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1. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes the hotel for more than 20 years at that time.

Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is

452 SCRA 532 (2005)
very unlikely for her to make a scene in the party
FACTS: she was managing. That would only make her
look bad.
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party
was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21
Garden. The party was being held for a of the Civil Code. Art. 19 was not violated by Lim
prominent Japanese national. The person in as it appears that even Reyes testified in court
charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very
the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during close to him – so close that they could almost
the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only
known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list Reyes shall hear whatever is it that she’s going to
of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who tell Reyes and exclude other guests from
invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained hearing.
that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim
Article 21 is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven
approached Reyes and told the latter, in a
by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes.
discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the
They do not know each other personally. She has
party. Reyes however made a scene and began
no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so
shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to
that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
escort Reyes out of the party.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
damage he incurred upon himself. Under the
Garden for damages. In his version, he said that
“doctrine of volenti non fit injuria”, by coming to
he was invited by another party guest, Dr.
the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the
Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing
risk of being turned away, and thus being
to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-
him in a loud voice to leave the party
inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart
immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr.
herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and
Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart
that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not
the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted
even present any supporting evidence to
out of the party like a common criminal.
support any of his claims. Since he brought injury
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be
Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in held liable for damages.
favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her
“The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-
right and that Reyes deserved to be treated
inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is,
humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the
to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she
as injury, that consent to injury precludes the
should have done it respectfully.
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.”
2. Spouses Custodio et al vs. CA
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version
G.R. No. 116100, Feb. 9, 1996
of Lim more credible. She has been employed by
FACTS: of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
apartment in Interior P. Burgos St., Taguig,
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
Metro Manila. There were tenants occupying the
action, since damages are merely part of the
apartment at the time of purchase. Taking P.
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left
breach or wrong. There is a material distinction
side going to Mabasa’s apartment, the row of
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
houses are as follows: That of Custodio, then of
invasion of a legal right; damage is the hurt, or
Santos, then that of Mabasa. On the right side is
harm which results from the injury; and damages
that of Morato and a septic tank. The first
are the recompense or compensation awarded
passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St.
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
is through these houses. The second passageway
damage without injury in those instances in
goes through the septic tank, with a width of less
which the loss or harm was not the result of a
than 1 meter.
violation of a legal duty. These situations are
Sometime later, one of the apartment’s tenants often called damnum absque injuria. In order
vacated it. Mabasa checked the premises and that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
saw that the Santoses built an adobe fence, injuries of which he complains, he must establish
making the first passageway narrower. Morato that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
also built an adobe fence in such a way that the which the defendant owed to the plaintiff, a
entire passageway was enclosed. Then the concurrence of injury to the plaintiff, and legal
remaining tenants vacated the area. Santos responsibility by the person causing it. The
claimed that she built the fence because of an underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
incident involving her daughter and a passing the premise that an individual was injured in
bicycle. She also mentioned that some drunk contemplation of law. In the case at bar,
tenants would bang their doors and windows. although there was damage, there was no legal
The RTC granted a right of way and damages in injury. Contrary to the claim of private
favor of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA respondents, petitioners could not be said to
modified it, ordering an award of damages to have violated the principle of abuse of right. The
Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way act of petitioners constructing a fence within
and award of damages in the SC. their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
ISSUE: W/N the award of damages is in order? customs or public policy. At the time of the
HELD: NO. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES HAS NO construction of the fence, the lot was not subject
SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL BASIS. The decision of the to any servitudes. The proper exercise of a lawful
CA which awarded damages was based solely on right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which
the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico an action will lie, although the act may result in
Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of damage to another, for no legal right has been
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the invaded.
leased premises by reason of the closure of the 3. Cebu Country Club vs. Elizagaque
passageway. However, the mere fact that the
plaintiffs suffered losses does not give rise to a 542 SCRA 65 (2007)
right to recover damages. To warrant the
FACTS: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI),
recovery of damages, there must be both a right
petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating
as a non-profit and non-stock private CCCI did not reply. Consequently, on December
membership club, having its principal place of 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional
business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a
are members of its Board of Directors. In 1996, complaint for damages against petitioners.
respondent filed with CCCI an application for
ISSUE: Whether in disapproving respondent’s
proprietary membership. The application was
application for proprietary membership with
indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members,
CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for
namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo. As
damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint
the price of a proprietary share was around the
and several?
