
1. Three Kinds of Admissibility 2. In case of objective evidence, when it is presented in court for its
viewing or evaluation;
1. Conditional 3. In case of testimonial evidence, at the time the witness is called on the
 The proponent of the evidence may ask the court that witness stand;
the evidence be conditionally admitted in the meantime, 4. In case of documentary evidence; when it is formally offered and
subject to the condition that he is going to establish its before resting of the case.
relevancy and competency at a later time. 
 If the connection is not shown as promised, the court When evidence is inadmissible
may upon motion of the adverse party, strike out from
the record the evidence that was previously
1. Rules of Exclusion under the Constitution
conditionally admitted. 
2. Multiple  Any evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2 (Right against
unreasonable 
 proffered evidence is admissible for two or more
purposes; 
 sometimes, evidence is inadmissible for one purpose but Searches and Seizures) and Sec. 3 (Right to Privacy of
admissible for another  Communication) of Art III 

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 
 No Miranda Rights in Custodial Investigation 
 Right against self-incrimination 
2. Doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
 Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
an unreasonable 
search and seizure on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. It shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 
 If the warrant issued by the judge did not comply with the
requisite of the law, and therefore, void, or when the search
made without warrant is unjustifiable, whether it is found or
discovered afterwards, cannot be used as evidence against
the suspect. The items obtained are the “fruits of a poisoned
tree” 
3. Exclusion under R.A. 4200 “Anti-Wiretapping Act”
“Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.”
Acts punished:
Acts by direct participation:
o To tap any wire or cable; or using any other device or arrangement
o To secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device Acts of possession and use:
o To knowingly posses ay tape record
o To replay the same for any other person o To furnish transcriptions
36
Exceptions to the rule on Anti-Wiretapping
Peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any
of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving:
o Treason
o Espionage
o Provoking war
o Disloyalty in case of war
o Piracy
o Mutiny in the high seas
o Rebellion
o Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
d. Exclusion under R.A. 9372 “Human Security Act”
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of
Communications. -The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping
Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and
the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen
to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic
or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the
use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication,
message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members
of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group
of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications
between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources
and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted,
and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained
therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning,
which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall
absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry,
proceeding, or hearing.
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e. Exclusion under R.A. 10640 “Dangerous Drugs Act”

Chain of Custody Rule – presentation and admission of the seized prohibited

drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter

in question is what the proponent claims to be.
It would include testimony about every link in the chain
Ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identify of the evidence are
removed.

The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article
confiscated from the accused to the evidence that is ultimately presented to the
court for its appreciation.

Failure to strictly comply on the chain of custody of confiscated, seized or

surrendered dangerous drugs, will not an arrest illegal or the items seized from
the accused inadmissible in evidence.

f. Collateral matters

 GR: Evidence in collateral matter is not allowed because it does not

have direct 

relevance to the issue of the case. 

 XPN: May be admitted if it tends in any reasonable degree to establish

the 

probability of the fact in issue. 