P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then
president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a HELD: YES. In rejecting respondent’s application
share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, for proprietary membership, we find that
however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. petitioners violated the rules governing human
Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on relations, the basic principles to be observed for
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary the rightful relationship between human beings
Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent. and for the stability of social order. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad
30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action
faith in disapproving respondent’s applications.
on respondent’s application for proprietary
This is contrary to morals, good custom or public
membership was deferred. In another Board
policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages
meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent’s
pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
application was voted upon. As shown by the
the same Code.
records, the Board adopted a secret balloting
known as the “black ball system” of voting It bears stressing that the amendment to Section
wherein each member will drop a ball in the 3(c) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring the
ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to unanimous vote of the directors present at a
the admission of an applicant, while a black ball special or regular meeting was not printed on the
means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as application form respondent filled and
amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon
directors is required. When respondent’s was the original provision of Section 3(c) which
application for proprietary membership was was silent on the required number of votes
voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, needed for admission of an applicant as a
1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. proprietary member.
Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was
disapproved. Petitioners explained that the amendment was
not printed on the application form due to
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf economic reasons. We find this excuse flimsy
of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from
reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, being extremely significant, was introduced way
respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before
letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. respondent filed his application. We cannot
On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf
CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of country club, like the CCCI, whose members are
the Board objected to his application. Again,
all affluent, did not have enough money to cause FACTS: Private respondent Ramon Miranda
the printing of an updated application form. purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
four special cabin tickets. The tickets were for
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping
Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
in the dark wondering why his application was
Manila and going to Bacolod.
disapproved. He was not even informed that a
unanimous vote of the Board members was Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the
required. When he sent a letter for Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine
was an objection to his application, petitioners National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent Shipping and Transport Corporation
did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank.
been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a Several of her passengers perished in the sea
special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were
should have been treated by petitioners with found and brought to shore, but the four
courtesy and civility. At the very least, they members of private respondents’ families were
should have informed him why his application never found.
was disapproved.
Private respondents filed a complaint against the
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
must nonetheless be in accordance with the Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and
proper norm. When the right is exercised Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damages for the death. Petitioner, however,
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed denied that the four relatives of private
for which the wrongdoer must be held respondents actually boarded the vessel as
responsible. shown by the fact that their bodies were never
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the
The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
and competent crew, and that the collision was
modification in the sense that (a) the award of
entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
moral damages is reduced fromP2,000,000.00 to
Tacloban City.
P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary damages
is reduced from P1,000,000.00 toP25,000.00; In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in
and (c) the award of attorney’s fees and litigation failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
expenses is reduced from P500,000.00 required of it in the carriage of passengers, both
andP50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, the trial court and the appellate court relied on
respectively. the findings of this Court in Mecenas v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
4. Cabardo vs. CA
brought for the death of other passengers. In
May 19, 1998 Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of
negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship
captain and crew members in playing mahjong
5. Negros Navigation vs. CA during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the
vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to
November 7, 1997 carry more passengers than it was allowed to
carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only
damages to the full extent. against issues litigated in a previous case. Where
the issue involved was not raised nor presented
Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on
to the court and not passed upon by the court in
the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
the previous case, the decision in the previous
case arose out of the same incident as that
case is not stare decisis of the question presently
involved in Mecenas, the parties are different
and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner
contends that the decision in this case should be The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the award would naturally vary or differ in each case.
record of this case.
6. Picart vs. Smith
ISSUES: 1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v.
37 Phil. 813, March 15, 1918
Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of
petitioner to be grossly negligent in the FACTS: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on
performance of their duties, is binding in this Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando. He pulled his
case; pony over the bridge’s railing on the right instead
of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly
2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas
approaching. His pony was unfortunately
v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.
frightened when the automobile passed so close
HELD: 1. No. The contention is without merit. to them. The horse was struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in
thrown off with some violence. As a result of its
jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
injuries the horse died. Picart received
questions relating to the same event have been
contusions which caused temporary
put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
unconsciousness and required medical attention
previous case litigated and decided by a
for several days. Picart seeks to render the sum
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
of Php31,000 as damages. CFI- La Union
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
absolved Smith.
2. No, it is not applicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear
Petitioner contends that, assuming that the chance is correctly applied?
Mecenas case applies, private respondents
HELD: Yes. The last clear chance was passed
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each
unto the defendant driving the automobile. It
as moral damages because in the Mecenascase,
was his duty to bring the car to an immediate
the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the
stop or upon seeing no other persons were on
seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is
the bridge to take the other side and pass far
where the principle of stare decisis does not
away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of
apply in view of differences in the personal
doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was
circumstances of the victims. For that matter,
almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the
differentiation would be justified even if private
horse and rider to this danger he was negligent
respondents had joined the private respondents
in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances,
in the Mecenas case.
the law is that the person who has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to 8. PLDT vs. CA
do is chargeable with the consequences, without
178 SCRA 94
reference to the prior negligence of the other
party. The existence of negligence in a given FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a
case is not determined by reference to the mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
personal judgment of the actor in the situation excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
before him. The law considers what would be installation of its underground conduit system.
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that
of ordinary intelligence and prudence and Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
determines liability by that. which was left uncovered because of the
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning
7. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving permanent scar on her cheek, while the
while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided respondent husband suffered cut lips. The
with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company windshield of the jeep was also shattered.
(MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the
in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the
contention that the injuries sustained by
Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious
Spouses Esteban were the result of their own
burns at the hospital the next day, while the
negligence and that the entity which should be
soldier sustained serious physical injuries and
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and
Company, an independent contractor which
In the decision appealed from, the lower court, undertook the said construction work. The trial
after summarizing the evidence, concluded that court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas
the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to the CA reversed the ruling.
speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk
ISSUE: Whether or not the Estebans can claim
and attempted to reach the other side, but
damages from PLDT.
unfortunately he became the victim of his own
miscalculation. Plaintiff´s husband was injured HELD: NO. A person claiming damages for the
and died as a result of such injuries. Plaintiff negligence of another has the burden of proving
brought an action for damages for the death of the existence of such fault or negligence
her husband. causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
competent evidence.
HELD: Complaint Dismissed. ¨ A person in
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
control of an automobile who crosses a railroad,
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the
even at a regular road crossing, and who does
negligent omission on the part of petitioner
not exercise that precaution and that control
PLDT. The jeep was running along the inside lane
over it as to be able to stop the same almost
of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside
immediately upon the apperance of a train, is
lane, it would not have hit the accident mound.
guilty of crominal negligence, providing a
That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before
collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident
it swerved to hit the accident mound could have
was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s
been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson
husband and she was not allowed to recover.
Street to the south of the accident mound. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal
Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers because he noticed a blinking light while looking
an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that at the speedometer.
speed, he could have stepped on the brakes the
Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for
moment it struck the accident mound.
the payment of the damages he incurred
The above findings clearly show that the because of the accident but he did not receive
negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.
but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial
the accident, as one of its determining factors,
Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of
and thereby precludes their right to recover
defendant and ordered LADECO and Deocampo
to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court
9. Lapanday Agri and Dev’t Corp. vs. Angala found that Berenguel was not liable because he
was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and
525 SCRA 229 (2007)
Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but
FACTS: On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a the same was denied on June 13, 1995.
Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was
Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of
driven by Apolonio Deocampo bumped into a
Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed
1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475
in toto the trial court’s decision. Petitioners filed
owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven
a motion for reconsideration. In its March 11,
by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural
2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the
the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present
crewcab which was assigned to its manager
petition was filed before the Supreme Court.
Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and
bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear
running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao chance applies in the case at bar.
City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.
HELD: Yes. Since both parties are at fault in this
The left door, front left fender, and part of the
case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that
Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-
where both parties are negligent but the
Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that
LADECO, its administrative officer Henry
of the other, or where it is impossible to
Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged
determine whose fault or negligence caused the
that his pick-up was slowing down to about five
loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity
to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making
to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable
a left turn preparatory to turning south when it
with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last
was bumped from behind by the crewcab which
clear chance to avoid the collision. Since
was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab
Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had
stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
full control of the situation since he was in a
Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching
position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
sound before the impact. Respondent was
Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding
seated beside the driver and was looking at the
bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is
speedometer when the accident took place.
done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding ISSUE: What does the Doctrine of Last Clear
and overturning, compared to running straight Chance enunciate?
ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the
HELD: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated
vehicle if he was not driving very fast while
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff
following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step
of the defendant where it appears that the
on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
prudence, might have avoided injurious
10. Allied Banking Corp. vs. BPI consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding
the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine
G.R. No. 188363, February 27, 2013
necessarily assumes negligence on the part of
FACTS: On October 10, 2002, a check in the the defendant and contributory negligence on
amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply
Mgt. Group International" (MMGI) was except upon that assumption. Stated differently,
presented for deposit and accepted at the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does
petitioner's (Allied Bank) Kawit Branch. The not preclude him from recovering damages
check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn caused by the supervening negligence of the
against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) defendant, who had the last fair chance to
with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch. Upon prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the
respondent through the Philippine Clearing doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s
House Corporation (PCHC). The check was failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the
cleared by respondent and petitioner credited last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which
the account of MMGI with P1,000,000.00. On was the proximate cause of the occurrence of
October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed such loss or injury.
and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A
ISSUE: Does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
month later, Silva discovered the debit of
apply in this case?
P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to
Silva’s complaint, respondent credited his HELD: YES. In this case, the evidence clearly
account with the aforesaid sum. Petitioner filed shows that the proximate cause of the
a complaint before the Arbitration Committee, unwarranted encashment of the subject check
asserting that respondent should solely bear the was the negligence of respondent who cleared a
entire face value of the check due to its post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC
negligence in failing to return the check to clearing facility without observing its
petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary
own verification procedure. As correctly found
period as provided in Section 20.1of the Clearing
by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only
House Rules and Regulations (CHRR) 2000. In its
respondent exercised ordinary care in the
Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged
clearing process, it could have easily noticed the
petitioner with gross negligence for accepting
glaring defect upon seeing the date written on
the post-dated check in the first place. It
the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent
contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence
could have then promptly returned the check
was the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner
would have not credited the amount thereof to
the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola.
antecedent negligence of the petitioner in CA Reversed, hence this petition for review.
accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it
ISSUE: W/N Tano’s alleged negligence was the
can seek reimbursement from respondent the
proximate cause of the accident?
amount credited to the payee’s account covering
the check. HELD: YES, Tano’s negligence is the proximate
cause of the accident.
11. LBC Air Cargo vs. CA
From every indication, the proximate cause of
241 SCRA 270
the accident was the negligence of Tano who,
FACTS: At about 11:30 in the morning of 15 despite extremely poor visibility4, hastily
November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport
driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki road entrance) without first waiting for the dust
motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which
along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the
Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the path of the motorcycle coming from the
LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant opposite direction, that almost instantaneously
Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence
direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On required him not to attempt to cross the other
board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager lane until after it would have been safe from and
of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated clear of any oncoming vehicle.
beside Tano.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last
When Tano (driver) was approaching the vicinity clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw "supervening negligence" or as "discovered
two vehicles racing against each other from the peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect
opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and that where both parties are negligent, but the
waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settle, determine whose fault or negligence should be
Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards attributed to the incident, the one who had the
the airport road. When he was about to reach last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
the center of the right lane, the motorcycle harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37
dust and smashed head-on against the right side Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule would also
of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe mean that an antecedent negligence of a person
injuries he sustained. A criminal case for does not preclude the recovery of damages for
"homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against Tano. A civil suit was likewise instituted against the liability sought by, another if the
by the heirs of deceased Monterola against latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo avoided the impending harm by the exercise of
Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs.
two cases were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and
Court. RTC dismissed both cases on the ground Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173
that the proximate cause of the "accident" was SCRA 464).
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and
along the lane where he was rightly supposed to encroaching on the west lane of the road. To
be. The incident occurred in an instant. No avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger
appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of
Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to
that could have afforded the victim a last clear move toward the western lane and bumped the
opportunity to avoid the collision. left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners
alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was
It is true however, that the deceased was not all
careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle,
that free from negligence in evidently speeding
which he very well knew had a mechanical
too closely behind the vehicle he was following.
defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of
We, therefore, agree with the appellate court
action against the petitioners.
that there indeed was contributory negligence
on the victim's part that could warrant a ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable to
mitigation of petitioners liability for damages. respondents for damages incurred as a result of
the vehicular accident.
12. Achevara vs. Ramos
HELD: Petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos
601 SCRA 270
own negligence in knowingly driving a
FACTS: Respondents alleged that in the morning mechanically defective vehicle was the
of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a immediate and proximate cause of his death,
passenger jeep heading north on the national and that doctrine of last clear chance does not
highway in Brgy. Tablac Candon, Ilocos Sur in a apply to this case. Foreseeability is the
reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent,
tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the a defendant must have acted or failed to act in
passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by would have realized that certain interests of
Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo certain persons were unreasonably subjected to
Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding a general but definite class of risks.
prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling
that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due
and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled
diligence in the selection and supervision of
on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno
Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.
Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if
Respondents sought to recover actual damages
he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he
for medical expenses in the sum of P33,513 and
failed to take precaution by immediately veering
funeral expenses in the sum of P30,000, as well
to the rightmost portion of the road or by
as moral damages and exemplary damages, lost
stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder
earnings, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass
In their Answer, - petitioners denied before proceeding southward; hence, the
respondents allegation that Benigno Valdez collision occurred. The CA correctly held that
overtook a motorcycle and bumped the vehicle Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable
driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on negligence by neglecting to take such
April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving precaution, which a reasonable and prudent
southward at a moderate speed when he saw an man would ordinarily have done under the
owner-type jeep coming from the south and
circumstances and which proximately caused considering that the time the owner-type jeep
injury to another. encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of
impact was only a matter of seconds, he no
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo
longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly
Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not
driving a defective jeep on the highway. An
apply to this case.
ordinarily prudent man would know that he
would be putting himself and other vehicle he In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to
would encounter on the road at risk for driving a exercise reasonable care and caution that an
mechanically defective vehicle. Under the ordinarily prudent man would have taken to
circumstances, a prudent man would have had prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross
the owner-type jeep repaired or would have negligence of Ramos and the inexcusable
stopped using it until it was repaired. Ramos negligence of Valdez were the proximate cause
was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot
drive on the highway the mechanically defective recover damages pursuant to Art. 2179 of the
jeep, which later encroached on the opposite Civil Code.
lane and bumped the passenger jeep driven by
Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence
of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless
disregard of safety of persons or property. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and

Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when
Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on
the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical
defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to
the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the
wiggling vehicle of Ramos.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply

to this case, because even if it can be said that it
was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to
avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the western lane of the
passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of
petitioners stated that when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger
jeep, Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the
western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision,
but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos
continued to move to the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus,
petitioners assert in their petition that